This dissertation has been 64—9587 microfilmed exactly as received

RIFE, Jr., John Merle, 1925— THE POLITICAL CAREER OF LOUIS BARTHOU, 1 8 8 9 -1 9 1 3 .

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1964 History, modern

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan rHE POLITICAL CAREER OF LOUIS BARTHOU

1889-1913

DISSERTATION

Presented In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

John Merle Rife, Jr*, B.A., M.A.

********

The Ohio State University 196^

Approved by

A d v ise r Departmentf of History VITA

April 5. 1925 Born - Bloomington, Indiana

1950 .... B. A., Muskingum Gollege, New Concord, Ohio

1952 .... M, A., Hie Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

Summer 1952 . I n s t r u c t o r , Muskingum C o lleg e, New Concord, Ohio f 1955*1953 . . Graduate Assistant, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1957*1953 • . Research Assistant, Graduate School, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1953-193^ . . Associate Professor, Indiana State College, Indiana, Pennsylvania

FIELDS OF STUDT

Major Field: Modern European History

Twentieth Century Europe. Professors Walter L. Dorn and Sydney N. F is h e r

Nineteenth Century Europe. Professor Lowell J. Ragatz

The Enlightenment. Professor James E. Gillespie

American Diplomatic History. Professor Lawrence F« Hill

Recent American History. Professors Foster Rhea Dulles and Robert H« Bremner

International Relations and Politics. Professor E. Allen Helms

i i CONTENTS

Page VITA...... i i

C h ap ter I . INTRODUCTION ...... 1

I I . THE CONSERVATIVE D E P U T T ...... 8

L a b o r ...... 16 Constitutional and Legal Reform ...... 23 T a r i f f ...... 2? S e p a r a t i o n ...... 32 Colonialism and Foreign Policy ...... 35 P a n a m a ...... 36 Politics and Progress ...... **2

I I I . THE CONSERVATIVE M IN IS T E R ...... 48

1 8 9 4 ...... 49 Minister of Public W orks ...... 54 1895-1896 62 Minister of Interior ...... 70 Politics, Reform, and the Sixth L egislature ...... 75 Constitutional Reform ...... 84 Colonialism and Foreign Policy ...... 85 The A f f a i r ...... 86 The Emerging P o litic ia n ...... 94

IV. THE ANTI-CLERICALIST DEPUTT ...... 97

The End of the Affair and the Appearance of the Bloc . . 97 Religion and the Seventh L egislature ...... 106 Labor and the Seventh L egislature ...... 112 Colonialism and Foreign Policy * ...... 114 Election Law D iscussions ...... 117 Party Politics and the 1902 E lection ...... 118 S e p a r a t i o n ...... 123 The Two-year Law ...... 139 Labor and the Eighth L egislature ...... 142 Colonialism and Foreign Policy in the Eighth Legislature ...... 151 The End of the H io c ...... 154 The Party Leader ...... 159

i i i CONTENTS (co n td .)

Chapter Page V. THE ANTI-SOCIALIST M IN ISTER ...... l 6 l

Politics in 1906 ...... 161 S e p a r a t io n ...... 164 Labor and the Ninth L egislature ...... 166 Nationalisation of the Cheinin de Fer de l*Ouest .... 177 Income Tax and the Ninth L egislature ...... 162 Foreign Affairs and the Ninth Legislature ...... 163 Nationalism and Party Policies in the Ninth Legislature ...... 184 The E le c tio n o f 1 9 1 0 ...... 189 Labor and the Tenth L egislature ...... 190 Foreign Affairs under the Tenth Legislature ...... 198 Education and Politics ...... 201 Election Law Discussion ...... 203 T a x e s ...... 206 The Party Leader Trium phs ...... 207

V I. LE PRESIDENT DU C O N SE IL ...... 209

V II. THE BARTHOU-CAILLAUX PU Z Z L E ...... 233

V I I I . LOUIS BARTHOU: POLITICIAN ...... 243

APPENDIXES...... 247

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 251

iv CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the many works attempting to analyze the politics of the

Third Republic there runs a persistent theme of uncertainty and

instability, along with the numerous partial answers to why the

instability existed. The Third Republic's 109 cabinets in ?0 years gave

French m inisters an average cabinet-term expectancy of seven months and

three weeks, and stand as quantitative evidence that there was an unusual

amount of conflict and uncertainty in French political affairs. It

caused Will Rogers to write from Paris in 1926 for his newspaper column:

I arrived in Paris late at night. The next day we had Briand Premier for breakfast; Herriot Premier for lunch; Poincare for dinner; and woke up the next morning and Briand is back in again. This is not a government; it is an old-fashioned Movie, where they flash on the screen, "Two minutes, please, while we change p re m ie r s

The Third Republic was the child of French internal political

crises as well as of the defeat by Germany. The Second Etapire fell with

its Emperor a prisoner of war, and a National Assembly attempted to take

over the work begun by a provisional republican regime. Crises continued,

As twice before following revolutions, the republicans found less and

less support among the workers and fell more and more under the influence

1 Will Rogers, Sanity Is Where You Find I t . edited by Donald Day (Cambridge, 1955). p. 71. of the bourgeoisie, with a twilight shadow of the monarchists lengthening across it. But while the monarchists argued, the Orleanists joined the republicans long enough to write and finally to adopt a constitution in

1875. The Seize Mai crisis in I 877 then determined by precedent that the

President of the Council of Ministers, and not the President of the

Republic, would be the real executive; and in the ensuing election republicans managed to keep their majority, critical proof that the royalist, Catholic MacMahon could not dismiss a premier, much less a

Chamber, simply because they were republican, even when he had the consent of the Senate, From then on, cabinets were responsible to the Chamber and Senate, coming and going at the disposition of the parliament. After the 1379 senatorial elections gave republicans control of the upper house as well, MacMahon resigned recognizing that France was republican. The joint houses elected a republican president, Jules Grevy, and in 1880 the government felt safe enough to move from Versailles back into Paris.

With monarchy out of the question now, the next constitutional threat came from Boulanger, who for a while it seemed would be able to accumulate enough clericalist and socialist support to attempt a coup dTetat. and thus a man on horseback might carry off the Third Republic, too. Running in several ty*"°Iections he was elected to the Chamber from the Dordogne and the Nord in 1888 and from Paris in 1889. His failure to seize the moment denied France the answer to the question of whether or not he could have succeeded. But after 1889 France appeared safe from any restoration, either royalist or Bonapartist.

Its constitutional problems resolved, the Third Republic had to run the gauntlet of other crises—both political and moral. Each in the 3 long series of these events and scandals upset a cabinet if not a political clique; some threatened the very fabric of republican govern­ ment. So numerous were these that they read almost as chapter titles in a survey of the Third Republic: Wilson, Panama, Dreyfus, Fashoda, laic education, separation, Morocco, Rochette, and Calmette. Interspersed among these were the more permanent problems stemming from economic and social evolution, although the industrial revolution progressed more slowly in France than in Great Britain, Germany, and the United States.

Urbanization and industrialization by and large gave rise to socialism and labor organization, with consequent campaigns for economic and social reform legislation.

With a cabinet and premier responsible to parliament, and without the leveling influence of a two-party system, most of the cabinets were in a precarious position typical to coalitions. But in spite of this flammable nature of French politics, there was more stability in the structure than was usually evident from day to day. Probably as early a s 1 8 7 9* and surely by 1 8 8 9, the governments were under the control of middle class republicans, whose opposition consisted of camps left and right; for the right, the appearance of the Republic had been a disaster; for the left, the revolution resulting in the Republic had not gone far enough. This third force of center republicans, however, managed quite well the task of warding off attacks from both the right and left. When they thought it necessary they sought support from either side to stop presumed threats from the other. Consequently the right and left frequently found themselves voting together in order to overthrow republican cabinets. And everyone—even socialists at times—evidenced a 5 enabled the family to cope with ordinary living expensest but little more.*4” Louis completed grammar school at the P etit Seminaire d* d o r on and, at the age of thirteen, entered the Ivcee at Pau, now called the

Lycee Barthou in honor of its illustrious alumnus. One of his professors in the third form there was M, Artand, brother-in-law of Charles Dupuy, which helps explain Bar thou* s first cabinet appointment in 189^-» At the lycfee he received first prize in classic recitation, second prize in

Latin and music, and third in French,

As a youth who had already shown exceptional promise, he entered the University of Bordeaux, He was substantially aided in his studies by a photographic memory, and found university life much to his liking. His roommate described Louis 1 usual daily activities at Bordeaux. He would

spend the mornings playing the violin and studying; then the two would attend lectures, eat dinner, go to a cafe for coffee and then back to the room for more study, Barthou made a hobby of reading about the French

Revolution while majoring in law and political economy. The university gave scholarships amounting to free expenses to its best student in each

class, and the young man from Oloron thus paid his own fees for his first year only. In addition, he won prizes in 1881 and 1882 as Droit Civil

Droit Romain. and in 1883 as Droit Civil and Droit Commercial.^ After

Bordeaux, he attended the University of Paris, successfully defending his doctoral thesis in law in 1886.

Sew York Times. 10 October, 193^.

^Jules Bertaut, Louis Barthou (Paris, 1919). P« 7 k

noticeable indifference to needed reforms. Political groups often fought

each other first, and agreed on mild social and economic changes later.

In the pre-World War I era, this group of center republicans

actually controlled the cabinets of France which made up the "Republic of

comrades," as Robert de Jouvenel expressed it, and formed the "bourgeois

dynasties," which is the term &ianuel Beau de Lom 6 nie used to describe r the families whose names appeared in the parliamentary lists for two and 2 three generations.

Regardless of which term is more accurate to describe these center

republicans, any effort to understand the Third Republic must include an

analysis of the men who made up its cabinets and led this third force. In

1889, 87 coincidence the same year that Boulangism disappeared and the

Republic seemed safe for republicans, there arrived in Paris a young lawyer from the old Vice-Duchy of Bearn in the very southwest corner of

France--Deputy Louis Barthou.

Jean Louis Barthou was born at Oloron-Sainte-Marie in the Depart­ ment of the Basses-Pyrenees, on August 23, 1862. His grandfather had been a blacksmith, and his father was a bookkeeper for the Midi R a i l r o a d . ^

When his father returned to Gloron from the Crimean War, he combined the

Family enterprises and resources and opened an ironmongery. The business

Robert de Jouvenel, La RfoubliQue fjnuiraH.. (Paris, 1913), and Emanuel Beau de Lomenie, Les R^sponsibilitfis des Dynasties Bourgeoises (Paris, 1932), Vol. II* Both titles suggest the theses. 3 Unless otherwise indicated, biographical information comes from Octave Aubert, Louis Barthou (Paris, 1935)» PP« 1-38. Aubert in 1892 became editor of LTIndependent des Basses-Pvrfoies. the newspaper which Barthou edited for three years. See also Appendix I. 6

Louis became much intrigued with the Bohemian life on the left

bank. A lthough many of h is frie n d s among th e upper b o u rg eo isie accumu­

lated solid investments, his own interests were literature and politics.

He was not a property owner in either the Basses-Pyrenees or in Paris,

and when he went back to Paris as a young deputy at the age of twenty-

seven, he moved into an apartment at 17 Boulevard Saint-Michel.

Barthou was a small man with quick mannerisms and actions, with

proportions that would have looked stout on a taller man, and was always

extremely neat in appearance—in fact dapper. As early as his days at

the lvcee he developed a deftness in public speaking. He took naturally

to debating and arguing, frequently calling on his phenomenal memory to

relate details of laws and statistics which shattered later Chamber

opponents.

The first qualification which brought this young deputy to the

attention of the Chamber was the ease with which he spoke and the effec­

tive manner in which he handled his opponents in parliamentary debates.

The government republicans were to use him as a star speaker long before

his prominence and seniority warranted his elevation to a key position with any political group. This success at the rostrum was to make him

useful in the cabinet, too, where he could help defend government policy.

It was not until the end of the century that he began to emerge

as one of the republican leaders, using his influence to unify the

center splinter groups into one republican party. With separation of

church and state as a focal point, he actively sought cooperation of the republicans with the groups to the left of them. But when the spectre of the ralliem ent had faded and separation had materialized, he was equally vigorous after 1906 in leading his party away from the left, his chief concern then having become the united and growing socialist force. The controversies that ended the cooperation between the republicans and socialists were rearmament and the Russian alliance. CHAPTER I I

THE CONSERVATIVE DEPUTY

Louis Barthou*s public career began as soon as he returned home with his doctorate from the University of Paris in 1886, He began law practice at Pau and immediately became editor-in-chief of L*Ind^pendant des Basses-Pyrenees. As an editor he supported causes that were tradi­

tionally republican and entered at once into a newspaper debate with the local royalist paper, Memorial. ^ Occasionally during this period his letters also appeared in the Paris papers, Le Soir and Le Matin. He remained head of the newspaper until he departed for Paris as a Deputy i n 1889.

It was a problem as large as Bculangism which gave Barthou his

opportunity to enter politics on the national level. In his editorials he opposed Boulangism and thus disapproved of demenceau*s attack against

Ferry*s campaign for president.^ But he might have remained several more years in Pau as an editor and lawyer had not the scrutin de liste

been abolished in France in an effort to head off Boulanger or any such

subsequent opportunist. When France returned to the scrutin d*arrondisse- ment, there was no strong republican to run for the 1889 Chamber of

Deputies election in the nearby arrondissement of Oloron-Est, the district

Aubert, Barthou. 37.

2I b i d . , U6 - 5 0 .

8 9 in which Barthou was born and raised. And although he never claimed

Oloron as his voting r e s i d e n c e , ^ the Republican Congress at Oloron announced on July 12 that Louis Barthou of Pau had been chosen by a vote o f 101 to 3^ as their candidate for Oloron-Est.^

Barthou fs vigorous campaign in the summer and fall was faith­ fully recorded by the Oloron newspaper, Le Glaneur dfOloron. and by his

own L!Independant des Basses-Pvrenees. Both papers were anti-Boulangist, anti-clericalist, anti-royalist, anti-socialist, and pro-republican; Lfi.

Glaneur. for instance, had earlier applauded the dissolution of the

League of Patriots.'* Neither paper could have found a better candidate

to fit its editorial policies.

At the same July 12 Republican Congress, Barthou launched his

campaign with the statement of a five-point platform. The first issue— the completion of the government-approved international railroad vis Jaca and Canfranc to Spain--was for local political consumption; the other

four were statements supporting republicanism:

1. I am a republican. I have never swerved in ny affirma­ tion of republican convictions. 2 . Continuance of the republican peace which has not hindered the liberty of citizens nor the honor and inde­ pendence of France by her constitution. 3. Support of the existing government—especially the Senatorial fight against Boulangism. 4. Constitutional revision—but not while such revision can discredit the republic to the advantage of the diehard instigators of monarchical restoration, the pretense used

3 Ibid.. 13^35* First he voted at Pau, and later at nearby Meillon where his sister owned a house and where he spent most of his v a c a tio n s . 4 Le Glaneur d 1Oloron. 13 July, 1889. Hereafter cited as Le Glaneur. with date.

5Ibid. . 9 March, 1889. 10

for dictatorship. Progressive reform policies should be instigated [by constitutional revision] assuring security for the future, admitting free discussion, and emanating directly and incontestably from our sovereign wishes. With the same frankness, Messieurs, I declare to you that if the separation of Church and state appears to me as a necessary part of the principles posed by the French Revolution and as a later development of liberty of con­ science, I am nevertheless hostile to the immediate realization of anything close to this reform. . . . I do not wish a y>ld venture which could foolishly threaten the Republic itself. I am partisan to observing sincere reciprocity regarding the obligations resulting from the concordat. I would vote to maintain the religious budget. 5 . There should be economies of reform as well as economies of control, simpler administrative services, vigilance in the use of public money. Reduction of taxes is not suffi­ cient; it should be accompanied by a more equitable dis­ tribution of the tax burden. Tariffs should be revised, taxes on patents reduced; in agriculture the survey should be revised on land registry, and a reform on land tax, organization of agri­ cultural credit, and agricultural schools. If agriculture becomes the object of a great study, so should the problems of the working class be studied.

He concluded, as he had begun, with a rousing appeal for a dedication to republican ideals:

Against partisans of the old monarchy, against the allies of a new party whose scandalous maneuvers afflict us so unneces­ sarily, but whose triumph would mean not only the end of liberty but also the end of the country itself, against the deceitful equivocators and hypocricies 0f candidates pretending conservatism, it is necessary for all of us to unite, to make a valiant campaign. . .

During the summer he continued to campaign against "the enemies of the Republic" and received a great amount of criticism from local reactionaries. One of his infrequent statements on foreign affairs was published in Le Glaneur on August 17, 1889, by which he sought to answer the conservative criticism of French policy.

6Le Glaneur. 20 July, 1889. 11

The incidents with Germany over Schnaebele and the French consulate at Alexandria have been handled favorably . . . each time we received satisfaction and saved the national honor. . . . France has colonies in Asia-Indo-China and Tonkin; her influence is preponderant at the court of Siam, and this is resented even in Tibet. She [France] can, thanks to Tonkin, sell her merchandise in the rich Si-Kiang valley. Also this republican government has added Tunisia and peoples of Central Africa to our country. . . • They say we have no national honor but rebuke us for defending national honor in Tonkin and Madagascar. . . . We have made advances in the Niger, in Senegal and on the Congo River. We prevented war four years ago between Greece and Turkey. You royalists, what about bowing to England in the Pritchard affair? You Bonapartists, what about Waterloo and Sedan?®

From August until September 21, Le Glaneur devoted itse lf to

Barthou. It reported his appearace at Laruns with his opponent, Jacques

La Caze. Ihe crowd shouted "A bas Cazet A bas le boulangistelw and

"Vive la Republique—vive Barthoui" The editor opined that Jacque La

Caze was ill-prepared to outline a program such as Barthou1s.^ In true

Socratic fashion Le Glaneur asked its readers constantly,

Do you want war? Do you want anarchy? Do you want revolution? Vote for Jacques La Caze.

Do you want peace? Do you want government under wise reforms? Do you want a reduction of land tax? Do you want freedom, respect for religion, family and property? Votez-tous pour M. Louis Barthou.10

7Ibid.. 10, 17 August, 1889.

^Ibid.. 1? August 1889.

^Ibid.. 24 August 1889.

^ Ibid.. 7, 14 September 1889. 12

Jacques La Caze's chief platform plank seemed to be that of

running on his father's reputation. Louis, the elder La Caze, had been a

liberal under the Second Empire, and a republican rallie under the

Republic. But the son had what proved to be unfortunate reactionary, monarchist, Boulangist connections.^ Thus, Louis Barthou won the election on September 22 by 7033 to 6695 votes, the slimmest election majority he ever received. An indication of the local interest in this

contest may be seen in the fact that 83.4 percent of the 16,572 registered voters turned out for the election.^

Nationally, as in Oloron-Est, the 1889 general elections proved to be a victory for parliamentary republicans over Boulangists, reac­ tionaries, monarchists, and clericalists. The ultra-conservative forces l o s t 29 s e a ts —down from 201 to 172—due c h ie f ly to the is s u e s o f

Boulangism and monarchism. The Boulangists lost 130—from 177 to 47. The total gain of the parliamentary republicans was thus some 160 members, and the opportunists were known from this time on as governmental 13 republlcans . J

Of Barthou*s early political position there was never any ques­ tion. Picturing himself as a defender of the Republic and republicanism, he looked upon both the conservative critics of the right and the radical critics of the left as his own and France's natural enemies. But he did

^ Le Glaneur. 31 August-21 September I 889.

12L* Indgpendant des Basses-PvrSn^es. 24 September I 889. (H ere­ after cited as Ind B-P. with date.) See also Le Glaneur. 23 September 1889. 13 Le Glaneur. 12 October, 1889. See also Jacques Chastenet, Histoira de la Iroisifeme Republique (Paris, 195^). Vol. Ill, pp. 242 ff. 13 work for certain mild social and economic reforms and for modified constitutional revision. Shortly after his election to the Chamber, while speaking at the unveiling of busts of parliamentarians Michael

Renaud and Charles Floquet at St. Pied-de-Port, he stated his attitude toward the left: "As for radicalism, I am not afraid to oppose either I k the word or the thing.

His first year as a deputy saw him take a traditional, nineteenth- century liberal view of the mild reform issues that came before the

Chamber* He voted with the left on November^ to defeat a law making the manufacture of matches tax-free in all French territory and, on the same day, voted to sustain the state tobacco monopoly.^ Likewise, two days later he voted against a tariff on matches, helping defeat it by seven votes. He abstained from voting on a measure lim iting child labor to those children over seven years old, which passed, and abstained on lim iting the match industry to an eight-hour day, which failed. Nor did he vote on a bill to establish equal wages for women and men. He also abstained on a vote which defeated a minimum wage law. Opposing a law to give unemployment compensation and amnesty to strikers, he said this 17 would make it appear that the government was siding with labor. lhen three months later, he voted in favor of a law on amnesty without the

Aubert, Barthou. 1*6. 15 ^ Journal Officiel: .Chambre des Deputes; D^bats Parlementaires (Paris, 1890), 21 November 1889. (Hereafter cited as JOCD. with date.)

~^JQCD. 23 November 1889.

^ JOCD. 25 November 1889. 18 unemployment compensation; this version of the bill passed. And his

anti-monarchist attitude became evident on February 10, 1890 when he

voted with a majority of the Chamber to sustain the 1886 law, prohibiting

members of former French ruling families from entering the country. 19

This discussion was occasioned by the arrival of the Duke of Orleansin

France and his claim to the right to serve his three-year compulsory military service. The first issue over which Louis Barthou entered a parliamentary debate arose on March 3i 1890, when Premier Eknmanuel Tirard explained why Interior Minister Jean Constans had been dismissed from the ministry.

The assumption was that he was too liberal for Tirard. Actually, he had resigned after unsuccessful attempts to make the ministry more liberal.

In his maiden speech, Barthou declared that he had nothing against the ministry, but he felt the precise details of Constans' departure should

be made known; also, he reminded the ministry that its political duty was dictated by the same mandates as those imposed on the parliamentary majority by the electorate—unity and reform. The day after the

September elections, Barthou continued, the republicans declared that the

"republican party should veer not to the left but to the right"; and concessions had already been made to the right in matters of m ilitary law and the law on elementary education. 20 He thus asked Tirard which way he

~^J0CD. 25 November 1889. • ^ JQGD. 10 February 1890. 2QJ 0CP. 3 March I 8 9O. Conservative republicans had indicated their disapproval of the three-year law of I 889 because, although it reduced the term of compulsory service from 5 y e a rs to 3 , it also abolished many conscription exemptions which they wished to restore. In regard to schools, the 1890 budget had included appropriations to build public elementary schools in many districts which had none as yet; the Minister of Instruction on December 5» 1890 proposed a law to the Chamber which would have cancelled this appropriation. See JOCD. 12-21 January, 6 , 9 July, and 5 December 1890. 15 planned to lead the government and the majority; he, himself, favored a

shift to the left* Next he moved into a general policy discussion in which he called for all republicans to remain loyal to reform and

republican union rather than to a policy of conservative consolidation which would sacrifice the gains that had been made:

So if such is the contradiction of these two policies, and if this contradiction was expressed at the beginning of the legislature, the question now is to determine which policy the cabinet plans to follow. . . . There are in the Chamber spokesmen for party policies different from those represented in the cabinet. . . .

Barthou felt it would be in the interest of all if these repre­

sentative opinions were expressed in the tribune. Although they did not

follow his suggestion and define their positions, and although Tirard

offered no further explanation of his disagreement with Constans, the majority voted its confidence in the cabinet 275 ho 195 when the vote was

called for by Barthou and Clemenceau.^ And though few newspapers out­

side the Basses J^renees were interested in Barthou and the policy discussion, they did take note of the "young Bearnais who spoke so clearly and fervently during his first speech." La Republique Francaise spoke of his "well chosen words"; Le Matin called him a "new parliamentary valiant." Although most of the comment was favorable, Le Rappel

criticized both "his Spanish accent and his attitude."

One of the new deputies, a nobody, M. Barthou, spoke with the deplorable facility of words which are common to too many provincial lawyers, a harangue the meaning of which was d iffi­ cult to grasp.22

21J0CP. 3 March 1890.

2 2 / k March 1390 issues of La Republioue Francaise. Le Rappel, and Le Matin. Also articles in Ind B-P. 5-^ March 1890, and Le Glaneur. 8 March 1890. 16

These first-year votes indicated a man who, with only a 51 percent majority in his election and no stature in the Chamber, was glad to follow the party line on most votes and to abstain on those most likely to be controversial at home.

f L ah m »

Labor policy was the topic most frequently discussed in the

Fifth Legislature. In May, 1890, Einile Ferry submitted a resolution to delete from the 1884 law on unions the clause stating that union member­ ship could not be used as grounds for refusing employment. This would have meant that employers or foremen who refused to hire union members could no longer be prosecuted under this law. Ferry1s motion was defeated and a second vote sustained the original article; Barthou voted with the liberals of all parties both in defeating the proposed change and in sustaining the 1884 law in this respect.23 Again, he voted in

July in favor of a completely inadequate child labor law which limited child labor in mines to ten-hour shifts and not more than eighteen hours in any twenty-four hour period. At least the majority, including

Barthou, rejected a proposal to permit the shifts for the children to begin and end at any hour of the day; in the final bill children were forbidden to be in the mines from midnight to 4 A.M. under any circum­ stances. The final b ill passed, with Barthou counted among the majority.

The same day he voted against an amendment to the law concerning working conditions in industrial establishments, which would have allowed miners

23JOCP. 13 May 1890. 1? to elect the government inspectors of the mines; the measure failed

363 to 66 . ^

But a better indication of his cautious attitude toward labor reform appeared in a series of articles written in November, 1890. A parliamentary work committee was initiated to investigate the problem of working hours. Barthou feared that the committee would visit only the industrial centers and overlook the provinces. Worse yet# he felt labor would take too optim istic a view of the existence of this committee.

Wouldn*t they expect more from the committee than the com­ mittee could promise? If an eight-hour day doesn1! result from this investigation, won*t they feel the parliamentary regime and the Republic have deceived them and made unrealiz­ able promisesT^5

Barthours home town paper was not so hesitant on the issue, even praising the socialists for peacefully advocating the eight-hour day at

M arseille, Lyon, and Bordeaux; it cited similar agitation in Switzerland,

Germany, and the United States where some states already had eight-hour la w s .

The next year substantial changes were discussed on the questions of retirement benefits and maximum hours for labor. Louis Barthou was a reporter for the law on retirement funds. After a few alterations were discussed, this bill was adopted with almost no contest; it provided for withholding from wages to build up retirement credit, and was sent back

2.U JQCD. 8 J u ly 1890.

2^Ind B-P. 1-3 November 1890.

26Le Glaneur. 10 May 1890. 18 to the Senate for consideration. 27 The maximum hours issue was much more complicated, however. Barthou opposed lim iting the work day of women and children under eighteen to eight hours, and children under fourteen to eight hours. Then fcy voice vote the lim it was set at ten hours for children under eighteen. 28 He also wanted to prohibit 29 children under eighteen from working on Sundays, but the motion failed.

The entire bill on labor for women and children was passed, but Barthou was absent for the vote. 30 The measure returned from the Senate at the end of the year, and Barthou favored it this time. In addition to the ten-hour day, the bill prohibited children under thirteen from all work, and required children under sixteen to pass physical examinations; it passed this time in spite of a last-minute unsuccessful effort to exclude women from the ten-hour lim it .J31 Another resolution passed the same day eliminating women and children from night work—night work being from midnight to 4 A.M.—and Barthou favored this. He again voted for a resolution to prohibit women and children from working on Sundays, but the Sunday resolution was defeated with the aid of the socialists, who then turned around and helped pass a six-day week resolution. The entire bill was again accepted the same day,^ but it had to make one more round

27Ind B-P. 5 March 1891; also JQCD. 3 March 1891. 28 JQCD. 2 February 1891.

2^J0CP. 3 February 1891.

^ JOCD. 12 February 1891. 31 JQCD. 19 December 1891. 19 trip between the Senate and Chamber the next year before it became law.

In 1892 the Chamber once again concentrated much of its attention on labor problems* The center of the fight concerned the employers* consideration of union membership in hiring and firing. In March,

Georges Leygues* Deputy from Lot-et-Garonne, asked that the proposed

Bouvier-Lapierre law on unions, twice amended by the Senate and now back in the Chamber for the third discussion, be amended again to provide penalties of 6 to 30 days in jail and 100 to 200 francs for firing or threatening workers for joining unions. The same penalty would be imposed on any employer who fired an employee for not belonging to a union, a provision it was hoped would prevent unions from forcing employers to fire non-union workers.

Barthou opposed Leygues* amendment, not because he disagreed with it in principle, but on the grounds that it would only necessitate sending the bill back to the Senate for additional approval. Besides, he felt the original Bouvier-Lapierre law already reassured the unions of the good intent of the Chamber. It would impose a civil penalty on the people who violated the 188^- law by firing members of a union. The

Bouvier-Lapierre proposal was already under attack from the conservatives for not imposing obligations on the employees similar to those placed on the employers. Barthou admitted that it was unilateral in this respect; but, as he observed, it was not often the employer who needed protection against the worker in these matters. He considered the law a measure which would put workers on an equal basis with their employers in negotiating for jobs. 20

It is a law of progress which frees the worker from all subjugation by a regime of an oppressor under which the freedom to bargain without equality in bargaining is only, according to the phrase of Louis HLanc, "hypocracy of oppression," (cheers from the left)33

But the bill was returned to committee anyway for several

changes and reappeared with a 100 to 2000 franc fine and a sentence of

one to three months in jail for interfering with the freedom of organ­

ization established in 1884. In spite of support from the radical left 34 and the socialists (and Barthou), this proposition failed.

This amendment out of the way, the Chamber turned to the Bouvier-

Lapierre law itself. Three times the first article was voted down

because it now imposed the same penalties on workers as on employers and

foreman for interfering with the provisions of the 1884 law. Ely a majority which crossed party lines, enough leftists, centerists, and

conservatives stuck together—Edouard Jacques, Camille Pelletan,

Alexandre Millerand, and Leon Bourgeois, for example—to defeat all three votes; when the article passed, it imposed penalties on the employers and foreman only. After this vote, still another amendment to penalize workers was brought forward by the anti-labor extremists, and was defeated by an even larger majority. The complete law finally passed,

supported by Barthou, Henri Brisson, Clemenceau, Jean Baptiste Dumay,

Eugene Etienne, Edouard Jacques, and Millerand . ^ Barthou*s votes on

33JOCP. 29, 31 October 1891.

34J0CP. 19, 22 March, 2, 4 April 1892.

35Jb id . 21 this bill showed his moderately pro-labor position and also indicated his impatience with those politicians who could not reconcile themselves to being placed in the minority on an issue and would keep on trying to reverse the majority decision.

Labor relations came up again in the fall of 1892 when the unions

sponsored strikes in order to force Chamber action on legislation.

Barthou was already suspicious that the labor movement in France was revolutionary in its program. He was to write some thirteen years later that he had already reached this opinion by 1891. "For the most part," he said, "the unions did not recognize the law of 1884; theirs was a policy with revolution as its object and the general strike as its method.He thought they were revolutionary in all countries except

the United States, whereas the majority of their members did not favor political action.

In any case the strike of the miners had occurred at Carmaux in

August and was dealt with in the Chamber in October at the same time the

child labor law was under discussion. The strike demonstrations were

extensive enough that troops had been called in to restore order—by a ministry that was already accused of abuses of public power, not only in its efforts at Carmaux, but for its general handling of strikes. On

August 15 the company had refused an ultimatum of the workers, who

retaliated by riots. Ten arrests and six imprisonments resulted when employees armed with rocks stormed the house of the director of the

Carmaux company. On the Chamber floor the company was accused of

"36 Louis Barthou, L1Action Svndicale (Paris, 1904), 32-5. 22 intimidating the workers at the time the company-picked candidate had lost the election for conseiller d'arrondissement to one of the miners employed by the company.3?

The Carmaux s tr ik e was th e most s ig n if ic a n t of the 26l s tr ik e s in

1892,3® and it undoubtedly influenced labor legislation before the

Chamber that autumn. But the concessions granted labor were quite mild and well within the nineteenth century tradition. Nine days after the discussion of the Carmaux conflict, Barthou and 391 others voted against

Dumay's proposal to remove the troops from the strike area. No doubt the unsuccessful efforts by the government to arbitrate the dispute helped convince the Chamber to consider an a r b itr a tio n law . A proposal en actin g forced arbitration was defeated, and then one was approved allowing arbitration on a voluntary basis, with the state match and tobacco workers excluded from this voluntary provision. The next problem was a reconsideration of the women's and children's labor law. On March

28 the lim it on hours for women was raised to eleven per day again by the Senate, and the Chamber accepted this final form on November 19 in order to preserve its article limiting children under seventeen to a ten-hour day, and the seventeen-year olds to a sixty-hour week; also the final bill prohibited women and children from working in mines. Ihis bill was the most significant social measure passed by both houses of the

French parliament in the 1889-1893 period.

Barthou emerged from these labor discussions neither liberal nor conservative. He supported the campaigns for child labor reforms, reduced

37JOCP. 1 8 , 2 7 , 29 October 1892.

38Chastenet, Irolsieme Republiaue. II, 306 . 23 hours for women, and a ten-hour day and six-day week for men. But he was not ready yet to cut the working day from ten hours to eight. And fearful of the power the unions might accumulate, he was willing to protect the workers1 right to join unions but was equally solicitous that they not be forced to join.

Constitutional and Legal Reform

Five constitutional and legal issues were discussed by the 1889

Chamber: judicial reform, criminal penalties, multiple candidatures, the holding of multiple government posts, and partial renewal.

In November, 1890, Deputies Desire Barodet, Alfred Martineau, and

Alfonse Labuissere were pressing for a revision of France1s lower level judicial structure as an economy measure. Barthou did not agree that curtailment of the small, local courts was the place to cut expenses.

Martineau proposed abolition of all first, or local level tribunals, which handled fewer than 100 cases a year; such a step, said Barthou, would leave 57 towns in 39 departments without courts. He proposed instead that these justices of the peace continue to operate and that

France economize on the number of courts (courts of the first instance), one of which had heard only 22 cases in the past year and another 18.

Beyond this, like the majority of the Chamber, he felt the whole court 30 system could be reorganized to make it more economical and efficient.

Nonetheless, it was Martineau1s type of revision which was approved and llQ sent on to the higher courts for their examination. The next spring

^ Ind B-P. 14 November 1890. hr, 13-24 February 1891. 24

Barthou again stressed the need for improving the caliber of provincial justice by raising the quality of the justices of the peace rather than by eliminating some of them. He still favored an immediate reduction of the number of inferior courts rather than doing away with many of the justices of the peace, as the Garde de Sceaux preferred.^ He charged that the government was merely equivocating on the whole question of court 42 reform, thus indicating it wanted no change at all. In either case the issue was never discussed again in that session.

In 1891, the Chamber also nominated a committee, with Barthou as its secretary, to reevaluate criminal penalties. After much discussion it presented a bill to the Chamber which would defer the sentences of criminals convicted of misdemeanors, providing they were involved in no other crimes for a period of five years; the proposal also increased the punishment of those who repeated a major offense within five years. The

Chamber approved this bill without discussion.^

In 1893* an election year, a hard core of minorities from the right and the left proposed to the Chamber in February that France return to multiple candidatures under the scrutin de liste . Hie measure was defeated, Barthou joining the m ajority.^

Another issue discussed prior to the election was that of deputies holding other government posts while in office. A proposed law on this matter contained six parts: 1. The mandate of deputy was incompatible with all salaried government jobs. (This motion carried 293 to 210.)

^Le Glapynp- 30 May 1891. 47 Ibid.. 20 June 1891. 3 March 1891; and Le Glaneur. 3 March I 89I. 44 JOCD. 27 May 1893. 25

2. This disposition is applicable to the clergy. (Barthou and the majority agreed.) 3. Or to persons employed by those having contracts with the state. (Barthou and the majority opposed.) 4. Administrators, directors, or managers of companies having treaties with the state or constituted by state monopoly are included in this act. (Barthou and the majority opposed 200 to 2 8 5 .) 5. Candidates must resign such posts before running for office. (Barthou opposed and it failed 197 to 25*0 6 . The function of a deputy is incompatible with those of conseiller general, conseiljer arrondttsaament. and con- seiller municipal. (Discussion on this point was adjourned to 96, Barthou with the majority.)

The much weakened measure, now containing only parts 1 and 2, was then 45 accepted by voice vote.

Partial renewal of the Chamber provoked the longest debate of the session. Barthou spoke eloquently in favor of it on the basis that deputies elected for six-year terms, half the Chamber renewed every three years, would provide more continuity both for the Chamber and its bills and for the cabinet; this resistance to change was already becoming one of the chief focal points in Barthou*s political frame of reference. It is interesting that each side in the discussion used Boulangism as its strongest argument. Barodet argued that partial renewal would be a new coalition against the Republic similar to that of Boulangism;^ Clemenceau agreed with Barodet that the six-year, partial renewal tenures would be a seizure of power by those in office and that the Chamber should consult the people more frequently than this. Barthou, speaking in favor of the proposal, said it would help prevent violent attacks such as Boulangism and argued that under the present system of integral renewal each general

45 JOCD. 1 June 1893.

JOCD. 13 June 1893* 26 Un election became a struggle for the very existence of the Republic. '

Barthou1s June 13 speech on the subject was the most eloquent and most

praised one he had yet made. But in spite of the wide acceptance of the

speech in the Chamber and the favorable reports of it in the June 14

is s u e s of Le S o ir. Le M atin. Le S ie c le . Le R a d ic al, and Le Jo u rn al (and

even Le Figaro which favored complete renewal), the Chamber voted on

June 19 to drop discussion of the whole issue. 48

Change through parliamentary deliberation was the gradual,

steady method by which Barthou sought reform. The judicial reform proposal was made with budget efficiency in mind and also with the view

to leave justice on the local level where it would be closer to the people. The new criminal penalties were simply for the purpose of bringing the criminal code up to date and serve as a good example of the processes by which he thought change should be accomplished. But the other measures—forbidding multiple candidatures, holding more than one government position at a time, and partial renewal—were closer to his political being. These were safety provisions which would work in favor of the group already in control of the government. They would help prevent sudden or substantial change. For such change might endanger the

Republic. And survival of the Republic was already Barthou*s primary political norm.

47 JO£E., 16 June 1893; and Ind B-P. 17, 28 February 1893. 48 JOCD. 19 June 1893; and Ind B-P. 16 June 1893- 27

T a riff

The Chamber of D eputies in 1891 resem bled the calm c e n te r of a storm, Boulangism having been the turbulence just passed and the Panama scandal being the crisis yet to come. The one persistent issue that year was that of protection, which was debated off and on until the adoption of the Meline Tariff of 1892. Party positions on the idea of a protec­

tive tariff were a mixture of nineteenth and twentieth-century concepts

of liberalism and conservatism. Socialists and the less radical left favored protection as a part of government regulation and as a kind of

job security. But their primary consideration in the matter during this period was assistance for the peasant class. Two issues were in juxta­ position on the question of a higher tariff. First there was the factor

that any tariff was a type of government control. The socialists were

for government control; the republicans approved of it in some cases; and

the conservatives were opposed to it altogether. Second was the factor

that import duties protected both labor and profits, especially in

infant or sick industries. The socialists favored helping labor and new

enterprises; the conservatives were economic nationalists; and the center

republicans of the government were in favor of free trade, because it was an economically efficient policy and because they connected protectionism with socialism, yet even they still felt that there were some areas where

"the state should intervene to protect the weak."^ During these debates

Barthou wrote in the press agreeing with this republican position.^

49 Eugene 0. Golob, The Meline Tariff (New York, 1944), pp. 1 0 4 -1 5 .

~^Ind B-P. 10 February 1891.

51I b i d . 28

A by-product of Boulangers 1889 campaign had been a protec­

tionist victory in the parliamentary elections. The complicated synthesis

of the various points of view in the Chamber was a series of decisions on

tariff items which would allow some protection, with liberal and conserva­

tive groups both splitting their votes. Since much of France still depended on agriculture for a living—48.4 percent in 1881^—the policy

of the left had to include the welfare of the farmers as well as that of

other workers; the left had to find a way to support farm prices while keeping the price of food low.

The tariff theory most frequently expressed in France at the time was the "justice tariff" concept of Professor Paul-Louis Cauwes, Dean of

the University of Paris Law Faculty. Cauwes believed that justice rather

than mere gain should be the criterion of economic good. Free trade,

Cauwes decided, might lead to international division of labor, but it first resulted in more specialization within individual states, since the * le^s efficient industries and marginal producers in strong industries would have to go. But if the long-term national interest and the total economy benefited from certain tariffs, then, asserted Cauwes, economic justice was in operation.-53 F^lix-Jules MSline, former Minister of

Agriculture and sponsor of the tariff measure under discussion, was fam iliar with these theories, since both MSline and Cauwes were officers in the Society of Political Economy . ^ Undoubtedly Louis Barthou was

^2Golob, Meline Tariff. 62-3.

53Ibid.. 116-46.

^ I b i d . 29 also acquainted with Cauwes* work; Barthou had specialized in political

economy at the University of Bordeaux and then had received his law doctorate from the faculty of which Cauwes was dean.

M$line*s purpose was to effect a tariff revision which would aid

the farmers. However, the protectionist group, which he might look to

for support, was a strange, shifting coalition composed of socialists

(who wanted lower food prices but protection for labor), the Syndicat

wnrmnnrigun agrlcole. controlled mainly by well-to-do, landowning farmers

(who wanted higher tariffs), representatives of the labor unions (who

wanted high rates on manufactured goods), a few economic liberals (who

were beginning to oppose free trade), and the conservatives (economic

nationalists). Consequently the various duties voted in the Chamber do

not show a consistent coalition favoring agricultural protection. It was

only with the assistance of those favoring higher industrial tariffs that

MSline managed to obtain higher rates for farm products.

The first agriculture measure voted by the Chamber was one to

reduce the property tax on fields planted in grain in the spring of 1 8 9 1;

wheat and wine producers were the hardest hit by crop failures that year.

This measure, which Barthou opposed, passed in the Chamber but was only a

partial solution to the problem.Moving on to tariff rates, the votes

on those covering for wheat, corn, bread, and flour were inconsistent.

First the Chamber opposed increases on flour,^ then refused to reduce

rates on grain and flour, but lowered them on wheat alone next the

3^10CP. 10 March 1891.

56JOCD. 23 May 1891. 57 JOCD. 11 June 1891. 30 rates on corn, bread, salted beef, and salted pork were increased;^® the socialists voted for reduction on all these items and Barthou favored the existing duties on grain and flour and increases on beef and pork.

