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66 | 1945 2017 isjailedfor blasphemyagainstIslam. public debate,the Christiangovernorof As Islamistideas increasinglyinfluence 2017 . Since1998,10,613havedied. The Helsinkipeaceaccordendsthe warin 2005 secessionist warfareintensifies. declaresmartiallawinAcehas 2003 . Malino IIpeaceaccordendsviolencein 2002 . Large-scale communalviolenceinCentral 2001 Kalimantan. out inMaluku,NorthandWest Large-scale communalviolencebreaks 1999 most violentsince1965. resigns.Thenextfiveyearsarethe and threedaysofriotingthatkills1,200, After threemonthsofstudentprotests, 1998 warfare bytheearly2000s. but eventuallyescalatesintosubnational The insurrectionisdecimatedby1979, Hasan TiroformstheFreeAcehMovement. 1976 . Guided DemocracyisreplacedbySuharto’s Suharto becomespresident.’s 1967 Darul Islamissuppressed. Kartosuwirjo iscapturedandexecuted. 1962 over thenextthreeyears. provinces. Sukarnosuppressestherebellion a “revolutionarygovernment”inseveral Rebellious militarycommandersdeclare 1958 for 13years. rebellion gainssignificantterritoryandlasts Kartosuwiryo, declaresanIslamicstate.The The DarulIslamrebellion,ledby 1949 acknowledge Indonesiain1949. After fouryearsofhostilities,theDutch , withSukarnoasPresident. Indonesia declaresindependencefromthe 1945

armed resistance.Governmentstarts controversial ActofFreeChoice,sparking Dutch cedePapuatoIndonesiain 1969 massacres thatkillatleast500,000. Suharto blamesthePKI,triggering Suharto takesfullcontrolofthemilitary. Movement issuppressed,andGeneral Apparent coupbytheSeptember30 1965 special territorialstatus. lack ofautonomyisgrowing,granted Aceh Province,whereresentmentovera 1959 authoritarian GuidedDemocracy. Indonesia’s parliamentarysystemwithhis Sukarno declaresmartiallawandreplaces 1957 The PKIreenterspoliticsinthe1950s. revolt isviolentlysuppressedbySukarno. Republic in the city of , East . The attempts toformanIndonesianSoviet Communist PartyofIndonesia(PKI) 1948 suicide bombinginJakarta. Group loyaltotheIslamicStatelaunches a 2016 170,000. A tsunamistrikesAceh,killingalmost 2004 Islamiyah kills202,164ofthemforeigners. First BalibombingbyjihadigroupJemaah 2002 Central . Malino peaceaccordendsviolencein 2001 Sulawesi. Large-scale communalviolenceinCentral 2000 . Referendum onindependenceinEast 1999 Indonesia. Asian financialcrisisseverelyaffects 1997 conflict untilthepresent. counterinsurgency, withPapuaseeing

th

* Rankingsarebasedonthelast15yearsandrelativetootherAsiancountries. Indonesia and ideashavegaineda growing influenceovermainstreampolitics. The country’s tradition of religious pluralism is also under stress, as fringe Islamic groups persistent issues with justice and governance, land, and natural resources management. has largely disappeared since 2005, but sporadic and localized forms of violence betray conflict Large-scale challenges. these overcome Indonesia helped economy dynamic a the civil war with separatist insurgents in Aceh. , decentralization, and violence, including large-scale ethnoreligious conflicts in several provinces and a surge in sacres of 1965–66. The 1998 collapse of the New Order regime led to another period of to define Indonesia’s political and national identity, leading to the anticommunist mas violence. Following independence from the Dutch, political forces engaged in a struggle . Yet today’s relatively peaceful Indonesia is the product of a history of periodic Indonesia is regarded as a rare Asian example of a successful and enduring multicultural At a glance a At Overview Shifted from hightolow andautonomy Medium Transnational Low National politicalconflict Absent National civilwar Urban crimeandviolence Medium Local resource conflict Medium low Local politicalandelectoralconflict Shifted from hightomediumlow Communal/ideological conflict Low -

