DOCSLIB.ORG

The Shadow of Vietnam Over Kabul

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Shadow of Vietnam Over Kabul October 2009 The shadow of Vietnam over Kabul Astri Suhrke Summary The present controversy over the elections in corrupt but weak state and had started to talk about nego- Afghanistan recalls the dilemmas Washington faced tiating with the enemy. He also had a corrupt and obsti- in Vietnam when Ngo Dinh Diem, whom the Ameri- QDWHEURWKHUZKRH[HUWHGFRQVLGHUDEOHLQÀXHQFHRQKLP cans had helped establish as president, no longer ,Q2FWREHU&DERW/RGJHLQIRUPHGWKH9LHWQDPHVH appeared as a reliable and effective partner. They general Duong Van Minh that Diem was no longer de- then decided to get rid of Diem, but this merely led sired as president. This led to a military coup in which to a period of greater instability and eventual defeat. Diem was shot and thrown into the back of an army ve- KLFOH/DWHU/RGJHVDLGWKHLQWHQWLRQZDVQRWWRNLOO'LHP He was only to be deposed because the country needed a new president. The ghost of Vietnam keeps appearing in the debate over NATO’s role in Afghanistan. It also haunts the back- Rigid fronts ground of Richard Holbrooke, President Obama’s special It is hardly necessary to remind Holbrooke of the paral- representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, for Hol- lels with present strife around Hamid Karzai. Also the brooke began his career in the State Department as an Afghan president is accused of corruption and of being aid-worker in South Vietnam in 1963. uncooperative, and he presided over the rigged elections in September. Karzai has a problem brother, Ahmed Wali $VD\RXQJDPELWLRXVRI¿FLDO+ROEURRNHKHOSHGGHYHO- Karzai, who is said to be deeply involved in the narcotics op the ”hearts and minds” strategy in Vietnam, writes WUDGH/LNH'LHP.DU]DLRULJLQDOO\KDGWKHGHFLVLYHVXS- Noref Article his former boss, Rufus Phillips, in his recently pub- port of the Americans, who helped install him after 2001 lished book Why Vietnam Matters. Development in the in the expectation that he would be a nationally unifying villages rather than raw military power was to win the ¿JXUH SHRSOH¶VFRQ¿GHQFHLQWKHEDWWOHDJDLQVWWKH&RPPXQLVWV Holbrooke was in the Mekong delta when the US ambas- Relations cool VDGRU+HQU\&DERW/RGJHGHFLGHGLWZDVWLPHWRUHPRYH $WWKDWWLPHWKH81VSHFLDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYH/DNKGDU%UD- the South Vietnamese president, Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem himi and the Americans cooperated in making Karzai the had become uncooperative and authoritarian, he led a leader of the transitional government, which formally was Astri Suhrke LVDVHQLRUUHVHDUFKHUDW&KU0LFKHOVHQ,QVWLWXWH%HUJHQ6KHLVDSROLWLFDOVFLHQWLVWZLWKEURDG experience in academic and applied research. She has worked on the social, political and humanitarian con- VHTXHQFHVRIYLROHQWFRQÀLFWDQGVWUDWHJLHVRIUHVSRQVH0RUHUHFHQWO\VKHKDVIRFXVHGRQWKHSROLWLFVRIKX- manitarian policies in the UN system, concepts of human security and peacebuilding. She is currently working on strategies of post-war reconstruction and statebuilding, with particular reference to Afghanistan. Her most recent books (co-authored) are Roads to Reconciliation (2005), Eroding Local Capacity. International Humani- tarian Action in Africa(2003), and The Path of a Genocide. The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (1999). 7KHFXUUHQWDUWLFOHRULJLQDOO\DSSHDUHGDVµ(LGHRJ+ROEURRNHLVN\JJHQIUD9LHWQDP¶LQ%HUJHQV7LGHQGH Translated from Norwegian by John Meyrick. October 2009 Astri Suhrke: The shadow of Vietnam over Kabul Abortive efforts HOHFWHGE\WKHWUDGLWLRQDO$IJKDQDVVHPEO\ OR\DMLUJD LQ The”minimalists” in Washington, as they are called, note 2002. The US special representative, the Afghan-Ameri- that the military escalation and foreign-supported state- can Zalmay Khalilzad, made it clear that neither the king, building in Afghanistan so far have not attained the de- Zahir Shah, nor any member of his fraction were accept- sired results. On the contrary, the deepening foreign pres- DEOHFDQGLGDWHV:LWKVXSSRUWIURP%UDKLPL.KDOLO]DG ence has created a bigger and tougher insurgency, has cost announced that the king had withdrawn his candidacy, billions of dollars and many American lives (as well as the even before the king himself had the opportunity to do so. lives of others). It has