1 Introduction

Notes

1 Introduction

1 . See also McIntyre and Ramage (2008). 2 . See, for example, Mietzner (2010). This, however, is a rather optimistic view of Indonesia’s democratization, which is in accordance with Diamond’s (2010) assessment of a decade of Indonesia’s democracy in a comparative perspective at global level. A less optimistic view, for example, argues that the democratic change in Indonesia has been superficial by which the oligarchic elites who controlled Suharto’s New Order have survived the 1998/99 regime change and continue to use the state for rent-seeking objectives (Robison and Hadiz, 2004; Boudreau, 2009). Others have identified several serious shortcomings embedded in Indonesia’s currently consolidated democracy. They include administrative ineffectiveness, rampant corruption, patronage, widespread money politics and the state’s failure to protect the rights of several minority groups, which has led scholars to label Indonesia’s democratic trajectory as a consolidated illiberal democracy (Hadiz, 2004), a consolidated patrimonial democracy (Webber, 2006), or simply a low-quality democracy (Klinken, 2009; Aspinall, 2013; Drakeley, 2014). For a comprehensive analysis of a decade of political reform in Indonesia, see Mietzner (2009a), Aspinall and Mietzner (2010) and Crouch (2010). 3 . See Booth (1999) and Cribb (1999). 4 . For a comprehensive review of key episodes of ethno-communal violence during Indonesia’s democratic transition, see Klinken (2007). 5 . According to a widely noted report by the Washington-based Centre for Global Development, a ‘struggling state like Indonesia, whose weakness has allowed terrorism, corruption, and civil conflict to take root in alarming ways’ has performed only slightly better than the comprehensively failed states of Afghanistan, Haiti or Somalia (CDG, 2004: 7). 6 . Suharto distinguished his regime from that of Sukarno as ‘New Order’. The social contract of the New Order was based on the principles of Pancasila (Five postulates), which consist of (1) Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (Belief in the one and only God), (2) Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab (Just and civilized humanity), (3) Persatuan Indonesia (The unity of Indonesia), (4) Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan, dalam Permusyawaratan Perwakilan (Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives) and (5) Keadilan Sosial bagi seluruh Rakyat Indonesia (Social justice for all the Indonesian people). Suharto came to power through a military coup against the threat of a communist take- over, as Indonesia was seen as the last bastion of the anti-communist front in Southeast Asia. Thus, against the Godless communists, belief in God was the first postulate of Pancasila. At the core of the new social contract is the belief that to work for social and economic justice is also to serve God; but to achieve social and economic justice, the country must achieve economic

183 184 Notes

development, as the ideal or goal is not to suffer poverty together, but rather to share prosperity. This core principle provided the basis for Suharto’s growth and redistribution policies. 7 . As a part of International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) bailout requirements in the wake of the 1997–98 economic crisis, a law on competition policy was passed by the parliament in 1999 (Law no. 5) and the Indonesian competition commission (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha/KPPU – Commission to Monitor Business Competition) was established through a presidential decree in the following year (Pangestu et al., 2002; Thee, 2002). Although there have been some reforms aimed at breaking the hold of the economy by a few connected families, their influence has not fully diminished. Nonetheless, the economy did recover from its worst decline, albeit slowly. Indonesia has managed to grow at an annual rate of around 5 per cent since 2003, but it is uneven across the regions and decent jobs growth in the formal sector remains a challenge, making it very difficult for poverty reduction. This book, however, does not deal with the transition of the economic system directly. It seeks to relate social conflicts to democratic transition and decentralization – the transition to which is undisputable – and to the overall social economic progress. 8 . For example, Zakaria (2003) maintains that, given its income level, Indonesia in 1998 was not an ideal candidate for democracy. Instead, he says that the ideal contender is Indonesia’s neighbour, Malaysia, which has reached a per capita income of US$ 5,000, which is assumed to be the income threshold for democracy to be safe. 9 . This stability and peace, however, were achieved at the cost of approximately half a million people who were banished by the military in the name of purging the country of communists and their sympathizers (Cribb, 2001). 10 . More than one thousand people were killed in a two-day anti-Chinese riot in Jakarta only a week before President Suharto was removed from office. After that, armed separatist struggles in Aceh, Papua and East Timor intensified. Muslims and Christians killed each other in several hot-spots in the eastern part of the country. Even the much lower-profile routine-everyday violence increased markedly. See Tadjoeddin (2002a) and Varshney et al. (2008). 11 . See Bertrand (2004). 12 . See Huntington (1968), Snyder (2000) and Hegre et al. (2001). 13 . See Lipset (1959), Londregan and Poole (1996), Barro (1999), Przeworski et al. (2000), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a) and Acemoglu et al. (2009). 14 . See Collier and Rohner (2008) for theoretical and empirical findings on democratic transition and violence in poor and lower-middle-income countries. 15 . See Tadjoeddin et al. (2001), Ross (2005), Tadjoeddin and Murshed (2007), Mancini (2008), Barron et al. (2009) and Murshed et al. (2009). 16 . See Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) for the three most influential studies. 17 . See Tadjoeddin (2002a) and Varshney et al. (2008). 18 . Compared with secessionist and ethnic violence, terrorist violence came rather late. The October 2002 Bali bombing was the first and the deadliest terrorist incident in the country. The most commonly accepted definition of terrorism is focused on politically motivated violence directed against non- combatants (Burgoon, 2006). Notes 185

19 . For more discussion on this, see Horowitz (1985) and Varshney (2002). 20 . For example, three recent books on violent conflict at a country level on Indonesia (Bertrand, 2004; Sidel, 2006; Klinken, 2007) did not give attention to routine violence. 21 . However, they can also fall within the rational choice approach to conflict: that is, conflict is an optimal option for the conflicting parties, given the socio-economic circumstances at the time. Interestingly this relates to Marx’s famous quote: ‘The proletariat have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.’ 22 . See Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009) for a review. 23 . See in particular Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004). 24 . See Sabine (1961). 25 . See footnote 1 on the ‘philosophical’, social, economic and political founda- tions of the New Order, embodied in the state principle of Pancasila. Sukarno also used Pancasila, but Suharto significantly redefined it with more emphasis on socio-economic development and shared prosperity, by linking them to religious duties. 26 . Suharto rose to power in the mode as, and roughly at the same time as, Zaire’s Mobutu (1965) and Chile’s Pinochet (1973). They were military generals, anti-communist and autocratically ruled their countries with strong support from the West. Since the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, these dictators were simply no longer needed. 27 . By providing legitimacy, development and diversification, reduced political risks. By contrast, Mobutu of Zaire did not opt for development and diversification since he faced a high degree of societal opposition, which led him to believe that investments in infrastructure and other public goods would pose a threat to his grip on political power. 28 . See UNDP (2001). 29 . Pancasila is the Indonesian state philosophy that literally means ‘five postulates’; see endnote 1. 30 . This is in line with Ferguson’s (2006) hypothesis on the lethal coincidence of three forces (economic volatility, ethnic disintegration and end of empires) in explaining why twentieth-century wars were concentrated in east and central Europe. 31 . The term ‘aspirations to inequality’ was first introduced by Tadjoeddin et al. (2001) in the context of centre–regional conflict in Indonesia. 32 . The concept of horizontal inequality has its roots in Gurr’s concept of relative deprivation (see Gurr (1970) and the discussion in the following sub- section). In the case of Indonesia, the sense of relative deprivation has not been the result of one group simply comparing its socio-economic position with another group; but it arose from a situation when one group compared itself with its past privileges. This has motivated it to try to regain political control when the situation permitted. This is different from relative deprivation due to widening horizontal inequalities as argued by Stewart (2000), which is a genuine or pure grievance that can be more easily isolated from greed. 33 . See Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for a comprehensive treatment of repeated games. 34 . See also Chapter 3 on this. 186 Notes

35 . After exercising non-cooperative behaviour in the 1969 racial riots, Malaysia’s major ethnic groups (Malay, Chinese and Indian) came to an agreement in the form of the New Economic Policy. They cooperated to form a consen- sual political entity, the Barisan Nasional coalition, to execute the new social compact. It worked, demonstrating that everyone gained from such cooperation – but only after experiencing losses from their non-cooperative behaviour in the riots. See Chowdhury and Islam (1996). 36 . For example, the Christians regained control in Maluku province and Poso district, and the Dayaks now enjoy political leadership in districts and provinces in Kalimantan. 37 . See Table 4.4 for examples of inter-ethnic political coalition in Indonesia’s localities. 38 . See Chapter 7 on this.

