Robert Johnston

U.S. EXPORT CONTROL POLICY IN THE HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER SECTOR

by Robert Johnston

Robert Johnston is a doctoral candidate at the American University, School of International Service in Washington, D.C., and a political risk analyst at the Parvus International Corporation in Silver Spring, Maryland. Previously, he was a research analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in Washington, D.C.

ince the end of the Cold War, proliferation, they have liberalized policy goals. Despite their inherent successive U.S. administra- the export control regime for HPCs appeal, neither nonproliferation nor Stions have struggled to create markedly.1 trade promotion has been able to and enforce an export control policy Nonproliferation advocates have assume the central role held by con- that balances the conflicting de- blamed these changes for the appear- tainment during the Cold War. In mands of promoting trade and coun- ance of American-made HPCs in fact, no concept has been able to tering the proliferation of weapons Russian nuclear weapons labs and generate the consensus needed to of mass destruction (WMD). The Chinese research facilities that may assume this role. Instead, American high performance computer (HPC) be military-related. foreign policy since the end of the industry presents a major challenge Cold War has largely been reactive, in this respect. HPC technology is This struggle between nonprolif- responding to immediate crises with- highly profitable, creating powerful eration advocates and trade promot- out being clearly guided by a broader incentives for export, while it also ers has taken place in a conceptual strategy. vacuum caused by the end of the has numerous potential military ap- The development of HPC export plications, making it a significant Cold War, and the failure of any overarching concept to assume the controls under the Clinton adminis- proliferation threat. In its policies tration reflects this broader pattern toward the regulation of dual-use role played by containment in U.S. foreign policy prior to 1991. Vari- of drift. The early years of the ad- technology exports such as HPCs, ministration were marked by an al- the Clinton administration has gen- ous concepts, including nonprolif- eration and trade promotion, most unbroken string of victories by erally won laurels from trade pro- those who favored liberalization of moters and darts from champions of continue to compete for dominance in American foreign policymaking. HPC export controls, despite the nonproliferation. While administra- warnings of nonproliferation advo- tion officials argue that current The Clinton administration has de- clared that both nonproliferation and cates, who feared the consequences policy strikes a balance between of the rapid spread of this technol- competing interests in trade and non- trade promotion are major foreign

44 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Robert Johnston ogy. Bolstered by the absence of any This article examines the devel- term to describe: urgent security threats, the trade pro- opment of U.S. HPC export control the technology, or collection of technologies that make it moters were able to convince the policy since the end of the Cold War. possible to address the most Clinton administration to launch two It begins by discussing the potential computationally demanding significant liberalizations of HPC proliferation and security implica- problems...this term recog- nizes that a computing sys- export controls in 1993 and 1995. tions of HPC exports. It then tem today depends not only More recently, revelations in 1997 sketches the history of U.S. export on a powerful computa- controls on dual-use technologies, tional engine, but also high about exports of American-made speed networks, advanced HPCs to Russia and China may shift before detailing the development of storage systems, sophisti- the balance of forces in the other U.S. export controls on HPCs, with cated graphics, collections particular emphasis on the Bush ad- of less than the most pow- direction. By dramatically liberaliz- erful computers, etc.7 ing HPC export controls, the Clin- ministration (1989-1993) and the ton administration has changed the early years of the Clinton adminis- The primary measurement of the nature of the debate among nonpro- tration (1993-1995). Next, the ar- capabilities of a computer is Millions liferation advocates and trade pro- ticle examines the as yet of Theoretical Operations Per Sec- moters. During the Bush unsuccessful attempts in Congress to ond, or MTOPS. The rapid growth administration, the debate on U.S. reform the export control process by in the MTOPS capabilities of HPCs HPC export control policy tended to passing a revised Export Adminis- during the 1990s has been reflected be couched in terms of whether U.S. tration Act and discusses the impor- in certain policy actions by the Clin- high technology manufacturers were tance of multilateral arms control ton administration. In September losing export revenues. Today, new regimes in the formulation of U.S. 1993, the Clinton administration emphasis is being placed on how export control policy. It concludes raised the definition of a U.S. technology might be contribut- with a detailed examination of the supercomputer from 195 to 2,000 8 ing to WMD programs in foreign 1997 revelations about the export of MTOPS. By the October 1995 re- countries. The trade promoters, de- U.S.-made HPCs to Russian nuclear view of export control policy, the spite their success in shaping export weapons labs and Chinese facilities level of 3,000 to 5,000 MTOPS was control policy during the Clinton ad- with possible military links, and dis- already being considered as “mid- 9 ministration, have now lost the ini- cusses the impact of these revela- range.” Just two months later, in a tiative, and are being asked tions on current and future HPC further review of policy, the very uncomfortable questions about how export control policy. MTOPS standard was on the verge their HPC technology products have of becoming obsolete, because pro- ended up in Chinese or Russian HIGH PERFORMANCE cessing speed could be achieved at weapons labs. As a result of these COMPUTERS AS A supercomputer levels by using revelations, nonproliferation advo- SECURITY ISSUE widely-available parallel processing technology.10 Revolutions in minia- cates in Congress were able to in- An HPC is a “general purpose turization meant that the desktops of clude language in the 1998 Defense computer that is faster than commer- the 1990s matched the capabilities Authorization Act (Public Law 105- cial competitors and that has suffi- of the supercomputers of the 1980s, 85), passed in November 1997, that cient central memory to compute complicating efforts to design an tightened HPC export controls.2 problem sets of general scientific export licensing policy that could Nevertheless, the battle over HPC interest,”4 or a computer “designed keep pace with technological ad- export controls continues. Draft specifically to achieve the highest vances. 11 regulations on end-user verification execution rate possible in scientific of HPC exports issued by the Com- computation for a given technol- As with other “dual-use” tech- merce Department in January 1998, ogy.”5 HPC systems are also fre- nologies, HPC export licensing which were harshly criticized by quently referred to as policy must balance commercial and nonproliferation advocates, suggest “supercomputers.”6 However, given security interests. Commercially, the that trade promoters remain a pow- the complexity of the technologies HPC industry is viewed as “strate- erful political force in Washington.3 involved, HPC is perhaps the best gic,” since “higher profits will not term. Seymour Goodman uses this be competed away by new entrants,

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 45 Robert Johnston because huge start-up costs, econo- HPCs are also useful for design- post-Cold War HPC export control mies of scale, and learning curve ing and testing advanced conven- policy becomes even more striking. advantages create high barriers to tional weaponry. They have played During the Cold War, COCOM 12 entry.” These entry barriers, to- a key role in the design of critical provided the primary structure for gether with lucrative government American defense systems such as the organization of U.S. export li- procurement opportunities, have fos- stealth aircraft, infrared trackers to cense processing. COCOM had tered a strong HPC industry in the detect incoming missiles, acoustic clear, broad lists of controlled dual- United States. The major competi- detectors for use in shallow water, use technology items that required 16 tor to the United States is Japan, airborne lasers, and rocket motors. licenses for export to the Eastern where the HPC industry has also HPC systems are also central to “in- bloc.20 Under the 1949 Export Con- benefited from government trade formation warfare” and “informa- trol Act, the president had consider- protection as well as funding through tion dominance” strategies that are able autonomy to establish strong 13 keiretsu. Among the leading com- becoming a key concern of Ameri- export controls lists, even above and 17 mercial applications of HPC are can military strategy. As informa- beyond COCOM standards. The managing the operation of precision tion warfare becomes a more critical president initially enjoyed “defer- machine tools and helping in the aspect of conflict, the possible ence” from allies, Congress, and in- design of aircraft and motor vehicles. spread of HPC systems to rogue dustry, but consensus support for a HPC technology also has a num- states will raise additional security tight technology embargo against the 18 ber of military uses, including the concerns. Collectively, the use of Eastern bloc began to collapse in the development of WMD, the design of HPC systems in the design, testing 1960s.21 Several trends contributed so-called “smart” conventional and maintenance of nuclear, conven- to the eroding consensus, including: weapons, and the management of tional and information warfare overuse of sanctions and export con- information warfare. Each of these weapons technology creates a seri- trols; increased competition for U.S. areas affects American nonprolifera- ous arms control issue. manufacturers from European rivals; tion and arms control policy. For a new emphasis on controlling “criti- example, HPC systems make it pos- THE DEVELOPMENT OF cal technologies” instead of prod- sible for nuclear weapons designers HPC EXPORT CONTROLS ucts; and, more intense interagency to test nuclear devices through simu- Recent difficulties in reforming disputes over export licenses among lation, rather than explosive testing. the U.S. export licensing process for U.S. government agencies.22 All of In the United States, this capability HPC technology resulted from ef- these issues continue to confront is under the direction of the Accel- forts to replace the Cold War era U.S. export control policy. erated Strategic Computing Initia- Coordinating Committee on Multi- HPC technology entered the ex- tive of the Department of Energy lateral Export Controls (COCOM) port control debate in the mid-1970s, (DOE), which is responsible for while pursuing two conflicting poli- when Cray Research, Inc., began to meeting the “stockpile stewardship” cies: the 1991 Enhanced Prolifera- introduce the first HPC products.23 needs of the American nuclear arse- tion Control Initiative and the The U.S. government quickly recog- nal under the terms of the Compre- September 1993 Trade Promotion nized the military potential of this 14 hensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Coordinating Committee initia- technology, and when Japan 19 The Defense Nuclear Agency is also tive. An examination of the liber- achieved HPC manufacturing capa- a primary user of HPC technology alization of export controls for HPC bility in the early 1980s, a for “weapon systems lethality, op- technology undertaken by the Clin- “Supercomputer Safeguard Plan” 15 erability, and safety.” In this vein, ton administration in 1993 and again was negotiated in 1984 to control one major worry of nonproliferation in 1995 shows that the debate has exports of HPCs to countries other advocates is that exporting HPC sys- been driven primarily by supporters than Japan, the United States, and tems could facilitate efforts by other of trade promotion. When compared Canada. The system consisted of states to either improve existing to the Cold War system of export informal guidelines and negotiations nuclear weapons or facilitate the controls for HPC, the ascendancy of between U.S. manufacturers and the design of new ones. commercial interests in shaping “Supercomputer Interagency Work-