led to a proliferation of unclear aims, contributed to widespread corruption and a president the Karzai was clearly the Americans’ candidate in the 2004 Americans can no longer control. The time has therefore presidential election. Washington allocated an extra bil- come to use “smart power”, the critics say. The Americans lion dollars ahead of the election to show that Karzai can use rockets and special forces against a smaller group could open the aid faucet in the service of reconstruction of international terrorists now on the Pakistani side of the and peace-building. In the months prior to the election border. The Taliban insurgency, state-building and “win- school buildings shot up like toadstools, roads were tar- ning hearts and minds” are matters the Afghans them- macked and wells drilled. Much of it was done too fast. selves must deal with. International aid can make a con- School roofs collapsed and those that were left standing tribution but not govern this process. That is simply too often lacked both teachers and textbooks. complicated. This was the beginning of the end of the cooperation be- :HOONQRZQ ¿JXUHV DPRQJ WKH PLQLPDOLVWV DUH SROLWL- WZHHQ.DU]DLDQG:DVKLQJWRQ/LNH'LHP.DU]DLVWDUWHG cians and intellectuals whose views were shaped by the to criticise his powerful benefactors. He disagreed with Vietnam War. Senator John Kerry – who is rapidly mov- Washington’s military strategy (too many civilian casual- ing in the minimalist direction – fought there as a young ties) and state-building strategy (too much interference). soldier, afterwards becoming a strong critic of the war. Not surprisingly, he began to build another power base /HVOLH*HOEDZHOONQRZQFRPPHQWDWRUDGYLVRUMRXUQDO- founded on local alliances and tribal politics. This cre- LVWDQGIRUDORQJWLPHKHDGRIWKHLQÀXHQWLDO&RXQFLORQ ated even greater distance in the relationship, and when Foreign Relations, worked in the Pentagon under Robert Obama became president, things went from bad to worse. McNamara’s management of the war in Vietnam and de- veloped a certain scepticism towards intervention as an Opposing strategies instrument of power. An increasing number of Democrat- What lessons does Holbrooke draw from the US experi- ic senators are looking towards the congressional elec- ences with Diem now that he has a stubborn President tions next year and realize that the shadow of Vietnam Karzai to deal with? The time for military coups and as- grows ever longer over the debate on the war in Afghani- sassinating unpopular clients has probably passed. In- VWDQ9LFH3UHVLGHQW-RH%LGHQDVPDGHFOHDUKHIDYRXUV stead accusations of election rigging are used to eliminate a minimalist role. On the right he has the support from or at any rate marginalise Karzai. Holbrooke is said to relatively moderate conservatives such as the columnist SUHIHUDQHZURXQGRIHOHFWLRQV+LVFROOHDJXH3HWHU*DO- *HRUJH):LOO Noref Article braith, who has worked closely with Holbrooke and was SODFHGE\KLPLQWKH81.DEXORI¿FHXQGHU.DL(LGHKDV Bad experiences argued e that all election fraud should be exposed even if, as expected, this would mean that Karzai’s days in the 2QWKHRWKHUVLGHDUH*HQHUDO0F&KU\VWDODPRQJRWKHUV presidential palace are numbered. who argue for a greater and wider engagement with more foreign troops, a broad “hearts and minds” strategy and In the State Department, on the other hand, there is more more international support to ensure a stronger Afghan doubt and more support for Kai Eide’s line that more and state and better governance. direct intervention can create bigger problems. The con- sequence of removing Diem in 1963 was indeed less sta- Holbrooke himself is not saying much right now. He is bility. Military coup followed military coup to produce known to be an activist and a directive leader. On the sustained chaos. The idea that direct intervention is dif- other hand, he has lived through the experiences of failed ¿FXOWRIWHQKDVXQLQWHQGHGFRQVHTXHQFHVDQGIUHTXHQWO\ DWWHPSWVWRGRMXVWWKDWLQ9LHWQDP:KHQ2EDPDSXWKLP delegitimises the new regime, is now gaining ground in in charge of Afghanistan-Pakistan, he e-mailed his old established political circles in Washington. boss from the Vietnam period: ”Afghanistan is tougher than Vietnam”. October 2009.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • COIN in Afghanistan - Winning the Battles, Losing the War?