This ended the discussions on food. When it came to industrial items, the increases in metals and industrial chemicals passed by voice vote without any argument,*^ showing everyone*s willingness to accept higher prices as the solution to the problems of both capital and labor. The complete tariff bill passed, with Barthou favoring it, and the socialists opposed.^ The bill was returned from the Senate twice in the fall of 1891 for minor revisions. The final Chamber vote on the whole tariff was 384 to 100; Barthou voted for the measure and the socialists opposed it.®^"

It is difficult to state whether Meline and the farmers won or lost. Although there was no other comprehensive tariff bill enacted until after World War I, the Meline rates were neither a complete nor a permanent solution to the problems of the farmers. And although the tariff might not have been voted if industrial interests had not cooperated on supporting the revision, industry rather than agriculture obtained the higher protection. Raw hides, wool, and silk were left on the free lis t. Rates on manufactured goods, which had been between 25 and 30 percent, went to an average of 60 percent, while those on agri­ cultural commodities went from 15 to only 25 percent protection.^2 The

^ JOCD. 15 July, 4, 16 July I 89I. 59 JOCD. 4 July 1891. 60 JOCD. 18 July 1891. 61 JOCD. 7 January 1892.

62Golob, Meline T ariff. 179-97. hard core of resistance to the bill came from the industrial area deputies with labor constituents; most of the others seemed satisfied with the rates. Even the liberal banker L^on Say, who had earlier advocated free trade on agricultural items, approved most of the results.^ But the votes indicate that the socialist ideal of a protec­

tive tariff to protect labor was not so vital a consideration as that of protective rates raising prices and profits. Nor did Barthou*s fear of protection leading to socialism keep him from voting for it. In any

case most deputies, left and right, probably voted out of their economic

or political interests rather than out of ideology, and a tariff bill which helped industry and gave some help to agriculture was sure to be immediately popular.

As for assistance to the farmers, which was Meline*s purpose in the beginning, the tariff on agricultural items gave as much assistance

to the food processors as to the farmers. The increase on cattle for instance was 50 percent, from 20 francs to 30 francs per head; but the duty on beef was raised over 100 percent, from 12 to 25 francs per 100 kilograms. And whereas wheat growers, along with vineculturists, were

suffering the worst of all agricultural producers in 1 8 9 1, the tariff on wheat was not raised at a ll.^

Barthou was no more virtuous than the rest of the Chamber in his various tariff votes. Apparently he thought protection was desirable in spite of the aid and comfort it gave the socialist cause.

6 3 Ibid.. 204-10.

D*Ibid., 174-75. S e p a ra tio n

Next to labor problems the most controversial topic of the time was separation of Church and state and the influence of the clericalists in French politics. The issue of clericalism had become endemic and was discussed several times in the Chamber in 1891. In January the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexandre Ribot, described how the priests in his home department had worked against the republican candidates in the 1889 election. Of the twenty-nine priests involved, ten were replaced; seven of these ten appealed to Rome and Pope Leo XIII demanded their retirement

Then, due to pressure, he gave four of these seven the honorary title of cameri nr secret. One of the latter was the Abbe Diharassary. The most deeply involved of the seven, he had issued an election catechism telling good Christians not to vote for enemies of the state, namely republicans and anyone farther to the left. The Chamber subsequently had Diharassary office of abbe revoked, and the three priests did their penance by apologizing.^

Another incident was created in August when a questionnaire was sent by the Church to a ll p arish p rie s ts in France asking,

1. What Catholic candidate has the best chance of being elected in your arrondissement, and what are the chances of his opponent? 2. What papers will help us and which will oppose? 3. What men would be the best canton committeemen? How many subscriptions could you get to a local Catholic penny [sou] newspaper? 5 . How much money could you get for this newspaper project? 6. What proportion of the vote could we get in your arrondissemen t ?

^ JQGD. 27 January I 89I. 33

Barthou revealed this document to the press and strongly- criticized the Church for this campaign.8^

Feeling ran strong enough on the religious issue in the fall to influence votes on the budgets for the foreign office and for education.

Barthou opposed a measure, supported by the socialists, to cut the foreign office budget by 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 francs and consequently to withdraw the ambassador from the Vatican; the proposal failed and the ambassador remained. The same sides were taken the next day in an effort to reduce the education appropriations in the religious budget, but the 68 budget was sustained.

Premier Charles Louis de Freycinet, although not happy about the growing voice of clericalism, believed he would lose his majority by a

concerted campaign against it; he pointed to the fact that the religious budget was passed both before and after he lost his majority as proof that his religious policy was the popular one. He felt that his two years in power (his was one of the longest ministries in the Third

Republic) and the gradual wearing away of support brought about his down­ f a l l on February 18, 1 8 9 2. However, Barthou believed it was his hesitancy in attacking clericalism which cost Freycinet his ministry. 70

Although Barthou voted to sustain Freycinet, he had been critical of much 71 of his policy on both foreign and domestic issues.

66Le Siecle. 22 August 1891.

67jq cd . 26 October 1891.

68JOCP. 2? October 1891.

^Louis de Freycinet, Souvenirs (Paris, 1913). Vol. II, pp. 497-99; and JOCD. 27 October 1891.

70Le Glaneur. 5 March 1891.

^ Ibid.. 15 June, 19 September, and 12 December 1891. 34

Nevertheless Barthou was to change his ndnd by September concern­ ing public opinion on the religious issue; he urged then that a discus­ sion of separation not be given urgency in the Chamber, where he felt it did not have a m ajority,^ Public opinion opposing clericalism had partially subsided oy September. But the vote of confidence on Frey- cinet's ministry had followed close on the heels of the Pope's January encyclical suggesting that the way to oppose the Godless French government was to elect to parliament men who would make good laws (on Church- controlled education presumably). Two days later the Freycinet cabinet was defeated by a coalition of the right and the extreme left— a coalition which was to become traditional in the Third Republic, and a coalition which certainly was not in agreement on clericalism.

The ralliement to the conservative, Catholic policy officially started with the Pope's encyclical in January. The Chamber was already choosing up sides for the coming struggle over separation. Older right­ ists tried to ignore the ralliement. but the younger set, Albert de Mun,

Jacques Piou, Georges de Grandmaison, and Eugene Schneider organized the campaign. A few old conservative republicans, Freycinet, Jean Casimir-

Perier, Jules Meline, Constans, and Ribot, joined the ralHamant. because they sought in it allies against socialism. Not so the radicals, how­ ever; L^on Bourgeois said it was not enough for the raj H i as to accept the Republic, but they must also accept the Revolution . ^ Presumably he meant the Revolution's ideas on separation and lay education. As for

^ JQCD. 28 August 1892. 73 Guy Chapman, The Dreyfus Case; a Reappraisal (London, 1955)* pp. 22-3. 35

Barthou, he had decided by the end of 1892 that it was not yet possible to bring about the separation of Church and state, although that was the policy he preferred.

Colonialism and Foreign Policy

Foreign policy and colonialism received little parliamentary attention from the 1889 legislature except the annual voting of appro­ priations for these affairs. In 1890 Barthou agreed hesitantly with the

Brussels convention, which France signed, regarding rights of search and oh seizure, and the rights of neutrals and their cargoes. He also supported the governments decision to remain in Tonkin. Criticizing the extremes, right and left, he accused them of partisan politics. They favored intervention, and then denied they had formed a coalition two years before to advocate the evacuation of Tonkin. Among those who had reversed their field, he named Louis de Broglie and Jules Delafosse on the right and demenceau on the left.^^

In 1891 Barthou pointed out what he thought was an inconsistency in Freycinet*s policy; the government was making such gestures toward peace as signing the Brussels convention while at the same time busily expanding its colonial holdings. It was true that fcy 1893 the appro­ priations for colonial campaigns had increased substantially. Funds for m ilitary and naval expenses in Annan, Tonkin, and Dahomey were approved easily, Barthou voting with the majority and the socialists generally

7U Le Glaneur. 4 July 1891.

^ Ind B-P. 2 December 1890. 76 Le G laneur. 12 December 1890. 36 abstaining;^ and the budget for the colonial army passed without any ty Q protest at all.

When Casimir-Perier was selecting his cabinet at the beginning of December 1893, he asked Barthou to accept the post of Undersecretary of State for Colonies. But Barthou declined, stating that previous 79 studies did not prepare him to occupy this post.

Although these fragments are sketchy evidence of what Barthou felt about affairs beyond the frontiers of France, they indicate that he was at least solicitous that France protect and expand her overseas interests, perhaps to show the world that France was still a first class power.

Panama

In the autumn of 1892 consideration of all other political and governmental matters was submerged in the rising tide of the Panama Canal scandal. This crisis involved financial manipulation, the press, and the government. Since September La Libre Parole had been protesting improper dealings between officials of the Panama Canal Company and certain news­ papers and certain members of the government. Also, inquiry into the

Panama financing was completed by the Public Prosecutor*s Department and submitted to the Procurer General, who in turn forwarded the findings to the Garde de 5<^eaux in September. President Carnot and Premier Loubet both tried to get the Procurer General, Quesnay de Beaurepaire, to change

^ JOCD. 6 February 1893. OQ JOCD. 25 February 1893- 70 Ind B-P. 3-4 December 1893. 37 his conclusions. This man owed his position to the conservatives in power, however, and therefore modified his statement so it concluded that since there was insufficient evidence to indicate that the Panama directors intentionally planned the fraudulent scheme, they should be 80 tried in a civil rather than in a criminal action. This would have greatly reduced any ultimate prison sentence. Loubet tried to avoid the issue, saying that the executive and parliament should not discuss an issue which was being handled by the judiciary.

On November 19* however, the Panama q u e stio n was f i n a l ly brought to the Chamber and Barthou made a righteous appeal that all sides be heard on the issue. The result two days later was the Chamber decision to elect by scrutin de liste in the Chamber—rather than by the usual drawing of lots—a commission of inquiry composed of thirty-three deputies. In this vote a delegate needed a simple majority out of 431 votes to be elected to the commission. Barthou, with JQk votes, won seventeenth place in this strange popularity contest, with twenty-six 81 deputies being elected on the first ballot. He refused this mandate to serve on the commission and was among those elected three days later in the second scrutin; 32 this time apparently he decided to accept the vote of confidence of his peers.

80 Emanuel Beau de Lomenie, „ Qu^ppelez-vous Droite et Gauche (Paris, 1932), p. 241.

^ JOCD. 19, 22 November I 8 9 2. The other twenty-five were Clausel de Coussergues, Bertrand, de Labatut, Guieysse, Brisson, Dumay, Bory, Leydet, Dupuy-Dutemps, Sarrien, Gerard, Bouvier-Laplerre, Labussiere, Terrier, Jonnart, Gerville-Reache, Delcasse, Marthey, Maujan, Deluns- Montaut, Lavertujon, Pelletan, deRamel, de Villebois-Mareuil, and B rou sset. Qo Ind B-P. 24 November 1892. Before the commission had had time to act, the melodramatic death

of Jacques de Reinach brought even more attention and n^stery to the affair. As president of the commission of inquiry, Brisson asked in the

Chamber that the government take all medical and legal means possible to find out how Reinach had died. In the ensuing debate a vote of confi­ dence was called for on the issue of the government^ handling of the

scandal. Barthou voted with the majority to defeat the cabinet 194 to

293. Few Third Republic ministries could have withstood a scandal of

this magnitude. Loubet*s Foreign Minister, Ribot, formed the next government and made Loubet his Minister of Interior; and in the language of Count Munster, the German ambassador, "the Loubet-Ribot cabinet had fallen into the Panama Canal, and was revived as the Ribot-Loubet Qh cabinet" at least until the end of March. Meanwhile, the autopsy and investigation into Reinach1s death remained undecided between suicide and heart failure.

Of the 150 members of parliam ent—a few senators included—who i t was claimed received a total of three million francs from Reinach for various favors to the Panama Canal Company, little was ever verified.®-^

Jules Delahaye, the Deputy who made this charge in the Chamber, testified pZ to the inquiry commission that he had no material proof, only moral.

^ JOGD. 28 November 1892. 84 Chastenet, Iroisieme Republioue. II, 313-14.

Chambre des Deputes, Commission d*enquete des A ffaires de Panama, Rapport General (P aris, 1893), p. 20. a£ Itii., p. 162. 39

And the lis t of 104 parliamentarians who were stockholders was kept On secret during the investigations. Checks signed by Reinach to twenty- six people, mostly members of the legislature, were presented as part of the evidence; ten senators and deputies were brought into court and three of them were found guilty, the others being able to prove that their stock buyings were legal and innocent. Maurice Rouvier, it was proved, had received 50*000 francs, and although he paid it back his political 88 career was impeded by the gift; on December 13* for instance, Ribot announced that Rouvier was no longer in the m inistry.^ Clemenceau's paper, La Justice, had received money from Cornelius Herz, and his political career was retarded for nine years. Of all the politicians indicted, only Charles Baihaut received a jail sentence, of five years.

The precise damage to various politicians resulting from their involvement in the Panama scandal, or the precise gain through partici­ pation in its investigation are hard to measure. Certainly the affair brought into some disrepute the whole generation of republicans who had held the responsibility of the government. And doubtless also, the general distrust of expanding business and investment interests, and of government officials who were in any way connected with financial affairs, rubbed off heavily on the government republicans since many of them held positions of importance in business. But critics from the left charged

87 A drian D ansette, Les A ffa ire s dq Panama (P a ris , 1934), pp. 2 4 9 -5 0 .

88m. Valle, Enou^te de Panama (Paris, 1893), Vol. I, pp. 2 2 8 -3 0 .

^ JOCD. 13 December 1 8 9 2. 40 that the accusers in the affair were inspired by political passions and hate and thus were more despicable than were the accused. These accusers were a set of young republicans led by Godefroy Cavaignac who saw in the affair a chance to replace those damaged by scandal, such as Rouvier and

Clemenceau. Adrian Dansette quoted Jean Jaures on this observation,90 and w rote,

Not compromising anything, marking the deeds and profiting from all the good results, that is to say all the bad inci­ dents, a crew of young ambitious deputies took the place of the old ones who hung on. . . . They had valor and capacity, all of them, . . • Panama was n o t only a c o n flic t of money and co rru p tio n ; i t was a conflict of a political generation, new versus old.91

If, however, Louis Barthou belongs on this lis t of young repub­ lican "baby tigers," as Dansette called them, he was playing a very su b tle p o l it i c a l game, indeed. I t would seem he could have used h is position for much more political mileage. For on January 12, 1893 he voted to reverse the government because of its inaction in the matter without any real assurance that the whole republican group might not be discredited by further action.9^ Perhaps it was because Ribot was able to bounce back in the Chamber on January 13 that Barthou made a strong confession of republican faith in his speech at Chalons two days later, telling the government critics to look further to the right if they wanted to fin d the r e a l Panama v illa in s --A rth u r Meyer and h is 10 0 ,0 0 0

Panama fran c s fo r in s ta n c e .93 But h is a r t i c l e s in Le S ie c le in February

9°Dansette, Panama. 245-47. 91 Ibid., ix-x. 92 JOCD. 12 January 1893.

^Ind B-P. 20 January 1893. 41 seemed to indicate his feeling that Ribot, and even Jules Delahaye, did net seriously want the inquiry to do a thorough job and that, if they held the line another month or two while pretending to act, the whole storm would blow over.^ At the outset he resigned his elected position on the commission of inquiry with no guarantee that he would be reelected two days later* Nor did he use his position as one of the secretaries of the commission to any noticeable advantage. Furthermore, his share in the interrogation of the witnesses was one of the briefest. 95 ^ His first

cabinet appointment, by Charles Dupuy, less than two years afterwardmust be considered also in the light of his previous popularity and his acquaintance with Dupuy's brother-in-law as much as in light of what little note he got from serving on the inquiry commission. And if

Clemenceau held any ill feeling toward Barthou as a result of Panama, it was not strong enough in 1906 to dismiss him as Minister of Public Works from the cabinet that Clemenceau inherited from Sarrien.

Although the young republicans benefited in the government from the Panama scandal, if any group gained public popularity it was the

socialists. The last time the affair was discussed in the Chamber, on

February 16, 1893* Paul Lafargue identified the government republicans as monarchists and Panama as

the daily bread of the capitalist class. . . . The capitalist class a century earlier began with the Mississippi Bank; today it continues with Panama—it is on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico that the capitalists of France make their gigantic bankruptcies

Ok Le S ie c le . 6 , 11 February 1893* ^Chambre des Deputes, Rapport General: see also M, Valle, Panama. I-III.

96 jqcD. 16 February 1893* 42

Barthou was quick to respond that it was the benches of the right which had applauded when the government was criticized; therefore there must be

some difference between their policy and the governments. The discussion ended by the radical orders of the day being voted down and the government

being sustained, 306 to 172.^ The Panama liquidation law passed on March 4 with no further discussion of the matter. 98 But regardless of the government1s February vote of confidence, the socialists gained twenty- nine seats in the Chamber in the August and September elections.

Politics and Progress

In 1893 s o c ia lis ts began th e ir long campaign in the Chamber against the government republicans. In this respect the year ended much as it began, with two sharp-minded debaters throwing the heaviest of the verbal ammunition. The center government was represented by Louis

Barthou who matched eloquent attacks in the Chamber, and elsewhere, with

Jean Jaures, who by this time had become a socialist. In February

Barthou paid tribute to his adversary, wa powerful orator," and a "clever tactician," who could take an ordinary debate and give it "the allusion of importance of a discussion on social organization."99 And toward the end of November these two were principals in a policy debate in the

Chamber. The socialists, guided by Jaures and Millerand, were criticizing the government's education policy and its failure to uphold the principles

97 JOCD. 4 March 1893.

98J0GD. 4 March 1893- 99 Le Glaneur. 3 March 1893. ^3 of the Revolution; Jaures was also arguing that economic power was being concentrated all the time into fewer and fewer hands. Barthou1s answer to these challenges was likewise partially critical of the existing policy. The 1893 election had been a gain for the socialists, but

Barthou thought it was also a clear call for the parliament to produce further reforms and a revised constitution. He continued:

The policy of concentration of the economy has been necessary; better perhaps it should be said that up to a certain time this concentration has been indispensable. . . »

But justification of what had occurred in the past did not mean such a policy could be continued in the future.

One could say that for long years we have had many cabinets and ministers, but no government. . . . Those placed in authority have had no unity of direction, fixed purpose, or resolution of wish without which government, administration, and reforms are impossible. . . .1 0 0

The Republic seemed to be safe now from the opposition organized against it since its founding; the elections of 1893 served to convince the republicans of this fact. Now they could safely turn their attention to progressive reforms. Barthou outlined this program and debated step by step how it differed from that of the radicals and socialists.

We agree when the socialists denounce the concentration of economic power into fewer and fewer hands; in the second place not content to speak of personal riches in a general fashion, they have developed a legend of peasant proprietors. I think it is necessary when parallel declamations, equally vague, are mentior.ad to reply with precise facts. . . » First is it true that public wealth in this country is concentrated into fewer and fewer hands? . . . It is easy to

100 JOCD. 21-25 November 1893. prove that it is more widely distributed here than in ary country in the world. For example the proportion of railroad stocks in circu­ lation increased from 65 to 97 per cent from 1884 to 1893- . . . State bonds rose to 329*000,000 francs in value; mixed titles to 4,388,000 francs and payable bonds to 87,159,000 francs. . . .101

He went on to criticize JauresT figures on peasant land owner­

ship. Jaures had complained that most of the farms were too small— 1 to

10 hectares in size—and that less than 22 percent of the agricultural workers in France owned any land. Barthou corrected these figures by quoting official government statistics to the effect that 30 p ercen t owned their own farms, another 20 percent owned some land and worked part-time for others, and only half of them owned no land at all.^ ^

He took exception next to Jaures1 program for the nationalization of banks and mines. Furthermore, he disagreed on the ultimate nature of the law of syndicates, sticking to the right-to-work concept as an argument against unions:

. . . But it must not be ignored, M. Jaures, that if one wishes to give workers the right to organize, to combine, an equal right belongs likewise to those who do not wish to belong to a syndicate. . . . We are in agreement with those who support the right of the workers to improve their interests, their working conditions, and their protection from accidents; we also favor retirement pensions. . . . Yes, all this which is possible we should try to accomplish. But there are things which cannot be promised, and it is only a betrayal of the cause of the people to promise the impossible.

102 Then Barthou defined the real point at which he differed from

J a u r e s ;

For I fear Jaures, in his ardor and with good intentions which I do not doubt, has lured the people with vain hopes and words. To our society now is opposed another society—socialist. . . . What is the socialist idea . . . T First, expropriation economically and politically of the upper bourgeoisie, and second, the restitution to all workers in national ownership of their share of the instruments of work. . . . The object is collectivism. . . . The means is the class struggle,i®3

Barthou was not hopeful that the republican program for separa­ tion of church and state and for an income tax could be achieved in the coming session of parliament. But he did expect to realize a balanced budget, tax reform, judicial reorganization, agricultural reforms, and the aforementioned securities for labor. These then were the two pro­ grams; one he considered radical, the other practical. He concluded by admitting, with the socialists, that social reforms were needed but disagreed with their solution to the problem.

Their programs and contrasts were now defined. Barthou, like

Jaures, was a careful and competent student of the French Revolution.

But from this study he developed a fear of "rapid and radical change resulting from revolution, with its resulting moral disorder," whereas

Jaures advocated more violent departures from the existing order. On the other hand Barthou had developed a respect for the ideals of the First

103 JOCD. 21-25 November 1893* 104 The same definitions and statements of faith by Barthou were described by him in an article, "Socialismt" Ind B-P. 11 December 1893•

105 Subsequently he was to write three books about the French Revolution: Mirabeau (1913), Le. Neiif Thermidor (1926), and Danton (1932). 46

Republic, and for slow gains mads through the processes of republicanism; inefficient as they might be, he supported them against the possibility of total upheaval. The only permanent progress he thought was gradual progress. "Be republican," he said, "and practice the things which result in the liberty, equality, and fraternity of all social rights.

Both men for the next sixteen years opposed each other and each other*s id e a ls .

As for the Chamber of 1889, its substantial achievements were few.

Its list of major acts, those which also survived the Senate, was a short one: the Meline tariff which was of doubtful assistance to the problem of living costs; the labor arbitration bill which was reduced to a voluntary basis rather than compulsory; and the labor law for women and children which at least revised working hours in the right direction.

Through the annals of this Chamber, the young man from Oloron appeared to be running true to form for a freshman deputy. Representing republican constituents from a rural area, he was most cautious on labor matters, abstaining from most of the votes on this subject his first year, and following the conservative side of the middle-road for the remainder of this term. He realized labor legislation was long overdue, but feared that rapid progress in that direction might give too much momentum to a la b o r movement he considered too re v o lu tio n a ry .

In these early years Barthou was quite content to follow party policy, until time and opportunity would make his stature more significant.

He was not ready yet to pit his popularity in Oloron-Est against the

106 „ Ind B-P. 11 December 1893. 4? strong clericalist element there, for instance, and was content to follow the republican leadership on such matters as tariff and colonialism. And even when the Panama scandal gave him a chance to be heard, he acted with decorum. His chief consideration so far was to find constitutional means through which the Third Republic might be made even more secure in its e x is te n c e . CHAPTER III

THE CONSERVATIVE MINISTER

The parliamentary elections of August and September, 1893* were

a direct response to the events of the Panama scandal and the Ralliement.

The socialists made the most notable gains, whether they went from 10

percent up to 20 percent of the representation in the Chamber, as Beau de

Lomenie reported, or from 12 to 41 deputies which is the statistic of

Chastenet.^ New recruits to the socialist ranks included Jules Guesde

and Rene Viviani, as well as Jean Jaures who had been in the Chamber again

since a special election in his district on January 8.

The center government group, however, remained almost the same 2 in number—3H according to Goguel, or 297 by Chastenetfs count —with

o ld er prom inent names giving way to new, younger s ta r s . Gone were the

names of Rouvier, Emile Loubet, and Clemeneeau; but Paul Deschanel,

August Jonnart, Poincare, and Barthou were still there, "the youngsters

to whom the mantle of leadership would fall," wrote Beau de Lomenie.

"Young Republicans of the middle class," he called them, and went on to

list their middle class connections! Poincare, already a successful lawyer, Jonnart, son-in-law of the banker Aynard, and Deschanel, "the

^ Beau de Lomenie, Dynasties Bourgeoises. 248-53, and Chastenet, Troisiema RfipufaHqiift,. I l l , 325.

2Goguel, Politinue des Partis. 71-2.

48 49 biggest snob of all, was a frequenter of the salons of the aristocrats *11 ^

But apparently, he could find no parallel connections for Barthou, although Barthou had an extra-parliamentary job of defending cases before the Court of Appeal in Paris. As for Barthou*s own constituents, they gave him 1 0 ,1 2 1 v o te s, 88 percent of those cast in the arynnfilss^me^t.

Political activity on all issues began to pick up in 1894. The first argument was over the press law amendments of the previous December, passed as part of the security move against anarchists. The government was abusing its privileges under this law and was much too eager to search the homes of socialists. Although quite likely there had been improper use made of this law, the government won a vote of confidence on the issue.^ Next were controversies over matters of finance and taxes.

On January 16, the Chamber voted to reduce to a rate of 3 l/2 percent the interest on a series of government bonds which paid 4 1/2 percent.

In the Chamber M. La Rochefoucauld attempted to exempt from this reduc­ tion those bonds which supported hospitals and charitable institutions.

Barthou voted against this suggestion and the motion failed, with most of the socialists abstaining. Jaures then asked that the money saved by this scheme be used to help fanners who were being ruined by the import of cheaper American grain. This proposition was defeated, as was one to use the conversion sura for pensions to injured workers, with Barthou

Beau de Lomenie, loc. c it.

^Ind B-F. 24 August 1893.

5JOCD. 2? January 1894. 50 voting for the majority both times. The conversion proposition then passed with only one negative vote.^ Nor did the socialists succeed in aiding the farmers by lowering the land tax on farms; the government was upheld in its decision to postpone discussion of this idea until after 7 the budget was approved. But a strange revision in the tariff on grain was accepted after a nine-day debate. An increase of 10 francs was pared to 8 and then 7 before it passed. The socialists had mixed feelings on the matter; Jaures led those who favored the tariff while Jacques,

Millerand, and Vaillant were among those who opposed--as was Barthou.

Then a 3 franc tax on grain used by bakers narrowly missed passage by

212 to 223, Barthou approving and most of the socialists abstaining. The Q entire tariff law was then easily approved at 7 francs.

In the first half of 189*+ the republican deputies did very little to implement their campaign promises of reform made the previous fall.

In March, a resolution of urgence for the discussion of constitutional revision failed, and the Chamber then voted not to discuss the matter until the commission of initiative had finished its work; Barthou was with the majority on both votes, with the socialists and ultra conserva­ tives opposing.^

Of all the election planks, clericalism received the most consideration. In March the mayor of St. Denis had interfered with a parade by an order prohibiting religious services or symbols in the streets. This caused Brisson to introduce in the Chamber a resolution

16 January 189*+. ^JOCD. 12-19 February 189*+.

^JOCD. 20 January 189*+. ^JOCD. 3 March 189*+. 51 stating the Chamber *s steadfast adherence to the principles of anti­ clericalism. The resolution failed, with the government republicans rejecting it and accepting a milder resolution expressing confidence in the Chamber*s ability to defend the secular state.^ In voting with the government on these matters, Barthou demonstrated a strange pacifism toward clericalism in view of his later campaign against it. This may have been his means of keeping many Catholics on the side of the govern- ment--as indeed many of his critics charged. In any case it seems he was already starting on the course of trying to be both anti-clericalist and anti-socialist, and his attitude on this issue was more likely anti­ socialist. He mentioned this view on religion again in September in a speech at Les Sables d*Qlonne: "The government is always respectful of the Catholic religion, as of all religions. . . . It asks nevertheless that the clergy not manifest themselves against a regime legally estab­ lished by national sovereignty."^ But the issue was forced and sides had to be taken in May when a Papal Nuncio usurped his ambassadorial authority and privilege by advising French bishops on their political action. The government subsequently asked for and received an explanation from the Vatican and a promise that such a performance would not be rep e ate d . 12

Before arguments on politics and labor really got under way that spring, the Chamber voted, with little discussion and only one negative

10H2id.

^ Journal des Debats. 3 September 189^.

1 2 J0CP- 17 May 189^. 52 vote, to create a ministry for colonies. Funds to operate this newly 13 created department were then appropriated by a vote of 369 to 1 0 3 .

Giving the secretaryship for colonies ministerial status was one of the many indications that year of the continually growing importance of colonialism in French political affairs. Another clear expression of the g en eral p arliam en tary opinion came on November 26 w ith the passage of funds to finance the expedition in Madagascar. The French government resident in Madagascar, Le Myer de Vilers, had left the island in I 889 when the Queen of Madagascar refused to submit the whole territory voluntarily to the status of a French protectorate. After the 1890 agreement with England, in which England obtained Zanzibar in exchange for reco g n izin g France in Madagascar, the Chamber an n u ally became more interested in undertaking the expense of a m ilitary expedition to make the island a protectorate. Although the debate on this question continued fo r fiv e days, the money was ap p ro p riated by an easy m a jo rity , 372 to 14 135* Several socialists voted for the appropriation, but Lockroy,

Vaillant, and Jaures were opposed to the venture. Barthou, on the other hand, sided with the majorities on all these votes on colonial affairs, although he participated in none of the debates.

Labor and railroads were topics of great debate in the Chamber in

189^. Tn February the ministry of Casimir-Perier survived a vote of confidence, two to one, arising from a discussion of the government's closing the Bourse du Travail the previous fall; the answer of Jonnart,

22-26 November I 8 9 L. 53

Public Works Minister* had been that this Bourse by its political activ­ ities was violating the 1884 law on associations.^ In May the ministry was not so fortunate* Jules Guesde submitted a law proposing an eight- hour day and a forty-eight-hour week. Barthou charged that this was a political maneuver by the "chiefs of a noisy minority," rather than a desire of the majority of workers. The law was disposed of by denying it a declaration of urgence and sending it back to the labor commission.^

The discussion then turned to consideration of the National Congress of the Federation of Railroad Workers* Private railroad companies refused to let members of their unions go to the Congress. Antoine Jourde then asked the government what the reaction would have been if the question had involved state rather than private railroad workers, to which Jonnart responded that the ministry did not believe the 1884 syndicate law

covered government employees. This was the answer the socialists wanted.

Millerand proposed a motion to "invite" the government to request that both private and public railroads allow their personnel to unionize.

Casimir-Perier objected and called for a vote of confidence on this issue*

They voted ; he l o s t 271 to 251 w ith 76 abstentionsAgain i t was a left-right coalition that pulled down the ministry; it was becoming evident now to the government republicans that they would soon have to court substantial support from either the left or right if they intended to keep governments in office.

15JOGD. 10 February 1894.

l 6 ijJQCDt 22 May 1894. 17- Minister of Public Works

Eight days later, on May 30* Charles Dupuy put together his

second cabinet, which Pelletan charged was really a minority cabinet

since Dupuy and Casimir-Perier, former President of the Council and

President of the Chamber respectively, had simply traded titles. But the

crisis was resolved when the Chamber on June 4 accepted Dupuy by a 316 to

148 majority.^® Like the year I960 in the United States, Dupuy's choice

of ministers was a victory for youth. Only General Mercier, Minister of

Wa-, and Felix Faure, Minister of the Navy, were over 50- Dupuy himself

was 43. Poincare, Finance, and Barthou, Public Works, 33 and 31 respec­

tively, were referred to in the streets as Les deux gosses. which was the

title of a currently popular melodrama. 19 The change-over of the

government to the generation of young republicans was now complete.

Once the m inisterial crisis was resolved the talk turned again to

labor. The miners* retirement law was back in the Chamber from the

Senate and placed under discussion on June 9. Augustin Ramel proposed

further amendments; he wanted the usual sums paid into the fund for

miners during their service in the armed forces, foreign workers and their

employees to contribute to the fund, and the retirement age for miners

cut from 35 to 50- Barthou begged that this bill, which had already been

kicked back and forth since 1880 in a scrimmage between the Chamber and

Senate, be allowed passage without further delay. The law as it stood

l 8 J0CP. 4 June 1894. 19 Jules Bertaut, Louis Barthou (Paris, 1919). p. 11. Comically misspelled, gasses. in Barthou1 s obituary in the Home Edition of The New York Times. 10 October 1934. 55 already included health and accident insurance as well as retirement

credits. Ramel*s proposal lost by odds of four to one, and the law, later to be known as the law of 29 June 1894 on aid and retirement of o0 miners, passed with only one dissenting vote. u

Barthou took advantage of the summer Chamber adjournment to return to the Basses-F^ren^es and collect some of the cheers the people were waiting to bestow on him. At least one Paris paper took note of his 21 triumphal trip south, and the local papers were ecstatic about the department*s first cabinet minister. Politicking was kept at a minimum and the whole affair was a "veritable f&te de fam ille1' in honor of their

?? friend, compatriot, republican b£arnais.

Before the Chamber reconvened in the autumn, Barthou had found excuses to make a trip to England in his official capacity as Public

Works M inister. An improvement of the harbor facilities at Le Havre had

just been started and Barthou visited similar installations in London, and commented on the excellent omnibus service in both Manchester and

London, However, the chief purpose of this visit was to study the London

"metropolitan," as he called it, because the ministry was about to begin

construction of a metro in Paris, which he hoped would be open in time 23 for the Paris international exposition of 1900.

20 ilfifli, 9 June 1894.

21Journal des Debats. 30 July 1894.

22Ind B-P 30, 31 July 1894, and Le Glaneur. same dates.

^ Ind B-P. 30 August 1894. This was the Vincennes-Porte-Kaillot section of the present Vincennes-Pont-d*Ivry Line, and was opened 16 July 1900. See Chastenet, Trolsi&me Republique. Ill, 188. 56

On his return trip from London he stayed at Les Sables df01omie

two days to do some political fence-mending and to inaugurate the harbor

at Gachere. The region was upset over the government's attitude toward

clericalism. This is why he assured them (in the speech mentioned above)

that the government was always respectful of the Catholic religion. He also felt it necessary to remind them in his second speech that monarchical

restoration was impossible! Then he reverted to his usual statements about coming fiscal reforms, balanced budgets, a more just distribution of taxes, and railroad issues. He went on to accuse the socialists of raising many of their interpellations in the Chamber merely to reaffirm their existence. 25 For this Le Figaro applauded Barthou, listing

twenty-four "stupid questions" that had been raised in that session of OC. the Chamber.

Back in session that autumn, the Chamber renewed its arguments on labor and railroad issues. A proposition tc take up discussion of the articles of a b ill on unemployment compensation was defeated. Likewise, a resolution to reimburse the miners fired following the Pas-de-Calais strike lost by a heavy vote; Barthou's argument against this measure was the same that he had used in tie previous legislature, that it would encourage strikes if the workers could count on the government to pick up the tab for compensation during the time they were out of work. A bill to aid unemployed miners then came closer to passing by a vote of 222 to

24 Ind B-P. 4, 5 September 1894. 25 Ind B-P. 6 September 1894.

^ Le Figaro. 4 September 1894. 57

266 27 young republicans were no more interested in labor reforms than the older group had been.

In November the socialists censured the government for the frequency of railroad accidents, accidents due to a hundred different causes such as faulty brakes, low salaries, inadequate retirement pay, overwork, poor communications, policy collaboration try the companies, and not enough concern for safety. Barthou defended the government and the railroads by indicating that France had fewer accidents proportionally than other nations. But emotion was running high due to the recent wreck at Appilly, and the socialists were unimpressed with the safety-brake regulations Barthou had imposed on the company involved, or with the lim iting of the train crews to eight hours work in every twenty-four.

Three resolutions were defeated--to place the railroads at the disposal of the nation, to establish a commission to study railroad safety, and to establish responsibility for the accident and sue the North Railroad directors—and confidence was expressed in the government^ action by a vote of 397 to 61, most of the 61 from the le ft.28

The next month the railroad problem came up again with a vengeance. This time Jaures led a campaign to hold up government deci­ sion on giving financial aid to the railroads until the Chamber was made cognizant of important information on the administration of the lines and their faults and abuses which had gotten them into trouble; also Jaures was curious about the exact use of the funds which were listed by the

27JOCP. 13, 15 November 189^.

28J0CP. 1? November 189^. roads as "general expenses." He narrowly missed getting his adjournment

253 to 257, but then the resolution granting the subsidies passed 296

to 1 6 5 .129

Two days later Jaures was still hammering away at the ministry.

The static air in the Chamber had been building up since the Madagascar debate at the end of November and the railroad discussions the previous week; now it sparked a clash between Jaures and the government. As a side-issue during the discussion of the 1895 budget, General Mercier,

Minister of War, had proposed a b ill to make peacetime treason punishable by death. Jaures interrupted to suggest that such a law would not be enforced anyway since in the past twenty years officers convicted of treason, such as Marshal Bazaine and Captain Dreyfus (whose court-martial had pronounced him guilty of treason just two aays before), had not been executed, while at the same time enlisted men x. receive the death penalty for minor insubordinations. Jaure's and the socialists therefore proposed instead a measure which would revoke the articles in the military code that gave the death penalty for these minor infractions.

At this juncture Premier Dupuy reminded Jaures that it was illegal to bring up the decision of a court-martial in the Chamber.

Jaures argued that Article 76 of the penal code allowed the death sentence in cases of tre a so n , w hile Dupuy in s is te d i t did n o t. Dupuy then went on to charge,

He [Jaures] comes here in the name of a group of internation­ alists, under the pretext of defending the little man, to attack the hierarchy and discipline of the array. If his proposition is not opposed then the government will not remain on the benches.

29 JOCD. 2 2 December 189^. Jaures countered, "It is a little presumptious of Dupuy to speak of

internationalism the day after the whole government has attempted to

cover up for this whole cosmopolitan group (of spies,)1 referring to

Dreyfus1 trial. At this point Barthou shouted out of turn to Jaures, "I

have only one word to say to you. You know you liet" For this the

president of the Chamber called Barthou to order. Jaures replied in

kind that the Chamber was taking a singular attitude by associating

itself with affairs it was supposed to regulate. The lie, he said, was with those who were trying to bolster their popularity by a play to

patriotism . Likewise, called to order by the Chamber president, he

refused to recant. Article 124, Section 4, about temporary censure for

charges in the Chamber against members of the government, was read,

censure was voted, and Jaures was asked to leave. After a recess for

cooling off purposes, the Chamber in something of an anticlimax voted

overwhelmingly to place Jaure's1 proposal on the schedule for discussion 30 in the near future.

As for Barthou calling Jaures a liar, Jaure's charged Deputies

Viviani and Gaston Rouanet, as his seconds, to demand restitution of

arms from Barthou. Following a search the next morning for a place of

privacy, the duel finally took place at the race-track corner of Saint-

Ouen Park at 10:20 A.M., Tuesday, Christmas morning. Jaures fired a

split-second before Barthou, and both retired from the field of honor— 31 like two little boys—without a reconciliation having taken place .J

^ JOCD. 24 December 1894 60

After Christmas vacation, with this rather bizarre beginning, the

matter of railroads was taken up once more. The first problem was that

of commuter service into Paris; the complaints were standard—high fares,

too few trains, and old coaches. Part of the problem had been created by

the railroads making unannounced changes in schedules and fares, for which

Louis Barthou had warned them to comply with the regulations about posting

such notices at all stations.^ He indicated that some of the lines had

been ordered by the government, as far back as 1883, to offer commuter

service with reduced rates to workers; other lines had done so voluntarily.

He proposed that all the roads should offer such service and the Chamber

voted by voice their approval of this order . ^

Two days later, on January 13, Barthou submitted his resignation

as Public Works Minister to the President of the Council. The Council of

State had reversed his decision, which the Chamber of Deputies had

approved several times, that the Midi and Orleans Railroads had to adver­

tise on the securities they sold that the state was guaranteeing profits

to these companies only up to December 31, 1914. After the decision was made by the Council of State, the railroads had advertised that profits were assured through 1 9 3 6, the date of the termination of their franchises.

Barthou declared that he did not feel he should remain in a cabinet post where he would be responsible for a decision with which he did not agree.34 His critics of the day, such as Millerand, thought there were

^ Ind B-P. 16-17 August 1894.

~^J0CD. 11 January 1895.

^ JQCD. 14 January 1895. 61

deeper motives involved, that Barthou did not like the court decision but

was not going to stay around to fight the investment speculation that

would result from it.*^ Nearly two years later, the editor of La

Laaiflma, M. Cornudet, accused Louis Barthou of creating this conflict so

that he could profit from a c o u p d e Bourse and thus obtain a wedding

present from the stock brokers in the form of a kickback. He demanded

and got exoneration from a jury of honor on this charge.^ As for Premier

Dupiy, he did not feel the court*s verdict extending the interest period

had interfered with the parliamentary function of the Chamber and he

agreed to accept a vote of confidence on the concept of separation of

powers. The Chamber thought otherwise and he was voted out 2*4-1 to 2 6 3 .- ^

It is difficult to fathom the motives of Barthou in resigning.

It would seem that a young, ambitious—too ambitious of course for his

critics—minister would wish to remain in his first cabinet post; if he

was the upper-middle class friend of bankers; it would seem he could be

of more service to them by staying where he was during the railroad

stock speculation. Perhaps he did resign to protest the Council*s

decision. Or perhaps his resignation was for purely personal reasons,

because on January 29, Tuesday, at 4:30 in the Madeleine Church in Paris,

he was married to Alice Mayeur, daughter of a Parisian landscape painter.

Possibly Dup^y*s demise was precipitated by Barthou*s resignation; but if

35Andre Soulier, L*Instabllite Ministerielle de la Troisiime Republique. 1871-1938 (Paris, 1939). p. 352, has decided that Barthou was honest in saying he didn*t like the Council of State*s decision.

36Ind B-P. 17 October 1 8 9 6.

14 January 1895- 62

he bore Barthou any grudge because of the crisis, it was not strong

enough or soon enough to keep him from attending the wedding reception at

the Continental Hotel, along with Brisson, Ribot, Leygues, Poincare,

Hanoteaux, and Terrier.

The former minister from the Basses-Pyrenees participated very l i t t l e in th e a c t i v i t i e s of the Chamber p rio r to i t s adjournm ent fo r

summer v acatio n in 1895* Two p o l i t i c a l speeches in the summer and two press interviews indicated his views for the year however. On the thirtieth of May he spoke at a teachers meeting at Lille, asking for republican support against the royalists and socialists; included also were the usual pleas for economic reforms and a balanced budget. And he

criticized interpolators in the Chamber for turning many sessions into theoretical political discussions rather than sticking to b u s i n e s s . ^9

A month later in an interview with a reporter for the D£p£che de

Toulouse, he reiterated his opinion on the court decision on the govern­ ment guarantee of interest for securities of the Midi and Orleans lines; he s t i l l thought the in te n t of the Chamber was to term in ate these guarantees in December 31« 191^.^

In August he made his political speech of the year at Oloron, still pushing for the railroad through Canfranc to Spain and praising the department on defeating the socialists in the recent elections for the

^8Le Glaneur. 2 February 1895-

Qlanflur, 31 May 1895. ^°Ind B-P. 30 June 1895. 63

Council General. He went on to an attack against clericalism. He complimented the Republic for establishing and preserving liberty of conscience and then criticized the Catholic Church for trying to obtain revision of the school law, revision of the military law as it applied to seminary students, abrogation of the divorce law, revocation of the decrees relative to congregations—in effect supporting all the measures which would return to Christian principles all the legislation the Church thought was under the influence of social atheism. He defined the

Republic as achievement of equality of all citizens before law, the liberty of conscience, all aspirations—in Proudhon*s words—for the amelioration of society. "Our action, inspired by human solidarity, need have no lim its except the rights of individuals and the inalienability of natural law." Listing the recent achievements of the Republic he pro­ ceeded to place lim its on future action, as he criticized the program of the socialists.