67 | Indonesia 68 | Indonesia struggled to extend its authority across the archipelago. The Netherlands, the colonial power, colonial the Netherlands, The archipelago. the across authority its extend to struggled violence beyondsporadicattacks. Sukarno eventuallysuppressedtherebellion. regions, and being too close to the PKI. The rebels declared a revolutionary outlying government in neglecting 1958. bureaucracy, excessive of Sukarno accusing coups, bloodless in governors 1956–1957. Commanders in , Sulawesi, Maluku, and Nusa Tenggara wrested power from nesia. Indo modern secular, a of vision the shared they as even rule civilian doubted leaders whose military, the for foil a as them used Sukarno 1950s. the in mainstream to returned PKI Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) at Madiun was violently suppressed in September 1948. The standing IndonesianIslamicextremismtoday. under to crucial remain and afterlife long a had have , Darul with associated networks and principles, Islamic on founded Indonesia an of vision The 1962. in executed and captured was Kartosuwiryo until lasted and Aceh, and Kalimantan, , South Java, Central to spread revolt The movement. Islam Darul the established Kartosuwiryo response, In army. ment had in effect surrendered to the Dutch by agreeing to withdraw the Indonesian from , who aimed to establish an Islamic . In 1948, President Sukarno’s govern mystic Islamic an Kartosuwiryo, Maridjan Soekarmadji from came challenge violent most The Dutch EastIndiestoanindependentIndonesia. former the of transfer the negotiated and 1949 in relented Dutch the pressure, international tried to regain Indonesia by force following the Japanese withdrawal after World Indonesia Another threat came from the left. An attempt to form an Indonesian Soviet Republic by the The main internal drivers of conflict in Indonesia’s early years were ideology and . Following independence in 1945, Indonesia experienced two decades of instability as the state 2 A violent challenge to Sukarno’s government emerged from within the army’s ranks in ranks army’s the within from emerged government Sukarno’s to challenge violent A and a low-level separatist movement in . Neither have the means to escalate armed challenges to the authority of the state come from radical Islamist militants Indonesia has not experienced national civil war since the 1960s. The only current National civilwar 3 1 National level War II. Under - - - in concert with the PKI. The following day, a group called the September 30 September the called group a day, following The PKI. the with concert in seemingly military, the of members by putsch apparent an in killed were generals six 1965, 30, anticommunist. Nationalpoliticswereintenselypolarizedbetweentherightandleft. allied with Sukarno. The only other major political force was the military, whose leadership was Democracy. Parties were pushed to the margins, with the exception of the PKI, which remained 202 people,164ofthemforeigners, andfurtherbombingsinJakartaBali. killed that bombings 2002 the including , early the in beginning targets Western on into Indonesian extremist organizations, which perpetrated a series of lethal, high-profile attacks (JI) in the early 1990s. The skills and networks forged abroad injected capacity went abroad, to the - border and to , where exiled jihadis founded significant violence. to led not have they candidates—but and parties political with affiliated thugs or fronts youth involving incidents—usually occasional and force of shows by accompanied been regularly led tocorruptionandnepotism,buthasalsoservedlimitextremeorviolentcontestation. has sometimes elites Suharto. Dealmakingbetween authoritarian President 1998 fallofthe the killed, andover50womenwereraped. cities targeted ethnic Chinese and their businesses. An estimated 1,200 other people and were Jakarta in rioting widespread days, three next the Over Jakarta. in protest a during from the middle class. Violence spiked following the killing of four students by the security forces support garnered which protests, student of months three by precipitated was resignation His crisis, contributingtoSuharto’sdownfall. financial Asian 1997 the by affected severely was Indonesia However, high. rates growth kept technocrats, and civilian politicians in support of policies that stimulated foreign investment and elites, military together brought regime Order New His elections. stage-managing and parties, political most banning opponents, against violence deploying selectively and skillfully by 1998 dismissed Sukarno’scabinet;hebecamepresidentthefollowingyear. killed. were people 500,000 estimated An Sumatra. North and Bali, Java, East and Central in violence worst the with supporters, and members PKI targeting full controlofthearmy. in was command, strategic army’s the headed who officer ranking high a Suharto, General and crushed, been had mutiny the evening By coup. a prevent to action taken had it that nounced Stability crumbled as the contradictions in Sukarno’s coalition unraveled. On September On unraveled. coalition Sukarno’s in contradictions the as crumbled Stability National-level legislative and presidential elections in 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014 have 2014 and 2009, 2004, 1999, in elections presidential and legislative National-level Indonesia is now politically stable. Four peaceful presidential transitions have occurred since Suharto was forced to resign on May 21, 1998, handing over power to Vice President Habibie. National political competition was limited during Suharto’s tenure. He stayed in power until Suharto whipped up anticommunist fervor in late 1965. A campaign of mass killing ensued, National politicalconflict and replacing the parliamentary system with his authoritarian Guided declaring 1957, in democracy fledgling Indonesia’s dismantle to began He means. Under Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, relative peace was achieved by top-down forged during the New Order era when, due to repression by Suharto, extremists Suharto, by repression to due when, era Order New the during forged tensive and longstanding ties with radical networks outside the country. Ties were ex have militants Violent radicalism. Islamist out stamp not did Order New The Transnational terrorism 5 4 By , Suharto had Suharto 1966, March By th Movement an Movement - -

