The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-07-1

Editor in Chief Features LTC SHANE E. LEE 7 Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for U.S. Forces Based on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction Managing Editor by Captain Daniel Helmer CHRISTY BOURGEOIS 12 Lebanon 2006: Did Merkava Challenge Its Match? by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF, Retired Commandant 15 Teaching and Learning Counterinsurgency MG ROBERT M. WILLIAMS at the Armor Captains Career Course by Major John Grantz and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl 18 The Challenge of Leadership ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- during the Conduct of Counterinsurgency Operations month ly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, by Major Jon Dunn ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Building 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. 20 Building for the Future: Combined Arms Offi cers by Captain Chad Foster Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- MOR represents the professional opinions of 23 The Battalion Chaplain: A Combat Multiplier the authors and does not necessarily reflect by Chaplain (Captain) David Fell the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information 26 Practical Lessons from the Philippine Insurrection presented in other official Army publications. by Lieutenant Colonel Jayson A. Altieri, Lieutenant Commander John A. Cardillo, and Major William M. Stowe III Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored 35 Integrating Cultural Sensitivity into Combat Operations cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battal- by Major Mark S. Leslie ion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron 39 Advice from a Former Military Transition Team Advisor head quarters, reconnaissance squadron head- by Major Jeff Weinhofer quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com- pany, and motorized brigade headquarters of 42 Arab Culture and History: Understanding is the First Key to Success the United States Army. In addition, Army li- by Captain Ralph E. Elder braries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for 45 Armor Advances Worldwide armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, by Professor Richard M. Ogorkiewicz organizations, and the training of personnel 48 Future of Armor for such organizations may request two copies by Captain Brian William Bradley by sending a request to the editor in chief. Reprinted from the November-December 1966 issue of ARMOR Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor 53 Army Seeks Recommendations for MCOE Patch, Crest, and Motto Center has proponency. That proponency in- 54 Mounted ManeuverNet cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these Departments systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; 2 Contacts any miscellaneous items of equipment which 3 Letters armor and armored cavalry organizations use 4 Commander’s Hatch exclusively; training for all 19-series officers 5 Driver’s Seat and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; 6 1st Armor Training Brigade and information concerning the training, logis- The Evolution of Land Mine Warfare Training for IET Soldiers tics, history, and leadership of armor and ar- by Captain Daniel Trost mored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at 50 Reviews those levels. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offi ces. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, ARMOR, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. January-February 2007, Vol. CXVI, No. 1 USPS 467-970 “From My Position...”

“The training of troops when intelligently directed is the greatest In his article, “Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for of morale builders, as they are quick to sense that they are being U.S. Forces on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction,” Captain prepared to meet effectively any emergency that may arise.” Dan Helmer describes an Israeli army that entered Lebanon as a highly effective low-intensity conflict force. Its soldiers were highly — Major General John A. Lejeune proficient at conducting raids, fixed-site security, and cordon and Reminiscences of a Marine, 1929 search missions, among others. This proficiency, however, came with a price. For a number of seemingly valid reasons, many ar- The armor force’s participation in the long war has forced it to mored units were unable to maintain their proficiency in tank gun- quickly adapt institutional and unit training so that tankers and nery and combined arms maneuver. As a result, what began as a cavalrymen can more effectively meet the daily emergencies Gen- fairly straightforward mission to seize key terrain quickly became eral Lejeune referred to. Soldiers departing the Armor School an exercise in casualty evacuation, vehicle recovery, and improvi- for operational tours leave Fort Knox with a much wider and, in sation. some cases, a much deeper understanding of the critical skills necessary for them to succeed on today’s battlefields than was Most military professionals understand that the U.S. Army has the case just a few years ago. Understandably, unit training has been very successful in conducting counterinsurgency operations. focused specifically on the unique challenges awaiting soldiers in Although many of these successes are very controversial by mod- theater. As a result, some of the combat skills we took for granted ern standards, they nevertheless are helpful in understanding the just a few years ago are not as sharp today as they once were. current conflict. The U.S. Army’s successful campaign in the Phil- ippines at the turn of the century is one of those history lessons that To put this situation in perspective, some of our tank companies we cannot afford to ignore simply because of some uncomfortable and cavalry troops will soon be commanded by captains who have truths associated with the conflict. As professionals, we must learn never participated in company-level maneuvers. Some of our tank to apply lessons that transcend time while avoiding the heavy- crews will be led by staff sergeants with only limited experience handed excesses of the past. In their article, “Practical Lessons with Tank Tables VIII through XII, and vague memories of their last from the Philippine Insurrection,” Lieutenant Colonel Jayson Altieri, mounted combined-arms live-fire exercise. In the short term, this Lieutenant Commander John Cardillo, and Major William Stowe III situation is manageable because enough institutional knowledge provide us with a large list of valuable lessons gleaned from one currently exists within the force to properly address any near-fu- of our first overseas experiences with counterinsurgency. ture contingencies. Over time, however, the armor force could be- gin to lose its proficiency in the core competencies that define the Balance is the key to providing our soldiers with the means to ef- unique contributions we bring to the fight. fectively meet the complex emergencies they will face today and the unpredictable emergencies of tomorrow. We can neither com- Some could argue that given our opponent’s limited capabilities, pletely abandon the hard-won lessons of our experience with coun- we really do not need to be as proficient in these skills as once terinsurgency in favor of dealing with a conventional threat, nor thought necessary to prevail in a high-intensity conflict. After all, can we allow core “kinetic” competencies to completely atrophy in we have yet to encounter an enemy who can match our firepower, an effort to defeat current irregular enemies. The intent of both of technology, training, or leadership. What happens though when we these articles and others included in this issue is to provide a small encounter a highly trained, disciplined, and well-led, but no less portion of the common intellectual basis necessary to begin the dis- asymmetric, enemy? Although many initial spot reports turn out to cussion that must occur if we are to strike the proper training bal- be false, it appears that the Israeli army encountered this unnerv- ance; future success depends on the outcome of this discussion. ing situation during its most recent combat operations in Lebanon this past summer. S.E. LEE

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW PETER J. SCHOOMAKER Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff 0630303 DSN prefix – 464- Points of Contact Commercial prefix– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor in Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) LTC Shane E. Lee 4087 MG Robert M. Williams 2121 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Christy Bourgeois 4582 BG Michael S. Tucker 7555 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Editor Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Vivian Oertle 2610 COL Russell Cloy 1101 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Art Director Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Mr. Jody Harmon 3923 CSM Otis Smith 4952 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Editorial Assistant Command Sergeant Major to DCG (ATZK-DCG-CSM) Kathy A. Johnson 2249 CSM Raymond Chandler 7091 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) COL Marlin Levendoski 1315 ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in edit- E-mail: [email protected] ing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or print- ed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Word, Rich Text Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development Format, or ASCII (please indicate wordprocessing format on disk or COL Richard G. Piscal (ATZK-TD) cover letter). Tape captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Ad- E-mail: [email protected] 8247 ditionally, we accept articles as e-mail or attachments at: TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) [email protected] COL John M. Shay 7955 When sending articles via e-mail, please include a complete mailing ad- E-mail: [email protected] dress and daytime phone number. Experimentation and Analysis Directorate (ATZK-UAE) SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue, COL David Hubner 7809 we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for E-mail: [email protected] publication by, other Army professional bulletins. Please submit your TRADOC Capability Manager, Platform Battle article to only one Army professional bulletin at a time. Command/Combat Identification (ATZK-PBC-CID) COL Alan Mosher 4009 GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints, but E-mail: [email protected] will accept electronic graphic and photo files in no less than 300 dpi format. (Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) If you use PowerPoint for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of ex- Aubrey Henley 5155 cessive color and shading. If you have any questions concerning elec- E-mail: [email protected] FAX 7585 tronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above. Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (ATZK-UA) Joe Hughes 5050 ADDRESS CHANGES, PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS, AND ST. GEORGE- E-mail: [email protected] ST. JOAN AWARDS: For paid subscription ser vice, address chang- Assistant TRADOC System Manager es, and delivery problems, or for awards in formation, contact Con- Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS) nie Stiggers or Connie McMillen, United States Armor Association, MAJ Bryan Salyers 3519 P.O. Box 607, Fort Knox, KY 40121; E-mail: [email protected]; E-mail: [email protected] phone (502) 942-8624; or FAX (502) 942-6219. You can also access the Association through their web site at www.usarmor-assn.org. UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery prob- U.S. Army Armor School lems or changes of unit address, e-mail us at [email protected]. mil; phone DSN 464-2249, com mercial (502) 624-2249; or FAX DSN Director of the Armor School (ATZK-DAS) 464-5039, commercial (502) 624-5039. Requests to be added to the of- COL Robert Valdivia 1050 ficial dis tribution list should be in the form of a letter or e-mail to the Ed- E-mail: [email protected] itor in Chief. 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATZK-BAZ) EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, COL Peter D. Utley 8736 Bldg 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. E-mail: [email protected] 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATZK-SBZ) ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine web site COL Robert R. Naething 7848 at www.knox.army.mil/armormag. E-mail: [email protected] ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24- NCO Academy (ATZK-NC) hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, CSM Samuel Wilson 5150 training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force. E-mail: [email protected]

2 — January-February 2007 Loss of Hetz Due to Political Restrictions The IDF commanders were limited by Sha- erally light force based around the M1114 and ron’s military initiatives, which (for political pur- the Stryker family of vehicles, and trained to Dear ARMOR, poses) were obscure. Loss of air cover was de- conduct primarily anti-insurgency operations Mr. Warford’s article, “The Secret Testing of cisive and unlike the war in 1973, where ag- while continually deployed. The Army National M111 “Hetz” Ammunition: A Model of Failed gressive ground action led by Sharon across Guard should be reconfigured as the primary Commander’s Responsibility,” which appeared the canal neutralized SAM batteries, Syria’s air heavy force, based on Abrams tanks, Bradley in the September-October 2006 issue, is chal- defense artillery was defeated by successful fighting vehicles, and field artillery platforms, lenged by some Israeli officers and writers. The Israeli Air Force countermeasures. and trained to break nations and destroy mass enemy forces as the national strategic fist. The opposition proposes the loss of Hetz was a I do not believe Sulton Yakoub serves the pur- Army Reserve should be reset as the support negative result ensuing from political restric- pose of your essay; the battle on the Dama- component, trained to rebuild places deemed tions; specifically, restrictions placed on the sus/Beirut Highway is closer to the parameters worthy of rebuilding, and for low-density skills field commander’s knowledge of the battle of your paradigm. tempo and objectives and resulting action at heavily required for occasional operations. Sultan Yakoub. TERRY M. STAUB We are engaged in a GWOT that will boil and The 362d Battalion was a reserve unit, ac- cool (much like the Cold War) over the next 30 to 40 years, toppling a dictator here, blowing up companied by younger orthodox infantry “draft- Future Force Structure Completely Wrong ees.” They were not expecting to run or literally some infrastructure there, and covertly whack- ing key bad guys hither and yon. Sometimes lager in the midst of an entire Syrian armored Dear ARMOR, division. it may require heavy mechanized forces to to- The fundamental force structure of the U.S. tally break a country. Other times, it will be a Air support was unavailable; at that stage Army in the Active, National Guard, and Re- few bombs or individual bullets. The number of of development, surface-to-air-missile (SAM) serve Components is completely wrong for the young Americans desiring to be forward-de- batteries nullified Israeli Air Force support to current 40-year war against non-state terror- ployed warriors on this long-term basis is fi- ground operations. The disengagement of the ism. And nothing in the current brigade-based nite, certainly not enough to sustain the current 362d was a miracle in itself made possible by transformation process will fix it. mobilization tempo of all three components. curtains of artillery protecting the withdrawing column’s flanks. Movement in daylight before At their heart, U.S. Army ground forces are The current war in Iraq notwithstanding, the the withdrawal was nearly impossible as a sin- still designed to defeat large, mechanized, en- GWOT will not typically require mass forma- gle person could draw multiple rocket rounds. emy elements through the use of maneuver, tions of M1s, M2s, and cannons. The Active The night action was fought hand-to-hand with shock, and firepower. They are not fundamen- Duty warrior should reflect this with training and Syrian commanders. tally designed to defeat an insurgency and win skills as a street-walking, door-knocking, lan- the hearts and minds of a terrorized local pop- guage-talking, anti-insurgency soldier. The Ac- The tempo of the battle’s daily objectives was ulace. Further, the operational tempo of this tive Duty soldier should expect a career that fed piecemeal once the Israeli Defense Forces Global War on Terror (GWOT) is rapidly dete- sees him off to land on foreign shores again (IDF) gained the Litani River. Some suggest riorating the entire U.S. Army’s force structure and again throughout his career; sometimes Sharon manipulated the events to invest Bei- skills and recruitment focus. We are not struc- for a few days and sometimes for more than a rut a “fait accompli,” allowing Begin deniability, tured or training for the current fight and no year at a time. This soldier should enlist with the and immobilize a cabinet that may have disap- longer offer the soldier any real choice among understanding that the Army of the 1980s and proved. The IDF was also more intent on re- components. 1990s, and its normal civilian lifestyle, except covering two soldiers missing in action who with guns and gear, is a thing of the past, and belonged to the tank on display; their corpses Bottom-line: the U.S. Army Active Component he will be out the door and all over the world as were returned in 2003. should be rebuilt, from the ground up, as a gen- a light, expeditionary ground-pounder, with his M1114 and Stryker to move him around and provide firepower. This Active Army will more reflect the expeditionary forces of the British 2007 Armor Warfighting Symposium Empire of the late 1800s, forward based around the world, and ready to move, shoot, and com- Armor: Strong Today — Strong Tomorrow municate at a moment’s notice.