Do you think that the nationalization of the banks, railroads, and mines w ill su ffic e ? The object is collectivism. And collectivism is expro­ priation with or without indemnity. . . . After collectivism comes communism. . . . What do they ask for in the s o c ia lis t papers? The commune 1^-

Moving on to economic m atters he advocated immediately a balanced budget, an income tax at proportional rates, a commission headed by Poincare to study an income tax arrangement, and a retirement plan for all workers.

The last proposal in his speech was an appeal for universal suffrage.^

Le Glaneur. 17 August 1895.

^2Ib id . 64

When Ribotrs cabinet fell at the end of October and Bourgeois formed a ministry the first of the next month, he offered Barthou the

Ministry of Colonies, The DenSche de Toulouse reported that Barthou, in declining the portfolio for which he did not feel he had much qualifica­ tion, stated that he was nonetheless glad to be a friend of Bourgeois,

More realistically, he admitted he did not agree with Bourgeois on either a "lump tax" or a progressive tax on revenue, or on the principle of having to declare incomes for tax purposesthese were most likely reasons for declining the cabinet post.

The most animated discussion of the deputies in 1895 concerned the labor situation at Carmaux. The strike had begun in early August—in the last analysis due to a lockout—and it was the first major topic considered by the Chamber when i t convened in l a te O ctober. For three days Jaures described the situation which had developed as largely due to the management's. efforts to obstruct union activities. 44 The glass workers were among the best paid in France, but the owners were deeply and basicly opposed to organized labor; two employees who had been elected as delegates to a national glass workers conference had been denied all fu tu re entrance to the fa c to ry . The Chamber voted on October 26 not to intercede forcibly in the strike.^

Ribot's cabinet had fallen October 28 when his Minister of

Justice, Jacques Trarieux, refused, on the principle of separation of

43 Ind B-F. 3-4 November 1895-

JQCD. 24-26 October 1895*

^ JOGD. 21 November 1895- 65 powers, to reveal the court findings on the financial irregularities of the Sud Railroad. Leon Bourgeois replaced Ribot and within the month

Jaures was after Bourgeois to help out the Carmaux workers. Although the strike was announced settled prematurely in September, Jaures sought on

November 21 a law which would protect the employees during arbitration; he wanted regular negotiation facilities established for the two parties and a fine of 100 to 1000 francs for firing or demoting a worker for union activities. Barthou objected that Jaures' real purpose in trying to get a declaration of urgence to discuss this law was merely to get the opportunity to bring up the Carmaux strike again. Although there was probably a great deal of truth in this, Barthou1s arguments against the proposed law were not the strongest he had presented. He took exception to Jaures* statement that it was always the patrons that refused to arbitrate, and cited cases from the Public Works Ministry records where workers had refused to negotiate; as for Carmaux, he reminded Jaures that the workers had willingly accepted the decision of the arbitrators.

He then presented the lame logic that it was a biased law Jaures proposed

since it policed only the patrons (the opposite of his 1890 s ta n d on treating both labor and management alike), and made syndicates obligatory.

Although Jaures got a four vote edge for urgence for his proposition, 255 46 to 2 5 1 t it was buried back in the Chamber schedule and never discussed a g a in i n 1 8 9 5.

Two more disagreements rounded out the year. On November 18

Barthou had eloquently supported the Bourgeois cabinet when a M, Arton

46 I b id . 66

was arrested and extradited from London in connection with the Panama

scandal. The socialists, led by Millerand, charged that the various cabinets had been sitting on this case for years. Arton was supposed to

have the lis t of 104 parliamentarians that were Panama Canal Company

stockholders; Bourgeois replied that the problem had been that of locating

Arton. The issue was a small one and the vote of confidence carried Lin overwhelmingly with only fifty-two dissenting votes. ' The other

discussion in November concerned a request to investigate the force and

funds used in Madagascar. Logistics had been so poorly organized on

this expedition that illness proved to be the greater foe—reminiscent

of Napoleon*s armies in Haiti. The measure failed 108 to 394, Barthou

opposing the investigation and Jaures and Millerand supporting it. While

they were considering colonialism they approved the campaign in

Madagascar by voting thanks to the French soldiers and officers who

fought there; this passed 426 to 54, for few deputies could fight both

colonialism and the army. 48

The rest of the year was used up, as usual, approving the budget

fo r 1896.

Had it not been for the Dreyfus affair, the income tax proposal would probably have shared the stage with labor problems as a star

attraction in the drama between left and right for at least six more years. The commission on income tax had presented its proposals, most of

^ JOCD. 18 November 1895* 48 JQGD. 2? November 1895* U ltim ately Arton served e ig h t y ears in j a i l fo r fraud in s e llin g dynamite to the Panama Canal Company. See Chastenet, Troisieme Republlque. Ill, 8?, and D. W. Brogan, France under the Republic (New York, 19^0), p. 283. 67 which were accepted by the Chamber on March 26. The scheduled rates were not exorbitant, running from one percent beginning at an income of 2500 francs and progressing to five percent for those over 5 0 * 0 0 0 ; and a s

Chastenet observed, 2500 francs then was about 45,000 in present-day

(1964) francs (or $9000), but even at that Chastenet felt the measure would not have been approved by the Chamber had not some of the moderates voted with the radical government simply to prevent a cabinet crisis at this point.^ However, the radicals, aided by liberals and moderates, never enjoyed more than a 46-vote majority on the tax, the final resolu­ tion passing only 286 to 270, with Barthou opposed to the whole id ea.^

In April the Senate, in an antediluvian display of ideology, buried the income tax right beside the whole Bourgeois government.

Worried already about what might come to light regarding railroad financing, if Bourgeois 1 cabinet wasn1t flagged down, they not only held up the income tax, but also let it be known that they would not approve additional funds for Madagascar—which the Chamber had voted 442 to 30— unless Bourgeois and company were removed. In the face of this barrier— reminiscent of the reaction of Seize Mai—Bourgeois resigned on April

23.^ Barthou was highly lauditory of Bourgeois* efforts to solve what he thought was something more than a simple m inisterial crisis. "Do you think the personal convictions of Bourgeois had more to do with the duration of his cabinet than his policy, speeches, or actionT No other

49 ^ Chastenet, Troisifeme Republlque. Ill, 87.

^°J0CD. 26 March I 8 9 6.

31J0CP. 2, 23 April 1896. 68

course could have added to his incomparable suppleness," he wrote. He

thought Bourgeois resigned to prevent a situation from which only the

left stood to benefit.

M. Bourgeois was retired for not having opened an insolu­ ble conflict in the cabinet. A radical ministry would have defied the high Assembly and war would have been declared between the public powers. We know that the collectivist parties desire these hostilities for their own profit . ^2

It is interesting to speculate how long Bourgeois might have

stayed in office had he chosen to fight the Senate at this point. He had

good support from the left and from the moderates, even those moderates

who opposed him on the income tax. Prior to the whole crisis Barthou had

w r itte n :

Our extreme parties press for extreme solutions. . . . One, still longing for an unexpected victory, calls for a radical cabinet with socialist tendencies. The other, by fear or by calculation, demands a ministry of resistance with retrogressive tendencies. The Chamber cannot tolerate either of these combinations. . . . Whereas the 300 voice republican majority calls for fiscal and social reform for the country, . . .

. . . The republicans who have reproached Bourgeois for living off the support of Jules Guesde should not resign themselves to living off the support of de Mackau [a deputy and baron with almost royalist views]. . . . They cannot have it both ways. Those who desire harmony of public power [republicans] should not practice with those who excite people . . . with hate [reactionaries].53

All the same, if success can be measured by the length of time a

Third R epublic prem ier could rem ain in o f f ic e , th e Chamber in 1896 preferred to proceed along the middle of the road as Meline steered it

52Ind B-P. 28 April 1896.

^^Ind B-P. 28 February I 896. 69 rather than the middle of the road as charted by Bourgeois. Also, these are the f i r s t in d ica tio n s by Barthou—who r e a lly hoped a republican alliance could carry future majorities—that if necessary the radicals would better serve the republican cause than would the Action Llberale

or the Groupe des Droltes parties of the right.^

Thus Meline was called in as a safe republican to appease the

Senate. Barthou was given the portfolio of Interior, to the high-blown delight of Le Figaro. which called him the Deputy who had taken the

"offensive against Clemenceau when all the world gave way to this terrible man, . . . rendered justice to Jules Ferry when the less timid recoiled before such a reckless enterprise . . • [and] has accepted blow for blow with Jaures.

With a successful election behind them, and with their champions now in the ministry, the young republicans could afford to be a degree more fo rce fu l in helping determine p o licy during the 189*4-1896 Chamber

sessions* Their bourgeois leanings were evident in such matters as

tariff, and they were no more ready to undertake any real social reform than their predecessors, the old republican clique, had been. The

change was one of power, not policy. As for Barthou, his resignation from the Public Works Ministry was the first indication that he did not intend to remain forever a mere party follower.

5*+ In addition to notes 52 and 53 * see Ind B-P. 7-8 June 1895*

^ Le Figaro. 29 April 1896. Minister of Interior

As Minister of Interior, Barthou exchanged words on June 4 with the socialists in a leitm otiv, of which most French deputies were capable, and which frequently livened the pages of the Journal O fficiel. Louis

Renou, deputy from the Seine, complained to the Minister of Interior about the recent use of police to regulate the crowd at the annual socialist procession to Pere-Lachaise Cemetery. He accused Barthou of having secret agents there to kick socialists and still to appear to act as though the police were impartial. The Minister responded that the socialist press reported that the police did not employ their usual tactics and were less beastly than usual. Jaures interrupted at this point to say, "We always exaggerate (laughs were heard)."

But beyond the jokes, right and left, the discussion continued regarding the policies of the Minister of Interior; the police were there, and the Chamber approved the policy by a vote of ^12 to 6 l . ^

Again, four days later, the government was questioned about use of police— this time at Carmaux the previous year. Jaurds inquired why the govern­ ment had not punished the prefect of police who had acted so arbitrarily in the strike. Although Barthou had not been in the cabinet at the time, he explained that the prefect had been removed to another d istrict and promoted because he was due for a promotion to a position which was above that of prefect; the man had sixteen years seniority and a good record, and Barthou added that he and the government had complete confidence in the man. What the government’s instructions might have

5 6 JOCP. k June 1896. 71

been to the prefect during the strike was never discussed, but obviously

they were not unhappy over the way he had handled the situation. Jaures and Barthou summed up their cases by each claiming his own party to be

the better friend of the Republic, and the Chamber approved the resolu-

tions of the government once more. 57 The press dutifully echoed public

opinion and the policy of the ministry in reporting this seance. The

Journal des Debats complimented the government; "well played," said

Le Rappel: "a decisive victory by a single coup against the socialist and radical coalition," decided La Palx: Le Temps thought Moline* s

cabinet had proved it was not pro-right and pro-Catholic; "Jaures wasn*t Cg at his best," concluded Le Siede.

The first few months of Barthou1s occupancy of this post were

a good example—and probably not uncommon to the Third Republic—of

how the office could, still within the confines of the law, operate

to further the security of the government in power and to hold down

the communication between its opposition and the public. Before depart­

ing from Paris for his summer vacation, Barthou addressed a circular

to all the prefects—"confidential, naturally," said Le Siecle; "these

are the first which are most assuredly and most promptly revealed" —

on the attitude to take during parliamentary vacation regarding

revolutionary agitators and on the instructions to give their agents.

With the Chamber adjourned, deputies could not invoke their usual

immunity and thus could be immediately apprehended if they got in

trouble. Prefects of police were to watch carefully for all speeches,

^7JOCD. 8 June 1896. Cg See the 9 June issue of these papers; also see Ind B-P. 11 June 1896. 72

articles, and especially party reunions and take action as soon as any

of these passed the legal confines of the law. Violators were to be

apprehended immediately, in the case of speakers, without waiting until

the meeting was over.^ In another move he annulled a 10,000 franc

appropriation by the municipal Council of Paris to send two delegates

from the Bourse du Travail to a labor conference in London.^

Altogether the Ministry of Interior was a depository for reports of meetings, party rallies, and newspaper articles; information concern­

ing the acts and words of the government1s critics was forwarded to the Paris office from the Courts of Appeal and Councils General throughout

France.^ The same policy applied to statements of foreign policy, even

when the attacker was outside France, Applying sections of the 1881

press law, sometimes acting on information and clippings sent to it, the

Interior Ministry stopped the circulation of foreign journals which

criticized the French government or even France*s allies. The Italian

paper Secolo XIX and the German journal Juaend both had some of their

issues banned from France and the overseas departments for writing disparagingly about the Franco-Russian alliance and the czar.^^

59Ind B-P. 22 July I 896.

6 QInd. B-P. 2k July 1896.

^This information, letters from local officials, frequently with the pertinent clippings attached, was forwarded to the Interior Ministry from local officials. Two boxes of such material are deposited at the Archives Nationales in Paris, Box nos. BB 18 2022 d. 129 A 96 and BB 18 2051 d. 129 A 9 7. One article from Le Progres Socialiste of 6 December 1896, described the Beau trio as Felix, the Father, Meline, the Son, and Barthou, the Holy Ghost. 62 See telegrams and answers from the Algerian Security Police to the Minister of Interior, 6 , 7 O ctober and 9 November I 896. Archives Nationales, loc d t. 73

As a result in part of the strike of the glass workers at Carmaux in the summer of 1895» the workers decided to open a cooperative, self- ovned glass factory at Albi. Various unions and socialist groups sub- 63 scribed funds, and the factory was ready for operation in October, I 8 9 6.

On October 25 at Albi, a celebration was held for the official opening of the factory. Hie next day at Carmaux the socialists held a rally at which Jaures was the main speaker.

Two weeks later in the Chamber, Jaures protested the governments handling of affairs at Albi and at the Carmaux rally. He told how, when the visitors arrived to attend the ceremony at Albi, they observed that the government had taken abundant precautions for the affair; police were everywhere. Hie next day Jaures read in the papers that whistles had 64 been distributed to the school children and the laborers, and the area around the railroad station had been closed to those without whistles.

W histlers heckled the socialist leaders when they arrived. Also the station where the dignitaries arrived had been closed to the public. At

Carmaux the chief of police informed Jaures that the town was under a state of siege for forty-eight hours. While the delegates gathered at the Hotel M alaterre, an orchestra was playing the Carmagnole; the orchestra leader was arrested and the instruments confiscated. After dinner Jaures continued, when they assembled in the town hall, a dis­ turbance occurred outside between the miners and the factory workers; a knife was taken from one of the crowd and brought into the hall and

^Harvey Goldberg, The Life of Jean Jaures (Madison, 1 9 6 2), pp. 187-9**. 64 The workers at Carmaux were not happy that the new factory had been built at Albi rather than Carmaux. Ibid. ?k

presented to the chairman of the meeting. Then the police arrived and

broke up the meeting.^

Barthou explained that the government was not opposed to the whole project of the cooperative glass factory, as Jaures had charged.

For example the organizers of the factory had financed it by collecting

500,000 francs in a ticket sale; the tickets actually constituted a lottery since the holders of certain numbers would receive money.

Although this lottery was illegal since no permit was asked for or granted

for it, the government had shown its good faith by allowing the sale to

continue. Barthou assumed full responsibility for all the actions of the police, who had acted under direct government orders. He explained that red flags were displayed at the union hall rather than the tri-color, and

that the group around the orchestra were singing words to the Carmagnole that insulted the "aliens," their term of reference to the workers from

Albi, and that the orchestra was playing on a public terrace where it did not belong. As for the evening meeting, Barthou explained that there were

4000 people crowded into a hall lighted with kerosene lamps, there was a disturbance outside, the special police commissioner inside the building

(the prefect from Albi deputized for the occasion) had quieted the crowd, and the meeting had progressed for half an hour before revolvers and knives began to appear; at this point the commissioner left for help, and reenforcements arrived within minutes to clear the auditorium

The Chamber voted 308 to 222 to approve the governments attitude ^ ry toward the events. The police had acted within their legal lim its.

65 JOCD. 5 November 1897.

66 Ibis*. 67 I b i d . 75

The actual motives presumedly lay somewhere between Jaures1 description and Barthou1s explanation. But the affair served as another example of the power of the Minister of Interior in political affairs throughout

France, a power Barthou was quick to use when a threat arose to his concept of the Republic.

Another example of internal security possibilities occurred on

F e b ru a ry 2 0 , 1897, when the government was interpolated on its action the previous autumn; this crisis had developed on the sixth of September when two socialist members of the German Reichstag had crossed the border into France to attend a socialist meeting at Wissembach. The two were arrested under a law that prohibited foreigners from participating in political meetings in France. Barthou and the government easily won a vote of confidence on this issued® The same law was invoked in

November, 1897, when two B ritish citizens were arrested for working for the Bourse riu Travail in Paris; the government again got a vote of confi­ dence on its action, 39^ to 9^ * ^

Politics. Reform, and the Sixth Legislature

Barthou1s middle road political doctrine was expressed quite clearly in his major political speeches. At Nancy on the first of July,

I 8 9 6, he made an anti-socialist, anti-reactionary appeal. His protests against collectivism and revolutionary socialism, he said, were not developed because he was nai've enough to think collectivism would soon

68JOCP. 20 February 1897.

69JOCP. 27 November 1897. 7 6

become a reality; such a hope was "the impossible illusion of unrealiz­

able utopias." Nor did he look any more favorably on the other extreme,

"bloody reaction." His purpose was brief; "we are determined to bend

everyone toward republicanism ."^

Later, just before his return to Paris for the convening of the

Chamber, he spoke at Qloron on October 19, giving a detailed policy

speech.^ He began by reminding his constituents that for eeven years

they had shared a mutual confidence and therefore he never felt it necessary to guard his words with them; indeed he would not likely have

spoken so strongly in the Chamber. He explained how the Moline ministry had accepted the power of government in a difficult time, after an

experience which had greatly agitated and stirred up the nation (a reference to the Senate1s victory over Bourgeois).

We have watched the radical party attempt a social division, under the pretext of fiscal reform; it has catered to revolutionary socialism; it has risked compromising Francets traditional interests to outside powers; and it has created a redoubtable conflict between the two Chambers of parliament.

All thi s wa s in direct contrast to Barthou's support of Bourgeois 1

cabinet and his praise of Bourgeois for resigning, demonstrating his

unwillingness yet to accept the idea of an income tax. He continued by

stating the governments policy as opposing equally "reaction and revolution," a phrase that was to be his political slogan the rest of his

career. He objected to the inference of the left that the "radicals and

70 Ind B-P. 2 July I8 9 6 .

^ Ind B-P. 20 October 1896. 77 the collectivist revolutionaries were the only groups upholding the ideals of the Republic, as if all the progress realized in the past twenty-five years had not been achieved by republican m inistries;" he listed especially the school law, the m ilitary law, and the law on unions among these reforms. He was critical of the Senate, which some wanted elected directly and others wanted abolished completely; he said it was actually separating responsibility from authority by exercising such great power.

Barthou continued his discussion by criticizing the socialists.

He pointed out that they advocated collectivizing the means of production to be followed by socializing the means of consumption, thus returning to the social regimes of primitive humanity; they promoted internationalism , they favored German socialists over the Franco-Russian alliance, and they wished to place even more economic and legal burdens on the industrialists. He quoted Jules Guesde as saying that since universal suffrage only sacrificed the mandate of the people to the ambitions of the candidates, therefore collectivism by revolution was the only way to serve the mandate of the people. Barthou then defined his own program: a colonial army, judicial reform by decentralizing local justice, and canals for the Midi. The next day's newspapers echoed their political preferences in reporting this speech. "A clarity, a franchise, a spirit of resolution," praised Le Temps: Le Figaro, and La Petite Gironde were complimentary. On the other side La L antern decided "nothing was lacking in the harangue of M. Barthou except ideas.

See the 20 October issues of these papers; also Ind B-P. 20-21 October 1896. 78

A year later at Bayonne he followed much the same theme in

defending the Meline ministry and republicanism in general. The one new

item in his oration was a statement on religion. Not ready yet to come

out fully in favor of separation of church and state, he simply reaffirmed

the government’s respect for freedom and liberty of conscience, a policy

which he r e ite r a te d in the Chamber the next March by voting w ith the

majority not to discuss clericalism. 73J The rest of the speech sounded

much like the platform of the year before. He spoke of the success of

the Moline ministry, of the differences between those who wished to main­

tain the accomplishments of 1789 and those who wished to repudiate them,

of the differences between those who honestly advocated organized labor

and those who merely wished to make the unions the illegal instruments of

political agitation, between those who wanted a proportional tax on

income and those who favored a graduated tax, and between those who

preferred a bicameral legislature and those who advanced the idea of a

unicameral house. Specifically, he accused Jaures, Guesde, and Millerand

of a "fogginess of program^" but he did not propose much for the immediate

future, either, except the continuance of the small and sparse reforms

under Meline. The press was not quite so taken with this performance.

Le Temps could only say that Barthou was a forceful speaker, and Le Matin

merely applauded his recount of the long, successful Meline

administration.

73 JOCP. 6 March 1897.

74 Le Temps, and Le_Matin. 4- October 1897; Ind B-P. 5 October 1897. 79

His major campaign speech in 1898 echoed the same program. He accused the radical and socialist parties of deceiving the people by offering them collectivism; he agreed collectivism was ideal, utopian, but that promising it in the near future misled the people and threatened a bloody terror against private property. Contrasting the radical and socialist program with his own republican platform, Barthou asserted that the radicals wanted a progressive income tax and a return to the scrutin de liste elections. Once again he quoted Jaures who had said that there was no difference between socialism and collectivism , that socialism was the system under which collectivism could be produced. Wanting none of this, Barthou advocated universal suffrage rather than socialism as the way to achieve reforms and promised the people new agricultural laws, fiscal reform, and constitutional reforms which would tend to decentralize administration.

In summary, Louis Barthou1s policy during the Sixth Legislature was anti-socialist, opposite to most of the radical reform programs, anti-clerical but not yet ready to fight the clericalists, pro-republican, and pro-M eline; the only noticeable change was on income tax where he had now accepted the fiscal necessity of this tax, but thought the rates should be proportional to income and not progressive. The work of the

Chamber mirrored these policies rather closely.

Few gains were made by labor during the Sixth Legislature. In

Ju n e , I 8 9 6, the socialists made an effort to secure an eight-hour day for labor but could not even get hours for children ages 13 to 16 cut down to

73Ind B-P. 26 April I898. 7^ eight; only 48 socialists voted for this bill. In October the next year, the Chamber approved in two days, with a minimum of discussion, a law providing accident insurance for industrial workers; employers were required to pay a percentage based on the type of disability and the first 2400 francs in annual wages if the disability required absence from the job for over four days. This law came back from the Senate and was 77 accepted unanimously by th e Chamber on March 2 6 ; known as the Law of 9

A p ril 1898, it was the most important piece of labor legislation of the

Sixth Legislature. As a partial result of a study of railroads begun two years earlier, a law was passed setting a work lim it of ten hours in any 24-hour period for train crews, and establishing retirement pay for workers disabled after five years or more employment with their companies

Measures involving old-age or disability pensions had no trouble on the Chamber flo o r during th is le g is la tu r e . They were the work of parliamentary commissions that presented the bills after long delibera­ tion. Less popular were the attempts to lower the maximum working hours; the campaign for a shorter week came from the socialists and the trade unions rather than parliamentary commissions. In the consideration of such measures, fiarthou*s policy, like that of many government republicans, was influenced more by anti-socialist considerations than by the desire for mild, deliberate, social reform. Although the socialists and

^ JQCD, 27 June I 896.

77iIfiffi, 26 , 28 October 1897, and 26 March I 898.

^ JOCD, 17 December 1897- 81 radicals voted in favor of all the reform issues before the Chamber, those they supported most actively were the ones least likely to succeed.

Since France, economically, was still almost half agricultural, the other part of the social reform problem concerned the farmers. Dis­ cussion began in June, 1897, when Jaures launched his analysis of rural economic problems. On June 2 2 , this debate on agricultural affairs touched another argument of several days duration—that of the preroga­ tives of the Bank of France. JaurSs saw an opportunity to further two causes: checking some of the influence of the Bank, and getting the government to decide upon a project to provide agricultural credit. He felt that the funds of the agricultural credit societies should be taken out of the Bank of France in Paris and controlled locally where the money would be used anyway. Ihus he introduced a resolution that the consider­ ation of the Bank of France should be postponed until the government had adopted a plan for agricultural credit. His proposal failed, however, with most of the republicans, Barthou, and the right opposed to i t . ^

Tariff was another suggestion for ameliorating the farm situa­ tion; and since it was the only one proposed by the government, Jaures included it in his agriculture discussion. He explained that the socialists advocated neither protection nor free trade which he consid­ ered international economic anarchy. He pointed to Great Britain where the industrialists were asking for the abolition of duties now that their industries were well developed, and where the socialists were asking for 80 certain tariff reforms; some protection was helpful.

79 JQCD. 22 June 1897.

80JOCP. 26 June 1897. 82

But the real problem—an old one for France—was the ratio of

large estates to small holdings. In 1892 there were 17,573.000 hectares

in small farms of under 10 hectares in size, 12,758,000 hectares in

farms of 10 to 40 hectares each, and 19,230,000 hectares in farms of over

40 hectares apiece. Ten years later in 1892 the figures had declined to

11,626,500; 12,946,400; and 18,597,700 respectively.81 (This also

seemed to leave 6,400,000 hectares less in production by 1892.) These

figures indicated a consolidating trend and a decline in the number of

farms. As a solution Jaure^is offered communization of much of the land.

Both Jaures and Moline agreed that the creation of food processing cooperatives would help the farmers and still hold down the price of

food. Seven resolutions were submitted suggesting courses of action the government might initiate to help the farmers. The one which was accepted

stated that "transformation of individual property into collective property would be the end of agriculture" and "resolved to reduce the

costs of agricultural production by legislative reforms and by develop­ ing the principle of cooperatives." Thirty-nine deputies voted against

this resolution, and only 150 voted for Jaures* resolution inviting "the

government to organize a public investigation into the affairs of agri- Qp culture and the ownership of farms and agricultural working conditions."

Although this ended the discussion of agriculture, the idea of tariff as an aid to farmers came up again on December 20. Both the right

Q - i iQfiC., 13 November 1897. Qp JQCD- 20 November 1893- For complete treatment of Jaures* agricultural program see Goldberg, Jaures. 187-94. 83 83 and the left thought raising tariffs on farm products would help, but

the socialists argued that the tariff on processed food should not be raised and tariff increases should protect farmers without protecting

food processors. The socialists and farmers lost, however, and new rates were established for bread, flour, and meat, as well as for grain and

livestock. The new law gave the government authority to raise or lower ftk tariffs on these items subject to ratification by parliament. As for

Barthou, he supported Meline on all these issues.

Barthou also saw mutual aid societies or cooperatives as the

solution to other social reform needs. In a speech made to the Society

pour le preyvoyance de mutual!te in Paris in May, 1897, he proposed

mutual assistance societies as the solution to social problems through

individual initiative and free association. The various mutual aid

groups already had 230,000 members.®^ The next month at Rouen, he told

the National Congress of Public Assistance that he was in favor of old

age pensions, that the Council of State was examining such a b ill, and

he hoped to get prompt action on it in parliament. Although this was a

premature hope on his part, he at least summed up the immediate political

scene in France by observing that social problems were overshadowing

political considerations.®® Ihe bill to allow, regulate, and protect

8 3 T 20 November 1893-

JPCD. 20 December 1893. Also see Golob, Moline T ariff. 23^—35.

85In d B -P. 29 May 1897.

66Ind B-P. 16 June 1897. these mutual aid organizations was passed by the Senate on February 15*

1898, and try the Chamber March 22, by voice vote in both places.8^

Barthou1s attitude toward agricultural and social problems indi­

cated that he was looking in all directions for solutions to these prob­

lems short of adopting the policies indicated by the socialists. The

cooperatives and mutual aid societies could relieve some of these

economic problems and still preserve his concept of individual initiative

and along with government programs for old age and accident insurance for labor, they would help take away some of the gradually growing popularity

of the more comprehensive socialist program of complete unionization,

shorter hours, and regulation, or even ownership, of production

facilities.

Constitutional Reform

A few efforts were made during the Sixth Legislature to change the constitutional structure. In November, 1896, the Chamber discu ssed a proposal for direct election of senators; Barthou spoke in favor of the idea and the Chamber approved it by support from the repuolicans, radi- p Q cals, and socialists. But of all the laws brought forward this was the one least likely to get approval by the Senate.

The next October th e Chamber voted to d isc u ss a law proposed by the socialists to return to the scrutin de liste for Chamber elections,

87JOCD, 22 March I 898, and Journal Offlciel: __ Senat: Debats Parlementaires (Paris, 1897), 15 February I 898. Hereafter cited as w ith d a te .

16, 17 November I 8 9 6 . 85 and the discussion was subsequently held the following March in the midst of the turbulence of the Dreyfus Affair. The socialists favored the scrutin de liste because it more closely provided proportional repre­ sentation* which was not only proper but should have increased the strength of the minority party. The government republicans, on the other hand, preferred the scrutin d*arrondissement since it tended to magnify their majority. They had been willing to sacrifice the principle of more equitable representation of parties in the Chamber when they adopted the latter system in 18S9 to work against Boulanger. Disregarding principle, Barthou pointed out that the socialists themselves had not been in agreement in October on returning to the scrutin de liste . They appealed that their proposal was a "law to return the choice of candidates to universal suffrage"; but the Chamber voted 3^+9 to 13^ not to discuss the bill further. Barthou defended his position by explaining that the scrutin de liste would again allow multiple candidatures which he and the government felt would impede the functioning of the parliamentary system 89 as it was constituted under the Republic.

Colonialism and Foreign Policy

There was little change in the traditional attitudes on colonial­ ism and foreign policy during the Sixth Legislature, and debates on these topics decreased as the Dreyfus Affair increased in political importance.

Colonial appropriations generally were accepted in the annual budgets.

In 1 8 9 6,^^ funds for improvements in Madagascar passed overwhelmingly,

89 7JOCD. 29 October 1897; 21, 28 March I898

9°JOCD. 2 April 1896. 86 91 442 to 30> and its status was changed from enclave to colony. Likewise the creation of a Ministry of Colonies in 1894 was evidence of the in c re a sin g im portance of th is a c t i v i t y . ^ In June, 1895. the Chamber expressed its approval of the Foreign Ministry1s operations by voting approval of the Franco-Russian Alliance and of the Far Eastern involve­ ment, along with a more hotly contested decision to approve the agreement to take part in the Kiel celebration. 93 ^

Xhfi Affair

While Barthou was Minister of Public Works in Dupuy*s second

cabinet, an army artillery captain, Alfred Dreyfus, was arrested on

October 15, 1894, charged with having delivered secret documents to agents of a foreign power. Found guilty on December 22, after a three- day court-martial, he was sentenced, decommissioned, and transported to

Devil*s Island, in the spring of 1895, to begin a sentence of deportation and life imprisonment.

Few Frenchmen outside of *he members of the court-m artial, and

those actually guilty of the treason, had knowledge of the trial evidence, nor had any reason to suspect the trial was mishandled, in that evidence used was not made available to the defense.^ Not even General Mercier,

Minister of War, had any immediate reason to examine the classified evidence in what appeared to be a routine case of treason. Because the

20 June 1896. 92 See above,fp. 51-52.

93JOCP. 10, 11 June 1895-

^^Chapman, Drevfus Case. 95. 87 case dealt with secret data of the arny and the possible dealings with foreign powers, Mercier and Premier Dupuy, who was also M inister of

Interior, only discussed the matter with the other ministers who might become involved in the m atter—Eugene Guerin (Justice) and Gabriel

Hanoteaux (Foreign A ffairs). It was only after Dreyfus* arrest was pub­ lished in the press that the rest of the cabinet were told of the 95 bordereau—a note ascribed to Dreyfus—which proved his guilt. J And even had they subsequently learned of the illegal trial procedure, they would not have requested a retrial for a man everyone believed to be g u i l t y .

So the matter lay for nearly two years. In this interim only a handful of Dreyfusists came forward: Mathieu and Lucie Dreyfus, who were brother-in-law and wife of the accused; Mernard Laxare, who as a literary critic and historian was reasoning well with no access to evidence;7 96 and later Lieutenant Colonel Picquart, who had both evidence and morality. Each of these for his own reasons continued to protest the verdict on Dreyfus. It was Picquart among the officials involved who was first w illing to question the decision. On July 2, 1895* he became head of the counter-espionage office of the French General Staff, the office in which Dreyfus had worked and from which he was supposed to have stolen certain documents. By fall Picquart had realized that papers were still disappearing from the office and that a Major Marie-Charles-Ferdinand

Walsin-Esterhazy was involved in espionage. Picquart could not be

■^Louis Leblois, L*Affalre Drevfus (Paris, 1929)* pp. 240-48.

96Goldberg, Jaures. 213-14. 88 dissuaded by his superiors from investigating the entire situation, and a

year later was transferred to an army post in the Midi just two days 9 7 before the first Chamber discussion of the matter.

On November 18, Andr6 Castelin interpellated the government on

the case and the developments which had appeared in print since that

time. General Billot, a permanent senator and now Meline1s Minister of

War, assured the Chamber that the court martial and the government's

action had all been in order. The majority of the Chamber was uncon­

cerned and still convinced of Dreyfus' guilt. The best Castelin could do was get a vote of confidence on a resolution enjoining the government

to "investigate, if there were cause, the responsibilities that are

revealed in the Dreyfus trial, and since the trial." This passed by-

voice vote.^®

Two allies joined the Dreyfusists in 1897. The first was

Clemenceau who wanted to use this scandal to redress his involvement in two previous scandals, those of Boulangism and Panama; and if any of the new generation of young republicans were placed in jeopardy by this

Affair, fine. The second ally was Auguste Scheurer-Kestner—another permanent senator and almost the Senate's permanent vice-president. A lawyer friend of Picquart1s had convinced Scheurer-Kestner that he should continue to seek a reexamination of the Affair, and reconfirmed for the senator what Mathieu Dreyfus had told him two years earlier. Scheurer-

Kestner had gotten nowhere talking to General Billot in the fall, so

97 Chapman, Dreyfus Case. Chap. VI.

•^JQCD. 18 November 1896. 89 this time he went directly to the President of the Republic, F^Lix Faure, who also refused to become involved.^ His next appeal, to Moline, was no more successful, and prompted Moline to call a cabinet meeting on

November 9 at which Faure himself presided, and at which an official policy was determined, Barthou issued a statement to the press.

Captain Dreyfus has been properly and justly convicted by the general staff [Conseil de guerre]. . • . Since the M inister of Justice has received no new information and no new evidence, it is the government’s duty to guarantee the execution of the s e n t e n c e . 1^0

In November the army decided to investigate the charge of Mathieu

Dreyfus against Esterh&zy. The decision to court-m artial Esterhazy was announced on December h, and Castelin again interpellated the government, asking if there was now new information on the Dreyfus A ffair. Meline replied, “There is no Dreyfus Case.“ He went on to explain that a court- m artial was to be conducted for another army officer and the two trials were not related; nor did he plan to interfere as long as the matter was being handled by the army and an examining judge. This was what most of the Chamber wanted to hear and they voted their confidence in Meline.

However, regardless of the difficulty in fathoming accurately the motives behind the votes of that day, it would appear that some of the traditional attitudes were being reexamined. The m ajorities Meline received were not as large as those of the previous winter. A resolution stating that the Chamber should stay out of judiciary matters was swamped, 90 to V+2; a measure requesting the government to try to stop

99 Chapman, Drevfus Case. 152-53.

100Leblois, LHffair _Dreafus. 37-^3. the public attacks on the army was defeated, although only by 18 votes; and in the last resolution, voted clause by clause, the Chamber approved the judgment of the array and the compliments made to the army by the War

Minister with only 18 negative votes; but approval of the declarations of the government passed with 13*+ more deputies voting their dissatisfaction with these declarations. A vote was not taken to pass tc the order of the day, and in the next session two days later, nobody felt like renewing the discussion.

With the events of 1898 it became impossible to sweep the Affair under the rug, where Meline and the republicans wanted it to stay, at least until after the general elections of May. Had not the Chamber the previous spring voted itself a six-month extension of power, this hurdle would have been cleared in the calmer months of August and September,

1897. But the tide was rising rapidly in the pre-election months, and to try to deny that an Affair existed grew increasingly difficult month by month. On January 11 Esterhazy was acquitted, to the surprise of very 1 op few. Three days later Emile Zola published his letter, 11 JTaccuse. w

On the twenty-second a session of the Chamber turned into a riot. In

February Zola was tried and found guilty of attacking a branch of the government; and Picquart was dismissed from the army.

It was the conservative rallia. Albert de Mun, who brought up

Zola's charges in the Chamber the same day they appeared in the press, charging Zola had defamed the country, the government, and the two

^ ^ JOCD. *+, 6 December 1897.

1Q2Le Figaro. 12 January 1898. 91 courts-m artial. Jaures answered that the existing situation was sub­ ordinating the Republic to m ilitary power. Criticism of Meline now came from the other side; Godefroy Cavaignac asked Meline why he did not exonerate the army and the government by revealing the confession Dreyfus had made to the m ilitary police officer who guarded him at his decom­ missioning. Moline neither confirmed nor denied that such a confession

I n o IQk e x i s t e d , J actually it did not exist. The deputies seated in the

Chamber who had been in the cabinet during the trial of Dreyfus—Barthou,

Iheophile Delcasse, Dupuy, Leygues, Poincare, and Marie Viger—all remained silent, moot testimony to their loyalty to Meline, republicanism, and the republican prospects in the coming election. It seemed odd, wrote Jacques Kayser, a nephew of Dreyfus, that not one of them fe lt he should speak out.^^ That same day the Senate indicated its attitude toward the Dreyfusists; Scheurer-Kestner was defeated in the annual 106 election for vice-president of that house.

On January 22 in the Chamber, Cavaignac renewed his request for revelation of the confession Dreyfus was supposed to have made to the m ilitary police officer, Lebrun-Renaud; Meline this time stated there was such a confession. At this point Jaures charged that the Republic was now threatened by Jesuit generals in the same way court generals had brought down the Empire; he continued that the charges against Jola were lies and cowardice. As Jaures warmed up to his subject the applause from

^ ^ JOCD. 13 Ja n u a ry I 8 9 8. 10^ Chapman, Dreyfus Case. 100.

Jacques Kayser, L1 Affaire Drevfus (Paris, 19^+6), pp. 133-3^. 136 Ib i d . 92

the left and the protests from the right increased in volume. Twice the

President of the Chamber admonished Jaures about his choice of words. The c o n serv a tiv e Compte de B arnis accused Ja u res of being a member of the

Syndicate—the spokesman for Jews and Dreyfusards. Jaures flatly called

Barnis a liar and verbal action changed to physical. The President gave up at this point and so did the secretary. The Journal Official reads

simply, “(Vive agitation) M. le president leve la seance." The guards 10? were called to clear the house. At the next session two days later, in a calmer atmosphere, Jaures asked for precise answers to three direct questions: why was it assumed that the Army cculd not be criticized (by

Zola), why had the Dreyfus and Exterhazy courts-martial been held in closed chambers, and why had secret evidence been used against Dreyfus? Meline still tried to follow his policy of non-involvement by pleading

the separation of legislative and judicial powers. He got his vote of 108 confidence with only 123 deputies opposed.

Twice more before the elections the Affair was discussed in the Chamber. On February 22 Ernest Roche, quoting Le Temps, told about a meeting between commander-in-chief of the Army General Martinie and

Mathieu Dreyfus in which Martinie wanted to know who in the Senate was

pushing for revision, since this involved the integrity of two generals;

one was Billot, but Roche wanted to know who the other one might be. He

also accused Blillot of knowing and withholding everything Picquart knew,

and asked why, if Esterhazy was acquitted, had not charges been brought against his accusers. Provocative questions all, the government

10 7 JOCD. 22 January 1898.

~^^JQCD. 2k January 1898. 93 nonetheless got a vote of confidence again, H21 to 4-9, with only the 109 socialists opposed. On April 2 when the Court of Cassation granted

Zola*s request for an appeal trial, the government was criticized in the

Chamber for its attitude which prolonged the crisis, but Moline1s XX o ministry was again upheld, 306 to 167* On April 7 the Chamber adjourned to concentrate on election campaigns.

Molinefs policy of trying to avoid the Affair was only a partial success. He did manage to reach the election adjournment without losing a vote of confidence; any cabinet change at that point, he was sure, would produce a radical cabinet and would have been a handicap to the republicans in the May elections. It was claimed that he wanted to use the government machinery, especially the Interior M inistry, to work against the radicals in the elections, but Barthou refused to do this.^^

However, in the election campaign the government felt it necessary to explain to the country that it was not following the dictates of the XX2 right in the Affair. The election returns were not completely satis­ factory for Meline, either. The republicans won some 2H5 seats, a loss of about i*-0; the conservatives and rallies remained at about 100; the total radical and socialist force increased ty about the same amount 113 that the republicans lost, and now totaled 1H0 or 150. This meant

^ 9 J Q C D . 2U February I 8 9 8.

I 1 QJQCD. 2 A p r il 1898.

Chapman, Drevfus Case. 208. 112 See Barthou's campaign speech at Oloron on April 25, in the Ind B-P. 26 April I 8 9 8.

113 Figures do not agree. These are averages taken in considera- ation of the lod-ihE. Meline*s La R&publiaue Francalse. and Le Journal des Debats issues for 9, 10* and 23-25 May 1898. See also Peter Campbell, French Electoral Systems (Paris, 1958), pp. 80-83. 94

that a coalition of the right and left could muster as many votes as

could the republicans, the very situation Meline had hoped to prevent by

placating the right in the Affair,

For Barthou, the election was proof of his fear that Meline was losing popularity because the support he had from the right was too much 114 influenced by the clericalists.

Two weeks after the Chamber reconvened in June, 1898, Meline was

winning a vote of confidence on the government1s program! "The Chamber

approves the declaration of the government and resolves to practice a

policy of reforms founded on a union of Republicans, ..." At th is

point, wrote Guy Chapman, Brisson, who had been defeated in the election

for president of the Chamber and took this as an indication of Meline*s pro-clericalist feelings, saw a chance to defeat Meline by making it

appear Meline wanted only republican support for his governmentHe

had a clause added to the resolution being voted, "supported only by

republicans;" Meline saw the trick and asked the Chamber to vote down the

clause. They accepted it, however, 295 to 246, with the left and the

right, and a few republicans making up the majority. Once again, on an

issue as clearly conservative as this one, the left joined the right to

pull down a cabinet. Meline resigned.

