Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law Volume 23 Issue 4 Article 4 2021 Race Cartels: How Constructor Collaboration Is Curbing Innovation in Formula 1 Chandler C. Gerard-Reimer Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Chandler C. Gerard-Reimer, Race Cartels: How Constructor Collaboration Is Curbing Innovation in Formula 1, 23 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 855 (2021) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/vol23/iss4/4 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Race Cartels: How Constructor Collaboration Is Curbing Innovation in Formula 1 ABSTRACT Formula 1 is in the midst of a copycat scandal: technology has made it possible for teams to reverse engineer clones of competitors’ race cars. This is a less than ideal state of affairs for the championship series, which prides itself on being the pinnacle of motorsport and automotive innovation, thanks in large part to the cars’ rapid rate of technological advancement. In order to address this problem, the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA), Formula 1’s governing body, must increase independent innovation efforts by amending the technical regulations to restrict the extent of presently allowed inter-team collaboration. Worried that the sport was becoming a “copying championship,” the FIA adopted new measures that ban extreme reverse engineering methods.