The 2007 Armor Warfighting Symposium will be hosted at Fort Knox by the United States Entire careers will be spent overseas. It will Army Armor Center from 29 April to 3 May 2007. The theme for this year’s symposium is not be a married Army with families — that will “Armor: Strong Today — Strong Tomorrow.” have to wait for 20 years and retirement. Criti- cally, this force will specifically recruit young In keeping with this theme, the symposium will have a dynamic and varied agenda. Along men and women who desire an active, busy, with the normal vehicle and product displays, each day’s agenda will have a mixture of and aggressively mobile lifestyle with hopes of subject-matter expert (SME) briefings and focused discussion panels. Many of the Ar- engaging America’s enemies wherever they my’s top leaders will be invited as guest speakers for the symposium. Attendees will get are, whenever they can. a complete update on the current and future Army, as well as an update of the current status and future direction of Armor and Cavalry. Units are encouraged to send Soldiers National Guard recruitment will focus on young to the symposium — the information they gain will more than offset their travel costs and men and women who seek to serve their coun- time away from their unit. try at critical times, while maintaining a civilian lifestyle and career. Until the GWOT, this has The Armor Center will also award the Frederick M. Franks Award at the 2007 Symposium. always been the role of the National Guard. It This early reminder should make everyone aware of the opportunity to nominate a de- is only the past five years that the National serving individual for the award. Each year the Armor Center presents this award to an Guard has been totally mobilized, repeatedly, Active Duty or Reserve officer, noncommissioned officer, or Department of the Army civil- and it is showing wear and tear. Most people ian who has demonstrated a long-time contribution to warfighting capabilities of the U.S. do not join the Guard with dreams of heading Army. This award is a great chance to recognize someone who has worked hard to make out the door every few years for 18 months at the Armor Branch and the Army better institutions. Please give careful consideration to a time. They join in support of the Minuteman anyone in your organization who might be a good nominee. Details for submission of the heritage with the desire to be there at the stra- Frederick Franks Award, as well as details on all aspects of the Armor Symposium are tegic moments in defense of the Nation. available on the symposium website at: http://www.knox.army.mil/armorsymp. Continued on Page 52

January-February 2007 — 3 Major General Robert M. Williams Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center Maintaining Armor Core Competencies

The U.S. Armor Force has had certain rarely, if ever, conduct maneuver opera- characteristics throughout its existence tions above that level. A generation of of- that sets it apart from other branches as ficers and Soldiers are becoming less fa- the “Combat Arm of Decision.” Speed, miliar with offensive and defensive oper- know that the horse keeps them alive in long-range fires, and the unique ability to ations. On the plus side, reconnaissance battle. In this technological age, we must cross the beaten zone, coupled with the skills are still quite strong due to the need not forget that greater care of our equip- Warrior Ethos that our Armor Soldiers and for current, actionable intelligence in sup- ment is still important, which requires Cavalry Troopers have always displayed, port of operations. training on how to run a proper unit main- make our branch unique and exception- • al. This capability is not issued on grad- Gunnery. Units are proficient with tenance system. uation from Armor Basic Officer Lead- machine gun engagements; however, main What can we do to stop this degradation er Course (BOLC) III or one station unit gun engagement skills have been signifi- of our core competencies? The Armor training (OSUT), however. Strapping on cantly degraded. Gunnery training from Center and School are aware of this situ- tanker boots or donning a Stetson does the standpoint of training management is ation and are addressing some of these not magically transform an average Sol- also a skill that we are losing at the junior issues through course training. The Ma- dier into a steely-eyed mounted warrior. officer and senior noncommissioned of- neuver Captains Career Course, BOLC Our unique capabilities, which we all train ficer level. In a recent survey of career III, and NCO Academy continuously and drill on, require a set of core compe- course captains, who were assigned to Ar- work to improve instruction on topics, tencies. I am concerned, based on reports mor battalions, a significant number of such as gunnery training management, from the field as well as observations of officers reported they had never fired a maintenance and supply, and tactical op- training units, that the long war is taking full-up gunnery. We are losing not only erations at the high end of the warfight- a toll on our core competencies. the technical skills associated with de- ing spectrum. We are investigating the stroying targets, but also the leadership possibility of reinstating a two-week tank The broad branch core competencies for skills associated with training technical commander’s certification course to ad- Armor include: command and control, procedures. gunnery, maintenance/combat service dress gunnery and maintenance shortfalls sup port, and maneuver. Reconnaissance • Command and Control. While our for Soldiers who lack depth and experi- is addressed as part of the maneuver com- junior leaders are being exposed to better ence in this critical competency. petency. Due to the nature of current oper- integration of branches, services, and al- While I fully understand the require- ations, we are receiving reports that these lied forces, there are very few maneuver ments for training the Armor Branch to competencies are beginning to atrophy. operations being conducted above com- fight the current enemy, we cannot forget Initial insights obtained from surveys of pany level. Many operations are standard- that we must always be prepared to en- students and cadre at the Armor School, ized and do not require a high level of dy- gage and destroy the enemy in offensive coupled with queries sent to brigade and namic retasking of assets, collocation of and defensive operations across the spec- battalion commanders from the opera- command nodes, or large-scale deconflic- trum, as well as conduct stability and re- tional force, indicate that maneuver, gun- tion of battlespace. construction operations. In this issue of ARMOR nery, and command and control tasks are • Maintenance. Our Soldiers are doing , several articles highlight lessons indeed suffering. Maintenance and sup- a great job keeping their assigned equip- learned by the Israeli Defense Force in ply-related tasks have experienced some ment working, but we have defaulted to its most recent conflict with Hez bollah, deterioration as well. What follows is a crisis maintenance management instead specifically lessons learned by its mech- roll up of what we are seeing from the of preventive maintenance in too many anized forces. I ask all leaders in our force force: cases. Time constraints and competing to continue to find the time and resourc- • Maneuver. While our force is getting requirements remove junior leaders from es to train our Soldiers and junior lead- more proficient at cordon and search op- planning and executing essential mainte- ers on those tasks that make our branch erations at platoon and company levels, nance events such as services. Troopers unique and essential to our great Army battalion and squadron commanders are have always ridden their horses hard, but and the United States. concerned about the fact that their units they also take care of them because they Forge the Thunderbolt!

4 — January-February 2007 CSM Otis Smith Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Tanks Don’t Float

The Armored Force has experienced sev- of him to guide him as he maneuvered eral water-related armored vehicle inci- across the rough countryside. Something dents; this article focuses on one specific felt wrong as the Bradley made an abrupt incident and discusses countermeasures maneuver. The tank driver knew that his that can save crew members’ lives. NVD did not give him good depth percep- • Situational awareness — inside the What could possibly go wrong? As an M1A2 tion, so he asked for assistance from the TC. The TC glanced forward through the tank, position the turret so the driver system enhancement program (SEP) driv- can egress through the loader’s or tank er, he had done this many times. The mis- CITV and gave the command to proceed. Almost immediately, the tank driver felt commander’s hatch in the event his sion was simple — a cross-country tacti- hatch fails to open. cal road march over rough terrain, roads, the ground give way as the tank slid into and canals, following behind two Brad- the canal. The TC gave the evacuation • Ground guides should be used as stat- ley Fighting Vehicles with another M1A2 command. The tank driver popped his ed in U.S. Army Field Manual 90-13, SEP bringing up the rear. The route was hatch, but it would not open because the River-Crossing Operations. This man- well traveled, but there had been reports NVD would not come loose. The only ual provides step-by-step procedures of enemy contact. There was also a known other means of egress, the hell hole, was for crossing water hazards. blocked due to the orientation of the tur- risk of improvised explosive devices • Practice rollover drills and egress pro- (IEDs) along the route. This particular ret. The TC saw the tank driver’s prob- lem and attempted both power and man- cedures constantly — especially at mission would start in late afternoon and night. continue into the night. ual traverse of the turret. By the time the TC was able to move the turret, and get Tank crews must always remember that The pre-operational brief and preven- the tank driver through the hell hole, he when an evacuation incident occurs, safe tive maintenance checks were part of the had drowned. evacuation of your entire crew is first pri- standard pre-combat inspection. Since Several events occurred, making a bad ority — worry about shutting down the there was the possibility of enemy contact tank later. Tank crews must rehearse this and they would be traveling at night, the situation even worse. The following pre- cautions could lessen the egress time and drill regularly. Commanders must inte- tank driver knew he was required to drive grate crew evacuation drills into all gun- buttoned up and in blackout conditions. permit successful evacuation: • nery and maneuver training; training must He also knew that he would need to install Plan your mission — when vehicles be performed until knowing what to do his AN/VVS-2(V) 2A night vision device are required to maneuver near or across and when to do it is second nature. We (NVD). He remembered that he had ex- water hazards, take precautions to en- owe it our soldiers to enforce these stan- perienced problems with the NVD before; sure the crew understands where the dards. The Armor Center continues its ef- it had even vibrated loose and dropped vehicle is located in relationship to forts to reduce risk to tank crews; howev- into his lap once while he was driving. the hazards. Conduct a map recon- er, tank crew members must know how The ever-resourceful tanker had the an- naissance of the route prior to the mis- to implement effective control measures swer to that situation — he tightened the sion. And remember, weather and ter- to minimize risk to crew members across NVD support thumb screws attaching the rain conditions may change during the the board. NVD to the driver’s hatch with his handy course of the mission — dry creeks pliers. He now knew the NVD was secure aren’t always dry. Special thanks to Mr. William D. Wat- and would not come loose. • son Jr., for his contributions to this arti- Conduct preventive maintenance cle. Mr. Watson is the System Safety En- As the mission began, the tank com- checks and services (PMCS) to ensure gineer for Combat Developments at the mander (TC) used his commander’s in- all exits are free and clear of any equip- U.S. Army Armor Center. We thank him dependent thermal viewer (CITV) (an- ment that could block or degrade quick for his dedication to training and support- other night vision device) to assist the egress in case of an emergency. If you ing our troops. tank driver and for his own situational are required to use the AN/VVS-2(V) awareness. As night fell, the tank driver 2A NVD, ensure the thumb screws are “Teach our young Soldiers and leaders used the tail lights of the Bradley in front loose enough to be removed quickly. how to think; not what to think.”

January-February 2007 — 5 The Evolution of Land Mine Warfare Training for IET Soldiers

by Captain Daniel Trost

Since the invasion of Iraq on 20 March quency radio initiators and alter how, ity to recognize when things just do not 2003 by coalition forces, the U.S. mili- when, and where they emplace devices. look right. Using the “every soldier as a tary has combated the ever-evolving threat Soldiers, not just leaders, on the ground sensor” model, trainers are better equip- of improvised explosives devices (IEDs). must now better understand our inherent ping soldiers with the knowledge to bet- Roadside bombs are not a new threat to vulnerabilities and how our standard op- ter understand how and what to look for, U.S. forces; however, their effectiveness erating procedures directly contribute to as well as how to react when in contact and use increases as we increase our ef- those vulnerabilities. Leaders must en- with threat forces. fectiveness in closing with the enemy. As sure that all soldiers realize that counter- Each company in the 1st Armor Training with all warfare, technological upgrades IED measures start at their level. Brigade now has a company-level IED and tactical improvements by one army The evolving IED threat brought about training aid kit or “IED in a box.” These force the opposing army to adapt with a complete restructuring of programs of kits are no cost and are a locally produced varying results. instruction for all initial entry soldiers in assembly of commonly encountered mu- Soldiers in Vietnam were subjected to basic combat training (BCT) and one- nitions and triggering devices. The kits IED threats on their convoys and patrols station unit training (OSUT). Previously, offer units and soldiers a permanent train- much like units in Iraq and Afghanistan soldiers were taught land mine familiar- ing tool, which can be used during con- today. The solutions for IEDs in Vietnam ization, mine identification, probing for current and opportunity training through- were to heavily armor and arm convoys mines, and conducted practical lane ex- out the cycle. Also, IED training does not to massively increase their defensive pos- ercises to clear and negotiate mine fields. require commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) ture and firepower. This proved effective The training has transitioned from a strict- products; simple products, such as the in deterring the opposition from direct at- ly land mine curriculum to a combina- “IED in a box” provide units a great train- tacks, but was not the silver bullet in com- tion of intensive land mine/IED exercises, ing value with minimal monetary and man- bating the IED threat completely. which include reacting to an IED, identi- hour costs. Although the COTS products fying an IED, and reacting to an IED at- are outstanding at offering realistic sce- Insurgent forces of today are less likely tack. Soldiers arriving at the land mine narios with auditory and visual feedback, to stand and fight as did the Viet Cong and warfare site will immediately react to a they should be used during capstone ex- North Vietnamese. Rather, they seek to simulated IED detonation, which not only ercises to ensure soldiers have mastered cause terminal failure of our tactics and serves as a practical exercise, but also their 10 level task sets. Not only does this equipment in an attempt to draw in a large as a wake-up call as they enter the training afford soldiers the opportunity to experi- reactionary force. Once they have accom- environment. During training, soldiers ence a realistic attack, but it also sets con- plished this, they meld back into the pop- also learn the five “Cs” — confirm, clear, ditions to test soldiers’ tactical reactions. ulous and study our response. Our reac- call, cordon, and control; five meter and The “IED in a box” is one of the great and tion is what drives their evolution in tac- twenty-five meter searches; IED identifi- simple tools now incorporated into the tics and lethality. cation; and IED reporting. IED training matrix, which will further enhance the combat effectiveness of new- The propagation of tactics and technol- The land mine warfare training culmi- ly minted soldiers. ogy among our enemy is driven by the nates in a collective task practical exer- fact that they realize they will be success- cise where soldiers identify an IED, re- The IED and its evolution as a battle- ful as long as they continually change act to an IED, administer first aid, and field condition is not a revolutionary tac- how they implement IED threats. These properly report an IED. More important- tic; the training we conduct to better equip changes do not occur at theater level, but ly, this single-day training is just a small our soldiers to meet this threat is revolu- at the local operating level, and are often part of the IED immersion taking place tionizing our Army. Every soldier at ev- cross-pollinated within insurgent groups throughout BCT and OSUT. The real ery level will meet this threat with varying throughout theater. For example, a tactic training begins at the unit level with the degrees of success. This training should that is effective in Baghdad may not be integration of “every soldier is a sensor,” not remain at the BCT level, but should be effective in Al Anbar, but it is guaranteed where drill sergeants and cadre alter as- part of every unit’s ongoing training pro- that as we counter the threat in Baghdad, pects of the training environment and gram. Gone are the pre-deployment train- established tactics from other areas of op- task soldiers to identify the environmen- ing days afforded many new soldiers; lead- eration not seen in Baghdad for some time tal modification. It can be simple exer- ers and trainers must continue to provide will reemerge. cises, such as emplacing cones along a the most combat effective soldier possi- road-march route while requiring soldiers ble to the force while improving condi- The enemy is exploiting our ability to to report the environmental discrepancies tions to combat IED attacks. To alleviate rapidly change our tactics; they rapidly they notice. To challenge soldiers even IED attacks, we must continue to use the alter tactics as our forces adjust to “cur- further, IED training aids can be placed greatest asset available to us: the soldier rent” enemy tactics, techniques, and pro- in and around soldiers to allow them to on the ground; the training they have re- cedures. They do this by moving from implement reactionary measures. This ceived and their will to fight will win this command-detonated IEDs to high-fre- training greatly enhances a soldier’s abil- battle.