The Emerging Politician

The young minister from Qloron was assured a national political reputation by his inclusion in the Dupuy and M6line cabinets. His defense of these two ministries in the Chamber was enough to prove his

n i h Aubert, Barthou. 115.

115Chapman, Dreyfus Case. 209. 95 usefulness to the republican groups. Furthermore, his judicious handling ox the Interior Ministry for two years demonstrated to them that he could guard their interests against inroads from the left. His own position was well known; he disliked both extremes—reaction and revolution.

The primal determinant in Barthou*s policy thus far had been the gradually rising force of socialism. At each point he had managed to find a partial answer with which to thwart the reforms pressed for by the left, thereby denying them complete success in their plans. The tariff issue was settled by including protection for some businesses as well as agriculture, and he hoped the mutual aid societies and food processing cooperatives could alleviate the economic problems of farmers and industrial laborers, consequently stealing some of the thunder from the socialist program. He also opposed proportional representation under the scrutin de liste . fearing that adoption of this plan without any modification would aid the socialist minority at the expense of the republican majority. His only real policy change during this period was his acceptance of the idea of an income tax, only if this tax had a single rate for all income levels.

But Barthou was equally wary of the growing clericalist campaign on the right, a program which included more Church control over education and less government regulation of the activities of the religious orders.

Thus, so far, his dilemma was that of avoiding both the left and the right; this became especially complicated when these two groups joined forces occasionally against the center government. The advent of the

Breyfus A ffair, however, gave him an opportunity to divide these two factions over the religious issue. Also the Affair had already given too much aid and comfort to the left, in part due to the fact that the

republicans had some friends among the clericalists. An anti-clericalist

policy, therefore, could be used to rid his group of its clericalist

taint as well as to divide the enemy.

Barthou, however, was not yet a party leader. This came after

I 8 9 8. The anti-clericalist issue was to elevate him to the position of policy-maker. CHAPTER IV

THE ANTI-CLERICALIST DEPUTY

The End of the A ffair and the Appearance nf th« HI ne

Like many movements and changes in the history of France, the

Dreyfus Affair did not reach out to the residents of the countryside nor down to the lower classes in the urban areas. "I am bound to admit that the working classes appear to take no interest whatever in the question," wrote demenceau.^ But in political and intellectual circles France was divided by the Affair in much the same way the Civil War divided the

United States; there could be no "no-man^ land" of neutral opinion.

Families, engagements, partnerships, and friendships were broken up, 2 wrote Chapman. So too, he could have added, were political coalitions.

As early as February, 1898, the socialists and radicals were beginning to reconsider their position vis vis the Affair, and before the end of the year the republicans who had supported Meline were designing ways to disassociate themselves from the right.

Quoted in Chapman, Dreyfus Case. 199• As an indication of how little interest was generated outside Paris over the Affair, Barthou1s campaign speech of 25 April 1898 and a report of his criticism of the treatment of Jews in Algerian riots caused by the Affair (Ind B-P. 22 February 1898) were the only times the Affair was mentioned in the Oloron press. 2 Chapman, loc. c it.

97 98

But before the autumn convening of the Chamber where the new

coalitions were in evidence, decisive events transpired for Alfred

Dreyfus. In the summer Major Joseph Henry*s house of forged and fabri­

cated documents collapsed. As a staff officer in the counter-espionage

office in I89h, Major Henry had pieced together the borderau used against

Dreyfus; since that time he had come up with manufactured evidence as the

occasion required. On July 7> Cavaignac had presented in the Chamber a

lette r provided by Henry as one of three documents which he swore

convinced him of Dreyfus* guilt. This memorable evidence and statement

were approved by the government and Chamber, printed, and posted on the

bulletin boards of every town hall in France. The vote to do so was

passed unanimously in the Chamber with only 21 abstentions.-^ Two days

later Picquart gave his opinion in an open note to Brisson that the

letter was forged. On August 13, a security officer, Captain Cuignet,

discovered that the letter, the faux Henry as it came to be called, was put together from two different types of paper. Henry was confronted with this fact on August 30 and took his own life the next day, thus ending the cloak and dagger phase of the Affair and convincing nearly everyone that Dreyfus—guilty or innocent—had been framed. In September,

Brisson*s Minister of War, General Chanoine, ordered a court investiga­ tion of Picquart, regardless of the fact that Picquart was the ma j°r witness for the revision of the case.^

All of these events occurred prior to the reconvening of the

Chamber in October and eliminated for the republicans any possibility of

3J0CP. 7 July 1898. Ll Chapman, D reyfus Case. 213-36. 99

supporting* even for political purposes, the Army*s action thus far

regarding the Affair. This, plus the election results, had convinced

Barthou that the right was now the faction with too much power, and that

the republicans would have to make enough of a move to the le ft to get

assistance against these conservatives. He, therefore, accepted the

presidency of the Progressive Republicans with the aim of effecting a

republican union liberal enough to attract support from the left.^ In

November, he declined their offer to campaign for him for one of the

four vice-presidencies of the Chamber.^ This veering to the left was not

a sharp one and was given a more significant appearance by the attitudes

of the radicals and the socialists. These groups also felt that the

Republic was in actual danger from the right due to the Dreyfus A ffair,

and up until 1906 there was to be a great deal of radical and socialist

cooperation with the center groups which held the actual power of the 7 government. Thus, rather than being an era of substantial policy change

on the part of either the republicans or the socialists, it was one where

each was w illing to cooperate on matters such as separation of church and state in order to diminish the influence of the right. It was a pro-Republic policy against what was thought to be a threat to the

R e p u b lic .

Even so, the Brisson ministry was defeated before any cooperation between the republicans and the left became evident. The Chamber adjourned

^Aubert, Barthou. 116-17. 6 Ind B-P. 9 November I 8 9 8. 7 G. D. H* Cole, A History of Socialist Thought (London, 1956), III, Part I, p. 41 100 for its summer holidays two weeks after Brisson formed his ministry. On

October 25 it reconvened and he was immediately attacked regarding his

conservative policy. Barthou was pessimistic about Brisson1s ability to handle the crisis; after all, Brisson had kept Cavaignac as his War

Minister to appeal to the nationalists and anti-Semites. After Henryk suicide, which led to Cavaignac*s resignation, Brisson had waited too long to opt for revision. Or so Barthou thought anyway, because he spoke that day in criticism of Brisson*s reluctance to discuss the case which by now was being investigated by the Ministry of Justice. Barthou also spoke against the nationalists and anti-Dreyfusards. A resolution expressing the supremacy of civil power over m ilitary passed, after which action a clause blaming the government for not making the army respect it came within eight votes of approval. After that, Barthou announced that he and the republicans were withdrawing their support O from Brisson, and the government lost a vote of confidence to 286.

The defeat of Brisson was a mixed victory since all the political groups had some reason for wanting to get rid of him. The socialists, radicals, and now most of the republicans, wanted a government that would take a firm stand toward revision, and the supporters of the Church and the Army did not like his whole position in general. But the radicals and socialists voted for the government on October 25 fearing that

Brisson*s successor would turn out to be even more conservative and less

Dreyfusard, whereas in voting to defeat him the Progressive Republicans

8 J0CP. 25 October I8 9 8 . 101 were at the same time helping to fu lfill the policies of the right—those Q of Deroulede and Drumont,

Before leaving office, Brisson and his minister of Justice, Jean

Sarrien, had forwarded Lucy Dreyfus* application for a revision of her

husband*s case to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Principally on the

arguments of Guignet, the Court had become almost convinced there was

insufficient evidence against Dreyfus. At this point the noise from the

anti-Dreyfusards began to worry Brisson*s successor Dupuy, and M inister of

Justice Georges Lebret. The scheme of the anti-Dreyfusards was to head

off what seemed to be an inevitable decision of the Criminal Appeals

Court. Attacking its judges and pleading the unusual nature of the case,

they campaigned for removal of the case from this court to a hearing

before all three appeals courts sitting as one body—the other two being

the Civil Appeal Court and the Petition Court

Before such a b ill could be presented to the Chamber, Jules-

Louis Breton, Charles Tramau, and Viviani started a discussion in which

they charged that the members of the Meline ministry had known about the faux Henrv but had thought it better not to reveal the matter. They also accused Barthou of having denied before the Criminal Court that he had any knowledge of the faux. Barthou and Meline both denied that they or any of Meline*s cabinet had known about it. Barthou went on to say that as soon as Cavaignac*s inquiry in August had shown Henry*s letter to be a forgery, he, Barthou, considered the revision of the Dreyfus judgment

9Kayser, Affaire Dreyfus. 191.

Chapman, Drevfus Case. 229-50 102 to be a necessity. And anyway, asked Moline in conclusion, how could they have known about the faux before it was even discovered

At the end of January, Dupuy tried to pass on to the Chamber the responsibility of a decision on revision; a bill was presented try Lebret to change Article 445 of the criminal code so that the Criminal Appeals

Court could decide on requests for revision of cases still in progress, but on cases already judged the decision for revision should be made by the United Appeals Court. This bill would place the decision for the

Dreyfus revision before the United Court. In the debate the socialist- radical -progressive republican coalition began to appear. Barthou,

Bourgeois, Brisson, Jonnart, and Poincare, along with Viviani and

Millerand, signed a public manifest against the government and condemned the bill. 12 Camille Pelletan and Millerand spoke against it in the

Chamber calling it an action aimed at delaying a decision and prolonging an already serious crisis. But the majority of the Chamber seemed unim­ pressed with these arguments and followed the unnecessary admonishment of

Lebret*s that they should bear in mind what their constituents might think about this vote; consequently the bill was passed 324 to 207.^

After this session Barthou resigned his office in the Progressive

Republican Party and joined Poincare*s group, Republicains de

11JO CD. 20 January 1899.

12Kayser, Affaire Dreyfus. 229-50. 13 JOGD. 30 January-10 February 1899. 14 Chapman, Dreyfus Case. 270. This was still a progressists group. 103

However» this seeming victory for the anti-revisionists was? a short one: on June 3 the United Appeals Court agreed with the earlier view of the Criminal Judges and ordered a retrial of Dreyfus. The next day, Sunday, June h, President Loubet went to the races at Auteuil and received a blow on his top hat from a baron. The following Friday

Picquart was acquitted by a lower criminal court. And although Dupuy corrected his former error by having all sorts of police at Longchamps on June 11 to protect Loubet, he lost a vote of confidence the next day for his lack of vigor in defending the Republic; Barthou, the socialists, radicals, and progressists generally voted against him, 296 to 159»^

After ten days of searching for a premier, in which Poincare,

Waldeck-Rousseau, and Bourgeois, in that order, were invited by President

Loubet to form a government and refused, Waldeck-Rousseau reconsidered and formed a cabinet which included a socialist, Millerand, and which was at the outset Dreyfusard and resolved to remove the affair from the realm of politics. Consequently, when the second court-martial decided on

September 9 to maintain the integrity of the Army, Waldeck-Rousseau sought and achieved the pardon of Dreyfus by Loubet, September 19» thus bringing to an end the legal aspects of the Affair.

The effects of the Affair on French political parties were to be felt for another six or eight years. Already the 1898 election results had indicated numerical changes that were to lead to regroupings. Peter

Campbell has concluded that the I 898 election came the closest of any during the Third Republic to mirroring what would have happened under proportional representation. The socialist-radicals and socialists

^ JQCD. 12 June I899. 104

benefited most from the opinions that existed and were registered at the

polls in May. Popular vote corresponded within 2 percent with the seats

won by various parties in the Chamber. Out of 570 deputies, the moderate

or government republicans had 235, only 41.2 percent of the Chamber; the

radicals and radical socialists. 98 and 82 seats respectively, or a total of 31.6 percent; the socialists 55* or 9*8 percent; and the monarchists

and r a llie s could count on 65 and 35* or 17.5 percent combined.^

Relative gains went to the right and left—about 20 and 15 seats respec­

t iv e ly . The center government bloc no longer had a majority. The conse­ quence of this was understood by both the liberal and conservative groups

within the center. Additional assistance had to be found against the

growing noise of the right—the anti-Dreyfusards, the clericalists, the

League of Patriots headed by Deroulede, and the anti-Semites, who later

formed the Action Francaise. The more liberal part of this old center

group followed Leon Bourgeois and his neo-Jacobin concept of solidarite.

E(y 1901 it had become the Radical and Radical Socialist Party, known

commonly as the Radical Party. This concept had been officially launched in September, 1900, by the International Congress of Social Education,

sponsored by the government as part of the Paris International Exposi­

tion. Solidarite was an effort to join the forces of private property

and labor in a non-revolutionary, Christian socialist effort to bring

about reform while preserving intact the concepts surrounding private

p ro p e rty .

^Campbell, French Election Systems. 79-86. The Havas Agency and Moline1 a RApubllque Francaise put the figures at 253 republicans, 110 radicals, ?Q radical socialists, 65 socialists, 44 monarchists, and 28 rat Hag. See 24 May I 898 edition and Ind B-P. 25 May 1898. 17 J. F. Scott, Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France (New York, 1951), pp. 157-86. 105

The conservative branch of the former center was to be found now in the Progressist group; the middle element of this party, no longer wishing to be identified as Progressists, joined Barthou*s Progressive

Republicans in the summer of 1898 or went with him into Poincare*s

Republicans of the Left Party early in 1899 • This evolvement was organ­ ized in Hay, 1901, as L*A11lance Republicaine Demo era ticiue. The Alliance, as it was called, was also neo-Jacobin; it was anti-collectivist, anti­ national, and anti-clerical. Its chief differences from the Radical

Party were its abhorrence of the income tax and the presence in its ranks of a longer lis t of bankers than the Radicals could muster.

Ghristophle, of the Credit Fonder, Raynal the railroader, Etienne

Siegfried, Hennesy the d istiller, Jonnart whose father-in-law was the

Catholic banker Aynard, and Edmond Blanc were among the founders of the

Alliance Party.^®

In spite of the separate party organizations, to distinguish between the more moderate Radicals and the more liberal members of the

A lliance^ was difficult before 1906; both groups supported Waldeck-

Rousseau* s m inistry. Together, with occasional aid from farther left, these two groups formed a bloc which controlled the cabinets from 1898 to 1906.

T*or brief accounts of the liberal policies and wealthy con­ nections of I.*AH lance RS'publlcaine Dlmocratioue. see Beau de Lomenie, Dynasties Bourgeoises. 329, and Eugene Weber, The Nationalist Revival in France. 1905-191^ (Berkeley, 1959)»PP» 28-9. Also Goguel, Politique des Partis. 106-07. The Letellier family with their paper, Le Journal. and the Bunau-Varillas* Le Matin expounded the policies of the Alliance Party as did Le Temps and Dupuy* s Petit Parisian. 19 Chapmen, Dreyfus Case. 309-10 106

As for Barthou1s policies, his major campaign speech of 1898 voiced the aims of the Alliance. The progressive income tax he consid­ ered "domestic inquisition." He quoted Jaur£s that socialism was the same as c o lle c tiv ism , m erely the system under which c o lle c tiv ism was produced. He again stated that he thought collectivism utopian but impossible to achieve in the near future because at the moment such efforts would cause a terroristic attack against individual property and liberty. Thus he renounced radicals and socialists as "a party of reac­ tion and negation." As for positive measures, he stood in favor of universal suffrage, better agricultural laws, fiscal reform, administra­ tive decentralization, and laws providing for more mutual aid societies.

These latter were his answer to the problem of ameliorating the social shortcomings of the time without reliance on either human volition or

"legislative intervention of the state to modify the social organiza- tion." 20 Because of his leadership role Barthou was appointed to the original "Honorary 100" committee of the Alliance at its conception.2^

Religion and the Seventh Legislature

Some of the familiar personalities were missing when the Seventh

Legislature convened in the fall of I 898. The conservatives lost Jules

Delafosse and George Gamard, the Radicals, Goblet, and the socialists were without the voices of Jaures, Guesde, Deville, Gerault-Richard,

Sever, Thiery-Cazes, Soulet, Charpentier, Shauvin, Toussaint, Faberot,

2QInd B-P. 26 April I 898.

^■T^AlHance Republicaine Democratjque. 4- April 1902. (Here­ after cited as with date.) This was the house organ of the p a rty of the same name. 107 s 22 and Lavy. The Depeche de Toulouse admitted a Radical victory. The

Journal des Dehats tried to find comfort in the fact that the combined republican and pallia forces could outnumber the Radical and socialist forces by some 75 seats^ --little comfort since many republicans had no intention of courting the ralHamant.

Louis Barthou began immediately to clarify his own position vis a vis the right and the clericalists. In speaking before a Progressist group at Pau in November, he warned the audience about domestic wars caused by class, religion, or race; he expressed his confidence in the courts to uphold the equality of all Frenchmen in these matters, but feared that many judges of the United Court of Appeals preferred to defend the Army and justify certain mistakes rather than take the risk of com- 24 promising the Army and re-trying Dreyfus. As for the left, he drew the usual distinctions between its policy and his; "we speak without confusing the spirit of agitation with the spirit of reform." He then chided the radical group, "which seems to have renounced its own doctrines so it can take over ours, and seems to disapprove of the ministry more than of its program.">25

The Dreyfus re-alignment continued to set the tenor of political opinion throughout the Seventh Legislature. It was the growing strength

22 DepSche de Toulouse. 23 May 1898.

^ Journal des P6bats. 23 May 1 8 9 8. 24- Chapman, Dreyfus Case. 229-50* For an explanation of France^ court system see Raymond Poincare, How France Is Governed (London, 1913), pp. 225-77* 25 Ind B-P. 23 November I898. of the Dreyfusards that had removed Dupuy from the premiership and

replaced him with Waldeck-Rousseau in June, 1899* It was this sam9

strength that convinced the government it should seek support from the

left and should include a socialist, Millerand, in the cabinet. The

following summer, the Affair was still the major subject of a speech

Barthou made at Oloron during his holiday. After the customary remarks

extolling the republican ideals and the separation of church and state, he moved on to an attack against the nationalists and anti-Semites who fought Waldeck-Rousseau^ efforts. "The truth is," he said, "that nationalism had found its cause, its food, its force in the successive developments of the Dreyfus Affair." These same forces, he continued, had latched on to Dreyfus1 pardon as a confession of guilt by the govern­ ment and an abandonment of the Army. Thus he agreed with the ministry

that nothing further could be achieved by re-investigation of the Affair and he would vote against such a measure in the Chamber. On the other hand he would support a law of amnesty for all those done damage by the

Affair, clear back to 189^; now that Dreyfus was free, Barthou felt that the government could thus show itself generous for its heavy-handed use 26 of force at several points in this whole drama. And besides he did not like the nationalists to keep pointing to the Affair as an example of the 27 need for subverting civil authority to military. Amnesty was the way to squelch the cries of the revisionists and still deny succor to the

26 Ind B-P. 23 August 1900. 109 nationalists. To these ends he also complimented Waldeck-Rousseau for his joint policy of doing justice to Dreyfus and likewise dissipating the campaign against the army. His only criticism of Waldeck-Rousseau was the inclusion of a socialist, Millerand, in the ministry. Done as an expedient, Barthou feared this would become a policy. As Commerce

M inister, Millerand was already allowing the unions to appoint factory work inspectors and had appointed only union members to the National pQ Labor Council.

The political forces set rolling by the Affair provided a happy solution to Barthou*s dilemma over trying to maintain Catholic support and still push for separation of Church and state. Hie nationalists and clericalists had, by their stand, created enough opinion against them­ selves that he could now safely advocate that their control over the affairs of France should be curtailed. It was during this summer vaca­ tion in 1900 that he began his active support of public education.

Seeing public education as one of the principles of the republican conscience, he denied that government controlled schools constituted a blow being struck at freedom of religious choice.

It is pretended that the public school law opposes the elementary teacher to the priest, the civil moral to reli­ gious, the school to the church; it does not put them in competition with each other; it maintains each in its proper character, in its particular function, in its true mission. . . . Separation is one of the ideas of the Revolution, of the Rights of Man and Citizen. . . .29

2 8 I b j d .

29Ind B-P. 12-13 August 1900. 110

In the Chamber, a proposed law on associations—including soci­

eties engaged in education—was discussed as early as May, 1899* In

November, 1900, in response to protests about the activities of teaching

orders in the departments of Aube and Vaucluse, Waldeck-Rousseau promised 30 to initiate debate on such a measure yet that year. Although fearful

of the total consequences of a strong position favoring separation, he at least carried out his promise by pressing for a law that would regulate associations. Defining an association as any agreement between two or more persons for reasons other than profit, the proposal prohibited them

from having headquarters abroad—such as the Vatican—, required all associations to be chartered by the government, and kept them from deny­ ing their members individual and natural rights.

Supporters of the premier and the bill argued the need for such regulations by citing the Vatican's attitude toward the proposed law.

Pope Leo XIII was instructing the French clergy to spread the word that the proposed law not only would interfere with missionary work but would violate the Concordat of 1801.^ Casagnac, arguing against the bill, said that the Belgian socialist Vandervelde had tried to force

French socialists to participate in republican cabinets; why object to one type of foreign influence and not another? As a result of arguments

JOCD. 16 November 1900. The Assumptionist Order had provided good press for Waldeck-Rousseau's case. Already involved in the campaign against Dreyfus, they were in trouble with the courts for statements they made against the government in support of General Mercier's candidacy for the Senate. The court dissolved the Assumption!sts, but withheld the v e rd ic t u n t i l a f te r the a sso c ia tio n law was passed. See Chapman, Dreyfus Case. 307-13. 31JOCD. 1^ January 1901. I l l and ©vents, the advocates of the measure did not deem it wise to support a resolution in January "to pursue the separation of church and state once the law on associations was passed;" this resolution failed 146 to

328.-^ On the other hand they defeated a resolution sustaining the

Concordat of 1801 by a scant 15 votes—246 to 261.-^

Albert de Mun pressed the fight against the b ill by bringing out the economic consequences of dissolving the Church orders. He talked of the social functions performed by the Qiurch property which the government was going to confiscate, to which argument Waldeck-Rousseau replied there would be no penalties or confiscation against associations that complied with the law. In March an amendment was added to the proposal giving all associations six months to register their activities with the govern­ ment, and in case of confiscation of property by the government under this measure, the property would revert to the donors or their heirs.

An amendment to keep members of the regular clergy from voting, because their allegiance lay outside France, failed and the entire law passed

303 to 224. ^ The Senate approved the measure on June 22, and the Chamber accepted the Senate*s mild revisions 305 to 225, almost identical to the

March vote; the law went into effect July 1, 1901.^ Barthou supported the Waldeck-Rousseau m inistry on all these votes and defended the 37 measures in the bill with an article published July 6.

32Ibid. 33Ibld.

^ JOCD. 21 Ja n u a ry 19 0 1 . 33JOCP. 29 March 1901.

36JOCP. 28 June 1901. 37Ind B-P. 6 July 1901. 112

Labor and the Seventh Legislature

As for the pronounced Radical and Alliance Party programs for social amelioration, it was in the sections on labor relations that some slight progress could be discerned. In June, 1899* the Chamber extended those covered by the industrial accident law of 9 April, 1898, even including tractor drivers. In December, 1899» the Chamber agreed to begin the re v is io n o f the 1892 law on women*s and c h ild re n 's la b o r. A wide range of views existed on the proper lim it of hours and when the new regulations should be initiated. Finally, a compromise was reached which expressed the desires of those opinions pro and con on the issue of a shorter work-day. Work for both women and children was to be reduced to

10 1/2 hours in 1901 and to 10 hours in 1903* Most of the center and le ft accepted these figures, not being able to overcome the conservative resistance to further cuts. Sitting squarely in the middle this time,

Barthou—and the Alliance—helped defeat an effort to have the reduction to 10 hours completed by 1900, and on the other hand helped defeat another proposal to hold off the cut until 1905.*^ All this vote-trading of the center, supporting first the left and then the right, was irradicated in

March by the Senate which decided on 10 hours for women and children and

11 hours for men as the proper type of solution to the variant points of view. This the Chamber approved by voice vote without discussion;^

Barthou supported the cabinet on these votes. This hour restriction was

38J0CP. 8 June 1899.

^ JOCD. 20, 22 December 1899. hO JOCD. 30 March 1900. 113 the most Important social act passed by the Seventh Legislature. In the autumn o f 1900 a b ill to provide equal employment rights for women 41 failed, with Barthou joining the socialists against it.

Although no other labor reforms were enacted by this legislature, discussions continued on matters of strikes, retirement, and hours. On

March 8, 1901, the government was accused of improper use of troops in the Hontceau-les-Mines strike, and the debate became a general one over labor policy. J. Thiery complained that this strike was part of an international campaign on the part of unions. Waldeck-Rousseau quite cleverly corrected him, saying that it was not an organized plot but 42 simply part of the international economic progress surrounding them.

Waldeck-Rousseau went on record, too, as favoring an eight-hour day. As for minimum wage legislation, he thought this would have to be worked out 4 3 on a regional basis and in consideration of regional living costs.

After the socialists countered that the nationalization of mines was the only solution to the wage problem, a vote of confidence was called for in which many socialists after a ll supported Waldeck-Rousseau, and the

4 4 Alliance-Radical-socialist vote easily sustained the ministry.

By fall Waldeck-Rousseau had added retirem ent pensions to the 45 list of legislation he thought labor should have. Retirement pensions had been discussed often in 1901. On January 2? Barthou was criticized

^ JOCD. 22 November 1900. 42 JO CD. 8 March 1901.

^ JOCD. 22 October 1901. ^ Ibjd. 46 in Le Radical for advocating government-subsidized pensions* But the

idea had critics as well as supporters among the government*s majority.

Caillaux opposed it unless set up as a long-term capitalized fund. To

begin paying pensions immediately, he said, would mean the young men were

giving money to the old men. This proposition, however, was disposed of

by the Chamber decision to send it to the unions and mutual aid societies

for consideration, which meant no action was taken on it for several y e a rs . 4.7 '

In the last months of the legislature, before elections, two more issues were dispatched by the Chamber in order to make its reform efforts look good to labor. In November a proposed law was passed lim iting the work day of train crews to ten hours; most of the republicans opposed this measure or abstained—Barthou opposed it—but it was passed and

sent to the Senate. 48 And the next February a proposal to lim it miners to a nine-hour day was accepted by the Chamber, Barthou approving.^

Colonialism and Foreign Policy

The problem of colonialism continued to grow in importance in

French national life. The Fashoda incident, as well as rapprochments with Great Britain and Russia, were settled to the satisfaction of both sides in French politics. For those looking for guarantees of peace there seemed to be a friendly ally that would oppose Germany if necessary for the nationalists this was an indication of French power and an

46 i±7 Le Radical. 2? January 1901. 'JOCD. 18 June 1901.

^ JOGD* 14 November 1901. ^ JOCD. 5 February 1902. 115 alliance to oppose Germany when necessary, although the extremists felt

Commandant Marchand should not have given in at Fashoda and pointed to this as further evidence of decay in the Army high command and the nation.But th e Chamber voted i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n , by v o ic e , o f th e

British-French Treaty resulting from Fashoda with no real differences of 51 opinion expressed. Likewise, colonial expansion was popular with all 52 sides; even the socialists were attracted to it as a civilizing mission.

One of Barthou's criticism s of Dupuy*s fourth and fifth m inistries was over the Algerian situation* He accused Dupuy, who was serving as his own Interior Minister, of agitating the inequities there; he started 53 a discussion that consumed two weeks of the Chamber's attention. He wanted 1&99 to be a decisive year for the development of Algeria and for decision as to the future French policy in that colony. The problems of the Algerian Jews he thought to be part of the general economic and social 54 situation which should be settled by the government. Algeria was costing France 100 m illion francs per year, and crime in Algeria, based on number of arrests, had increased 143 percent in the past year. It has

3°Ind_B-P, 23 August 1900.

31 JOCD, 12 May 1899 52 No faction raised any protest to appropriations for the Colonial Office. The 8,450,000 francs for the expedition of Marchand into the Sudan was passed by the Chamber without a word of discussion. See JOCD. 10 December 1895. 53 JOCD. 1 5 -2 6 May 1899. 5 4 The anti-Semitic riots in Algeria in January, 1898, were in response to PicquartTs trial and Zola's J'accuse and also due to tho campaign of the Jews there to secure extra-citizenship rights. 116

already been given the status of an overseas department. Suffrage had

been granted a young colony with no accompanying, organized effort to

make it culturally a part of France; as a result, 80,000 voters repre­

sented 5 million French subjects. For the time being Barthou thought it

better to return Algeria to the control of the colonial minister, whom he

considered to be in a better position to handle the problem than the

interior minister who was trying to keep peace. For example, he thought

the colonial ministry could more properly handle such problems as the

railroads in Algeria. And the Superior Council of Algeria, he argued,

should be given fiscal autonomy and be more responsible to the

A lgerians.^ This position was greatly lauded in the Chamber and in the press; Le Temps. Le Journal des Debats. Matin. Le Figaro. La Lanterne.

Le Gironde, and La Renublique Francaise were in agreement that this was

a great appeal to give protection, education, and justice to the 56 natives. But after the applause subsided the Chamber took no action on Algeria. The only result of Barthou's efforts—if there is a direct

connection--was that during the crisis following Dupuy*s fall, Poincare,

Brisson, Sarrien, and Mougeot concluded that the radical group could not allow Barthou a portfolio in the new cabinet, and by way of compensation they asked him if he was interested in appointment as governor-general oT Algeria; he declined, saying he did not wish to be a party to this kind of political bargaining . ^

55JOCP. 15 May 1899.

56Ind B-P. 18 May 1899.

57Ind B-P. 16 June 1899. 117

In 1900 a controversy arose over the financial difficulty of the

Franco-Algerian Railroad. The Chamber passed a law nationalizing the line; Barthou voted with the majority on this issue, Bourgeois, Caillaux, and Millerand abstained, and other socialists, Pams, Holland, V aillant,

Vivian!, and Zevaes opposed, arguing that the state should either take 58 over all the Algerian railroads or none.

Much less heat was generated over the decision to pay the expenses of participating in the Boxer Rebellion and to allow an indemnity to those French who suffered losses therein. This bond issue passed 322 to

19^, with the socialists splitting their vote, and Barthou, the Radicals, 59 and the Alliance mostly included in the majority.

Election Law Discussions

On the eve of the 1902 elections the socialists brought forth a proposal to return to the scrutin de liste . Not all their own people voted for it, however, and it failed passage. Barthou opposed the bill just as he had favored the scrutin d ^rrondlsaement in I 889 and in 1897.

Next the Chamber passed a b ill giving deputies six-year terms and pro­ viding integral renewal. Barthou opposed this extension of power for the Chamber and abstained on a vote which passed providing partial renew al.^ Nothing came of this though, since the Senate remained silent on the subject, quite probably regarding it as a device of the

Chamber to create for itself power equal to that of the Senate.

58 JOCD. 22 November 1900.

^ JOCD. 2 5 , 28 November 1901. 60 JOCD. 17, 18 March 1902. 118

Party Politics and the 1902 Election

The Seventh Legislature met for the last time on March 29, 1902.

O fficial business was adjourned while the deputies went home to work for

reelection. In February the Alliance had begun publication of its own

newspaper for obvious propaganda purposes. The immediate reason for

going to the public in print was the appearance of brochures under the

name Jacques Rural, representing the nationalist and reactionary coali­

tion against the government and the Republic itse lf: "the Republic is a

regime of deficit, is the enemy of the country and the army, encourages

social disorder, has done nothing for France for thirty years, persecutes

religion," read the nationalist brochures. The chief campaign was against

the right, not the left, There were three expressed purposes of the

Alliance*s fledgling newspaper:

1. To contribute to the constitution of the great demo­ cratic party of Waldeck-Rousseau, party of progress in all matters, distinguished by its conception of the rights of the secular state, and in the name of this freedom to oppose the ideas of the adversaries of the republican ideal. 2. To hold as its immediate object the republican campaign, with all the republicans, resolved not to desert any of its political and social ideals, to attack first the nationalist coalition of pretended defenders of o rd e r. . . . 3. To nationalism, the coalition of all the reactionary and clerical forces, to its accomplices, its allies, the Alliance presents a bloc of all democratic republican forces, without exception,^!

The president of the Alliance was Adolphe Carnot, brother of the late

President Sadi Carnot.^

61 . 21 February 1902.

6Zi''Alliance. 25 April 1902. 119

The chief issue In the campaign was nationalism, or rather clericalism , or as Barthou stated it in his campaign speech at Oloron,

"nationalism which is the new mask of the eternal clerical enterprise.

Against this spectre he waxed not only eloquent, but long;

I have approved of the measures taken against it, notably the dispositions relative to the religious congregations which, rigorously applied, remove from clericalism its best in stru m en t and i t s f a v o r it e arm o f w ar. . . • Nationalism is not a party with a doctrine, a method, or a program. It is a coalition formed of decep­ tions and grudges, of ambitions and appetites . . • vehe­ ment apostles of the progressive income tax rub shoulders with it behind talk of social reform. The French masons are led astray by it and join rebel congregations. There former members of the commune sit with former apostles of war. Jews really not believing in it yet make confessions of anti- Semitism, The Academic Francaise descends into the street and rubs its palms on the white cloaks of the pedlars. The ministers dismissed on Seise Mai reconcile with the reaction that chased them down from power. Even Boulangism was not offered to us by such a strange collection of interests. • . . It is clericalism wearing a new mask.

On the issue of cooperation with the socialists in the government he was quite clear He felt Millerand was allowing labor and other radical groups too large a role in formulating the cabinet* s actual policies. Ejy the same token he did not think that the inclusion of a socialist in the ministry should become a regular practice. But other­ wise he approved of Millerand and his support of the government and observed that the socialists were already disappointed that Millerand was not pursuing their program on all fronts. Barthou even predicted that the socialists would leave the bloc as soon as the 1902 elections were over. Likewise he feared that those most frightened by the socialist campaign would go over to nationalism—thus the socialists were creating

63Ind B-P. 8 April 1902. 120 a threat to the government from both sides* "Between nationalism and ^3 socialism there is a place for a large republican union*" he concluded.

He moved on then to the a c tio n he hoped to g e t from th e new

Chamber. He wanted a law which would end the abuses possible by allowing

"demands of urgency" in the Chamber which allowed issues for which the urgency was granted to replace the orders of the day; frequently such questions, unexpected by the Chamber, were not urgent and were settled by badly improvised resolutions. Likewise, he wanted to prohibit poli­ tical debates during annual budget discussions, since this had often meant the budget was not passed until three or four months into the year it was supposed to cover. He favored six-year terms for deputies, renew­ able by half every three years, and proportional representation by departments.

On the school separation issue he reconfirmed his belief in the law of associations passed the year before and assured his constituents he did not oppose the legitimate functions of the Church—religious instruction, religious and so-called civilizing missions abroad; and those teaching orders which complied with the government regulations concerning their "origin, status, dependence on foreign authority, and the nature of their teaching" would be allowed to continue operation.

He concluded by appeals for more public secondary schools, more retire- 67 ment pensions, and more control of unions.

6jInd B-P. 8 April 1902.

^G etting a demand or urgency approved meant the Chamber could discuss the proposition immediately instead of waiting for the second reading and future date when the matter was scheduled for discussion. Sometimes it was used to avoid debating matters that were on the day's agenda.

6?Ind B-P. 8 April 1902. 121

The election results fro® April 27 and Hay 11 were gratifying for the Radical Party; they gained 20 seats to a strength of about 200.

The center of plurality had shifted to then from the republicans who favored the Alliance, which could now muster only 125 deputies, having lost some 40 members to forces to its right. But the results showed the gains of the nationalists and the need for the Radicals and Alliance to cooperate. It also convinced most of the socialists they must support the Radical cause against a nationalist strength that occasionally would 68 number 140 votes. Throughout the Eighth Legislature the Radicals and the Alliance needed each other in a Chamber totaling 575• Octave Aubert sized up the situation thusi^

Pro-ministrv Anti-ministry

Republicans 126 Nationalists 49 Radicals 128 Republicans 67 Radical Socialists 85 Conservatives ?Z Socialists 46 Socialists 2 385 190

In what might be excusable enthusiasm, Louis Barthou addressed an

Alliance rally in Paris on June 5 proclaiming a defeat of the nationalists in a campaign where "we were confronted with the greatest campaign of money and propaganda the Republic has known.* He spoke of continued support of the Republic and its Army, resistance to clerical action, and 70 enforcement of the July, 1901, law on associations. It was a Pyrrhic victory perhaps, but the nationalists and clericalists were at least

68 Campbell, French.Electoral Systems. 79-86.

69Ind B-P. 29, 30 April and 13 May 1902.

70LlAlUance , 6 June 1902. 122 rendered inactive in the Chamber. Barthou’s own constituents were 71 solidly behind him again with a majority of 10,899 out of 11,928 voting.

Before the new Eighth Legislature could meet on the first of

June, Waldeck-Rousseau announced his retirement for reasons of health.

T^Allianna suggested that the ministry would have soon been defeated anyway by a coalition of monarchists, Bonapartists, plebisciters,

Christian socialists, and HLanquists.^ The only possible policy these groups held in common was the desire to get rid of Waldeck-Rousseau. But whether it was ill-health, fatigue from arguing against the nationalists, or anticipation that the new Chamber would not have a majority for him, his resignation was to establish two precedents: he held the longest ministry in the Hiird Republic; and he was the first premier to resign without having lost a vote of confidence.

The next prime minister had to be a Radical, not only because it was the party of plurality, but because registration and approval of the associations under the law of July 1, 1901• was sure to be the immediate issue. Neither Brisson nor Bourgeois was interested in forming a cabinet, so the mantle fell to Boail Combes, an undistinguished Senator of sixty- seven whose immediate qualification was his late chairmanship of the

Senate committee that pushed for the association law.

For the moment a ll sides were happy with Combes1 intended program.

His policy speech in the Chamber mentioned preventing the threat from the

71Ind B-P. 29 April 1902. 72 HLanquists were followers of Vaillant who in 1900 did not agree with Jaurhs and Millerand that socialists could serve in republican cabinets. See Chapman, Dreyfus Case. 32?. 123

right—with republican support, upholding General Andre (M inister of War

since 1900) In his campaign against the nationalists, and execution of

the law on associations.^ Even the Depech de Toulouse was pleased with

the new government for a while. It spoke of

two schools which contest for the direction of the Republic: one the irrecondlables and rough-riders who practice a policy of all or nothing. The other is a school of temporizing and opportunism sim ilar to a chorus in the Qpera-Cpwi/p^ which does little but cry, Marchons. Between these two extremes there is a just, practical, moderate egalitarian path. It is this path that the Combes ministry has taken.

And the Depech de Toulouse lauded his five advocated reforms: a balanced

budget, the association law enforcement, better workers* retirem ent, 74 more equitable taxes, and a cut in defense spending. The Alliance

concurred with all this and praised the accord of the Combes ministry 75 with its policy and that of the Radicals as well.

S e p a ra tio n

It was not long before disharmony struck this happy coalition.

But it remained a united front against the single largest controversy

that came before the Eighth Legislature, the matter of separation. For

Barthou this issue was the most significant in his pre-war political

career. If the quantity of his speeches and writing is a valid measure of his conviction, he felt more strongly about it than about income tax or the three-year law. Outside the Chamber, from June 6, 1902, until

73 JOCD. 12 June 1902.

La DeoSche de Toulouse. 11 June 1902.

6, 13 June 1902. 124

the law was passed at the end of 1905* he gave seven major speeches and wrote twenty-four articles against the relationship of Church and state.

In the Chamber he spoke four times favoring the law, his first important debate since 1398. It was an all-out campaign for which he marshalled

statistics, history, and parallels from other nations.

As early as February 1901 Barthou had drawn the distinction

between clericalism and Catholicism: "clericalism is a policy, Catholi­

cism is a religion* The republic has a right to defend itself against

the monkish politicians of the ultramontain. but it should respect the

exercise of the Catholic religion." He cited Gambetta, Ferry, and even

Leon Bourgeois as recognizing that the principle of separation was not an anti-Catholic campaignHe warned the Alliance at their June rally

that the clericalists with their money had tried to unseat him in the previous month*s election in Oloron-Est.^

The first proposed law presented to the Chamber called for com­ plete separation, cessation of salaries from the state to the clergy, the end of the Concordat, and a withdrawal of the ambassador from the Vatican.

This was Ernest Roche*s proposal of October 1, 1902, hut more moderate deputies, not wishing to disrupt the Concordat, would not give urgency to the proposal. Many socialists and Radicals abstained, and by a light vote of 269 to 172 , it was decided not to discuss this type of separation.The following January Barthou wrote an article entitled,

76 Ind B-P. 2 February, 1901.

Alliance. 6 June 1902.

78JOCP. 20 October 1902. 125

"Ou est le MalentenduT" explaining the failure of this proposal. He ex p la in ed th a t Combes had made i t c le a r b efo re he took o f f i c e th a t he d id not intend to sever relations completely between France and the Vatican and that neither the country nor the Chamber had a majority wishing to denounce the Concordat; in fact support for it seemed to be growing each year. He listed the premiers who had favored it—Ferry, Floquet,

Bourgeois, and Waldeck-Rousseau. Even Brisson, separatiorfs greatest advocate, did not speak against the Concordat. Barthou also mentioned \ 79 Jaures and Sembat as extremists who favored it, as well as Roche.

The next month in an article for the Revue de Paris, he traced

the whole French Revolutionary precedent for public rather than Church

education, beginning with the cahiers and ending with the education law

of 1795. The Tiers de Senechaussee de La Rochelle first proposed public

education; these were among the cahiers of 1789. Then, four of Mira-

beau*s discourses, published after his death and entitled Works on

Public Education, advocated public education and argued that the estab­ lishment of all private schools should be perfectly free. On September

15* 1791* Talleyrand proposed state schools and the freedom of teaching.

The Constitution of November 3» 1791» said public instruction should be

established. On April 20 and 21, 1792, Condorcet submitted a plan of public instruction to the Legislative Assembly. The Convention of

October 2, 1792, named a committee of public instruction. Robespierre in the Assembly of 1793 created a commission to examine the work of

Lepelletier, who had advocated that a ll children between five and eleven

79 Ind B-P. 30 January 1903. 126 be educated In boarding schools at the expense of the state and paid for by a tax to be levied mostly on the rich. The public education plan was finally approved December 19* 1793; on 5 Fructidor, the year Three, private schools had been allowed, and on October 25, 1795, freedom of teaching had been added. This long, deliberate progress toward public education, Barthou concluded, should now be culminated by parliament. 80

Before a revised separation bill could be brought back to the

Chamber, the Catholics who had favored the law on associations posed a momentary threat to the Combes ministry by proposing a law that would authorize en masse all of the teaching orders that had applied for such authorization* This was a well calculated strategy since many supporters of Combes each had a favorite school or two they wanted to promote, but had voted for the association law; now they had to choose between all or none. Catholics also argued that the law of 1901 on associations was keeping many French citizens from following their chosen occupation or that this action would leave some areas of France without any schools.