2 Conflict and Violence in Indonesia: A Background

1 . The Dutch did not want Indonesia to be a unitary state, in order to weaken the newly established country. Indonesia diplomatically accepted it. The other 15 constituent states were the puppet or semi-puppet states (negara ) and special territories (daerah istimewa) originally set up by the Dutch to weaken the revolution (Kahin, 1952). They were Eastern Indonesia, Pasundan, Eastern Java, Madura, Eastern Sumatra, Southern Sumatra, Central Java, Western Kalimantan, Greater Dayak, Banjar, South-eastern Kalimantan, Bangka, Belitung and Riau. 2 . Only since 2005 has the Netherlands officially accepted 17 August as the anniversary date of Indonesia’s independence in 1945. 3 . See Sukarno (1926). 4 . Santri are devout Muslims, while abangan are socio-economically lower-class nominal Muslims who mix their religious practice with Hinduism. The last category is priyayi , which refers to nominal Muslims with Hinduism influence, who enjoy a higher socio-economic status. Such social stratification of Javanese society was introduced by Geertz (1976). 5 . See http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/. 6 . This sub-section draws largely on Dijk (1981). 7 . However, there were some attempts at a negotiated settlement. For example, in 1950 a team of central government envoys led by Wali al-Fatah was dispatched to meet Kartosuwiryo, the DI president; however, Kartosuwiryo refused to talk. This was because the central government army continued to attack the DI rebels while the envoy was attempting to develop contact with DI leaders, and Kartosuwiryo was reluctant to sit in a negotiation with the relatively unimportant representative of central government (Dijk, 1981). 8 . Their principal demands were the ousting of the cabinet led by Premier Djuanda with its unnamed ‘communist sympathizers’, its replacement by a government without communist participation headed by Hatta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta, President Sukarno’s return to a constitutional position and the abandonment of his efforts to implement Guided Democracy. Note that Hatta resigned as the vice president in 1956 due to his deep disagree- ment with Sukarno’s policy. Notes 187

9 . Estimates of casualties of the anti-communist killing lay between 200,000 and 800,000, with a figure of 500,000 the current most plausible estimate (Cribb, 2001). 10 . For instance, in July 2000, when Lorraine Aragon was doing research on Muslim–Christian violence in Poso, she was repeatedly, and wistfully, told by some citizens of Sulawesi that ‘for thirty-three years under Suharto Indonesia was a peaceful place, but now ... there are disturbances everywhere’ (Aragon, 2001: 78). Such views are not uncommon in Indonesia today. A longing for the ‘stability’ of the New Order is unmistakably present in some circles. 11 . Dhanani and Islam (2002) estimate that the poverty rate increased from 29 per cent in February 1997 to 44 per cent in September 1998. 12 . Secessionist violence in Aceh and Papua is not included, owing to unavail- ability of data. However, the intensity of violence in those two regions significantly increased after the fall of Suharto (Tadjoeddin, 2002a). 13 . GAM received Libyan support as part of Muammar Gaddafi’s chairmanship of the ‘Mathaba Against Imperialism, Racism, Zionism and Fascism’, an organization set up in 1985 to supply moral and financial support to liberation movements around the world (Kell, 1995). 14 . While the first and second generations of GAM membership (1970s and 1980s) were mainly driven by ideological motives. 15 . Sponsored by Dutch colonial rulers who wanted to see West Papua separate from Indonesia, the first Papuan Congress was held in October 1961 and resulted in a political manifesto calling for an independent West Papua. 16 . The first Riau People’s Congress in 1956 demanded the creation of Riau as a separate province. At that time, Riau (together with the current West Sumatra and Jambi provinces) was part of the province of Central Sumatra with Bukittinggi as its capital city. The arguments for the case of independence for Riau can be found in Rab (1999).) 17 . Decree no. 28/1999 of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) (provincial parliament) of East Kalimantan. 18 . See Tadjoeddin (2002a) for a brief discussion on an evolutionary shifting pattern of the strengths and weaknesses of state and society in Indonesia. 19 . Deaths due to separatist violence in Aceh and Papua are not included here. The 15 regions are the capital city Jakarta; the districts of Sambas, Bengkayang, Pontianak, Landak and Sanggau in West Kalimantan; the district of Kotawaringin Timur (Sampit) in Central Kalimantan; the district of Poso in Central Sulawesi; the districts of Maluku Tengah, Maluku Tenggara, and Buru, and the city of Ambon in Maluku province; the districts of Maluku Utara and Halmahera Tengah, and the city of Ternate in North Maluku province. This refers to conditions in 2000. Several of the districts have since been split into new districts. 20 . Between 1990 and 2003, ethno-communal violence accounted for 89 per cent (or 9,612 casualties) of total deaths in collective violence, but only 17 per cent of incidents, while the rest, routine violence, accounted for 11 per cent of deaths but 83 per cent of total incidents (Varshney et al., 2008: table 2, p. 379). 21 . In 2001, the Ministry for Health and Social Affairs released the figure of 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) spread across 19 provinces due to violence in the country (Jakarta Post , 24 August). 188 Notes

22 . See HRW (1997), ICG (2001a), Peluso and Harwell (2001), Achwan et al. (2005) and Smith (2005) on anti-Madurese violence in Kalimantan; see HRW (1999), ICG (2000, 2002b) and Klinken (2001) on Muslim–Christian violence in Ambon; see Tomagola (2000) and Wilson (2008) on violence in North Maluku; see Aragon (2001), HRW (2002) on Muslim–Christian violence in Central Sulawesi; see ICG (2003a) on violence in Luwu, South Sulawesi; see Robinson (1998), ICG (2001b, 2003b) and Aspinall (2005, 2009a) on armed rebellion in Aceh. 23 . Brown (2008) places Aceh in a comparative study of three secessionist movements in Southeast Asia. The other two cases are southern Thailand and the Mindanao region of the southern Philippines. 24 . The actor-based conflict categories are centre vs. region, state vs. society, inter-ethnic and company vs. community.

3 Secessionist (Centre–Regional) Conflicts

1 . The first half of this chapter draws on Tadjoeddin (2011). 2 . On armed rebellion in Aceh, key studies include Robinson (1998); ICG (2001b, 2003b), Aspinall (2005, 2009a). On Papua, see Chauvel and Bhakti (2004), ICG (2002) and Kivimäki (2006). 3 . See also Chauvel and Bhakti (2004) and ICG (2002). 4 . See ASNLF (1976) ‘Declaration of Independence of Acheh-Sumatra’. 5 . This is cited from the congress’s official resolution. Furthermore, ‘this resolution was truthfully and earnestly drawn up at the Papuan Congress 2000 which was attended by 501 lawfully chosen representatives of West Papuan society from all corners of the Papuan land and from abroad, and which was also attended by 21,000 Papuans and non-Papuans. This Congress is the highest democratic vehicle of the Papuan people and, as such, it is the only authority entitled to adopt lawful political decisions of the Papuan Nation.’ 6 . See Chauvel and Bhakti (2004) and ICG (2002). 7 . See also Crouch (2010). 8 . Author’s interview with Mr Erlan Agussalim, head of East Kalimantan DPRD, Samarinda, 25 November 2008. 9 . The other two elements of the grievance theory are polarization and horizontal inequality; see Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009). 10 . However, there was a belief that the centre–region fiscal flows were mildly equalizing; see Ravallion (1988). 11 . Aceh Utara is where all Aceh’s natural gas reserves exploited by the US Exxon Mobil are and one of GAM’s strongholds. Fak-Fak is where the US Freeport McMoran Copper and Gold Inc has been operating since the late 1960s. Bengkalis is where the majority of Riau’s oil fields are located. Now the three districts have been split into several districts each. Kepulauan Riau has some off-shore oil fields and is where Exxon Mobil-controlled and newly discov- ered natural gas reserve in Natuna is located. Kepulauan Riau has become a new province, separated from Riau in 2004. 12 . In the case of Aceh, for example, a similar concern was expressed. Although by 1985 Aceh together with Riau and East Kalimantan were the largest three provinces contributing to Indonesia’s export, ‘benefits to local economy Notes 189