6 — January-February 2007 Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for U.S. Forces Based on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction by Captain Daniel Helmer

On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah fighters, possibly led or directed portedly was blown more than 10 feet into the air). One soldier by Imad Mughniyeh, once the world’s most wanted terrorist, be- was killed by Hezbollah sniper fire as an armored force with in- gan a diversionary rocket attack on military targets in Northern fantry support attempted to extricate the quick-reaction force. 1 Israel before launching a lightning attack across the border against Israeli soldiers in armored HMMWVs. The attack resulted in These were the opening volleys in a month-long war in which killing three soldiers, wounding two others, and capturing two Hezbollah demonstrated that the spectrum of warfare for which prisoners. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) dispatched a quick-re- regular forces must be prepared is larger than the two poles of action force, led by one of the world’s most advanced tanks, the counterinsurgency and maneuver warfare. It is vital that we not Merkava. Hezbollah militants, armed with a proficiency they regard Hezbollah’s 30-day performance as a fluke unlikely to be would demonstrate throughout the war, ambushed the quick-re- encountered by the U.S. military. Indeed, while elements of the action force, blowing up the lead tank with a several-hundred war are unique to the Israel-Lebanon conflict, such as Hezbol- pound pitcharge-type improvised explosive device (IED). All lah’s positioning on a border adjacent to Israel and its capability four crew members in the tank were killed instantly (the tank re- to terrorize the Israeli population with rockets and missiles, at the tactical and operational levels, other enemies of the United taneously supplying inspiration, technical help, and weaponry States can learn much from the Hezbollah experience. The fact to the Palestinians.6 According to a senior analyst with Defense of the matter is that Hezbollah leaders, an avowed if not active News, understanding that a future conflict would likely be a de- enemy of the United States, who likely have agents working in fensive action against an Israeli incursion seeking to destroy our country, believe they have arrived on an exportable model them, Hezbollah leaders studied the historical model of the Viet of Islamist insurgency, and other terrorist organizations are al- Cong as inspiration for establishing an advanced tunnel network, ready openly seeking to gain lessons learned from the conflict.2 extending through the main avenues of approach into southern Given that there are real limitations on garnering a full under- Lebanon.7 standing of what happened in Lebanon so soon after the 14 Au- Working secretly, Hezbollah built up weapons stockpiles, par- gust 2006 ceasefire, this article, using interviews with a number ticularly short- and medium-range rockets and antitank guided of key observers and open-source reporting on the war, seeks to missiles (ATGM), and developed reinforced, highly camouflaged explain the possible lessons and implications for the mounted bunkers throughout their area of operations — all in spite of ex- maneuver warrior of what Israel came to call “Operation Change tensive monitoring by UN observers and Israeli intelligence. of Direction.” Confronted after the war with the location of a football-field- A New Model sized bunker complex, with meter-thick, steel-reinforced con- Six years after Israel’s ignominious withdrawal from south Leb- crete on an open hillside in Labboune, one UN observer remarked anon and six years after the beginning of the Second Palestinian that Hezbollah must have brought in cement by the spoonfuls. Intifadah (the al Aqsa Intifadah), IDF forces remained woefully The bunker complex was situated only two-hundred meters north of the Israeli border and only several kilometers from UN head- unprepared for a new fight in Lebanon. In the final 15 years of quarters in an-Naqurah; neither the UN nor IDF realized the ex- the occupation, only a small cadre of IDF soldiers experienced tent and sophistication of the bunkers, and the IDF was unable to the terrible uncertainty of asymmetric war in Lebanon’s south. destroy them or force the fighters to evacuate them during fight- The rest of the IDF, according to two-time IDF Lebanon veteran 8 and respected historian, Michael Oren, trained to win the conven- ing. Unlike in the occupied territories, neither signal intelligence 3 nor human intelligence could successfully penetrate Hez bollah tional surprise encountered during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. before or during the war. Subsequent to the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifadah in 2000, the IDF leadership realized that it was ill-prepared for the fight- Throughout the six years of relative quiet, Hezbollah focused on ing against Hamas, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), extensive intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), mon- and other extremist forces that held the hearts and minds of much itoring IDF units to its south by eavesdropping on IDF soldiers’ of the populations of Gaza and the West Bank. “When the Inti- cell phone calls; using criminal networks of mostly Bedouin drug fadah broke out, the IDF went on a massive retooling [effort]… dealers, other criminals, and malcontents to provide information we went to be an urban anti-terrorism force, like a large SWAT on IDF movements and plans; and by inconspicuously taking team…and became the most advanced large scale anti-terrorism extensive notes on Israeli movements for months at a time. As 4 Timur Goksel, the former chief spokesperson for UNIFIL (the force in the world,” explains Oren. From 2000 through 2006, al- title of the UN observers), describes Hezbollah, “What was re- though skirmishes occurred from time to time on the Northern ally significant is the amount or quality of staff work that goes Border, including kidnapping and attempted kidnapping of sev- into their activities that renders them different from any other eral IDF soldiers, as well as shelling and sniper fire in the dis- 9 puted Shebaa farms area, the Hezbollah threat went largely ig- guerrilla outfit.” nored. Responses to Hezbollah provocations were extremely Although Hezbollah launched the surprise raid on 12 July and limited, and similar to the United States’ focus on conventional “was itching for a fight and got a fight,” it did not anticipate the war against the USSR after Vietnam, the IDF was determined to tremendous Israeli response to the kidnapping of two soldiers.10 focus on a different enemy than the one to which it had just ced- As a result, the IDF possessed the initiative in the first hours and ed an 18-year struggle.5 even days of the war when it focused excessively on the use of its air force. When the IDF launched its ground incursions, they The core combat competencies required for the urban fight in anticipated (just as the U.S. anticipates in Iraq and Afghanistan) the occupied territories were significantly different from those re- that when confronted with a regular force on the offensive, Hez- quired for the fight in which the IDF would find itself in Leb- bollah would essentially melt into the countryside. In fact, pre- anon. By 2006, the IDF excelled at conducting cordon and search 11 operations, door-to-door searches, hasty raids, and identifying vious to 2000, this had been the doctrine of Hezbollah. Yet, and capturing or killing suspected Palestinian terrorists and guer- Hezbollah doctrine had evolved, and Hezbollah prepared to en- rillas. Through a network of collaborators exploited since the counter the IDF unlike any guerrilla force in history. In the words 1970s, the IDF gained extensive intelligence information on Pal- of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, “The resis- estinian terror organizations. Israeli control of the borders of tance withstood the attack and fought back. It did not wage a Gaza and the West Bank meant that Palestinian fighters often guerrilla war either….it [Hezbollah] was not a regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense either. It was some- possessed inferior weapons and were forced to fight in a virtu- 12 ally untenable situation. Israeli information dominance made thing in between.” “This,” he said, “is the new model.” training difficult for Palestinian forces. Meanwhile factionaliza- “We were caught unprepared.”13 tion prevented a unitary military effort against the Israelis. In ef- fect, the IDF, like the U.S. military, was a seemingly militarily The IDF encountered innumerable problems with Hezbollah’s superior counter-terrorist/insurgent force fighting a militarily “new model.” In a city that became a showcase for the IDF’s tac- inferior terrorist/insurgent enemy. tical failures during the war, despite repeated incursions and air attacks aimed at the Lebanese Shiite city of Bint Jbail through- Meanwhile, Hezbollah, flush with their 2000 victory, did not out the war, the IDF was unable to take the city, allowing Nas- rest on its laurels. Believing that another showdown with the Is- rallah to claim it as Hezbollah’s Stalingrad. As Goksel puts it, raelis was looming, it began the arduous task of exploring les- “in one day in 1982 they [the IDF] reached Beirut; here, in six or sons learned from its 17-year open war with Israel, while simul- seven days, they couldn’t go more than a few miles.”14 Among

8 — January-February 2007 the most disturbing concerns to U.S. Army armor and mecha- of artillery and close air support (CAS) in built-up areas, not nized infantry forces should be the large losses taken by the IDF’s only failed to achieve tactical results against Hezbollah, but also much vaunted armor corps. During operations in Lebanon, ap- earned the approbation of much of the international community proximately 10 percent of the IDF’s 400 Merkavas were dam- for the IDF’s destruction of civilian areas.19 When artillery fire aged by an enemy without a single armor or helicopter plat- lifted, Hezbollah fighters took it as a signal that the infantry was form. Thirty tank crewmen, comprising 25 percent of the IDF’s about to move in and would commence firing on them.20 total dead, were killed during the war. Of the 40 tanks damaged, Hezbollah units worked almost exclusively in their hometowns, half were actually penetrated by ATGMs or rocket-propelled gre- thus allowing effective coded communications over unencrypt- nades (RPGs) with tandem charges, resulting in the deaths of 24 15 ed radios. A typical Hezbollah transmission might be no more of the 30 tank crewmen killed. than, “let’s go meet by the house of the girl who broke your heart While the exact details of Hezbollah’s arsenal are difficult to 20 years ago.” The IDF, while able to hear and understand the determine, due to conflicting battlefield reports and the fact that communication, could gain no actionable intelligence from it.21 both the IDF and Hezbollah held their cards close, various reports indicate that Hezbollah possessed either originals or Iranian versions of the AT-3 Sagger, the AT-4 Spigot, the AT-5 Spandrel, the AT-13 METIS-M, and the AT-14 Kornet-E, as well as the RPG-29. In addition, Hezbol- lah expertly employed various mortar and other antipersonnel systems, as well as command-detonated IEDs. Many of the weapons were provided or purchased from Iran or Syria, although a substantial cache of small arms and explosives were stolen from the IDF over the years. Throughout the war, the toll taken on read- iness by occupation duty in the West Bank and Gaza was evident. Infantry, artillery, and armor coordination, once the focal point of Israeli doctrine, was significant- ly degraded. Tactical expertise and inno- vation were almost entirely absent — all along the border, where Hezbollah had spent six years preparing for a defense in Photos courtesy David Eshel depth, IDF forces launched frontal at- “During operations in Lebanon, approximately 10 percent of the IDF’s 400 Merkavas were dam- tacks.16 The IDF reserves, on which the aged by an enemy without a single armor or helicopter platform. Thirty tank crewmen, compris- IDF relies heavily, had not received ma- ing 25 percent of the IDF’s total dead, were killed during the war. Of the 40 tanks damaged, half neuver training since the inception of the were actually penetrated by ATGMs or rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) with tandem charges, Intifadah in 2000 — they were too busy resulting in the deaths of 24 of the 30 tank crewmen killed.” with occupation duty. Even the active duty forces had not completed a major maneu- ver training operation in more than a year.17 During mobilization, reserve forces received three to Hezbollah, while possessing some night-vision equipment, ac- five days of training. It should have been no surprise that the cepted Israeli dominance of the night. To overcome this, they IDF performed poorly at the tactical level against its formidable went to ground at night while the Israelis shot at designated tar- enemy: its soldiers were, on average, 10 years younger than en- gets; they would resurface at or after dawn (BMNT) with full emy forces, they had little experience or training, and faced knowledge of the composition of the IDF forces in the area. an enemy who was extensively prepared for this moment. On the morning of 10 August, Hezbollah fighters disabled two Hezbollah demonstrated surprising tactical innovation. Know- tanks withdrawing from al-Khiyam ridge with ATGMs just af- ing that the AT-3 was incapable of doing damage to Israeli ar- ter dawn, killing one crew member. Hezbollah fighters then mor- mor, they used it effectively as an anti-infantry weapon. From tared the two tank crews and were sending an infantry squad to- distances well outside the engagement range of IDF infantry, ward the soldiers when the soldiers were rescued, almost an hour Hezbollah would use indirect fire, including ATGMs, to scatter after their tanks were disabled. Evidencing the problems the the infantry. As the infantry moved closer to the towns where IDF had during the war with training and coordination, the tank Hezbollah fighters were fighting, IDF infantrymen would often crews, which included a company commander who had opera- take cover in barns and other buildings on the outskirts of the tional radios, failed to call for suppressive fire on the ridge, de- city. Hezbollah would then hit houses with the AT-3s; on 9 Au- spite knowing it was the source of the mortars.22 gust 2006, nine IDF infantrymen were killed in Bint Jbail in a single attack using this technique.18 In addition, Hezbollah reg- The battle of Wadi Saluki from 11 to 13 August illustrates the ularly employed snipers, a tactic they had not used prior to 2000. tactical and operational problems faced by the IDF throughout Artillery, which the IDF used to suppress Hezbollah fighters as the war. Eleven of the twenty-four Merkava IVs employed by infantry moved in, was ineffective against the bunkers and tun- the 401st Armor Brigade during the battle were hit by ATGMs nels in which Hezbollah was fighting. In fact, undisciplined use or RPGs; eight tank crewmen were killed, as were four infantry-