Barthou replied that the law and the governments action were necessary to protect French liberty; even royalist Spain had passed such a law and taken similar action, and he iterated that religious freedom of the 8 l orders was not impaired by not allowing them to teach. The mass authorization law failed 257 to 300, and the vote on it was printed and fl5 posted on town halls all over France.

oq Louis Barthou, "La Revolution et La Liberty d*Enseignement," Revue de Paris (February 1, 1903), pp. ^*93-507. 8IJ0CP. 12 March 1903. 82J0CP. 18 March 1903. 127

Now the Radicals had their turn. Confident that their group and the Alliance would support Combes, they defeated 166 to 322 an effort to amend the association law to allow regular clergy to change into lay clothes and teach in schools that had formerly belonged to religious orders.8-^ They lumped together applications from the 44 men*s teaching 84- orders that had applied for authorization and rejected them together.

Three days later like treatment was accorded 81 women1s teaching orders; but where the men*s orders were done in by a 448 to 110 vote, only 16 85 votes—269 to 283—defeated the women*s orders as teachers.

These, however, were just the beginning steps in an unrelenting campaign for the next two years. Provision for more educational facili­ ties, enforcement of the associations law, and further steps toward separation were the issues. Barthou seized every event as ammunition with which to fire shots at the clericalists. At a party rally in May he replied to the Catholic charge that the state was monopolizing educa­ tion. Quite the contrary, he said, it was the Catholics that were seizing the schools. He talked against the "illegitim ate conquests of the congregations," and warned that the Republic had ceded to the congre- 86 gations the right to license teachers. In a speech at Mans in June, he complimented Caillaux, whose arrondissement Hamers is just north of

Mans, for having collaborated with the current Republican policy against nationalism .8*7

83JOCH. 18 June 1903. 8\jQCD. 23 June 1903. 85 86 JOGD, 26 June 1903. Ind B-P. 26 May 1903.

8?Ind B-P. 6 June 1903. During the summer recess of 1903* Barthou used the press again

to carry his separation campaign. He complimented Waldeck-Rousseau for

having pushed for funds for new school buildings 88 and praised the courts

for acting against the organized resistance of the orders to the govern­

ment; he mentioned Father Le Dore of the Barnabites as an example of the

outright declaration of civil war and the intent of the teaching congre­

gations to ignore the association la w .^9 And even on the occasion of the

launching of the battleship, Jules Ferrv. Barthou wrote that Ferry had

greater claims to fame, such as his colonial policy and his stand on

public education. In autumn he explained the legality of the decision of

the Court of Cassation in the case of the Capucians* appeal for authori­

zation. The Capucians could not claim, he wrote, that since they were in existence at the time the association law was passed, it was up to the

Chamber to pass a law de-author!zing them. No association was authorized

under the terms of the law unless both houses of parliament approved it— 90 and this authorization had been rejected by the Chamber. Also he

complained that the Vatican was once more, in violation of the Concordat, expressing its dissatisfaction with the governments nominees for 91 bishoprics. And at the end of November he listed again the precedents for public education during the Revolution and concluded, "could one believe that you reserve for the religious houses the concern of raising citizens? Religious orders are incompatible with social order and 92 public welfare."*^

88Ind B-P, 3 Ju ly 1903. 89Ind B-P. 2k J u ly 1903.

9 Ind B-P. 30 October 1903. 9^Ind B-P. Ik November 1903.

92Ind B-P. 27 November 1903. 129

In March, 1904, the b ill to abolish religious teaching came up again. The clericalists tried to alter, delay, and defeat it at every turn. First they moved to have it sent to the municipal councils for consideration of the idea that each council could be responsible for the schools in its district; efforts were made to postpone the discussion by denying urgency on it; it was proposed that it be sent to the legal committee to determine what to do with the orders that had gone into 93 teaching since the passage of the association law. Finally, the proposal emerged onto the Chamber floor; "All congregational teaching is forbidden,n read the first article; "Teaching congregations have five years to desist," read the second. Joseph Lasies managed to get these articles limited to France only, not the colonies. Caillaux spearheaded a drive to change the five years to ten, and it was accepted over some socialist opposition, as was an article to allow clerical teachers to be trained in France for teaching overseas. After a month of argument, it was passed, with the Alliance, the Radicals, and socialists supporting it over every obstacle on the course; Barthou voted with this bloc con- 94 sistently until the day of the final passage when he was absent.

Accepted by the Senate on July 6, this law became effective two days l a t e r .

With the death of Leo XIII on July 20, 1903, both the government of France and the Vatican seemed to give up on the idea that there could be a Catholic-Republic France. The new pope, Pius X, was more interested

93JOCP. 1, 7, 8 March 1904. 94J0CP. 15, 21, 28 March 1904.

95JQSD. 5 July 1904. 130 in resisting recent changes, and Combes was no more conciliatory on the separation issue than was Pius X. It was said that Combes engineered

President Loubet*s v isit to Rome in the spring with calculated attention to arrangements so that the French President would not call on Pius X during the visit. ^ Pius recognized the insult and protested in secret by a note to all the nations with which the Vatican had diplomatic relations. Delcass^—molder of French foreign policy from 1898 to 1905— kept this note from leaving his office, but a copy of it got out by way o f Monaco when th e P rince of Monaco sen t i t to Ja u re s. The double Q7 temptation of sales for his new proletarian and anti-Russian paper,'

Humanite. and a shot at the Radical ministry, was too much. The note 98 was published in this paper on May 17. Both Combes and Pius recalled their emissaries. In the Chamber Barthou helped marshal a vote of confi­ dence in Combes for recalling the ambassador and refusing to appoint 99 a n o th e r. 7 But Pius was not finished. In July he revoked the offices of the Bishops of Dijon and Laval because they were not following his instructions regarding the fight with France. At this point Combes completely severed diplomatic relations with the Vatican and when the

Chamber reconvened in the fall won a vote of confidence for this action,

318 to 2 3 0 .100

96 Ind B-P. 10, 24 June 1904. 97 This is Beau de Lom£nie*s judgment of Jaures in Dynasties Bourgeoises, 350-53.

9^See also Goldberg, JaurSs. 320-21. 99 JOCD. 27 May 1904. 100JOCD. 21 October 1904. 131

Meanwhile Barthou kept up the separation campaign at every

opportunity. He spoke to the Alliance in January, recalling once more

the historical precedents for public education. In April he addressed

them again, stating that freedom of teaching was included both in Article

69 of the Charter of 1830 and in Articles 8 and 9 of the 1848 Constitu­

tion; and he added that from the time of the passage of the Falloux Law

until 1899 the relative percentage of students enrolled in religious

educational establishments had tripled, while the numbers in public

schools had declined 73 percent.

During the summer vacation months, Barthou came out in the press with his policy. In view of the imminent abolition of parochial schools

it was necessary to provide for certification of the teachers in the

state system. Barthou noted in June that the Commission on Education was

advocating a w ritten examination only to certify teachers already estab­

lished, although the extreme anti-clericalists such as Ferdinand Buisson

were trying to prohibit from obtaining licenses all former clerics who 102 had ever taught. He noted, too, that the Church had left open all

its secondary schools which trained pre-theological students—petites

seminairas these were called. Under the Concordat the Church was per­ mitted to operate one petite seminaire (since these were the nurseries

for the seminaries) and one seminary per diocese. "It keeps that part of

the contract which binds the state to allow it advantages,* he wrote,

"but ignores with a facility that must be admired, if not condemned, its

~*~Q^Ind B-P. 19 January 1904 and L1 A lliance. 3 April 1903.

102Ind B-P. 10, 24 June 1904. 132 obligations under that same agreement," He pointed out, however, that

France and Algeria comprised 8? dioceses, but had 138 secondary sem­ inaries. The Ministry was aware of these flagrant violations and would take action.

The clericalist strength in Oloron-Est even caused Barthou to 104 violate his principle concerning duplicity of office holding. The republican candidate for general councilorlO.5 had died suddenly and the republican committee in the arrondissement frantically notified Barthou that the clericalist coalition would now be able to elect their choice,

Ribera. Therefore the deputy announced himself a candidate and, in a hurried three-day campaign tour, let it be known that he was running, that legally there was no incompatibility between the office of councilor general and that of deputy, and that he was only running because the clericalists would use every opportunity to dislodge the post from the republican ranks. His victory was no surprise, 1573 to 915 over

R ib e re .1 °6

At the time the Chamber reconvened at the end of October, Barthou addressed a rally of the Alliance at Pau. While promising that the party was pro-Republic, pro-republican, pro-economic reform,

103 Ind B-P. 27 September, 7 October 1904. 104 See above,pp. 24-25* 105 The QQunjgey.l e r g e n e ra l was e le c te d by h is arro n d issem en t to sit on the departmental general. The term was for six years, and carried no salary. The council was the legislature for the department; also its members are part of the departmental electoral college that elected senators. See Poincare, How France Is Governed. 67-71. 106 Ind B-P. 9. 16, 19 July 1903. 133 anti-nationalist, and anti-communist, the bulk of his message concerned

clericalism . "One French party has become royalist. Where are its ideas? Where does it get its program?" And the audience dutifully

shouted, "Romet" Barthou continued by relating that "the Assumption!sts 107 and the Jesuits have not asked Parliament for authorization. They won*t either. If we dose their doors they will come back in through the windows."1^®

Meanwhile, in the Chamber, excitement reached an even higher pitch when irregularities were discovered in the army*s systems for promotions, administration, and information gathering—especially at

St. Qyr. Deputy Guyot de Villeneuve began to reveal the influence of the

Freemasons in the army. He read to the Chamber seventeen letters which indicated the extent of the Masons1 influence in political, social, and religious matters leading to promotions. It was not the Catholics who were charging the army of corruption nor the anti-dericalists who were defending it. The Chamber had not been forewarned that these letters were to be submitted and the deputies hardly had time to collect their thoughts for the debate. An unidentified socialist charged that prefects appointed by Barthou (under Moline) were not only pro-Meline but were partial to republican officers in the information they sent to the Masons concerning colonels being considered for promotion to generals. Barthou replied to this charge that these prefects still held their jobs after six years and if the charges were true Combes had not seen fit to remove

107 These were the two orders most deeply engaged in teaching.

^~^Ind B-P. 1-2 November 1904. them; m oreover, the Chamber should use i t s p re se n t in d ig n a tio n a g a in st the attackers of the arny who were trying to discredit the Republic. But it was from farther left that Combes got his support on the issue; Jaures mounted the rostrum and asked the deputies how they could be sure the fiches^9 W6re authentic, and defended War Minister General Andre by saying Andre had not known about the plot of the Masons. Three votes of confidence sustained Combes by the narrowest of m ajorities—282 to 278,

298 to 274, and 294 to 263. Most of the left voted for him, but some of the recent bloc—Barthou, Bourgeois, Jules Dansette, and Millerand— 110 voted with the minority.

The same issue came up again a month later when Adrien Lannes de

M ontebello questioned the government about Commandant P asquier who had denounced 228 officers in writing, nine of them generals. Maurice

Berteaux, the new War Minister since November 13 (Andr£ resigned), denied that Pasquier was the author of the document degrading the offi­ cers. But in answer to a question from Barthou, he stated that the

Commandant had been removed from h is command. The government survived a vote of confidence 274 to 290 and the new War Minister was sustained 298 to 239; Barthou, Caillaux, Bourgeois, Dansette, and Millerand again voted against Combes; and Barthou and Caillaux abstained while the others voted

109 The l e t t e r s read in the Chamber were f i l e card s on which the information had been kept on each officer; this was hence known as the affair of the fiches.

^ ^ JQCD. 28 October 1904. Since Barthou wrote an article just a day or two before asking for support of Combes, it seems probable this business of the fiches was a surprise to him. See Ind B-P. 28 October, 1904. 135 a g a in s t Berteaux.Weary of this uncertain existence. Combes followed

Waldeck-Rousseau*s precedent and resigned.

It was the following February before discussion of the separation law was begun. In an argument over the empty bishoprics of Dijon and

Laval, the clericalist deputies Morlet and Gayraud protested to the

Chamber that the Concordat surely was not in force in dioceses which had no bishops. At this point Bienvenue Martin, the new Minister of Educa­ tion and Religion, answered that the Vatican was responsible for the shape of things in France by its irreconcilable policy. The bloc came back in solid support of the ministry with a vote of confidence, 338 to

185» on a resolution which stated that the attitude of the Vatican had now rendered a law on separation necessary.

As soon as the two-year m ilitary law was passed the Chamber began again the discussion of the separation of Church and state. Speaking for the clericalists, Jean Plichon argued that the whole idea was just a popularity campaign thought up by Combes for his m inistry. He traced the complete history of the recent conflict: the association law; abolition of parochial schools; and breaking off diplomatic relations with the

Vatican. Next, he argued, would be the denunciation of the Concordat, the closing of churches, and refusal to approve the Pope*s decisions on bishops. He compared the proposed separation law with the Revolutionary law on the same topic, asserting that this had finally necessitated the

Concordat in order to make France strong. He did not see any future for

1I3-JQCD. 23 December 1904

10 February 1905 136 a free church after separation; he quoted Cavour that a free state needs a free church; and he reasoned that Bismarck had fought the Church in order to eliminate it as a "liberal institution in Germany."

It was Barthou who replied to this speech. Separation of the spiritual and temporal realms were to be the last step in the seculariza­ tion begun by the Revolution; he reminded Plichon that it was the conserva tives who used the Church to their political advantage in 1794; he quoted

Napoleon as saying, "I had my best results from Catholicism; it kept the

Pope on my side . . . and what a force for world opinionI" Diere were murmurs in the Chamber, and he continued, "And you who applaud these words. ..." He was interrupted by Gaillard-Bancel who said, "We did not applaud," and continued without breaking stride, "You who did not applaud th e se words (th e Chamber laughed) know what extreme m easures 113 Napoleon was forced to use to achieve his subjection of the Church."

The discussion then turned to the disposition of church property.

Barthou argued in favor of Articles 4 and 12 of the proposed law that established public worship societies, or congregations, and let the bishop—or general assemhly in the case of Protestants—decide which public worship society should receive the property; thus the property would continue to be operated and provide the traditional revenue for the respective denominations. This economic settlement was especially necessary because under the terms of the same law the state could no 1 1 4 longer help pay the salaries of clergymen.

I l l JQCD. 28 March 1904. 137

Most of the Chamber meetings In April and May were consumed

arguing the separate articles of the law. The longest hassel was over

the relegation of property—Article 4. The left extremists wanted to do

away entirely with ecclesiastical ownership; the right, of course, wanted

to defeat the entire proposal. But the hloc wished to leave religion

intact and only separate it from the state, not destroy its traditional

system of operation* Barthou was in favor of any solution which would

allow the legitim ate cultural and worship activities to continue.

A r t i c l e k was finally approved along with the other 36 articles

in the law. Essentially the law established complete freedom of reli­

gion, forbade any government recognition of any state religion, and gave

church property to the designated public worship societies to administer.

Beyond this, the law was so controversial it had required thirty-six

sessions to get it out of the Chamber. It was so vital to the very fabric

of French loyalties that political coalitions were altered over it. The

final vote, 3^1 to 233 on July 3t it was agreed, was to be posted on all

town halls. Those in the majority on the final vote ranged the way

from the center to the extreme left; among those on this lis t were

Doumergue, Cruppi, Dupuy, Z6va$s, Briand, Bourgeois, Barthou, Sarrien,

Caillaux, Millerand, Steeg, Vaillant, Jaures, and Etienne. Opposed to it were Roche, de Mun, Grandmaison, Montalambert, Plichon, Ribot, and

Cavaignac.*^

1:l5 jo c D. 28 March 1905-

116 JOCD. 6 , 8 , 12 A p r il, 29 May, and 3 J u ly 1905. 138

Discussed in the Senate from November 9 to December 6, the law 117 passed without alteration and is known as the Law of 9 December, 1903.

The year 1906 was an e le c tio n year fo r the Chamber and re p e r­ cussions of the separation law were still heard. Government officials sent to inventory church property encountered real difficulty. In Paris,

Moulins, Bayonne, and Saint-Roch, just to mention a few cities, they were ■j 1 chased out of churches and had to enlist police protection. The government was interpellated twice over its policy regarding the change­ over of property—either to the public worship societies or to state confiscation, Briand brilliantly defended the government's actions argu­ ing that it was the Catholics and their clergy that were behind the inci­ dents and that the cabinet intended to "carry out the law calmly, systematically, with moderation and prudence, but with full authority,"

Ribot, and even Churchman Abbe Lemire, 119 tried to moderate the feeling of the clericalists by adding their weight to the argument that the government had not intended that all this conflict should develop over separation, nor did it have any desire to confiscate church property, Hie

Pope meanwhile had remained silent, offering no policy to his bishops 120 during the inventory.

It appeared as though a spirit of moderation might prevail and the socialists and Radicals would be magnanimous about the execution of

1 1 7 JQSD. 9 November-6 December 1903. 118 JOCp. 1 February 1906. 119 Lemire represented the Boeschepe in the Nord from 1893 to 193h. 120 Ind B-P. 6, 7 March 1906. 139 the law now that It had passed. Nine resolutions were presented repre­ senting various shades of opinion from which the Chamber Might choose.

Rouvier (now premier) repeated that he intended to exercise prudence and firmness and asked the Chamber to support him. At this point* however,— with a possible view to the coming elections—the socialists, some

Radicals, and the clericalists withdrew their support, and Rouvier was defeated 234 to 267, Brisson, Jaures, Ribot, Vaillant, and Zevaes with the m ajority.!2^ The coalition of the left and right seemed to be r e t u r n i n g .

The Two-Year Law

Although reduction of the term of m ilitary service was part and parcel of the program of the bloc, it did not generate as much heat as did the religious issue, nor was it argued by quite the same sides as those taken on separation. The bloc was anti-m ilitary as well as anti- clericalist, but the question of reducing the term of service to two years was not part of the campaign against the power and influence of the an^r.

Foreign policy was not an issue in the debates over army size, either.

The anti-m ilitary argument that France was not a m ilitary state with a large standing army was not utilized. Nor was this particular measure aimed at the recent collusion between some of the army and some of the right. The argument of economy was not brought forth; there was no general campaign to cut defense appropriations in 1902. In fact, General

Andr€ was to argue in June, 1904, that doing away with the various

m jQCD. 7 March 1906 140 exemptions of the 1889 law on recruitment would likely increase the size 12 2 of the army in spite of the year*s reduction in the length of service.

The reason most consistently given—and the center of the month-long discussion in the Chamber—was the egalitarian one that there should be no immunities in the law, that compulsory army service implies universal service in a democracy. The 1889 law establishing a three-year term had removed some of the inequities from the five-year term law of 1872; now it was time to abolish the exemption list altogether.

For at least two years the bloc had been advocating a "two-year 123 law"—as the bill was to be designated. J Barthou favored the whole campaign. In a major speech in 1902 he pledged, "I am in favor of the 12i two-year m ilitary law but along with it suppression of all exemptions."

Two years later, and a month before the Chamber discussion of the pro­ posal, he wrote,

The reform of the military law stands as the first order of the day. It responds to the promises of the candidates and the wishes of the nation. The shortening of the term of service and establishing its absolute equality by suppressing all exemptions are its essential terms . ”125

The two-year term of service had already been accepted by the

Senate in the version of the bill that was presented to the Chamber on

June 6, 1904. This was a compromise between the existing law and the one-year stipulated in a bill deposited in the Chamber in 1902.12^

122 JOCD. 6 June 1904. 123 See I^Alliance issues 4 July-1 August 1902, and 28 June 1903. 124 Ind B-P. 8 April 1902. 125 Ind B-P. 20 May 1904. 126 JOCD. 12 June 1902. 141

Vaillant was spokesman for the extreme liberal view, envisioning one year

of active service and a sort of federal m ilitia such as Switzerland's.

But coupled with the length of service was the matter of exemptions.

Uncompromising on the equality principle, the bloc resisted all efforts

to list special categories. "AH Frenchmen shall have m ilitary service,"

read A rticle 1, and it was passed by voice vote. Then the Chamber

majority successfully put down a ll efforts to exempt anyone—even doctors,

lawyers, professors, and students in the government trade schools, St.

Cyr, and the Polytechnical School. By June 21 it was agreed that every­

one should serve two years in the active army, eleven years in the

reserves, six years in the territorial army, and six years in the terri­

torial reserves—by the overwhelming vote of $k6 to 3* Two weeks later

the final bill was passed 489 to 42 and sent on to the Senate where it

was lost until the following spring. Back in the Chamber in March, one

day was spent comparing the size of the German army with that of France.

It is surprising that foreign policy did not become more of an issue at

that juncture in view of the Moroccan situation and the poor showing of

France's ally, Russia, in Manchuria, The German army totaled 450,000 to

F r a n c e 's 25 5,000. But after learning that the Germans had 165 infantry

batallions to France's 104, and 68 of cavalry to Germany's 72, the

Chamber gave another solid sanction to the b ill 504 to 43, and it became 127 the Law of 21 March 1905. Only the extreme right voted against it, deputies such as Montebello and de Mun; only the extreme right could be

considered Germanophobe or advocating revenge in 1904 and 1905 on the basis of these votes.

127JOCD. 16, 17 March 1905. 142

Labor and the Eighth Legislature

On problems regarding labor, the bloc was not so much in agree­ ment. Unions had long since been accepted as part of the economic scene. The issues were those of closed shop, the right of secondary boycott, and the general strike. On these issues Barthou was conserva­ tive. Favorably disposed toward the idea of labor organizations, he wrote about the right-to-work versus the accumulation of economic power by the unions. Quoting Paul-Boncour on this topic he concurred that mandatory membership or the closed shop principle was tyrannical. He even accused the Catholics of using their association catholioue to aid in organizing and consolidating the closed shop in order to oppose the owners of industry in a class struggle.He was against this type of accumulation of power by any group and suggested that Albert de Mun and his group were trying to organize labor into Christian syndicates because they felt they were the only group fit to resist socialism.l^O But the

Catholic workers' unions did not materialize; it was rather the Confeder­ ation g^nfirala du travail that was bidding to speak for French labor.

The year 1904 was another of those especially inclined to s t r i k e s —1026 of them Involving 271.097 s t r i k e r s.Had not the issue of separation loomed so large, undoubtedly the Chamber would have taken action in the realm of labor. In spite of his deep involvement with

128 Joseph Paul-Boncour, Federal! sme economioue (Paris, 1901), pp. 35-67. *nd Louis Barthou, L'Action Syndics!e (Paris, 1904), pp. 47-8, 304-03. 129 Louis Barthou, "Le Syndicat Obligatoire,* La Nouvelle Revue. Vol. IX, No. 36 (April 1, 1901), pp. 321-47.

13°I6£d. 131t.«A llia n ce. U June 1905. 143 132 separation that year, Barthou1s thoughts were occupied with unionism.

Labor organizations were growing in France along with industrialism . The

Bourses du Travail was reconstituted in 1892 along with the appearance of

the C, G. T#, and in 1902 the F6d6ration des Bourses du Travail joined

other labor groups in consolidating the C. G. T.

From 1884 when there were 500 unions with 60,000 members, French

unionism had grown by 1903 to 3934 groups totaling 643,757 members. The miners held the highest percentage of unionization—44.3 percent of the

154,500 miners were organized. All told, 9 percent of French labor

belonged to unions compared with 17 percent for Germany, 30 percent for

the United States, and 50 percent for Great B ritain^3 (Barthou thought

these percentages for the United States and Great Britain were too

h i g h ) .1^

As a member of the Chamber labor commission, Barthou was delegated

to report on the results of the law of 1884. Citing the above statistics, he went on to speculate on the lack of success of organized labor in

France. First he listed the opposition of management to the movement,

but observed that this type of opposition was diminishing. Second, he

blamed organized labor for being too much concerned with political ideology and not enough with the welfare of their members. Third, he

blamed the "tyranny1' some unions held over their members who wanted to

132 In addition to publishing his book, Lection Svndicale. that year, he wrote the numerous articles cited on unions. Since 1894 he had been a member of the Chamber*s labor commissions. See for example, Louis Barthou, Chambre des D^put^s Rapport No. 372; SixiSme Legislature; 1894 S e s s io n .

133 Ind B-P. 20-23 January 1904; also LtAllianoe. 24 January 1904. 144

resign or over those who refused to join. He summarized four proposed

laws which the commission had agreed should be enacted: (1) retired

workers and apprentices should be allowed union membership; (2) profes­

sional people and government employees—who were not officials (those who

held part of the public power)—should be allowed to organize unions;

(3) unions should have the status of individuals in law—that is the

right to own offices, meeting ha lls, and any type of property that was

needed for their legitimate business, even libraries, hospitals, and

homes for the aged; and (4) membership should be voluntary rather than

obligatory so that unions could not in effect refuse employment, fire, or

blackball workers. 135 Groups two and four were to be the objects of most

of the discussion for the next six years.

Barthou*s article in the Nouvelle Revue, early in 1904, also protested the efforts of the Catholic Association in trying to create

closed shop conditions. He quoted Albert de Mun who as early as 1887 had s a id ,

The General Association of French Catholics is opening the door for the reconstruction of corporations, not only in the sense of professional syndicates, but the association together of all workers for the purposes of advancing the goals of Catholicism.138

The article continued by citing cases of priests joining syndicates and discussing religious, political policy at syndicate meetings. He recounted how Austria-Hungary had had similar trouble in 188? when,

135 Ibid. See also Barthou, L*Action Syndicale. 304-05.

^■^Barthou, "Le Syndicate Obligatoire,n loc. c it. 145

because of the involvement of priests in labor unions, it became 13? necessary to pass a law ridding organized labor of their influence.

As proof of the undesirability of the closed shop, Barthou

pointed out that the British and United States trade unions had not, with their greater numbers, been seduced by the idea of obligatory mem­

bership. His prime example was Switzerland where in 1885 the workers,

foremen, and owners, a ll concerned about sales abroad, had formed a

large federation to control the entire Swiss watch industry. The pro­ moters of this enterprise tried to get the government to require in this

federation, among other things, compulsory membership of all attached to

watchmaking enterprises, but the Swiss people voted down the proposal in

1 8 9 4 .138

Unnoticed in the midst of greater problems, the Chamber on

January 28, 1904, and the Senate on March 9 approved a b ill giving equal 139 em ploym ent r i g h t s to women*

The problem of strikes in 1905, although smaller in quantity,

received more attention in the Chamber interpellations. The usual departure for such discussions was the government*s use of troops or police on the strike scenes. At Limoges in April, for instance, Baron de Reille, from the right, complained that there were not enough troops

there to keep order, only to be challenged by Jaures who complained that there should have been no troops there at all. A typical variety of

137 Ind B-P. 3-6 February 1904. 138 Ibid. See also Louis Barthou, "Le Syndicate Obligatoire," l o c . c i t . 139 JOCD and JQSD for dates mentioned. 146

resolutions followed: one, to appoint a commission of inquiry; another

to sympathize with the strikers and blame the owners and the Minister of

Interior; and still another, to extend sympathy and express confidence in

the attitude of the government. As in the great majority of inter­ pellations, only the last one passed.

The following month the police struck at Lyon, involving another principle. They protested because their minimum retirement age had been raised from 45 to 55 and time in the armed forces was no longer to be counted as part of their years of service. Their prefect called in

350 soldiers to take their places and ultimately 53 of the strikers were suspended. The Chamber overwhelmingly approved both this action and

Premier Rouvier's statement that this was a strike of agents of public authority which could not be tolerated—shades of Governor Coolidge fifteen years hence. Also there were usually complaints that the negotiator or troop commander was pro-capitalist.^-^ -

With little fanfare both houses passed by voice vote the Law of

29 June 1905 establishing an eight-hour day in the mines.

As a member of the Chamber Labor Com m ission,Barthou presented in behalf of that group a formula for classifying government employees who had the right to organize and those who did not. Civil servants who held part of the public executive or decision-making power could not

140 JQCD. 18 April 1905. 141 JQCD. 3 November 1905- lh P JQCD. 27 June 1905» and JQSD. 8 November 1904. 143 JQCD. 23 June 1905- 147 organize. Teachers could on the local level since they were classified as professional workers, but were not to join a national association, according to the Law of Associations of 1901. However, postal clerks, for example, were not covered by this law since they had no professional s c h o o lin g .

Immediately thereafter teachers in three departments—Seine, Var, and the Pyrenees-Oriental—violated the law by amalgamating their associ­ ations into a syndicate. Socialists, Vaillant, Z^vaes, and Jaures, hoped to get the 1884 law modified so more categories of civil servants might organize, but they had to settle for a Chamber promise to "discuss the 144 . law in the very near future." Barthou*s own legalistic view of this problem was that the teachers were not covered under the 1901 law and that this law did not elastically give the right to organize to every group not mentioned in the law, especially to professional groups. A special law would be needed to give them this authority, similar to a

1902 law allowing physicians to form an association.^-* The following 14< March he published an article to the same effect in the Revue de Paris.

In November Barthou wrote out for L1Independent des Basses

Pyrenees his own views and the attitude of the Labor Commission toward current labor activities. He was quite impressed with the calibre of the delegations of workers that had met with the Labor Commission. He

144 JQCD. 7 November 1905* 145 Ind B-P. 1 December 1905* 146 Louis Barthou, "Les Syndicats d*Instituteurs," Revue de Paris. Vol. XIII, Part 2 (March-April, 1906), 4-7. 148

complimented their knowledge of affairs and accredited the syndical

organizations with having done a creditable job of socially educating

the laboring classes. He even speculated, "Is this the fourth estate

that the socialists have predicted is coming?” He did not see it in the

immediate offing, however. Instead, he objected to the General Associ­

ation of Civil Service, Postal, and Telegraph Employees trying to change

its status from association to that of union. The only motive he could

see in this was their desire to secure the legal right to strike, which

he thought was only the right to interfere with "a public utility that is

necessary to mobilization, national life, and public order.” Aside from

this he recognized that the postal workers were underpaid and long-

suffering under the existing regulations, but only suggested that they

should keep on working and hoped the government would provide them a

r a is e .

With elections in the offing, liberal and conservative deputies and labor groups stepped up their reform and popularity contests aimed at labor votes. Several suggestions, considered radical for the time, were

brought up in the Chamber early in 1906. Constans proposed that old-age pensions be financed by an income tax. A proposal including both these ideas was defeated, with only the socialists and a few Radicals voting for it. Briand and Jaurl's favored it while Barthou, Bourgeois, and

Millerand were opposed. Similarly, a proposal to pay for the pensions by withholding funds from payrolls failed.It was finally resolved that

147 Ind B-P. 21 November 1905- 148 JQCD. 18 January 1906. 149

2 percent of the first 2400 francs annual wage should be withheld and matched by the employer to finance the pensions and mutual aid societies.

The entire proposal passed 512 to 5 and w*s forwarded to the Senate 149 February 13, not to reappear for three years.

On the tenth of March in the midst of a cabinet crisis there occurred at Courriers the most tragic disaster in the history of French mining: 1100 miners died in an explosion—thirteen survived. The miners went on strike and the government was interpellated on its responsibility for the disaster. Barthou was to be Minister of Public Works in the new cabinet accepted two days hence and took the question for the government.

The mines had been properly inspected and the company given instructions to take proper precautions, he related; indemnity of 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 francs was unanimously voted the beneficiaries, and confidence in the government*s 130 ability to handle the situation was easily forthcoming.

The new cabinet under Sarrien got its first vote of approval in

March 14 from Marcel Sembat*s resolution favoring permission for the postal workers to form a syndicate. Following rejection of the resolution by 85 to 383, the vote of confidence passed, 460 to 37.^^

Less than a month later the postal workers struck in order to pressure the government on their right to organize and strike. Barthou spoke in both the Chamber and the Senate in his capacity as Public Works

M inister, arguing that this was not the time to discuss the right of government workers to strike, that it had been decided the year before

149 JQCD. 18, 23 January, 1-23 February 1906.

^Q jQCD. 12 March 1906. 1^I JOCD. 14 March 1906. 150

that civil servants could not strike, and that the issue of the moment

was whether or not the postal workers had the right to interrupt the

public function which had been entrusted to them in order to press for

further rights and privileges. They had been granted raises under both

the 1905 and 1906 budgets, so the present agitation was simply over the 152 right to strike. This, he said, the government would not tolerate,

and he received overwhelming votes of confidence in the Chamber, ^60 to

37, on the day of its adjournment for the spring elections. Paris itself

suffered no disruption of mail service during the strike. Barthou had made an appeal, which was at the same time a threat, for the postal workers to return to work. Three hundred were fired for not doing so,

for to let the mail service lapse, he said, would be an abdication by the government of its power.

Meanwhile, the miners' strike had spread from Pas-de-Calais to

Clermont-Ferrand and Barthou had gone to Courriers to talk to the disaster survivors and to announce that an inquiry would locate the negligence responsible for the disaster and that persecution would follow.15^ The miners and postal clerks were still out on strike when the Eighth Legislature gave way to the Ninth in the spring of 1906.

132JQCD. 12 April and JQSD. 1^ April 1908. 153 . L1Allian ce. 22 A pril 1906.

154 . L*Alliance. 8 April 1906. 151

Colonialism and Foreign Policy in the Eighth Legislature

In view of the impressive build-up of French involvement in imperialism and international affairs, discussions of these matters remained remarkably quiet in the 1902 to 1906 period. In January, 1903» a discussion was evoked in the Chamber over Jaures1 by now public letter to the Italian socialist deputy Andrea Costa. The two socialists had exchanged views on the alliance structures to which their respective nations belonged. Jaures, placing the cart before the horse, had written that the "tripple alliance was a necessary counterbalance to French

chauvinism and to the fantasies of the Franco-Russian A lliance.11 Deputy

Joseph Lasies asked Jaures to explain why he was an internationalist when the German socialist Liebknecht was not; at the Marseille conference the year before Liebknecht had been asked directly what the German socialists would do in case of war between England and France, and answered that the

Germans would defend their country. Jaurds, when asked the same question, replied that it was time France stopped relying on army and navy appro­ priations for its defense and started to rely on its resources and people 155 and develop them.

It was nearly a year later that Millerand practically read him­ self out of any socialist group by opposing—almost singly among the socialists—Gustav Hubbard1s proposal that France take unilateral initiative in disarmament, stating that he "refused to be called before

1 ^ J0CD. 23 January 1903. 152

the ecumenical council of socialist doctors, that is to say the coming

Congress which alone is sovereign in such matters.

In February, 1904, both Barthou and Caillaux wrote letters in

L1Alliance supporting Russia*s case in the war with Japan; Barthou reminded his readers of France*s interests in Indo-China and Caillaux

stressed lending moral support to Russia. 157 The extreme right was at the same time complaining that the president of France did not have the 1 Cft authority to declare war as the czar of Russia had.

Disappointed that England would not make any move to cooperate with France in stopping the Russo-Japanese War, Delcass^ nevertheless pushed for and obtained an entente cordial with the British on April 8,

1904, settling problems outstanding in Egypt, Morocco, Siam, Newfound­ land, and the New Hebrides. In spite of a week-long argument over this 159 measure, the Chamber ratified it by the lopsided vote of 443 to 105.

The chief opposition to it came from the socialists who were already opposing monarchist, agrarian Russia and supporting industrialist Germany and saw England as a competitor of Germany.

The next spring during the arguments on the separation law, an international crisis was precipitated by the approval of the Anglo-French

Alliance, by the bad showing of Russia in the war, and by the whole

Alliance. 9 January 1904. The quotation is the LlAlliance reporter1s, not Millerand*s.

Alliance. 22, 28 February 1904. 158 L1Alliance. 21 February 1904.

^•^JQCD. 3-10 November 1904, 153

anti-German polity of Delcasse. Emboldened by Russia1s defeat in the

east, Germany decided to protest the French economic and political push

which had been going on in Morocco for four years. The kaiser's yacht

dropped anchor at Tangiers on March 31 and William II made a speech there

regarding Germany's interest in Morocco's future independence and business

relations. Whether this represented a change in Germany's African policy

or an effort to throw cold water on the Anglo-French Entente, the effect was the same. Rouvier was convinced that Delcass&'s refusal to nego­

tiate with Germany could well mean war—a war which neither France nor

England was prepared to undertake at the moment, especially since little

aid could be expected from Russia. In the Chamber Delcass^ was attacked from all sides. He had been in office too long; he was engaged in secret diplomacy; and he was pro-Russian—these were the criticism s leveled at him. But most of the crisis took place behind the closed doors of

cabinet meetings and in the embassies in London, Berlin, and Paris. To placate Germany Rouvier decided to take over the Quai d'Orsay himself,

but then to save face in the Chamber he changed his mind and kept Delcasse in the cabinet. It is even possible that Biilow insisted on Delcass£'s removal as the price of further negotiation or as the price of Germany's withdrawal from Morocco; at least Rouvier and the rest of the cabinet thought much about this prospect. Delcasse settled that part of the problem by resigning on June 6 .^^

JQCD. 19 April 1905* See Sidney B* Fay, Origins of the War (New York, 1928), Vol. I, pp. 186-8?; and Frederick L. Schuman, War and Diplomacy in the French Republic (New York, 1931)* PP* l67-8h. 15^

The Algeciras Conference met from January 16 to April 7, 1906* and the Chamber unanimously passed the necessary funds for the conference 161 on April 12 without any argument over the decisions made there.

The End of the Bloc

The Eighth Legislature began life during one of the few harmonious periods of accord in the Third Republic and ended in the greatest confu­

sion since 1871. The relative stability of politics was provided by the

Radical Party, and to a lesser degree by the Alliance Party; this latter "1 A? group had elected Barthou their vice-president in 1902, Both these groups were conceived as a result of the anti-clericalism augmented by the Dreyfus Affair. In this fight against the clericalists these two groups had the support of the socialists. But as early as 1903, on issues other than Church and state or the two-year law, the split on principle was evident.

In January Joseph Lasies and Paul Pugliese-Conti both complained in the Chamber that socialists1 brochures, the Pioupiou de l tYonne. Le

Manuel. and the Voix du Peuple. were being circulated among army recruits instructing them how to conduct themselves should they be called upon to police strike areas.But the range of cooperation against the

"nationalist and clericalist enemies of the Republic" is evidence of the singleness of purpose of the bloc. In the name of the Alliance Barthou spoke in April, 1904, of the great work of Waldeck-Rousseau against

l6 lJ0CP, 12 April 1906. l 6 ZL 'A lliance. 12 December 1902.

l Z n JQCD. 23 January 1903. 155

"these enemies." He went on to applaud the socialists for their support

of the Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes m inistries; "The socialists," he said,

"understood wherein lay the real danger to the Republic." In fact the

real purpose of the 1901 law of associations, Barthou thought, was to get 164 rid of the organizations that were political bodies. In an effort to

attract republicans of all shades to the Alliance, as many notable poli­

tical figures as possible were given official titles within the party.

Caillaux was a member of its executive committee^8^ and Waldeck-Rousseau

himself was offered an honorary presidency.’*'88 In an article the same month Barthou urged that all republicans everywhere in spite of their

variant views should rally to the party on the larger issues like

separation.

The first argument after the honeymoon seemed to be over the

result of the International Socialist Congress of Amsterdam in 1904. Led

by the German delegation and supported by the French followers of Guesde,

the Congress adopted a resolution condemning socialist support of estab­

lished governments even though these governments were reform ist in

character; it was the confirmation of class struggle as the means of

change. Barthou congratulated Jaures for his stand against this resolu­

tion at Amsterdam and referred to the decision as a sentence of excom- 168 munication. The January 8, 1905, issue of li*nce predicted a

united front would appear among the socialists for the 1906 elections;

1 6 Alliance. 3 April 1904. l65Ind B-P. 8 April 1904.

l66Ind B-P. 8 April 1904. l6?lbid.

l68Ind B-P. 5 August 1904. 156 this comment was only echoing the decisions of the Amsterdam Congress, but it is the first sign of admission that there was a socialist policy as opposed to the policy of the Alliance Party and that the socialists no l6 9 longer planned to support bourgeois governments. Socialist committees began negotiation in January and on April 25, 1905, the united French

Socialist Party came into being. Officially it was the Parti Socialists, section francaise de l 1international ouvrieres. referred to as the

S.F.I.O., for obvious reasons.

In spite of the Amsterdam unification decisions, many Socialists remained faithful to Combes, hoping to stay with him until he could get the separation law and the two-year law passed. It was a combination of other factors that continued to nibble away at his majority. A few republicans were clericalist and disapproved of his vigorous stand on separation; Z6vaes thought, for example, that the association law had separated some of the republicans from the government group.Several

Radicals were anxious not only to move on the work of reform but wanted to advance their own political careers; Combes thought Leygues, Caillaux, and CLemenceau were especially ambitious politically, and wanted Combes 171 out of the way. Having survived the affair of the fiches. he found himself in another general debate in January 1905- L1Hopiteau, Deschanel, and Krants complained that Combes was not carrying out his announced program—income tax, two-year law, nationalization of railroads, and

169 . „ 1 70 LtAlliance. 8 January 1905. JQCD. 13-14 January 1905. 171 Emil Combes, Mon Ministers (Paris, 1956), pp. 249-59- retirement pensions. It was Berteaux, Jaures, and Combes, himself, who tried to defend the slow pace of things; these laws had been introduced, but the imminent religious and army controversies had consumed much of the time. Coming from the other flank then, the conservatives criticized

Combes for pushing a retirement b ill, which he knew would pass, as a sop to those liberal and radical elements which wanted a separation b ill, when he was not so sure he could get it. He repeated that separation was part of his program, too, and won a vote of confidence, 287 to 281, with

Barthou, Caillaux, and Millerand against him but supported to the end 172 by most of the socialists.

The most important single element that defeated Combes was the affair of the fiches. Many of the bloc felt genuine moral amazement at the use of such influence in running the army. Then, too, they must have felt that this type of scandal would only add fuel to the flames of nationalism and clericalism , and they could not countenance this type of assistance being given to the other side. As for Combes, he considered the January 14 vote one of no confidence, since his majority of six included ten of his own ministers who could really carry the balance.

He resigned as soon as President Loubet was back in Paris from his mother*s funeral.^73 His resignation is testimony of his own loyalty to the program of the bloc. Three times in three months the Chamber had brought him to the brink of demission on secondary issues. In his parting letter to Loubet he wrote, "It is easy to see that I am exposed to a vote

^ ^ JOCD. 13-14 January 1905. 1 73_1_. , 158 of no confidence at any moment on some issue which does not concern the 17^ government*s program. Taking such a risk might spoil our program."

So he followed Waldeck-Rousseau*s precedent and resigned without waiting to be voted out.

In view of the solidarity expressed at Amsterdam it was necessary for the bloc to replace Combes with a Radical who was more conservative.

The negotiations by the socialists to unify—a policy of substituting committee control for parliamentary action, Barthou called i t —were well known, as were Briand's objections to party discipline.Rouvier was called. He was known among bankers but was also a strong separation!st; and he was to reap the success of the two-year law and separation sown by

Combes. He presented a program to the Chamber on January 27 identical to that of Combes, except nationalization of railroads was omitted. The vote of confidence submitted by Sarrien, stipulating that the government would achieve its program by use of a republican majority, passed 373 to

99 with only socialists disapproving.^^ Although Combes had born the brunt of the fight, it was Rouvier who saw the completion of the two-year law and the law on separation; and with the passage of these two laws went the last passing of the Alliance-Radical-socialist bloc.