46 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Robert Johnston ing Group” headed by the Depart- water down, or turn back several lib- “proliferation also takes place ment of Commerce, aimed at con- eralizing initiatives.”28 through a more insidious route; na- trolling HPC exports. A similar tions can acquire both a weapons system was created in Japan, al- The Bush Administration capability and a nuclear arsenal though U.S. HPC manufacturers without having to take the step of Subsequently, the Bush adminis- complained that the Japanese gov- actually exploding, or even assem- tration faced the difficult task of re- ernment was more lax in enforcing bling one of these devices.”30 Like forming HPC export controls in the control guidelines, thus enabling its other nonproliferation advocates, tumultuous environment of the end manufacturers to sell in markets for- Glenn feared the use of HPC by of the Cold War, the 1991 Gulf War bidden to American companies.24 rogue regimes—such as Iraq, Iran, with Iraq, and accelerated techno- Libya, and North Korea—to design Until the mid- to late-1980s, this logical breakthroughs by the HPC in- and test nuclear weapons without system was effective. The large size dustry. As the centerpiece of its conducting physical tests. of early HPCs, the small number export control policy, the Enhanced produced, and the need for pro- Proliferation Control Initiative Even after the 1991 Gulf War, longed vendor support made covert (EPCI) was launched by the Bush when the discovery of clandestine acquisition and use difficult.25 Con- administration in 1990. Under the WMD programs in Iraq boosted trolling HPC exports became more EPCI, exporters must apply for a li- awareness of the dangers of WMD difficult in the late 1980s, however, cense when informed by the Depart- proliferation, the Bush administra- as alternative means of achieving ment of Commerce that the end use tion had to juggle security and com- “supercomputer” performance of an item may be intended for pro- mercial interests in setting HPC emerged. Under these conditions, liferation purposes. The EPCI seeks export control policy. A senior Bush American manufacturers of HPC- to identify and control dual-use administration official responsible equivalent technology grew increas- goods and technologies useful for for nonproliferation stated that the ingly frustrated with the threshold the production of chemical and bio- “policy dilemma facing the admin- limitations imposed on their exports, logical weapons, ballistic missiles, istration is to find a balance between as European and Japanese competi- and nuclear weapons technology. excessive controls that would im- tors began to capture markets that The initiative became a basis for the pede legitimate export trade and were denied to them. Industry rep- expansion of the Australia Group those controls which the US and resentatives began to lobby for a spe- and Nuclear Suppliers Group con- other major world suppliers find nec- cific definition of supercomputers trol lists to include precursor com- essary to support common security for export licensing purposes. The ponents for WMD.29 objectives.”31 A central aspect of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Bush administration effort to strike With the disintegration of the So- Act of 1988 included such a defini- this balance involved COCOM. Dur- viet bloc and the collapse of the So- tion, consisting of specific technical ing the final years of the Cold War, viet Union itself in the early years guidelines and a threshold perfor- the Bush administration had to bal- of the Bush administration, concern mance level of 160 MFLOPS (Mil- ance its desire to facilitate economic about HPC exports began to shift lions of Floating Level Operation and political reform in the Soviet away from the Eastern bloc and fo- Points per Second).26 American Union by expanding technological cus on the threat posed by prolifera- manufacturers hoped that the defi- cooperation with a continuing desire tion of WMD in other areas of the nition would limit the ability of the to prevent any new arms break- world. Senator John Glenn (Demo- Department of Defense (DOD) to throughs by the Soviet military.32 In crat-Ohio), a leading advocate of disrupt trade through its efforts to May 1991, at a High Level Meeting tight export controls on HPC tech- control “re-exports” of U.S. HPC- of the COCOM, member nations re- nologies, warned in 1989 against equivalent desktops and mainframes viewed the International Industrial “complacency” about nuclear prolif- from allies to Eastern bloc coun- List of controlled dual-use items and eration resulting from an absence of tries.27 However, subsequent at- decided to decontrol commodities observed nuclear test explosions. In tempts to further liberalize controls with wide availability outside CO- a reference to “virtual” testing of were undone by the Department of COM nations.33 In the computer nuclear weapons, he pointed out that Defense which “managed to delay, area, COCOM decided that available

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 47 Robert Johnston capabilities outside COCOM peaked lent systems still continued to grow, ated a clearer division between at a Composite Theoretical Perfor- triggering increased pressure to raise supercomputers and upper-end work mance (CTP) of 26 MTOPS. As a the threshold limits again. The Bush stations and advanced personal result of the bilateral and COCOM administration implemented further computers. The Clinton administra- reforms, powerful computing capa- reforms through the bilateral tion argued that these changes “lev- bility began to be transferred to the Supercomputer Control Regime eled the playing field” for U.S. former Soviet Union and other East- agreement with Japan, which was personal computer and workstation ern bloc countries. modified so that security safeguards manufacturers, who could now According to a joint study by the would be applied to all exports of freely compete in a $35 billion mar- National Academy of Sciences and HPCs with capabilities above 195 ket with European and Asian ri- 40 the Russian Academy of Sciences in MTOPS. This liberalization initially vals. 1991, Russian computer manufac- pleased HPC manufacturers, but The October 1993 licensing re- turing capability had yet to reach the technological progress marched on, forms represented a victory for free equivalent of the 386 microproces- and by 1993, U.S. workstation pro- trade advocates over nonprolifera- sor, at that time practically ubiqui- ducers, whose products had not pre- tion advocates. The electronics and tous in American-made desktop viously been powerful enough to computer industry had lobbied vig- computers.34 This gap represented a reach the threshold limits, found orously for these reforms during the potentially significant market oppor- their sales restricted by the 195 1992 campaign and throughout the 38 tunity for U.S. exporters, but also MTOPS threshold. first year of the Clinton administra- raised important security questions tion, and Clinton had criticized Bush concerning Russia’s end use of HPC The Clinton Administration for failing to recognizing the impor- technologies. The joint study urged In January 1993, the Clinton ad- tance of economic security issues. a further liberalization of U.S. HPC ministration took office and inher- Clinton also received significant controls, particularly with respect to ited the unresolved conflict between support from high technology pro- systems of which 100,000 or more the policy objectives of trade pro- ducers in California. During the first had already been sold, and recom- motion and export control. Under the year of his administration, Clinton mended that confidence-building Clinton administration, significant was sympathetic to complaints from measures be implemented to moni- shifts have occurred in HPC export industry about the burden of export tor Russian end use of U.S. HPC.35 controls and in the responsibilities controls. A Sun Microsystems ex- Under this proposed system, U.S. of agencies involved in export re- ecutive complained in June 1993 that officials would be able to monitor view. In October 1993, the Clinton U.S. workstations and personal com- detailed logs about the use of Ameri- administration announced that all puters were losing market share to can-made HPCs exported to Russia, computers with capabilities up to Taiwanese and Korean manufactur- ensuring that they were not diverted 194 MTOPS would be decontrolled ers operating outside the COCOM to military purposes.36 for all countries except the former system. Moreover, the American The Bush administration also con- Eastern bloc, China, and the so- Electronics Association complained fronted rapid technological progress called rogue states. With agreement that despite export controls, mid- in the HPC sector. In 1990, the De- from COCOM states, controls would range workstations could be turned partment of Commerce revised the also be removed on previously HPC- into supercomputers like “a Lego 1988 supercomputer definition to equivalent machines with capabili- set” by substituting a motherboard 41 reflect three appropriate thresholds ties up to 500 MTOPS. Furthermore, with faster microprocessors. for different sets of countries, de- the administration also aimed to re- In introducing these reforms, the pending on proliferation risk and duce license processing time for Clinton administration largely ig- safeguard requirements. The three more powerful computers by 25 per- nored nonproliferation advocates new thresholds were set at 100, 150, cent. Finally, and most dramatically, such as Stephen Bryen, who cau- and 300 MFLOPS, depending on the the definition of a supercomputer tioned that looser controls were a country involved.37 The perfor- was upgraded from 195 MTOPS to “prescription for proliferation.” 39 mance capabilities of HPC-equiva- 2,000 MTOPS. These changes cre- Without a strong international re-