January-February 2007 — 9 Any element of surprise about the loca- tion of the IDF’s advance on the Litani was eliminated by Division 162’s week in waiting. When paratroopers of the Nahal Infantry Brigade performed an uncontest- ed air assault outside the cities of Ghan- douriyeh and Farun on the evening of 11 August, any remaining uncertainty in the minds of Hezbollah fighters as to the tim- ing and direction of the attack was elimi- nated. They soon established a hasty de- fense of the Wadi using mines, ATGMs, and possibly some previously built-up po- sitions. “Hezbollah believed for a long time that the road between Qantara and Ghandouriyeh presented a Using the same methods as those used in likely avenue of approach for invading forces. Knowing that Wadi Saluki, and particularly the bridg- es that ran over the Saluki, provided a good choke point for an ambush on invading forces, they es- the occupied territories, Nahal infantry sol- tablished permanent defensive positions overlooking the Wadi, including one west of Beni Hayan.” diers claimed to have control of the high ground over Wadi Saluki after they had seized key buildings on the outskirts of the two cities in the early hours of 12 Au- men of the Nahal infantry brigade, jointly accounting for 10 per- gust. The 401st Armor Brigade sent a column of 24 tanks to- cent of all IDF killed in the war. The battle took place as a result ward the town to link up with paratroopers and give the IDF of the IDF’s desire to control the Litani River, the former high- control of key roads. As the tanks maneuvered on the partially water mark of their occupation zone.23 Division 162 was or- built road in the Wadi, Hezbollah fighters detonated a mine just dered to take the town of Ghandouriyeh, a village at the inter- north of the bridge on the road between Qantara and Ghan- section of a major east-west road, and a road leading to a bridge douriyeh, killing the entire crew of the lead tank, including the north over the Litani. The village also provided significant over- company commander. Hezbollah then launched swarms of watch of the Litani, making it a key location for controlling south rockets of all different types onto the Israeli tanks. As one crew Lebanon. member described it, “You should understand that the first missile which hits is not the really dangerous missile. The ones Positioned in the vicinity of the northern Israeli city of Metul- which come afterwards are the dangerous ones — and there al- la, Division 162 had known for a week that it was to take Ghan- ways follow four or five after the first.”24 Hezbollah fighters douriyeh; however, its orders were canceled several times. The used ATGMs, small-arms fire, and mortars to suppress the Na- main axis from Metulla to Ghandouriyeh is on a major road that hal Brigade, preventing them from providing effective infantry first runs through the village of Qantara; to move from Qantara support for the armor forces. Not a single tank crewman in all to Ghandouriyeh, an invading force must cross Wadi Saluki. The 24 tanks thought to deploy the tanks’ smoke grenades while they area of the Wadi is covered with dense undergrowth, consisting of juniper bush- es, scrub oak, and other thornbushes, con- fining vehicles to the partially built road that runs through the Wadi. The Saluki, a tributary of the Litani, runs through the Wadi and pro vides a natural obstacle for both tracked and wheeled vehicles. A couple of bridges run across the Saluki on the road between Qantara and Ghandouri- yeh; the terrain does not allow for the bridges to be bypassed, except with great difficulty. The Wadi is surrounded by high ground consisting of limestone rock with many natural caves, and surrounding hills, which provide excellent fields of fire onto the Wadi. Hezbollah believed for a long time that the road between Qantara and Ghandouri- yeh presented a likely avenue of approach for invading forces. Knowing that Wadi Saluki, and particularly the bridges that ran over the Saluki, provided a good choke point for an ambush on invading forces, “Using the same methods as those used in the occupied territories, Nahal infantry soldiers claimed they established permanent defensive po- to have control of the high ground over Wadi Saluki after they had seized key buildings on the out- sitions overlooking the Wadi, including one skirts of the two cities in the early hours of 12 August. The 401st Armor Brigade sent a column of west of Beni Hayan. 24 tanks toward the town to link up with paratroopers and give the IDF control of key roads.”

10 — January-February 2007 were being ambushed, further evidence of failing to train with Notes

their weapons. 1Unless otherwise noted, all foreign media reports were accessed through OpenSource.gov (for- merly the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service). All documents cited in this article are open Lack of coordination between armor, infantry, close air sup- source, available to the general public, not listed as for official use only, and unclassified. Reports port, and artillery meant that initial calls for fire were denied be- on the Hezbollah kidnapping garnered from numerous sources, including “Hezbollah terrorist at- tack on Israeli’s northern border: eight IDF soldiers killed and two abducted,” Intelligence and Ter- cause of the potential for fratricide. Only after all forces gained rorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Tel Aviv, Israel. Although all reports situational awareness on 12 August was the IDF able to synchro- on Imad Mughniyeh are instantly suspect, he is as much of a boogeyman as exists in the world to- nize its overwhelming firepower and take the high ground in day, the report on his involvement comes from Ronen Bergman, “The Executor,” Yedi’ot Aharonot Ghandouriyeh by the morning of 13 August. The IDF claims to (original in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, Israel, 16 July 2006. 2Maryam al-Bassam, “Interview with Lebanese Hizballah leader Hasan Nasrallah.” Beirut New have killed more than 80 Hezbollah fighters in the course of TV Channel in Arabic, date of interview unknown, aired 27 August 2006. On agents in our coun- fighting; yet this claim seems based on battle damage assess- try and anti-American nature of Hezbollah, see Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah Financing Terror through Criminal Enterprise,” Testimony to the U.S. Senate committee on Homeland Security and ments from close air support that dropped countless cluster mu- Government Affairs, 25 May 2005. On groups seeking lessons learned from the conflict, see Ibra- nitions on 12 August. This time, as in much of the war, Hezbol- him Humaydi, “Abu Marzuq to ‘Al-Haya’: ‘HAMAS’ Discussing Cloning ‘Hizballah’s’ [sic] Ex- lah’s dead proved as elusive as its living fighters. Hezbollah, perience, Denied There Is ‘Anything New’ in Israeli Soldier Deal,” Al-Haya, (original in Arabic), London, United Kingdom, 30 August 2006. which in the past has celebrated its “martyrs,” including the son 3 of Hassan Nasrallah, still claims that only 150 members were Author interview with Michael Oren, September 2006. killed during the entire war. Israel claims it killed closer to 600 4Ibid. 25 5For a discussion on willful blindness to the lessons of Vietnam, see T.X. Hammes, The Sling fighters. and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, Zenith Press, St. Paul, MN, 2006. When fighting ended on 14 August, fighters from Division 162 6Hezbollah really only arrived on the scene in 1983, although Israel’s war against the Palestin- ians in Lebanon began in 1982. Although helping the Sunni Palestinians might seem an odd task were ordered to withdraw from Ghandouriyeh, due to the cease- for Shiite Hezbollah, it is worth noting that Imad Mughniyeh, a Shiite Lebanese, began his long fire. Guy Zur, commander of Division 162, walked away “as- terrorist career working for the Palestinian al-Fatah, rather than for any of the Lebanese militant tonished” and told the press that Hezbollah was the world’s best groups, and is believed by numerous sources to have had contacts with Osama bin Laden or other 26 agents of al-Qaeda. guerrilla group. Goksel says of the terrain at Wadi Saluki, 7 which he visited innumerable times during his duty in south Leb- Author interview with Riad Kahwaji, September 2006. anon, that “anyone dumb enough to push a tank column through 8Author interview and e-mail exchanges between author and Nick Blanford, September 2006. Wadi Saluki should not be an armored brigade commander but 9Author interview and e-mail exchange with Timur Goksel, September 2006. a cook.”27 The 401st Armor Brigade could have bypassed the 10Interview with Hassan Fattah, senior Middle East correspondent for the New York Times, Sep- Wadi to the south or on the more northern road leading to Fa- tember 2006. 11Reported by Ehud Ya’ari based on a translation of the doctrines transmitted by Haj Hallil, Hez- run; its failure to do so allowed Hezbollah to win another pro- bollah’s 1996 director of operations, “Hizballah: 13 Principles of Warfare,” The Jerusalem Re- paganda victory in the last day of fighting. port, 21 March 1996. 12Maryam al-Bassam. Lessons for the United States 13An anonymous soldier from the 401st Armor Brigade on the fighting at Wadi Saluki, as report- ed by Nava Tzuriel and Eitan Glickman, “The Canyon of Death,” Yediot Aharonot, Adam Keller A number of issues for U.S. forces emerge from the IDF’s ex- (trans), published variously, including online at http://www.kibush.co.il/. perience in Lebanon. Obviously, the effectiveness of “swarming” 14Interview with Goksel. ATGMs and RPGs against the Merkava is a tactic that should be 15Information on casualties from author interview with Yaakov Katz, September 2006; and Yaa- kov Katz, “Wadi Saluki battle — microcosm of war’s mistakes,” Jerusalem Post Online Edition, of concern; using the AT-3 as an anti-infantry weapon is a tactic 29 August 2006, online at http://www.jpost.com. of which all cavalry and mechanized units should be aware. 16Interview with Oren. While it is important that U.S. forces continue to dominate the 17Interview with Katz. night, Hezbollah has demonstrated the need to make certain U.S. 18Interviews with Blanford, Kahwaji, and Katz; and “IDF Report Card, Jerusalem Post Online forces do not cede control of the day. Also, if Hezbollah exports Edition, 24 August 2006, online at http://www.jpost.com. its sophisticated ambushes and combined-arms attacks, it could 19Interview and e-mail exchange with Goksel, September 2006. pose new challenges in the Global War on Terrorism. The pos- 20Interview with Kahwaji. sibility must not be discounted; Hezbollah’s leaders have pro- 21Interview with Blanford. vided arms and training to the Palestinians and publicly ex- 22Jonathan Spyer, “On the El-Khiam Ridge,” The Times, 30 August 2006. pressed a desire to export their “model” elsewhere. It is not im- 23The purpose of the push to the Litani is an interesting question. Many in Israel see the battle possible to imagine that in certain areas, such as Anbar Prov- for Ghandouriyeh as having had little strategic value, especially as the bridge crossing the Litani had been destroyed by the IDF earlier in the war. A number of soldiers have demonstrated against ince, variants of Hezbollah’s tactics may be developed by local IDF leaders for what they believe was a wanton sacrifice of life for little strategic advantage; how- insurgents as they await the reinforcement of the relatively small ever, judgment on the strategic ramifications of the battle remain outside the purview of this arti- number of U.S. forces now in the area. cle. 24Tzuriel and Glickman, “The Canyon of Death.” While the combined arms battalion (CAB) structure may natu- 25Information on the battle remains unreliable. This narrative is based on a compilation of inter- rally alleviate some of the coordination issues experienced by views and e-mails with Goksel, Oren, Blanford, Katz, and Kahwaji, September 2006; Tzuriel and Glickman; Katz, “Wadi Saluki battle — microcosm of war’s mistakes;” and Amos Harel and Yair the IDF, it is vital that CABs train as such. Perhaps most impor- Ettinger, “Why did these soldiers die?” Haaretz, 23 August 2006, online at http://www.haaretz. tantly, the IDF’s experience demonstrates the need to retain core com. combat skills, even as the United States takes on anti-terrorist 26Interview with Katz. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Army must careful- 27Interview with Goksel. ly consider whether the training it undergoes to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan would result in tactical success against a deter- mined enemy such as Hezbollah — an enemy that exists in the Captain Daniel Helmer is currently at Fort Riley, Kansas, preparing for gray area between insurgents and the regular armies that U.S. a Military Transition Team in Afghanistan. He received a B.S. from the forces traditionally train to fight. U.S. Military Academy, and as a Rhodes Scholar, he received a Masters in Philosophy from Oxford University. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States and while deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

January-February 2007 — 11 Lebanon 2006: Did Merkava Challenge Its Match?

by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF, Retired

The so-called “second Lebanon war,” they planned to introduce in future en- eral Rodoi, the Merkava proved to be well which opened on 12 July 2006, actually gagements. protected and designed to minimize risk, started on 22 November 2005, when Hez- even when it was penetrated. The IDF bollah attacked the village of al-Ghajar On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah was ready, employed several hundred tanks in com- in an attempt to capture Israeli Defense its men fully trained to challenge Merka- bat. According to official reports, about Forces (IDF) soldiers. The commanding va tanks with the latest antitank weapons 10 percent were hit by various threats, of general at the time, Udi Adam, noted in supplied by Iran and Syria. What followed which less than half were penetrated. his after-action report, that “it was the first in 33 days of battle was the ultimate test time Hezbollah used its entire tactical ar- by western armor against third-genera- In an overall assessment, the potential senal,” revealing that one of his Merkava tion antitank weapons from the arsenals risk to crewmen would have been much tanks received no less than seven hits of Russia, China, and even North Korea. higher, if the tank had been more con- from various antitank missiles, none of Assessing Merkava in Battle ventionally designed. Colonel Moti Kidor, which penetrated its armor while the crew Four types of Merkava tanks were in ac- commander, 401st Armored Corps Bri- escaped unhurt. tion in Lebanon 2006, including Merka- gade, which bore the brunt of battle, men- va Mk4, the Merkava Mk2D (with its dis- tioned in an interview that during the war, Iranian instructors had taken the al-Gha- tinctive sloped turret), the standard Mk2 hundreds of antitank missiles were fired jar incident very seriously and reacted (mostly with reserve units), and Merkava on his unit, and, in total, only 18 tanks by sending antiarmor specialists from Mk3Baz. were seriously damaged. Of those, mis- Tehran to their training base located in siles actually penetrated only five or six Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley. Iranian tank ex- Toward the end of the fighting, Brigadier vehicles, and according to statistics, only perts examined Hezbollah video shots General Halutzi Rodoi, the chief of the two tanks were totally destroyed, both of that clearly displayed hits on the Merka- IDF armored corps, was asked to assess them by super-heavy improvised explo- va tank taken during the action at al-Gha- the performance of his tank force, and es- sive device (IED) charges. One officer, jar. The Iranian tank experts carefully pecially the lessons drawn from the fight- Lieutenant Yotam, reported that his Mer- studied these displays, looking for “blind” ing against advanced antitank missiles kava Mk4 tank had been simultaneously spots in which Merkava could be vul- fired by Hezbollah on the coveted Mer- hit by two unspecified antitank missiles. nerable to AT-14 Kornet and rocket-pro- kava Mk4, which saw its first combat en- Miraculously, all four crew members evac- pelled grenade (RPG) 29V fire, which gagement in Lebanon. According to Gen- uated unscathed.