In the national presidential election of January, 1906, Fallieres won over Doumer. Barthou hailed the result as a republican success and used the occasion to advocate open ballots for presidential elections in the future.

17^ August Soulier, L 1 In sta bi ~H t6 M inisterielle sous la Trolsieme Republique (Paris, 1939). p* 315i footnote.

^ Ind B-P, 10 February 1905* ^ ^ JOCD. 27 January 1905. 177 Le F ig a ro . 8 March 1906. 159

With the chaos of the spring of 1906 it is surprising that only one cabinet fell in the melee of inventorying church property, miners' strikes, and the strike of the postal workers. Actually it was Rouvier*s decision to complete inventories of church property, albeit with delib-

*1 n O erate speed, that lost him his support. The Chamber had "election fever" according to Le Figaro, and was in no hurry to take strong stands on any of these crises. The president conferred with Poincare, Sarrien, and Bourgeois concerning a new premier and the short straw was drawn by

S a r r ie n .

Le Figaro predicted on March 10 that Barthou would be in the new cabinet. Four days later Sarrien presented his list of ministers with

Barthou at Public Works. On April 12 the Chamber, and on April 14 the

Senate, closed and went home for the May elections.

The Party Leader

Motivated primarily ty his anticlericalist convictions, Barthou*s role in the period of the Eighth and Ninth Legislatures—1898 to 1906— was of vital significance. He supported Moline's ministry to the end and then acted immediately to help bring about a re-examination of the

Dreyfus A ffair. Considering the nationalists and clericalists in 1898 a greater threat to the Republic than socialism, he used his power to organize the Alliance Party as a force against this spectre—even cooperating with the socialists in this campaign. The resulting bloc was responsible for three laws against clericalism; the 1901 law on

^■^See above pp. 138-39. l6 0 associations; the 1904 law abolishing teaching by religious orders; and the 1905 law separating Church and state. In the meantime this bloc had also promulgated the law of 1900, limiting the work-day to eleven hours for men and ten hours for women and children, and had passed the two-year law of 1905. The relatively long duration of the Waldeck-Rousseau and

Combes governments stands as further evidence of the success of the bloc.

On other matters, however, the charm of this coalition did not exist. The Radicals kept Barthou out of Waldeck-Rousseau*s cabinet and tried to exile him to Algeria in 1899- But Barthou remained loyal to the Radical Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes m inistries, recognizing the necessity of Radical Party cooperation for the bloc. He only withdrew his support of Combes when the affair of the fiches threatened to give the clericalists an opportunity to rise once more.

By 1905 the separation of Church and state was complete, and the socialists were presenting a solid front to press on their campaign for more labor reform and more collectivism. Not only had the reason for existence of the bloc vanished, but the S. F. I. 0. then appeared to

Barthou as the larger menace to the Republic. S till opposed to the closed shop and the unionization of civil servants who exercised public authority, supporting all France*s foreign policy, reconciled finally to the need for an income tax, and willing to accept a modified scrutin de liste election system, he sought enough support from the right to stop the growing appeal of the left.

As vice-president of L*Alliance Republlcaine D&nocratique—for the moment F rance *5 second largest political party—he planned to lead this group in a battle against international and domestic socialism. CHAPTER V

THE ANTI-SOCIALIST MINISTER

Politics in 1906

The election campaign of 1906 began quite early. In January

Barthou declined the invitation by party officials to stand for the

Senate from the Basses-^ren^es, his reason being that he wished to remain in the Chamber of Deputies for the coming arguments on church property inventories and labor.** His first major campaign speech was made at Bordeaux in February. He complimented the Senate for its role in

supporting Fallieres for president, reminded the audience that the separa­

tion law was really a guard against those who used religion for political ends, and called for a grand union of the republican party of the left

to support the Republic against reaction, laic against clerical, and legal progress against utopian revolutionaries. He went on to specifics which he thought should be instituted immediately: "equity and security in the relations of capital and labor by a remuneration more propor­ tionate to their respective work"; granting more legal and economic power to unions; organizing of all government employees except those who exercised public power; and securing civil servants from political 2 influence in their jobs and promotions. As a means of financing the

^Ind B-P. 7-8 January 1906. 2 Ind B-P. 7 February 1906, or L1Alliance. 11 February 1906.

161 162

program and of distributing more equally the public expenses, he now

advocated an income tax,^ which he had opposed as late as 1900 as being

arbitrary and inquisitional.^ Perhaps taking a lesson from the socialists

he was applying a little party discipline to himself, now that his party

was advocating the tax.

Fortunately for Barthou he was unopposed in Oloron-Est and had

no need to campaign because after March 14 he and the rest of the

ministry were preoccupied with labor conflicts. In April he visited

Courriers, where the company and L.he government engineers were blaming

each other for the disaster.'* It was not until the nineteenth of May

that he spoke to an Qloron audience; it was an anti-clerical speech

about the thirty-six year struggle between the Catholic Church and the

Republic. Three days later he repeated the same theme, adding that democracy in France had triumphed over its adversaries.*3

Interestingly enough the Alliance press continued to speak of

the socialists as their friends, even after the first scrutin: possibly

they wished to carry on the myth that the bloc still existed until after 7 all the votes were in two weeks later. Actually, both the Alliance and the Socialist Party, and the Radicals, too, knew better.

The election results showed, if not the maintenance of the bloc, at least a preference for its policies. The right—the nationalists, reactionaires, and Progressists—lost 58 seats to the parties left of

3 4 Ibid. See Ind B-P, 23 August 1900.

L1Alliance. 8 April 1906. °Ind B-P. 20, 21, and 27 May 1906.

^L1 Alliance. 13 May 1906. 163 Q them. The Socialists gained 14, the Radicals 30» and the Alliance 14.

It was a victory for the Radicals, who now numbered about 230 deputies; also significant is the fact that the Radicals, with some support from the 120 or 130 Alliance republicans, clearly formed a majority without any support from the S.F»1*0.; this, on top of the socialist unification, made any semblance of the old bloc neither necessary nor desirable for the center republicans. Although the Radicals outnumbered the Alliance nearly two-to-one, the two groups were still indispensable to each other.

Immediately following the election, Barthou spoke in the neigh­ boring department of the Hautes-Pyrenees at a political meeting cele­ brating the reelection of Deputy Joseph F itta; he outlined the govern­ ment^ program which they would try to achieve in the coming legislature:

(1) income tax as a more equitable distribution of public expense;

(2) judicial machinery for settling labor disputes; (3) closer examination of state monopolies to insure their laborers of fair conditions; and

(4) a public transportation system. Sarrien*s platform speech t, ^ weeks later in the new Chamber was broader; it advocated a six-day week, a maximum hours law, subsidy to agriculture, economic development of

France*s colonies, pursuance of the traditional interests in foreign policy, solution of labor problems on an international as well as national level, and adherence to existing French alliances.^

g Campbell, French Electoral Systems, 80-3, and George Bonnefous, Histoire Politique de La TroisiSme R^publique (Paris, 1956), Vol. I, p . 19-

9Ind B-P. 12 June 1906. 164

Separation

The separation issue, as evidenced by the arguments over redis­

tribution of church property, continued to flare up under the period of

the Ninth Legislature. In August, 1906, Pius X issued an order for­

bidding public worship societies or congregations, which were the local

organizations under which congregations could get financial support for

their churches.^ In November the Chamber discussed the refusal of the

Pope and Catholics to apply the separation law. Clemenceau received a

vote of confidence—Sarrien had retired October 19. claiming poor health—

on the government’s policy of trying to ignore the situation and yet enforce the law."^ Inasmuch as neither side made any further statement p rio r to December 11, the day the separation was to take e ff e c t, the

Chamber passed a law December 21 allow ing lo c a l p re fe c ts or mayors to regulate worship. Property reverted to either the communes or the departments, and the Church had the right—or the priests, as citizens— to use, occupy, or rent such property. The Senate approved the same 12 proposal December 29.

In 1907 the problem arose of what to do with money and property of the churches that were not used in the various worship services, now that there were no religious societies to administer them. If left

unclaimed they were to become state property, or the donors or their heirs could reclaim them, according to a proposal approved by the Chamber 11 on December 21. J This measure turned up in the Senate the following

10 11 Ind B-P. 29 May 1906. JQCD. 5, 13 November 1906.

12 JQCD. 21 December, and JQSD. 29 December 1906.

^ JOCD. 21 December 1907* 165

March, whore it was amended to let mutual aid societies handle retirement

funds for clerics and endowments for future masses. The Senate accepted 14 this version April 7, and the Chamber April 13, 1908.

Two years later the problem of buying in church property arose yet again. A scandal was uncovered, and Msrs. Duez and lie couturier were

found deeply involved in giving too much money to members of dissolved

congregations. The matter came up in the Chamber March 14, 1910. The

complaints came from Georges Berry, a nationalist deputy from Paris, and

from Jaures. Duez had been brought into court on a charge of embezzeling

four million francs through his position as one of the three court appointed liquidators to handle church property. The theft presumably

took place while Barthou was Minister of Justice under Briand, so Barthou responded to the charges in the Chamber. The three liquidators had all

been chosen on merit and not on political or religious considerations, and their appointments authorized by parliament, he said; but he evaded

the issue by declining to discuss a problem that was still before the

court. Me also inferred that the court system was corrupt; **i should like to invite this Chamber to search high and low with me to see if

there isr*t something gangrenous in our judiciary organization, and if it isn*t necessary and indispensable to burn it out with a red-hot iron."

Possibly impressed by this accusation made by the M inister of Justice, but on the other hand apparently satisfied the courts could handle the matter (the liquidators had already been fired), the deputies terminated

14 JOSD, 28 March-April, and JQCD. 13 April 1908. 166

their discussion by a voice of confidence that the judiciary could and would punish those guilty.^

Labor and the Ninth Legislature

The labor crisis continued for most of the period of the Ninth

Legislature. The issues were still those of the right to organize and

the right to strike for certain categories of workers—especially among

government employees. As a counter attack to growing syndicalism various managements began to create a Confederation du Travail as a company union arrangement to oppose the workers* syndicates. The first of these was in the metal machinery production plants, and its program seemed to be just a counter-attack to oppose the increased demands from the syndicates.

Their resolution of organization opposed the eight-hour day, advocated a

six-day week rather than five and a half, opposed collective bargaining, advocated piece work in plants, would prohibit all workers* commissions from conferences on salaries or policy-making, and advocated agreements not to hire during a strike without the Confederation*s consent—aimed probably at black-balling syndicate members, ihe Confederation also intended to keep files on workers of all plants belonging to the Confeder­ ation for convenient cross-reference purposes.^

With the miners and postal workers s till agitating, GLemenceau and Louis barthou (kept on as his Public Works M inister) found themselves

^JQCD. 14, 15 March 1910. French politicians of all colors were to ponder for a long time over this statement made by the Minister of Justice, bee donnefous, Troisi^me J&puhlioue. 1?3«75.

l6L»Allianz. 20 May 1906. 167 immediately confronted in the Chamber on June 19* 1906, with interpella­ tions from the left. Qemenceau criticized the socialists and syndi­ calists for talking about the substitution of collective property for capitalist ownership without any mention of the means of achieving this or of the consequences of such a change. **taile presumably pursuing the ideal of collectivism* the socialist program actually listed only mild reforms such as an eight-hour day, the right of all government employees to organize, social insurance against work steppage and illness, a pro­ gressive income tax, transfer of monopolies to the state, and propor­ tional representation. He maintained further that this was precisely the government's program except that the government wanted immediate national­ ization of one of these monopolies—railroads, lhen, predicting a long and happy future for private property, he asked Jaures if he thought the workers were ready to take over and direct industry.

Olemenceau then proceeded to lis t the major achievements made by labor since 1884 when they were first allowed to organize J the 1892 law establishing a 10-hour day for women and children and 11 hours for men; the voluntary labor arbitration law of 1892; free medical care for the indigent in 1893; the miners retirement law of 1894; the law of mutual aid societies in 1898; industrial accident insurance in I 8 9 8; equal employment rights for women in 1904; and an 8-hour day in the mines the previous y e a r .

Jaures immediately acknowledged this progress but argued that evolution in French society had reached the point where the government could soon b rin g about even more gains for the individual, lhen descending to a personal level, he countered that Qlemenceau was no great friend of 1 6 8 labor and that he had voted against accident insurance when it first came up back in 1884. Next he dragged in the matter of 1400 (sic) miners killed at Courriers. Barthou interrupted the proceedings at this point by reminding Jaures that he could not criticize the government for this disaster while investigation was under way to establish the responsi­ bility for it. The argument was settled by voting to post Clemenceau's 17 speech and not Jaures'.

Three weeks later this controversy came down to specific cases when the Chamber was d iscu ssin g an amnesty b i l l fo r the p o sta l workers who had struck in April. The work stoppage had lasted eight days.

Barthou revealed that the government considered this an unannounced walk out for the purpose of securing recognition of an illegally constituted union. It was a move against public service and the national interest

(the left applauded), and he reminded the Chamber that on April 11 they had voted confidence in the government for its action in this crisis, barthou admitted that he was investigating the record of those fired because of the strike and that their return depended on their attitude at the time of the strike; of the 31? fired, 279 had been reinstated.

As for the amnesty proposition under discussion, he argued against it because it applied to government employees, i'he logic of his position ran thus* "Would you ask the finance minister to reinstate agents who refused to take investories of church property, or the minister of war to reinstate generals who refused to close the parochial schools?" The first resolution voted on was Constans* proposal to give amnesty to all

1? JQCD. 19 June 1906. 169 the postal clerks en masse; this failed by a vote of 349 to 127. But a sim ilar one which excluded those with executive authority passed by voice 1 fi vote. As late as November, 1907. Barthou was still refusing to rehire the rest of the strikers.^

Meanwhile a six-day week law, to become effective July 13, was voted with almost no discussion and only one dissenting vote. w Also20 in

November, with no discussion except V iviani's statement of principle on being appointed FranceTs first labor m inister, the Chamber approved the 21 establishment of the Labor Ministry with only 20 dissenting votes.

The year 190? was even more occupied with strikes than the previous one. Both Clemenceau and Jaures had hoped the labor problem could be delayed until the crises over church property, income tax, and 22 nationalization of railroads could be settled. No such luck. In

March the Paris electricians struck but were back at work in 48 hours when Clemenceau threatened to put soldiers in their jobs, and the per­ petual issue of the use of troops was raised once more, but this time with public opinion in favor of a lighted Paris. Likewise at Nantes, the same month, longshoremen walked off the job, and in the melee one striker was killed by a soldier*s gunshot. In April a C, G. T. foodhandlers strike in Paris was only a partial success because the bakers were the 23 only ones who obeyed the strike order.

The real test of the government's labor policy came, however, from the schoolteachers who organized and affiliated with the C. G, T.

18J0CP. 10, 11 July 1906. 19JQCD. 25 November 190?. 20 PI JQCD. 10 J u ly 1906. JQCD. 8 November 1906. 22 Beau de Lomenie, Dynasties Bourgeoises. 381-402. 23 N ✓ Bonnefous, Troisieme Republioue. 5 8 . 170

The Syndicate of Functionnaires was made up of teachersf postal agents,

municipal workers, tobacco workers, match makers, naval employees, prison

guards, and the workers at the mint, and all were represented on a

petition to Qleraenceau asking for the right to have their union recog­

nized. Ministers Briand and Caillaux hauled them in to see who was 2 k responsible for this organization. Furthermore, the Teachers Syndicate

had requested Clemenceau to let them join the bourses du Travail.

Coincident to these events the socialist congress at lyon in April adopted a resolution advocating collectivism, international action of workers, autonomy of interior socialist policy for each nation, and the conquest of all public power.^

For at least seven years cabinets had remained intentionally vague on the status of teachers; Clemenceau thus thought it necessary to reply to their requests to associate with other unions. He told them they could affiliate with the bourses du Travail and he had in fact submitted a proposal to the Chamber to that effect. But as for joining the C. G. T. he felt teachers should not promote the general strike which all C. G, T, members swore to do.2^ The next day a reply to demenceau* s admonishment about this was printed and posted around Paris, signed by

Marius Negre, secretary of the Teachers Syndicate, and government employees from several m inistries. Negre and a postal clerk, Quilici, were among the signators fired for this. Ferdinand Buisson interpellated the government concerning Quilici*s dismissal. The M in iste r of P u b lic

2 k , L’Alliance. ? April 1907.

2^I b id . 26I b id . 171

Works, Barthou, reiterated the position that the government held, that neither the 1884 law on unions nor the interpretations of subsequent education ministers gave the teachers the right to organize, since they were classified as civil servants of authority. The debate on the status of teachers continued four days. Were they government employees, did they exercise part of the public power, and did government employees have the right to organize or to advocate and participate in a general strike? Included in the argument was a personal criticism exchange between Jaures and Briand over why Briand had deserted the socialist cause, to which Briand replied that he, as a socialist, was remaining faithful to his original concept of lending support to left-center governments. Eighteen' resolutions on the topic were condensed into seven v o te s by w hich th e Chamber showed i t s approval o f the governm ent1s action; the seventh, approving the declaration already made and opposing all additional action, passed 325 to 236, Jaures, Pelletan, Millerand, and Vaillant voting no.^

The labor agitation continued through 1908. In April the brick­ yards in Paris organized a lockout for sixteen days and organized company unions, both aimed at opposing the sabotage going on in their yards in 23 particular and the growing strength of organized labor in general. In

May the sand and gravel workers at Draveil-Vigneus near Paris struck and police were called in to protect those that continued to work; two

JOCD. 7-14 May 1906. See also Bonnefous, Troisieme Republioue. 59- 6 8 . 23 \ ✓ Bonnefous, Troisieme Republioue. 106. 172 29 strikers were killed. Because of the governments handling of this matter, and general principles, the C. G. T. organized a general strike during the summer parliamentary vacation. The result was partial compli­ ance by the workers on July 30* and a riot at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges;

cavalry troops were used to disperse the 2000 strikers, resulting in four d e a th s . ^

It was in 1909* however, that the labor conflicts were brought directly to the government. A delegation representing the postal clerks met with Barthou, their Minister, to protest recent rules regulating promotion and firing of agents for political involvement. Not satisfied with Barthou*s attitude, the postal clerks held a two-hour work stoppage

Sunday, March lh, and on March 16 voted a general strike to begin the next day.^ The case of the strikers was sent before the Council of

Discipline, but Barthou refused to meet with the strikers and reorganized the mail service with clerks who had stayed on the job. The government was criticized from the left for its handling of the situation. Liberals protested the replacement of the striking workers and argued they should be allowed to organize*

The crisis was discussed in the Chamber on March 19- Barthou clarified his position concerning the pressure the strikers were putting on his Ministry. "A minister can negotiate on equal terms with deputies," he said, "but it is impossible to admit, without abdicating the authority

I represent, that the union of civil servants can negotiate with a

30 JOCD. June 11, 1908. Bonnefous, Troisieme Republioue. 107.

^ Journal des P6bats. 16, 17 March 1909. 173 minister from positions of equal authority. ...” He made no claim to

infallibility and declared his willingness to assume full responsibility

for the appointments and other decisions he made.

The question is simply this: it is a matter of learning if public power, which represents national sovereignty, could be abandoned before the revolting civil servants. It is a question of knowing if ministers are responsible to the civil servants which they nominate or if they are responsible to the parliament.32

The Chamber then voted 282 to 145 to post this speech which

Jaures, Baillant, and most of the rest of the socialists opposed.32

Barthou continued his explanation by relating the incidents of sabotage

on the telegraph and telephone lines in the department of the Nord.

Several resolutions were presented to let the Chamber indicate its a tti­

tude toward the strike; it decided not to appoint a committee to search

the causes and responsibilities of the strike. Next they "resolved not

to tolerate the strike, confident in the government to maintain order and

peace in the postal and telegraph service," by a vote of to 118.-^

For two days Barthou and CLemenceau negotiated with representa­

tives of the postal, telephone, and telegraph workers syndicate, during which time Barthou issued new regulations regarding promotions that

seemed to settle part of the problem. The strikers then agreed to return

to work if the Undersecretary of State for Postes and Telegraphs, Julien

Simyan--who had been extremely heavy handed with dism issals—were removed

from his office and if no action were taken against the strikers.

Clemenceau, at least, gave the syndicate workers to believe that Simyan

32JOCP. 19 March 1906 could be moved elsewhere. Barthou issued an indirect order that those who did not show up for work on the morning of March 24 would be fired* which was a left-handed way of saying all was forgiven and no legal action or firing would result if the strike ended. Now the conservatives complained in the Chamber that the government was capitulating to the strikers—-abdication by the government of its authority, they said. The next morning a placard appeared around Paris to the effect that the clerks no longer considered Simyan their chief. But Barthou stood firm on the matter of the undersecretary; he would not dismiss him unless so instructed by parliament. Nonetheless* the strike ended on schedule and the syndicate in turn promised to undertake its own investigation into the sabotage. The Chamber voted confidence in the government, 341 to

237 , and by 470 to 63 decided to give the civil servants legal status while denying them the right to strike. ^

During the Easter vacation of parliament the C. G. T. agitated the situation by establishing a Union of Industrial Workers and State

Employees. At a rally at the Hippodrome on April 4, M, Georges Tvetot, secretary of the bourses du travail, whipped up the audience by declaring

"the hour has come for the government employees to join the Confederation general du t r a v a i ^ l Following this rally, the postal clerks again asked for the dismissal of Simyan. For bringing this up again Louis Barthou dismissed seven of them and reopened the inquiry into the insubordination.

When the Chamber returned the government was immediately questioned about

3 ^ Journal des D ebats. 1 6 -2 4 March 1909, and JOCD. 19, 22, 26 March 1909. 175 the new developments; Barthou cited statistics to show the extent of the new strike. Out of France*s 2h,215 postal workers, 236? were on strike.

The seven who had been fired not only were involved in the strike but had refused to give information during the inquiry. More sabotage again placed public opinion on the side of the government, and 223 was the total number of clerks fired.

The climax of the Chamber discussion came May 13 when, with the extreme left chanting "the International,” a three-part resolution was passed (1) to refuse civil servants the right to strike, (2) to see the government exist with respect to law, discipline, and its obligations to

the country, and (3) to give legal status to the unions of the civil

servants. Each part passed by a vote of more than two-to-one, A week later, in spite of the C. G. T.*s efforts to hold a general strike, the

clerks were back at work. And when on May 28 Jules Coutant brought up the question of amnesty, Barthou replied that there would be no rein­

statement of the strikers as long as the government remained in power,

the Chamber approving this position, 305 to 115* A second attempt to grant amnesty was no more successful on July 7» failing 109 to 392.-^

Further indication of Barthou*s attitude toward organised labor

cropped out in three speeches made during the summer of 1909. In June he spoke to the Paris convention of the Fraternal Association of

Employees and Workers of the Railroads of France. He was an honorary member of this group by virtue of his father*s white collar job with the

Midi Railroad before the Crimean War. He extolled the merits of such

3 j J0CP. 1 1 , 1 3 , 28 May, and ? Ju ly 1909. 176 mutual associations "which were the honor and force of the country. . .

This employees organization had regulated and disciplined the work of the roads. He went on to laud the management of the companies which had already established a six-day week for their employees and had provided accounts for retirement pensions. Such private cooperative arrangements

could provide the social security needed without submitting to the demands that such protection be provided through the united campaign of a much s tro n g e r and much more s o c i a l i s t i c fo r c e , such a s th e C. G. T. In a

September speech, campaigning for reelection as president of the Council

General in the Basses-Pyrenees, he repeated his view on the right of government functionnaires to strike:

When men have solicited and obtained a civil service job, with the advantages attached, the regular pay increases, the security of the present and the future, these privileges create for them a rigorous obligation to serve the nation with fidelity. Interruption of th.’ s service constitutes desertion.37

He stated that government employes., ,• ?;oold have the same loyalties to duty as members of the armed forces. He repeated his confidence in and preference for the solution of social and political problems by the 'Ifl deliberate passage of reform legislation.

The great concession to labor made by the Ninth Legislature was the passage finally of the retirement pension law. It provided for a

2 percent withholding tax, matched by the employer, and a minimum pension 39 of 360 francs. The Senate raised the retirement age from 60 to 65 and

~^Ind B-P. 8 June 1909. ^ Ind B-P, 26-7 September 1909•

~^Ind B-P. 28 September 1909. 39 Bonnefous, Troisieme Republioue, 167-73* 177 passed the bill on March 22, 1910* some four years after its first passage by the Chamber. The Senate*s version was approved once more by the Chamber, with almost no argument, by the overwhelming vote of 590 to 40 4 on the last day of March.

In view of Clemenceau* s statement in 1906 that the program of the socialists was the same as that of the government, it is surprising that so much conflict arose over the activities of organized labor.

After making due allowances for political playing to the grandstand, the real fear of the Radicals and Alliance republicans was the future strength of the C# G. T., once all workers would be affiliated with this group—especially with its supporters and those of the S, F. I. 0. making regular references to collectivism.

Nationalization of the Chnirn n rie Fer de l*0uest

The nationalization of the West Railroad was completed under

Barthou*s Public Works M inistry and became the precedent for the buying-in of the rest of the private railroad lines in the next thirty years. Barthou had resigned the same m inisterial post in 1894 because he felt private investors were benefiting too easily from a public utility.

The idea, however, was not original to the Ninth Legislature. In 1900 the government bought the Franco-Algerian Railroad, and in 1904 the

Chamber discussed redemption of the West and the Midi Railroads for the 41 first time. But it was 1906 when purchase of the West road was really

40 JOCD. 31 March 1910. 41 JOCD. 22 November 1900, and 18-26 January 1904 178

strongly advocated. In June, Barthou urged purchase of the line by 42 adopting the committee report by Deputy Lucien Klotz, At the end of

the year the Budget Commission returned a favorable report on the redemption plan and it was brought to the Chamber for discussion. It met its first opposition from the deputies in the area served by the railroad; they stood 76 to 4 against nationalization. Speaking for the government,

Barthou argued that this matter concerned all France and not just the region covered by the railroad. Next Louis Brindeau (Seine-Inferior) asked the Chamber to postpone the decision until the deputies could hear the opinions of the Chambers of Commerce in the area. Barthou replied to this by pointing out that the 76 deputies who signed the resolution against nationalizing the road certainly knew what their constituents wanted, so why should the Chamber wait to hear more of the same from sev eral Chambers of Commerce? The Chamber accepted th is lo g ic and thwarted two more delaying tactics two days later—one to have all the provisions of purchase and administration of the railroad included in the original bill, and the other which would provide only partial purchase. The final proposal approved was one to allow the Public Works

Minister to buy in the railroad and to provide a special law under which 43 the railroad would be operated. J

The follow ing February i t was suggested in the Chamber by Deputy

Georges Bergers that the government nationalize all the railroads, but his order of the day to this effect failed by a vote of 117 tr 419, after

42 JOCD. 21 June 1906. 43 JOCD. 5» 7 December 1906. 179

which the Chamber unanimously voted its reaffirm ation of Barthou1s plan 44 to purchase the West Railroad. In January, 1908, the government was

interpellated regarding the poor service and late trains on the lin e;

Barthou* s reply mentioned old equipment and the need for more personnel

and emphasized that most of the workers on the road were anxious for the

state to take it over. 45 ^ In June the Public Works Minister went before

the Senate arguing his case.

It has been said that by this project of purchase we are committing an act of collectivism . It is always easy to accuse someone of collective tendencies. . . . Meanwhile if we ask the authentic collec­ tivists, we see that they are less of the belief that our project spawns their doctrine. I add that exploitation by the state is not a new thing unknown to France, and that it is a question today of a simple extension.4o

The chief issues involved were those of government ownership, to which the extreme right objected, and of the cost to the public of pur­

chasing the railroad*s liabilities, which displeased the left. The

Senate agreed in June to the concept of purchase but stipulated that a special law should be written to provide for buying and running the railroad.The Chamber, in its turn, discussed provisional conditions under which the government could make the transfer and meet the obliga­ tions of the road; over mild opposition from the right these provisional

to conditions passed, 381 to 117. In November the budgets for public works and state railroads passed with very little difficulty. In

44 it1! JOCD. 26 F e b ru a ry 1907. JOCD. 17 Ja n u a ry 1908.

^ JOSD. 3, ^ Jane 1908. ^?JQSD. 26 June 1908.

JOCD. 11 December 1908. 130

December the bill providing for transfer of ownership to the state returned from the Senate with slight alterations, which Barthou urged the Chamber to accept so the government could take over the line the first of January. This carried by voice vote. 749

It may have been the strategy of both the liberals among the right and the conservatives among the left to agree to the principle of nationalization first and to talk prices later, possibly realizing it would be easier to get agreement on the former than the latter. Critics of the whole scheme could easily argue that the government was oailing out the stockholders of a line which already owed the government over

440 million francs as of the end of 1906—a line whose property and rolling stock were at the same time priced at only 358 million. On this venture the government had guaranteed a profit until 1938 and a franchise through 1958. As Rouvier argued in the Senate, since the government’s guarantee had cost 25 1/2 million francs in 1901, and only

6 million francs in 1906, why not wait to see if the company could not pull itself out of debt and pay off what it had been advanced by the government? Projecting the situation as of 1908, he thought the company could do this in forty years. Proponents of the bill, on the other hand, thought the government might as well buy in the liab ilities and eliminate the need to guarantee the profit of the road every year.^

49 JOCD. I? December 1908.

50 V „ Bonnefous, Troisieme Republioue. 102-03. 1 8 1

Paul Beauregard, George Berry, and Jaures, versus Briand,

Millerand, and Barthou fought over the price of the road. The crux of the matter was the terminal date for guaranteeing interest on the stocks of the company. $y an 1883 law the dates of guaranteed interest on railroad stocks and the terminal dates of their franchises were estab­ lished. Several court decisions, such as the Council of State's decision of 1894, had interpreted the law to imply that the stock was guaranteed as long as the terms of the franchise lasted. Jaures argued that the

Chamber had the right to change the 1956 date to 1938. Having lost this argument in 1894, however, Barthou and Millerand were ready to guarantee dividend payments through 1 9 5 6, twenty-one years too long according to

Beauregard, and at least 240 m illion francs too much. As proof that the price was high Berry protested that speculators were making as much as

200 francs per share simply on the knowledge of the high sum set aside to purchase the railroad. Actually the quotation on stock had gone from

820 francs since August, 1908, when word of the nationalization became known, to 9^7 francs in December, 1909. Financially the road was in worse shape than either right or left realized in 1 9 0 8, a condition which necessitated increasing from 95 million francs to 115 million the funds needed to meet the annuity; it was at that moment the only road that needed state assistance. Ultimately the Chamber provided the funds for the interest payments to stockholders and for buying in at least 397,134 francs worth of stock each year. It also provided lower rates to customers and abolition of the extra fare on express trains.A c o n s ta n t

^ JQCD, 3 -1 2 December 1909; JOSD, 21 December 1909; Le Temps. 11, 12, 21 December 1909- See also Bonnefous, Troisieme R&publlque. 101- 1 4 , 1 5 6 . 132 group of about 120 deputies opposed the measure. In this number were the extreme right, which still objected to the government ownership principle, and the socialists, who disapproved of the exorbitant price and dividends going to the stockholders. The nearly 400 who voted for it may have felt that a lower price would not have attracted enough votes to pass the measure. In any case they voted with Barthou who told the Chamber that the provisions were neither an economic nor a political plot; they were just the necessary developments to insure purchase of the West 52 Railroad and its operation to the benefit of both the owners and users.

Nearly overshadowed by the workers retirement act of 1910 was a law in July, 1909, to provide retirement pensions for railroad employees.

Barthou, still Minister of Public Works at the time, advocated passage of a proposal setting 55 as the retirement age for train crews and 60 for the office clerks. The Senate approved this measure and lowered the retirement age for train crews to 50 years of age, active agents 55, and sedentary employees at either 60 or after 25 years of service. The

Senate v ersio n was passed in the Chamber by voice vote on Ju ly 13.

Income Tax and the Ninth Legislature

Although an income tax was still a long way off for France, it was broached once more in 1908. The project of Caillaux had been intro­ duced the year before and Barthou again in March at S*int-Die—in a speech honoring Jules Ferry—spoke in favor of Caillaux,s proposal. Off

52 JOCp. 3 December 1909*

53JOCP. 14 June, 13 July 1909. 183

and on throughout the entire year various articles of the proposed law

were discussed. On June 2, Barthou and a majority of the Chamber decided

against allowing income tax exemptions of up to 1250 francs for landlords

and against exemption allowances on property of up to half that much

depending on the size of the community in which the property was located.

Also the Chamber struck out of the b ill a clause giving the income tax­

payer the right to prove he had been overassessed. Louis Barthou was 54 among the majority on both these votes.

Foreign Affairs and the Ninth Legislature

Barthou payed little attention to foreign policy during the

1906-1910 period; like most members of the government and the parliament

he was preoccupied with domestic issues, and it was only the occasional

flare-up such as over Morocco that indicated any feelings on foreign

policy* The Algerian agreements had little effect on internal security

in Morocco, and after several incidents in February and July, 1907, the

government decided to act. Cruisers, including the Joan d*Arc, had

already been sent to Tangiers. It was decided In November to assist the

Sultan in policing the country; the foreign minister easily won a vote of

confidence on this issu e.^ As a result of the German consul aiding

French deserters in escaping from Casablanca in September, 1908, the two

nations instigated conferences that resulted in a Franco-German agreement

in November, 1908 on the economic development of Morocco,^ And in 1909,

^ JOCD. 2 Ju n e , 2 J u ly 1908.

55JOCD. 12, 13 November 190?. 56 JOCD. 22-9 November 1909. Bonnefous, Troisieme„ Republioue. 1 1 6 - 2 0 . 184 following a m ilitary build-up, the Chamber approved a loan to Morocco on 57 November 23. Except to support the government on th ese is s u e s , the deputy from Bearn made no major pronouncements on foreign policy.

Nationalism and Party Policies in the Ninth Legislature

The change in the nature of party alliances during the Ninth

Legislature was evident immediately after the 1906 elections. In July

LTAlliance Republicaine D&nocraticue began to criticize the Socialist

Party and to write about the necessity of thwarting collectivist policy.

Ja'ires was naturally one of its chief targets. It disagreed with his all-or-nothing policy and advocated a middle road of progress and reform between the two extremes of revolution and status ouo. It noted, too, that in addition to those on the right, there was now also a group on the left that was saying "down with the Republic, abolish m ilitary duty, and promote the class struggle.In a speech at Pau in June, 1907, Barthou reaffirmed the cooperation between his own group and the Radicals; he then lauded the Radicals for their adherence to programs of reform, their fight against clericalism, and their persistent opposition to nationalism.

He noted that the union of these Radical and Alliance political forces was f i r s t made p o ssib le by the Dreyfus A ffa ir. Commenting on unfinish ed business, he advocated the income tax as a means of giving the wealthy more of the tax burden imposed inequitably on the poor; but he opposed the revolutionary idea of the class struggle advocated by a few extremists.

^ JOCD. 22-9 November 1909.

'Alliance. 15-29 July 1906. 185

We are opposed to class struggle in our country because we know no c la s s e s . We are opposed to revolution which is justified in some countries which have only this means of affirming their w ishes. -59

This same theme was repeated by Louis Barthou a year later when

he addressed the Councillors General of the Basses Pyr6n£es in the fall

of 1908, adding only his concern over those in France who "deny the

country its defensive force and national armament." He could also boast

that the local railroad to Spain which he had promised in his first

campaign in 1889• was now under construction.^

It is difficult to guage the strength of nationalism in France during the period from 1906 to 191^. It was obviously growing. The

Action Francaise. for instance, had been founded in 1905 to draw together

the nationalists, the royalists, and the dissatisfied elements of the

Catholic Church. Its sharpest spokesmen were Charles Maurras, Leon

Daudet, and Jacques Bainville. Its program was one of returning to

"constitutional monarchy and to things French." It was anti-foreign—

especially anti-German—anti-Republic, supernationalist to oppose the

internationalism of socialism, and counterrevolutionary to oppose the

revolutionary nature of socialism.

Nationalism was a possible factor in the defeat of demenceau!s ministry in 1909* In his debates in the Chamber with Delcasse in July, it was the benches of the right and center that were anything but amused at demenceau*s charge that neither the army nor navy had been prepared

^ Ind B-P. June 190?. ^ L1 Alliance, ^ October 1906.

^Weber, Nationalist Revival. 5 6 - 6 8 . 186

for the commitments Delcasse had made for France by his foreign policy in

1905. In one of his first appearances at the Chamber rostrum since his

ouster from the Quai d*Orsay, Delcasse had invited this comment by

criticizing Clemenceau1 s role in the naval investigations of 1 9 0 4 . But

to invoke such comments about a time when France*s term of m ilitary

service had been cut to two years was just asking for trouble from the nationalists and also from those who simply feared Germany*s relative increases in armament and defense.

Barthou belonged in this latter group. As early as August, 1899* in a speech to a veterans group at Qloron, he had said what would be expected of any speaker before such an audience, that he resented the 63 recent expressions and the rapid progress of Germany. He had voiced his alarm in September, 1908* over those who opposed rearmament. But by the same token he spoke against nationalism in his public appearances in 64 1909 at Nancy, at Monein, and at Pau.

In any case it may have been other coincidental circumstances that ended demenceau*s term as President of the Council. In the first place the Chamber remained in session after July 14 that summer, an irreverence to Bastille Day in particular and summer vacations in general; thi s was 'unheard of in the annals of the past twenty years. Hie result was some 1?6 absences, many of them due to a parliamentary junket to

Bonnefous, Troisieme R^publique. 13/+“37.

63Ind B-P. 10 August 1899. 64 Ind B-P. 22 June, 21, 28 September 1909* respectively. 18?

Sweden; among those absent par conge were 99 Radicals and Alliance

republicans most of whom would have supported Clemenceau.^ In the second

place, time was against the m inistry; France had not had a good govern­

ment crisis for two years and nine months, which ranked Clemenceau third

Dehind Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes in premiership endurance. Thus on

July 20 following the Clemenceau-Delcass£ hassle over national defense,

on a simple vote of confidence, Clemenceau lost, 196 to 212, and

r e s ig n e d, . 66

With the advent of Briand as Clemenceau1s successor, Barthou was

moved from Public Works to the Ministry of Justice. Briand had relin­

quished the Justice portfolio and had taken that of Interior when he

became premier, and Barthou wished to withdraw from Public Works so that

someone else could proceed with the reintegration of the postal clerks

he had fired.^

Electioneering began in the fall of 1909 for the councillor

general from the Basses Pyrenees, who was running for reelection to this post in September. In campaigning he mentioned the major problems that had been settled or were to be settled by March, 1910. He spoke of the

completion of separation regulations. He recalled the various labor difficulties, including the resolving of the status of the civil servants

by Clemenceau and his cabinet. Next he mentioned the nationalization of

the West Railroad. He spoke against nationalism. He also assured his

°^Bonnefous, loc. cit. ^ JOCD. 20 July 1909.

67 Bonnefous, Troisieme Republioue. 139* 188 constituents that the Briand ministry was not a socialist ministry: "It is not Important to know where the head of the government comes from, but where he goes. He goes to republican reforms and socialist demands. He is anti-clericalist." Under items of business yet to be completed, he mentioned the workers' retirement act (which materialized the following

March) and the income tax.

The essential thing is that the progressive principle should be conserved. The tax is certainly not an instrument for levelling fortunes, but it is essential that some sort of system be established so that the poor do not pay a larger proportional share than the rich.6°

Barthou not only won the councillor general election but was also reelected president of the Council General of the Basse-Pyr£n£es.

Although Clemenceau was presumably closer to the center of the road than either Combes or Rouvier, his ministry was able to continue the same moderate type of social reform that was under way with Waldeck-

Rousseau as early as 1899. It was obvious in all quarters that the government republicans—either Radicals or Alliance—were numerous enough to constitute a majority after 1906 without courting socialist support.

As for the Ninth Legislature, its most impressive achievements were the completion of the separation of Church and state, the national­ ization of the Vest Railroad, and the passage of a workers' retirement law .

68 Ind B-P. 21 September 1909* 189

The Election of 1910

On Monday, April 8, 1910. Louis Barthou, Gard de S^eaux, Deputy for Oloron-Est, President of the Council General of the Basses-Pyrenees, made his major campaign speech at Oloron extolling the past and future glories of the government republicans. He defined once more very clearly his attitude toward government employees—they should be allowed to organize but not strike, and a law should be passed (discussion of which .69 had been dropped in 1909) permitting them to organize. The other 70 paramount issue for which he spoke was the progressive income tax.

The Radicals and the Alliance decided to support, as they had in 71 1906, each other*s candidates in arrondissements where it seemed the 72 candidate of one or the other party had an edge over other aspirants.

But even this effort at cooperation could not head off a definite swing toward the left in the election. Since the S. F. I. 0. was the only party that required membership discipline, candidates of other stripes could join as many parties as suited their whims or political expediency.

Specific percentages on gains and losses are thus as vague for 1910 as any other year. Possibly due to this confusion, the Journal Officiel undertook for the first time to publish its own version of party strengths. This list showed an increase in Socialist Party strength totaling 75 seats compared to 5^ in 1906, with the independent socialists

^Bonnefous, Troisieme Republioue. 124-25.

7°Ind B-P. 19 April 1910.

7^See James Graham, "The French Radical and Radical Socialist Party, 1906-14" (Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1962), pp. 99*100. 72 I.* A llia n c e . 3 0 January 1910. 190

gaining about 10 over the 20 they won four years previously. The

Radicals dropped from 250 to 225» and the Alliance from 120 or 130 down to llh. To the right of the Alliance there were 75 Progressists, 3^

Action p-harale and 21 Droite— a total right bloc of 120, about the same as before. A net sum of about 30 seats thus went from the government 73 republican benches to the group of the left. Or, if one prefers the statistics published by the Ministry of Interior, the right lost 8 seats, the Alliance gained 11, the Radicals lost 17, and the Socialists gained

20. This is a net loss of 20 seats from the right and center to the 7h advantage of the left, according to the following figures:'

1906 Chamber 1910 Chamber R ight 96 88 Alliance Republicans 142 153 Radicals 269 252 Independent Socialists 29 30 Unified Socialists J k 591 597

The Radicals and Alliance could still constitute a majority through cooperation. Barthou carried Oloron-Est by 10,530 votes to 1309 for

Cuzaubon-Nontary.

Labor and the Tenth Legislature

The first crisis of the new legislature was the railroad strike of 1910. Working conditions were not the best, although hours had been regulated, and, as in most areas of French labor, wages had not increased proportionately with living costs. 'Die agitation was in part the result

?3LlAlliance, 10 July 1910. 7h Ministry of Interior statistics reproduced in Bonnefous, Troisieme Republicue. 135. 191 of the decision of the National Railroad Syndicated campaign to make

1910 a year of wage increases for all railroad workers. Sporadic labor conflicts had thus occurred since April but transportation had continued unimpaired. In June, Millerand and Briand met with representatives of the State Railroads, granted most of the demands of the workers, and urged that the private companies do likewise. In part the conflict was the refusal of the private lines even to meet with their labor represents 75 tives in sessions with Millerand as Public Works Minister in the chair.