have been much smaller and cost benefit calculus more problematic, [so that] perhaps ironically one of the most staunchly independent regions, long in conflict with the central government, is now subsidising that government and the rest of the country’; see Dawood and Sjafrizal (1989: 115). 13 . The argument for the superiority of the greed hypothesis (loot-seeking) based on the positive association between the share of primary commodity export to total export and the onset of civil war against the grievance hypothesis (justice-seeking) can be found in Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004). 14 . Michael Ross’s (2005) field interview finds that, by mid-2000, children of DOM victims constituted a significant corps of GAM fighters. On 30 July 2000, the Jakarta Post reported that most of GAM’s new recruits were children of DOM victims. 15 . According to Indonesian intelligence sources, by 2003 GAM had collected about IDR 1.1 billion (approximately USD 120,000) a month through an extensive tax system called Pajak Nanggroe, levied on personal income, business income and schools across the province. Funds were also collected from Acehnese living in Malaysia, Thailand and other parts of Sumatra, often under the threat of violence; see ICG (2001b) and Schulze (2004). It is estimated that in 2001, between 2,000 and 3,000 Acehnese lived in Malaysia, while 7,000 to 8,000 were in Thailand, Australia, Europe and North America; see Rohan Gunaratna. 2001. ‘The Structure and Nature of GAM’, Jane’s Intelligence Review 13 (3). 16 . The company pays a salary and travel expenses to Tom Beanal, who has sat on its board of commissioners since 2000 as part of a settlement between Freeport and the Amungme ethnic group, of whom Beanal is a leader. Beanal says he combines Freeport business with campaigning. The company has also paid travel expenses for Presidium supporters; see ICG (2002). 17 . The two Laws were rushed through by the Habibie administration in 1999 due to the threat of disintegration faced by the country, but mainly due to political developments in East Timor surrounding the 1999 referendum. 18 . For various types of decentralization in developing and transition economies, see Bardhan (2002) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006). 19 . ‘Holding together’ federation is one of three processes of federalism identified by Stepan (1999). The other two are: (i) independent states which ‘come together’ by ceding or pooling sovereign powers in certain domains for the sake of benefits otherwise unattainable, such as security or economic prosperity; and (ii) ‘put together’ federations with a strong centre like the former Soviet Union. 20 . See Timo Kivimäki (2006), who is a Finnish political scientist who was an adviser to the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari during the Helsinki talks between the GAM and the Indonesian government. 21 . Before, pro-independent components of the Papuan were asked to appoint a widely accepted representative leader to hold talks with the Indonesian government. They held a meeting in Vanuatu in April 2008 to select a Papuan Hasan Tiro (interview with Thaha Al-Hamid, the secretary of PDP, Jayapura, 8 November 2008). 22 . Media Indonesia , 5 May 2005. 23 . During the civil war, illicit money collected from direct extortions was the main funding source for buying weapons for the GAM in launching the 190 Notes

insurgency. Since the peace settlement, they need money to fund their political activities, maintain their political patronage or simply to enjoy life after the struggle. In this context, many, if not all, former commanders of the rebel group have become contractors, but essentially engaged in rent seeking from government projects (Aspinall, 2009b). 24 . Interview with a source close to the former rebel group, Banda Aceh, November 2011. 25 . The introduction of election soon after peace settlement cannot be overem- phasized: see Collier (2009) on post-conflict election. 26 . The elite will only agree with democratization if they can protect their wealth from seizure by the newly empowered masses. If their wealth is in the form of mobile assets that can easily be transferred abroad, they do not need to worry about the assets’ seizure, and will agree with democratization. However, if their wealth is based on oil or other minerals, which is in the form of ‘fixed’ assets and subject to seizure by a newly democratic government, they will oppose democratization since they cannot protect their wealth by sending it abroad (Boix, 2003). 27 . Fish (2005) argues that corruption can help explain the connection between petroleum (and other mineral wealth) and the absence of political freedom, both in Russia and around the world. 28 . Ross (2009) argues that that oil-rich governments are less accountable to their citizens because they receive exceptionally strong backing from foreign powers like the US, Britain, France and (during the Cold War) the Soviet Union. 29 . ‘An Interview with Lee Kuan Yew’, The Economist , 27 August 1994. 30 . The agenda diagnosed the perceived ills of the Middle East as being due to its lack of democracy. Thus, Selden (2004) defines the neocon agenda as ‘American power to reshape the global environment in the name of a set of liberal democratic ideals. It is their belief that this will make the United States more secure by reducing the seemingly intractable problems of the Middle East, thus getting at some of the root causes of terrorism.’ 31 . Allocating government contracts to businesses that are politically connected to those in power. 32 . At cross-country level, Ross (2004b) argues that resource-rich countries that impose low taxes tend to have less representative and accountable governments through the logic of no representation without taxation. Their poli- ties are also more likely to be less democratic (Ross 2001a); furthermore, Ross (2001b) argues that there tends to be institutional breakdown due to negative government responses to the resource boom’s positive revenue shocks. 33 . The term Dutch disease was coined in 1977 by The Economist (26 November) to describe the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands after the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea in the 1960s. The classic economic model describing Dutch disease was developed by Corden and Neary (1982). 34 . This highly influential empirical work was followed by a series of updated versions, i.e. Sachs and Warner (1999, 2001). 35 . See Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001), Bevan et al. (1999), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Kim and Kim (2008). Notes 191

36 . According to Heidbüchel (2007), at the district level a huge amount of funds seem to disappear in the form of travel expenses for local government officials and into the private pockets of district heads. She mentioned a case as an example: the corruption of the regent of Wamena district reached such a dimension that the district was nearly bankrupt and electricity was shut down. 37 . Media Indonesia, 24 October 2009 and www.metronews.com news on 28 October 2009. 38 . The two cars were bought at the price of IDR 2 billion (USD 218,000), http:// www.detiknews.com/read/2005/04/28/174537/350624/10/anggota-dprd- riau-minta-mercy-gubernur-di-jakarta-dilelang, accessed 30 October 2009. 39 . The project allocated IDR 2 billion (USD 220,000) block grant per village per year since 2001. 40 . This concern was voiced by several key local politicians I met during my visit to the province in November 2008. 41 . See Aspinall (2011a) and ICG (2011). 42 . Author’s interview, Jayapura, 6 November 2008.

4 Ethnic Violence

1 . Approximately half of this chapter draws on Tadjoeddin (2013a). 2 . With regard to anti-Chinese violence, there might be interconnectedness among pogroms, governance and ethnic violence. Although the killing of (communists) Chinese by Dayaks in West Kalimantan in the late 1960s/ early 1970s would appear as inter-ethnic violence, this was a clear case of pogrom, since the Dayaks was backed/supported by the army (Kammen and Davidson, 2002). This is similar to the general pattern of the anti-communist killing in the mid-1960s in Java and Bali. There are also indications that the anti-Chinese riot in Jakarta, few days before the fall of Suharto in May 1998, might be considered a pogrom since it was linked to the problem of internal factions within the army (Rinakit, 2005; Mietzner, 2009a), not simply a case of ethnic violence as it has been commonly treated in the literature. 3 . Many Western countries issued travel warnings to their citizens wanting to visit Indonesia, and international tourists almost disappeared. It seemed that the whole country was torn by violence. 4 . Smaller acts of violence may be widespread, as is true of many parts of the world, but large-scale collective violence was not. This result is consistent with data on group violence in several other parts of the world: Africa ( Fearon and Laitin, 1996); the Hindu–Muslim conflict in India (Varshney, 2002), racial violence in the US in the 1960s (Horowitz, 1983) and Catholic–Protestant violence in Northern Ireland (Poole, 1990). Klinken (2007) provides a comparative case study of major episodes of ethnic violence in Indonesia. 5 . See HRW (1997), ICG (2001a), Peluso and Harwell (2001), Achwan et al. (2005), Smith (2005) on anti-Madurese violence in Kalimantan; see HRW (1999), ICG (2000, 2002b) and Klinken (2001) on Christian–Muslim violence in Ambon; see Tomagola (2000) and Wilson (2005, 2008) on violence in North Maluku; see Aragon (2001), HRW (2002) on Christian–Muslim violence in Central Sulawesi; and see ICG (2003a) on violence in Luwu, South Sulawesi. 192 Notes

6 . In the first four periods of the New Order Five-Year Development Plan (1969–89), 919,484 families, involving 4,249,240 people, were moved (Adhiati et al., 2001) 7 . Most migrants are generally found to be hard working as they are driven by hardship in their own land, and take the decision to leave and try a new life in a new land. They have to start from scratch and work hard to fulfil their dream of a better life. 8 . The concept of horizontal inequality has its roots in Gurr’s concept of relative deprivation. Such relative deprivation is not the result of one group simply comparing its socio-economic position with another group; but it arose from a situation when one group compares themselves with their past privileges. This has motivated them to try to regain political control when the situation permitted. This is different from relative deprivation due to widening horizontal inequalities as argued by Stewart (2000), which is a genuine or pure grievance that can be more easily isolated from greed. 9 . The logic of ‘the rage of the rich’ is also applicable to the case of secessionist sentiments expressed by several resource-rich provinces in Indonesia: see Chapter 3. 10 . In fact, Mancini initially finds that government employment and education were also significant, but the child mortality variable dominates; so when it is included, the other variables lose significance. 11 . Child mortality can be an outcome of poverty, unemployment, lack of services and other capabilities. One wonders why, when direct measures – such as education, income, unemployment and land-holdings – of horizontal inequalities fail to indicate any relationship with ethnic violence, the indi- rect outcome-based measure of child mortality should. 12 . Smith’s (2009) study on North Maluku confirms this. She argues that ethnic violence reflected elites’ power struggle over the state at the local level and was utilized by local elites for survival during political transition. 13 . The North Maluku province was part of Maluku in 1990. 14 . For example, see ICG (2007), Roth (2007), Kimura (2010, 2013) and Toha (2012). 15 . For example, the Christians regained control in Maluku province and Poso district, and the Dayaks now enjoy political leadership in districts and provinces in Kalimantan. 16 . Suharto, after 30 years in power, was losing his grip, and became excessively corrupt and less politically astute. 17 . In this regard, an edited volume on local politics in Indonesia during the height of the democratic transition (1998–2004) is appropriately titled Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia (Nordholt and Klinken, 2007). 18 . See also Chapter 3. 19 . It should be noted that routine violence is different from ethnic or secessionist violence; see Chapter 5 on routine violence. 20 . It is similar to Brancati’s (2006) method in coding the severity of ethnic and secessionist conflicts according to certain criteria based on the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, and the way the widely used PRIO–Uppsala conflict dataset classifies internal armed conflict into two categories, namely minor armed conflict and war according to battle-related deaths in a given year Notes 193