48 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Robert Johnston gime focused on WMD prolifera- promote the objectives of their re- Department of Energy for inter- tion, Bryen warned the House For- spective programs, supporters of the agency review. These delays, they eign Relations Committee in TPCC and CPI, both within and out- claim, cost American manufacturers September 1993, the mistakes lead- side of government, have high- sales, and hurt American dominance ing to the Iraqi WMD buildup would lighted particular cases that either in the HPC sector. The most fre- only be repeated. “Had there been unfairly restrict trade or recklessly quently cited case is a 1990 license an agreement that all licenses ap- overlook proliferation-related end request by Cray for the export of a proved by each government still had uses. The arguments focus on what supercomputer to India. The deal to stand up to international review,” are viewed as either the shortcom- collapsed in 1993, when after four he stated, “more care would have ings or the excesses of the consulta- years of license review, the Indians been given about approving some tion process. succeeded in developing a 42 exports in the first place.” By con- The reports of the TPCC have supercomputer of their own, which trast, after the changes were an- been instrumental in supporting the they then marketed to compete with 47 nounced, a grateful U.S. computing arguments of those who advocate Cray. Trade promoters such as industry heaped praise on the White more liberal export controls on HPC Willard Workman of the U.S. Cham- House. Robert C. Haven, vice chair- systems. One of the key goals of the ber of Commerce called this case “a 48 man of the American Electronics TPCC is “reducing government ob- horror story.” Senator David Association, termed the changes stacles to exporting” through the Durenberger (Republican-Minne- “the most progressive action taken streamlining of the export control sota) called the decision a “total fail- to rationalize the export control re- licensing process.44 Representative ure of the United States export 49 gime since the end of the Cold War,” Norman Mineta (Democrat-Califor- licensing process.” Within the non- while Sun Microsystems called the nia) called for a National Export proliferation community, by con- changes a “bold step to bolster our Strategy in September 1993, com- trast, the India case is often described 43 high-tech exports.” plaining that “when United States as a “straw man.” Nonproliferation Despite these reforms, the com- high technology companies try to advocates argue that although India puter industry and other trade pro- compete in world markets, we do so did construct a supercomputer when moters remained dissatisfied with with one hand tied behind our back denied access to equivalent Ameri- the consultative process required by much of the time.”45 In October can equipment, the four-year delay the licensing procedure for comput- 1993, Representative Barney Frank postponed covert nuclear weapons ers above the threshold limits. The (Democrat-Massachusetts) called development by India. They also problem arose from the interplay of for “unshackling American busi- contend that since India had to de- the two conflicting Clinton admin- nesses” and characterized opponents velop its own capabilities, equiva- istration policy initiatives: the of decontrol as those “who still ob- lent equipment was not available on Counter-Proliferation Initiative ject to the efforts to free American the open international market, so (CPI—an updated version of the business to compete on equal terms American firms did not surrender a Bush EPCI) and the Trade Promo- in the world.”46 It is not coinciden- potential market to foreign competi- 50 tion Coordinating Committee tal that these Congressional advo- tors. (TPCC), designed to bolster Ameri- cates of looser export controls come Still dissatisfied with the restric- can exports. The institutional spon- from two states with high concen- tions imposed by export controls af- sor of the CPI was the Department trations of computer firms. ter the October 1993 reforms, of Defense, while the TPCC had its Supporters of the TPCC point representatives from the computer origins in the Department of Com- with considerable frustration to the industry pressured Congress to urge merce. Efforts to pass a revised Ex- delays that often occur when the the Clinton administration to further port Administration Act in the 104th Department of Commerce refers a liberalize controls over HPC tech- 51 and previous Congresses floundered license application to the Defense nology exports. The pro-trade because of a failure to achieve a Technology Security Administration Council on Competitiveness re- compromise that reconciled the ob- (DETSA) at the DOD or the Office ported that remaining controls over jectives of these sometimes conflict- of Export Enforcement (OEE) at the HPC technology cost American ing programs. In their effort to companies some $640 million in

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 49 Robert Johnston sales and 12,240 jobs.52 Howard Australia, and Japan. On the other intellectual support from a Novem- Lewis, vice president of the National end of the scale, countries in “tier ber 1995 report issued by the Cen- Manufacturers Association, com- 4,” like Iran, Iraq, and other “rouge” ter for International Security and plained that U.S. export control states cannot receive any HPC ex- Arms Control at Stanford University policy was still “sidetracked by ar- ports. Exports to countries in “tier on the issue of export controls for cane debates” over issues such as 2,” including South and Central HPC. The report found that “the ef- HPC threshold limits, while failing America, the Pacific Rim, and East- ficacy of the [HPC] control regime to address systemic issues like the ern Europe, were assigned a thresh- will weaken significantly over the “gridlocked” licensing review pro- old limit of 10,000 MTOPS, above longer term” because of the “rapid cess and the misuse of unilateral which an individual license is re- rate of technological development controls.53 quired. “Tier 3” countries, including and diffusion” and suggested that “it Advocates of further liberaliza- non-allied nuclear weapon states and remains unclear” if the current threat tion frequently referred to specific other states suspected of nuclear pro- posed by HPC applications are “as cases where the time-consuming liferation, including Russia, China, compelling a justification for export process of interagency consultation Pakistan, and Israel, were assigned controls as were nuclear, crypto- had hurt the competitiveness of their a threshold limit of 2,000 MTOPS graphic, and anti-submarine warfare 60 products. International trade consult- for military end users and a thresh- applications during the Cold War.” ant Paul Freedenberg referred in old limit of 7,000 MTOPS for civil- Those concerned with nonprolif- 57 Congressional testimony to the ian end users. eration immediately criticized this losses of the U.S. machine tool in- Most significantly, however, the latest liberalization of export restric- dustry in the potentially lucrative October 1995 reforms effectively tions. House National Security Com- Russian market in the 1970s as a re- allowed the exporter, rather than the mittee Chairman Floyd Spence sult of unilateral export controls. He U.S. government, to determine if the (Republican-South Carolina) com- argued that this example was typi- representations made by the pur- plained that the liberalization of cal of the “Kafkaesque horror sto- chaser about the planned end use of HPC controls “has serious prolifera- ries” that resulted from lengthy the computer were accurate. Thus an tion implications and was made interagency export license review.54 exporter would not even need to ap- without any opportunity for Con- Luke Alexander of Sun ply for an export license to export a gressional review.”61 Nonprolifera- Microsystems struck a similar tone 7,000 MTOPS computer to Russia tion advocates brushed aside the in his May 1994 testimony, where if it believed that the computer complaints of the computer indus- he objected to Sun Microsystems would be used for civilian pur- try, arguing that the needs of national having its exports used as “pawns in poses.58 These changes reversed the security justify occasional, if not foreign policy power plays,” when temporary gains made by nonprolif- systematic, delays in the export li- its products have an “average life of eration advocates at the Arms Con- censing approval process. Moreover, only 18 months.”55 trol and Disarmament Agency they also criticized the Department In the wake of this lobbying cam- (ACDA) in February 1994, whose of Commerce, accusing it of some- paign, the computer industry won vociferous lobbying had led to the times failing to refer dual-use items another victory in October 1995, lowering of the threshold limit for for interagency review. In particular, when the Clinton administration HPC exports from 2,000 MTOPS to these critics have pointed to cases 59 launched a second wave of export 1,500. in which HPCs and other dual-use control liberalization in the HPC sec- The general consensus within the technologies have ended up in either tor.56 Under the new standards, entire executive branch, most of rogue states, threshold states, or tra- countries were placed into four Congress, and the computer indus- ditional U.S. adversaries such as “tiers,” and export licensing require- try, however, was that the 1993 re- China and Russia. For example, a ments were based on the country of forms had been an unqualified 1994 General Accounting Office destination. Controls were lifted on success and that further liberaliza- (GAO) report requested by Senator all computer sales to countries in tion of HPC technology was neces- Glenn was highly critical of a wide “tier 1,” which consists of North sary. Advocates of this view drew array of dual-use export licenses that Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, had been granted during the period