69 | Indonesia 70 | Indonesia Tens ofthousandsadditionaltroopsweredeployed. Agreements (CoHA) of December 2002—failed. The government declared martial law in 2003. Hostilities of Cessation the and 2000, September of Pause Humanitarian peace—the restoring at attempts Two province. the across presence gaining grew, GAM plebiscite. independence an war. The new political environment, and ’s independence referendum, led to calls for that killed thousands. campaign decade-long a launched military the response, In 1980s. late the in returned in trained fighters after again grew but 1979, by out wiped largely was The ence. independ and (GAM) Movement Aceh Free the of formation the declared Tiro di Hasan 1976, In meaningless. became this however, strength, gained state central Indonesian the As status. territorial special given Aceh with 1959, in resolved largely was conflict The Islam. Darul join to many leading broken, were province own its become would Aceh that promises when grew helped addressregionalcallsforgreaterrepresentationandinclusivegrowth. arrangements autonomy special and reforms decentralization Order, New the of collapse the After development. economic and patronage, political arrangements, autonomy special action, and outdatedantiterrorismlaws. lectures; and publications, websites, schools, Islamic radical via ideology jihadi of spread the against action effective of lack a returnees; Syria and convicts former of monitoring poor cells; their from plotting and recruiting continue to jihadis convicted allows that system prison rupt weaknesses also remain in Indonesia’s counterterrorism response. These include a lax and cor future. the in attacks better-organized to lead may Indonesians IS-trained of return that the fear observers But 2016. 18, July on forces security by killed was Santoso, leader, MIT’s its hideout in . The Jakarta attack was a failure (it resulted in four deaths), and from 2012 since police the on attacks numerous out carried has (MIT), Timur Indonesia hidin cafe and a police station in Jakarta on January 14, 2016. Another group affiliated with IS, Muja Anshar Khilafah (JAK). JAK was responsible for a suicide bombing and shooting at a Starbucks have sworn allegiance to IS from their prison cells, with both Abdurrahman involved in Aman the creation and of Jamaah Ba’asyir Bakar Abu as such clerics jihadi home, Back speakers. sian Syria and Irag in IS with fighting were Indonesians 500 2015, In networks. jihadi Indonesian to momentum often bysmallgroupswithlimitedtrainingandfunding. executed, and planned poorly and small been have attacks most 2010, since terrorism: Islamic a role: with tens of thousands of aid workers pouring in, offensives could not take place. Other place. take not could offensives in, pouring workers aid of thousands of tens with role: a played The . in signed was MoU) (the deal peace Aceh—a in people 167,000 achieved considerable success in dismantling terrorist cells. terrorist dismantling in success considerable achieved government has been able to reduce the threat. The police counterterrorism unit Densus 88 has the assistance, foreign extensive With disputes. strategic and theological to due shifting ments On August 15, 2005—less than nine months after the December 2004 tsunami, which killed Aceh. fresh provided 2013 in (IS) State Islamic the of declaration the and war civil Syrian The align and killed or jailed personalities key with evolved, has scene jihadi the then, Since The Acehnese played an important role in the anticolonialist struggle, but discontent Suharto managed to control the centrifugal forces of separatism through military through separatism of forces centrifugal the control to managed Suharto and Sukarno Papua. and Timor, East Maluku, Aceh, in developed movements tist Preserving the integrity of Indonesia has been a major concern of the state. Separa Separatism andautonomy 8 with a special military unit, Katibah , established for Malay Indone Malay for established Nusantara, Katibah unit, military special a with 11 Following the New Order’s demise, the conflict escalated into subnational 10 7 6 This led to a shift in homegrown in shift a to led This Subnational level 9 Major ------the tsunami. of cost economic the double billion, 10.7 USD exceeded conflict the from losses and Damages deep. From 1998 until the signing of the peace accord, an estimated 10,613 people lost their lives. conflict hadbeen process. Theimpactofthe peace the EU andASEANtooversee by the ployed de was Mission, Monitoring Aceh mission, the peace unarmed province. An the left police and military Indonesian 30,000 Over forces. rebel reintegrate and disarm to provisions included It and gas revenues, and enabled former rebels to form a political party and for local elections. Aceh. The MoU devolved considerable power to Aceh, granted the province a larger share of oil to approach political a favored Yudhoyono president Indonesian New post-9/11. unlikely was that international support for the independence of a small Muslim state on the Straits of factors were also important. GAM had been decimated by martial law, and its leaders understood including mass killings of civilians, with hundreds of thousands of deaths and displaced people. Counterinsurgency campaigns by Indonesian armed forces led to severe rights violations, (TPN-OPM). Organization Papua Free the of wing armed the by insurrection separatist tained latest roundofelectionsforgovernoranddistrictheads,inOctober2016,waspeaceful. deaths. 13 to led which Aceh, in recorded been have violence election-related of violent incidents such as attacks—sometimes deadly—on party cadres: since 2005, 465 incidents marked by divisions between two GAM factions. Both elections saw widespread intimidation and cial anddistrictparliaments.The2012 for provincialheads, was governoranddistrict election, the first in which Partai Aceh, the political party formed by GAM, fielded candidates for provin Elections have been marked by significant political violence. The 2009 legislative elections were opportunities. economic postwar at combatants former of disappointment the and conflict the ( dropped drastically after the accord, but the end of the war did not mean the end of all violence have moved into governing roles, securing landslide victories in post-MoU local elections. Deaths figure 1 Papua. Aceh is now at peace, and few predict that large-scale violence will reemerge. Former rebels ). Crime increased sharply after the MoU. This was partly a result of leftover weapons from Indonesia’s Coordinating MinistryforHuman DevelopmentandCulturalAffairs, 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 ,000 Since integration into Indonesia in 1969, Papua 1969, in Indonesia into integration Since 500 12