12 — January-February 2007 The unique Merkava design uses spe- amining these reports in detail and pre- South Lebanon were divided into tank- cial armor to minimize the risk of spall, paring to make necessary amendments killer teams of five or six. Each team was which is generated by shaped charge plas- without delay, pending the resumption of armed with five to eight antitank missiles, ma jets. All Merkava vehicles use fire re- the conflict should the presently fragile with a pre-stock stored in small fortified tardant containers to store ammunition, ceasefire fall apart. well-camouflaged bunkers, built to with- preventing highly lethal secondary explo- stand Israeli air attacks. In another tactic, sions. Furthermore, tanks are equipped Assessing Hezbollah Antiarmor Hezbollah tank-killer teams would lay in with a rapid fire suppression system that Tactics and Weapons wait in camouflaged bunkers or houses, eliminates sympathetic detonation of am- having planted large IEDs on known ap- munition. As a result, only a few tanks en- Hezbollah fighters used heavier, more proach routes. Once an Israeli tank would countered catastrophic fire hazards after capable missiles, including the Metis M detonate one of these IEDs, Hezbollah suffering penetrating missile attacks on and the AT-14 Kornet, to engage the Mer- would start lobbing mortar shells toward ammunition, substantially reducing le- kava Mk4. The Konkurs, Fagot antitank the attack to prevent rescue teams from thal-burn casualties to crew members. guided missile (ATGM), and RPG-29 were mostly used against the less-pro- rushing forward. This was also an ef- Some of the tanks, especially those out- tected Merkava Mk3Baz and Mk2, while fective method for outflanking Merkava fitted with the low-intensity conflict (LIC) nontandem weapons, such as the tube- tanks by targeting the tank’s vulnerable urban combat kit are equipped with bot- launched, optically tracked, wire-guided rear zone with RPG fire. The IDF attempt- tom hull plates to protect against heavy (TOW) missile, Fagot ATGM, and RPG ed to respond with heavy artillery fire, mines and belly charges. Several Merka- were left to engage other targets such as smoke, and by using special medical evac- va tanks and heavy armored fighting ve- armored infantry fighting vehicles. The uation Merkava tanks to evacuate casu- hicles (AFVs) encountered a number of least used were AT-3 Sagger and nontan- alties. It took awhile for Merkava crews these charges, some weighing more than dem RPGs, which are considered obso- to change tactics, which included dis- 330 pounds. While heavily armored ve- lete, but proved quite lethal against troops mounted infantry advancing over high- hicles can hardly be expected to survive seeking cover in buildings. risk ground, taking out enemy bunkers such an attack, the upgraded vehicle types with close-in fighting, and using heavily demonstrated effective protection for the Overall, almost 90 percent of the tanks armored D-9s for recovery action under crew, which, in some cases, even man- were hit by tandem warheads. In general, fire, thus reducing losses from Hezbol- aged to survive such an attack with only Hezbollah militants prioritized Merkava lah tactics. minor injuries. In one instance, a Mer- Mk4 over the Merkava Mk2 and Mk- kava tank was hit by a belly charge car- 3Baz, and in general, targeted tanks over Inadequate Tank Crew Training rying more than 330 pounds of explo- armored infantry fighting vehicles. At the beginning of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon During the past six years, in which the sives, which killed one crew member and bulk of the IDF was constantly engaged wounded the remaining six (some travel- conflict, Israel’s primary concern was a report that Hezbollah possessed Russian in low-intensity urban counterterrorist ing in the rear compartment). Despite the warfare in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, loss of one crew member, this incident is Kornet antitank missiles. However, Isra- el was also aware of the RPG-29 Vampir, all regular forces, including tanks crews, considered proof of the effective protec- were retrained for small-unit infantry tion of the new Merkava Mk4. armed with a tandem high-explosive an- titank round that had stolen the show. policing operations, mostly dismounted. To reduce this threat even further, the There were even rumors that Hezbollah This proved extremely painful when heavily armored D-9 bulldozer was em- had received the notorious TBG-29V ther- young conscripts, who make up the bulk ployed to precede the tanks over high- mobaric rounds, which could not be con- of the regular IDF, were rushed into bat- risk tracks, blowing up IEDs with mini- firmed in action. tle after hasty retraining. It soon became mum damage to the bulldozers and clear- apparent to IDF commanders that tank ing the way for the tanks to follow. The An estimated 500 to 600 members of the combat in Lebanon, fighting a highly pre- IDF Armor Corps has traditionally in- roughly 4,000-strong Hezbollah force in pared and well-equipped enemy, was a to- vested considerable effort in examining after-battle hit statistics on its tanks to establish new tactics and techniques. The founder of this procedure was Major Gen- eral Israel Tal, “father of the Merkava” and a leading armor expert of worldwide renown. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Gen- eral Tal led a development team that stud- ied Israel’s unique battlefield character- istics and lessons learned from previous wars. On General Tal’s orders, a special team of experts examined every single tank hit while the tanks were still on the battlefield. The team then conducted an in-depth investigation, which resulted in developing effective means for crew pro- tection and formed the basis of the unique Merkava project. A similar investigation All photos courtesy David Eshel team has already recorded all hits on “According to General Rodoi, the Merkava proved to be well protected and designed to minimize tanks received during the Lebanon crisis. risk, even when it was penetrated. The IDF employed several hundred tanks in combat. Accord- A full report was made available for an ing to official reports, about 10 percent were hit by various threats, of which less than half were assessment team of experts, who are ex- penetrated.”

January-February 2007 — 13 tally new “ballgame” for the courageous, but inexperienced, soldiers of the armor corps. As a result, Israeli armor troops had to quickly relearn conventional, col- lective and individual, combat procedures. At the beginning of the war, several tanks lost tracks due to driver inexperience, es- pecially when traveling mountainous and rugged terrain, trying to avoid the heavi- ly mined paved roads and tracks. Moreover, during the Intifada, which be- gan in September 2000, the armored corps did not receive top priority from senior defense establishment officials. Short- sighted budget cuts took a heavy toll on armored units. As a result, at the begin- ning of the war, tanks were lacking basic “It soon became apparent to IDF commanders that tank combat in Lebanon, fighting a highly pre- countermeasures such as instantaneous pared and well-equipped enemy, was a totally new “ballgame” for the courageous, but inexperi- smoke canisters, laser warning detectors, enced, soldiers of the armor corps. As a result, Israeli armor troops had to quickly relearn conven- and infrared jammers. While some of tional, collective and individual, combat procedures.” these devices were urgently supplied lat- er in the war, the damage was already done. “Money kills” was the term used spheric protected zone around armored calculates an approach vector. Once the by several senior armored corps officers vehicles such as the Merkava Mk4 tank. incoming weapon is fully classified, com- to express their frustrations over the de- puters calculate the optimal time and an- fense establishment’s refusal to fund the The Trophy design includes four flat- gle to automatically fire neutralizers. The installation of a rocket defense system on panel antennas and a search radar device response comes from two launchers in- Israeli tanks, claiming soldiers were pay- mounted on the vehicle. When properly stalled on the vehicle, one on each side, ing the price with their lives. The officers mounted, the combined radar view is a which have a pivoting/rotating ability and were referring to the Trophy, which is a full 360 degrees. When a weapon is fired are able to fire in any direction the com- new and unique locally developed active at the vehicle, the internal computer uses puter directs. The launchers fire neutral- protection system that creates a hemi- the signal from the incoming weapon and izing agents, which are small metal pel- lets similar to shotgun shot. If such mea- sures would have been available, Merka- va tank crews would have fared much bet- ter against even third-generation weap- ons. Summing up the performance of Mer- kava tanks, especially the latest Mk4, most tank crews agree that, despite loss- es sustained and some major flaws in tac- tical conduct, the tank proved its mettle during its first high-saturation combat op- eration. The overall consensus revealed that tanks with less armor would have caused much higher losses.

Retired Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, Israel Defense Forces, is a freelance journalist and serves as a defense analyst for several military journals. Following his brief service with the British Forces during World War II, he became one of the founding members if the Israeli Ar- moured Corps and served as a career officer with the IDF for 26 years. Educated at the “‘Money kills’ was the term used by several senior armored corps officers to express their frustra- French Cavalry School at Saumur, he later held tions over the defense establishment’s refusal to fund the installation of a rocket defense system on various command and staff assignments and Israeli tanks, claiming soldiers were paying the price with their lives. The officers were referring to fought in all of the Arab-Israeli wars, including the Trophy, which is a new and unique locally developed active protection system that creates a the 1973 conflict, when he served as the Ar- hemispheric protected zone around armored vehicles…” moured Corps’ chief of signals.

14 — January-February 2007 Teaching and Learning Counterinsurgency at the Armor Captains Career Course

by Major John Grantz and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl

“This is a game of wits and will. You’ve The ACCC conducts extensive after-ac- graduate level.”1 In a recent lecture at the got to be learning and adapting constant- tion reports with students and instructors ACCC, Dr. David Kilcullen, chief strate- ly to survive.” throughout the course. The course also gist of the Global War on Terrorism at the conducts surveys with students six months State Department, said, “Simply put, to- — General Peter Schoomaker after their graduation. day’s fight is a competition to mobilize the population.” This is the overarching As the U.S. Army transforms to prepare Results from student surveys have re- theme of the COIN educational program for the current and future fight, its pro- vealed an increasing desire for even more at the ACCC. Every effort in this pro- fessional military education system is COIN instruction. As all of the instruc- gram is designed to help students discov- transforming along with it. Over the past tors at the course have operational expe- er and share tactics, techniques, and pro- nine months, the cadre of the Armor Cap- rience, many wholeheartedly agree. It is cedures for conducting operations among tains Career Course (ACCC), soon to be important to note, however, that we must the people while defeating the insurgent’s reformed as the Maneuver Captains Ca- temper this with the fact that we cannot attempts to gain support of the populace. reer Course (MCCC), has made signifi- predict the future fight and must stay cant efforts to enhance the study of coun- grounded in the core competencies of ar- To help ACCC captains understand the terinsurgency (COIN) in its warfighting mor and infantry officers. Today, ACCC complexities of this kind of war, we have curriculum. Lessons learned from this ef- instructors are keenly aware that we must developed a five-pronged approach. Cap- fort may be of use to units conducting strike a balance between preparing our tains at ACCC write reviews of books professional development programs, as captains to fight the next high-intensity from the ACCC professional reading list, well as to formal officer and noncommis- fight and preparing them to defeat insur- read and present oral reports on articles sioned officer educational institutions. gents in places such as Iraq and Afghani- from the ACCC “professional articles” stan. The cadre of the ACCC constantly as- list, participate in COIN and cultural un- sesses the curriculum to ensure it meets COIN is an enormously dif ficult subject; derstanding seminars, participate in a vis- the needs of the force and that the course the new COIN Field Manual 3-24, Coun- iting COIN experts lecture series, and provides current and relevant instruction. terinsurgency, notes that it is “War at the participate in practical exercises on COIN

January-February 2007 — 15 Course Reading List Professional Articles List

Learning to Eat Soup with A Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons “The Fall of the Warrior King” by Dexter Filkins, from Malaya and Vietnam by Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, Updated New York Times, October 23, 2005 edition, September 2005 “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of The Sling and the Stone: On Warfare in the 21st Century by Thomas Company-Level Counterinsurgency” by Dr. David Hammes, September 2004 Kilcullen, Washington, D.C., March 29, 2006 On Combat by Dave Grossman and Loren Christensen, September 2005 “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations” by BG Nigel Aylwin-Foster, British The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Army, Military Review, November-December 2005 Power by Max Boot, May 2003 “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of Spectrum Operations” by MG Peter Chiarelli and America’s Last Years in Vietnam by Lewis Sorley, September 2000 MAJ Patrick Michaelis, Military Review, July-August Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula, 2005 Updated August 2006 “Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from The Philippine War, 1899-1902 by Brian Linn, October 2002 Guerrilla Warfare” by Robert Cassidy, Military Review, September-October 2005 Islam: A Short History by Karen Armstrong, August 2002 “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency” by Dr. Kalev The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror by Bernard Lewis, Sepp, Military Review, May-June 2005 March 2004 “Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency” Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse by Bard by Dr. John Lynn, Military Review, July-August 2005 O’Neil, 2d Edition Revised, August 2005 “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare” by Robert Tomes, Parameters, Spring 2004 Figure 1 “The Current Revolution in the Nature of Conflict” by Chris Donnelly, The Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, Advanced Research and operations. This article briefly referenc- class discussions on the Assessment Group, September 2005 es each subject. individual officer’s educa- “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations tional experience cannot be from Soldiering in Iraq” by LTG David Petraeus, Counterinsurgency Professional overstated. In addition, these Military Review, January-February 2006 Reading Program assignments reinforce the Students at ACCC read a book from the importance of effective writ- Figure 2 course reading list (Figure 1) and write ten communications skills a two-page summary of how the book for commanders and staff applies to company commanders in the officers. contemporary operating environment. The Subject-Matter Expert Lecture Series derstanding be added to the programs of goal of this program is to introduce stu- instruction for all captains career cours- dents to a self-paced study environment The ACCC has hosted a number of not- es. The main goal of the program at the so that they become comfortable with in- ed COIN theorists and practitioners, such Armor School is not necessarily to create dividual educational development pro- as Dr. Kalev Sepp, designer of the Multi- subject-matter experts on any particular grams throughout their careers. While at national Force I Campaign Plan and au- culture, but to give our students an appre- the course, the reading program is the thor of “Best Practices in Counterinsur- ciation for how cultural understanding in heart of the students’ COIN study. The gency;” Dr. David Kilcullen, author of their future companies and troops will course cadre reviews and updates the “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals affect their operations. The cultural un- reading list quarterly, or as necessary. of Company Level Counterinsurgency;” derstanding program is built on three pil- Units wishing to use the ACCC reading Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, author of lars: classroom small-group instruction list as a template for their own profession- Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife; and using the 2007 Iraq, Afghanistan, and Is- al reading lists are invited to download the Colonel T.X. Hammes, author of The lam cultural training support packages, list from the Captains Career Course web- Sling and the Stone, to discuss their 2 created at the U.S. Army Training and site on Army Knowledge Online (AKO), thoughts and ideas with ACCC students. Doctrine Command’s Culture Center at or the Mounted ManeuverNet Profession- Authors are willing to come and discuss Fort Huachuca, Arizona; briefings with al Forum on the Battle Command Knowl- their ideas if asked; so far, there has been international military student officers and edge System. no shortage of authors and subject-mat- international liaison and exchange offi- ter experts who are willing to contribute Counterinsurgency Articles cers on post; and classroom time to con- to the education of our captains. The duct self-paced Rosetta Stone language Students at ACCC read articles from the course will continue the lecture series on training. “professional articles” list (Figure 2) dur- a quarterly basis over the long term. ing selected weeks of the course. Students The intent is not to teach a language dur- then write executive summaries of the ar- Cultural Understanding Program ing the five-month ACCC, but to get cap- ticles, which are subsequently graded as Based on lessons that the Army has tains started on the path to learning a sec- part of the writing program. Students then learned and relearned in the past five years ond language, as well as expose them to lead discussions of the articles in a small- on fighting an insurgency, a cultural un- a valuable training tool on AKO to use group seminar. The articles serve as driv- derstanding program has been added to in preparing their future companies and ers for discussion, which is where most the COIN educational program. In 4th troops for deployment. As has been prov- of the learning is done. The ACCC is Quarter, FY05, the Combined Arms Cen- en in past deployments, the ability to small-group centric, and the impact of ter directed that 13 hours of cultural un- speak another language and understand