50 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Robert Johnston of study from 1985 to 1992.62 In THE EXPORT companies to bring new products to particular, the report highlighted spe- ADMINISTRATION ACT AND market.69 cific examples of U.S. license ap- LICENSING REFORM Nonproliferation advocates re- provals that appeared questionable, PROPOSALS spond that the agencies involved do such as the 1988 approval for export The post-Cold War U.S. export not deliberately delay licenses, but to Iraq of computers that may have control process assigns responsibil- are obligated to fulfil multilateral subsequently been used “in fabricat- ity for HPC and other dual-use tech- treaty commitments. They also re- 63 ing nuclear weapons design work.” nology licensing to the Department ject the “artificial speed” of the new Licensing procedures and policies of Commerce, under the auspices of process, which they argue is inad- were also criticized by the report, the Commodity Control List (CCL). equate to ensure that allies are con- which said that the Department of Exporters apply to Commerce for a sulted, the identities of end users are Commerce “did not always refer license, whereupon the matter is re- confirmed, and accurate information nuclear-related dual-use license ap- ferred to the Bureau of Export Ad- is collected.70 The dissatisfaction plications to the Department of En- ministration, an agency within among both sides of the debate with 64 ergy as required by regulations.” Commerce that bears responsibility respect to the attempt to restructure Nonproliferation advocates in for the administration of export li- the interagency review process is Congress unsuccessfully used the censing. Although controlled dual- typical of the broader difficulty of 1994 GAO report to try to restrain use items are subject to formal designing post-Cold War export con- the liberalization of HPC export con- approval by Commerce, other agen- trols. trols. Senator Glenn in particular cies are consulted in cases of sensi- Trade promoters have also re- argued that the report showed the tive export license applications. Key quested looser interpretations of need for more robust and thorough agencies include DETSA at DOD, “foreign availability” as part of the export controls on HPC that reflect OEE at DOE, and the Office for proposed Export Administration the letter and the spirit of American Defense Trade Controls (DTC) at Act. In November 1993 Congres- treaty commitments under the Treaty the Department of State. Other agen- sional testimony, Richard Lehman, on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear cies involved in the consultative pro- head of the Emergency Committee 65 Weapons (NPT). The shortcom- cess include the intelligence for American Trade, lauded the con- ings of the post-shipment verifica- community, the Nuclear Regulatory cept of “anticipatory list construc- 67 tion process that checks overseas end Commission and ACDA. tion” included in the October 1993 uses of dual-use technology exports The proposed Export Administra- liberalization of HPC and called for have been equally worrisome to non- tion Act put forward in the 104th the codification of this policy in the proliferation advocates. The 1994 Congress and again in the 105th is proposed Export Administration GAO report found that unsupervised designed to streamline the licensing Act. Lehman argued that U.S. decon- foreign nationals are often used to process.68 However, neither trade trol decisions should be based on verify post-shipment end uses, promoters nor nonproliferation ad- future foreign availability “because which increases the risk of decep- vocates are completely satisfied with you cannot prove foreign availabil- 66 tion. It also expressed concern the proposed legislation. Trade pro- ity until you have already lost sig- about the lack of technical training moters are upset because the new nificant market share to your foreign among embassy officials responsible legislation still allows consultative competition.”71 The foreign avail- for post-shipment verification. The agencies to appeal Bureau of Export ability of HPCs is particularly diffi- Clinton administration liberalized Administration decisions to the cult to establish because multiple export controls in 1995 despite the president on the grounds of national alternative systems can be used to 1994 GAO report and the arguments security. Leading trade promoters, achieve controlled levels of perfor- based on its conclusions. such as Representative Sam mance. While “supercomputers” are Gejdenson (Democrat-Connecticut), only made in the United States and argue that the appeals process is still Japan, numerous countries produce an impediment to fair trade, because computers and software that can be it lengthens the time necessary for arrayed to achieve HPC threshold

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 51 Robert Johnston limit performance. if the United States has a treaty com- COCOM, as provisions that allowed mitment not to proliferate.75 For ex- a single member to veto sales by MULTILATERALISM AND ample, Article One of the NPT states other members have been elimi- INTERNATIONAL ARMS that each signatory shall not trans- nated.79 Consequently, the United CONTROL REGIMES fer to “any recipient whatsoever” States may be forced to make a stark nuclear weapons and shall “not in choice between strict unilateral ex- The issue of multilateral arms any way to assist, encourage or in- port controls and consequent trade control export regimes has been a duce any non-nuclear weapon State losses, or more lax controls over central aspect of the debate over to manufacture or otherwise acquire dual-use technologies such as HPC HPC technology export controls in nuclear weapons.”76 Consequently, and consequent security losses. the post-Cold War era.72 The United if a technology is controlled as a Trade consultant Paul Freedenberg States has a series of commitments nuclear dual-use commodity, then argues that in the absence of a strong to a variety of multilateral arms con- the issue is clear cut for the nonpro- security threat like that faced dur- trol agreements, which range from liferation advocates: the United ing the Cold War, the Wassenaar formal treaties like the NPT to in- States should not export the product Arrangement will not “have any- formal arrangements like the to “any recipient whatsoever,” re- where near the discipline, the struc- post-COCOM Wassenaar Arrange- gardless of foreign availability. ture, and the coherence that its ment.73 These agreements have COCOM predecessor had.”80 With- varying compliance requirements The second argument advanced out a strong multilateral regime, the and cover a wide range of issue ar- by advocates of nonproliferation in economic costs of unilateral export eas. The differing levels of compli- defense of unilateral export controls controls on HPC are less politically ance requirements can be critical for concerns international leadership. tenable in the United States. Indeed, American export control policy, be- They argue that bearing the eco- one supporter of tight dual-use con- cause the stronger the commitment nomic costs of unilateral export con- trols admitted that only “one-half to to tight export controls on a multi- trols is necessary while Washington one percent of Congress supports lateral level, the less pressure gen- “raises diplomatic hell” to bring unilateral controls—competitive- erated domestically with respect to other countries around to its point ness wins the rest.”81 One important the costs of unilateral export controls of view.77 As an example, they cite determinant of the willingness of and foreign availability. the American unilateral insistence on International Atomic Energy U.S. exporters and their supporters Those who favor liberalized ex- Agency safeguards for all U.S. in Congress to accept stronger con- port controls for dual-use technolo- nuclear exports following the pas- trols on HPC systems will likely be gies such as HPC contend that sage of The Nuclear Non-Prolifera- the ability of the Clinton adminis- controls are only effective when a tion Act of 1978. European and tration to strengthen the Wassenaar product is not available in another Russian nuclear exporters did not Agreement and other multilateral country that does not adhere to the adopt this policy for 12 years, but export control arrangements. relevant arms control regime. In eventually recognized the necessity other words, if would-be prolifera- of the policy in a world of increas- 1997: U.S. HPC tors in the area of chemical weap- ing proliferation risks under the ae- TECHNOLOGY SURFACES IN ons or ballistic missiles can get the gis of the Nuclear Suppliers RUSSIAN AND CHINESE desired dual-use technology from Group.78 WEAPONS LABS another country, than the United States only hurts the short-term prof- These issues are critical in the at- Despite their victory in 1995, the itability and long-term competitive- tempt to create a new multilateral position of advocates of trade pro- ness of its industries by adopting export control regime in the area of motion has been undermined by rev- broad unilateral export controls.74 dual-use technologies to replace the elations during 1997 about COCOM regime of the Cold War supercomputer exports to unautho- Those who favor tight export con- era. The current replacement, the rized facilities in Russia and China. trols criticize this point of view from Wassenaar Arrangement, is quite The issue was first raised when Rep- two perspectives. First, they argue weak in comparison to the former resentative Duncan Hunter (Repub- that foreign availability is irrelevant lican-California) indicated in