0 1998 Violent crimeincidents Separatism incidents

Source:

1999 2000

Figure 1.

Indonesia’s National Violence Monitoring System(NVMS),

2001

2002

Violent deathsandincidents,bytype,Aceh

200 2004

Deaths ther violentincidents

2005

2006

200

2008 2009 15

has seen a low-intensity but sus but low-intensity a seen has

2010

2011 2012 14

201

13 2014 However, the However, 16 - - -

71 | Indonesia 72 | Indonesia of benefits. of against companies, and have exacerbated tribal disputes over land borders and the distribution lead to conflict. Tensions over customary land rights and resettlement have pitted communities Bay), forest exploitation, and oil palm. While these create revenues and jobs, they also frequently forces over protection rent. Investments have been made in (the BP plant in sions and violence related to labor issues, environmental damage, and rivalries between security the target of frequent ambushes attributed to separatist groups, and is associated with been other has world, ten the in deposit and richest the mine, Grasberg The tensions. drive year from2011to2014( per fatalities 31 of average an to leading however, years, recent in sharply again surged cidents in of frequency The forces. security and rebels between shootings sporadic only involves now it and decreased, dramatically has conflict the of intensity the Order, New the of end the Since demonstrations ofsupportforindependence.Humanrightsabusesgolargelyunpunished. land.” own their in minority “a becoming fear Papuans many and 2009, migration. grants from other parts of Indonesia, as a result of both transmigration programs and spontaneous and the presence and poor track record of security forces. Papua has seen a steady influx of mi Papuans, the perception that the exploitation of Papua’s natural resources does not benefit locals, regarded asillegitimatebymostPapuans. plebiscite on independence. Although the vote’s outcome was endorsed by the UN, it is broadly a for demands Papuan meet to meant was Act The Choice. Free of Act 1969 the via Indonesia to Dutch the from sovereignty of transfer contested the including grievances socioeconomic Other grievances include a sense of marginalization and disenfranchisement of indigenous of disenfranchisement and marginalization of sense a include grievances Other Pro-independence sentiment is widespread among Papuans, rooted in historic political and Source: 17 19 The proportion of nonindigenous people in Papua’s population was 53.5 percent in 10 20 0 40 50 60 0 Figure 2. Finally, the police and military often use excessive force in response to peaceful peaceful to response in force excessive use often military and police the Finally,

0 NVMS,Coordinating MinistryforHumanDevelopment andCulturalAffairs, World Bank 1998

Incidents

Separatism-related incidentsanddeaths,Papua andPapuaBaratprovinces 1999

2000 figure 2 2001

Deaths

2002 ).