16 — January-February 2007 other cultures has a positive impact on our endless; students discuss various training which is uniformly and enthusiastically ability to create a positive impression on topics, such as how to avoid sniper and positive, to ensure we are training all as- the local populace and accomplish our improvised explosive device (IED) con- pects of the current operating environ- mission. In the coming months we also tact en route to objectives, how to enter ment. We are constantly re-examining our plan to integrate the tactical language and clear rooms and buildings, and how programs to determine what we may do trainer. to handle civilians in and around target better. Critical to the success of this mis- houses. sion is sharing ideas with other institu- Counterinsurgency Exercises tions and operational units. We are in dai- As we near the pilot date for MCCC, we The Louisville TEWT is just one exam- ly contact with other centers and schools have integrated several new practical ex- ple of how students are applying knowl- and subject-matter experts throughout ercises into ACCC. One of the primary edge to tactical operations. As mentioned the Army, Department of Defense, and differences in the new course is that stu- earlier in this article, ACCC cadre strive State Department, sharing new ideas about dents conduct practical exercises on real- to strike a balance between high-intensi- how to train and educate this Nation’s istic terrain using a variety of organiza- ty and COIN training; however, one dif- officers. tional platforms. In the past, all of our ference is that now both cultural under- practical exercises have been based on standing and COIN are common themes, Leaders who wish to create their own Germany, National Training Center, or which students consider in all the practi- COIN professional development programs Fort Knox terrain. In the new course, we cal exercises, regardless of terrain. Even are invited to make full use of the Army’s will conduct practical exercises on ter- during National Training Center exercis- numerous online training sites, such as es, students are forced to consider civil- the Battle Command Knowledge System, rain in Iraq, Korea, and Kosovo, with a companycommand.com, few exercises based on Fort Knox and ians on the battlefield and small popula- and the Captains combat training center terrain to facilitate tion centers in their intelligence prepa- Career Course Forum available on AKO. training exercises without troops (TEWT) ration of the battlefield. While in theory, We must share our ideas to make the and computer program exercises. this should be no different than what we Army a true learning organization. The have always done at the schoolhouse, in Armor Captains Career Course is adapt- The ACCC began creating this new ma- reality, those parts of the training have of- ing to the demands of the contemporary terial some 12 months ago, with the bulk ten been paid lip service in the past. With operating environment, creating adap- of the work for MCCC being in the past 98 percent of our students and 100 per- tive leaders for our Army and our Na- six months. The most notable of these cent of our instructors having operation- tion. These adaptive leaders will be on exercises is the Louisville TEWT, where al experience in the post-9/11 world, not point as we take the fight to the enemy students receive a task force operations talking about the current fight and the — and win. order and are tasked to develop plans for treatment of civilians on the battlefield four companies conducting raids, cordons would be a difficult task. and search, and deliberate attacks in an urban stability and reconstruction opera- Continuing to Improve Notes our Fighting Position tions (SRO) environment against an in- 1Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, U.S. Government Printing surgent threat. Students develop and brief The ACCC COIN program greatly ben- Office, Washington, D.C., June 2006 (Final Draft). their plans prior to the small group trav- efits armor captains because it teaches 2Kalev Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Mili- eling to each of the objectives. Once on them how to think through a difficult tary Review, May-June 2005; David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgen- the ground, the learning opportunities are way of war. We rely on student feedback, cy,” paper, Washington D.C., March 2006; Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, Counterinsur- gency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, University of Chica- go Press, 15 September 2005; and Thomas Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On Warfare in the 21st Century, Zenith Press, 12 September 2004.

Major John M. Grantz is currently serving as course manager, Maneuver Captains Career Course, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.A. from James Madison University. His military edu- cation includes the Infantry Captains Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include small group in- structor, Armor Captains Career Course, Fort Knox, KY; commander, Headquarters and Head- quarters Company, 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry (1-502 IN), 101st Airborne Division, Fort Camp- bell, KY; commander, C Company, 1-502 IN, 101st Airborne Division, Mosul, Iraq; assistant S3, 1-502 IN, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell; senior platoon leader, Infantry Offi- cers Basic Course, Fort Benning, GA; and sup- port platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, Schweinfurt, Germany. Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl is currently serv- ing as commander, 1st Battalion, 34th Armor, “The intent is not to teach a language during the five-month ACCC, but to get captains started on Fort Riley, KS. He led a tank platoon in the the path to learning a second language, as well as expose them to a valuable training tool on 1st Cavalry Division during Operation Desert AKO to use in preparing their future companies and troops for deployment. As has been proven Storm, taught national security studies at the in past deployments, the ability to speak another language and understand other cultures has a U.S. Military Academy, and served as the op- positive impact on our ability to create a positive impression on the local populace and accom- erations officer, Task Force 1st Battalion, 34th plish our mission.“ Armor, Khalidiyah, Iraq.

January-February 2007 — 17 The Challenge of Leadership during the Conduct of Counterinsurgency Operations by Major Jon Dunn

To the credit of our profession in gener- the questions, this article intends to gen- such, junior leaders are often required to al, and the Armor branch specifically, erate discourse among professionals, operate independently during the con- much has been written over the past cou- which will help better prepare our sol- duct of combat operations. The young ple of years on the subject of lessons diers for the current fight and for future sergeants, squad leaders, platoon ser- learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of counterinsurgency fights we are certain to geants, and platoon leaders who led mis- the literature focuses on proven tactics, encounter. sions in the Balkans and beyond are to- techniques, and procedures (TTP), or ad- day’s senior scouts, platoon sergeants, justments made to TTP in response to The U.S. Army exists to win our nation’s first sergeants, senior platoon leaders, and counteraction by the enemy. For obvious wars. This fact has not changed since the company and troop commanders in Iraq reasons, this is sensible and contributes to inception of the Army in 1775. There has and Afghanistan. Collectively, they are preparedness as units train to deploy in been, however, a significant change in the extremely successful, adaptable, flexible, support of the Global War on Terror. nature of the wars the Army is called on and operate with minimal guidance, but to win and the demands these wars place we must do better — we must prepare our Conspicuously absent, however, is any on junior leaders. Despite one’s personal leaders and soldiers to handle the unique discussion on how conducting counterin- or professional opinion about the rele- complexities required when conducting surgency operations affects the nature of vance of the peacekeeping missions over counterinsurgency operations. Chance leadership, or conversely, how leadership the past 15 years, there is no doubt that the favors the prepared man — the better we can, for better or for worse, impact the missions conducted in places such as Bos- counterinsurgency fight. As leaders, how train (the more realistic, stressful, and dif- nia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Macedonia (to ficult the training), the more lives we save do we train to kill insurgents, yet at the name but a few), have strengthened the on the battlefield. Moreover, the compli- same time win the support of the local competence and confidence of today’s cated nature of the counterinsurgency population? How can we reconcile the ap- junior officers and noncommissioned of- fight demands a better trained army. parent contradiction of the need to have a ficers to operate with minimal guidance plan to kill everyone we meet while si- and even less direct supervision. Counterinsurgency operations require multaneously planning to win the sup- the successful and simultaneous accom- port of everyone we meet? While far from Today’s modern battlefield is most of- plishment of two distinct objectives: to professing to have the answers to all of ten nonlinear and noncontiguous, and as kill the enemy (insurgents) and win the

18 — January-February 2007 support of the local population. It is crit- tion with a civil affairs or psychological fensive operations and is the only way of ical to conduct the former without com- operations unit less than 24 hours after maintaining the initiative against an elu- promising the latter. Although the cliché an intense combat. This is not easy to do sive enemy. is trite and worn-out, winning ‘hearts and and becomes even more difficult if the minds’ is precisely what we must accom- ‘soft’ civil affairs mission occurs in the In fighting an insurgency, we often will plish. Winning the support of the local same vicinity as the preceding high-in- not be the one who strikes first. The en- population contributes to the defeat of the tensity fight. This is a leader challenge emy has the advantage of the initiative insurgency in two ways: a lack of popu- and responsibility — ensuring units re- and gets to dictate when an engagement lar support will eventually destroy the in- main aggressive to destroy the enemy, occurs, if at all. Even more frustrating, surgency; and if the local population sup- but have the ability to refocus when the the enemy frequently will not show him- ports our mission and not the insurgency, mission changes from high-intensity to self and thus there is nothing to fight it can provide actionable intelligence. back against. This frustration adds to the stability operations. already difficult challenge, and necessi- Killing insurgents is certainly the 25- Leaders cannot mentally stay in the ty, of wearing ‘two faces.’ Unfortunately, meter target and most tend to equate win- high-intensity combat fight of yesterday it can get even worse — nothing boils the ning the hearts and minds to a 300-meter or even three days ago. A leader must re- blood of a soldier more than seeing a fel- target. However, it is probably better de- focus himself and his subordinate lead- low soldier wounded or killed, particu- fined as 25, 50, 100, 200, and 300-meter ers — this is paramount to successful mis- larly if by an unseen enemy. Not surpris- targets — winning hearts and minds is a sion accomplishment. If leaders are not ingly, one’s first reaction to such an in- continuous objective. More to the point, flexible enough to refocus, it is certain cident is the desire to kill anyone who it is the most important objective, be- that no progress will be made at the neigh- might remotely be the enemy. In an un- cause it ultimately brings success. Con- borhood (grassroots) level in improving limited, high-intensity fight against a con- trary to what many junior soldiers think, quality of life. Grassroots progress is ventional foe, such reactionary aggres- winning hearts and minds actually en- essential to obtaining actionable intelli- sion is, more often than not, quite useful. hances our ability to kill insurgents. Work- gence from the local population on ene- However, in a counterinsurgency fight, it ing toward an objective to increase coop- my activity. Such intelligence from the lo- is not difficult to see how such aggres- eration of the local population, or at a cal population often directly leads to of- sion could prove quite detrimental to ac- minimum, cultivate a neutral stance complishing the mission, particu- that develops a less active opposi- larly in the long term. tion toward us, is definitely a com- bat multiplier. Admittedly, it may Is it possible to ‘wear two faces,’ not always lead to an enhanced deterring possible enemy contact, ability to kill insurgents, but los- yet simultaneously win hearts and ing the hearts-and-minds fight will minds? The answer is simple, it assuredly impede our efforts. can be done; it must be done, es- pecially if we want to claim victo- Killing and winning hearts and ry in the fight against insurgents. minds simultaneously requires two This is much easier said than done; seemingly contradictory mentali- how do we train leaders and sol- ties. On one hand, soldiers must be diers to kill the enemy while simul- the steely-eyed killers they train to taneously winning the hearts and be — able to identify an enemy in- minds of the local Iraqi people? surgent and drop him (or her, as the case could be) with a single, First and foremost, we need to well-aimed rifle shot. Yet, at the provide tough, realistic training same time, we expect the same sol- with scenarios that replicate going diers to be smiling at the ‘friendly’ from ‘hot’ (high-intensity) scenar- locals, particularly children, some- ios to ‘cold’ (stability) operations. times even handing out candy or This training is currently being ac- school supplies. complished at the combat training centers as they prepare units for In an environment such as the one deployment. The training address- we face in Iraq, soldiers need to es the tactical problem and can be shift gears rapidly, often in a split trained extensively, both at home second. Soldiers must constantly station and at combat training be on alert for enemy activity — centers. However, it only address- we have been taught that compla- es half of the problem, and quite cency kills. More importantly, an bluntly, the easier half of the prob- alert and ready posture does have lem. The more difficult aspect, and a deterrent effect. Not only must much more difficult to train, is the soldiers essentially wear two ‘fac- emotional side. At the end of the es’ simultaneously, often times day, the ability to wear two faces they must conduct two fundamen- depends on the ability to control tally different missions with little “Counterinsurgency operations require the successful and si- emotions. We can never truly rep- multaneous accomplishment of two distinct objectives: to kill or no time to ‘reset’ between the the enemy (insurgents) and win the support of the local popu- licate a battle buddy being wound- two. For example, after several lation. It is critical to conduct the former without compromising ed or killed, nor would we want to. weeks of high-intensity combat, the latter. Although the cliché is trite and worn-out, winning the mission may require an opera- ‘hearts and minds’ is precisely what we must accomplish.” Continued on Page 44

January-February 2007 — 19 Building for the Future: Combined Arms Officers

by Captain Chad Foster

The U.S. Army is undergoing a signifi- of combat leadership remain true, the tac- during air assault operations. Our lieuten- cant period of transition. As with many tical skill set expected of our company- ants and captains are not just tankers any- past conflicts, the Global War on Terror grade armor officers has greatly expand- more. Armor officers at the company lev- has hastened this change and the unpre- ed, highlighting the need to reexamine el must feel equally comfortable on their dictable enemies we now face have al- some aspects of officer training and pro- feet with M4 carbines as they do in a tur- tered the notions that Army leaders had fessional progression. It is no exaggera- ret behind a 120mm main gun. concerning the status of our military in tion to say that today, and in the foresee- the post-Cold War world. For example, able future, armor officers are not just This is hardly a new idea — armor lieu- the widely heralded demise of heavy ar- tankers anymore. tenants have long served as scout pla- mor forces was quickly forgotten as the toon leaders mounted in HMMWVs, and many of our captains have commanded battlefields of Iraq demonstrated the con- Not Just “Tankers” Anymore tinued value of tanks working in close light cavalry troops. However, with the coordination with infantry. However, the The old (and misguided) notion of “death advent of the combined arms battalion winds of change are still blowing against before dismount” has been completely in- (CAB) we have reached a new stage in the armor branch, especially its junior validated by recent combat operations in the evolution of our officer corps. The leaders. Iraq. Armor officers are no longer chained CAB provides maneuver commanders to tanks as they conduct counterinsurgen- with a level of organic tactical flexibility There is no doubt that our soldiers and cy missions. Although tanks remain a vi- previously unknown. By placing armor, noncommissioned officers will remain tal tool in this fighting environment, the infantry, and engineer units in the same specialists in very specific fields, retain- role of the armor officer has expanded be- battalion, the Army sent a clear signal that ing their technical expertise as tank crew- yond the confines of a tank turret, to in- field-grade officers are expected to pos- men and cavalry scouts. However, future clude the vehicle commander’s position sess a level of expertise that allows them armor officers are going to require a broad- on the M1114 up-armored HMMWV, the to properly train and prepare units for er range of technical and tactical exper- patrol leader’s position on dismounted combat. In the days of temporary task or- tise. Although the time-tested principles ambushes, and the UH-60 landing zone ganization, battalion commanders and op-

