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The Influence of Ground Combat Vehicle Weight on Automotive Performance, Terrain Traversability, Combat Effectiveness, and Operational Energy

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The Influence of Ground Combat Vehicle Weight on Automotive Performance, Terrain Traversability, Combat Effectiveness, and Operational Energy 2018 NDIA GROUND VEHICLE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY SYMPOSIUM MODELING & SIMULATION, TESTING AND VALIDATION (MSTV) TECHNICAL SESSION AUGUST 7-9, 2018 - NOVI, MICHIGAN THE INFLUENCE OF GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE WEIGHT ON AUTOMOTIVE PERFORMANCE, TERRAIN TRAVERSABILITY, COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, AND OPERATIONAL ENERGY Robert J. Hart, PhD Richard J. Gerth, PhD Product Lifecycle Office of the Chief Engineering Materials Scientist U.S. Army TARDEC U.S. Army TARDEC Warren, MI Warren, MI ABSTRACT This study utilized computer simulations to analyze the influence of vehicle weight on automotive performance, terrain traversability, combat effectiveness, and operational energy for the M1A2 Abrams, M2A3 Bradley, and M1126 Stryker. The results indicate that a 15% reduction in combat vehicle weight correlates to 0-20% or greater improvements in: automotive mobility (top speed, speed on grade, dash time, fuel economy), terrain traversability (minimum required soil strength, % Go-NoGo, off road speed), combat effectiveness (% of combat effective outcomes, hits sustained, time, average and top speed in kill zone), and operational energy (gallons of fuel and fuel truck deliveries). While it has always been “understood” that vehicle weight impacts performance, this study has actually successfully quantified the impact. Through the use of multiple simulation tools, this study shows that reduced vehicle weight improves automotive performance, which directly improves the combat effectiveness in this current combat scenario. This study demonstrates that weight has a far more significant impact than previously known, and traditional methods of simply adding capability at the expense of weight could actually be self-defeating: reduced combat and operational capability of the combat platform. This paper also examines the relevance of mobility-based combat effectiveness within the framework of Brigade Combat Team fundamental operations, which provides direction and context for future studies. INTRODUCTION on transportability and other factors [2]. A recent Weight reduction of ground vehicles is a high study by Gerth and Howell outlined some of the priority for the US Army to increase expeditionary reasons lightweighting solutions have been so capability. For decades, vehicles have been elusive [2]. Further complicating the issue is a increasing in weight due to increased lack of understanding into the impact of weight requirements, which has had detrimental impact growth on: operational capability, cost, reliability, UNCLASSIFIED: Distribution Statement A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Proceedings of the 2018 Ground Vehicle Systems Engineering and Technology Symposium (GVSETS) logistics, and more. As vehicle weight increases simulation was conducted with the vehicles at beyond design, support system, and operational 100% of their Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW) and limits, the need for lightweighting solutions is at 85% of their GVW. No other vehicle becoming increasingly urgent. performance characteristics, such as survivability The Army’s Lightweight Combat Vehicle S&T or lethality were altered. In other words, it was Campaign (LCVSTC) calls for operational metrics assumed that the weight reduction occurred to evaluate the benefit of weight reduction and through implementation of technology that did not better prioritize weight reduction technology [3]. otherwise change vehicle capabilities. Understanding the operational value of weight The reader is cautioned not to compare the reduction would help prioritize research results between vehicles. The vehicles have investments in weight reduction and the impact different requirements and are used for different that requirements can have on weight issues. missions. Hence comparisons should only be Based on the hard point analysis presented in within a vehicle type and between the different Gerth & Howell, a recent study on lightweighting weights studied. the Abrams utilized cost, risk, and schedule to determine the combination of lightweighting AUTOMOTIVE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS technologies most likely to have an operational The automotive performance metrics analyzed transportability impact [4]. in this study were: (i) top speed (mph), speed on However, prior work has not looked at the 10% grade (mph), (iii) speed on 60% grade (mph), impact that vehicle weight has on mobility, (iv) dash speed (time to cover 50 meters from a combat effectiveness, reliability, spare parts dead stop in seconds), (v) fuel economy at a logistics costs, lifecycle costs, etc. There exists