DOCSLIB.ORG

Country Group C: Destinations of Diversion Concern (Rin 0694-Ad93)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Country Group C: Destinations of Diversion Concern (Rin 0694-Ad93) RECORD OF COMMENTS: COUNTRY GROUP C: DESTINATIONS OF DIVERSION CONCERN (RIN 0694-AD93) Published in the Federal Register 72 FR 8315 Comments Due: March 12, 2007 COMMENT # SOURCE SIGNER OF DATE # OF LETTER/EMAIL PAGES 1 Hittite Microwave Corp Scott E. Barney 02/28/07 1 2 Extreme Networks Julie Holland 03/01/07 1 3 Dubai Chamber of Hamad Buamim 03/11/07 4 Commerce & Industry 4 Baker Hughes Bryan Schillinger 03/12/07 2 5 Endevco Corporation Russell W. Spittler 03/12/07 5 6 Wisconsin Project on Arthur Shulman 03/12/07 13 Nuclear Arms Control 7 Pacific Sky Supply, Inc Kelly Anderson 03/12/07 1 8 Telecommunications Grant Seiffert 03/12/07 2 Industry Association (TIA) 9 American Electronics Ken Montgomery 03/12/07 3 Association (AeA) Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 37 / Monday, February 26, 2007 / Proposed Rules 8315 That airspace extending upward from 700 Background Request for Comment feet above the surface within a 6.3-mile radius of the Middlesboro—Bell County. The Department of Commerce seeks to Consideration of designating Country * * * * * address the threat to national security Group C to identify ‘‘Destinations of Issued in College Park, Georgia on caused by the illicit transshipment, Diversion Concern’’ is part of the February 13, 2007. reexport, and diversion in international Department of Commerce’s effort to Mark D. Ward, trade of items subject to the EAR. strengthen the trade compliance and Through government-to-government and Group Manager, System Support Group, export control systems of countries that Eastern Service Center. government-to-industry outreach, the are transshipment hubs. By working to [FR Doc. 07–857 Filed 2–23–07; 8:45 am] Department of Commerce encourages strengthen those systems, the transshipment countries to strengthen BILLING CODE 4910–13–M Department of Commerce seeks to their international export control enhance international security and practices. confidence in international trade flows. Country Group C would identify those DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE This effort includes both government- to-government cooperation and U.S. countries of diversion concern, based on Bureau of Industry and Security Government cooperation and certain criteria including, but not information-sharing with the private limited to: 15 CFR Part 740 sector. To strengthen government-to- • Transit and transshipment volume; government cooperation, the • [Docket No. 0612242560–7024–01] Inadequate export/reexport Department of Commerce has worked controls; with its counterpart agencies to: (1) RIN 0694–AD93 • Develop or strengthen export control Demonstrated inability to control diversion activities in this destination; Country Group C: Destinations of regimes, (2) promote information and Diversion Concern data exchanges, and (3) strengthen • Government not directly involved cooperation and facilitate enforcement. in diversion activities; and AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Specific initiatives to develop export • Government unwilling or unable to Security, Commerce. control capabilities have included cooperate with the U.S. in interdiction ACTION: Advance notice of proposed technical assistance in the areas of legal efforts. rulemaking. framework and licensing procedures and practices, enforcement training, and As a result of being placed into SUMMARY: The Department of industry outreach. To strengthen Country Group C, the licensing policy Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and cooperation and facilitate enforcement, would likely change for items going to Security (BIS) is considering the Department of Commerce has posted any country designated as a amendments to the Export export control attache´s to serve as ‘‘Destination of Diversion Concern.’’ Administration Regulations (EAR) to Such changes could include changes in further the national security interests of liaisons in many of these areas, and has sought agreements and other License Exception eligibility (Part 740 of the United States by designating the EAR), License Requirements and Country Group C for countries that are government-to-government cooperation in certain destinations. Licensing Policy (Part 742 of the EAR), ‘‘Destinations of Diversion Concern.’’ and End-User and End-Use Based This amendment would establish The Department of Commerce has Controls (Part 744 of the EAR). The also concentrated on outreach to key license requirements for exports and result of these changes could mean that reexports to countries that represent a companies involved in forwarding, more license applications might be concern for the diversion of items processing, and transporting goods required; more stringent license review subject to the EAR. BIS by this notice through transshipment points, i.e., policies might be implemented, which requests comments on Country Group C. freight forwarders, integrators, air cargo could result in less approvals or more DATES: carriers, and shipping lines. The Comments are due no later than conditions on licenses; authorizations close of business March 12, 