In small doses, scattered ameliorations had been given to the railroaders by the companies. The Orleans Railroad had granted some wage increases, living quarters had been provided to agents out on the lines, and fifteen-day pay bonuses had been granted to those of the age of 55 with at least 25 years of service. The P-L-M Railroad had a scale of periodic raises and cost of living equalizers for different areas; it had long had a retirement program and a merit raise system. The Nord line had granted small raises of from 25 to 50 centimes per day.'

It was a situation on the Nord Railroad which finally ignited the strike conflagration. When firemen on the line were raised to 5 francs per day, other workers who had already received equal or larger raises thought they should be raised again to keep ahead of the firemen and decided October 10 to strike the next day. Workers on the state road

"^Bonnefous, Troisieme Republioue. 199~200.

^ L1 A llia n ce. 28 August 1910, and Edouard D olleans, H istoire du Mouvement Ouvrier (Paris, 1953)» P» 178. 192 at Saint-Lazare station joined the strike on October 11, and that night 77 the Syndicate proclaimed a total railroad strike.''

The same night that the union was calling the strike, Briand called a cabinet meeting in his office with most of the ministers attend­ ing. Conflicting stories—and no official minutes—tell of the occur­ rences in this meeting, Briand was determined to draft the railroad employees into the army and, after an animated discussion during which

Viviani, Millerand, and Barthou protested this action, Briand apparently had a majority on his side. Millerand preferred legislation which would make arbitration of labor disputes mandatory and for this purpose proposed they follow a formula recently legislated in Canada. Barthou favored suppression of the strike, but by less drastic measures. Viviani

(France*s first Labor Minister) said it was political suicide and accused 7ft Briand of being "pro-company," the "prisoner of the forces of reaction."

Running out of arguments and words, Viviani iterated that, if the mobilization order went through, he might as well kill himself, at which point Briand sat down and signed the order which apparently he had drawn up before the arrival of his ministers, got up, looked at Viviani, and replied, "Now go kill yourself." Without a word Viviani slowly rose, put on his overcoat and left the meeting, followed in like manner try

Barthou and Millerand. On Octobei* 13 the railroad workers were drafted into the army for 21 d ay s,77 9 ancj/the f leaders of the strike were

78 Georges Suarez, Briand (Paris, 1938), Vol. II, pp. 278-95. 79 Ibid. , and Beau de Lomenie, Dynasties Bourgeoises. ^1^. 193 80 arrested—Reneault, Albert Lemoine, Le Gueninnic, Toffin, and Brandony

Although Georges Suarez and Edouard Beau de Lom&nie both wrote 81 that Viviani and Barthou resigned at this point t there is no indication

of this action in either the Journal Officiel or the Paris press, and the

cabinet lists show no replacements in their posts from October 12 until

November 3; on the other hand inability to fill these posts was supposed

to have been part of the problem which caused Briand to resign.

As soon as the Chamber reconvened in the fall, the S. F. I. 0.

confronted the cabinet with the charge of unnecessarily harsh handling of

a strike undertaken to agitate for more pay. Briand was also personally

attacked for his past socialist and pro-strike statements in view of his

present attitude. He argued that higher wages was not the purpose of the

strike since increases just had been instituted on the line that started

the strike• He cited sabotage in the form of cutting telegraph and

telephone lines and turning engines loose on the lines; these facts he

said made the strike a criminal enterprise. He also said that the nation

had the right to expect properly functioning communication and trans­

portation, a right which created for the government the responsibility

of maintaining such service.

The debate lasted six days and built up to a crescendo of emotion.

Barthou1s only contribution to the arguments was to answer the charge of

Albert Wlllm that the government was interfering with the workers1 right

to strike; to this Barthou weakly replied by quoting the 1845 laws on

sabotage and the right to work. As for iht. arrest?.- Barthou said he was

80. frtAlliance. 23 October 1910. 194

not going to interfere with the functioning of the courts as he had been 82 frequently admonished by his opposition not to do on other occasions.

But the double forte in the Chamber came on the fifth day when Briand— prompted no doubt by persistent applause—charged that the government had used legal means to deal with a strike and that, if legal means had not been available to "defend the existence of the nation" and "preserve part of the instrument of national defensethe government would have

been forced to use illegal onesl With the left crowded around the rostrum to shout down Briand, and the rest of the Chamber standing on their benches to applaud him, he finished this speech by stating he would

remain in the service of the Republic against the tyrannies which menace it. It is not I who move against the Republic to sla sh i t s th ro a t a t the very moment when i t i s on th e verge of being seized by revolution and the worst enemies of the Republic.

The debate ended in a calmer anti-climax on the sixth day. Very graphically Briand concluded his defense of his actions in settling the strike by asking if there was one drop of blood on his hands as a result of his policy—a devastating argument in view of the violence accompany­ ing the strikes of the past four years. And he received two votes of confidence on the issue, 384 to 170 and 329 to 183.®3

Three days after Briand*s victory he submitted his resignation to

President Fallieres, stating that in view of the nature and magnitude of the attack against him, he would also need the approval of the President in order to continue as premier. Suarez observed that this action of

Briand*s was a clever way of exploiting his dramatic success to emphasize

82JOCD. 29 October 1910. 83JOCD. 25-30 October 1910. 195 84 the confidence placed in him by all agencies; it may also have been

for the purpose of spelling out his triumph to his enemies in headline

ty p e .

In any ease this marked Briand*s final break with the left, for

his new cabinet was made up of representatives of the center and Radicals

who supported him. It must also be said that the new list of ministers

was moot testimony to his opinion of the three m inisters who had opposed

him on the mobilization of railroad workers, for neither Viviani,

M illerand, nor Barthou was in the new cabinet. Was Briand*s November 2

resignation a simple ruse to get rid of these three without asking for

their resignations, or was it just to prove to them that he could get

along without them? Barthou carried his grudge for a time; refusing to

breakfast with Briand the morning following the announcement of the new

cabinet, he wrote his reply to the invitation saying, "Wait a while and O c I w ill shake your hand." D

Meanwhile the Appeals Court of Paris decided on October 27,

1910, that postal clerks were illegally constituted as a syndicate under

the law of 21 March 1884; and Briand and Millerand both agreed that the

state had the right to intervene to see that public service functioned— whether the public service was carried out by the government or was 86 contracted to private companies as in the case of railroads.

As for Briand, in a vote of confidence arising out of administra­

tion of the separation law, he saw his majority of November drop to only

84 At; Saurez, Briand. II, 294. JIbid.. 295-

^ L1 Alliance. 7 January 1912. 196

26 votes in February, For the second time, on February 27, he submitted a resignation to President Failleres which this time was accepted.

Briand's place was taken by Ernest Monis who was able immediately to manipulate two small tokens favorable to labor. On March 20 the

Chamber decided overwhelmingly—475 to 26—that the railroad workers1 pensions were retroactively effective to 1909» the date the law was passed, rather than the first of 1911 when the funds were first paid in by the workers; Barthou approved. And on April 14 the Chamber voted to urge the private railroads to rehire—as the government lines had done— those who participated in the strikes of the previous year; if urging was not enough, the Chamber would seek stronger action. This resolution

O n passed, 341 to 1 1 5 , with Barthou abstaining.

These votes indicate the course Monis' ministry might have taken had not a freak and tragic accident removed him from the scene of effec­ tive political administration. He accompanied Maurice Berteaux, Minister of War, to Issy-les Moulineaux Field on May 21 to be present at the start of a paris-Madrid aircraft race; the government was hoping to create some interest in air transportation. One of the planes—one of the first metal, monoplanes constructed—had trouble on its take-off, either due to its excessive weight or a malfunctioning engine* It made a bad take-off run and after clearing the ground tried to land again. It stalled trying to glide over platoons of troops and mounted guards and struck a small group of people including Berteaux and Monis. Berteaux died immediately, QQ and Monis1 injuries kept him in bed for several weeks.

87J0CP. 20 March and 14 A pril 1911. 88 Le Temps. 22, 23, and 25 May 1911. 197

This was the first precedent in France for a premier trying to direct a government while incapacitated. It was thus a new war m inister,

General Goiran, and the Vice-Premier of the Council, Antoine Perrier, who gave unsatisfactory answers to the Chamber on June 23 regarding an

i n t e r p e l l a t i o n on th e a c tu a l c h a in o f command i n tim e o f w a r. When a

socialist deputy, Andre Hesse, and a nationalist, Admiral Bienaime, ques­

tioned General Goiran about who would actually make wartime decisions,

Goiran could only repeat the opinion of his predecessor, Berteaux, that

there was no supreme commander of the m ilitary in peacetime and that in war the general staff and the actual commanders in the field received 89 their orders from the government and from the M inister of War.

If anything this answer was too simple to satisfy those concerned over national security. And unwisely at this point, Vice-Premier Perrier insisted that an order of the day pure and simple on the adequacy of this wartime decision-making authority be turned into a vote of confidence in the whole government. The vote lost by 2h8 to 22^-, with 75 Radicals and

Alliance republicans--including Barthou—voting against Monis, 90 It is also possible that the vote indicated some dissatisfaction with the way the ship of state was being steered with its captain bedfast; possibly the simplest way to solve the situation was to let the first officer form a new cabinet. Caillaux, Minister of Finances, was chosen as the new p re m ie r.

89 JOCD. 23 June 1911, and Bonnefous, Troisieme Republique. 239“^2. 90 7 I b i d . 198

Under Caillaux, the policy adopted on April 14, of urging the

private railroad companies to reinstate the workers fired over the 1910

strike, was to receive a reversal. At the end of December, in spite of 9 1 C aillau x *5 June pronouncement favoring the rehiring of the strikers,

the government opposed Deputy Colly*s resolution to move now against the

companies to force reintegration. The government*s opposition to this 92 policy carried the day by a vote of 312 to 140.

Foreign Affairs under the Tenth Legislature

One good crisis per cabinet was about all the Tenth Legislature

seemed prepared to tolerate. It was foreign affairs that proved to be the downfall of Caillaux. In March, prior to his appointment as premier, the government had sent reenforcem ents to Morocco follow ing the ambush of a small French contingent of troops. This build-up was increased in

April, and Spain also moved additional troops to Morocco. Finally on

July 1, the German gunboat Panther arrived at Agadir. Jules Cambon, ambassador to Berlin, counseled his government to make a bargain with

Germany, if necessary exchanging the Congo for a free hand in Morocco,

Caillaux, preferring the channels of his international banking connections to those of the foreign office, negotiated behind the back of Foreign

Minister Justin de Selves. Nor did he take Jules Cambon or the British government into his confidence during the crisis.9^

91J0CP. 30 June 1 9 1 1 . 92JOCP. 30 December 1 9 1 1 . 93 '^Frederick L. Schuman, War and Diplomacy in the Third French Republic (New York, 1931), p. 185; and Harold Nicolson, Portrait of a Diplomatist (New York, 1930), pp. 254-55* 199

The dealing of Caillaux for Morocco was nonetheless as much a victory over Germany as was D elcass^s manipulation of the same colony six years earlier; and on both occasions the French government considered itself unprepared for war. To begin with, Caillaux managed to make it clear to Germany that England, Spain, Austria, and Russia all desired another conference on Morocco as in 1906—and that Germany would be standing alone at another Algeciras. Next he got Germany to agree to settle outstanding differences concerning Morocco first, then Congo later. Third, the situation forced Great Britain—where the government really thought war was imminent—to put more force into the Entente

Cordiale. And fourth, it caused Germany to back down, feeling an uncom- promising stand would simply mean war. 95

But the gaining of a free hand in Morocco was only a short­ sighted success. Europe came closer to war over this crisis than it had thus far been during the Third Republic, and the Treaty of Frankfurt of

November U—as the Franco-German agreement was called—did nothing to 96 relax the persistent tensions among the powers involved. In like manner it proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for Caillaux. His nationalist critics felt any compromise with Germany was a defeat, even the relin­ quishing of 100,000 square miles of Congo jungle. The socialists were torn between two ideals; they did not approve of the treaty as an extension of imperialism but considering it a move toward keeping peace

94 Bonnefous, Troisieme R^publique. 2 5 ? -5 8 . 95 N icolson, Diplomat. 238~59» and Rudolph Binion, D e fea te d Leaders (New York, i 960), pp. 31-51. 96 Nicolson, Diplomat. 255- 200

they approved it. Several deputies from the northeast were geographically 97 too close to Germany to favor any franco-German agreement. Many of

Caillaux’s own party disapproved of his backstair negotiating.

C a illau x must have known th a t h is s tra te g y in th e summer of 1911 was pressuring Germany rather than placating her. He may have wanted to be the man of the hour. Certainly he knew the relative economic advantages of Morocco over one-fourth of France*s equatorial territory since just over two-thirds of the French 600 million franc colonial market was in 98 Tunisia and Morocco. This undoubtedly was a vital factor to Caillaux

the banker. He must also have been influenced by the fact that Germany had 10 percent of Morocco*s commerce and ranked second in the area’s 99 100 carrying trade. To the president of the Credit Fonder Egyptien. surely a German Congo looked less disastrous than a German Morocco.

In spite of lofty moral and patriotic arguments carried on for a week in the Chamber, the treaty floated through with only 36 negative votes. Barthou was for it. The various critics of Caillaux recognized the treaty as a good bargain and protested only to the extent of abstaining—14-1 of them—rather than voting no.^^- However, a special

Senate commission organized to study the treaty gave Caillaux the opportunity to hang himself. On the commission were Ribot, Poincare,

97 L’Alliance. 16 February 1908. 98 Binion, Defeated Leaders. 48.

^Schum an, War and Diplomacy. 17o.

■^^Beau de Lomenie, Dynasties Bourgeoises. 404. 101 JOCD. 21 December 1911. 201

Barthou, demenceau, and Pichon—a ll of whom Caillaux considered his 102 friends but his rivals as well. It was when Caillaux and De Selves appeared before this group on January 9 that CLemenceau posed the crucial question. Being neither asked nor provoked, Caillaux volunteered the information that he had never engaged in secret negotiations, after which demenceau asked De Selves if he could confirm this statement. De Selves 103 begged to be allowed silence on the matter and resigned forthwith.

Caillaux replaced De Selves with Delcasse, but after getting refusals from Poincar£, M illerand, Combes, Admiral Geminet, and Pierre

Baudin (who was president of the Maritime League but seated in neither the Chamber nor the Senate at the time) to take Delcass£*s place at the IQh Marine Ministry, Caillaux turned in his own resignation. Although he lost, personally, the treaty was approved by the Senate February 10 by a vote of 212 to kZ, 105

Education and Politics

Twice under Poincares m inistry, education problems appeared.

The first of these, a discussion of the status of private schools, showed once more the anti-clerical nature of the 1898-1906 cooperation

102 Binion, Defeated Leaders. 48. See also Joseph Caillaux, Memoirs (Paris, 1942-43), Vol. II, pp. 205-06. PoincarS and Barthou wrote in L1Alliance criticizing Caillaux*s Moroccan policy. Also T.1 Alliance, 14- January 1912 charged Caillaux with forgetting France*s past international agreements. This must have been a reference to the Franco-Russian alliance and general anti-German policy. In any case these plus a strong French Morocco were Barthou's policies; see L*Alliance. 1 September 1912, and Ind B-P. 20 August 1912.

^°-^Binion, Defeated Leaders. 49.

104 - Soulier, Briand. II, 339*

Bonnefous, Troisieme Republique. 282. 202

among the Alliance, Radicals, and Socialists. A proposal was considered

to prohibit the establishment of private schools in communities of less

than 3000 population, unless such newly established private schools were

under the control and surveillance of the state. The conservatives

objected to this state monopoly on education, and those advocating the

measure were equally concerned that since 190? some 36,392 students had

transferred from public elementary schools to private. The Chamber passed

the measure 399 to 122 supported by the above-mentioned groups, including

such old adversaries as Barthou and Jaures."^

The other education issue found deputies divided by quite differ­

ent considerations. In August, 1912, the Congress of Teachers Syndicates

at Chambery had passed a resolution declaring its loyalty to the C. G. T. and in appreciation for its "efforts in liberating education," (referring to the campaign for the passage of the public education law of 1904).

Also it was decided to create in each craft or profession a Sou de

S o ld ats s e t up by the Bourses du T rav ail o rg an izatio n to aid members of that craft or profession while they were in the armed forces. However, some of the Sousdes Soldats had distributed pamphlets to their soldier members urging them, if the occasion ever presented itself, not to fire on their fellow union members on strike. Poincare not only had decided the brochures were anti-m ilitary but had given the teachers* syndicates two weeks to disassociate themselves from the movement. Needless to say this prompted a stirring debate in the Chamber where Poincare et a l. claimed the pamphlet campaign was imperiling the concept of public

106 JQCD. 2 February 1912. 203 education, and Paul-Boncour spoke for the other side suggesting that the pamphleteering was neither unpatriotic nor anti-m ilitary* But a rather lengthy resolution carried the day for the government, with Barthou among the m ajority:^''7

The Chamber regrets certain resolutions of the Congress of Chambery, and likewise issues prejudicial to the interests of public education which they have advocated, moreover firmly convinced of the patriotism of the teachers and resolved to defend our national primary teaching against all attack, which teaching should be dominated by the cult of country, approve the declarations of the government and con­ fident in it to produce with the least delay a law on func- tionnaires and proposals relative to the defense of public education, opposing all other action on these issues, passed to the order of the day.

Election Law Discussion

It was the election reform law, however, that was the real crisis for Poincar^. Although this had not been an outstanding campaign point in 1910 it did figure strongly in Briand*s policy statement to the new legislature in June. Barthou read the government declaration to the

Senate, speaking of electoral reform, proportional representation, partial renewal, and social reforms such as a five-day week and a new tax structure. The next month Barthou talked about the political problems of the pre-1889 era when delegates could stand from several districts.

This was changed, however, in 1889 and the scrutin dfarrondissement meant a candidate could run in one d istrict only and needed a majority to win.

"The scrutin d^rrondissement has gotten more criticism than it deserves. . . It has permitted the Republic to survive and prosper. . . .

107 JOCD. 8-13 November, 13 December 1911. 204

1 fjD We now have a government which governs." But he thought it was time

to revise the election system again. Now he advocated the scrutin de

lis t, or proportional representation, with limited representation for

the minority party group s.

After a year*s deliberation by committee the bill for proportional

representation was brought to the Chamber in May. The proposal—Briand*s-

was to provide proportional representation for electing deputies and 110 six -y e a r term s w ith a o n e-th ird renewal of the Chamber every two y e ars.

The first of many amendments was one by Paul Painleve to allow the com­

bining of party vote lists on the second ballot by parties willing to

cooperate, after which the fractional sums left over all went to the party with the most votes; this proposal would have allowed the already

existing problems of coalitions to continue.The next system, proposed

by Malavaille, was called the scrutin ma.iorite and was aimed at gathering in those deputies who preferred single-member districts and those who preferred a plain scrutin de liste for the whole nation. Under this

suggestion, a candidate who received a clear majority in his district was elected, and any vote totals less than the needed majority went to elect

n t A candidates from the national lists. Both Painleve*s and Malavaille*s proposals were defeated prior to the summer holiday, and the principle of establishing equal electorate quotients for each seat in the Chamber was ad op te d .

108 , n 109 frt^Hianna. 8 June 1911. L*Alliance, 10 December 1911.

110J0GD. 3 June 1910. ^ JOCD. 29 May 1911.

1 1 2 JQCD. 20-22 June 1911. n3 J0CD. 22 June and 2 July 1911. 205

It was not until after the Moroccan crisis, the signing of the

Franco-German Treaty of Frankfurt, and the fa ll of Caillaux that the

Chamber took up th e e le c t io n is s u e s a g a in . P oincare made i t c le a r in h is

governmental declaration that he intended to finish the passage of the

measure. The discussion began anew in January, 1912, and three weeks

elapsed before the Chamber agreed that the department would be the 11 if election district for which lists of candidates would be presented.

Just prior to Easter the Chamber decided to establish regions in which

fractional vote totals would be accumulated to elect additional deputies

from regional lists and to use the number of registered voters rather

than the total population as the base for proportioning the Chamber

seats.Finally on July 10 the entire proposal was adopted, 339 to

2 1 7 .116

Although Barthou favored proportional representation, he did not

like the provisions for allowing parties to pool their votes in regional

arrangements, these articles of the law clearly favoring the smaller

political parties. He voted against these parts of the law and spoke

against them at a Democratic Republican Alliance rally at Bleus

d*Anjou.^^ But he advocated passage of the b ill even though the whole , , 118 proposition was unpopular in the Basses-fyrenees.

114 115 JOCD. 16 February 1912. JOCD. 18, 25 March 1912.

^ ^ JOCD. 10 July 1912. For a detailed discussion of the princi­ ples and various points of view Involved, see Bonnefous, Troisieme Republioue. 233“39 end 286-302. 117 JOCD. 16 February 1912. 118 He was the only member of the Council General of the Basses- Pyren$es that did not sign a petition asking the Senate to reject the law . Jnd Tf-p. 20 A ugust 1912# 206

Due to Poincare's election to the presidency of the Republic, he

resigned his premiership and Briand replaced him on January 22, 1913.

Barthou received the portfolio of Justice. Realizing the election bill

faced rigid opposition in the Senate, Briand appeared there himself to

answer the criticism of Qemenceau and Combes who led the campaign of

those senators opposing the representation of the minorities. Immediately he was faced with an amendment which would have done away with the

fractional vote totals for seats, meaning any deputy elected would have had to have a full compliment of votes either from his arrondissement or department totals. Briand chose to make the Senate vote on this amend­ ment one of confidence in his government. He lost, l6l to 128, walked 119 out of the Senate, and turned in his resignation to President Poincare.

The campaign against him had been well organized and went beyond any

considerations of the electoral reform.

Taxes

An interesting footnote should be mentioned regarding BriandTs ministry. In February certain changes in the tax structure were approved by the Chamber. During the budget discussion it was decided unanimously that by 1913 taxes on unimproved property would be raised and that taxes on doors and windows and a head tax would be replaced by an income tax; 120 this latter measure carried, hll to 12h, Barthou among the majority.

119J0SP. 18 March 1913.

120JOCD. 10, 21 February 1913. 207

The Party Leader Triumphs

A leader of the Alliance republicans, Barthou1s name appeared on

the cabinet lists again for most of the period from 1906 through 1913*

The separation campaign was over, and it was only necessary to defend

against any amendment the laws already passed curtailing the operations

of the Church. This the former members of the bloc continued to do

through 1912.

But Barthou1s greatest concern during this period was the growing

strength of the S, F. I. 0. and the ever increasing drive of the C. G. T.

to organize all labor—even government employees—into one united,

socialist syndicate. The union issue reached its pre-war zenith while

Barthou as Public Works M inister used his influence to deny government

employees first of all the right to organize and then the right to

strike. He fought for a broad interpretation of the concept of workers

who held part of the government authority. In his mind this included

not only postal clerks and schoolteachers but even employees of private

railroads since they provided a necessary service under government

franchise. He agreed with the subsequent decision of the Chamber in

1909, however, that these people could organize but not strike.

In foreign affairs the deputy from Oloron supported the entire

French policy. He favored the Franco-Russian alliance and the entente with England as a power balance against Germany. He approved the deci­

sions on Morocco also, being against the aggrandizement of Germany in any way whatever.

S till, Barthou was not a nationalist. He agreed with them on a

stand vis £ vis Germany, but opposed their program on all other 208 matters—especially on issues of education, religion, and labor. As

Public Works Minister he succeeded in buying in the West Railroad, over socialist opposition as well as nationalist. He was in the ministry that succeeded finally in getting retirement pensions for workers, in spite of opposition from the extreme right. And he resigned from

Briand*s cabinet because of the extreme force used to settle the 1910 railroad strike. On the income tax issue and election reforms, as on labor, he stood midway between the extremes of reaction and revolution.

The Republican Alliance was still France*s second largest party.

Barthou*s top-level position in the party, as in the country, resulted from his campaign against the clericalists. His stature was increased even more after 1906 because of his fight against socialism and extreme unionism. In addition to this record he was the foremost advocate of defense against Germany to be found outside the ranks of the nationalists.

These policies won for him the ultimate honor in French politics. The man from B^arn was invited, albeit by his old friend Poincare, to form his own cabinet. CHAPTER VI

LE PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL

On March 21, 1913* Barthou submitted his lis t of m inisters. All sources then and now agree that he was chosen to guide a revised m ilitary law through parliament. It seems as though each premier during the Tenth

Legislature formed his cabinet with an eye to one major law or reform.

Barthou1s choice of ministers certainly fits this description, for he selected m inisters who—like Briand1s before him—were unanimously in favor of the three-year term of m ilitary service.

The m inisterial declaration read to the Chamber on March 25 exemplified Barthou*s intellectual and administrative efficiency as well as his impatience with the slow pace of governmental process that was especially evidenced by the parliamentary machinery. Contained on less than two columns of one page in the Journal O fficiel. his message was graphically brief in outlining his six-point policy J The first item, and far most important, concerned national defense, and he asked for a three-year term of compulsory m ilitary service, increases in the engineering corps and cavalry, development of a larger navy, expansion of the existing army and navy units to full effectiveness, and increased harbor facilities.

1JOCD. 25 March 1913.

209 210

Republican France has proved in the course of recent events, its disinterested attachments to world peace, but it would not, without betraying itself, renounce the efforts which are only to maintain the protection of its interests, dignity and security.

Second, he hoped to effect cooperation between the two houses on getting the electoral reform bill passed.

A co n flict between the two chambers can only serve the designs of the adversaries of the Repuhlic. . . . We will ask the Senate to add equitable representation for minority groups to the principle of majority elections it has already adopted. The problem is not insoluble. An inter-parliamentary com­ mittee could work it out.

Third, a point, by now mostly in operation, was the public school policy. "E|y protecting the public schools against attacks which are becoming more and more in to le ra b le, the Republic renders to the devotion of its teachers the tranquility that it has unjustly refused them for some tim e."

Fourth was financial policy.

The Cabinet follows with vigilance a triple project; to maintain the position of France*s credit, assure the equili­ brium of our budget from normal and permanent receipts, and to keep the already ancient promises toward democracy, in p a rtic u la r toward ru ra l democracy, so overburdened and so courageous [a reference to the fact that in the absence of an income tax, the farmers paid a heavier tax burden than urban w orkers].

F ifth ,

Justice . . . commands from the more fortunate citizens a contribution to public expenses, from which they derive their security, based on their ability to pay; consequently we pur­ sue without hesitation the coming vote in income tax, rendered necessary more than ever by the heavy sacrifices imposed on the working populations.

Sixth, was a plea for peace and cooperation in international a ffa irs . 211

Attached to developing social progress by more humane laws at home, the government is constantly trying to make a spirit of conciliation and high impartiality prevail in the counsels of Europe. Strictly faithful to our pacts of alliance and friendships which contribute to our external security, we continue to cooperate with all powers for a peaceful settle­ ment of the Balkan conflict. The government has less an honor than a duty. We have limited our promises to the possible which we can accomplish. Republicans united for a common work, we wish to serve democracy and France with confident support from republicans.

The critics of a strong national defense policy, for whatever reason, chose the three-year term of m ilitary service as their prime target. The proposed m ilitary law would bring France*s army up to a compliment of 673.000. and the longer term of m ilitary service was necessary both to fill out existing regiments to full compliment and allow the organization of new units. Previously, in February, naval appropri- ati ons had been approved without contest—not even over a sum of 50,000 francs to provide protection for schools of fish. New items included

500,800 francs for the development of navel aviation, and 60,119,000 for new construction of ships. All 63 articles in the naval appropri­ ations section of the budget had been accepted by voice votes over a five-day period. And the entire defense budget for 1913 had been approved by a 462 to 75 vote; Barthou, Cruppi, Morin, and Steeg in the majority, Millerand and Caillaux absent, and Buisson and Jaures voting no . No party responded to Winston Churchill^ suggested yearrs mora­ torium on naval construction.^

2JOCD. 10-14 February 1913- 3J0CP. 15 May 1913.

4 Le Figaro. 29 March 1913* 212

At the end of March the Chamber Array Committee made known the

governments intention to keep on duty another six months the men who

had just finished their two-year term and were eligible for discharge;

this six-month extension was permissible under the 1905 law if circum­

stances warranted it. On May 15. the government was criticized in the

Chamber fo r not having n o tifie d the Chamber of i t s in te n t. Not only was

the government within its rights in this action, Barthou argued, but the

class last discharged could be called back anytime within a year. Jules

Breton proposed a resolution tagging the half-year*s extension an unneces­

sary expense and Barthou called for a vote of confidence which he won 241

to 315 against the resolution; Jaur&s and Paul-Boncour voted for the

measure, Millerand and Cruppi were with Barthou, and Caillaux abstained.'*

The public opinion campaign on both sides of the defense issue

began early in 1913- It was March 5. under Briand that the Chamber first

considered the three-year law,^ partly in response to German military

expansion. The Socialists, through Jaures* paper L*Humanity, made

available petitions which could be circulated among any group interested n in defeating the law. In May, Humanite advertised a huge anti-three- year law rally with invitations to attend signed by Brisson, Brizon,

Dumas, Guesde, and Jaures. The same paper boasted that the petition had

588,147 signers ty May 27.^

5JOCD. 15 May 1913.

^Chastenet, TroisiSme Republique. TV, 122.

^L*Humanite. 24 March 1913. L*Action Francaise. 12 April 1913, boasted there were only one-tenth as many intellectuals signing this petition as signed the one for Picquart. 8 L*Humanite. 25, 27 May 1913. 213

The Journal des D^bats decried the S. F. I. 0. stand on the issue, referring to that group as a "state within a state unconcerned o about all which doesn't touch them directly,"7 Other center papers

supported the government's three-year law campaign. Le Figaro thought for a short time that the acceptance of Barthou1s cabinet would be the end of the three-year law, but this unnecessary concern on its part was mollified as soon as Barthou made his first policy statement in the

Chamber.^ Both Le Figaro and the Journal des Debats were critical o f the Socialist and Radical campaign against the law .^- The Independant des Basses Pyrenees approved of all his program except the electoral reform proposal. And L'Alliance R^publicaine Democratique supported the campaign in toto, noting that the German socialists were cooperating in

Germany's rearmament efforts, while the French socialists were not supporting their government.^

As for the right, they were solidly behind the three-year law.

As might be expected the veterans groups, such as the Society of Veterans of the Armies of the Land and Sea of 1870-1871, voted in their local and 13 national meetings to ask their deputies to vote for it. Ejy far the strangest campaign, however, was tnat of the Action Francaise. Generally

9 Journal des D^bats. 20 February, 8 March 1913* 10 Le F ig a ro . 2 1 -7 March 1913*

^For typical articles in this campaign see Le Figaro. 25 March 1913. and the Journal des D^bats. 27 March 1913*

I2L'A lliance. 13 April 1913*

^ Le F ig a r o . 16 March 1913. 214

it was hostile to Barthou and the republicans for what it viewed to be

lib e r a l tendencies. S pecifically i t disliked Barthou for h is campaign

against religious control of primary and secondary education. It spoke

of the Anti-France which appeared as it did at the time of the Dreyfus

Affair. These were the "Sorbonnicles" in the service of foreigners, the

Aulards, the S^ailles, the Seignobos, the Havets who allied with Jaures,

and "criminal grubs" of the same ilk. It also listed schools whose

students had written advocating the three-year law: the Lycee de Nancy,

Saint-Louis-de-Gonzaque de Paris, the law school of the University of

Paris, the Lycee Lakanal, the College Chaptal, Brestoire, the Lyc&e Gay-

Lussac of Limoges, and the lyc^es of Perigueux and of Saint-Etienne.^

The paper went on that summer to complain about the number of Jews in

government positions.^

Long opposed to all the cabinets and policies of the Third

Republic, ultras under the banner of the Action Francaise launched the

usual campaign against Barthou as soon as he formed a cabinet. I ts newspaper hailed Barthou with,

The Barthou government is greeted with a great shout of laughter in all informed circles; it is a ministry of grubs and flotsam, of politicians who lack prestige and power. Here is a team charged with reconciling th is goat and th is cabbage, the electoral reform and the three yearsl Jean Jaurls is delighted and in this happiness he is not wrong. . . . The Barthou ministry is without popularity. It falls back into the radical rut.17

Leon Daudet, "Et Poincare," Action Francaise. Vol. V III (February, 1913), pp. 1-25. 1 15 Lection Francaise.j 25 March 1913. Action Francaise. 4 July 1913- 17 LfAction, Francaise. 23 March 1913- 215

Then suddenly Barthou was on its side once it decided he was

going to press for the three-year law after all. By May it was saying,

"We feel no embarrassment about the compliments we give Louis Barthou for the tenacity with which he has pushed for a vote on the three-year 1 ft law." Barthou himself made many public appearances that spring to

speak to youth groups favoring the law. He spoke to the young republicans in Paris, to the F^te F6d6rale de Gymnastique at Vichy, and to the meeting of the Union of French Societies for Athletic Sports in Paris; this was the first time a minister had addressed this latter group since

188?.19

The campaign in the Chamber for the new military law began in

May. On May 23 an interpellation was submitted protesting restrictions imposed by the government on the annual demonstration at Pere Lachaise

Cemetery and in general regulating demonstrations for the three-year law.

Edouard Vaillant argued that this was a blow against universal suffrage and free thought. Minister of Interior Klotz assured the assembly that the restrictions prohibited street demonstrations either for or against the law. Barthou admitted to Vaillant that he was responsible for the prohibition, and won a confidence vote, 330 to 1 68 , Caillaux, Cruppi,

Etienne, and Millerand in the majority, with Guesde, Jaures, and Vaillant opposed.^®

18 . LlAction Francaise. 14 May 1913. This paper carried daily articles advocating the three-year law until August 8.

^9LfAlliance. 10, 12, 18 May 19131 Le Figaro. 23 June 1913-

2QJQGD. 23 May 1913. 216

Before the Chamber could begin argument on the articles of the

military law, demonstrations began to occur, first at Toul and then else­

where, among the class of 1910 whose two-year terra of service was to have

ended in March, 1913. The Sous des Soldats were still in circulation,

thanks to the C. G* T .^ Ten days after these disturbances began,

Maurice V o ile tte p ro te s te d in the Chamber th a t France was in no emergency and these men had the right to protest and strike. Barthou*s reply was that, although international tensions had eased for the time being, it was too early yet for France to consider these problems solved. Further­ more, as long as soldiers are in uniform they obey orders. "A barracks revolt," said Barthou, "was a blow to liberty, it was a revolution and

could not be tolerated." The Chamber was in no mood to trifle with this type of insubordination, either. It voted the 23^,000 francs necessary to keep these men in service, 336 to 165, with Caillaux, Etienne, and 22 Millerand among the majority.

On June 2 the debate on the modification of the 1905 m ilitary law began its fast and stomy course through the Chamber. Knowing they lacked the backing to defeat a vote on the measure, Caillaux and Jaures followed the strategy of injecting as many amendments and revisions as possible in the hope of delaying the final vote on the bill until some other incident gave them more support. Already Radical chiefs Caillaux and Doumergue were plotting the overthrow of Barthou and his replacement with Doumergue. For this purpose they were not only putting together a

21 Le Figaro. 29 May 1913-

22JOCD. 2? May 1913. 21? reserve corps proposal as a counter to the three-year law, but Caillaux was also withdrawing his support from the electoral reform—ignoring 23 that during his own m inistry and Monis* he had advocated the reform.

The first argument against the law was by F6lix Chautemps who reasoned that Germany had to enlarge its army because of Russia, the

Balkan problem, the ambitions of Austria-Hungary and Italy; the German build-up, he said, was merely fulfillm ent of Germany's recruiting laws and marked no new legislation on the subject. Joseph Reinach, vice- president of the Chamber's Army Commission, gave statistics on the rela­ tive size of the two armies by way of reply. By October Germany would have 871,000 men in uniform—they had 653.000 as of the day of the speech—while France had 5^3,000 men, 63,000 of whom had to stay in

Morocco. This, to Reinach, meant a net difference of 400,000 troops by

October. Next he quoted birth rate statistics. The French birth rate was 22, 21, 20, and 19 per 1000 population for the years 1890, 1900,

1905. and 1910 respectively; Germany on the other hand for the same years had figures of 3 8 , 37, 35, and 31 P©r 1000. As a result France had

933,000 births in 1880 from which to draft the class of 1901 while

Germany had 1,850,000 born the same year; the resultant army inductions were 235,000 for France to *+62,000 for Germany. These figures had dropped by 1 9 1 1 to 278,000 inductees for France and 468,000 for Germany, and the declining French birth rate bode ill for any hope in the future 24 of equalizing the relative army strengths. Thus, what had seemed

23 Journal des Debats. 19 May 1913* See also Binion, Defeated Leaders. 5^. 24JOCD. 27 May 1913- 218

adequate in 1905 under the two-year law was becoming less so each year,

even had international relations not become more and more complicated.

Reinach even quoted Von Clausewitzj "The active army is the

iron warrior lance, everywhere its point has passed, the rest follows."

Then loaded with statistical ammunition he showed that the German army

reserve was organized and France's was not. Germany kept between

300,000 and 400,000 reserves, who resided close to the frontiers, on a

24-hour call. He revealed that Germany's eastern line had just added

a sixth army corps, and he predicted (correctly it seems) that in the

event of war, Germany would guard her eastern frontier with these six

regiments and turn against France with 19 or 20 others, seven of which were stationed permanently in Alsace-Lorraine and the Palatinate.

Against this France had only three regiments. Then followed similar 25 figures showing France's poor position in artillery and cavalry as well.

These statistics were rebutted by Francois Thalamas in an air of absolute futility. If France lost a war in 1870 when her population was nearly equal to Germany's it was impossible to expect to match the

Germans under present circumstances.

"Suppose consequently that with the three-year law you arrive after several years at an inequality of still 150,000 men for example, will you go to five years or six?" he asked.

"A seven-year law!" came a voice from the left.

Andre Lifeire pointed out that Germany spent nearly twice what

France spent for war material, in the past year, 4,702,000 francs to

2 ^Ibid. 219

France1s 2,746,000. But he also predicted a short war because the

financial resources in the national banks of the Triple Entente were far

ahead of those of the Triple Alliance—7§936,000,000 to 4,200,000,000

francs. As much to stop the discussion as to prove either side right or wrong in this hopeless debate, the Chamber voted, 303 to 210, to support

the government*s oampaign for the new military law, with Caillaux, Jaures,

Buisson, Guesde opposed. This was a larger majority than Barthou

received when he first formed his cabinet.

Altogether the opponents of the three-year law managed to inter- 27 je c t ten amendments and cou n ter-projects, some of which were so sim ilar

that they can only be considered delaying tactics, the most obvious being Vaillant*s effort to postpone consideration of the matter until 23 after the 1914 elections. It is ironic to note also that the adver­

sa r ie s of the three-year plan, who had by and la rg e been pro-German and anti-Russian since the beginning of the century, now argued that the

existence of the Franco-Russian alliance gave France 1,300,000 Russians

on the eastern front and eliminated the necessity of extending the twc- 29 year term * and, at the same time, said it was Na foreign government ■ 30 allied with France that was urging the three-year law on Barthou. Most of the counterproposals envisioned a shorter term of service with a stronger policy for recalling those recently released from regular duty.

Jaures argued in favor of such an arrangement fay viewing what must have

26 27 JOCD. 3-6 June 1913. JOCD. 16 June-18 July 1913.

28J0CP. 16 June 1913. 29Ibid. 3°J0CP. 16 June 1913. 220

been popularly known of Germany’s strategy; Germany would strike swiftly

at France in the first five or six months of the war before Russia could

organize to effectiveness. Therefore, he thought that a 28-month term

o f duty w ith an organized reserve could provide more troops at a moment’ s notice, with less investment in time on the part of the soldiers and less

financial investment on the part of the government. 31 This and similar

reserve programs were defeated by Chamber votes that averaged 70 to 480.

The proposal that came closest to passing called for two years of

service and placing the dischargees on 36-hour call for the third year.

It was in this discussion that Barthou made his strongest plea for the longer term.

. . . I think I have indicated that the initiative for this project has been imposed on our government by the projects wnich have been voted in Germany. I have attempted to demonstrate to the Chamber that there is now between our army and Germany’ s a disp rop ortion which no government could accept without realizing it constitutes a danger to national d e fe n se .

He went on to state that the three-year law was the only way to redress the imbalance between the sizes of the French and German armies. The government, he continued, did not intend to follow a policy of provocation or of adventure but felt that conditions would more likely lend themselves to the outbreak of war if France seemed to take no action whatever in the face of Germany’ s increased m ilita r y preparation.

. . . I am no more nationalistic than you, gentlemen, (inter­ ruptions from the left) simply because I oppose tendencies and consequences of a doctrine which only exploits patriotism. . . .

31 This was a reserve organization similar to Switzerland’s. France had such a system in 1940. See Beau de Lomenie, Dynasties Bourgeoises. 441.

32J0CP. 26 June 1913. 221

He did not feel peace was possible if France did not prepare for the other eventuality, because then the decision to go to war or not would be in the hands of Germany alone. He reminded the deputies that Georges

Leygues in Chamoer debates always alluded to this policy in the case of

England where a fixed ratio had been established to make sure their fleet

always remained larger than that of Germany.

. . . That which England does for its naval force, are we forbidden to do for our army? Does not the language of Winston Churchill, applauded cy the British parliament, define a policy of peace? The only policy ?33

Differences of opinion on this and other matters were so great

that the budget for 1913 had not even been approved yet, the longest delay of this kind in the Third Republic. Jaures, in a joint thrust meant to delay the three-year law and to force action on an income tax 34 measure, tried to hold up approval of July*s twelfth because there were military appropriations in it. But when Barthou threatened to make

the vote on the twelfth a vote of confidence, Jaures recognized the use­ lessness of his gesture and withdrew his motion.^

After surviving votes of confidence on July 3 and 6, by 312 to

266 and 323 to 238 respectively, Article 18 containing the three-year term of service was agreed upon July 7 by 339 to 223; Caillaux,

Buisson, Guesde, Jaures, and Vaillant consistently opposed the government.

34 When the next year*s budget had not been adopted oy December 31» Parliament each month passed a provisionary one-twelfth of the last Dudget to provide funds for the month until the new budget was ready.

^ JOCD. 26 June 1 9 1 3 . 3 bJOCD. 7 J u ly 1913- 222

Twice more the government was sustained Dy similar majorities on July 18, and on the second one—to hold under the new three-year law the class

then due for discharge^-Caillaux voted on the side of the government. 37

The entire law passed the Chamber after midnight July 19» by 358 to 204.

The usual sides were taken in the vote, there were almost no abstentions, and again the majority was much bigger than it had been in March.

The Senate approved the law on August 7 by a majority of 244 to

36, just one year before the outbreak of the First World War.