200

2004

2005

2006

200

2008

2009

2010

2011 2012 18

Extractive industries Extractive

201 2014 20 - - - and second-worstIndonesianprovincesontheHumanDevelopmentIndex. . new of liferation pro the from resulting facilities government and servants civil of number growing a on spent been has funds of share largest The development. on effect little with 2017, and 2002 between provinces Papua West and Papua into flowed funding autonomy special in billion 5 USD Over failure. a as Papua and Jakarta in regarded broadly is OTSUS However, Papuans. indigenous for jobs service civil to access preferential with along government, local to authority fiscal and political considerable devolved (OTSUS) Autonomy Special on 21/2001 Law and 1999, in gion re autonomous special a designated was Papua development. region’s the accelerate to efforts geographic areas. high ( were Fatalities confrontations. armed larger much into escalated then but groups, community between clashes small-scale with started place each in Violence battles. interconfessional into morphed violence ethnic Maluku, North in ); versus ( religious primarily was cleavage the Maluku, and Sulawesi Central in populations; Madurese migrant against in fiveIndonesianprovinces. and identity-basedconflict,isfrequent. conflict accounted for 22.5 percent of fatalities that year, other violence, such as resource-related separatist While average. Indonesian national the times five people, 100,000 per five was rate Papua regularly. West and Papua visits he and transmigration, state-sponsored ended also Widodo Joko areas. rural in especially development, economic Papua’s to obstacle major a been have prices high and commodities, other of price the affect prices Fuel decreased. Papua within areas rural and urban between differential price the archipelago; the of rest the with comparable more levels to down brought terrain—were difficult and remoteness region’s the of because Papua in high very prices—historically fuel example, For justice. of sense a with population local the provide Province Central Sulawesi Maluku Jakarta’s response to the “Papua problem” has combined ramped-up military action with action military ramped-up combined has problem” “Papua the to response Jakarta’s In West and Central Kalimantan, the violence pitted indigenous Dayak and ethnic ethnic and Dayak indigenous pitted violence the Kalimantan, Central and West In Nonetheless, Papua remains the most violent region of Indonesia. In 2014, Papua’s homicide and development improve to made been have efforts presidency, Widodo Joko the Under table 1 Source: ), violence was organized, government services halted, and clashes spread over large NVMS,CoordinatingMinistryfor HumanDevelopmentandCulturalAffairs,WorldBank violence since the 1965 anticommunist killings, with communal conflicts erupting conflicts communal with killings, anticommunist 1965 the since violence political and socioeconomic change. The years 1998–2004 saw the highest levels of The fiveyears following the collapse ofthe NewOrder regimewere aperiod of major Large-scale communalandideologicalconflicts Table 1. 23 Extendedintercommunalviolence,byprovince,intransitioningIndonesia April ’00throughDecember’01 February ’01throughApril February ’99throughApril January ’97throughFebruary January ’99throughFebruary’02 August ’99throughJune’00 Period ofextendedviolence 21 In 2016, Papua and provinces still ranked as the worst the as ranked still provinces Papua West and Papua 2016, In Deaths 2,793 3,257 1,031 1,103 517 Injuries 2,635 5,057 646 579 77 22 Buildings damaged 15,004 13,843 6,004 3,830 1,998 - -

73 | Indonesia 74 | Indonesia ACEH from attacksonminorityMuslimsectsandreligionsbySunnimilitantgroups. resulted deaths these of quarter A 2005–2009). in 39 with compared 2010–2014, in year per period than during 2005–2009, and fatalities were 67 percent higher (65 identity-related deaths since 2010 ( Timur (MIT). Data for 16 provinces Sulawesi continues to serve as a base for violent Islamist militants, such as Mujahidin Indonesia gation along communal lines remains, and tensions continue to lead to regular violence. Central fell from 3,624 in 1999 to an average of 17 per year from 2003–2014. However, in Maluku, segre munal violence dropped sharply in Indonesia: related deaths in the five most affected provinces Com Maluku. for agreement II Malino 2002 the and Sulawesi Central for Declaration Malino By 2002, these episodes had ended, in part as a result of local peace deals such as the 2001 the as such deals peace local of result a as part in ended, had episodes these 2002, By Source: Figure 3. figure 3 100 200 00 400 500 600 00 NVMS,Coordinating MinistryforHumanDevelopment andCulturalAffairs, World Bank 0 Jakarta Identity-related incidentsanddeathsperyear, 16Indonesianprovinces (2005–2014) 2005 Incidents ): incidents were more than three times more frequent during the 2010–2014 WEST KALIMANTAN 2006 CENTRAL KALIMANTAN 200 Deaths 24 shows a significant increase in incidents related to identity 2008 2009 CENTRAL SULAWESI 2010 2011 2012 NORTH MALUKU 201 MALUKU 2014 PAPUA - - of theelectionsinApril. led to massive street protests and likely played a crucial role in Ahok’s defeat in the second round allegations of insulting the Quran. With the support of opposing political forces, FPI’s agitation over Chinese, ethnic an (“Ahok”), Purnama Tjahaja Basuki governor, incumbent the against mobilization spearheaded dens, and nightclubs from payments extort to violence using for known mainly group vigilante a (FPI), Front Defenders Islamic the where Jakarta, of governor the for election 2017 the was example recent A debate. public shape and media the of over mainstream politics, using shows of force and blasphemy accusations to capture the attention offenses—was thedeadliesttype. period). Focusing on collective violence, mob justice—in reaction the to in criminal, deaths moral, of or personalpercent (15 violence domestic was fatalities of driver main second The 2014). to 2005 from annually deaths of percent 60 for accounting average (on issue main the crime with model, peace-time typical, more a assumed violence the 2005, After violence. deadly of as 2004, to 2002 communal conflictsFrom receded and civil provinces. war escalated nine in Aceh, the separatism became thein main driver deaths reported all of percent 80 to up for ed dropped, the nature of violence changed. From 1999 to 2001, identity-related violence account management, politicalrepresentation,andminorityrights. resources natural and land justice, to access community enforcement, law to related issues ( incidents localized radic, economy was rapidly recovering. Violence has dropped, and its nature has shifted to more spo the while benefits, show to starting were decentralization and reforms Democratic mid-2005. Over the past few years, fringe radical Islamic groups have also acquired a growing influence There has been a dramatic drop in fatalities since 2002 (red line in line (red 2002 since fatalities in drop dramatic a been has There by over largely were Order New the of collapse the followed that conflicts large-scale The