2007. Department of Commerce has sought to enhance cooperation with these private may be delayed because of increased ADDRESSES: Comments should be sent to end-user checks; or authorizations may [email protected], fax (202) sector entities via informal meetings, the establishment of communication decrease because of diversion risks for 482–3355, or to Regulatory Policy such countries. Division, Bureau of Industry and channels to facilitate information Security, Room H2705, U.S. Department sharing, the establishment and sharing Rulemaking Requirements of Commerce, Washington, DC 20230. of ‘‘best practices,’’ and by working with Please refer to regulatory identification the foreign trade zone board to address This advance notice of proposed number (RIN) 0694–AD93 in all transshipment issues. rulemaking rule has been determined to comments, and in the subject line of e- The diversion of items subject to the be significant for purposes of E.O. mail comments. Comments on the EAR could augment the capabilities of 12866. collection of information should be sent terrorists and state sponsors of Christopher A. Padilla, to David Rostker, Office of Management terrorism, and significantly undermine and Budget (OMB), by e-mail to Assistant Secretary for Export international counterproliferation Administration. [email protected], or by fax efforts. The illegal diversion of such [FR Doc. E7–3252 Filed 2–23–07; 8:45 am] to (202) 395–7285. items could also compromise the BILLING CODE 3510–33–P FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: effectiveness of U.S. export control Sharron Cook, Office of Exporter laws. In recent years, diversions have Services, Bureau of Industry and contributed to a number of major cases Security, Telephone (202) 482–2440. involving the violation of U.S. export SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: control laws for dual-use goods. VerDate Aug<31>2005 16:00 Feb 23, 2007 Jkt 211001 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\26FEP1.SGM 26FEP1 hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with PROPOSALS From: "Scott Barney" <[email protected]> To: <[email protected]> Date: Wed, Feb 28, 2007 12:58 PM Subject: (RIN) 0694-AD93 County Group C: Destination of Diversion Concern With regards to this proposed rule. Why would BIS/Commerce submit this proposed rule without providing a preliminary list of countries that might be listed under Country Group C? We would like to comment, but we have no clue if any countries that will be listed are current countries that we export to. Regards, Scott E. Barney Import/Export Compliance Manager Hittite Microwave Corporation 20 Alpha Road Chelmsford, MA 01824 U.S.A. Phone: 978.250.3343 Ext. 1155 Fax: 978.250.3373 www.hittite.com From: Julie Holland <[email protected]> To: "'[email protected]'" <[email protected]> Date: Thu, Mar 1, 2007 2:36 PM Subject: Country Group C Proposal In regard to the Country Group C Proposal; The concept is clear - however it would be difficult to discern the impact this proposal would have on companies without a tentative list of coutnries that you are considering to be placed in this category. Can you please advise us all of the tentative countries that would be placed under Country Group C - only then can we provide pertinent feedback. thanks, Julie Holland Julie Holland, Compliance Manager Extreme Networks, 3585 Monroe St, Santa Clara, CA 95051 Ph# 408-579-3312 Cell# 408-230-7587 Fax# 408-579-2910 email: [email protected] ...................... __x . .-.---........................................................ ....... .................................................... .. i.-..,. .I...... ... e..-..$ ....... ......................................-. C' ; .. , i .... <<fi:s>>>.... ..%,. x.. L:x<.wcr"\' .....-I: Q IrrCus .... .......... ....... ... .- .- March 12, 2007 U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security Regulatory Policy Division Room H2705 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20230 Attention: RIN 0694-AD93 RE: Comments on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking – Country Group C: Destinations of Diversion Concern Dear Sir or Madam, The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control submits the following comments in response to the Bureau of Industry and Security’s February 26, 2007, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (72 Fed. Reg. 8315), which proposes to designate Country Group C in the U.S. Export Administration Regulations for countries that are "Destinations of Diversion Concern." The Project is a non-profit organization that conducts outreach and public education
Load more

Recommended publications
  • CPC Outreach Journal #740
    USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Maxwell AFB, Alabama Issue No. 740, 02 September 2009 Articles & Other Documents: U.S. Eyes 12 Giant "Bunker Buster" Bombs Pakistan Denies It Altered US-made Missiles U.S. Mulls Alternatives For Missile Shield NSA: India Doesn‘t Need Another Nuclear Test Iran is Continuing Nuclear Activity, says United Nations Pakistani Nuke Scientist says Restrictions Lifted Watchdog Iran Ducking Scrutiny of Alleged Nuclear-Weapon 'Pak Enhancing Its Nuclear Weapons Capabilities' Studies, IAEA Says Nuclear Agency Says Iran Has Bolstered Ability to Ministry Wants ¥176 Billion for Missile Shield Make Fuel but Slowed Its Output Iran, Syria have not Carried Out Sufficient Cooperation Would-Be Killer Linked to Al Qaeda, Saudis Say in Clarifying Nuke Issues: IAEA Cargo of North Korea Materiel is Seized En Route to Israel Has Iran in Its Sights Iran Watchdog Extends Probe into Alleged Secret Site Don't Get Scammed By Russia Again 'IAEA Hiding Incriminating Evidence' Israeli Nuclear Weapons and Western Hypocrisy Iran 'Ready' for Nuclear Talks Another Attempt to Malign Pak Nuke Program Russia: Building a Nuclear Deterrent for the Sake of Controversy Over Pokhran-II Needless: Manmohan Peace (60th Anniversary of the First Soviet Atomic Test) U.S. Says Pakistan Made Changes to Missiles Sold for Defense Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Policy Toward Iraq Hearing Committee On
    U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION OCTOBER 4, 2001 Serial No. 107–44 Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 75–563PDF WASHINGTON : 2001 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Dec 14, 2001 Jkt 075563 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 F:\WORK\MESA\100401\75563 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York TOM LANTOS, California JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa HOWARD L. BERMAN, California DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa ELTON GALLEGLY, California DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina SHERROD BROWN, Ohio DANA ROHRABACHER, California CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia EDWARD R. ROYCE, California EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama PETER T. KING, New York BRAD SHERMAN, California STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ROBERT WEXLER, Florida AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York RICHARD BURR, North Carolina WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana GREGORY W.
    [Show full text]
  • United States Policy Toward Iran—Next Steps
    UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN—NEXT STEPS HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION MARCH 8, 2006 Serial No. 109–183 Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 26–438PDF WASHINGTON : 2006 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Mar 21 2002 12:49 Aug 21, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 F:\WORK\FULL\030806\26438.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, HOWARD L. BERMAN, California Vice Chairman GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American ELTON GALLEGLY, California Samoa ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California PETER T. KING, New York ROBERT WEXLER, Florida STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York DARRELL ISSA, California BARBARA LEE, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon MARK GREEN, Wisconsin SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada JERRY WELLER, Illinois GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana ADAM B.
    [Show full text]
  • Indo-Us Nuclear Cooperation: Altering Strategic Positioning & Shifting Balance of Power in South Asia
    “INDO-US NUCLEAR COOPERATION: ALTERING STRATEGIC POSITIONING & SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER IN SOUTH ASIA” The Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) is an independent, non-profit and non-governmental organization for collaborative research, networking and interaction on strategic and international issues pertaining to South Asia. Set up in 1992, the RCSS is based in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The RCSS is a South Asian forum for studies, training and multi-track dialogue and deliberation on issues of regional interest. All activities of RCSS are designed with a South Asia focus and are usually participated by experts from all South Asian countries. The Centre is envisaged as a forum for advancing the cause of cooperation, security, conflict resolution, confidence building, peace and development in the countries of the South Asian region. The RCSS serves its South Asian and international constituency by: (a) networking programmes that promote interaction, communication and exchange between institutions and individuals within and outside the region engaged in South Asian strategic studies; (b) organizing regional workshops and seminars and sponsoring and coordinating collaborative research; and (c) disseminating output of the research through publications which include books, monographs and a quarterly newsletter. The RCSS facilitates scholars and other professionals of South Asia to address, mutually and collectively, problems and issues of topical interest for all countries of the region. Queries may be addressed to: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies 410/27 Bauddhaloka Mawatha Colombo 7 SRI LANKA Tel: (94-11) 2690913-4 Fax: 2690769; e-mail: [email protected] RCSS website: http://www.rcss.org RCSS Policy Studies 44 “INDO-US NUCLEAR COOPERATION: Altering Strategic Positioning & Shifting Balance of Power in South Asia” SADIA TASLEEM REGIONAL CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES COLOMBO Published by Regional Centre for Strategic Studies 410/27, Bauddhaloka Mawatha Colombo 7, Sri Lanka.
