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AN ANALYSIS of VLADIMIR PUTIN and HIS POLITICAL PROJECT (I) UNISCI Discussion Papers, Núm

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AN ANALYSIS of VLADIMIR PUTIN and HIS POLITICAL PROJECT (I) UNISCI Discussion Papers, Núm UNISCI Discussion Papers ISSN: 1696-2206 [email protected] Universidad Complutense de Madrid España MORALES HERNÁNDEZ, JAVIER WHO RULES RUSSIA TODAY? AN ANALYSIS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN AND HIS POLITICAL PROJECT (I) UNISCI Discussion Papers, núm. 3, octubre, 2003, pp. 1-11 Universidad Complutense de Madrid Madrid, España Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=76711279011 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative UNISCI DISCUSSION PAPERS Octubre de 2003 WHO RULES RUSSIA TODAY? AN ANALYSIS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN AND HIS POLITICAL PROJECT (I) AUTOR1: JAVIER MORALES HERNÁNDEZ UNISCI FECHA: Octubre 2003 1.Introduction Yeltsin proclaims at a campaign rally, “Elect me and you'll get a brand-new president.” “What if we don't elect you, Boris Nikolaevich?” asks a voice from the crowd. “Then you'll get the same old president,” Yeltsin replies.2 In March 2004, a presidential election is expected to be hold in Russia, but—in contrast to the same event four years ago—the European non-specialised media and public have paid little attention to it. The difference between both campaigns does not lie in the probabilities about their outcome: having been appointed by Yeltsin as his semi-official successor, Putin was certain to become president in 2000, as he is now to continue for a second term. What happened then is that the Kremlin’s candidate was a complete stranger for everyone, from the Western analysts to the Russians themselves; discussion went on for a long time, trying to solve the now topical question of “Who is Mr. Putin?”. That all came to an end with 9/11. Russia’s support to the U.S. war in Afghanistan was seen as a litmus test of Putin’s intentions, and the “Pro-Western Reformer” paradigm triumphantly emerged among the contending explanations of the president’s aims. However, that was not supported by facts from his former career or, more importantly, the rest of policy measures he had been implementing before September 2001. War in Iraq has finally demonstrated that Putin’s choice to support the United States was not irreversible. 1 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI 2 A popular joke during the 1996 presidential campaign, quoted by Belin, Laura: “Humor of the Political Opposition: Then and Now”, RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly, Vol. 2, No. 36, 30 October 2002, in http://www.rferl.org. 1 UNISCI DISCUSSION PAPERS Octubre de 2003 The explanation for such a misinterpretation could be found in the analysts’ failure to rely on facts, rather than on official declarations and foreign commentators. As Bennet has wisely pointed out, Putin’s pre-electoral book-interview,3 long, authorized leaks in the media and a film autobiography “Muzhskaya Rabota” were occasionally quoted but not analysed. Western journalists and commentators preferred to rely on anti-Putin, erudite chattering classes in Moscow and St Petersburg and unattributed translations from the Russian press. Their Russian counterparts prematurely switched on their old Soviet auto-censorship mechanism, avoiding profiling Putin in depth. A better look at Putin at this stage would have shown that his background and his early working years could have been a serious drawback in his political career had they been scrutinized earlier [...]4 Today, we have not solved yet the enigma that Putin presented in March 2000. In addition to the optimistic, “post-9/11” interpretation, some have warned of a more conflicting foreign policy based on his goal of restoring Russia’s position as a “great power”. Others have stressed that he owes his job to Yeltsin, which should restrict his ability to implement changes that could affect the privileges of the so-called “Family”5; while many have perceived a return to authoritarian methods, based on the slogans “vertical of power” and “dictatorship of law”. This research,6 whose results are presented in two separate articles, tries to offer a wider and more accurate view of Putin’s role as Russian President, supported by direct evidence. Part One, which is published here,7 is focused on his biographical antecedents: the first section deals with his official biographies and their failures; section two presents a detailed analysis of his career in the KGB; section three deals with the start of his political career beside Anatoli Sobchak, and the influence that the mayor of St. Petersburg may have had on him. Part Two—in the next issue of this journal—will begin with a study of Putin’s later career in Moscow, until he became prime minister. Then, we will examine his political project, as stated during his campaign and on his public appearances; and finally, discuss the main interpretations of his role that have appeared in the scholarly literature. Our conclusions want to contribute to the debate about the next, and probably also Putin’s term of presidency, addressing the persistent question of “Who Rules Russia Today?” 