52 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Robert Johnston

October 1996 that he was “as- computers were arrayed in a single a nuclear weapons design facility in tounded and dismayed” to learn that cluster, the nuclear weapons lab a 1995 handbook published by the the Clinton administration was con- would have a computer with capa- Commerce Department, The Russian sidering licensing the Hewlett- bilities of 9,000 MTOPS, or possi- Defense Business Directory, de- Packard Convex SPP-2000 bly even 14,000 MTOPS—well signed to acquaint exporters with computer for sale to the Russian above even the 7,000 MTOPS Russian military facilities. VNIITF’s Ministry of Atomic Energy threshold established in 1995 for own home page on the World Wide (Minatom).82 Indicating the lack of exports to civilian end users in Rus- Web also clearly indicates that the consensus within the administration sia.86 institute is involved in the design of 90 itself on this issue, one senior Ameri- After Mikhailov’s revelations, the nuclear explosives. As of January can official claimed that the head of Silicon Graphics, Edward 1998, Silicon Graphics Inc. was un- Minatom weapons laboratories “are McCracken, said the company had der investigation by the Department the worst places in Russia to send a been told by Russian officials that of Justice for possible export con- 83 supercomputer.” The administra- the computers were to be used “for trol violations. tion eventually turned down the environmental science.” McCracken The second instance of controver- Hewlett-Packard request, along with admitted to making some “serious sial HPC exports that may undercut a similar application by IBM. Rus- judgmental errors” in selling the the previously strong position of the sian officials argued that they needed computers, adding that “we were trade promoters on the HPC export the computers in order to maintain naïve here in Silicon Valley not to control issue involves China. In the reliability and safety of their know” that the customer, the All- April 1997, Bureau of Export Ad- nuclear stockpile after the conclu- Russian Scientific Research Institute ministration chief William Reinsch sion of the CTBT, but American crit- for Technical Physics (VNIITF), is testified before a Congressional ics feared that Russia would use another name for the Chelyabinsk- hearing that 47 U.S.-made HPC technology to design new and 70 nuclear weapons lab.87 “We supercomputers were in use in the improved nuclear weapons. didn’t even know it was going to People’s Republic of China.91 Arms As a result, U.S. officials were Minatom,” claimed Chris control advocates expressed great flabbergasted when in February Blumenthal, the director of customer concern about the impact of this rev- 1997, Russian Minister of Atomic transactions at Silicon Graphics. 88 elation on U.S. security interests, Energy Viktor Mikhailov announced Nonproliferation advocate Gary specifically avoiding a high-tech that Minatom had obtained sev- Milhollin told a Congressional in- arms race with China, which could eral HPC systems from Silicon quiry that the illegal sale was the potentially use the HPC systems to Graphics Industries of Mountain result of the replacement of old ex- design improved nuclear weapons View, California, without an export port controls over HPC with a “dis- and ballistic missiles. William license. Silicon Graphics, one of the honor system, in which the exporter Schneider, a senior strategic trade leading U.S. manufacturers of HPC, makes money if it closes its eyes and official in the Reagan administra- had acquired Cray Research in 1996. holds its nose,” suggesting that he tion, testified before a Senate hear- Media reports indicated that the did not believe the company’s asser- ing that “end-user verification—a computers sold to Minatom had a tions that it had not known the true routine feature of advanced technol- capability of about 4,500 MTOPS, identity of the intended end user. He ogy exports to China in the 1980s— 92 over the 2,000 MTOPS threshold added that the current system of al- has been abandoned.” Without limit for exports to military end us- lowing exporters to determine the satisfactory end-user verification, 84 ers in Russia. Mikhailov freely identity of end users was so ineffec- nonproliferation advocates argued admitted that the machines were in- tive that if “Mr. Mikhailov hadn’t that HPC technology sold to the Chi- tended for use in the Chelyabinsk- bragged to the press about getting his nese Academy of Sciences, includ- 70 nuclear weapons laboratory, and supercomputers, we probably ing a Silicon Graphics Challenge XL boasted that the computers were “10 wouldn’t know about these sales to- HPC system linking some 32 proces- times faster than any previously day.”89 Other critics of the sale later sors, could be used for weapons de- 85 available in Russia.” The GAO pointed out that VNIITF is listed as sign purposes. Moreover, the HPC subsequently reported that if these technology is now incorporated into

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 53 Robert Johnston the “hidden network of the the threshold limit of 2,000 MTOPS. curity interests. The greatest concern supercomputer complex,” protected China had obtained these by buying for the panel was ensuring that HPC by electronic firewalls within the systems just under the threshold systems with capabilities of 7,000 Chinese Academy of Sciences: this limit at about 1,900 MTOPS and MTOPS licensed to civilian end us- makes it difficult to monitor which adding expansion motherboards to ers are not transferred, once in the computers within the Academy are boost capabilities well above the recipient country, to military end being used for military purposes and 2,000 MTOPS limit.97 This level of users.100 which are being used for civilian capability is described as “ten times The impact of the controversy 93 science research. Reflecting wor- the speed of the fastest personal surrounding the export of HPC tech- ries that the post-shipment verifica- computer,” and available only in the nology to Russian and Chinese 98 tion system has completely United States and Japan. Trade nuclear weapons facilities has revi- collapsed, a January 1998 report by promoters thus had a hard time mak- talized advocates of nonprolifera- the Republican majority of the Sub- ing a credible case for “foreign avail- tion. Despite objections from the committee on International Security, ability,” since these machines could computer industry and the Clinton Proliferation, and Federal Affairs of not have been acquired elsewhere by administration, Congress included the Senate Governmental Affairs the Chinese. language in the 1998 Defense Au- Committee complained: “Astonish- The Chinese government re- thorization Act (Public Law 105-85), ingly, not a single supercomputer sponded to the allegations about the which tightened HPC export con- exported to China had either a pre- possible military use of U.S.-made trols. In particular, the new law shifts license check or a post-shipment HPCs by stating that “the Chinese end-use determination back onto the 94 verification.” Even Assistant Sec- side has bought through normal trade government. The new legislation is retary of Commerce Roger Majak, channels some large computers from based on an amendment sponsored head of Bureau of Export Adminis- the U.S. for use in meteorological by the Chairman of the House Na- tration, admitted in January 1998 forecasting, earthquake disaster pre- tional Security Committee, Repre- that “we are not satisfied with the vention, and in other scientific and sentative Floyd Spence access that we have received, espe- research areas...this is completely (Republican-South Carolina), and cially on post-shipment verification normal business activity, [and] the Representative. Ronald Dellums 95 to China.” Chinese side has not violated the (Democrat-California), the ranking The Clinton administration, how- agreements reached concerning the minority member of the committee. ever, has defended its licensing aspects of export controls.”99 Even The legislation applies only to HPC policy toward China. William if the Chinese description of their exports to “tier 3” countries (includ- Reinsch responded to the reports usage of U.S.-made HPCs is accu- ing Russia and China). It provides about the Chinese Academy of Sci- rate, the reports reveal worrisome that any export of an HPC faster than ences by stating that “the adminis- gaps in U.S. export controls. Appar- 2,000 MTOPS to these countries tration rejects the view, held by some ently these controls can neither eas- must be submitted for a 10-day re- of our critics, that China is an ily verify end use in China, nor view by the Secretaries of Com- enemy...our export control policy ensure that exports below the licens- merce, Defense, State, and Energy seeks to support our engagement ing threshold cannot be easily up- and the Director of the Arms Con- strategy and creation of higher-pay- graded to performance levels above trol and Disarmament Agency. If any ing, export-based jobs in the United the threshold limit. These problems of these officials raise objections States, while denying licenses for were highlighted in a report released during the review period, an indi- items whose export would pose sig- by the House National Security vidual license must be obtained for nificant national security risks to the Committee in October 1997. The the export. Other provisions of the U.S.”96 This rhetoric failed to sat- report challenged the findings of the legislation mandate that the presi- isfy nonproliferation advocates in earlier Stanford report that shaped dent must give Congress 180-days Congress, however, particularly the 1995 liberalizations of HPC con- notice before changing the 2,000 when it was reported in June 1997 trols, concluding that HPC systems MTOPS threshold for “tier 3” coun- that China actually possessed “hun- well below the 7,000 MTOPS tries, and 120-days notice before dreds” of U.S. HPC systems above threshold were relevant to U.S. se- changing the list of countries that fall