(see http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/), to mention two examples. 21 . Incident as a unit of measurement in the case of ethnic violence is unlikely to be comparable across all observations as an incident might cause only one person to be killed, while another incident might result in hundreds of fatali- ties. However, Toha (2012) uses this measure. 22 . The 14 provinces are Riau, Jakarta, Banten, West Java, Central Java, East Java, Central Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, East Nusatenggara, West Nusatenggara, Maluku and North Maluku. It is estimated that these 14 account for 96.4 per cent of the total deaths in non-separatist violence in Indonesia (see Varshney et al., 2008). In fact, using a similar method, the Indonesian country office of the World Bank has expanded and updated the UNSFIR conflict database (Barron et al., 2009; World Bank, 2010). It should be pointed out that all conflict data, including the highly regarded PRIO–Uppsala dataset on conflict, is collected from a variety of anecdotal sources comprising the media, human rights groups and the Red Cross. 23 . The National Socio-economic Surveys (SUSENAS) during the Suharto era did not differentiate socio-economic data according to ethnicity or religion. This may have done deliberately in order to eliminate the association of socio- economic outcomes with ethnicity in an attempt to create an Indonesian identity. This is consistent with Suharto’s equalization schemes. 24 . Mancini (2008) attempts to measure inter-group horizontal inequality within districts in the context of ethnic violence in Indonesia. He employs the group-based coefficient of variation weighted by group size (GCOV) to measure horizontal inequality based on ethno-linguistic groups and ethno- religious groups. Note that only one basis, either ethno-linguistic or ethno- religious, can be applied at once.

1 1 ⎛ R ⎞ 2 GCOV = ∑ pyp ()y − y 2 rR= 1,, ⎝ r ⎠⎟ y r

where R is the number of ethnic groups in the district, yˉ is the district sample 1 nr mean of variable y, y = ∑ y is group r mean value of y in the district, and r ir nr i pr is group r district population share. Østby (2008a) uses a similar approach in a cross-country setting. We cannot use Mancini’s approach as we do not have data to measure the changes over time; see the previous footnote. Mancini uses data for only one year (1995) 25 . One might wonder that regional income (I) and HDI as a welfare measure (W) are correlated since national income-based purchasing power is one of three components of HDI, as in the case of cross-country HDI. This is not the case in the inter-district HDI in Indonesia, which uses household expenditure- based purchasing power as the proxy for standard of living in the Indonesian HDI (UNDP, 2001). 26 . Kediri had the highest per capita RGDP of IDR 20 million in 1996, while the second richest district in the sample only had IDR 5.5 million (all are in 1993 constant prices). 27 . This is part of the success of New Order development on education. The Inpres emphasized broad-based health and education development through 194 Notes

the massive introduction of Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat ( Puskesmas : community health centre) and primary schools all over the country, reaching even the most of remote places in eastern Indonesia, where most of the severe ethnic strife occurred. Another New Order development priority was rural agricultural infrastructure. 28 . The total district revenue is measured as the size of total fiscal revenue of each district relative to their RGDP, expressed in percentage, for the year of 2003. This year is chosen to have a more stable pattern of district revenues after the introduction of (fiscal) decentralization in 2001. 29 . Recession here is defined as when districts’ RGDP contracts or experiences a negative growth. It is expressed as a positive value of contraction magnitude; therefore, districts that did not experience recession or had positive growth in the 1998 crisis year will have a negative value. 30 . The issue of ethnicity does play a role in Aceh and Papua’s secessionist struggles, as ethnicity plays a critical role in much civil war, such as Tamil (Sri Lanka), Kashmir (India) and Mindanao (Philippines). However, ethnicity- based civil war is vertical in nature, which is completely different from our definition of ethnic violence used in this chapter. 31 . In a similar spirit, anti-Chinese violence preceding the fall of Suharto in May 1998 and the series of food riots that have occurred since early 1998, which can be labelled anti-Chinese violence, are excluded as well. This is because anti-Chinese violence was related to the mood at national level surrounding the fall of the New Order regime and is less relevant to the inter-ethnic power struggle at the local level. 32 . The excluded provinces are Aceh (1 province), Riau (2 provinces: Riau and Riau Islands), East Kalimantan (1 province), Papua (2 provinces: Papua and West Irian Jaya) and Jakarta (1 province). 33 . At that time Indonesia had a total of 298 districts. The number increased to 497 in 2012. 34 . See Chapter 3 on centre–regional conflict. 35 . Transfers include DAU, DAK and revenue from province. On average in 2003 in the sample districts, transfers account for 80 per cent of total district revenue. 36 . Our 2SLS regression emphasizes the sequential and simultaneous nature of the process. What we mean by simultaneous is the situation where the first stage of X = f (m, j, k) and the second stage of Y = f (X, w, z) , as in the case of our grievance and cooperation equations. It is slightly different from the instrumental variable (IV) approach that is primarily aimed at tackling the problem of endogeneity between the dependent and an independent variable in the second stage regression; see Wooldridge (2006). The use of 2SLS regression is appropriate since both equations in our simultaneous equation system are over-identified.

5 Routine-Everyday Violence

1 . This section draws on Tadjoeddin and Murshed (2007). 2 . The mean of poverty is 21.1 per cent and the poverty coefficient is 0.0557647 (or 5.58 per cent). Halving poverty means the reduction poverty by 10.55 per cent (0.5 × 21.1 per cent). Therefore, by halving poverty, violence incidents would decline by 58.9 per cent (0.5 × 21.1 × 5.58 per cent). Notes 195

3 . The figure is constructed hypothetically, so as to visualize the inverted-U- shaped relationship between violence and income/education. The distribu- tions of income and education along the turning points can be seen in the horizontal box-plot. 4 . This section draws on Tadjoeddin et al. (2012). 5 . Another widely used measure is the decile dispersion ratio, which presents the ratio of the average consumption or income of the richest 10 per cent of the population divided by the average income of the bottom 10 per cent. It indicates how the bottom decile of the population (in terms of income) fairs in comparison with the top decile. 6 . If Java is treated as a single country and small city states are excluded, it will be the second most densely populated area in the world after Bangladesh. 7 . This figure is moderate. In 2000, the age groups of 15–24 made up 17 per cent or less of the total adult population in almost all developed countries, while the figures for developing countries were around 35 per cent (Urdal, 2006). However, the variation of the figures across districts in Java is more impor- tant than the overall average. 8 . In addition to demand-induced scarcity, Homer-Dixon identifies the other two main-sources of resource scarcity: supply-induced scarcity resulting from deple- tion of natural resources and structural scarcity that applies only to certain groups, in relative terms, because they are excluded from equal access to particular resources. 9 . Taken from BPS data (National Income Account and Sakernas – National Labour Force Survey, various years). 10 . Since Aristotle, social philosophers have speculated that economic inequality is a fundamental cause of political violence and revolution. De Tocqueville ([1835] 1961: 302) stated the classical hypothesis succinctly: ‘Almost all of the revolutions which have changed the aspect of nations have been made to consolidate or to destroy social inequality. Remove the secondary causes which have produced the great convulsions of the world, and you will almost always find the principle of inequality at the bottom.’ 11 . See among others Hauge and Ellingsen (1998), de Soysa (2002b), Urdal (2005) and Theisen (2008). 12 . The use of 2SLS regression is appropriate since both equations in the simultaneous equation system are over-identified. 13 . The bold figure for income, growth and human development is classified as having values of these variables that are less than ‘average minus one standard deviation’, while the italic number refers to values of these variables that fall between the ‘average minus one standard deviation’ and ‘average’. 14 . This section draws on Murshed et al. (2009). 15 . A pure public good is described to be non-rivalled and non-excludable. One citizen’s consumption does not detract from the ability of others to benefit from the public good; moreover, its total provision is unrelated to individual ability to pay for it. 16 . Richer regions may have a greater ability to alleviate poverty, but may be unwilling to do so for the poor in distant parts of the country that they do not always identify with. 17 . Among others, see Saideman et al. (2002), Brancati (2006), Tranchant (2007, 2008) and Bakke and Wibbels (2006). 196 Notes

