Inter-War, Inter-Service Friction on the North-West Frontier of India and Its Impact on the Development and Application of Royal Air Force Doctrine
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Inter-War, Inter-Service Friction on the North-West Frontier of India and its Impact on the Development and Application of Royal Air Force Doctrine By Andrew John Charles Walters A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts and Law University of Birmingham June 2017 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract ABSTRACT India’s North-West Frontier was the one area where the British Raj could suffer a knockout blow from either external Russian invasion or internal revolt. Frontier defence was amongst the greatest burdens during India’s inter-War financial austerity. Despite the RAF’s operational and financial efficacy in 1920s Iraq, air control was never implemented on the Frontier and air power’s potential was never fully exploited. Instead, aircraft were employed to enhance the Army’s traditional battlefield capabilities, resulting in efficient tactical co-ordination during the 1930s Waziristan campaign - the RAF’s most operationally-active pre-War theatre. To address why air power was constrained on the Frontier, this Thesis examines the inter-War relationship between the Armies in India and the RAF and its impact on the development and application of RAF doctrine. It concludes that the conservatively-natured Indian Armies were slow to recognise the conceptual shift required to fully exploit air power. This entrenchment was reinforced by inter-Service rivalry and the threat of aircraft replacing land forces with a concomitant loss of political standing. The enduring high-level internecine conflict resulted in the squandering of both resources and the opportunity to test independent, ‘strategic’ air power theory prior to the Second World War. Its legacy impacted on Army-RAF relations into the War. ii Dedication DEDICATION To my wife and children, for their forbearance iii Acknowledgements ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am indebted to many people for their support during the research for this Thesis. My thanks go to my inspirational, erstwhile navigator, Air Chief Marshal Sir Stu Peach, for sparking my interest in air power. I am extremely grateful for the Portal Fellowship granted by the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, and am beholden for the support of the RAF Directors of Defence Studies and their staff over the last few years, particularly Air Commodore Neville Parton and Ms Jane Curtis. I would like to thank the staffs of the various archives I was allowed access to, including the India Office Records in the British Library and The National Archives, particularly Harriet Pilcher in the Records Copying Department. I am grateful for the prompt help of the Librarians at the Royal United Services Institute, Laura Dimmock and Tony Pilmer, Justin Saddington at the National Army Museum, Lynn Gamma at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Seb Cox and his staff at the RAF Air Historical Branch, Peter Elliott and the staff of the RAF Museum’s Department of Research and Information Services, John Hodgson at the John Rylands Library, and the staff of Christ Church Library, including their photographer, Alina Nachescu and their talented archivist, Elizabeth Piper. I would like to extend my deepest appreciation to two custodians in particular. Mr Chris Hobson, formerly the Head of Library Services at the UK Defence Academy, has been unfailingly responsive and helpful with my long list of requests. Similarly, I have benefitted from the extraordinary knowledge and goodwill of Squadron Leader (Retd) Rana Chhina, the Secretary of the United Service Institution of India’s Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research, who has provided me with records that would otherwise have been beyond my grasp. No research would have been possible without the endless enthusiasm of these professionals. I would like to acknowledge the friendship, support and advice of my colleagues, particularly Dr David Jordan, Dr Gary Sheffield, Dr Chris Tripodi, Dr Tim Moreman, Dr Robert Owen, Clive Richards, Wing Commander (Retd) ‘Jeff’ Jefford and Brigadier Andrew Roe. My greatest thanks go to my supervisor, Dr Peter Gray, and my family. They have all shown the utmost patience and have been the most vital elements of my studies. iv Contents CONTENTS Abstract ii Dedication iii Acknowledgements iv Contents v List of Figures xi List of Abbreviations xii Glossary xiv Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Introduction 1 Literature Review 3 Research Questions 