Robert Johnston U.S. EXPORT CONTROL POLICY IN THE HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER SECTOR by Robert Johnston Robert Johnston is a doctoral candidate at the American University, School of International Service in Washington, D.C., and a political risk analyst at the Parvus International Corporation in Silver Spring, Maryland. Previously, he was a research analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in Washington, D.C. ince the end of the Cold War, proliferation, they have liberalized policy goals. Despite their inherent successive U.S. administra- the export control regime for HPCs appeal, neither nonproliferation nor Stions have struggled to create markedly.1 trade promotion has been able to and enforce an export control policy Nonproliferation advocates have assume the central role held by con- that balances the conflicting de- blamed these changes for the appear- tainment during the Cold War. In mands of promoting trade and coun- ance of American-made HPCs in fact, no concept has been able to tering the proliferation of weapons Russian nuclear weapons labs and generate the consensus needed to of mass destruction (WMD). The Chinese research facilities that may assume this role. Instead, American high performance computer (HPC) be military-related. foreign policy since the end of the industry presents a major challenge Cold War has largely been reactive, in this respect. HPC technology is This struggle between nonprolif- responding to immediate crises with- highly profitable, creating powerful eration advocates and trade promot- out being clearly guided by a broader incentives for export, while it also ers has taken place in a conceptual strategy. vacuum caused by the end of the has numerous potential military ap- The development of HPC export plications, making it a significant Cold War, and the failure of any overarching concept to assume the controls under the Clinton adminis- proliferation threat. In its policies tration reflects this broader pattern toward the regulation of dual-use role played by containment in U.S. foreign policy prior to 1991. Vari- of drift. The early years of the ad- technology exports such as HPCs, ministration were marked by an al- the Clinton administration has gen- ous concepts, including nonprolif- eration and trade promotion, most unbroken string of victories by erally won laurels from trade pro- those who favored liberalization of moters and darts from champions of continue to compete for dominance in American foreign policymaking. HPC export controls, despite the nonproliferation. While administra- warnings of nonproliferation advo- tion officials argue that current The Clinton administration has de- clared that both nonproliferation and cates, who feared the consequences policy strikes a balance between of the rapid spread of this technol- competing interests in trade and non- trade promotion are major foreign 44 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 Robert Johnston ogy. Bolstered by the absence of any This article examines the devel- term to describe: urgent security threats, the trade pro- opment of U.S. HPC export control the technology, or collection of technologies that make it moters were able to convince the policy since the end of the Cold War. possible to address the most Clinton administration to launch two It begins by discussing the potential computationally demanding significant liberalizations of HPC proliferation and security implica- problems...this term recog- nizes that a computing sys- export controls in 1993 and 1995. tions of HPC exports. It then tem today depends not only More recently, revelations in 1997 sketches the history of U.S. export on a powerful computa- controls on dual-use technologies, tional engine, but also high about exports of American-made speed networks, advanced HPCs to Russia and China may shift before detailing the development of storage systems, sophisti- the balance of forces in the other U.S. export controls on HPCs, with cated graphics, collections particular emphasis on the Bush ad- of less than the most pow- direction. By dramatically liberaliz- erful computers, etc.7 ing HPC export controls, the Clin- ministration (1989-1993) and the ton administration has changed the early years of the Clinton adminis- The primary measurement of the nature of the debate among nonpro- tration (1993-1995). Next, the ar- capabilities of a computer is Millions liferation advocates and trade pro- ticle examines the as yet of Theoretical Operations Per Sec- moters. During the Bush unsuccessful attempts in Congress to ond, or MTOPS. The rapid growth administration, the debate on U.S. reform the export control process by in the MTOPS capabilities of HPCs HPC export control policy tended to passing a revised Export Adminis- during the 1990s has been reflected be couched in terms of whether U.S. tration Act and discusses the impor- in certain policy actions by the Clin- high technology manufacturers were tance of multilateral arms control ton administration. In September losing export revenues. Today, new regimes in the formulation of U.S. 1993, the Clinton administration emphasis is being placed on how export control policy. It concludes raised the definition of a U.S. technology might be contribut- with a detailed examination of the supercomputer from 195 to 2,000 8 ing to WMD programs in foreign 1997 revelations about the export of MTOPS. By the October 1995 re- countries. The trade promoters, de- U.S.