    COIN in Afghanistan - Winning the Battles, Losing the War? MAGNUS NORELL FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-funded agency under the Ministry of Defence. The core activities are research, method and technology development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and security of society. The organisation employs approximately 1000 personnel of whom about 800 are scientists. This makes FOI Sweden’s largest research institute. FOI gives its customers access to leading-edge expertise in a large number of fields such as security policy studies, defence and security related analyses, the assessment of various types of threat, systems for control and management of crises, protection against and management of hazardous substances, IT security and the potential offered by new sensors. FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency Phone: +46 8 555 030 00 www.foi.se FOI Memo 3123 Memo Defence Analysis Defence Analysis Fax: +46 8 555 031 00 ISSN 1650-1942 March 2010 SE-164 90 Stockholm Magnus Norell COIN in Afghanistan - Winning the Battles, Losing the War? “If you don’t know where you’re going. Any road will take you there” (From a song by George Harrison) FOI Memo 3123 Title COIN in Afghanistan – Winning the Battles, Losing the War? Rapportnr/Report no FOI Memo 3123 Rapporttyp/Report Type FOI Memo Månad/Month Mars/March Utgivningsår/Year 2010 Antal sidor/Pages 41 p ISSN ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Försvarsdepartementet Projektnr/Project no A12004 Godkänd av/Approved by Eva Mittermaier FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency Avdelningen för Försvarsanalys Department of Defence Analysis 164 90 Stockholm SE-164 90 Stockholm FOI Memo 3123 Programme managers remarks The Asia Security Studies programme at the Swedish Defence Research Agency’s Department of Defence Analysis conducts research and policy relevant analysis on defence and security related issues.
    [Show full text]
  • Negotiating Kosovo's Final Status
    NEGOTIATING KOSOVO’S FINAL STATUS Lulzim Peci, Ilir Dugolli, Leon Malazogu* 1. The current situation June 10th 1999 marks the beginning of a new stage for Kosovo. With confirmed withdrawal of the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the entry of KFOR, the UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 1244 (hereinafter: UNSCR 1244)1, replacing thus the existing legal order with a new one. In general, Kosovo has experienced a very wide range of constitutional solutions. Since the end of WWII and until the last constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1974, we have seen an enhancement of powers of Kosovo (as one of the two autonomous provinces). The federal constitution of 1974 introduced significant changes to the internal organization of the SFRY, decentralizing key areas of governance. Under these arrangements, the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo (SAPK) “had equal representation within the supreme commanding body of the federation, a collective presidency of eight, comprised of a member of each federal unit of Yugoslavia. All representatives enjoyed the right to veto any decision over which the collective body had authority, including those relating to security2. 1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99. Available: http://www.unmikonline.org/misc/N9917289.pdf (last visited: 20 February 2006) 2 Ilir Dugolli & Lulzim Peci, Enhancing civilian management and oversight of the security sector in Kosovo, KIPRED and SaferWorld, November 2005. p.5. Available online at: http://www.kipred.net/UserFiles/File/SecSectorManagement.pdf (last visited: 15 February 2006). This positive evolution came to an abrupt end in 1989 when the autonomy was revoked.
    [Show full text]
  • Hva Kjennetegner Talibans Propaganda Og Med Hvilke Kontrapropagandatiltak Kan ISAF Bekjempe Den?