    [Show full text]
  • Testimony of Gary Milhollin Before the US-Israeli Joint Parliamentary
    WISCONSIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL Testimony of Gary Milhollin Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School and Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control Before the US-Israeli Joint Parliamentary Committee September 17, 2003 1701 K STREET, NW SUITE 805 WASHINGTON, DC 20006 PHONE: 202-223-8299 FAX: 202-223-8298 EMAIL: [email protected] I am pleased to appear before this joint committee to discuss Iran's nuclear program and Iran's imports of sensitive technology. I direct the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a research organization here in Washington that is devoted to stopping the spread of mass destruction weapons. I will begin by describing the challenge posed by Iran to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and then I will comment on some important Iranian procurement attempts. I will conclude with a discussion of Iran's possible noncompliance with its international obligations. I would like to submit one item for the record. It is a recent op-ed and table authored by myself and Valerie Lincy for the Week in Review section of the New York Times. The article discusses the possibility that Iran could gain nuclear weapon capability while claiming to be a member in good standing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The article can be found electronically on my organization's web site: http://www.wisconsinproject.org. The Stakes With Iraq now under U.S. occupation, Iran is rapidly emerging as the new mass destruction weapon threat in the Middle East. If Iran's nuclear program continues down its present path, Iran is likely to achieve nuclear weapon capability within the next few years.
    [Show full text]
  • Testimony of Gary Milhollin
    Testimony of Gary Milhollin Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School and Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate May 26, 2000 I am pleased to appear before this distinguished Committee to testify on the export of dual-use technology. I would like to submit three items for the record. The first is an article on supercomputer export controls that I wrote for the Outlook section of the Washington Post on March 12, the second is an article on Iraqi procurement efforts that I wrote for the New Yorker magazine on December 13, 1999 and the third is a report entitled “25 Myths about Export Control” that my organization prepared a few years ago but which is still relevant to the issues we face today. The Committee has asked me to comment on two concepts that have been proposed for use in U.S. export controls. The first is known as “mass market status;” the second as “foreign availability.” The Committee has asked what the effect would be on our national security if these concepts were adopted as U.S. policy. The two concepts are now incorporated into S. 1712, the bill recently reported by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. In my judgment, if this bill were enacted it would overturn and to a great extent nullify the system of export controls that the United States has built up over the past half-century. Our present law attempts to strike a balance between national security and freedom of trade.
    [Show full text]
  • Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 01:36 24 May 2016 India’S Nuclear Debate Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 01:36 24 May 2016
    Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 01:36 24 May 2016 India’s Nuclear Debate Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 01:36 24 May 2016 Series Note War and International Politics in South Asia Series Editor: Srinath Raghavan Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, and Lecturer in Defence Studies, King’s College London, University of London. Th is Series seeks to foster original and rigorous scholarship on the dynamics of war and international politics in South Asia. Following Clausewitz, war is understood as both a political and a social phenomenon which manifests itself in a variety of forms ranging from total wars to armed insurrections. International politics is closely intertwined with it, for war not only plays an important role in the formation of an international order but also a threat to its continued existence. Th e Series will therefore focus on the international as well as domestic dimensions of war and security in South Asia. Comparative studies with other geographical areas are also of interest. A fundamental premise of this Series is that we cannot do justice to the com- plexities of war by studying it from any single, privileged academic standpoint; the phenomenon is best explained in a multidisciplinary framework. Th e Series welcomes a wide array of approaches, paradigms and methodologies, and is interested in historical, theoretical, and policy-oriented scholarship. In addition to monographs, the Series will from time to time publish collections of essays. Also in this Series Fighting Like a Guerrilla: Th e Indian Army and Counterinsurgency Rajesh Rajagopalan ISBN 978-0-415-45684-5 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 01:36 24 May 2016 Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World Editor: Harsh V.
    [Show full text]
  • Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction
    Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction December 1993 OTA-BP-ISC-115 NTIS order #PB94-126984 GPO stock #052-003-01361-4 Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993). Foreword ontrolling the spread of weapons of mass destruction depends on how hard it is to manufacture them and on how easy such weapon programs are to detect. This background paper, a companion volume to OTA’s report Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks,cl reviews the technical requirements for countries to develop and build nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, along with the systems most capable of delivering these weapons to distant or defended targets: ballistic missiles, combat aircraft, and cruise missiles. It identities evidence that might indicate the production of weapons of mass destruction, and technical hurdles that might provide opportunities to control their spread. Of the weapons considered here, nuclear weapons are the most difficult and expensive to develop-primarily due to the difficulty of producing the required nuclear materials. These materials, and the equipment needed to produce them, have quite limited civilian applications and are tightly controlled. States have produced nuclear weapon materials indigenously by evading international controls, but at great cost and with substantial opportunity for detection. For chemical and biological weapon materials, in contrast, most of the equipment needed also has civilian applications and has become widely available, making the capability to produce such weapons much more difficult to monitor and control.
    [Show full text]
  • Has the United States Violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?
    Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 1993 Parsing Good Faith: Has the United States Violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? David A. Koplow Georgetown University Law Center, [email protected] This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1735 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 301 This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the International Law Commons, and the National Security Law Commons ARTICLES PARSING GOOD FAITH: HAS THE UNITED STATES VIOLATED ARTICLE VI OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY? DAVID A. KOPLOW* The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has long been the cornerstone of the international effort to retard the spread of nuclear weaponry to additional countries, now appreciated as the greatest post-cold war threat to international peace and security. Under this treaty, the parties also undertook to pursue in good faith additional negotiations leading to further reductions in nuclear weapons-and, in fact, such subsequent bargaining has recently yielded dramatic, far-reaching successes. Professor Koplow, however, argues that in one crucial respect, the United States has been derelict in implementing the obligations of the NPT: Recent American presidents have rigidly refused to participate in negotiations that could lead to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, abolishing all nuclear explosions everywhere. Although the NPT's requirement of test ban negotiations is ambiguously stated, a close reading of the legal materials establishes that it was a key ingredient in the basic bargain of the NPT, and that numerous countries consider it a major, unresolved treaty controversy.
    [Show full text]
  • Export Control Development in the United Arab Emirates: from Commitments to Compliance
    The Dubai Initiative Policy Brief Export Control Development in the United Arab Emirates: From Commitments to Compliance Dr. Bryan R. Early Export Control Development in the United Arab Emirates: From Commitments to Compliance Dubai Initiative – Policy Brief Dr. Bryan R. Early Research Fellow, The Dubai Initiative Better Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard University July 6, 2009 ExPort ConTRol DEvEloPmEnT In THE UnITED ARAB Emirates | 1 Introduction The swiftness with which the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has launched its civil nuclear program presents a number of challenges for policymakers in seek- ing to ensure the program’s safety and security. At the onset of its efforts, the UAE government consulted with a set of the world’s leading nuclear suppliers to develop a framework that would help its nuclear program conform to the highest standards in terms of safety, security, and nonproliferation. The UAE drew on these con- sultations in making a sweeping set of international commitments in April 2008 to ensure that the sensitive nuclear materials and technologies it would acquire as part of its nuclear program would be securely controlled.1 While the UAE has been widely praised for the depth and breadth of the nonproliferation commitments it has made, it will be the UAE’s efficacy at complying with them by which its suc- cess will be judged. The largest commitment-compliance gap for the UAE government po- tentially relates to its system of nonproliferation export controls. Export controls While the UAE’s are national restrictions that governments place upon their constituencies’ exports recent nonprolifera- of sensitive goods and technologies, which generally include arms and dual-use goods that can contribute to WMD programs.2 Up until the fall of 2007, the UAE tion commitments did not possess a comprehensive export control law at the federal level—let alone strongly signaled an institutional framework capable of administering it.3 This allowed the country to the international to be exploited by the A.Q.
    [Show full text]
  • Seminal Issues As Viewed Through the Lens of the Progressive Case
    Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law LARC @ Cardozo Law Articles Faculty 2005 Transcript of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Security, and a Free Press: Seminal Issues as Viewed through the Lens of the Progressive Case David Rudenstine Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, [email protected] James R. Schlesinger Norman Dorsen Robert E. Cattanach Brady Williamson See next page for additional authors Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation David Rudenstine, James R. Schlesinger, Norman Dorsen, Robert E. Cattanach, Brady Williamson, Frank Tuerkheimer, Howard Morland, Gary Milhollin & Anthony Lewis, Transcript of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Security, and a Free Press: Seminal Issues as Viewed through the Lens of the Progressive Case, 26 Cardozo Law Review 1337 (2005). Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/168 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Authors David Rudenstine, James R. Schlesinger, Norman Dorsen, Robert E. Cattanach, Brady Williamson, Frank Tuerkheimer, Howard Morland, Gary Milhollin, and Anthony Lewis This article is available at LARC @ Cardozo Law: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/168 TRANSCRIPT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND A FREE PRESS: SEMINAL ISSUES AS VIEWED THROUGH THE LENS OF THE PROGRESSIVE CASE' WELCOME David Rudenstine^ It is wonderful having you all here for this very special twenty-fifth anniversary commemoration of this historic case involving the publication of the article by The Progressive magazine.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran: Weapons Proliferation, Terrorism, and Democracy Hearing
    S. HRG. 109–211 IRAN: WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, TERRORISM, AND DEMOCRACY HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION MAY 19, 2005 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 25–153 PDF WASHINGTON : 2005 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:49 Dec 19, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 963494.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois MEL MARTINEZ, Florida KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., Staff Director ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director (II) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:49 Dec 19, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 963494.SEN SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 CONTENTS Page Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware ..................................... 57 Prepared opening statement ............................................................................ 57 Burns, Hon. R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Depart- ment of State, Washington, DC .........................................................................
    [Show full text]