54 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Robert Johnston under “tier 3” restrictions. Finally, November 18, 1997, giving the non- that nonproliferation advocates in the legislation also requires that the proliferation advocates their first Congress would object to the pro- Department of Commerce conduct victory in this area in several posed regulations, viewing them as post-shipment verification of end use years.105 inconsistent with the end-use verifi- on all HPCs faster than 2,000 It may be premature to conclude cation provisions of the 1998 De- 108 MTOPS exported to “tier 3” coun- that the tide has fully turned in fa- fense Authorization Act. Thus the tries, although it allows exceptions vor of the nonproliferation advo- stage is now set for a the latest phase if the Secretary of Commerce pro- cates, however. In January 1998, the of the struggle between trade pro- vides a detailed explanation of why Commerce Department released moters and nonproliferation advo- such an inspection was not con- draft regulations covering end-use cates over HPC export controls. 101 ducted. verification for HPCs exported to In the debate over the bill, com- “tier 3” countries. The proposed CONCLUSION puter industry officials objected to regulations would reportedly allow Throughout the first five years of the new restrictions, which a trade the purchasers of U.S.-made HPCs his administration, President Clinton publication later referred to as a to fill out end-use reports on their has largely stood behind computer “rollback of the administration’s own and submit them to the U.S. exporters and taken several actions 1995 relaxation of export con- government. Apparently, the pro- to liberalize HPC export controls. It trols.”102 The Clinton administration posed regulations do not impose any is possible, however, that his stance also protested, with Deputy Assis- penalties on those purchasers who will now change in the wake of the tant Secretary of Defense Mitchell fail to submit such post-shipment Russia and China cases and the sub- B. Wallerstein warning that “these end-use reports, and the one-time sequent resurgence of nonprolifera- changes would significantly impair end-use report would not be fol- tion advocates in the Congress. The the President’s flexibility—and that lowed up if the HPC was subse- Clinton administration’s acquies- of DOD—to ensure that export con- quently moved to another site or cence in the provisions of the 1998 trol policies and procedures are re-exported.106 Defense Authorization Act suggests implemented in a manner that pro- The proposed regulations drew that the nonproliferation advocates tects our national security interests fire immediately from both computer have strengthened their position, al- without damaging the continued industry executives and nonprolif- though it remains too early to say if economic viability of the U.S. com- eration experts. Computer industry this trend will continue. The key fac- 103 puter industry.” Clinton’s Na- officials said the regulations were tor is the ongoing philosophical de- tional Security Advisor, Samuel “extraterritorial” and “unenforce- bate over the priority that should be Berger, even termed the Spence- able,” since they attempt to impose given to trade promotion and non- Dellums language an “unacceptable reporting requirements on foreign proliferation initiatives in the formu- limit to the President’s authority to companies operating outside the lation of export control policy. This conduct foreign policy,” and threat- United States. “This is wacko,” com- disagreement continues to find ex- ened to veto the Defense Authoriza- mented one computer executive, pression in both executive actions by tion bill if it were included. suggesting that the industry opposes the Clinton administration—like the However, a White House spokesman even cursory post-shipment end-use proposed regulations on end-user later changed this position, saying verification.107 Nonproliferation verification—as well as in Congres- that although “we strongly object” advocates, by contrast, ridiculed the sional debate over the still-pending to the tightened export controls, they proposed regulations as absurdly lax, revised Export Administration Act. would not trigger a veto.104 The Sen- with Dr. Gary Milhollin of the Wis- A review of the debate between ate initially resisted language simi- consin Project on Nuclear Arms the two perspectives in the scholarly lar to that proposed by Spence and Control saying that the Commerce literature and in Congressional de- Dellums in its version of the bill, but Department was “treating bates shows strong arguments on the conference report on the issue supercomputers like blenders and each side. Given the intensity of the preserved it. President Clinton sub- fishing rods. Just fill out a little card case for both trade promotion and sequently signed the bill into law on and send it in.” Milhollin predicted nonproliferation, it would appear

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 55 Robert Johnston that the best system of export con- has until now largely been satisfied rization Act. Whether this latest leg- trols is one that allows for flexibil- with the status quo. 111 William islation signals a new trend toward ity and the handling of export Reinsch, Under Secretary of Com- tighter controls on HPC exports may licenses on a case-by-case basis.109 merce for Export Administration, ultimately depend on the “transition By reducing the number of days al- takes a different tact, arguing that “a states”: should a former Cold War lowed for the processing of a license statutory foundation” for licensing adversary test a nuclear device that request, but preserving the right of reforms “would send an important can be linked to the export of a U.S. agencies to appeal Bureau of Export message to U.S. exporters that these HPC or transfer HPC capabilities to Administration decisions to the reforms will not be rolled back.”112 a rogue regime, it would likely gal- president, the proposed Export Ad- The reconciliation of these oppos- vanize support for stronger export ministration Act ensures that the ing viewpoints is necessary for the controls. However, in the absence of most contentious cases will be re- passage of a revised Export Admin- such a dramatic event, the impact of 110 solved at the highest level. The istration Act and the codification of the recent Russian and Chinese cases 10-day review period mandated by the HPC export control process. could easily fade over time. In that the 1998 Defense Authorization Act Until the trade promoters or the non- case, it may well be that the trade also seems a reasonable compro- proliferation advocates compromise promoters will continue to have the mise, as it at least allows some time or one of them attains the level of upper hand in the design of U.S. ex- for a review without imposing crip- consensus for their agenda that was port controls on HPC. pling delays on industry. reached by the containment doctrine However, the effort to reestablish during the Cold War, the current a statutory basis for export control standoff will likely continue. The policy through the passage of a re- tightening of controls imposed by the vised Export Administration Act has 1998 Defense Authorization Act been frustrated by the difficulty of could foster the emergence of a com- defining the precise conditions and promise, however, as computer in- 1 For a discussion of the issues involved in bal- time frames under which agencies dustry executives are now less ancing trade and strategic interests in the formu- may appeal to the president. Dis- satisfied with the status quo, and may lation of HPC export control policy, see John Arquilla, “Between a Rock and a Hard-Drive: agreements over reforming the li- view a revised Export Administra- Export Controls on Supercomputers,” The Non- censing process reflect the extent to tion Act as a way to prevent non- proliferation Review 3 (Winter 1996), pp. 55-61. which small details have enormous proliferation advocates from 2 Public Law 105-85, Sections 1211-1215. The full text of the law is available on the World Wide political implications in the export enacting piecemeal restrictions in Web through the Library of Congress at http:// control licensing process. While the the future. thomas.loc.gov. 3 business community is relatively Michael S. Lelyveld, “Computer-Use Certifica- Although the streamlining mea- tion Program Hit,” The Journal of Commerce, satisfied with the status quo and fears sures in the proposed 1996 Export January 13, 1998, pp. 1, 3. that new legislation—like the 1998 4 Marie Anchordoguy, “Japanese-American Trade Administration Act failed to pass in Conflict and Supercomputers,” Political Science Defense Authorization Act—will the 104th Congress, a new Export Quarterly 109 (Spring 1994), p. 40. 5 tighten controls, the proliferation Administration Act awaits the 105th Jack Worlton, Some Myths About High Perfor- community fears looser controls. mance Computers and Their Role in the Manu- Congress. Other Clinton administra- facture of Nuclear Weapons (Los Angeles: The result is deadlock, blocking the tion decisions, including general li- Worlton and Associates, Technical Report #32, passage of the proposed Export Ad- June 22, 1990). cense exemption reforms and the 6 ministration Act. Backers of the pro- Jack Worlton argues that the term supercomputer failure (thus far) to punish unli- term is now outdated because “a word that is used posed legislation have sought to censed exporters of HPCs to China to mean everything means nothing.” (See Worlton, resolve these problems before bring- Some Myths About High-Performance Comput- and Russia aggressively, indicate ers, p. 21). However, the term “high-performance ing the Export Administration Act that the trade promoters continue to computer” is also somewhat ambiguous. This to a floor vote, but Congressional remain a potent political force in anomaly is possibly explained by the desire of staffers believe that such behind the the computer industry and its representatives to Washington, despite the setback de-emphasize the power and capabilities of these scenes lobbying requires pressure dealt them by the restrictions im- machines by removing the word “super”. from the outside community, which 7 Seymour Goodman et al., Building on the Ba- posed by the 1998 Defense Autho- sics: An Examination of High-Performance Com-

