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Projected Acquisition Costs for the Army's Ground Combat Vehicles
Projected Acquisition Costs for the Army’s Ground Combat Vehicles © MDart10/Shutterstock.com APRIL | 2021 At a Glance The Army operates a fleet of ground combat vehicles—vehicles intended to conduct combat opera- tions against enemy forces—and plans to continue to do so. Expanding on the Army’s stated plans, the Congressional Budget Office has projected the cost of acquiring such vehicles through 2050. Those projections include costs for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and for procurement but not the costs of operating and maintaining the vehicles. CBO’s key findings are as follows: • Total acquisition costs for the Army’s ground combat vehicles are projected to average about $5 billion per year (in 2020 dollars) through 2050—$4.5 billion for procurement and $0.5 billion for RDT&E. • The projected procurement costs are greater (in constant dollars) than the average annual cost for such vehicles from 2010 to 2019 but approximately equal to the average annual cost from 2000 to 2019 (when spending was boosted because of operations in Iraq). • More than 40 percent of the projected acquisition costs of Army ground combat vehicles are for Abrams tanks. • Most of the projected acquisition costs are for remanufactured and upgraded versions of current vehicles, though the Army also plans to acquire an Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle, which will replace the Bradley armored personnel carrier; an Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, which will replace the M113 armored personnel carrier; and a new Mobile Protected Firepower tank, which will be lighter than an Abrams tank. • The Army is also considering developing an unmanned Decisive Lethality Platform that might eventually replace Abrams tanks. -
The Army's Future Combat System (FCS)
= -*=72>8= :9:7*=42'&9=>89*2= a= &(0,74:3)=&3)=88:*8=+47=43,7*88= 3)7*<= *.(0*79= 5*(.&1.89=.3= .1.9&7>=74:3)=47(*8= &>=,3`=,**3= 43,7*88.43&1= *8*&7(-=*7;.(*= 18/1**= <<<_(78_,4;= -,222= =*5479=+47=43,7*88 Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress -*=72>8= :9:7*=42'&9=>89*2= a=&(0,74:3)=&3)=88:*8=+47=43,7*88= = :22&7>= The Future Combat System (FCS) was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program at the heart of the Army’s transformation efforts. It is was to be the Army’s major research, development, and acquisition program consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information network. FCS was intended to replace current systems such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The FCS program has been characterized by the Army and others as a high-risk venture due to the advanced technologies involved and the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together so that FCS-equipped units could function as intended. The FCS program exists in a dynamic national security environment which ultimately played a role in determining the program’s fate. Some questioned if FCS, envisioned and designed prior to September 11, 2001 to combat conventional land forces, was relevant in current and anticipated future conflicts where counterinsurgency and stabilization operations are expected to be the norm. The Army contended, however, that FCS was relevant throughout the “entire spectrum of conflict” and that a number of FCS technologies and systems were effectively used in counterinsurgency and stabilization campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. -
The Army's M-1 Abrams, M-2/M-3 Bradley, and M-1126 Stryker: Background and Issues for Congress
The Army’s M-1 Abrams, M-2/M-3 Bradley, and M-1126 Stryker: Background and Issues for Congress (name redacted) Specialist in Military Ground Forces April 5, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R44229 The Army’s M-1 Abrams, M-2/M-3 Bradley, and M-1126 Stryker Summary The M-1 Abrams Tank, the M-2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), and the M-1126 Stryker Combat Vehicle are the centerpieces of the Army’s Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs). In addition to the military effectiveness of these vehicles, Congress is also concerned with the economic aspect of Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker recapitalization and modernization. Due to force structure cuts and lack of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) opportunities, Congress has expressed a great deal of concern with the health of the domestic armored combat vehicle industrial base. ABCTs and SBCTs constitute the Army’s “heavy” ground forces; they provide varying degrees of armored protection and mobility that the Army’s light, airborne (parachute), and air assault (helicopter transported) infantry units that constitute Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) do not possess. These three combat vehicles have a long history of service in the Army. The first M-1 Abrams Tank entered service with the Army in 1980; the M-2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle in 1981; and the Stryker Combat Vehicle in 2001. Under current Army modernization plans, the Army envisions all three vehicles in service with Active and National Guard forces beyond FY2028. There are several different versions of these vehicles in service. -