20 — January-February 2007 erations officers could get by with a ba- from both a tactical and logistics perspec- different tactical missions, many of which sic knowledge of operations beyond the tive. will not be traditional tanker missions. scope of armored formations. Of course, the best commanders and S3s always Scouts have long performed extensive strove to master all aspects of combined There is no such thing as exclusive- dismounted operations, and armor lieu- arms operations, but now that our battal- ly “armor” or “infantry” missions tenants fortunate enough to lead scout ions are truly combined arms formations, anymore. There are only missions. platoons have greatly benefited from the such knowledge and experience must be experience. Tank platoons in Iraq often the rule rather than the exception. Tomor- find themselves operating as motorized row’s field-grade officers are being de- Iraq presents our combined arms battal- infantry, mounted on M1114 up-armored veloped today — in combat theaters with ions with a complex battlefield. Due to HMMWVs. An armor officer in command young lieutenants and captains. the ever-changing threat, high operating of a battalion headquarters and headquar- tempo, and limitations in manpower and ters company can easily find himself lead- resources, it is not always possible to ing an air assault operation with battal- Observations from the Front match up armor and infantry formations ion scouts and 11C infantrymen from the The strains of multiple year-long combat to their traditional roles. As stated above, mortar platoon. None of these tasks are deployments have prompted many chang- our leaders at the company level must traditional “armor missions.” In fact, such es that would have been practically in- possess the flexibility to plan and execute labels are becoming obsolete. Different conceivable just a few years ago. Junior any type of mission. This means that lieu- missions might demand different levels officers are being asked to do things that tenants and captains must get the widest of force or different types of resources few of us would have thought about ear- set of tactical training and experiences and combat power, but they are increas- ly in our careers. Despite this, lieutenants possible, and they must maintain an ag- ingly becoming merely “missions” that and captains are rising to the challenge gressively flexible mindset that will allow all tactical leaders, regardless of whether and accomplishing their missions with an them to think beyond the traditional con- they are armor or infantry officers, must almost unbroken record of success. The fines imposed on armor forces. Of course, be ready to execute. lines between the branches, at least on this does not mean that units should mere- Implications for the Future the tactical level, have not restrained our ly throw a platoon of 19K tank crewmen company-grade officers, as indicated by on a UH-60 and fly off on a mission (al- Flexibility is nothing new to armor of- job assignments and performances. though with the proper training this is not ficers — we have always been proud of impossible). It does mean, however, that our emphasis on combined arms warfare, Due to a shortage of infantry lieutenants, armor officers who find themselves as integrating infantry, armor, artillery, avia- many new armor lieutenants are initially scout platoon leaders, infantry platoon tion, and engineers into the fight. There- serving as platoon leaders for mechanized leaders, and maneuver company com- fore, the notions in this article should hard- infantry. Despite the fact they were pre- manders (to include a headquarters com- ly be surprising. They are a natural out- pared to lead tank platoons, these young pany) can expect to perform a myriad of growth of our branch’s inherent strengths officers have generally performed very well. There is little difference between the amount of initial on-the-job training and mentorship for new armor lieutenants and that required for new infantry lieutenants. Combat leadership and warrior spirit are common to both branches, so the transi- tion is not as drastic as one might initial- ly think. Under close supervision of a sea- soned company commander, young ar- mor officers, who get the opportunity to lead infantry platoons, gain a valuable set of experiences that will serve them well throughout their careers. Battalion commanders at the front are asking many senior armor lieutenants to serve as executive officers of infantry companies. Such assignments are the re- sult of a clear understanding of the impor- tance of the company executive officer. As executive officers, lieutenants learn their most valuable lessons, which will help them as future commanders. They have the chance to observe their com- manding officers in a way that was not “The old (and misguided) notion of “death before dismount” has been completely invalidated by possible as platoon leaders. Most impor- recent combat operations in Iraq. Armor officers are no longer chained to tanks as they conduct tantly, they become acting commanders counterinsurgency missions. Although tanks remain a vital tool in this fighting environment, the in the absence of the commander. The role of the armor officer has expanded beyond the confines of a tank turret, to include the vehi- benefits of an armor lieutenant getting to cle commander’s position on the M1114 up-armored HMMWV, the patrol leader’s position on dis- serve in an infantry company are immense mounted ambushes, and the UH-60 landing zone during air assault operations.”

January-February 2007 — 21 and the ever-changing battlefield of the captain. To ensure lieutenants get the ap- identify potential, much in the same way Global War on Terrorism. Combined arms propriate amount of experience and pro- that we think of specialty platoon assign- battalions require flexible field-grade of- fessional development, it is now common ments. ficers who understand the capabilities and for officers to serve as executive officers limitations of every formation in the unit. or specialty platoon leaders following At the captain level, career courses must Building this type of senior officer begins their promotion to captain. continue to evolve, putting emphasis on at the lieutenant and captain levels. planning and executing operations, such Rarely do newly pinned captains attend as air assaults, dismounted infiltrations, The line dividing armor and infantry of- career courses; instead, they stay in their raids, and all manner of urban operations. ficers in mechanized units continues to battalions longer, which delays their at- Post-command captains instructing at fade, and this trend is likely to continue. tendance to career courses by months and ACCC are bringing these lessons with We should welcome this development sometimes even years. While this is often them to the classroom, but there must be and prepare for the future accordingly. It frustrating, it is necessary for new cap- an official effort to codify such efforts is impossible to say exactly what the fu- tains to learn everything they need at their within the schoolhouse. In this way, we ture holds. Will the armor and infantry first duty station. As long as battalion can ensure that future staff captains and branches eventually come together to commanders track this closely and do ev- company commanders are fully prepared form a combined arms maneuver branch? erything they can to get young captains to to plan and execute the myriad of opera- Only time will tell. However, we can be career courses in a reasonable amount of tions that battalion commanders will de- certain that young lieutenants and cap- time, there should be few problems with mand. tains require expanded tactical skills, this arrangement. which include missions that are not tra- Embracing the Change ditionally armor missions. The challeng- It is not necessary for all new armor lieu- and Building the Future tenants to serve as infantry platoon lead- es of training and leading combined arms Branch rivalry will likely be the biggest battalions demand that we prepare young ers prior to leading tank platoons. It is also not necessary to add executive offi- obstacle to making these very necessary officers today for what they will face to- changes. As professionals, all must over- morrow. cer duty time in a company of the oppo- site branch as a standard in an armor of- come the petty jealousies and foolish ficer’s progression. This would hardly be prejudices standing in the way. The ar- Many Challenges possible; however, assigning an armor mor community must play its vital part and Possible Solutions lieutenant to an infantry company should and, along with our infantry and engineer Of course, there are many challenges become something of a normal course of brothers, step boldly into the future. We with placing lieutenants in the right jobs action, and only the very best armor lieu- must train and prepare our lieutenants to within the ridiculously short time before tenants should serve as second-in-com- be the best staff captains and company they are promoted to captain. There is no mand of mechanized infantry companies commanders possible, which leads to de- way a newly arrived lieutenant can lead (just as only the best infantry lieutenants veloping the strongest possible field grade both an infantry and armor platoon, and should serve as armor company XOs). leadership for our combined arms battal- serve as an executive officer or specialty Such assignments should be seen as rec- ions in the years to come. platoon leader before he is promoted to ognition of past excellence and clearly This discussion is important for the fu- ture of the armor branch and the Army as a whole. It is a discussion that involves all the combat arms branches, especially our own and the infantry. This article is writ- ten with emphasis on armor officers, but much of the information applies to infan- try officers — we both have vital roles to play. The foundations of future excel- lence must be built today.

Captain Chad R. Foster is currently serving as commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor (1-66 AR), 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 4th Infantry Division (ID), Taji, Iraq. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy. His mili- tary education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Com- bined Arms and Services Staff School, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, Air Assault School, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include com- mander, D Company, 1-66 AR, 1st BCT, 4th ID, Fort Hood, TX; S3 (air), 1-66 AR, 1st BCT, 4th “The strains of multiple year-long combat deployments have prompted many changes that would ID, Fort Hood; XO, Headquarters and Head- have been practically inconceivable just few years ago. Junior officers are being asked to do things quarters Troop, 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry (3/7 that few of us would have thought about early in our careers. Despite this, lieutenants and captains CAV), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort are rising to the challenge and accomplishing their missions with an almost unbroken record of suc- Stewart, GA; scout platoon leader, A Troop, 3/7 cess. The lines between the branches, at least on the tactical level, have not restrained our com- CAV, 3d ID, Fort Stewart; and tank platoon pany-grade officers, as indicated by job assignments and performances.” leader, A Troop, 3/7 CAV.

22 — January-February 2007 The Battalion Chaplain: A Combat Multiplier by Chaplain (Captain) David Fell

The moral and ethical well-being of the 50 military occupational specialties. The tervention in such situations. Chaplains command is extremely important to suc- battalion has both kinetic and nonkinetic need to expend the time and energy to cessfully accomplishing missions. Battal- missions. forge relationships at all levels in a bat- ion commanders have an invaluable asset talion. Relationship building involves in- to support the moral and ethical well-be- As per U.S. Army regulations, “Chap- vesting time and shared experiences. It ing of soldiers, especially during coun- lains provide for the religious support, is important that all elements of the unit terinsurgency (COIN) operations. Com- pastoral care, and the moral and ethical receive attention — both inside the wire manders should assess how Chaplains can well-being of the command.” This con- and outside the wire. contribute to soldiers and their missions. cept becomes a reality within the three major religious support functional areas The Chaplain Outside the Wire As a Chaplain, near the completion of a — to nurture the living, care for the There are several primary tasks and pur- year-long deployment in Iraq, I realize wounded, and honor the dead. This arti- poses that a Chaplain accomplishes with every situation is unique, but many of the cle focuses on nurturing the living and soldiers outside the wire — some are pro- concepts and ideas in this article can be how the above-mentioned concepts have active and others are more reactive. Ev- adapted to fit a unit’s particular needs. specific and practical application in form- ery operation involves risk and these risks This article is based on the experiences ing a proactive ministry support program. should be considered when deciding how of a unit highly engaged in all aspects of While deployed, the focus is on keeping to employ the Chaplain. A Chaplain is a the brigade combat team’s area of opera- soldiers in the fight (spiritually and emo- noncombatant, like doctors and medics. tion (AO). To date, we have accomplished tionally) and doing the right things. Unlike doctors and medics, however, a over 2,800 combat patrols that include The heart of ministry is relationships. Chaplain is not permitted to bear arms. A regular contact with the enemy. The unit Without relationships it is difficult to be Chaplain’s Assistant is an armed com- is made up of more than 600 soldiers, both proactive in preventing moral, morale, batant and serves to protect the Chaplain organic and attached, representing over and ethical decline or providing early in- while on missions outside the wire. To-

Father (Major) Edward J. Waters, a Catholic Chaplain from Oswego, New York, conducts Divine Services on a pier for members of the first assault troops thrown against Hitler’s forces on the continent. Weymouth, England, 6 June 1944. way to assess actions and atti- Primary combat life saver provides tudes of soldiers and leaders is first aid to wounded soldiers, and as a non- with firsthand observation. A combatant prohibited from bearing arms, Chaplain can gain a general the Chaplain is a good choice to fill this sense of their feelings by vis- role — especially in the absence of a med- iting with squads and platoons ic. This frees up combat power to remain while inside the wire, but it engaged with the enemy or provide se- is working alongside them curity. Ideally, a Chaplain would only when they are in battle mode need to focus on the spiritual needs of the and fatigued that the warning wounded soldier; however, experience has signs become clear. The pur- demonstrated the need to fill this role. pose is not to single out any particular soldier or leader, it Ministry of presence provides comfort is to help them before they and reassurance to soldiers in harm’s way. reach the point of necessitat- It assesses the condition and recovery ing significant outside inter- progress of soldiers directly affected by a vention or attention. significant event. As soldiers experience various losses due to combat, they grow Religious and cultural as- weary and sometimes fearful. Many have sessment and advisement is faith in God and the presence of a Chap- a proactive task. Its purpose lain reassures them that they are not alone is to assess and advise com- in their struggle. The Chaplain, as a lead- manders and others on issues er, thus sets a standard of personal cour- related to local religious and age and care of soldiers. Ministry of pres- cultural considerations. ence also provides Chaplains the oppor- tunity to assess how soldiers are coping Chaplains are subject-matter “‘Chaplains provide for the religious support, pastoral care, with difficult situations, enabling him to and the moral and ethical well-being of the command.’ This experts on religion. This knowl- provide or facilitate appropriate care. concept becomes a reality within the three major religious edge and experience is very important during COIN oper- support functional areas to nurture the living, care for the The Chaplain Inside the Wire wounded, and honor the dead.” ations where religion plays a large role in the day-to-day life The Chaplain’s experiences outside the of the local population. They wire, his demonstration of personal cour- provide a general religious area age, and shared danger with soldiers pro- gether, they make a very effective team assessment based on basic re- while accomplishing their tasks and pur- search. By interacting with the poses. local population and attend- ing and observing meetings Religious support and services is a with local governments and proactive task. Its purpose is to meet the contractors, the Chaplain can religious and spiritual needs of soldiers facilitate a better understand- by providing partial or full worship op- ing of issues that relate to the portunities to those unable to attend ser- area of operation and the local vices at the forward operating base. population. Soldiers who remain spiritually engaged can continue to draw on the strength they Visiting the wounded at the receive from their faith. The visit pro- combat support hospital is a vides soldiers an opportunity to interact reactive task with the purpose as a group or one-on-one with the Chap- of providing comfort and spir- lain. This also provides an opportunity to itual support for the wounded. address several minor counseling issues. Caring for the wounded is an Assessing the moral and ethical envi- important part of the ministry ronment is a proactive task. Its purpose of a combat chaplain. This is is to observe and interact with leaders not only beneficial for wound- and soldiers as they interact with each ed soldiers, but it also lets oth- other and the local population. er soldiers know that they will receive care in their hour of This is particularly important during need. COIN operations where there is a lot of nonkinetic interaction with the local pop- There are other secondary tasks and purposes that the “Chaplains are subject-matter experts on religion... They ulation. Patrols interact with the local peo- provide a general religious area assessment based on ba- ple as they conduct their daily business Chaplain and his assistant per- sic research. By interacting with the local population and at- of work, school, shopping, and playing. form while outside the wire. tending and observing meetings with local governments After contact with the enemy, it is natu- The following tasks are defi- and contractors, the Chaplain can facilitate a better under- ral for soldiers to feel animosity toward nitely combat multipliers dur- standing of issues that relate to the area of operation and the local population. The most accurate ing combat operations. the local population.”