18 . Between 1999 and the first three years of fiscal decentralization (2001–03), on average in real terms at national level, central government transfers (including the revenue sharing of natural resource rents) to district governments increased by 138 per cent. At the same time, total districts’ own revenues also increased by 182 per cent, since district governments become more active in collecting their own local revenues due to decentralization. However, the role of districts’ own revenues in the overall district government revenues is still small: 13 per cent in the period of 2001–03 and 11 per cent in 1999 (Source: author’s calculation based on data presented in World Bank (2007) , table C.8, page 160). 19 . This is to capture any improvements made in the second and third years of the implementation of fiscal decentralization after the rather chaotic situation in the first year. 20 . The real revenue and expenditure figures are obtained by using the GDP deflator at the district level. 21 . We use the simple average value of RGDP growth and per capita RGDP for 2001–03, and for population we use figures for 2001. 22 . Available online at www.djpk.depkeu.go.id. 23 . The origin of increased local district government budgets can be attributed into two sources. First, there is a truly incremental increase in (fresh) money spent at the local level. This is very apparent in the case of local revenue derived from the sharing of natural resource rents as experienced by a few resource rich regions, such as Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan and Papua. However, new fresh transfers from the centre are also possible depending on the different needs of localities. In addition, local district governments have also become more active in collecting new sources of local revenues. Second, is the shifting of spending from central to district governments due to the transfer of responsibilities in areas such as health, education and infrastructure, whereas in fact many such expenditures were made at the local level before decentralization, but were centrally managed. In resource-poor Java, the second component is much more dominant than the first. However, we are not able to separate them due to data paucity. The allocations of incremental revenues are determined according to the fiscal balance law for resource rents, and according to the nationally designed formula for the general allocation fund (transfer). However, there is still some limited room for manoeuvre available to patronage networks between local and national elites; for example, it has been reported that local executives tried to lobby relevant national elites in order to secure more allocation of certain budgetary items, such as disaster mitigation funds. 24 . Pooled Poisson models (a1) and (b1) have the over-dispersion problem. Total revenue to RGDP ratio retains its significance in NB estimation (column a2), while locally generated revenue to total revenue retains its significance in column (b3). 25 . Likelihood-ratio tests are performed to check the appropriateness of the panel estimation (random effects) model against the pooled variant. 26 . One might think of the possibility of endogeneity problem between routine violence and locally generated revenue since lower levels of violence might create an enabling local condition to increase local revenues. However, such Notes 197

a possibility can be ignored since routine violence is a low-intensity and commonly occurring phenomenon in Javanese society that hardly affects local economic conditions. It is episodic violence that can badly damage the local economy. 27 . Income positively correlates (0.4) with the size locally generated revenue (as % of total revenue). 28 . One way of investigating the joint effect of the size of locally generated revenue and income is to introduce an interaction term between them. This has been tried and the sign of this interaction term is positive, meaning that the violence-reducing effect of locally generated revenue is offset by income (result available upon request). This might be due to the inverted-U-curve relationship between violence and income, where the positive sign of the interaction term is driven mainly by the upward part of the inverted-U curve. Therefore the offsetting effect is most likely to be temporary. Once income reaches a threshold level, we can expect violence to decline as found in Tadjoeddin and Murshed (2007).

6 Local Electoral Violence

1 . This chapter draws on Tadjoeddin (2012). 2 . See also Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009). 3 . The term PILKADA, standing for Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (head of regional election), has been widely used. It refers to the elections of both district heads as well as provincial heads. The new term PEMILUKADA (Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah – general election of regional head) has been introduced since late 2010. However, the PILKADA term is used throughout this chapter. 4 . This is not to suggest that the national elections were entirely free of violence. In fact there were some. During the campaign period of the 1999 elections, several clashes occurred between the supporters of the Islamist party of PPP and the Islamist-inclusive party of PKB in Central Java: the most serious one was the clash in Jepara district that claimed five lives. When Megawati Soekarnoputri, the chairman of the winning party PDIP in the 1999 parliamentary elections, failed in her bid to be elected as the president by the MPR in October 1999, riots broke out in Bali and Solo that killed one person, and burned dozens of buildings and hundreds of vehicles (Tadjoeddin, 2002b). Although minor violent incidents still occurred during the 2004 and 2009 national elections, especially during the campaign periods, they were negli- gible compared with incidents of electoral violence during 2005 and 2010 rounds of local direct elections. 5 . See http://www.kemendagri.go.id/news/2013/11/18/kemendagri-elit-lokal- tak-siap-berdemokrasi, accessed on 30 November 2013. 6 . DPD has no legislative function; however, it may propose legislations relating to regional development to the Indonesian Parliament (DPR – Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat). Both DPR and DPD form the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR – Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat). 7 . Fragmentation refers to the division of an entity into many fragments, while complete polarization occurs when an entity is divided into two segments of equal size. 198 Notes

8 . The chairman of Nahdatul Ulama Hasyim Muzadi called for the abolition of direct elections for local executives and a return to the old system where heads of districts or provinces were elected by local parliaments (Kompas, 28 January 2008). The chairman of Muhammadiyah Din Syamsuddin suggested that local direct elections should be seriously re-evaluated with a view to finding a better solution (Suara Karya , 3 March 2008). 9 . This was voiced by the chairman of DPD in his official speech at a plenary session of DPD on 22 August 2008 (http://www.tempo.co.id/hg/ nasional/2008/08/22/brk,20080822–131863,id.html, accessed on 26 April 2009). 10 . Comment made by Professor Ryaas Rasyid, a key designer of Indonesian decentralization laws and a former Indonesian minister for regional autonomy (Kompas , 5 September 2009). 11 . Kompas , 18 July 2013. 12 . Among others, some key studies are Londregan and Poole (1996), Barro (1997, 1999), Przeworski and Limongi (1997), Przeworski et al. (2000), Boix and Stokes (2003), Epstein et al. (2006), Glaeser et al. (2007), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a) and Acemoglu et al. (2009). 13 . Patronage politics are not limited to immature democracies, as they are also frequently practised in advanced democracies. However, in Indonesia, it has been argued that the legacies of the old regime have survived and succeeded in reinserting themselves in the newly set-up democratic political system (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). 14 . The military was not ordered to brutally crush student demonstrations, as one observed in the Tiananmen Square in 1989. 15 . The South Africa path is one of four scenarios of dictatorship and democracy offered by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). The other three are the UK, which gradually moved towards democracy without significant resist- ance from the elites; Argentina, where the elites strongly resisted democratic demands, resulting in a long period of instability moving from dictatorship to democracy and vice-versa; and Singapore, which ended up with a stable and happy anocracy. 16 . Again, it does not mean that the national level elections were totally free of violence. 17 . This is not to reduce the failure of the democratic experiment in the 1950s simply because of Indonesia’s lack of socio-economic development at that time. Democracy functioned reasonably well until 1956, when non- democratic forces (President Sukarno, the Indonesian Communist Party – PKI and the military) started to undermine parliamentarism. It could be argued that democracy could have survived without the organized and coordinated pressures from these non-democratic actors (Mietzner, 2009a). In line with the modernization theory, Bhakti (2004) argued that the failure was the result of a lack of adequate institutional back-up for democracy: a lack of education, a lack of democratic culture and an insufficient economic base. 18 . By providing legitimacy, development and diversification reduced political risks. By contrast, Mobutu of Congo did not opt for development and diversification since he faced a high degree of societal opposition, which led him to believe that investments in infrastructure and other public goods would pose a threat to his grip on political power. Notes 199

