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United States Policy Toward Iran—Next Steps UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN—NEXT STEPS HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION MARCH 8, 2006 Serial No. 109–183 Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 26–438PDF WASHINGTON : 2006 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Mar 21 2002 12:49 Aug 21, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 F:\WORK\FULL\030806\26438.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, HOWARD L. BERMAN, California Vice Chairman GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American ELTON GALLEGLY, California Samoa ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California PETER T. KING, New York ROBERT WEXLER, Florida STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York DARRELL ISSA, California BARBARA LEE, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon MARK GREEN, Wisconsin SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada JERRY WELLER, Illinois GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana ADAM B. SCHIFF, California THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan DIANE E. WATSON, California KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida ADAM SMITH, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California CONNIE MACK, Florida RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas TED POE, Texas THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director HILLEL WEINBERG, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator (II) VerDate Mar 21 2002 12:49 Aug 21, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 F:\WORK\FULL\030806\26438.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL C O N T E N T S Page WITNESSES The Honorable Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................................................................................ 11 The Honorable Robert Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and Inter- national Security, U.S. Department of State ..................................................... 22 John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., The Heritage Foundation ............................................. 58 Michael A. Ledeen, Ph.D., The American Enterprise Institute for Public Pol- icy Research .......................................................................................................... 65 Mr. Gary Milhollin, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control ....................... 72 Abbas William Samii, Ph.D., Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty ......................... 78 LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING The Honorable Nicholas Burns: Prepared statement ........................................... 15 The Honorable Robert Joseph: Prepared statement ............................................. 25 John C. Hulsman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ...................................................... 60 Michael A. Ledeen, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 68 Mr. Gary Milhollin: Prepared statement ............................................................... 75 Abbas William Samii, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................ 79 APPENDIX Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 91 (III) VerDate Mar 21 2002 12:49 Aug 21, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 F:\WORK\FULL\030806\26438.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL VerDate Mar 21 2002 12:49 Aug 21, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 F:\WORK\FULL\030806\26438.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN— NEXT STEPS WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 2006 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:23 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chair- man of the Committee) presiding. Chairman HYDE. Iran presents perhaps the most difficult na- tional security problem confronting the United States. Should Iran’s clerical regime acquire nuclear weapons, as is its evident aim, it would be able to foment mischief in its region or beyond without fear of regime threatening retaliation other than from an- other nuclear power. In a suicidal mode, it could well lash out at Israel, Europe or at American forces in the region. Inevitably, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia will seek nuclear powers of their own so that they will not have to rely on others to secure their survival. Were Iran not in such an important location, its behavior might be of mar- ginal concern, even though we would reprove it for its abysmal human rights record and especially its record of religious intoler- ance. But Iran produces a significant portion of the world’s petro- leum resources. Moreover, it can threaten from its proximity to the energy fields of the Arab countries, of the Gulf and its ability to close the Straits of Hormuz, much of the world’s energy supply. While we are less dependent on Gulf energy than are some of our major allies and trading partners, any disruption in oil supply from the Gulf would, as we have known for decades, present a major economic and national security problem. Given the current lack of non-Gulf excess production capacity, instability in the Gulf would cause world oil prices to spike significantly. Because of Iran’s eco- nomic importance, it has thus far proven to be hard to isolate or pressure successfully. Japan, for example, derives 15 percent of its energy from Iran and fully 90 percent of its energy from the Middle East. What should a Japanese political leader do if that country is asked to cut itself off from Iranian oil? Because of Iran’s size and military capacity, it is hard to coerce militarily, and it may prove to be exceedingly difficult to disable its nuclear assets. Any attempt to do so is likely to strengthen the most retrograde political forces there. Iran’s leaders know all this, which is evidently why they have continued to defy the world, breaking agreements and ignoring international standards of behavior with abandon. Iran’s internal (1) VerDate Mar 21 2002 12:49 Aug 21, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\030806\26438.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL 2 politics are dominated by a clerical clique that holds power by force, but which also enjoys the active support of a strong minority of the Iranian population and the passive support of a larger share. Iranian nationalist sentiment can be stirred up easily. At the same time, the United States is popular in Iran, not least because we clearly oppose that regime and support the Iranian people’s true aspirations for peace and economic progress. The Administration has begun reaching out even more strongly and proposed a $75 million public diplomacy program in Fiscal Year 2006 supplemental budget now under consideration. The Ad- ministration’s approach to Iran in earlier years lacked focus, but for the past year it has found its footing and concentrated on a dip- lomatic strategy that has borne fruit not in the sense that Iran has been convinced to change its behavior, but in the sense that the world community is more united than ever on the proposition that Iran must change. This is a remarkable accomplishment for which the Administra- tion deserves great credit. We got Iran to the Security Council not by bullying or sanctioning the IAEA’s members, but by persistent and skillful diplomacy. We will move forward the same way. We need to keep that in mind as we craft legislation to deal with Iran, although I think the Administration has sufficient tools and ample motivation right now. The next step will require cooperation by states which have a lot to lose in the short term by alienating Iran’s regime, so we must be able to show them that it is in their long-term interest to join us in the next difficult phase of this ef- fort. I now yield to my colleague, Mr. Lantos, for any opening com- ments he may have. Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As we consider the question of United States policy toward Iran today, there is no room for naivete´. We must be as clear-eyed as the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Philippe Douste-Blazy, was 3 weeks ago when he said, and I quote: ‘‘No civilian nuclear program can explain the Iranian nuclear program. It is a clandestine military nuclear program. Now it is up to the Security Council to say what it will do, what means it will use to stop, to manage, to halt this terrible crisis of nuclear proliferation caused by Iran.’’ Mr. Chairman, I have not often had occasion recently to applaud statements from the French Foreign Ministry, but in this case I do so emphatically and without reservation. The Iranians are hell-bent on acquiring nuclear weapons. If any leader any place on this planet still doubts this, he is in urgent need of medical attention. There is no other reasonable explanation for the nearly 20 years of lies and deceptions about their covert nu- clear activities. We need to come to terms with this fact, and we need to respond with resolve. There are no good options in this situation, Mr. Chairman, and it comes at a time when we confront numerous seri- ous other crises globally. This week, as we await the conclusion of the IAEA meetings in Vienna and the shifting of the Iran file to the UN Security Council, VerDate Mar 21 2002 12:49 Aug 21, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\030806\26438.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL 3 one thing is clear.
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