Source: Share of total yearly deaths () 100 20 40 60 80 0 Figure 4. NVMS,Coordinating MinistryforHumanDevelopment andCulturalAffairs, World Bank

esources Mob ustice Separatism 1998 1999

Share ofyearlydeaths,bytypeviolence,fornineprovinces (1998–2014)

2000 2001 4 figure

thers Identity Domestic violence

2002

200 persistent shows it deadly, less far now is violence While ).

2004

2005 2006

lections andappointments rime

200

2008 2009

25

2010

2011

2012 201

overnance aw enforcement

figure 4 figure 2014 Local level 0 1,000 2,000 ,000 4,000 5,000

). As deaths As ). Number of total yearly deaths yearly total of Number - -

75 | Indonesia 76 | Indonesia power power of eminent domain; the lack of safeguards to enforce the right of local communities to free, classification and ownership rights. Other factors include the excessive application of the state’s across ministries and between central and , have led to a lack of clarity in land tainability. sus or damage, environmental rights, customary for regard little with concessions, land. Indonesia’s of percent 70 of control in state the placed which Law, Forestry 1967 the include These regime. Order New authoritarian the under policies and era colonial the to back traced of politicalactorsandlandspeculatorstryingtotake advantage ofthedispute. intervention the by complicated further are and interests, private and migrants, communities, ( customary by claims overlapping involve They narratives. simple defy disputes, land between indigenous populations and migrants. Many large cases, such as the Mesuji and state, but they also map onto communal lines of opposition between different ethnic groups, or communities against agribusiness companies or extractive industries granted concessions by the comparatively morelikelytoleadfatalitiesthanothertypesofviolence. is it but percent), (2–3 Indonesia in violence all of share small a only represents violence lated onto clan-basedtensions),orinregionsformerlyaffectedbylarge-scaleconflict,suchasAceh. been concentrated in remote regions such as Papua’s highlands (where politics often map lent deaths were related to elections or other forms of political competition. Violence has mainly elections have not led to major unrest. From 2005 to 2014, just 98 of a total of nearly 2,500 vio subnational However, parliaments. by chosen were heads district and governors where system and street violence. This has led to calls to cancel direct local elections and revert to the previous plays out violently: contenders mobilize thugs for shows of force that occasionally lead to clashes Multiple factors explain the prevalence of land conflicts in Indonesia, many of which can be The vast majority of these incidents result from contestation over land. These typically pit local 28 This opened the way for the massive conversion of into timber and plantation 29 Contradictory laws and regulations, and overlapping lines of bureaucratic authority increased by 40 percent, and deaths more than doubled, from 34 to 72. Resource-re have increased steadily during the past fiveyears. Between 2010 and 2014, incidents Land and natural resources conflicts lead to more deaths. Annual violent incidents Local conflictover resources andcommunityrights as many provincial and district parliaments. Local political competition sometimes governors and 514 district heads and mayors, all of whom are elected directly, and 34 has Indonesia voters, registered million 200 nearly with democracy large A Local politicalconflictandelectoralviolence 26 27 ) - - - remains tobeseen. effective be will they Whether level. district to national from established were disputes land of escalation of disputes into lethal violence. In 2014, institutional mechanisms for the the adjudication to contribute forces security private and police by responses heavy-handed side, other the On grievances. their addressing into government pressure and attention public secure to force and civil society organizations acting on their behalf, often have little choice but to use shows of prior, and informed consent; poor maps and cadastral records; and corrupt courts. homicide andsexualassaultvictims,hasbeendecliningoverthepastdecade( system, especiallyamongpoorandruralIndonesians. justice the and police the in trust of lack pervasive a reflects Indonesia in incidents justice mob to it. Lynchings killed over 300 people in 2014; two-thirds were petty thieves. The prevalence of deadly violence in Indonesia—mob justice—is also related to crime, as it is in large part a response of cause main third The line. the to close or poor were One-fifth 2014. in cities in lived Figure 5. Source: 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 ,000 ,500 number of reported domestic violence incidents, as well as the number of female of number the as well as incidents, violence domestic reported of number the However, deaths. violent all of percent 15 or 2014, in persons 449 killed It sia. Domestic violence is currently the second-highest cause of violent death in Indone Domestic andgender-based violence rapid urbanization. Fifty-three percent of the population, 134 million Indonesians, or 58 percent of all homicides that year. Since the 1970s, Indonesia has undergone Violent crime is the main source of violent deaths today, with 1,744 deaths in 2014, Urban crimeandviolence Domesticviolenceincidentsand femalevictimsofsexualassaultandhomicide,16provinces 500 NVMS,Coordinating MinistryforHumanDevelopment andCulturalAffairs, World Bank 0 2005 emale homicidevictims Domestic violenceincidents 2006 200 2008 2009 emale sexualassaultvictims 2010 2011 2012 201 figure 5 2014 30 Claimants, ). -