ARMOR Janfeb2007 Covers.Indd
The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-07-1 Editor in Chief Features LTC SHANE E. LEE 7 Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for U.S. Forces Based on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction Managing Editor by Captain Daniel Helmer CHRISTY BOURGEOIS 12 Lebanon 2006: Did Merkava Challenge Its Match? by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF, Retired Commandant 15 Teaching and Learning Counterinsurgency MG ROBERT M. WILLIAMS at the Armor Captains Career Course by Major John Grantz and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl 18 The Challenge of Leadership ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- during the Conduct of Counterinsurgency Operations month ly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, by Major Jon Dunn ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Building 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. 20 Building for the Future: Combined Arms Offi cers by Captain Chad Foster Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- MOR represents the professional opinions of 23 The Battalion Chaplain: A Combat Multiplier the authors and does not necessarily reflect by Chaplain (Captain) David Fell the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information 26 Practical Lessons from the Philippine Insurrection presented in other official Army publications. by Lieutenant Colonel Jayson A. Altieri, Lieutenant Commander John A. Cardillo, and Major William M. Stowe III Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, ar mored 35 Integrating Cultural Sensitivity into Combat Operations cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battal- by Major Mark S. Leslie ion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron 39 Advice from a Former Military Transition Team Advisor head quarters, reconnaissance squadron head- by Major Jeff Weinhofer quar ters, armored cavalry troop, armor com- pany, and motorized brigade headquarters of 42 Arab Culture and History: Understanding is the First Key to Success the United States Army. -
Brazilian Tanks British Tanks Canadian Tanks Chinese Tanks
Tanks TANKS Brazilian Tanks British Tanks Canadian Tanks Chinese Tanks Croatian Tanks Czech Tanks Egyptian Tanks French Tanks German Tanks Indian Tanks Iranian Tanks Iraqi Tanks Israeli Tanks Italian Tanks Japanese Tanks Jordanian Tanks North Korean Tanks Pakistani Tanks Polish Tanks Romanian Tanks Russian Tanks Slovakian Tanks South African Tanks South Korean Tanks Spanish Tanks Swedish Tanks Swiss Tanks Ukrainian Tanks US Tanks file:///E/My%20Webs/tanks/tanks_2.html[3/22/2020 3:58:21 PM] Tanks Yugoslavian Tanks file:///E/My%20Webs/tanks/tanks_2.html[3/22/2020 3:58:21 PM] Brazilian Tanks EE-T1 Osorio Notes: In 1982, Engesa began the development of the EE-T1 main battle tank, and by 1985, it was ready for the world marketplace. The Engesa EE-T1 Osorio was a surprising development for Brazil – a tank that, while not in the class of the latest tanks of the time, one that was far above the league of the typical third-world offerings. In design, it was similar to many tanks of the time; this was not surprising, since Engesa had a lot of help from West German, British and French armor experts. The EE-T1 was very promising – an excellent design that several countries were very interested in. The Saudis in particular went as far as to place a pre- order of 318 for the Osorio. That deal, however, was essentially killed when the Saudis saw the incredible performance of the M-1 Abrams and the British Challenger, and they literally cancelled the Osorio order at the last moment. This resulted in the cancellation of demonstrations to other countries, the demise of Engesa, and with it a promising medium tank. -
T 80 Standard Tank
T80 STANDARD TANK The Soviet Army’s Last Armored Champion STEVEN J ZALOGA ILLUSTRATED BY TONY BRYAN © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com NEW VANGUARD • 152 T80 STANDARD TANK The Soviet Army’s Last Armored Champion STEVEN J ZALOGA ILLUSTRATED BY TONY BRYAN © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 4 ORIGINS 4 • New Medium Tank for the 1980s • The Turbine Option • Obiekt 219 THE T80B 12 • Reactive Armor: the T-80BV SUPERTOUGH: THE T80U 19 • Back To The Diesel: the Kharkov T-80UD T80 AT THE CROSSROADS: THE SOVIET COLLAPSE 28 ACTIVE PROTECTION 35 THE UKRAINIAN T84 38 T80 FOLLOWON TANKS 43 • Specialized T-80 Derivatives FURTHER READING 46 GLOSSARY 47 INDEX 48 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com T80 STANDARD TANK THE SOVIET ARMY’S LAST ARMORED CHAMPION INTRODUCTION The T-80 tank was meant to be the ultimate Soviet main battle tank (MBT), entering the Soviet arsenal around the same time as the new NATO- generation American M1 Abrams, British Challenger, and German Leopard 2. It was not a new design, but rather an evolutionary reconsideration of the T-64A tank. In the event, the T-80 proved to be deeply troubled, offering modest advances over the existing T-64A and T-72 tanks, yet being considerably more costly due to the use of a powerful but thirsty gas-turbine engine. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was fierce competition between surviving tank plants to win the contracts for a standard tank for the new Russian Army, and the rival T-90 was selected as the next Russian tank. -