The second problem was the electoral reform. Having rejected the Chambers proposed election law in March, the Senate passed its own version in June, The choice they preferred divided France into small regions of one department or less in which three to five deputies would be chosen in a local kind of proportional representation arrangement; no other provision was included for representing minority parties. The impasse was now completely defined; the Senate did not like proportional representation that would give equality nationally to the minority p a rtie s , most of which were l e f t of center, and the Chamber would not accept proportional representation cut down to a regional basis unless it did provide for the small parties, because in many departments of

France this would leave the minority parties no chance at all.

Barthou's attitude on proportional representation at the time he formed his ministry may have cost him votes. At that time, in response to a question, he said he was willing to submit to the Senate’ s regional list idea if they would allow representation of minorities; alsohe told

37JOCD. 18 July 1913. 38JOCP, 19 July 1913. 223 the Chamber he had another compromise scheme, but he was, for the time- being, adhering to the constitutional principle of not discussing in the

Chamber an issu e th a t was under d isc u ssio n in the Senate. ' Once39 more the Chamber Election Committee approved the proportional representation concept with representation of minority parties, and Barthou feared the

Senate would simply reject this—as it did for Briand—even if he made it a vote of confidence. He thought it advisable not to send this dO particular law back to the Senate until after the 191 h elections.

This was not the strong proportional representation position some of the deputies hoped for and probably accounts for some of the abstentions and for his small 63-vote majority on March 25.

In November the Chamber once more voted, 338 to 201, in favor of the idea of representation of the minority parties; of all the tradi­ tional critics of Barthou1s cabinet only Caillaux voted against this proposal, h i although Caillaux favored the reform during his own ministry.

Then by way of p la c a tin g the Senate, the Chamber passed a proposal th a t the seats remaining unfilled after the first vote would go to the party getting the plurality on the second vote; this was approved, 328 to h2 222. Also in hope of appeasing the Senate, it decided to base the calculations involved on the number of registered voters rather than 43 total population. This was as far as the proposal went, however, for

39 JOCD. 25 March 1913-

^See Bonnefous, Troisieme Republique, I, 35^~6l. h i ✓ JOCp. 6 November 1913* See a lso Journal des D ebats. 19 May 1913.

4 2 JO CD. 10 November 1913. ^ JOCD. 17 November 1913- 224

the Senate did not act on it, and France had no new electoral law until

1919*

Public education, the third plank of Barthou's ministerial pro­

gram, loomed up again, th is time for purely p o litic a l reasons. The

Socialists and the Radicals saw in it a way to split off the ultra con­

servative support from Barthou and in fact to remove vital support from

the three-year law. To this end they began to campaign strongly for

public education in order to force the cabinet to make a strong issue of

a stand which would disenchant the ultras. The effectiveness of this

tactic was early evident in the pages of the daily L*Action Francaise. which wrote, "It seems in fact that M. Louis Barthou has demonstrated

something arbitrary in separating, in a way, the question of French

patriotism and that of republican laicism. The two problems are the 44- same. " Under the ru b ric of old cliches the paper lis te d from one of

his Oloron speeches such phrases as "terrain laic" and "patriotic

republicans." 45 And in June while a school law was under discussion, it warned that, by his insistence of public education in the Chamber dis­

cussions, he was risking losing the votes of the Catholic deputies on 46 the three-year law. The split did not materialize, however. It was a hollow threat, really, because wishing ooth a stronger national

L'Action Francaise. 28 April 1913-

^3Ibid- 46 L'Action Francaise. 19 June 1913. 225

defense and Catholic schools, L!Action Francaise would not give up one

on the chance of saving the other.

The President of the Council is always in demand for high-level

after-dinner speeches. Since Barthou had taken the portfolio of Public

Instruction and Fine Arts he was sought after to speak at teachers meetings. Wishing to see the three-year law and the electoral reform

through parliament first, and realizing as well as his opponents did

that he would need conservative votes especially on the former, he chose

the strategy of his predecessors of riding only one horse at a time.

Consequently he used the public speaking rostrum rather than the Chamber

to carry his education program to the public. In April he spoke to the

Association of Teachers as their twentieth president, applauding their loyalty to France.^ At Oloron in April and at Caen in Kay he advocated public education. In June the Chamber started its talk of the new

school law. Attendance had been dropping in French schools and there were countless cases of fam ilies being threatened for not sending their

children to parochial schools; it was hoped that legislation could resolve these problems and that of proselytizing in the schools. "The door of the school should remain closed to the teaching of religious

beliefs," said the Minister of public Instruction. Ke successfully opposed relaxing the absences allowed from four each month to the

4-7 Ind B-P. 22 April 1913-

Ind B-P. 29 April and 6 May 1913•

^ JOCD. 18 June 1913- 226

proposed figure of six.^° But more critical were the provisions regarding

threats to those preferring public schools for their children and the

problem of unauthorized or religious orientated texts. No provision was

made to penalize parents who sent their children unwillingly to Catholic

rather than to government schools.

Probably concerned over what taxes he could get approved to

finance the new three-year law, Barthou soft-pedalled the school issue in

the fall. Speaking as a member of the Teachers League at their fall

conference at Aix-les Bains,—he had joined while a student at the Univer­

sity of Bordeaux—he reiterated that the "government and public education

are inseparable. If you attack one, you menace the other." But to the

dismay of many liberals and conservatives, he qualified his usual position

by adding that although the separation law would remain intact, too much

fuss had been made over the evils of Catholic schools.^ Then later he

returned twice to his anticlericalist stand in speeches inaugurating the

normal school at Saint-Germain and a school at Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

The entire attendance and lay school b ill did not pass the Chamber until

January, by which time other factors had removed Barthou from power. He

got an agreement, nevertheless, from the Chamber that it would complete c2 the education b ill after the electoral reform law was concluded.^

The sixth point in the program of Barthou, a foreign policy aimed at peace, was hardly mentioned in 1913. The Balkan crisis that year was

settled quietly with all the big powers satisfied with the peaceful

5°Ibid. 51Ind B-P. 27 September 1913.

-^ JOCD. 6 November 1913* 227

conclusion of the war; it was thus unnecessary to consider France's offer to use her good offices to mediate the situation.-^ Even violations of the frontier by German military aircraft went by with surprisingly little notice except by irate citizenry in the northeast—not an indication that either the government or the general public wanted war in the spring of

1913* On April 3* an L-Z-16 Zeppelin flew for some time on the French

side of the frontier before landing near Luneville, and had fuel brought to it from Germany—by permission of the French government—for its return flight. On the twenty-second a German biplane, one of a flight of four, landed out of gasoline near Arracourt two kilometers into France, refueled, and took off for Metz.-' No official protest was made either day.

One more item of foreign policy was evoked by Barthou's vacation trip to Italy during September. Interviewed by an Italian newspaper reporter for the Cornere delle Sera, he was quoted as deploring the currently popular attitude that France was hostile to Italy. The fact that they belonged to different alliance systems did not mean they were not f r i e n d s . L'Action Francaise deplored this "verbal exaggeration which corresponds neither with the reality of diplomacy or of military 56 affairs." On his return he had to deny that he had made any overtures

53 JQCD. lb May 1913- All the powers demanded a status quo. See L1A lliance. 11 May 1913. 54 Le Temps and Le F ig a r o . 4, 5. and 23 A p r il 1913*

^ L1 Alliance. 7 September 1913- This same encirclement of Germany idea ended tragically for all in the 1930’s.

^ L 1 Action Francaise. 1 September 1913* 228 toward negotiating with the Vatican . ^ In any event this was his last gesture toward encircling Germany prior to the war.

In Barthou1s program, point four, tax reform, and point five, income tax, provided the mechanism for his defeat. As soon as he formed his government, Caillaux and Jaures plotted to defeat the three-year law, and failing that, they would try to get an income tax instigated as the means of financing it. 5^ Having already lost on the former they prepared to try the latter.

The Socialist conference at Brest, May 23-27, hadboasted 68,903 members for its party, 10,000 of whom lived in the department of the

Seine. They had restated their stand against both the three-year law and the Russian alliance, 39 showing once more their preference for industrial workers over farmers and a constitutional monarchy containing a socialist party over a monarchy that was still almost absolute. The prospect for socialism looked brighter in Germany in 1913 than in

Russia. Both the industrial and political revolutions came too late for pre-war Russia to attract the French socialists. Jaures could count on the support of the S. F. I. 0. for his strategy.

Caillaux meanwhile was courting the Radicals. The Journal des

D^bats in Kay described him as a man who would very much like to be a chief, and nad found a party that was looking for a chief The conference of the Radical and Radical S o c ia lis t Party was heid a t Pau in

October, 1913» with the idea that this meeting in Barthou*s back yard

37 Journal des Debats. 27 September 1913 - 58 Binion, Defeated Leaders. 5^~3- 59Journal des D ebats. 24-28 March 1913* Journal des D^bats. 19 May 1913. 229 would somehow be an affront to him and his policies. This was the first

Radical conference Caillaux had attended and he was elected president of the party.^ Immediately he asked the Alliance Republicaine D^mocratique

Party not to renew his position as their vice-president. At long last the die was cast. He was a Radical and he would vie with Briand and

Barthou to head the government. He had already joined the Socialists in a campaign against the government, a campaign whose theme was peace. And who could come out against peace?

The opportunity to dump Barthou came in the discussion of the means of financing France's new defense program. As reforms in the tax structure, the door, window, head, and land taxes could be abolished only if some other source of revenue replaced them. In May the income tax, with no opposition from Barthou, was brought up as a way of paying for public expenditures; it was to begin on incomes of 10,000 francs and

Z n contain a 1000 franc exemption for each dependent under 16 or over 7 0 .

In the budget discussion in July it was trotted out again and supported by the government as the new tax source; this time Caillaux opposed it unless it was accompanied by capital and capital gains taxes. As for proposing these three taxes together, Barthou was convinced the Senate would not approve them, nor did he wish to lim it the money raising possibilities to these sources only. When he threatened to make the 64 issue a question of confidence, the measure was withdrawn. Income tax

6 l Binion, Defeated Leaders. 55' 6 2 L fA llia n c e . 26 October 1913-

Q3J0CP. 27 May 1913- 6^J0CP. 24 July 1913- 230 was not mentioned again that year and France had no income tax until wartime crises brought it about in 1917*

In December the Chamber discussed once more how the increased

Moroccan expenses and an enlarged array might be financed. Louis-Jean

Maloy objected that the taxes on incomes and dividends, or capital, would not be enough and that the government would be forced to borrow money.

Further, he charged the government had only bought time during the July discussion by promises of subsequent proposals; now, he said the govern­ ment was trying to delay the matter again by proposing a loan. Malvy was opposed to the income tax as anti-demoeratic: "It is not and never 6 5 w ill be the doctrine of the republican party." Possibly concerned about the prospect an income tax would have in the Senate, Barthou

supported the idea of securing the necessary funds by a bond issue rather than new taxes, and the Chamber accepted it, 291 to 2?0. The 66 Chamber then agreed to a bond is s u e o f 1 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 fr a n c s , w ith annual funds allocated to retire the bonds.

The Budget Committee of the Chamber next submitted a text stating that the bonds were "assured of all the privileges and immuni­ ties attached to state dividends." The idea of exempting government bond interest from taxation was not new. But Barthou suspected that once the commission1s proposal went through that way, Caillaux would push to abolish the idea of tax exemption for all government rentes.^

^ JOCD. 1 December 1913- ^ Ibid.

67 C aillau x d id so move in the Senate in March 191^. See Binion, Defeated Leaders. 6^. 231

Casimir Delpierre, therefore, proposed that it be printed on these bonds

that they "continue to benefit from the immunities they now enjoy."

Behind it all was a desire to sell the bonds quickly to raise the needed

funds; Barthou did not want confidence in the bonds to drop because they 68 might be taxed, he argued. Also he must have been aware of the

resistance this proposal—as well as the income tax and electoral reform measures—had yet to face in the Senate. Perhaps he hoped to trade some

tax-exempt bonds to the rentiers in the Senate for votes on the other two

issues, and the exempted bonds would make the income tax a little less

binding. Perhaps he had decided the Senate would reject the income tax

and this was the only way to get funds for the new military needs. He

must have had some motivation in addition to the relative weak reason he

gave about maintaining confidence in the bonds. He may even have been

thinking of the interests of some of his banker friends, although one

neutral observer at least, American Ambassador to France Myron Herrick,

thought at the time that he lost his vote because he did not bring enough 69 bankers into the bond sale deal.

Likely the biggest single mistake in strategy the President of

the Council had made thus f a r , he made the vote on the tax exemption

principle one of confidence.

Judge me on this declaration. . . . I will give up to you my responsibility and my ministerial existence, but at least I am convinced I have done my duty to my country. . . . The government declares that if this text is defeated it cannot, mark my word, assume responsibility for the bonds nor for public affairs.

^ JOCD. 2 December 1913. 69 'Weber, Nationalist Revival, footnote p. 9* 232

Either he gauged improperly his own strength or he was impatient

to get on to other things, for he did not have to stake his entire

government on this vote. Possibly his successful threats to make tax

matters votes of confidence in the summer had convinced him he could get

away with it in December. But the Chamber rejected the proposal, 263 to

290, with all the Radicals and Socialists among the majority. Barthou,

with his cabinet, rose, and calmly and quietly walked out of the Chamber.

Just as Barthou reached the door Vaillant shouted, "A bas le loi de trois

ansi" Both Joseph Reinach and Henry Pat£ demanded that V aillant1s 70 interruption be recorded in the Journal Q fficielf insisting that this 71 was not a vote on taxing bonds but another vote on the three-year law.

The left cries of "Vive la Republiquel" and "Vive la France" evoked a

"Vive la Francel" from Louis Barthou as he passed out the door. As

Deputy Charles Danielson stated at the time, it was the three-year law

issue, on which Barthou had rallied a vote in July, that defeated him in 72 December.

No effort was made in 191^ to repeal the three-year law.

70 The secretary had already anticipated this request and it was already recorded. 71 M . 2 December 1913*

72 Ib id. CHAPTER VII

THE BARTHOU-CAILLAUX PUZZLE

In the legislatures of the Tnird Republic prior to the First

World War there were many personal rivalries, friendly and otherwise.

One of these was between Louis 3arthou and Joseph Caillaux. This rela­ tionship oegan as friendship, changed to friendly rivalry, and fast became only rivalry.

Caillaux was brought up in a typical rich man's home complete with English speaking governess and annual holiday trips to the Riviera and to ParisBarthou grew up in a poor shopkeeper's home. J o sep h a s a youth knew the Public Works apartment at Versailles and the Finance

M inister's apartment at the Louvre, his father, Eugene, having held these cabinet posts. Louis went to the Lycee at Pau. Both men had lived and liked the student life on the Left Bank. Both received law 2 degrees in 1886, Caillaux from the Lycee Condorcet, and Barthou from the University of Paris. While one worked twelve years in the Ministry of Finance before going to the Chamber, the other spent two years as a newspaper editor before entering politics. Both practiced law on the

^Early biographical information on Caillaux, unless otherwise cited, comes from Alfred Fabre-Luce, Caillaux (Paris, 1933)* and Caillaux* s Memoires. I (Paris, 19^2), and is resumed in Binion, Defeated Leaders, 18-22. 2 See Caillaux*s obituary in the New York Times, 23 November 19^3*

233 234 side. Each had known the other and they had become friends after

Caillaux arrived in the Chamber in 1898. Barthou was seven months the o ld e r.

Joseph began political life as a conservative and became a radical; Louis started to the right of center, moved to the left side of the same group and back again, never leaving the center very far or for very long. Joseph came out in favor of an income tax, possibly in

1898; Barthou was opposed to it from 1890 until his party adopted the idea in 1906. The former was against proportional representation,^ the latter for it. The two couples, Barthou and Caillaux, were friends in

Paris; Alice Barthou remained friendly with Henriette Caillaux even

Ll a fte r th e ir husbands had parted company. Joseph and Louis took a vaca­ tion boat trip up the Nile together in January and February, 1911.^

While C aillaux, with his m illion franc fortune became absorbed in the

Credit Foncier Egyptien. and the Credit Foncier Argentin.^ Barthou became a critic of the French romantic movement.' Both served as vice- presidents of the Alliance R^publicaine D&nocratique Party. The man from Oloron was pro-Russian and anti-German p rio r to both World Wars;

3 . . Binion, Defeated Leaders. 53* 4 Binion, Defeated Leaders. 5°*

"’Caillaux, Memoires. Ill, 53* This trip was also mentioned at the time in L1Independant des Basses Pvr£n^es.

^Beau de Lomenie, Dynasties Bourgeoises. 404. 7 Barthou wrote Les Amours d1un poete (Paris, 1919) about Victor Hugo; Autour de Baudelaire (1917); Lamartine Orateur (1918); Rachel (1926), which was a biography of actress Elisa Felix; and Victor Hugo (1935). 235 the deputy from Mamers was just the opposite, although in 190*+ he seemed D to approve of the Franco-Russian Alliance. Both men were premiers in pre-war France. Both men were capable, ambitious, and possessed of a more than necessary amount of vanity. Barthou managed to keep his personal affairs separate from his public career and out of the public eye. Caillaux managed neither. His private negotiations with Germany over Morocco in 1911 and h is p erso n al dom estic a f f a i r s were known a t the time in wide circles ; he married Henriette the same month he divorced Berthe Eva.^

Barthou voted to bring Caillaux1s cabinet to power and for his

Morocco treaty; there was no confidence vote preceding Caillaux1s resignation* Caillaux abstained on the vote forming Barthou's cabinet, voted against the three-year law, and voted to defeat Barthou. Then, being the strongest voice in Doumergue's ministry that succeeded

Barthou1 s, he made no move to reverse the three-year law .^

*******

The Rochette affair was the fuse of a time bomb that might never have been ignited had it not been for the impetuous pistol shooting of

Madame Henriette Caillaux. This affair had occurred under demenceau's ministry in 1908 when a young stock speculator, Henri Rochette, drew down

8 George Michon, The Franco-Russian Alliance 1 8 9 1 -1 9 1 7 (L ond on, 1929), p. 127.

q 'Binion, Defeated Leaders. 52.

^See Weber, Nationalist Revival, vii. See also Le Figaro. 1 February 191*+. 236

the wrath of older, established manipulators and CLemenceau had him arrested in March.^ He was convicted and appealed. It was widely rumored th a t Procurer-General V ictor Fabre had, under pressure from

Monis and Caillaux, delayed the appeal case for stock market reasons which would help Rochette's operations. A Chamber commission, appointed in 1910 to examine his stock market irregularities, and chaired by 1 7 Jaures, could get only a hint of this the next year from Fabre and

Monis who were called as witnesses. The commission was dissolved for lack of evidence or from fear of making a bad situation worse. The

Appeals Court subsequently reversed the first verdict on Rochette. 13

Maurice Bernard, who handled Caillaux's divorce case, was also Rochette1s Id lawyer. At that time Barthou was Minister of Justice and expressed his confidence in Faore as a dignified magistrate

Late in 1913 Gaston Calmette, editor of the daily Le Figaro, launched an attack against Caillaux. On January Id, 191d, in the midst of this campaign Calmette got hold of Caillaux's budget proposals based on a tax on incomes of over 30,000 francs—or about $7500 in pre-war currency. These had been revealed only to the Council of Ministers and it seemed Calmette was about to tell all Paris newspaper readers.^

Caillaux asked Poincare to prevent publication of his proposals. Rather

"^Arrested owner of a 50 h .p . autom obile, noted Le Temps, 2d March 1908. See also D, W. Brogan, France under the Republic (New York, 1940), pp. d52-53.

^ JOCD. 11 July 1910. ^Brogan, loc. cit.

■^Binion, Defeated Leaders. 34. ^ JOCD, 11 July 1910.

■^Binion, Defeated Leaders. 59“60. 237 than talk to Calmette himself, Poincare asked Barthou to speak to

Calmette so did Doumergue. Barthou did, and Calmette agreed not to use this information. Both Doumergue and Caillaux thanked Barthou for his intercession.^

A few days later, Calmette renewed his anti-Caillaux campaign.

Caillaux was accused once more on March 10 of interfering to delay

Rochette1s appeal trial in order to allow Rochette to continue stock 19 manipulations in the Congo and in the Credit Foncier Egyptien. 7 On

Friday, March 13, Le Figaro carried on the front page a letter written to Eva Gueydan Caillaux on July 5* 1 9 0 1 , before she had become the first

Madame Caillaux, revealing how Caillaux had ''crushed the income tax" in the Chamber "while appearing to defend it"; the letter was signed, "Ton

J o ." That same day the Rochette matter was brought up again in the

Chamber and its discussion was postponed until the following week.

None of the principals in the subsequent trial and investigation could suggest—or would—enough motive to explain the violence of 20 Calmette1s attack. Caillaux was the central figure in the Doumergue cabinet; Poincare simply did not want to make Caillaux premier and had given the post to Doumergue. Possibly a new investigation of the

17I b i d . 18 Barthou1s testimony before the Chamber commission of inquiry into the Fabre document, published in L^umanite. 25 March and 8 April 191^.

Figaro renewed the campaign February 1 and kept it up through March 13.

^Binion, Defeated Leaders. 68-70. 238

Rochette affair, or the slander attack of Calmette, could have pulled down the Doumergue-Caillaux government had not more dramatic events denied everyone the chance to see how much damage Calmette could do.

Monday afternoon, March 16, Madame Henriette Caillaux called at the Figaro office of Calmette, waited for his return at nearly six, and was shown into his office. Behind closed doors six revolver shots were heard. Office personnel rushed in to find Mme, Caillaux with a smoking revolver in her hand and Calmette with four bullet wounds. Calmette 21 died that night. Caillaux resigned immediately and the Doumergue cabinet lost its bowsprit. The debate on the Fabre-Rochette affair was resumed two days l a t e r . Deputy Jules Delahaye immediately demanded th at

Fabre either be removed from his post in the Ministry of Justice or reveal who had persuaded him to postpone Rochette*s appeal case back in

1911. He added th a t Calmette had promised him two days before h is assassination that he was not going to reveal any of Caillaux1s private letters, only the account Fabre had written of how Monis and Caillaux 22 had asked him to postpone the second Rochette trial. Monis denied using his influence, saying Rochette*s lawyer had gotten the delay because of his own health, at which point a socialist deputy, Hubert

Rouger, exclaimed, "And Barthou, what does he know?" Before Barthou answered, however, Doumergue interjected that he did not believe Fabre*s letter existed, and reminded them an "inquiry commission had already investigated the affair." Barthou then went to the rostrum, drew the

21 Le F ig aro . 17 March 191^. 22 This was confirmed by Le Figaro, 18 March 191^+, two days after Calmette*s assassination. 239

Fabre document from his pocket, explained how he happened to have it, 23 and revealed i t s contents.

On the last day of March, 1911. Fabre had w ritten down his

version of the business. Both Monis, then premier, and Caillaux’s and

Rochette*s lawyer, Bernard, had asked him to postpone the trial. Monis

pleaded that Caillaux1s Finance Ministry was already having difficulty liquidating church property holdings as well as with the Credit foncier,

and Monis did not want to add the Rochette problem to these others.

Bernard pleaded that Caillaux had asked for the postponement for

Rochette1s sake, and Bernard, therefore, stated his own illness as the

reason for requesting delay. He persuaded the president of the Appeals

Court on March 30 to delay the hearing until after the summer vacations.

"Never have I submitted to such humiliation," Fabre had concluded in his 2k pro ce s-v e rb a l.

This document was addressed to the Garde des Sceaux, but apparently Fabre did not send it to that office until both Monis and

Caillaux were out of the government; consequently it was Justice

M inister Briand who received it in 1912. Briand never deposited this

Fabre document as an official Ministry of Justice document; it had no registry number on it. Sometime after Briand left the Ministry of

Justice on January 21, 1913. and before Barthou*s becoming premier on

23 JOCD. 18 M arch 191^.

^The whole letter is reproduced in bonnefous, Troisi&ne Republique. I, 392-93- 2h0 25 March 22,—in other words while Barthou was Minister of Justice J—

Briand passed on the document to Barthou, advising him to destroy it

only after the Rochette affair should be terminated and, in the meantime, to pass it on to his successor. Until his revelation in the Chamber, 26 Barthou swore he had spoken of it to no one.

The Chamber the next day re -a c tiv a te d the old commission of inquiry into the Rochette affair, under chairman Jaures again, Monis followed Caillaux*s lead and resigned from the cabinet so that he would 27 be a free agent in the coming investigation.

The investigation revealed little else. Barthou, Briand,

Caillaux, and Monis were accused of withholding information, Caillaux and Monis of using their influence on the judiciary, and Barthou of retaining an official document in his private possession. Barthou testi­ fied at the inquiry that the document was not official and that he con- 2Q sidered nimself a depository for Briand. Both Jaures and Briand agreed that it was the death of Calmette that caused Barthou to read the document in the Chamber; as Barthou put it later, "To remain silent then would

^Barthou succeeded Briand as Minister of Justice in January and as premier in March. Barthou was probably given the document on January 2 1 . 26 The proceedings of the inquiry commission may be found in any Paris daily between March 20 and April 10. These notes came from Le Figaro. L*Humanity, and the Journal des D^bats. See also Bonnefous, Troisieme Rlpubliaue. I, 389~^Oh. Bonnefous was himself a deputy and a member of the In q u iry Commission.

pQ The man before whom he was testifying, Jaures, was not known for his sense of humor. See Brogan, France under the Republic. ^+53- 241 have been cowardice most vile and inexorable committed against one

29 , dead." In the presence of Poincare, Caillaux had threatened to k ill 30 Calmette if any more letters were published. Caillaux accused and 31 Barthou denied that the first Madame Caillaux had shown him letters*, their observed street corner meeting is not in itself conspiratorial since they had known each other for years and lived on the same street in Paris, and they would not likely have plotted in the open anyway.

Caillaux testified at his wife’s trial that Barthou had in fact inter­ ceded to get Calmette to stop his campaign .^

The Inquiry Commission concluded that governmental intervention had been used to delay the appeal case of Rochette and that Barthou was found to have kept an official document received while he was Garde des 33 Sceaux. Barthou claimed all responsibility for his actions.

Madame Caillaux was tried and found not guilty of the murder on 34 grounds of temporary insanity.

Sometime during 1912 o r 1913 Barthou and Caillaux had fallen out.

Jaures and Caillaux accused Barthou of keeping the Fabre document so he could use it at an opportune time. Barthou’s reply to this was that the proper time would have been when Caillaux was trying to (and did) throw 35 him out of office the previous year. possibly there was not room on the French political state for both actors. Perhaps Barthou did keep

29 jqcD . 2 April 1914. ^ L’Humanite, 7 April 1914.

^ L1 Humanity. 2, 8, and 9 April 1914. -^L'Humanite. 8 April 191^* 33 34 , See note 25 above. Journal des Debats, 30 July 1914.

-^JOCD. 2 April 1914. 242 the Fabre document to use against Caillaux at a more opportune time, but it could be argued as easily that he removed it from the Justice Ministry to protect Caillaux and Monis, and Briand too; besides, he did not use it anyway until after Caillaux*s wife had committed murder and Caillaux had resigned from the cabinet. This argument would be more plausible had he destroyed the paper, but engaged in a conflict with Caillaux perhaps he kept the paper as future ammunition with which to protect himself and then could not resist the opportunity to play a trick on both Doumergue and Caillaux. Undoubtedly he was happy to see Caillaux done in. He was not vindictive, but he was a politician and a prankster.

Caillaux in his memoirs wrote that he considered Barthou physically and morally vulgar. But this was written after the two had disagreed once more in the early 1930*5 over a policy vis £ vis Germany and Russia.

It was after L1Action Francaise attack against Barthou prompted by 37 Barthou*s campaign against Hitler*s fascism. It was also written eight years after Barthou*s assassination. Barthou wrote no memoirs.

The Barthou-Caillaux relationship in the two years before the

World War remains a puzzle.

^Joseph Caillaux, Mes Memoires. Ill (Paris, 19^7), p. 55. 37 Alexander Werth, France in Ferment (London, 1935). pp. 88- 8 9, and The Destiny of France (London, 1937), p . 384. CHAPTER V III

LOUIS BARTHOU; POLITICIAN

Thera is no greet complication behind the man from Blarn and his

career. He had many qualities that gave him exceptional stature in an

era when French politics was at its moral worst and French politicians

were at their scheming best. His photographic memory, legal background,

quick wit, and speaking ability gave him a distinct edge over most of

the people against whom he debated in the Qiamber. These attributes

first brought him the attention of politicians and put him in the national

lim e lig h t .

He had principle. Twice he declined cabinet posts and once the

governorship of Algeria when he considered himself improperly qualified.

Twice more he resigned m inisterial posts over what he considered

improper policy. Both his resignations were over points which seemed

anti-haute bourgeoisie, which is a partial answer to the charge of his

critics that he was too much inclined toward the middle class or banking

interests. Making allowances for political expediency and maneuvering

in these five cases, it still requires some moral character to turn down

or resign high government office.

Unquestionably he was am bitious and lik ed power. In a le t t e r written as part of his 1913 re-election campaign for Councillor General,

he signed his name, "Louis Barthou (Depute, President du Conseil General,

2^3 244

President du Conseil des Ministers, Ministre de I1Instruction publique et des Beaux-Arts).^ But he sought these and the fulfillment of his policies only through proper channels. His legal training and character led him to seek the realization of the principles of the First Republic, only manipulating and plotting within the framework of what was legal.

He managed to keep both his public and private careers untouched by the scandals so typical of his time.

Louis Barthou was a party to two great shortcomings that affected

France at the beginning of the twentieth century. The first great criticism of him is that he seemed to agree with the pre-war, French opinion that conflict with Germany was nearly certain and could only be avoided by strong defenses and, better yet, a strong alliance structure as a balance of power. Controversy still continues as to whether or not less nationalism and more cooperation with Germany would not have been the alternative for avoiding war.

His second great shortcoming was the slow pace at which he sought social reform through his middle road course of "neither reaction nor revolution." Well acquainted with labor problems, he, like most of the third force, and many other politicians, lacked a real sympathy for the economic and social conditions among laborers. On both of these questlons—Germany and social reform—he opposed the left, particularly the S • F• I. 0.

The international force of socialism was not strong enough to have prevented war. Was it much more likely that it could have achieved

1Ind B-P. 5 August 1913. 2 45 its domestic goal of a collectivist stateT And if not, was there any real danger in cooperating with these socialists to achieve domestic reform? Or was socialism a phantom which was important to attack for political reasons? The record of the members of both the left and the third force in the governments and in the Chamber seem to indicate a larger divergence between their ideologies than between their practices.

Robert de Jouvenel is often quoted regarding the left-wing politicians of this era, that there was less difference between two deputies one of whom was a revolutionary than between two revolutionaries one of whom was a deputy. The same could have been said about republicans and republican deputies.

Barthou*s disdain for the endless deliberation of politicians and the slow pace of various government machineries caused him to push rapidly for the achievement of his program during the short time he was head of the government. His own quick wit and memory made him impatient, and he often complained about the nonsequiturs introduced into the many

Chamber debates. He preferred to have each matter resolved regardless of whether or not he agreed with the majority opinion; and whether it was political expediency or his feeling for democratic processes, he always accepted the decisions of the majority.

Politicians must at times be pragmatic. Barthou did not fight the clericalists until 1893 when he thought he could defeat them. When clericalism did seem too strong he sought help from the left; when he considered socialism the greater threat he looked to the right again for

Jouvenel, Republique des Camarades. 16-7. 2^6 help. He defied his own principle of aversion to duplication of office when he saw his party and his nation faced with the threat of clericalism, likew ise he changed h is view on the income tax when he found most of his party opposed to him on the issu e. Like any capable p o litic ia n , the party was usually more important to him than his own career and ideals, and—his greatest norm--survival of the Republic was the most important

consideration of all.

The man from Oloron played three important roles in pre-war

French politics. He helped organize and then lead AT H ance Republicaine Demoeratique. He was a vital influence in the opposition to the cler­ icalists on the right and the S. F. I. 0. on the left. And he succeeded in increasing the size and preparedness of defenses in the year before

Europe went to war.

Barthou wrote what could w ell have been said of h is own p o litic a l career thus far. Looking backward in 1919 he commented on both the politicians and the Republic in this era;

The Third Republic, with its half century of existence, could from the point of view of parliamentary honesty pro­ voke comparison with the Restoration and the July Monarchy. I t has had i t s mangy black sheep; but the flock has remained in ta ct. The largest scandals have not soiled the hands of the m inisters who handled them. Some have passed often by the government; others have remained in i t a long time. These honest men have clean hands. Who has known the modest interior of a Brisson, a Dupuy, a Sarrien, or a Combes, to speak only of the dead, do they refuse to associate with my testimony? Democracy is no more a school for corruption than monarchy; less perhaps, because if the appetites are more numerous in democracy the control i s also more severe.-'

\o u is Barthou, La Politique (Paris, 1919). pp. 11^-15. APPENDIX I

By the remotest of chances, in August of 1961, I met a retired

French army captain who was reading next to me in the Bibliotheque

Nationals. His family lives on the road from Pau to Lourdes, and he has

Known of the Barthou family all his life.

He related how at the University of Bordeaux Barthou was a first

rate student. The University gave free tuition and expenses each year to

its top students. Barthou won this prize from the law faculty every

year he was at Bordeaux. He also told how Barthou had won his first

elective post as municipal councillor in Pau in 1888. The republican

candidate for this post died three days prior to the election, and the

republican committee in Pau asked Barthou to run. He had no money, so

the committee offered to pay his campaign expenses for him. He won the

e le c tio n .

Also, this captain*s father, who was in the French army during

World War I, witnessed the death of Louis Barthou*s only son, Max. The

nineteen-year-old Max was a cavalry officer and went into service within days a fte r war was declared. On Sunday morning, December 14, 1914, he was seated at a sidewalk cafe in Thann, some eight kilometers behind the front. He had just gotten up from his table and started to walk down the

street when a stray shell landed in the street. It was the only shell to hit Thann that day and Max was the only victim of the explosion. His

247 248 father*s critics referred to Max as the "child of the three-year law."

Actually he had volunteered, and was not old enough to have been conscripted anyway.

Alice Barthou, ill with flu, never recovered from the loss of her only child and died a month later on January 15.

*********

Again entirely by accident, I discovered Barthou*s grave in the

P^re Lachaise Cemetery in Paris. A simple, Hue granite stone marks the graves of Louis, Alice, and Max. The stone was appropriated by act of parliament and it bears the caption, HMort pour France—loi de 23

Janvier 1935.11 APPENDIX I I

Premiers 1889-1913

Numbers in parentheses following certain premiers indicate number of premierships held by the man indicated* Cabinet portfolios underlined are those held by Barthou in various governments. Also listed on the right half of the page are the major lavs passed by parliament.

22 Feb. 1889 14 Mar. 1890 T ira rd (2 ) 17 Mar. 1890 18 Feb. 1892 Freydnet (4) 7 January 1892 Meline Tariff 27 Feb. 1892 - 28 Nov. 1892 L oubet 2 November 1892 11-hour day f o r women and c h ild r e n 6 Dec. 1892 - 10 Jan. 1893 R ib o t 11 J a n . 1893 - 30 Mar. 1893 R ib o t (2 ) 4 A pr. 1893 - 25 Nov. 1893 Dupuy 3 Dec. 1893 - 22 May 1894 Ca sim ir-Perier 30 May 1894 - 1 July 1894 Dupuy (2 ) M inister of Public Works

24 June 1894 Miners retire­ m ent law 1 July 1894 - 14 Jan. 1895 Dupuy (3) M inister of Public Works 26 J a n . 1895 28 Oct. 1895 R ib o t (3 ) 1 Nov. 1895 23 Apr. 1896 B ourgeois 29 Apr. 1896 16 June I 898 M eline Minister of Interior

1 A p r il I 898 Establishment of mutual aid societies 9 April 1698 Accident insurance for labor 28 June 1898 25 Oct. 1898 Brisson (2) 1 Nov. 1899 18 Feb. 1399 Dupuy (4 ) 18 Feb. 1899 12 June 1899 Dupuy (5 ) 22 June 1899 7 June 1902 Waldock-Rous seau 30 March 1900 11-hour day for men, 10 hour day for women and children July 1901 Law on associ­ a ti o n s 249 250

7 June 1902 - 24 Jan. 1905 Combes 7 July 1904 Abolition of teaching by congregations 24 Jan. 1905 - 18 Feb. 1906 Rouvier (2) 21 March 1905 Two-year law 29 June 1905 8-hour day for miners 9 December 1905 Separation of Church and state 18 Feb. 1906 7 Mar. 1906 Rouvier (3) 14 Mar. 1906 19 Oct. 1906 S arrien M inister of P ublic Works

13 July 1906 Six-day week

25 Oct. 1906 - 24 July 1909 Clemenceau Minister of Public Works

1 January 1909 Nationaliza­ tio n of the Chendn de fe r de 1*Quest 25 July 1909 - 3 Oct. 1910 Briand Garde des sceaux

5 April 1910 Workers1 retirement pensions 3 Nov. 1910 27 Feb. 1911 Briand (2) 2 Mar. 1911 23 June 1911 Monls 27 June 1911 10 Jan. 1912 C alllaux 14 Jan. 1912 18 Jan. 1913 Poincar

8 August 1913 Three-year law BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unpublished Sources

Archives Nationalss, Box Numbers. BB 18 2270 d. 219 A 04 BB 18 2270 d. 213 A 04

French Government Publications

Barthou, Louis, Chambre des Deputes Rapport No. 372: Sixieme Legislature 1894 Session. Paris, 1894,

Chambre des Deputes, Conaission d*enou 6 te des Affaires de Panama: Rapport General.P a ris , Chambre des D 6 put£s, 1893*

Journal Official . r.hnmbre des Deputes; D^bats Parlementaires. Paris, 18 8 9 -1 9 1 4 .

Journal Official: Senat; p 6 bats Parlementaires. Paris, 1898-1914.

V a lle , M. EnauSte Ha panam a. 3 vols. Paris, 1893.

Newspapers

(Place of publication indicated for those not published in Paris.)

L*Action Francaise. 1913*

T.^lHftnce Renublicaine D&nocratjque. 1902-1914.

La Depftche de Toulouse (Toulouse), 1898-1913.

Le Figaro. 1889-1914.

Le Glaneur 8*01oron (Qloron), 1889-191^-

T/K"1""1!4 1904-1913.

L1Independant des Basses-Pvrenees (Pau), 1889-1914.

Journal des Debats. 1898-1913-

Le Matin. 1889-1913. 25 2

Le Rappel. 1889-1913.

La Republiaue Francaise. 1889-1913*

Le Siecle. 1889-1913.

Le Tenros. 1889-1914.

Biographies and Memoirs

Aubert, Octave. Louis Barthou. Paris, Aristide Quillet, 1935*

Bertaut, Jules. Louis Barthou. Paris, Bibliotheque International dfEdition, 1919.

Caillaux, Joseph. Memoires. 3 vols. Paris, Plon, 1942-47.

Combes, E m ile. Won M in iste rs 1902-1905. P a ris , Plon, 1956.

Fabre-Luce, Alfred, Caillaux. Paris, Gallimard, 1933.

Freycinet, Louis de. Souvenirs. 2 vols. Paris, Ch. Delagrave, 1912-13.

Goldberg, Harvey. The Life of Jean Jaures. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1962.

Nicolson, Harold. Portrait of a Diplomatists Being the Life of Sir Arthur Nicolson. New York, Harcourt Brace, 1930.

Rogers, W ill. Sanltv Is Where You Find It. ed, Donald Day, Cambridge, Houghton M ifflin, 1955*

Saurez, Georges. Briand. 6 vols. Paris, Plon, 1938-52.

Special Monographs

Barthou, Louis. L1 Action Syndicale. Paris, A. Rousseau, 1904.

Barthou, Louis. La Politique. Paris, Hachette, 1923.

Beau de Lomenie, Emanuel. Qulapnelez-vous Droite et GaucheT Paris, Librarie de Dauphin, 1932.

Beau de Lomenie, Emanuel. Les Responsibilitys des Dynasties Bourgeoises. Vol. II. Paris, Denoel, 1932.

Binion, Rudolph. Defeated Leaderst the Political Fate of Ca-maux- Jouvenel. and Tardleu. New York, Columbia University press, 1958. 253

Campbell, Peter. French Electoral Systems and Elections. London, Faber and Faber, 1953.

Chapman, Guy. The Dreyfus Case. London, R, Hart-Davis, 1955*

Dansette, Adrien. Les Affaires de Panama. Paris, Acad&nique Perrin Editeur, 1934.

Dolleans, Edouard. Histoire du mouvement ouvrier. 3 vols. Paris, A. Colin, 1936-53.

Fay, Sidney B» Origins of the World War, 2 vols. New York, Macmillan, 1928.

Goguel-Nyegaard, Francois. La Politique des Partis sous La Troisieme Republiaue. Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1958*

Golob, Eugene 0. The Moline T ariff. New York, Columbia University Press, 1944.

Graham, James Q. "The French Radical and Radical Socialist Party 1906- 1 91 4 . * Ph.D* dissertation. The Ohio State University, 1962.

Jouvenel, Robert de. La Republiaue des Camarads. Paris, Grasset, 1914.

Kayser, Jacques. L1 Affaire Dreyfus. Paris, Gallimard, 19^*6.

Leblois, Louis. LlAffaire Dreyfus. Paris, Aristide Quillet, 1929-

Michon, Georges. The Franco-Russian Alliance 1891-1917. London, Allen and Unwin, 1929*

Faul-Boncour, Joseph. Le Federalism economiaue. 2nd ed. Paris, F. Alcan, 1901.

Poincare, Raymond. How France Is Governed. London, Unwin, 1913.

Scott, John A* Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France 1870-1914. New York, Columbia University Press, 1951*

Soulier, Andre. L1 Instability Min^ptAtf.elle dans la troisieme Republiaue. Paris, Librarie du Recueil Sirey, 1939-

Weber, Eugene. The Nationalist Revival_ln France 1905-1914. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1959.

Werth, Alexander. The Destiny of France. London, Hamish Hamilton, 1937.

Werth, Alexander. France in Ferment. London, Harper Brothers, 1935- 254

General Histories

Bonnefous, Georges. Histoire Politique de la Troisleae Republiaue. Vol. I. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1956.

Brogan, David W. France under the Republic. New Xork, Harper and Brothers, 1940.

Chastenet, Jacques. Histoire de la Troisieme Republiaue. Vols. II-IV. Paris, Hachette, 1954-55■

Cole, G. D* H* A History of Socialist Thought, Vol. Ill, Part I. London, Macsdllan, 1956.

Schunan, Frederick L« War and Diplomacy in the French Republic. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1931.

Periodical Articles

Barthou, Louis. "La Revolution et La Liberte d*Enseignement,N Revue de Paris. X (Feb. 1, 1903), pp. 493-50?.

Barthou, Louis. “Les Syndicats d*Instituteurs»* Revue de Paris. XIII (March-April, 1906), pp. 1-28.

Barthou, Louis. “Le Syndicat Obligatoire," La Nouvelle Revue. IX, No. 36 (April 1, 1901), pp. 321-4?.

Daudet, Leon. “Et Poincare,* LTAction Francaise. VIII (Feb., 1913)* pp. 1-25.