77 | Indonesia 78 | Indonesia 13 12 5 4 3 2 1 14 11 10 9 8 7 6 Notes No. 135(ICG,2012). Aceh in Violence Election Averting ICG, 2009); (ICG, 90 No. Briefing AcehasElectionsApproach in sia: DeepDistrust ICG, 2008); (ICG, 81 No. Briefing Asia ICG, Complications (ICG), Group Crisis International Full-report worldbank.org/curated/en/716601468259763959/ 2009), Bank, World DC: ington, Sustainable Peace and Development inAceh Programming inAceh: Identifying the Foundationsfor World Bank, University Press,2009). lion inAceh, Indonesia Edward Aspinall, IPAC, such as ISIS is not considered a . See organization terrorist foreign a joining example, For org/file/2016/02/IPAC_25.pdf 2016), 1, February the Risk ofMoreViolence Disunity AmongIndonesian ISIS Supportersand (IPAC), Conflict of Analysis Policy for Institute See TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ into Syria and dated AssessmentoftheFlowForeignFighters (TSG), Group Soufan The more thanfive. kill to last the were Jakarta in hotels Carlton Ritz and attacks, but the 2009 bomb attacks on the JW Marriott Since the Bali bombing, 120 have been killed in terror -admission-tip-iceberg-amnesty-international/ jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/police-negligence International Negligence Admission only Tip of the Iceberg: Amnesty died in custody, 2007–2016. See Eko Prasetyo, “ 121 least at and arrest, during killed were suspects many force: abusive for reputation a has 88 Densus indonesia/indonesia-impunity-versus-accountability https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/ Asia Report No. 12 (Jakarta and Brussels: ICG, 2001), (ICG), Group Crisis International See raped. were women 52 and killed were people 300–1,200 that concluded The Habibie government convened a commission that Monash University,1990). Studies from Java and Bali Robert Cribb, ed., 32–46. Rebellion,” donesian In the of End “The Lev, S. Daniel and Feith Herbert of theIndonesianArmy,” Ruth McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation 89 (April2010). sia: From to Jemaah Islamiyah,” Quinton Temby, “Imagining an in Indone on every violent incident reported by local newspapers with The Habibie Center, a think tank. It contains data partnership in and Indonesia, of Government the of NVMS was implemented by the World Bank on behalf Indonesia:Pre-Election Anxieties in Aceh Disunity AmongIndonesianISISSupporters Indonesia: Impunity versus Accountability versus Impunity Indonesia: . Multi-Stakeholder Review of Post-Conflict ,” Jakarta Globe , Asia Report No. 139 (ICG, 2007); (ICG, 139 No. Report Asia , Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebel Separatist andNation: Islam The Indonesian Killings 1965–1966: The IndonesianKillings1965–1966: http://file.understandingconflict. (TSG, December 2015), December (TSG, Pacific Affairs Pacific (Stanford, California: Stanford , IPAC Report No.25 (IPAC, , IPACReport Indonesia Foreign Fighters: An Up , April22, 2016, (Clayton, : (Clayton, . Aceh: Post-Conflict Aceh: http://documents. . 11(April1971). 36, no. 1 (1963): 1 no. 36, , Asia Briefing Asia , Indonesia: Indonesia Indone (Wash http:// http:// . Police Police . ------. , , ,