Worldwide Equipment Guide
WORLDWIDE EQUIPMENT GUIDE TRADOC DCSINT Threat Support Directorate DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Worldwide Equipment Guide Sep 2001 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Page Memorandum, 24 Sep 2001 ...................................... *i V-150................................................................. 2-12 Introduction ............................................................ *vii VTT-323 ......................................................... 2-12.1 Table: Units of Measure........................................... ix WZ 551........................................................... 2-12.2 Errata Notes................................................................ x YW 531A/531C/Type 63 Vehicle Series........... 2-13 Supplement Page Changes.................................... *xiii YW 531H/Type 85 Vehicle Series ................... 2-14 1. INFANTRY WEAPONS ................................... 1-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicles AMX-10P IFV................................................... 2-15 Small Arms BMD-1 Airborne Fighting Vehicle.................... 2-17 AK-74 5.45-mm Assault Rifle ............................. 1-3 BMD-3 Airborne Fighting Vehicle.................... 2-19 RPK-74 5.45-mm Light Machinegun................... 1-4 BMP-1 IFV..................................................... 2-20.1 AK-47 7.62-mm Assault Rifle .......................... 1-4.1 BMP-1P IFV...................................................... 2-21 Sniper Rifles..................................................... -
Shared with the DRDO Its Notion of What Design Features and Performance It Would Like
Occasional Paper ISSUE NO. 324 JULY 2021 © 2021 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. Light Tanks: A Missing Priority for the Indian Army Kartik Bommakanti Abstract The Indian Army’s (IA) difficulties with regard to the acquisition of light tanks are as much self-inflicted as they are a product of fiscal constraints. The Army has exerted only half-hearted efforts in developing its light-armoured capabilities—inconsistent with current Army doctrine and in disregard of history. Indeed, the IA has used light armour in high-altitude operations in the past. This paper argues that the IA is hobbled by an infantry-oriented mindset that does not allow for other areas of force development such as a light-tank capability. Attribution: Kartik Bommakanti, “Light Tanks: A Missing Priority for the Indian Army,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 324, July 2021, Observer Research Foundation. ndia remains locked in boundary tensions with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and although these crises have momentarily abated, India would need to seriously address the gaps in its ground armour against the PRC. The Indian Army (IA) has been historically biased in favour of medium- and Iheavyweight tanks, and there is an absence of a significant or at least a consequential light-tank component in its armoured corps. The IA’s predilection for medium and heavy tanks is largely due to the service’s preoccupation with India’s foe on its western border—i.e., Pakistan. -
And Radio Communication in Tank T-72
A Report on Automatic Loading Gear (ALG) and Radio Communication in Tank T-72 By- Name of Students ID nos. Rudresh Gupta 2016A3PS0160G Jaskirat Singh Chhabra 2016A3PS0155G Vasu Gupta 2016A3PS0153G Dhruv Sharma 2016A8PS0371G Akanksha Singh 2016A8B30261G AT 505 ARMY BASE WORKSHOP, NEW DELHI Practice School – I station of BIRLA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY & SCIENCE, PILANI (MAY-JULY, 2018) BIRLA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY & SCIENCE PILANI (RAJASTHAN) Practice School Division Station: NEW DELHI Centre: 505 ARMY BASE WORKSHOP Duration: 8 WEEKS Date of Start: 22/05/2018 Date of submission: 13/07/18 Title of the project: 1) Auto-Loading Gear (ALG) in tank T-72 2) Radio Communication in tank T-72 Name of Students ID nos. Discipline Rudresh Gupta 2016A3PS0160G EEE Jaskirat Singh Chhabra 2016A3PS0155G EEE Vasu Gupta 2016A3PS0153G EEE Dhruv Sharma 2016A8PS0371G ENI Akanksha Singh 2016A8B30261G ENI Name and Designation of the expert: Sh. Kshitij Gupta, DGM (TEG) Name of the PS faculty: Dr. Nirankush Dutta Keywords: Tanks, ALG, KR-175, K1-M, Testing Jig, Amplifiers, Relays, Contactors. Project Areas: Electronics of the ALG system Abstract: The project is a detailed study and practical analysis of Auto-Loading Gear in tanks proposing improvements and possible changes, thereby reducing manual effort. Signature of student(s) Signature of Supervisor Date : Date : ACKNOWLEDGEMENT We wish to express our sincere gratitude to Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani for providing us the opportunity to do our internship and project work in “505 ARMY BASE WORKSHOP, New Delhi.” We sincerely thank Sh. Kshitij Gupta, DGM (TEG) for his guidance and encouragement in carrying out this project work. -