19 . During Suharto’s rule (1966–98), provincial and district heads were nomi- nally elected by the local (provincial and district) parliaments, but they were essentially Suharto’s choices. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, Jakarta virtu- ally lost control over local elections and regional heads were purely elected by local parliaments. And since 2005 they have been elected through popular votes of direct local elections. 20 . Erb and Sulistyanto (2009) is probably the best collection of case studies on the direct local elections covering a wide range of issues such as political parties, local elites, corruption and money politics, media, ethnic politics, women and conflict. Other case studies, among others, include Buehler (2007), Buehler and Tan (2007), Choi (2007), Mietzner (2007, 2009b), Nurhasim (2009), ICG (2010, 2009, 2008, 2006), Palmer (2010). 21 . The 1999 free and fair multi-party elections marked Indonesia’s second entrance to democracy. 22 . This is very similar to Brancati’s (2006) approach in constructing an ordinal scale for determining the severity of ethnic conflict in cross-country settings, based on the Minority at Risk (MAR) dataset. 23 . They are KOMPAS , Koran TEMPO , Media Indonesia, Republika , Sinar Harapa , Suara Karya, Suara Pembaruan and the Jakarta Post. I thank Teguh Yudo Wicaksono, who facilitated my data collection at CSIS. 24 . The provinces are Central Java, East Java, Yogyakarta, Aceh, Riau, West Sumatra and East Kalimantan. The three Javanese provinces were deliberately visited to read the PILKADA-related archives of Suara Merdeka (Central Java), Jawa Pos (East Java) and Kedaulatan Rakyat (Yogyakarta). A similar thing was done in East Kalimantan (Kaltim Post), Riau (Riau Pos) and West Sumatra (Singgalang ). The cross-check on local newspaper reports for Aceh was made possible by the availability of the UNDP’s Aceh Peace and Development Monitoring database and the World Bank’s Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update. 25 . However, it has to be noted that in the second cycle of direct local elections starting in 2010, the provinces of Papua and West Papua need to be put under a close scrutiny since direct elections in these regions have been the deadliest ones and the theatre for tribal wars. There is a strong indication that local democracy in the form of local direct elections in Papua is system- atically different from those in the rest of Indonesia. But a recent case study by IPAC (2013) on re-districting and local election in Papua highlands simply reduced the problem of violence during local direct elections into problems related to administrative aspects of the electoral process. 26 . See Appendix 6.1 for the detail list of district PILKADAs belong to the categories of medium, high and very high hostilities. 27 . It should be noted that this is not to deny the instrumental role of ethnic and religious factors for political mobilization during local elections; however, they do not serve as the cleavage by which the hostility takes place. It can be seen that the cleavage and the main reason for the hostility are mainly due to fierce electoral competition and dissatisfaction towards electoral management. 28 . Although two district PILKADAs in North Maluku province are categorized as very high hostility PILKADAs and four district PILKADAs in Maluku province fall within the category of high hostility PILKADAs, they seem to be not 200 Notes

driven by the Christian–Muslim religious divide that fuelled inter-communal violence in the region during the early phase of democratic transition. In fact, a mixed pair of Christian and Muslim for local leadership (governor and its deputy; or regent and its deputy) has become a newly adopted local norm in local direct elections in Maluku; see Chapter 4. 29 . Five district PILKADAs in West and Central Kalimantan are categorized as high hostility PILKADAs; however the hostilities were not related to the anti- ethnic Madurese sentiment that fuelled inter-communal violence in the two provinces’ several localities during the early phase of democratization. 30 . In Poso, which experienced a series of bloody Christian–Muslim clashes between 1998 and 2004, there were several cases of bomb explosions directed at a political candidate, approaching the voting day of the district PILKADA in June 2005. However, the attacks were not related to religious divide. They can be seen as the utilization of a specific skill acquired in the period of ethnic violence. 31 . Author’s calculation based on short descriptions of violent incidents in the 20 district PILKADAs in ICG (2010: 23–24). It should be noted that ICG (2010) is not a systematic large sample study, it provides case studies of four district PILKADAs in 2010 (Mojokerto, Tana Toraja, Toli Toli and Poso). A proper comparison should be based on the similar methodology applied to the second cycle of district PILKADAs starting in 2010. 32 . It should be also noted that the relative size of district government revenue might not be a good proxy of elite competition. Another alternative proxy for elite competition is to look at electoral competition itself, which can be measured by the margin of victory between the winner and the runner up. Smaller margin means higher competition. We could not exercise this due to data limitation; however, this can be a direction for further research. 33 . Before 2007, the district head or the provincial governor proposed candidates for regions’ respective KPUD commissioners, then the provincial KPUD or national KPU selected the definitive commissioners of the respective KPUD (Law no. 12/2003). The mechanism was revised in 2007 (Law no. 22/2007). National KPU and provincial KPUD form a selection committee in each province and district respectively. The committee members must be representative with a set of minimum qualifications. KPUD commissioners’ candidates are chosen through an open recruitment process with written exams, health checks and psychological tests. The selection committee propose candidates for respective KPUD commissioners and then the national KPU and provincial KPUD select definitive commissioners of respective KPUD through fit and proper tests. The latter mechanism is arguably better than the previous one.

Conclusion

1 . As North (1990) tells us, institutions can be formal and informal. Government policies and programmes that are geared particularly to enhancing horizontal equality generate an implicit social contract that does not have to be formal. But they shape human interactions. Notes 201

2 . Conflict transformation is a preferable concept than ‘conflict resolution’ or ‘conflict management’ (Galtung, 1996; Lederach, 2003). Conflict resolution implies that conflict is harmful – hence it is something that should be ended. It also assumes that it is a short-term phenomenon that can be resolved permanently through mediation or other interventions. Conflict management presumes conflicts to be long-term processes that often cannot be quickly resolved, but the notion of ‘management’ suggests that people can be directed or controlled. Conflict transformation involves altering negative forces in a positive direction for constructive change.

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Index

accountability, 3, 67 Bates, Robert, 116 Acehnese, 48 Bertrand, Jacques, 81 Aceh Party, 64 Beureueh, Daud, 27 Aceh province, 1, 2, 5, 15 Bhutto, Benazir, 161 autonomy laws for, 17–18 blood diamonds, 7 corruption in, 70–1 Bolivia, 70 electoral competition in, 72–3 Brown, Graham, 38 Free Aceh Movement, 1, 17–18, 32, Brunei, 15, 58 44–5, 57–8, 60, 64, 72–3 budget allocation, 78, 105–6 inequalities in, 36–7, 44–5 natural resources, 44–5, 188n11 censorship, 30 peace agreement, 18 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 28 resources, 44 Central Kalimantan, 89 secessionist conflict in, 31–2, 36, centre-region (separatist) conflict, 5 44–5, 57–9 Chenery, Hollis, 158 sectoral regional GDP, 73 child mortality, 37, 83–4, 192n11 Aceh Utara, 188n11 Christian-Muslim violence, 34, Acemoglu, Daron, 127 79, 81 affluence, 3 Christians, 11–13, 81, 84 see also prosperity civil emergency status, 86, 89 agency, 39 civil war, 4, 5, 6, 7, 25, 86, 112 Ahtisaari, Martti, 18 causes of, 13 anti-Chinese riots, 2, 34, 191n2, cross-country studies of, 16 194n31 club goods, 138–9 anti-colonial movement, 24 Cold War, 9, 25, 29, 47 anti-Madurese violence, 2 collective action problem, 126–7 Arab Spring, 108 Collier, Paul, 6–7, 57, 58, 83, 101, 126 Aristotle, 157 Commission for Reception, Truth and armed opposition groups, 63–4 Reconciliation (CAVR), 47 Asian financial crisis, 1, 2, 10, 11, 30, communism, 9, 24, 29, 47, 185n26 75, 160 communist uprising, 25 Aspinall, Edward, 86 community welfare, 55 ‘aspiration to inequality’, 15, 21, 55–7, conflict 59, 74, 185n31 see also violence asset specificity, 65 centre-region (separatist), 5, 11, authoritarian regimes, 3, 9, 28, 53, 14–16, 31–3, 42–74, 176, 180 65, 70 economics of, 35–9, 48–59 average growth per capita, 80 electoral, 5, 6, 20, 22, 153–74, 177–8, 181 bad governance, 70–2 enabling conditions for, 6–20 Balkanization, 2, 12, 33 ethnic, 5, 14, 15, 21, 36–7, 75–111, Bangladesh, 161 180–1 Batak, 36 explanations for, 34–5