-made HPCs to Russian nuclear view of export control policy, the spite their success in shaping export weapons labs and Chinese facilities level of 3,000 to 5,000 MTOPS was control policy during the Clinton ad- with possible military links, and dis- already being considered as “mid- 9 ministration, have now lost the ini- cusses the impact of these revela- range.” Just two months later, in a tiative, and are being asked tions on current and future HPC further review of policy, the very uncomfortable questions about how export control policy. MTOPS standard was on the verge their HPC technology products have of becoming obsolete, because pro- ended up in Chinese or Russian HIGH PERFORMANCE cessing speed could be achieved at weapons labs. As a result of these COMPUTERS AS A supercomputer levels by using revelations, nonproliferation advo- SECURITY ISSUE widely-available parallel processing technology.10 Revolutions in minia- cates in Congress were able to in- An HPC is a “general purpose turization meant that the desktops of clude language in the 1998 Defense computer that is faster than commer- the 1990s matched the capabilities Authorization Act (Public Law 105- cial competitors and that has suffi- of the supercomputers of the 1980s, 85), passed in November 1997, that cient central memory to compute complicating efforts to design an tightened HPC export controls.2 problem sets of general scientific export licensing policy that could Nevertheless, the battle over HPC interest,”4 or a computer “designed keep pace with technological ad- export controls continues. Draft specifically to achieve the highest vances. 11 regulations on end-user verification execution rate possible in scientific of HPC exports issued by the Com- computation for a given technol- As with other “dual-use” tech- merce Department in January 1998, ogy.”5 HPC systems are also fre- nologies, HPC export licensing which were harshly criticized by quently referred to as policy must balance commercial and nonproliferation advocates, suggest “supercomputers.”6 However, given security interests. Commercially, the that trade promoters remain a pow- the complexity of the technologies HPC industry is viewed as “strate- erful political force in Washington.3 involved, HPC is perhaps the best gic,” since “higher profits will not term. Seymour Goodman uses this be competed away by new entrants, The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998 45 Robert Johnston because huge start-up costs, econo- HPCs are also useful for design- post-Cold War HPC export control mies of scale, and learning curve ing and testing advanced conven- policy becomes even more striking. advantages create high barriers to tional weaponry. They have played During the Cold War, COCOM 12 entry.” These entry barriers, to- a key role in the design of critical provided the primary structure for gether with lucrative government American defense systems such as the organization of U.S. export li- procurement opportunities, have fos- stealth aircraft, infrared trackers to cense processing. COCOM had tered a strong HPC industry in the detect incoming missiles, acoustic clear, broad lists of controlled dual- United States. The major competi- detectors for use in shallow water, use technology items that required 16 tor to the United States is Japan, airborne lasers, and rocket motors. licenses for export to the Eastern where the HPC industry has also HPC systems are also central to “in- bloc.20 Under the 1949 Export Con- benefited from government trade formation warfare” and “informa- trol Act, the president had consider- protection as well as funding through tion dominance” strategies that are able autonomy to establish strong 13 keiretsu. Among the leading com- becoming a key concern of Ameri- export controls lists, even above and 17 mercial applications of HPC are can military strategy. As informa- beyond COCOM standards. The managing the operation of precision tion warfare becomes a more critical president initially enjoyed “defer- machine tools and helping in the aspect of conflict, the possible ence” from allies, Congress, and in- design of aircraft and motor vehicles. spread of HPC systems to rogue dustry, but consensus support for a HPC technology also has a num- states will raise additional security tight technology embargo against the 18 ber of military uses, including the concerns. Collectively, the use of Eastern bloc began to collapse in the development of WMD, the design of HPC systems in the design, testing 1960s.21 Several trends contributed so-called “smart” conventional and maintenance of nuclear, conven- to the eroding consensus, including: weapons, and the management of tional and information warfare overuse of sanctions and export con- information warfare.