​ 20 19 18 17 16 15 26 25 24 23 22 21 sia,” Human Rights Watch website, Indone 2016: Report “World Watch, Rights Human flict (ICG) Group Crisis International see Digoel, Boven in extraction resource to related disputes local on study case a For Estimates fromWidjojoetal., to Papuain2015. country. President ended transmigration of areas lated popu densely other and Java from people landless move to government, Indonesian the by continued later government, colonial Dutch the of initiative ( program transmigration The Indonesian InstituteofScience,2008). Future the Securing and thePresent ing et al., See the government-issued report, Muridan S. Widjojo Estimates of fatalities range from 100,000 to 500,000. province. Papua otherwise, specified unless chapter, this Throughout via in Indonesia from 1998 to 2014. Data can be accessed ten incidents(seenote14). violence types recorded by NVMS is one death for every five resource-related incidents; the average ratio for all In 2014, the NVMS dataset counted one death for every tan (seenote14). tral Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan, and West Kaliman by these conflicts: Aceh, Maluku, North Maluku, Cen provinces that includes all six provinces most affected The figure is based on NVMS data for a sample of nine population. country’s the of percent 53 about for account and groups major all represent provinces 16 These From SoiltoGod Chris Wilson, 2008); University, National Australian diss., (PhD Violent Conflict in , Central Sulawesi, 1998–2007” of Decline and Escalation “The McRae, Dave 2004); Indonesia Jacques Bertrand, 2006); Press, University Cornell London: and (Ithaca Pogroms, Jihad: ReligiousViolence inIndonesia and New York, Routledge, 2007); John T. Sidel, ratization inIndonesia: SmallTown Wars Klinken, van Gerry base-for-policy-and-economic-research) reports.aspx?source=indo~dapoer-(indonesia-data 2016, October accessed DataBank, Bank World (INDO-DAPOER),” “Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research More-Problems conflict/read/8/Carving-Up-Papua-More-Districts- 2013), Problems More (IPAC), Conflict tary consideration. See Institute for Policy Analysis of and proposals for 33 more divisions awaited parliamen By 2013, it had become two provinces with 42 districts, In 1999, Papua was a single province with ten districts. org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/indonesia http://snpk.kemenkopmk.go.id , AsiaBriefingNo.66(ICG,2007). Papua Road Map: Negotiating the Past, Improv is used to refer to both Papua and West Papua West and Papua both to refer to used is http://www.understandingconflict.org/en/ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, University Cambridge (Cambridge: Papua: A Local Perspective on the Con Local Perspectiveon Papua: A Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia:Ethno-Religious Indonesia http://databank.worldbank.org/data/ . , IPAC Report No. 3 (Jakarta: IPAC, (Jakarta: 3 No. Report IPAC , Carving up Papua: More Districts, upPapua:More Carving (Routledge,2008). and Ethnic Violence in in Violence andEthnic Nationalism Communal Violence and Democ Communal to less populous areas of the of areas populous less to Papua RoadMap transmigrasi . https://www.hrw. , (Jakarta: The . (London ) was an was ) Riots, . . ------​ 28 27 tomary forests from state control was an important an was control state from forests tomary cus remove to decision Court Constitutional 2013 A Jambi_web.pdf file/2014/04/IPAC_Report_9_Case_Study_from_ 9 (IPAC, 2014), Indonesia: ACase Study from Jambi and IPAC, ingconflict.org/file/2013/09/Mesuji_FINAL.pdf 2013), IPAV, (Jakarta: 1 No. Anatomy of an Indonesian Land Conflict Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), Indigenous Rights vs. Agrarian Reformin http://file.understandingconflict.org/ . http://file.understand , IPAC Report No. , IPAC Report Mesuji: Mesuji: - ; ​ 30 29 World Bank,2014). Opportunities Challengesand Reforms: Shivakumar Srinivas et al., year. SeeIPAC, each added ha 600,000 than more with ha, million 10 over had it 2014, in 1968; in cultivation For example, Indonesia had 120,000 ha of land under Rights IPAC, See off. way long a remains tation implemen but activists, rights indigenous for victory . Indigenous Rights Towards Indonesian Land Land Indonesian Towards . Indigenous (Jakarta: -

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