56 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Robert Johnston puting Export Control Policy in the 1990s (Palo (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 39 Nancy Dunne and Louise Kehoe, “US Relaxes Alto, CA: Center for International Security and Press, 1988); Stuart MacDonald, Technology and Controls on High Technology,” Financial Times, Arms Control, November 1995). the Tyranny of Export Controls (New York: St. September 30, 1993, p. 1. 8 Nancy Dunne and Louise Kehoe, “US Relaxes Martin’s Press, 1990); and Michael Mastanduno, 40 “Administration Delays Tackling Defense Ex- Controls on High-Tech Exports,” Financial Times, “The United States Defiant: Export Controls in port Issues,” Aerospace Daily, October 1, 1993, September 30, 1993, p. 1. the Postwar Era,” Daedalus 120 (Fall 1991), pp. p. 2. 9 Pat Cooper and Theresa Hitchens, “New U.S. 91-112. 41 Jack Robertson, “Export Curbs Blasted; Policy Computer Export Controls Spark Optimism, Arms 21 Mastanduno, “The United States Defiant,” pp. Change Urged; Controls on Technology Exports,” Control Fear,” Defense News, October 16-22, 99-100. Electronic News, June 14, 1993, p. 1. 1995, p. 26. 22 Ibid., pp.102-103. 42 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign 10 Pat Cooper and Theresa Hitchens, “U.S. Re- 23 See George Kozmetsky, “Supercomputers and Relations, U.S. Proliferation Policy Toward views Computer Export Decontrols: Will Rethink National Policy: Maintaining U.S. Preeminence Rogue Regimes: Testimony of Stephen Bryen, Technology Evaluation Process for Value to Weap- in an Emerging Industry,” in J.R. Kirkland and 103rd Congress, 1st session, September 14, 1993. ons Makers,” Defense News, December 18-25, J.H. Poole, eds., Supercomputers (New York: 43 Bernard Levine, “Industry Seeks More Export 1995, p. 6. Praeger, 1987), pp. 9-42. Slack; Computer Industry Wants Liberalized 11 For further reading on the technological aspects 24 Goodman et al., Building on the Basics, pp. 2- Rules for Components And Telecommunica- of the development of high performance comput- 3. tions,” Electronic News, October 4, 1993, p. 1. ers in the 1990s relative to the capabilities of other 25 National Academy of Sciences, Panel on the 44 Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, computers, see Worlton, Some Myths About High Future Design and Implementation of U.S. Na- National Export Strategy, p. 32. Performance Computers, as well as Goodman et tional Security Export Controls, Finding Common 45 Norman Mineta, “Toward a National Export al., Building on the Basics. See also the testimony Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Glo- Strategy,” Congressional Record 139 (130), Sep- of Dr. Anita K. Jones, Director, Defense Research bal Environment (Washington, D.C.: National tember 29, 1993, p. E2312. and Engineering, Department of Defense, before Academy Press, 1991), p. 251. 46 Barney Frank, “Freeing the U.S. Computer In- the House Committee on Science Sub-Commit- 26 Goodman et al., Building on the Basics, p. 2. dustry,” Congressional Record 139 (144), Octo- tee on Basic Research on the Federal High Per- 27 Heinz, U.S. Strategic Trade, pp. 34-35. ber 22, 1993, p. E2515. formance Computing and Communications 28. Mastanduno, “The United States Defiant,” 47 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science, (HPCC) Program, Federal News Service, Octo- p. 107. Subcommittee on Technology, Environment, and ber 31, 1995, pp. 12-20. 29 Ambassador Alan Wendt, Senior Representa- Aviation, Hearing on Export Controls and High 12 Anchordoguy, “Japanese-American Trade Con- tive for Strategic Technology Policy, “US Export Technology: Statement by James L. Novakoff, flict,” pp. 35-80. Controls in a Changing Global Environment” Manager, International Trade Affairs, Cray Re- 13 Ibid., p. 39. Address before a National Academy of Sciences search, Inc. 103rd Congress, 2nd session, May 14 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science, symposium, Irvine, California, June 11, 1991, in 24, 1994, pp. 72-73. Subcommittee on Basic Research, Hearing on U.S. Department of State Dispatch 2 (July 1, 48 Stuart Auerbach, “Cray Deal A Casualty of Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative: 1991), p. 480. Atomic Weapons Fears,” The Washington Post, Statement of Dr. Anita K. Jones, 104th Congress, 30 John Glenn, “Supercomputers and Super- March 19, 1993, p. C1. 1st session, October 31, 1995, p. 16 bombs,” Congressional Record, October 31, 1989 49 David Durenberger, “Export Controls—The 15 William Perry, Annual Report to the President S14382. Need For A Sensible U.S. Policy,” Congressional and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov- 31 Wendt, “U.S. Export Controls,” p. 481. Record 139 (37), March 23, 1993, p. S3542. ernment Printing Office, February 1995), p. 161. 32 Gary K. Bertsch and Steven Elliot-Gower, “US 50 U.S. Government official (name withheld by 16 Gary Milhollin, “Fire Sale,” The New York Export Controls in Transition: Implications of the request), interview with author, Washington, D.C., Times, September 18, 1996, p. A19. New Security Environment,” in David Kemme, April 1996. 17 “Information warfare is designed to achieve ed., Technology Markets and Export Controls in 51 Levine, “Industry Seeks More Export Slack,” information superiority in support of national the 1990s (New York: New York University Press, p. 1. military strategy by affecting adversary informa- 1991), pp. 105-128. 52 Council on Competitiveness, Economic Secu- tion systems while leveraging and protecting the 33 See Gary K. Bertsch and Richard T. Cupitt, rity: The Dollar$ and Sense of U.S. Foreign Department’s information and information sys- “Nonproliferation in the 1990s: Enhancing Inter- Policy (Washington, D.C.: Council on Competi- tems.” In Perry, Annual Report to the President national Cooperation on Export Controls,” The tiveness, 1994), p . 66. and Congress, p. 263. Washington Quarterly 16 (Autumn 1993), pp. 53- 53 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interna- 18 For further reading on the emerging significance 70. tional Relations, Subcommittee on International of IW, see Martin Libicki, “The Emerging Pri- 34 Seymour E. Goodman et al., “High Performance Economic Policy and Trade, Hearing on Impact macy of Information,” Orbis 40 (Spring 1996), Computing: Controllability and Cooperation,” in of Export Controls on U.S. Industry: Statement pp. 261-274; John Arquilla, “The Strategic Im- Dual-Use Technologies and Export Controls in of Howard Lewis III, Vice President for Trade plications of Information Dominance,” Strategic the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint and Technology Policy, National Association of Review (Summer 1994), pp. 24-30; and Joseph Program of the National Academy of Sciences Manufacturers, 104th Congress, 1st session, Janu- A. Nye and William Owens, “America’s Informa- and the Russian Academy of Sciences (Washing- ary 25, 1995, p. 18. tion Edge,” Foreign Affairs 75 (March-April ton, D.C.: National Research Council, 1991), p. 54 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Bank- 1996), pp. 20-36. 38. ing, Subcommittee on Freedenberg, Testimony 19 See Perry, Annual Report to the President and 35 See also, Christine Westbrook and Alan B. before the Senate Committee on Banking, Hous- Congress., pp. 71-74 and Trade Promotion Coor- Sherr, “U.S.-Soviet Joint Ventures and Export ing, and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Inter- dinating Committee, National Export Strategy Control Policy,” in Gary K. Bertsch and Steven national Financial and Monetary Policy, Hearing (Washington, D.C.: Trade Promotion Coordinat- Elliot-Gower, eds., Export Controls in Transition: on the Export Administration Act, 103rd Con- ing Committee, October 1993), p. 32. Perspectives, Problems, and Prospects (Durham, gress, 2nd session, February 3, 1994, p. 73. 20 For a discussion of the COCOM regime, see NC: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 169-202. 55 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science, John Heinz, U.S. Strategic Trade: An Export 36 Goodman et al., “High Performance Comput- Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Tech- Control System for the 1990s (Boulder, CO: ing,” pp. 51-53. nology, Environment, and Aviation, Hearing on Westview Press, 1990); Philip J. Funigiello, 37 Ibid., p. 2. the Export Administration Act: Testimony of Luke American-Soviet Trade During the Cold War 38 Ibid., pp. 2-3. Alexander, 103rd Congress, 2nd session, May 24,