13 Methodology and Structure 15 Sources 18 Chapter 2 Political and Cultural Context 31 Introduction 31 The Importance of India 31 British Grand Strategy 32 NWF Administrative History 35 Topography 41 Cultural Aspects 41 Cross-Cultural Communication 48 British NWF Policy 53 The Close Border Policy – 1838 to 1879 55 The Forward Policy – 1879 to 1901 57 1897 Uprisings 58 The Modified Close Border Policy – 1899 to 1919 59 Modified Forward Policy – 1923-47 61 Anglo-Afghan Relations 68 The Causes of Violence 69 v Contents Chapter 3 RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1918-1922 74 Introduction 74 The Nature of Doctrine 75 Air Power Doctrine 80 Early RAF Doctrine 82 CD22 – Operations Manual 90 RAF Staff College 99 Conclusion 103 Chapter 4 RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1922-28 105 Introduction 105 Minor Doctrinal Publications 105 AP1300 - RAF War Manual, 1928 137 Conclusion 147 Chapter 5 RAF Tactics and Doctrine, 1928-39 150 Introduction 150 Minor Doctrinal Publications 150 Combined Frontier Manual 203 Conclusion 210 Chapter 6 A Brief History of the RAF on the NWF 212 Introduction 212 Early Indian Aviation 213 First World War 214 Post-FWW Aviation 216 Third Afghan War 218 Waziristan, 1919-1920 220 Budgetary Issues 221 1922 Salmond Review 223 1922-1924 226 Pink’s War, 1925 227 Mohmand Disturbance, 1927 234 Comparison of Pink’s War and Mohmand Disturbance 235 Kabul Airlift, 1928/29 236 Trenchard’s 1929 ‘Swansong’ 238 1929 Red Shirt-Inspired Incursions 240 Chitral Relief, 1932 247 vi Contents Upper Mohmands Operation, 1933 249 Bajaur Operations, 1933 251 Loe Agra Campaign, 1935 252 Mohmand Campaign, 1935 253 Improving In-Theatre Relations, 1935 256 Waziristan 1936-1939 – The Fakir of Ipi 259 Pre-War Modernisation in Financial Austerity 279 Looming War 292 Conclusion 293 Chapter 7 ‘Control and Constraints’ - Challenges to the Application of Air Power 298 Introduction 298 The Control of Air Power 299 Army vs RAF Decision-Making Speed 303 Inter-Service Hierarchy, Trust and Resentment 304 Army Reluctance to Publicise RAF Exploits 314 Personalities and Relationships 315 Moral Objections to the Use of Air Power 329 Tribal Resentment 335 Public Pressure 337 Diplomatic Pressures 339 Gestation of the Combined Frontier Manual 342 Chapter 8 Implications and Conclusions 351 Implications 351 NWF Influence on Strategic Bombing Policy 351 British Expeditionary Force, 1940 382 Conclusions 383 Annex 1 Definitions 399 Air Blockade 399 Air Control 400 Air Policing 400 Air Substitution 401 Guerrilla Warfare 401 Imperial Policing 401 Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency 402 vii Contents Insurrection, Rebellion and Uprisings 403 Irregular Warfare 403 Proscriptive Air Action 404 Small Wars 405 Subversion 406 Terrorism 407 Annex 2 Weapon Expenditure of Various NWF Operations, Waziristan, 1932-1939 409 Chitral Relief, 1932 - Destructive Phase 409 Chitral Relief, 1932 - Harassment Phase 409 Second Khaisora Operation - December 1936 410 Punitive Destruction of Arsal Kot - 1936/37 410 Wana Column Support - February 1937 411 Third Khaisora Operation - April 1937 411 Punitive Bombing of Bhitanni Villages - June 1937 412 Punitive Bombing of Razin - July 1937 412 Army Co-operation by 3(Indian) Wing - September 1937 413 Madda Khel Punitive Bombing - March 1938 413 Dargai Sar Emergency Air Support - April 1938 414 Madda Khel Punitive Air Proscription - May 1938 414 Punitive Action against Madda Khel Villages - August 1938 415 Punitive Destruction of Tamora - January 1939 415 Punitive Air Proscription of Karesta Algad - January to June 1939 416 Madda Khel Air Blockade - February to April 1939 417 Tori Khel Punitive Air Proscription - October 38 to May 39 417 Razmak Road Proscription - July 1939 418 Proscription of Fakir of Ipi at Kharre - August 1939 418 Proscription of Fakir of Ipi at Kharre - September 1939 419 Annex 3 Transcript from ‘Birds of Prey’ TV Documentary - NWF Excerpts 420 Annex 4 RAF Staff College Pre-Course Reading List, 1933 422 Annex 5 RAF Staff College Small Wars Syllabus, 1922-1938 423 Annex 6 Classification of Targets - AP1300 430 viii Contents Annex 7 Key Personality Biographies 431 Bottomley, Air Chief Marshal Sir Norman 431 Burt-Andrews, Air Commodore C B E 432 Capel, Air Vice-Marshal A J 433 Chamier, Air Commodore Sir John 434 Champion de Crespigny, Air Vice-Marshal Hugh 435 Darvall, Air Marshal Sir Lawrence ‘Johnny’ 436 Ellington, Marshal of the RAF Sir Edward 437 Embry, Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil 438 Game, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip 439 Harris, Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur 440 Joubert de la Ferte,