a constant 30 mph convoy speed (mpg), and (vi) strong need for a comprehensive approach for vehicle range (miles). Clearly vehicle range is also analyzing the impact that heavy vehicles have on a function of the vehicle’s fuel tank size, which is relevant operational metrics such as: readiness, different for every vehicle. combat effectiveness, and freedom of movement. The tools used for the analysis were GT-Suite This comprehensive approach and associated Software and MATLAB. GT-Suite enables fuel operational metrics is critical to shaping the future economy and performance modeling simulations acquisition programs in the Analysis of of a vehicle. MATLAB is a matrix-based language Alternatives (AoA) phase. Without such an optimized for solving engineering and scientific approach, we will continue to see weight growth problems using computational mathematics. GT- in future vehicles and in future upgrades of the Suite models of the M2A3 and M1126 Stryker existing fleet. were developed for the analysis. The engine This study expands upon prior work and is a set library of GT-Suite did not include a turbine of studies that examine the impact vehicle weight engine. Therefore, a MATLAB script was created has on automotive performance, terrain and used to calculate the performance of the traversability, combat effectiveness, and M1A2. The models were first validated by operational energy. In every study, unless comparing model performance predictions to test otherwise specified, three vehicles were studied: data. After validating, each vehicle model analysis (i) M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT), (ii) was conducted at the current GVW as well as at M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and (iii) M1126 85% of the current GVW, and the mobility metrics Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV). Each were calculated and recorded in Table 1. The Influence Of Ground Combat Vehicle Weight On Automotive Performance, Terrain Traversability, Combat Effectiveness, And Operational Energy UNCLASSIFIED: Distribution Statement A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Page 2 of 14 Proceedings of the 2018 Ground Vehicle Systems Engineering and Technology Symposium (GVSETS) function of various vehicle parameters, including Vehicle Top Speed Speed Dash Fuel Range Speed on on Speed Eco (mi) weight. While the NATO committee AVT-248 is (mph) 10% 60% (s) (mpg) currently working on the Next Generation NRMM Grade Grade (mph) (mph) (NGNRMM), it was not available for this study. The vehicle studies included wet and dry M1A2 --- --- --- --- --- --- conditions in the following three terrain types: (i) M1A2 +8.4 +27.4% +19.5% -6.1% +12.0% +12.0% terrain 1: foliage and muddy terrain, (ii) terrain 2: 85% wt % M2A3 --- --- --- --- --- --- sandy terrain, and (iii) terrain 3: mountainous M2A3 +0.5 +15.2% +100% -6.0% +14.3% +14.3% terrain. 85% wt % The terrain traversability metrics considered in M1126 --- --- --- --- --- --- this study were: (i) Vehicle Cone Index (VCI), (ii) M1126 +0.1 +9.8% +14.2% -5.3% +7.8% +7.8% % NoGo, (iii) V50 speed, and (iv) V80 speed. VCI 85% wt % quantifies the minimum soil strength required for Table 1: Automotive Performance Results a vehicle to consistently make a specified number of passes [5]. It is proportional to the vehicle’s For many of these metrics in Table 1, the weight ground pressure, and a lower VCI typically means had a significant influence on the automotive better soft soil mobility performance. In this case performance. For the M1A2, the 15% weight VCI1 relates to one vehicle pass on the soil. reduction led to an improvement in top speed of Lower VCI1 is better. % NoGo quantifies the 8%. Similarly, speed on grade increased by 20% percentage of the terrain in which the vehicle will or more, and fuel efficiency improved by 12%. not be able to travel. A smaller value is better. The M2A3 did not demonstrated a significant V50 and V80 speeds represent the average speed improvement in speed on 60% grade. The fuel the vehicle is able to travel over 50% and 80%, efficiency improved by an impressive 14% across respectively, of the most trafficable terrain. V80 a variety of terrains. Stryker also showed Speed - The average speed the vehicle is able to significant improvements in speed and fuel travel over 80% of the most trafficable terrain. efficiency due to lightweighting. This is All travel was over open, cross country terrain. noteworthy, because these results demonstrate that Paved or secondary roads are not considered in lightweighting has a significant influence on this analysis. The % NoGo, V50 Speed, and V80 automotive performance for both tracked (M1A2 Speed were computed using a representative unit and M2A3) and wheeled (Stryker) vehicles. All area for each country studied. The unit area was vehicles demonstrated an improvement in assumed to provide a reasonable representation of acceleration, as measured by their dash speed. The the terrain present in that country. The VCI1, on lighter weight vehicles
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