(FCS) “Spin- Outs” and Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): Background and Issues for Congress
Army Future Combat System (FCS) “Spin- Outs” and Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): Background and Issues for Congress Andrew Feickert Specialist in Military Ground Forces Nathan Jacob Lucas Section Research Manager November 30, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32888 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Army Future Combat System (FCS) Spin-Outs and Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Summary The Future Combat System (FCS) was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program at the heart of the Army’s transformation efforts. It was to be the Army’s major research, development, and acquisition program, consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information network. FCS was intended to replace current systems such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The FCS program has been characterized by the Army and others as a high-risk venture because of the advanced technologies involved and the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together so that FCS-equipped units could function as intended. On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates announced that he intended to significantly restructure the FCS program. The Department of Defense (DOD) would then plan to accelerate the spin out of selected FCS technologies to all brigade combat teams (BCTs). Gates also recommended cancelling the manned ground vehicle (MGV) component of the program, which was intended to field eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on a common chassis that would eventually replace combat vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank, the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the M-109 Paladin self-propelled artillery system. -
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018
1 115TH CONGRESS " ! REPORT 1st Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 115–200 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 R E P O R T OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON H.R. 2810 together with ADDITIONAL VIEWS [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] JULY 6, 2017.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed VerDate Sep 11 2014 10:45 Jul 07, 2017 Jkt 026108 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6012 Sfmt 6012 E:\HR\OC\HR200.XXX HR200 congress.#13 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 VerDate Sep 11 2014 10:45 Jul 07, 2017 Jkt 026108 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6019 Sfmt 6019 E:\HR\OC\HR200.XXX HR200 1 115TH CONGRESS " ! REPORT 1st Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 115–200 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 R E P O R T OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON H.R. 2810 together with ADDITIONAL VIEWS [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] JULY 6, 2017.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 26–108 WASHINGTON : 2017 VerDate Sep 11 2014 10:45 Jul 07, 2017 Jkt 026108 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 4012 Sfmt 4012 E:\HR\OC\HR200.XXX HR200 congress.#13 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. -
BCT Modernization Plan
BCT Modernization Plan The BCT Modernization Plan is informed by the comprehensive lessons learned from more than eight years of war, focuses on the evolving needs of our warfighters in a rapidly changing security environ- ment, and exploits the knowledge and technologies developed under the Future Combat Systems program. Instead of mak- ing one modernization decision and then applying it across the Army over two or more decades as was typically done in the past, the BCT Modernization Plan recog- nizes that modernization decisions must be made incrementally to stay ahead of the demands of the security environment and the needs of our warfighters. The Army’s new plan emphasizes the role of battle- tested soldiers in the development of new equipment, provides for the incremental delivery of the network, incorporates mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehi- cles into formations, accelerates the field- ing of capability packages across all BCTs, and initiates a new ground combat vehicle program as an element of a holistic plan for all combat vehicles. The Army’s BCT Modernization Plan is closely linked with the Army force genera- tion model (ARFORGEN), which continu- ously supplies warfighters within both the active and reserve components. ARFOR- GEN-based equipping is the main effort by which the Army manages equipment based on defined equipping goals linked to each phase (reset, train-ready, available) of the ARFORGEN cycle. Equipping resources are ARMY BRIGADE COMBAT allotted to units to meet their mission dur- TEAM MODERNIZATION ing