    Forsvarets stabsskole Våren 2009 Masteroppgave Kampen om den mest uimotståelige historien Hva kjennetegner Talibans propaganda og med hvilke kontrapropagandatiltak kan ISAF bekjempe den? Ola Bøe-Hansen 2 3 Summary This analysis is split into two where the first half is dedicated to what characterizes Taliban propaganda, and the other half to an analysis of which counterpropaganda measures ISAF can utilize in order to counter it. The Taliban’s propaganda apparatus has grown in size, skill and emphasis since it was removed from power in late 2001. It has shown ability to adapt to modern media and technology, and can now communicate with a global reach and impact. Their messages are mostly based on real incidents, but often strongly exaggerated. They use strong religious connotations to harvest authority and legitimacy. The civilian population is deliberately used as human shields, which has lead to incidents where ISAF operations cause civilian casualties, giving Taliban propaganda opportunities. They utilize their knowledge of the people’s culture, history, traditions and language. They have also learned weaknesses within their enemy and the paramount role of the news media. The Taliban is an actor that efficiently exploits the physical battle domain to support the decisive cognitive domain. Three cases of Taliban propaganda are being discussed in this thesis; Mullah Mohammad Omar’s Eid Messages, how the Taliban utilizes spectacular incidents, and exploiting incidents where ISAF causes Civilian Casualties. The main ISAF counterpropaganda
    [Show full text]
  • NEGOTIATIONS and RECONCILIATION with the TALIBAN: the Key Policy Issues and Dilemmas
    NEGOTIATIONS AND RECONCILIATION WITH THE TALIBAN: The Key Policy Issues and Dilemmas By Vanda Felbab-Brown Fellow, 21st Century Defense Initiative, Foreign Policy, the Brookings Institution and Author of Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Brookings 2009) Thursday’s London conference on Afghanistan where the Afghan government, Britain, and Japan have presented their plans for reconciliation with the Taliban has reignited a months-long debate about whether or not to negotiate with the salafi insurgents. But although passions run strong on both sides of the debate, in its abstract form– negotiate: yes or no – the discussion is of little policy usefulness. The real question about negotiating with the Taliban is what shape and content any such negotiation and reconciliation should have and what are the costs and benefits of such an approach. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF NEGOTIATIONS and RECONCILIATION: SOME QUICK LESSONS FROM HISTORY Negotiations and reconciliation frequently have been a critical component of ending conflict, reducing violence, and saving lives: be they the pentiti laws in Italy directed toward the Red Brigades or amnesty for the Shining Path’s soldiers in Peru or negotiations between the Provisional IRA and the Unionists in Northern Ireland. For many who advocate negotiations with the Taliban, negotiations are a way to extricate forces from what they consider unattainable and perhaps unimportant objectives in Afghanistan. But this position ignores the real and acute threat still emanating from the region in the form of terrorism and severe regional instability. It also underestimates the risk and the costs associated with negotiations, such as giving the opponent a chance to increase its forces, recuperate, and renege on its promises.
    [Show full text]
  • CFC Afghanistan Newsletter
    07 October 2009 Afghanistan Review This document is intended to provide an overview of relevant sector events in Afghanistan from 30 September -06 October 2009. More comprehensive information is available on the Civil- Military Overview (CMO) at www.cimicweb.org.1 Inside This Issue Letters to the Editor: Jonathan Hadaway, [email protected] /+1 757-683-4233: Letters to the Editor In Focus Dear Sir, if the US does not agree to General McChrystal's troop increase (Reference: Economic Stabilization 30 September 2009 CFC Afghanistan Review, „In Focus‟) it will undermine a crucial, first step in counterinsurgency: showing the population that you have the will to win. Governance & Participation Counterinsurgency operations require additional troops. The necessary focus, Humanitarian Assistance resources, strategy and troops have yet to be dedicated to Afghanistan. I think a new strategy with the required number of military forces deserves a chance to succeed. Infrastructure Justice & Reconciliation --Jesse Wilson, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Security Social Well-Being Response to Last Week‟s Question In Focus: Eide vs. Galbraith Jonathan Hadaway, [email protected] /+1 757-683-4233: Question of the Week Is it more important for The Deputy United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) the United Nations to was removed from his post following a „private-turned-public‟ spat with his superior at fully support free, fair, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).