217 218 Index conflict – continued controlled, 9 greed motivation for, 6–9, 20, 21, development and, 157–9 38, 57–9, 84–6, 89–90, 98, 100 economic growth and, 65–7 grievance explanation for, 7–9, education and, 158 12–14, 19, 20, 38, 47–8, 57–9, guided, 9, 24, 29, 186n8 89–90, 98, 100, 175–6 illiberal, 161–2 internal, 72–3 income and, 162 political economy of, 5 in Indonesia, 1, 2 religious, 34, 79, 81 mature, 156, 162, 172 research on, 4–5 modernization hypothesis and, resolution, 63, 201n2 157–9, 160, 161, 171 secessionist, 5, 16, 31–3, 42–74 parliamentary, 24, 28 typology of, 5 in resource-rich society, 65–7 conflict studies, 34–5, 39–41 routine violence and, 177 Congo, 161, 198n18 democratic transition, 1–4, 11–12, consociational democracy, 19 16–20, 23, 31, 183n2 consumption poverty, 96, 171 cooperation during, 89–90 contest, nature of, 182 direct local elections and, 160–2 controlled democracy, 9 ethnic conflict and, 108–9 convergences, 12–14, 15, 38, 49–53, post-transition development 79–83, 175–6 performance, 67–70 cooperation, 16–19, 39–40, 176 state capacity during, 78 model, 101, 105–6 success of Indonesian, 153 after violence, 86–90 violence during, 31–4 corruption, 11, 30, 65, 69, 70–1, 74 deprivation, see relative deprivation Cramer, Christopher, 40, 122, 126 Dijk, C. van, 26–7 crime, 6, 112, 117 direct elections, 20, 60, 64–7, 72, 86, cronyism, 11 151–2, 153, 155–74 cruel choice hypothesis, 66 dissent, 30 divergence, 83 Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM), DOM, see Daerah Operasi Militer 31–2, 57 (DOM) Darul Islam (DI), 24, 26–7, 44–5 Dutch disease syndrome, 69, 70, 73–4, Dayaks, 82–3 190n33 decentralization reforms, 15–17, 20–1, 31, 109 East Asian financial crisis, see Asian ethnic conflict and, 78, 85–6, 90 financial crisis fiscal decentralization, 137–45, 151, East Kalimantan, 2, 5, 12, 15, 177, 196n18 17, 37 local government and, 140–3 decentralization reforms in, 61 routine violence and, 137–50, 151 resources, 44 secessionist conflict and, 59–61, 63, secessionist conflict in, 44, 46, 57 66–7, 74, 176 sectoral regional GDP, 73 decile dispersion ratio, 195n5 East Timor, 2, 30, 33, 46–7 demand-induced scarcity, 124–5 econometrics, 40 democracy economic crisis, 30–1 affluence and, 3 economic decentralization, 59–60 consociational, 19 economic freedom index, 138 Index 219 economic growth/development, 19, districts with, 109–10 65–7, 78, 101, 103 greed as cause of, 84–6, 98, 100, democracy and, 157–9 102–5, 109, 175–6 inclusive, 179 grievances and, 98, 102–5, 109, lack of, 112 175–6 under New Order regime, 108, 161 inter-ethnic cooperation after, post-transition, 67–70 86–90 routine violence and, 116–20 major episodes of, 76 economics, of conflict, 35–9, 48–59 map of, 77 economy, 1, 4, 10–11, 17 matrix of correlations, 111 education, 11, 20, 21, 81, 82, 96 relative deprivation as cause of, democracy and, 158 78–84, 104 electoral hostility and, 169–70, 171 research on, 90–111 ethnic violence and, 176 severity of, 90–2, 106–7 routine violence and, 118, spatial differences in, 76–8 119–20, 121 summary statistics on, 110 education-poverty gap, 96–8, 99, 104 ethno-communal conflicts, 2 Egypt, 1 elections, 1, 17, 31 failed states, 2 direct, 20, 60, 64–7, 86, 151–3, Fearon, James D., 126–7 155–74 federalism, see decentralization elections, 72 reforms first, 24 financing, of rebel groups, 7, 64 local, 64–5, 72, 151–2, 155–74 fiscal decentralization, 2, 137–45, 151, multi-party, 24, 31, 75, 154, 177, 196n18 159, 160 Five-Year Development Plan, 51–2 parliamentary, 154, 155, 160 foreign investment, 10, 51 presidential, 154, 155, 160 foreign support, 65 electoral competition, 66–7, 72–3, 79 Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 1, 17–18, electoral hostility index (EHI), 162–73 32, 44–5, 57–8, 60, 64, 72–3 electoral management perspective, 172 Gaddafi, Muammar, 187n13 electoral violence, 5, 6, 20, 22, 74, Galtung, Johan, 179 153–74, 177–8, 181 GAM, see Free Aceh Movement elite competition and, 159, 171–2 game theory, 16 incidence of, 154 Geertz, Clifford, 52 research on, 162–73 General and Specific Allocation elite competition, 7, 78, 156, 159, Funds, 63 171–2 Gini coefficient, 10, 79, 80, 121, Elson, Robert E., 45 123–4, 127, 131–2 episodic violence, 34, 112 global financial crisis, 1 equalization scheme, 13–16, 48–53, globalization, 108 55, 58, 85–6 governance issues, 70–2 ethnic minorities, see minority groups government, local, 138, 139, 140–3, ethnic violence, 5, 14, 15, 21, 36–7, 145–50, 151, 196n23 75–111, 180–1 government expenditures, 71–2, defined, 5 138–9, 148–50, 151 democratic transition and, 108–9 government revenues, 61–4, 66, 147–8 220 Index greed, 6–9, 14–16, 20, 21, 38 democracy and, 162 democracy and, 108 per capita, 93–5, 100 ethnic violence and, 84–6, 89–90, violence and, 19–20, 37–9, 117–19, 98, 100, 102–5, 109, 175–6 121, 126, 131–4, 151 secessionist conflict and, 57–9 income index, 93–4 grievances, 6–9, 12–14, 19, 20, 38, income-welfare gap, 94–5 47–8, 175–6 independence democracy and, 108 declaration of, 45 ethnic violence and, 89–90, 98, 100, early, 24–8 102–5, 109, 176 internal conflicts since, 23–40 secessionist conflict and, 57–9, 74 India, 17, 83 group brawls, 19–20, 112 Indonesia group motivations, for conflict, 8 conflict and cooperation in, 9–20 growth model, 117, 118, 119 democratic transition in, 30–1, guided democracy, 9, 24, 29, 186n8 160–2, 183n2 Gurr, Ted, 13, 19, 92, 176, 185n32 economic crisis in, 30–1 ethnic violence in, 75–111 Habibie, President, 17 independence for, 45, 2304 Hadjar, Ibnu, 27 internal conflicts in, 23–40 Halmahera Utara, 87 local electoral violence in, 153–74 Hatta, Mohammad, 25 routine-everyday violence in, Helsinki Accord, 18, 60, 63 112–52 Hibbs, Douglas A., 116 secessionist conflict in, 42–74 Hindus, 83 Indonesian Communist Party, 25, 28 Hirschman, Albert O., 133 Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), 28 Hirshleifer, Jack, 8 Indramayu district, 135–6 Hobbes, Thomas, 8 inequality, 12, 20, 36–7, 44–5, 50–6, Hoeffler, Anke, 7, 83, 101, 126 83–4, 178 Homer-Dixon, Thomas, 124–5, 195n8 horizontal, 120, 121, 122, 123–4, horizontal inequality, 83–4, 120–4, 127, 185n32, 192n8 127, 185n31, 192n8 population pressure and, 134–7 horizontal social contract, 8–9, 16, 90, routine violence and, 120–37 151, 153, 177–8, 179 vertical, 120, 121, 122, 127–9, Horowitz, Donald, 5 131–4, 150–1, 177 human capital, 158 infant mortality, 10, 68 human development Inglehart, R., 158 indicators, 49, 51 Inpres, 51–2 measures, 55 institutional breakdown, 8–9 richer areas with lower, 93–5 inter-ethnic violence, 2, 11–12, 16, 18 routine violence and, 118, 119 internal conflicts, 23–40, 72–3, 75 violence and, 37–8 International Crisis Group (ICG), 35 human development index (HDI), 55, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 56, 68, 101 184n7 human rights abuses, 10, 30 international relations, 179 Human Rights Watch (HRW), 35 inverted-U hypothesis, 12, 20, 22, 37–8, 117, 131, 133, 151, 177 illiberal democracy, 161–2 Islam, 24, 28–9 income Islamic extremism, 179–80 across regions, 49–50, 63, 93–5, 100 Islamic State of Indonesia, 24, 26–7 Index 221

Jakarta, 2 migrants, 12–13, 79, 81, 84, Java, 19–22, 49, 112 192n7 migration from, 79, 81 mining, 54 population density on, 125 minority groups, 48 routine-everyday violence in, mobilization for violence 113–14 perspective, 172 Javanese, 36, 37, 45 Mobutu, 185n26, 198n18 Justino, Patricia, 17 modernization hypothesis, 3, 65, 157–9, 160, 161, 171, 177 Kalimantan, 82–3 Muhammadiyah, 155 Kenya, 162 Muller, Edward N., 126 Klinken, Gerry van, 15, 84, 85 multi-party elections, 24, 31, 75, 154, Kuznets, Simon, 12, 20, 117, 131, 133, 159, 160 151, 158 Murshed, S. Mansoob, 19–20, 37, 38, 39, 127–9, 131, 135 Laitin, David, 126–7 Muslims, 11–13, 25, 81, 83, 84, 180, Law on Governing Aceh, 18 186n4 legitimacy, 67 Muzakkar, Kahar, 27 Lerner, Daniel, 158 Myanmar, 1 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 58 Nahdatul Ulama, 155 Libya, 187n13 Nash equilibrium, 16 life expectancy, 169–70, 171 nationalism, 24, 28–9 Lijphart, Arend, 19, 86, 159 natives, 12–13 Limongi, Fernando, 159 natural resources, 12, 44–5, 51, 54, Lipset, Seymour Martin, 157–8 58, 188n11 literacy rate, 10 competition for, 7, 15 local election commissions (KPUDs), convergence across regions of, 154, 172 49–50 local elections, 64–5, 72, 151–2, rents from, 58, 61–7, 70, 74 155–74 resource curse, 61–4, 69–72, 176, local electoral violence, 153–74, 177–8 178 local elites, 84 natural rights, 9 local government, 138, 139, 140–3, negative peace, 179 145–50, 151, 196n23 neoconservatism, 66 Locke, John, 8–9, 16 neo-Malthusian perspective, 22, 120, 124–5, 135, 150–1, 177 Madiun, 25 Netherlands, 26, 45 Maluku, 2 New Order regime, 2, 9–12, 14, 23, Malaysia, 18, 83, 186n35 24, 29–31, 35, 48, 59, 75, 108, Maluku, 5, 87 183n6 Mancini, Luca, 37, 38, 83–4 collapse of, 31, 35, 59, 75, 89, 114 market economy, 114 economic growth/development market liberalization, 3–4 during, 48–53, 160, 161 Marxism, 24 Nigeria, 2, 70 massacres, 29 non-cooperative games, 16 Masyumi, 27–8 non-zero-sum games, 16 mature democracies, 162, 172 North Maluku, 2 middle class, 10, 11, 35, 84 North Sumatra, 36 222 Index