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 57 Robert Johnston

1994, pp. 52, 57. Role of Export Controls” The Journal of Strate- request), interview with author, Washington, D.C., 56 For the exact wording of the regulations gov- gic Studies 16 (March 1993), pp. 18-45; Bertsch April 1996. erning HPC export controls, see 15 Code of Fed- and Cupitt, “Non-Proliferation in the 1990s,” pp. 82 John J. Fialka, “Clinton Weighs Russian Bid to eral Regulations, Chapter VII, Subchapter C, 53-70. Buy 3 Supercomputers,” The Wall Street Jour- Paragraph 740.7 and 742.12. For Clinton’s state- 73 For a review of U.S. multilateral arms control nal, October 11, 1996, p. A2. ment announcing the 1995 liberalization agreements, see Zachary Davis et al., Prolifera- 83 Gary Milhollin, “Exporting an Arms Race,” The see,William Jefferson Clinton, “Statement on tion Control Regimes: Background and Status New York Times, February 20, 1997, p. A19. Reform of Computer Export Controls,” Weekly (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Ser- 84 Knut Royce, “Computer Sale to Russia Probed,” Compilation of Presidential Documents 31 (40), vice, April 27, 1995) and Arms Control and Dis- Newsday, February 16, 1997, pp. A4, A21. October 9, 1995, pp. 1783-1784. armament Agency, Threat Control through Arms 85 Owen Matthews, “Supercomputer Sale Under 57 Cooper and Hitchens, “New U.S. Export Rules Control (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Investigation,” The Moscow Times, February 18, Spark Optimism,” p. 26. Printing Office, 1995). 1997. 58 U.S. Congress, Senate Governmental Affairs 74 Six key reports that support, with varying de- 86 U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Na- Subcommittee on International Security, Prolif- grees of enthusiasm, trade promotion include tional Security, Subcommittee on Military Pro- eration, and Federal Services, hearing on Prolif- National Research Council, Dual-Use Technolo- curement, Sale of U.S. Supercomputers to Russia: eration and U.S. Export Controls, 105th Congress, gies and Export Control in the Post-Cold War Statement by Mr. Harold J. Johnson, Associate 1st Session, 11 June 1997, p. 17. Era (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Director, NSIAD, General Accounting Office, 59 Theresa Hitchens and Barbara Opall, “U.S. Sciences, 1994); Trade Promotion Coordinating 105th Congress, 1st session, April 15, 1997 (http:/ Revises Plan to Ease Computer Export Rules,” Committee, National Export Strategy: Meeting /www.house.gov/nsc/97-4-15Johnson.htm). Defense News, February 14-20, 1994, p. 1. Foreign Competition (Washington, D.C.: Trade 87 David E. Sanger, “U.S. Company Says it Erred 60 Goodman et al., Building on the Basics, p. vii. Promotion Coordinating Committee, October in Sales to Russian Arms Lab,” The New York 61 “Spence Blasts Clinton For Easing Overseas 1995); J. David Richardson, Sizing Up U.S. Ex- Times, February 19, 1997, p. 6. Supercomputer Sales,” C4I News, October 12, port Disincentives (Washington, D.C.: Institute 88 John J. Fialka, “U.S. Investigates Silicon 1995, p. 1. for International Economics, 1994); Jack Worlton, Graphic’s Sale of Computers to Russian Weap- 62 General Accounting Office, Export Licensing Some Myths About High-Performance Comput- ons Lab,” The Wall Street Journal, February 18, Procedures for Dual-Use Items Need to Be ers; Goodman et al., Building on the Basics; 1997, p. 4. Strengthened: Report to Senator John Glenn, Council on Competitiveness, Economic Security: 89 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on National Chairman of the Committee on Government Af- The Dollar$ and Sense of U.S. Foreign Policy. Security, Subcommittee on Military Procurement, fairs (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting 75 U.S. government official (name withheld by Hearing on Sale of American Supercomputers to Office, April 1994). request), interview with author, Washington, D.C., Russia: Statement of Gary Milhollin, Director, 63 Ibid., p. 30. March 1996. Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, 64 Ibid., p. 4. 76 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 105th Congress, 1st session, April 15, 1997 (http:/ 65 U.S. government official (name withheld by Weapons, Article I (New York: United Nations, /www.house.gov/nsc/97-4-15Milhollin.htm). request), interview with author, Washington, D.C., 1968). 90 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern- March 1996. 77 U.S. government official (name withheld by mental Affairs, A Proliferation Primer: A Ma- 66 General Accounting Office, Export Licensing request), interview with author, Washington, D.C., jority Report of the Subcommittee on Procedures, pp. 50-52. March 1996. International Security, Proliferation, and Federal 67 This summary of the export licensing process 78 Zachary Davis et al., Proliferation Control Re- Programs, 105th Congress, 1st session, January is taken from: Offices of Inspector General at the gimes, p. 8. For a more skeptical treatment of the 1998, pp. 40-41. See also, “RFNC-VNIITF’s Mis- U.S. Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, IAEA safeguards process, see Paul Leventhal, sion,” available on the Chelyabinsk-70 home page and State, The Federal Government’s Export Li- “Plugging the Leaks in Nuclear Export Controls: (http://www.ch70.chel.su/vniitf/mission.html). censing Processes for Munitions and Dual-Use Why Bother?” Orbis 36 (Spring 1992), pp. 167- 91 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on National Commodities (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern- 180. Security, Hearing on Sale of American ment Printing Office, September 1993), p. 8. For 79 For further discussion of the evolving Wassenaar Supercomputers to Russia: Statement of William a summary flowchart of the dual-use export li- Arrangement (named for the Dutch town in which A. Reinsch, Undersecretary for Export Adminis- censing process, see p. 23. the arrangement was signed) see, “COCOM: An tration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 105th 68 See H.R. 361 “Omnibus Export Administra- End and a Beginning,” Defense Trade News 5 Congress, 1st session, April 15, 1997, p. 13. tion Act of 1996,” section 109, for a detailed ac- (April 1994), pp. 4-5; Sarah Walking, “Russia 92 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern- count of the proposed timeline for license review. Ready to Join New Post-COCOM Organization,” mental Affairs, Subcommittee on International 69 See U.S. Congress, House, International Rela- Arms Control Today 25 (September 1995), pp. Security, Proliferation, and Federal Service, Hear- tions Committee, Comments by Representative 31-32; Theresa Hitchens, “Export Control Experts ing on The Role of Export Controls in Limiting Sam Gejdenson (D-CT), at H.R. 361 Mark-up, Meet to Fill Holes in New Accord,” Defense News, the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruc- 104th Congress, 1st session, March 29, 1996. January 15-21, 1996; John Holum, “Remarks tion, Their Means of Delivery, and Advanced 70 U.S. government official (name withheld by Before the Nonproliferation Breakfast Group of Conventional Weapons: Statement of William request), interview with author, Washington, D.C., the National Press Club,” Federal News Service, Schneider, 105th Congress, 1st session, June 11, April 1996. February 15, 1996; and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Ac- 1997 (http://www.senate.gov/~gov-affairs/ 71 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign cord on Sale of Arms To ‘Hostile’ Nations isphear.htm). Relations, Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Stalled,” The Washington Post, April 5, 1996, p. 93 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern- Trade, and the Environment, Hearing on the Ex- A27. ment Affairs, Subcommittee on International Se- port Administration Act: Statement of Richard 80 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Bank- curity, Proliferation, and Federal Service, Lehman, Director of Public Affairs, the IBM Cor- ing, Subcommittee on International Finance and Hearing on The Role of Export Controls in Lim- poration, 103rd Congress, 1st session, Novem- Monetary Policy, Hearing on the Export Admin- iting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass De- ber 18, 1993, p. 41. istration Act: Statement of Paul Freedenberg, struction, Their Means of Delivery, and Advanced 72 See the following for further reading on post- International Trade Consultant, Baker and Potts, Conventional Weapons: Statement of Dr. Stephen Cold War multilateral export control regimes: L.L.P.,103rd Congress, 2nd Session, February 3, Bryen, 105th Congress, 1st session, June 11, Mastanduno, “The United States Defiant;” Aaron 1994, p. 27. 1997(http://www.senate.gov/~gov-affairs/ Karp, “Controlling Weapons Proliferation: The 81 U.S. government official (name withheld by isphear.htm).

58 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Robert Johnston

94 U.S. Congress, A Proliferation Primer, p. 45. 95 David Ruppe, “China Challenging U.S. Export- Control Capability,” New Technology Week, Janu- ary 12, 1998, p. 2. 96 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern- ment Affairs, Subcommittee on International Se- curity, Proliferation, and Federal Service, Hearing on The Role of Export Controls in Lim- iting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass De- struction, Their Means of Delivery, and Advanced Conventional Weapons: Statement of William A. Reinsch, Under Secretary Department of Com- merce, Bureau of Export Administration, 105thCongress, 1st session, June 11, 1997 (http:/ /www.senate.gov/~gov-affairs/isphear.htm). 97 Barbara Opall, “China Possesses Hundreds of U.S. Supercomputers,” Defense News, June 16- 22, 1997, p. 1. 98 Lawrence Kaplan, “Where Do All the Supercomputers Go?” The Washington Times, September 24, 1997, p. A15. 99 Foreign ministry spokesman Tanq Guoqiang, cited in “China denies diverting computers to military use” Asian Political News, July 7, 1997, p. 1. 100 “Panel Recommends Tightening Supercomputer Export Laws,” C4I News, Septem- ber 25, 1997, p. 1. 101 Public Law 105-85, Sections 1211-1215. 102 “Commerce Seeking Quick Implementation of New Computer Export Curbs,” Inside U.S. Trade, December 5, 1997. 103 U.S. Congress, House, National Security Com- mittee, Hearing on Supercomputer Export Con- trol Policy: Statement of Dr. Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Deputy Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy, 105th Congress, 1st session, November 13, 1997 (http:/ /www.house.gov/nsc/11-13-97wallerstein.htm). 104 Michael S. Lelyveld, “White House Backing Off Veto Over Supercomputers,” The Journal of Commerce, November 4, 1997, p. 3. 105 U.S. Congress, A Proliferation Primer, p. 43. 106 Michael S. Lelyveld, “Computer-Use Certifi- cation Program Hit,” The Journal of Commerce, January 13, 1998, pp. 1, 3. 107 Ibid., p. 1. 108 Ibid., pp. 1, 3. 109 For a similar argument, see Arquilla, “Between and Rock and a Hard Drive.” 110 “Omnibus Export Administration Act of 1996,” H.R. 361, 104th Congress, 1st Session, Section 104 (g). 111 U.S. Congressional staff member (name with- held by request), interview with author, Washing- ton, D.C., April 1996. 112 E.J. Prior, “Enough is Enough—The Need for a New EAA,” The Export Practitioner, February 1997, p. 14.

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