    [Show full text]
  • Ackground Note: 30 April 2008
    BACKGROUND NOTE: 30 APRIL 2008 UNITEDNATIONSPOLITICALAND PEACEBUILDINGMISSIONS NUMBER OF MISSIONS ................................................................................................... 12 PERSONNEL Unifo rmed personnel ............................................................................................................................................. 455 International civilian personnel (29 February 2008)...............................................................................................1,012 Local civilian personnel (29 February 2008)...........................................................................................................2,236 UN Volunteers ........................................................................................................................................................346 Total number of personnel serving in political and peacebuilding missions .............................................................4,049 For information on United Nations peacekeeping operations, see DPI/1634 Rev.83 or visit the United Nations website asdf at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp United Nations CURRENT POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING MISSIONS SUNPO Since 15 April 1995 UNAMA* Since 28 March 2002 United Nations Political Office for Somalia United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNPOS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania) Kai Eide (Norway) Strength: international
    [Show full text]
  • Nordicom Review Journal from the Nordic Information Centre for Media and Communication Research
    Nordicom Review Journal from the Nordic Information Centre for Media and Communication Research Editor NORDICOM invites media researchers to contribute scientific articles, reviews, and debates. Submission of Ulla Carlsson original articles is open to all researchers in the field Nordicom of media and communication in the Nordic countries, University of Gothenburg irrespective of discipline and institutional allocation. Box 713 All articles are refereed. SE-405 30 Göteborg Tel: +46 31 786 12 19 Aims and Scope Fax: +46 31 786 46 55 Nordicom Review provides a major forum for media e-mail: [email protected] and communication researchers in the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The semiannual journal is addressed to the international Editorial Board scholarly community. It publishes the best of media Göran Bolin, Professor and communication research in the region, as well as School of Culture and Communication theoretical works in all its diversity; it seeks to reflect Södertörn University College the great variety of intellectual traditions in the field SE-141 89 Huddinge [email protected] and to facilitate a dialogue between them. As an interdisciplinary journal, Nordicom Review welcomes Lisbeth Clausen, Professor contributions from the best of the Nordic scholarship Department of Intercultural Communication in relevant areas, and encourages contributions from and Management senior researchers as well as younger scholars. Copenhagen Business School Nordicom Review offers reviews of Nordic publi- Porcelænshaven 18A cations, and publishes notes on a wide range of DK-2000 Frederiksberg literature, thus enabling scholars all over the world [email protected] to keep abreast of Nordic contributions in the field.
    [Show full text]
  • Peacemaking: Success on the Danube Region of Croatia the Erdut Agreement
    chapter 11 Peacemaking: Success on the Danube Region of Croatia The Erdut Agreement The Erdut Agreement for the Danube region of Croatia was one of the great successes of United Nations peacemaking in the former Yugoslavia. Thorvald Stoltenberg is the undoubted father of this agreement. icfy’s main efforts on Croatia had been to put down building blocks for peace one by one and to help work out autonomy regimes for the Croatian Serbs that would guarantee them respect for internationally respected stan- dards of human rights and the rights of minorities. Great credit for the drafting of such a regime must go to our dear departed friend Paul Szasz, who bore the brunt of the drafting of this and many other documents in his capacity as Legal Adviser to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. This effort to work out a regime of autonomy for the Croatian Serbs would come to naught in the end. Tudjman clearly wanted no part of it because he wanted full integration of the Serbs inside a unitary Croatia. As for Milosevic, when the plan was first presented to him and he had studied it, he told Stoltenberg and Owen, “Gentlemen, please do not ruin today ideas that might work in five years time in the future.” He also had other ideas in mind and prob- ably wanted to negotiate with Tudjman an exchange of territory in which he would incorporate into Serbia especially the eastern enclave which was sepa- rated from Serbia merely by a river. icfy, without a doubt, made foundation contributions to the building of peace in Croatia.
    [Show full text]
  • SWP Comments 2005/59, December 2005, 6 Pages
    Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs War of Resolutions Parliamentary Blockades in the Kosovo Negotiations Dušan Reljić SWP Comments The approaching start of the future status negotiations for Kosovo is marked by a hardening of positions in Pristina and Belgrade, as well as mounting violence in Kosovo itself. At the same time, differences are arising between the United States, which leans toward independence for Kosovo, and Russia and China, which oppose secession. On October 24 the UN Security Council tiations will not be the final phase of the (UNSC) gave a green light to the beginning process as a whole but rather would pave of negotiations following the recommenda- the way for the next stage of the inter- tions of the Norwegian diplomat, Kai Eide. national presence in Kosovo. Since early summer 1999 Kosovo has been a Since the report’s publication, the protectorate of the UN. The UN General security situation in Kosovo, according to Secretary requested that Eide prepare a the UN administration (UNMIK), has report for the UNSC on the situation in worsened. UNMIK members and vehicles, as Kosovo. In the report, the UN special envoy well as the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), have describes the situation in the province on been the target of a series of terrorist at- the ground as extremely grim. Eide point- tacks. A bomb injured many shoppers at a edly remarks upon the critical situation of market in a predominately Serb-inhabited the non-Albanian population there. Yet, village. On December 3 outside the city of Eide concludes that there will never really Prizren, a tour bus en route to Belgrade was be “any good moment for addressing attacked with hand-held rocket launchers.