3 The book mentioned is Gevorkian, Natalia; Timakova, Natalia and Kolesnikov, Andrei (2000): Ot piervogo litsá: razgovori s Vladimirom Putinim [In the First Person: Talks with Vladimir Putin]. Moscow, Vagrius. We will refer to it later in this article. 4 Bennet, Gordon (2002): Vladimir Putin and Russia’s Special Services, in http://www.csrc.ac.uk. 5 Designation for the group of Yeltsin’s advisors, aides, and relatives—as his daughter, Tatiana Diachenko,—that greatly influenced political decisions during his presidency. 6 The author—who is currently writing his Ph.D. thesis Russia’s Security Policy: Internal Factors and International Relations, 1998-2004—thanks the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for awarding him a grant towards a stay in Moscow in August 2003, during which the Russian materials for this study were obtained. 7 The second part, “Who Rules Russia Today? An Analysis of Vladimir Putin and His Political Project (II)”, will be published in the next issue of UNISCI Discussion Papers. 2 UNISCI DISCUSSION PAPERS Octubre de 2003 2.Official biographies In fact, I have a very simple life [...]8 The first source that may be approached for trying to analyse Putin’s project is, of course, his career, from which significant evidence could be obtained about how his ideology and personality were shaped. Therefore, as many Western scholars have done since he became Yeltsin’s successor, we should refer in the first place to his widely known official biographies. However, that kind of information must be carefully contrasted before reaching any conclusion, distinguishing facts from mere political propaganda. In Russia, since the 2000 electoral campaign, the president has been presented by the state-controlled media as a young, energetic, and reliable official (in contrast to Yeltsin’s chaotic style of leadership), and his life story been used to reinforce that image in the public. Such a phenomenon, which has gradually become a real “Putinmania”, reminds us of the Soviet “cult to personality” and, perhaps, Yeltsin’s popularity in 1990-1991. That is why we consider these biographies to be not only insufficient to assess Putin’s performance before becoming Russian president, but also plainly biased when they omit potentially embarrassing facts as, for example, his career in the KGB. All that we learn about his fifteen years in the organi 9, one third of them in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), is his role in the foreign intelligence, with no details about his actual duties or his possible relation to other KGB activities.10 Therefore, trying to stick to the official data could negatively affect the objectivity of our conclusions. This becomes evident by examining the very few lines, mainly an enumeration of his political posts since 1990, in which these biographies can be summarized:11 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was born in Leningrad (now St Petersburg) on 7 October 1952. He obtained a degree in Law at Leningrad State University in 1975 (later, he became Candidate to Doctor in Economic Sciences). After graduating, he was selected by the KGB, where he worked from 1975 to 1990 as a foreign intelligence officer. From 1985 to 1990 he served in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In 1990 he returned to Leningrad and became assistant for international affairs to the President 12 of Leningrad State University. Later, he was appointed advisor to the Chairman of the Leningrad City Council. In June 1991, he was promoted to Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Leningrad City Council. After the collapse of the USSR, from 1994 he also served as first deputy mayor of St Petersburg. 8 Vladimir Putin, in Gevorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, op. cit., p. 5 (translated by Javier Morales). 9 “Organs” (of the State Security). A common Russian designation for the KGB. 10 See: Morales Hernández, Javier: “Los Servicios de Seguridad e Inteligencia en la Rusia de Putin” [Security and Intelligence Services in Putin’s Russia], UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 2 (May 2003), in http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci, pp. 2-3. 11 Our sources here are the Russian Presidency’s website and the Ministry of Defence’s Military Encyclopaedic Dictionary. Substantial data in other official biographies are almost identical to these examples. See: Biografiya / Biography [Russian and English versions], in http://www.president.kremlin.ru; Ministerstvo Oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Institut Voyennoy Istorii (2002): “Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich”, in Voyenniy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar [Military Encyclopaedic Dictionary].
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