Oates, Wallace E., 139 positive peace, 179 oil, 7 Poso, 2, 87 Olson, Mancur, 116, 127 poverty, 8, 10, 13, 36, 49, 50, 54–6, 68 OPM, see Papua Free Movement consumption, 96, 171 (OPM) education-poverty gap, 96–8, Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), 33 99, 104 electoral hostility and, 169–70, Pakistan, 161 171, 173 Pancasila, 10 routine violence and, 118, 119 Papua Free Movement (OPM), 45, 46 poverty reduction, 50–1 Papuan People Congress, 60, 187n15 poverty trap, 7 Papua Presidium Council (PDP), 57 predatory peace, 70–1 Papua region, 1–2, 5, 18, 37 presidential elections, 1, 154, 155, 160 autonomy laws for, 17, 60, 74 Presidium Dewan Papua (PDP), 33 corruption in, 71 primary commodities, 101, 103 decentralization reforms in, 60–1 private violence, 117, 139–40 electoral competition in, 72 prosperity, 3, 10 ethnic composition of, 37, 48 prosperity-welfare gaps, 56–7, 63 poverty rate in, 56 PRRI-Permesta revolt, 27–8 resources, 44 Przeworski, Adam, 159 secessionist conflict in, 32–3, 44–6, public goods, 138–9, 195n15 57–9 public officials, 66–7 sectoral regional GDP, 73 parliamentary democracy, 24, 28 ‘rage of the rich’, 13–14, 59, 83, 192n9 parliamentary elections, 1, 154, rational choice, 2, 6–7, 179 155, 160 realist school, 39, 179 patronage, 66–7 rebel groups, 7, 63–4, 70–1, 86 per capita GDP, 53–6, 69, 80 recession, 100–1, 103 per capita income, 10 re-districting, 85 PILKADAs, 154–6, 162–8, 197n3, regional differences, 12 199–200 regional GDP (RGDP), 93–5, 100 Pinochet, Augusto, 29, 185n26 regional inequalities, 49–50, 50–6 Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 134 regional revolts, 24–8 policy implications, 179–80 relative deprivation, 13–14, 19–21, policy messages, 178 47–9, 58–9, 74, 78, 89 political coalitions, 86–9 as cause of ethnic violence, political decentralization, 59, 66 78–84, 104 political economy, 4, 5 education-poverty gap and, political exclusion, 79 96–9, 104 political parties, 63–4 measuring, 93–8 political science, 179 operationalizing, 92–3 politicians, 66–7 unfulfilled expectations and, 95–8 Pontianak, 88 religion, 2, 28–9, 34 population density, 80 rentier effect, 70 population pressure, 80, 178 repeated games, 16, 18, 39–40, inequality and, 134–7 109, 176 violence and, 120–37, 177 repression, 14, 65 pork barrel projects, 66, 69, 71–2, 74 resource curse, 61–4, 69–72, 176, 178 positive externalities, 148–50, 151 resource rents, 58, 61–7, 70, 74 Index 223 resource-rich regions, 12, 15, 21, 36–8, secessionist conflict, 1–2, 5, 11, 14–16, 42, 44, 49–50, 64–5, 67–70, 176 31–3, 42–74, 176, 180 see also specific regions in Aceh, 31–2, 36, 44–5, 57–61 democracy in, 65–7 in East Kalimantan, 33, 44, 46, 57 Dutch disease syndrome and, 69, in East Timor, 46–7 70, 73–4 economic origins of, 48–59 Revolutionary Government of greed motivation for, 57–9 Republic of Indonesia (PRRI), 28 grievance explanation for, 57–9 revolutionary war, 23 map of, 43 Riau region, 2, 5, 12, 17, 37 in Papua, 32–3, 44–6, 57–9 decentralization reforms in, 61 relative deprivation as cause of, resources, 44 47–8, 58–9 secessionist conflict in, 44, 46, 57 resource rents and, 63 sectoral regional GDP, 73 in Riau, 33, 44, 46, 57 RMS, see South Maluku Republic security measures, 17 Robinson, Geoffrey, 44, 127 Seko, Mobuto Sese, 10 Rodrik, Dani, 116 Sen, Amartya, 55, 173 Ross, Michael L., 65 separatist violence, see centre-region Rostow, Walt W, 158 (separatist) conflict Round Table Conference, 23 Sidel, John, 76 routine-everyday violence, 5–6, 19–22, Singapore, 33 34, 112–52, 176–7, 181 social contract, 6–9, 109 characteristics of, 112–16 breakdown of, 8–12, 38, 40, 75, 89, data on, 113 175 decentralization and, 137–50, horizontal, 8–9, 16, 90, 151, 153, 151, 177 177–9 determinants of, 118 vertical, 8, 9, 10, 90, 153, 178 education and, 118, 119–20, 121 social justice, 179 group brawls, 112 socio-economics, 4, 5, 10–14, 22, human development and, 118, 38, 48–53, 67–70, 113, 116–20, 119–20 156, 178 incidence of, 113–16, 151 see also economic growth/ inequality and, 120–37 development interaction effects, 134–7 Solo, 2 local government size and, 145–50 Southeast Asia population pressures and, 120–37 Balkanization of, 2, 12, 33 poverty and, 118, 119 democracy in, 1 regional differences in, 114–16 South Maluka Republic (RMS), 24–6 socio-economic development and, Soviet Union, 25, 47 116–20 state stage of development and, 119–20 capacity, 78 vigilante violence, 112 dependency on, 84–5 youth and, 125, 130 at local level, 140–3 Rwanda, 134 public goods provisioning by, 138–9 violence, 29–30 Saideman, S. M., 138 Steinberg, D., 138 Sambas, 2, 88 Stewart, Frances, 13, 83 Sampit, 2 structural scarcity, 195n8 Sanggau, 88 student riots, 10, 29–30 224 Index

Suharto regime, 1, 2, 9–12, 14, 24, 25, violence 183n6, 185n26 see also conflict; specific types collapse of, 31, 35, 59, 75, 89, 114 deaths and incidents of (1990– economic growth/development 2003), 32, 33–4 during, 48–53, 160, 161 during democratic transition, 3–4, equalization scheme, 85–6 11–12, 16–20, 23, 31–4 state violence during, 29–30 electoral, 74 Sukarno regime, 23–4, 28–9 enabling factors for, 14 supply-induced scarcity, 195n8 episodic, 34, 112 ethnic, 75–111 Tadjoeddin, Mohammad grievances and, 175–6 Zulfan, 19–20, 37, 38, 127–9, human development and, 37–8 131, 135 income and, 117–19, 126, Taylor, Lance, 158 131–4, 151 terrorism, 5–6, 179–80, 184n18 inter-ethnic, 2, 11–12, 16, 18 Theil-L index, 55 local electoral, 153–74 30 September movement, 29 political economy of, 5 Tiebout, Charles, 139 private, 117, 139–40 Tiro, Hasan, 64 rational choice perspective on, 2 Toha, Risa, 84 routine-everyday, 5–6, 19–22, 34, traditional societies, 116–17 112–52 transfer allocations, 105–6 separatist, 2 transition, see democratic transition state, 29–30 trans-migration program, 79 vigilante, 6, 19–20, 112 Treisman, Daniel, 139 youth and, 120–1 tunnel effect, 133 tyranny, 9 warlords, 16, 86 war of independence, 3 underdevelopment, 112 welfare gap, 56–7, 63, 94–5 unemployment, 121, 181 welfare index, 94 United States, 28, 47, 66 Welzel, C., 158 UN Support Facility of Indonesian West Kalimantan, 88 Recovery (UNSFIR), 40, 113 white elephant spending, 67, 69, 71–2 urban population, electoral hostility Wospakrik, Frans, 74 and, 169–70 Urdal, Henrik, 129 Yew, Lee Kuan, 66 youth, 120–1, 125, 130 vertical inequality, 120–2, 127–9, Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 18 131–4, 150–1, 177 Yugoslavia, 47, 108 vertical social contract, 8, 9, 10, 90, 153, 178 Zaire, 10 Vietnam, 47 zero-sum games, 16, 86 vigilante violence, 6, 19–20, 112 Zimbabwe, 162