    [Show full text]
  • United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues
    United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues Rhoda Margesson Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy December 27, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40747 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues Summary The United Nations (UN) has had an active presence in Afghanistan since 1988, and it is highly regarded by many Afghans for playing a brokering role in ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As a result of the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, coordinating international donor activity and assistance have been tasked to a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). However, there are other coordinating institutions tied to the Afghan government, and UNAMA has struggled to exercise its full mandate. The international recovery and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is immense and complicated and, in coordination with the Afghan government, involves U.N. agencies, bilateral donors, international organizations, and local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The coordinated aid programs of the United States and its European allies focus on a wide range of activities, from strengthening the central and local governments of Afghanistan and its security forces to promoting civilian reconstruction, reducing corruption, and assisting with elections. Some of the major issues UNAMA is wrestling with include the following: • Most observers agree that continued, substantial, long-term development is key, as is the need for international support, but questions have been raised about corruption, aid effectiveness (funds required, priorities established, impact received), and the coordination necessary to achieve sufficient improvement throughout the country.
    [Show full text]
  • Kosovo Ch.8 Supp 15
    Advance version Items relating to the situation in Kosovo Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999) Deliberations of February 2004 (4910th meeting) At its 4910th meeting, on 6 February 2004, in which all members of the Council and Albania, Ireland (on behalf of the European Union) 1 and Serbia and Montenegro made statements, the Security Council heard a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. At that meeting, the Council included in its agenda the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) dated 26 January 2004.2 In his report, the Secretary-General observed, inter alia, that the establishment of a mechanism, under the authority of the Council, to measure the progress made by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo 3 in meeting the standards within the “standards before status” policy 4 was a most welcomed development, and noted his intention to provide the Council with assessments on the progress of the Provisional Institutions on a quarterly basis. Pending the progress made towards reaching the standards, a comprehensive review of progress should occur in mid-2005. Initiation of the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo would depend on the outcome of that review. The “Standards for Kosovo” document and the development of the implementation work plan, would provide a clear framework within which the Provisional Institutions needed to act in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), the Constitutional Framework and the law applicable in Kosovo. The Secretary-General 1 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway aligned themselves with the statement.
    [Show full text]
  • UNAMA NEWS Kabul, Afghanistan
    _____________________________________________________________________ Compiled by the Strategic Communication and Spokespersons Unit UNAMA NEWS Kabul, Afghanistan United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 11 - 18 March 2010 Website: www.unama.unmissions.org ____________________________________________________________ New UNAMA chief pledges support for efforts towards Afghan stability and socioeconomic improvement 13 March 2010 - Staffan de Mistura, the new chief of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), has arrived in Kabul, assuring his support for efforts towards achieving stability and socioeconomic improvement for the country. “Whatever the United Nations will be doing in Afghanistan will be done to assist both the stability and socioeconomic improvement of the Afghan people, remembering it should be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, with total respect for their own sovereignty and independence,” said Mr de Mistura, who worked previously in Afghanistan. “I was serving in Afghanistan about 20 years ago, another very delicate transition period. I learned and I am familiar with the traditions and culture of Afghanistan,” Mr de Mistura told journalists at the Kabul airport.“I am totally aware of the fact that the Afghan people are very proud people, very attached to their traditions and sovereignty, and I'll be working along those lines,” he added. The Swedish-Italian diplomat – whose UN career adds up to nearly 40 years – had served with the UN Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan from 1989 to 1991 as fundraising and external relations director. “I am very honoured that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon selected me, with the full support of the United Nations Security Council and in consultation with the highest authorities of Afghanistan, to lead all United Nations activities and programmes in Afghanistan at a very critical period in Afghan history,” said the fifth chief of UNAMA.
    [Show full text]