24 — January-February 2007 vide a foundation for functioning inside the wire. The Chaplain’s Assistant plays a vital role in accomplishing these tasks. Planning and operations. According to doctrine, Chaplains serve as advisors to the command in the areas of morale, mor- als, ethics, and religion. This relates to both planning and operations. The Chap- lain’s education, combined with firsthand experiences and observations, are valu- able tools available to the unit during the planning and evaluation process. During a deployment, there will likely be several opportunities for the Chaplain to participate in and contribute to the mil- itary decisionmaking process (MDMP). A Chaplain who has his finger on the pulse of current operations can provide invaluable insight on how a proposed course of action will affect the soldiers carrying out the plan. The Chaplain also provides an assessment of the impact on the local population in relation to the re- ligion and/or religious holidays during the proposed operation. Firsthand knowl- edge and assessment of the area involved is very beneficial. Workplace visitation. This is an effec- tive way of being proactive in dealing with problems before they arise to the crisis level. Workplace visitations are an important part of relationship building and often involve informal chatting, look- Chaplain Kenny Lynch conducts services north ing at family photos, and discussing fam- of Hwachon, Korea, 28 August 1951. ily issues. Many times a soldier who would not otherwise seek out the Chaplain will “The Chaplain is also responsible for coordinating and providing (within a particular faith group) pull the Chaplain aside and ask for help weekly religious services. This also includes oversight of other lay leaders of other faith groups and with growing problems. At other times, other activities such as Bible studies. Working together with other Chaplains provides soldiers a the chain of command will pull the Chap- wide variety of worship opportunities.” lain aside and ask that he speak with a soldier who may be having difficulties — early intervention helps avoid crises. availability of the Chaplain is a great re- greatly in mission accomplishment. It is Critical incident stress debriefing. source for the unit. In this role, they can difficult to objectively measure the suc- When a traumatic event occurs in a unit, also help guide soldiers to the level of sup- cess of taking a proactive approach. To it is important to help soldiers who are port they need. As per regulations, com- date, my UMT has completed more than most significantly affected process the manders should never expect a Chaplain 100 missions outside the wire with sol- emotions of the event. This is an impor- to share anything told to them in their diers, as well as hundreds of workplace tant part of taking care of soldiers during role as a counselor or spiritual advisor. visits. These proactive activities, com- combat. A Chaplain who is actively in- bined with counseling, crisis intervention, volved with the unit can help soldiers Religious services. The Chaplain is also classes/briefs, planning meetings, and re- through this process by identifying those responsible for coordinating and provid- ligious services form a vital and active who may need additional care and facili- ing (within a particular faith group) week- religious support program. tate that care with agencies that offer pro- ly religious services. This also includes grams such as combat stress or mental oversight of other lay leaders of other health care. faith groups and other activities such as Bible studies. Working together with oth- Chaplain (Captain) David Fell is currently serv- Pastoral counseling. The importance ing as the battalion chaplain, 1st Special Troops er Chaplains provides soldiers a wide va- Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infan- of this should not be underestimated. At riety of worship opportunities. different times during a deployment, pas- try Division (Mechanized), Taji, Iraq. He re- ceived a B.S. from Texas A&M Commerce and toral counseling can occupy a consider- The proactive unit ministry team a Masters of Divinity from Southwestern Bap- able amount of a Chaplain’s time. This (UMT) is made up of the Chaplain and tist Theological Seminary. His military educa- is most effective when a Chaplain has the Chaplain’s Assistant. The UMT is a tion includes Chaplain Officers Basic Course. taken time to build relationships with tremendous asset that proactively pro- He received a Bronze Star Medal for his ser- soldiers and leaders. The day-and-night vides for the needs of soldiers and aids vice in Iraq.

January-February 2007 — 25 Practical Lessons from the Philippine by Lieutenant Colonel Jayson A. Altieri, Lieutenant Commander John A. Cardillo, and Major William M. Stowe III

“I prefer a country run like hell by Filipinos to a country run current and future counterinsurgency campaigns. It is important like heaven by Americans. Because, however bad a Filipino gov- to realize that sound counterinsurgency theory, combined with ernment might be, we can always change it.” a decent understanding of the conflict at hand, is essential for applying practices from learned lessons to a current or future — Manuel L. Quezon, 1 campaign; what works in one counterinsurgency campaign can First President of the Philippine Commonwealth easily fail when directly applied to another.

When stripped of ideological blinders, lessons learned from the Between 1898 and 1941, the U.S. Army transformed from a Philippine war can offer valuable insight into the complexities small-frontier constabulary army to the most powerful military of localized insurgencies and indigenous resistance to foreign land force in the world. During this evolution, the Army demon- influence.2 The war contained one of the most successful coun- strated how different counterinsurgency and pacification opera- terinsurgency campaigns in the United States’ history. A critical tional methods can be employed in separate geographic regions examination of how its military interventions, civic action, and for a campaign’s overall success. In the end, these methods were pacification operations and tactics fit into our joint doctrine of skillfully executed through the combined application of force phase IV and V operations will offer additional insight into our and politics by thinking “strategic captains and corporals” on Insurrection

the ground; some of these methods are worth serious consider- War, the war was initially a success for the United States. By ation in planning operations for future contingencies. December 1898, the United States successfully invaded Cuba, This article discusses the many similarities or parallels between Puerto Rico, and portions of the Philippines, deploying Army and Navy forces across the Pacific and Caribbean.4 Although, past and current conflicts during phase IV and V operations. by the time peace was declared in December 1898, it controlled There are easily many more dissimilarities or converging fac- 5 tors, which do not translate well for modern application. How- only small portions of those islands. Individual islands, moun- ever, some of the lessons learned from a U.S. campaign that be- tains, swamps, jungles, and bodies of water separate the island inhabitants; on Luzon alone the Ilocanos, Pampangans, Panga- gan on foreign soil over 100 years ago are too obvious and im- 6 portant to ignore. sinans, Tagalogs, and Bicols all speak different languages. Re- lations among the tribal groups were often strained; the Mus- lim, or Moro, population of Mindanao and Sulu, resisted the in- Philippine Counterinsurgency Operations 1898-1941 corporation into the Christian Filipino polity, often by force of In May 1898, the United States declared a “splendid little war” arms.7 The defeat of Spanish forces in the Philippines was due with Spain that lasted only eight months.3 Although historians in no small part to the support provided by Filipino revolution- have always questioned the reasons for the Spanish-American aries, primarily of the Tagolog tribe, who seized the opportunity

The four-day battle of Bagsak Mountain on Jolo Island in the Philippines took place from 11 to 15 June 1913. pying and administering the islands while simultaneously fighting insurgent forces. Troop strength never seemed sufficient for both missions. Some of this inability was due to the peacetime thinking of U.S. com- manders and political leaders who were more concerned about budgets rather than applying adequate resources to the con- flict.13 Will of the People The United States’ victory over the rem- nants of the Spanish Empire in 1898 and the subsequent insurrection, fought from 1899 to 1902 by Filipino nationalists, found U.S. military and political leaders faced with the prospect of having to ad- minister an occupied country without an established, legitimate government, while fighting a protracted insurgency. The Unit- ed States recognized that political, eco- nomic, and information affairs would play an important role in achieving the pacifi- “In May 1898, the United States declared a “splendid little war” with Spain that lasted only eight cation of the Philippines — a point Presi- months. Although historians have always questioned the reasons for the Spanish-American War, the war was initially a success for the United States. By December 1898, the United States suc- dent William McKinley made clear in the 14 cessfully invaded Cuba, Puerto Rico, and portions of the Philippines, deploying Army and Navy winter of 1898. Ironically, a military vic- forces across the Pacific and Caribbean.” tory was never the aim of Filipino leaders after 1899.15 Instead, they hoped to under- mine the will of the U.S. population to con- tinue the struggle by harassing the occu- provided by the Spanish-American War to rise up against their pation forces in a protracted struggle.16 The insurgents, through Spanish overlords.8 Unlike Cuba, where the United States had the press and contacts in the United States, were aware of the been able to persuade the indigenous rebel forces to disband, opposition to the U.S. Government’s forays overseas. Insurrec- the Filipino revolutionaries refused to acknowledge the United tionist leaders consciously played to this audience, timing their States’ authority over the islands.9 Although Spain dominated, it offensives to coincide with the Presidential election of Novem- had never replaced the indigenous local cultures.10 A system of local governance and geographic isolation set the conditions for the insurrection that followed the sur- render of Spanish forces, as local leaders believed they could administer their own affairs. The Philippine Insurrection The late 19th century witnessed the emer- gence of a Filipino national conscious- ness.11 The writings of Filipino national- ists, publicizing the abuses of the Spanish imperial system, advocated self-gover- nance of the islands.12 Following the Bat- tle of Manila Bay, U.S. Army forces occu- pied Manila where they encountered na- tionalist Emilio Aguinaldo’s Army of Lib- eration, which hoped to take the city and declare a Philippine Republic. A political and military stalemate developed that led to hostilities. Although the United States had no intention of getting involved in a protracted guerrilla war, the Byzantine po- litical system of the Philippines led vari- ous factions into armed conflict with U.S. occupation forces. Ultimately, due to the Spanish Army prisoners, c. 1898. disorganized nature of the insurgency, the “Unlike Cuba, where the United States had been able to persuade the indigenous rebel forces to United States defeated the majority of disband, the Filipino revolutionaries refused to acknowledge the United States’ authority over the Aguinaldo’s forces. Despite their combat islands. Although Spain dominated, it had never replaced the indigenous local cultures. A system successes, U.S. commanders were contin- of local governance and geographic isolation set the conditions for the insurrection that followed ually frustrated by the dual task of occu- the surrender of Spanish forces, as local leaders believed they could administer their own affairs.”

28 — January-February 2007 ber 1900, in hopes that a disenchanted electorate would replace McKinley with the anti-imperialist candidate William Jennings Bryan.17 The U.S. Army, in helping bring reform to Spain’s former col- onies, brought with it both the same progressive ideology that swept the nation in the late 19th century and a can do spirit that previously inspired the Lewis and Clark expedition and helped defeat the Confederacy in 1865.18 The desire to create a friendly ally amidst the colonial enclaves of the Western Pacific forced many U.S. political and military leaders to realize that drastic changes were necessary to transform the exploited oligarchies of Spain’s former colonies into open societies. But the United States also wanted these changes to be a quiet, evolutionary pro- cess, one in which the government would provide as much of a level playing field as possible without infringing on any- one’s personal or property rights.19 Although the United States managed to finally subdue the majority of the insurgency in the northern islands, the southern archipelago of Moroland proved tougher. The Sultan of Sulu Moroland consisted of mostly Muslim people on Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago who were fiercely independent and never accepted Spanish rule.20 Not only were the Moros different in “Following the Battle of Manila Bay, U.S. Army forces occupied Manila their religious beliefs, but they differed in their laws, customs, where they encountered nationalist Emilio Aguinaldo’s Army of Libera- and languages from the people of the Christianized north.21 The tion, which hoped to take the city and declare a Philippine Republic. A Moros were xenophobic and politically a patchwork of feud- political and military stalemate developed that led to hostilities. Although ing clans.22 The United States was faced with an enemy that had the United States had no intention of getting involved in a protracted guerrilla war, the Byzantine political system of the Philippines led various no central government or leadership to influence. In developing factions into armed conflict with U.S. occupation forces.” an effective policy to deal with the Moros, two approaches presented themselves.23 The United States could either strength- en the sultan of Sulu — the titular head of Islam in the Philip- pines — and rule Moroland indirectly, as the British and Dutch Philippine government in Manila.32 But U.S. efforts were suc- did in their Malaysian colonies, or it could attempt to directly cessful enough to allow the Philippine government a stable se- rule.24 Ultimately, U.S. officials opted for direct rule as neither curity situation to begin their own administration by 1946.33 the Sultan nor any other tribal chief had sufficient prestige to rule all of Moroland, and any effort to elevate one Moro leader Philippine Phase IV and V Operations over his peers would undoubtedly have resulted in civil war.25 U.S. Army officers, with experience from both the Civil and A Six-Phased Campaign Plan Indian Wars, reasoned it made more sense to establish direct In the 2006 draft version of Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Opera- U.S. rule than to uphold some native autocrat.26 Besides, the no- tions Planning, operational phases have been standardized. Plan- tion of ruling the islands through a despotic Asian potentate was ners are required to develop plans based on a new six-phase mod- distasteful to many in the United States.27 After a short campaign el that includes “shaping, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, to subdue the majority of the Sulu warriors, the United States stabilize and enable civil authority as main constructs.”34 A key began a system of rule where the local military governor was consideration of these new phases is that they are mandatory for given full control of legal and administrative powers. Army of- planning only.35 If there is no requirement for a particular phase ficers were not so naïve to believe that they could rule without to occur, then that phase should not be addressed and the next the assistance of the Moro sultan and the tribal chiefs.28 Work- phase considered.36 Standardizing phases will assist in the de- ing with tribal chiefs, officers established a basic government, confliction of combatant command and component plans.37 This while introducing a set of reforms that included medical care, is the construct under which we will evaluate the later stages of establishing schools, and land reform.29 The United States was military operations in the Philippine Islands and ultimately com- successful in pacifying the Moros until December 1941, and in pare them to current operations in the long war. 1946, finally allowed the commonwealth government to suc- cessfully concentrate on establishing an independent government Phase IV: Stabilize following World War II. Following the defeat of Spanish forces in late 1898, the U.S. Summary military faced a new threat from the same insurgents who helped By and large, the United States did a credible job of pacifying facilitate victory. Unlike the current situation in Iraq, U.S. forc- the Moros, using a combination of local tribal control and U.S.- es opted for an offensive approach where the military assumed a greater role in the stability of the Philippines following the con- led reform efforts.30 Building on previous experience in the West- ern frontier and other parts of the Philippines, Army officers ap- clusion of major combat operations. Under the new Joint Publi- plied the well-worn creed of firm-but-fair treatment to establish cation 5-0, the stability of either the host-nation government or a paternal regime that attempted to uplift the Moros without an interagency interim government, such as the Coalition Provi- completely disregarding their political, economic, and religious sional Authority in Iraq, is a separate and vital component to the termination of operations.38 heritage.31 Although relations were not always so smooth, some Moros came to regret the departure of the U.S. administration, In the late 19th century, U.S. Army senior leaders turned to prin- which they considered more sensitive to their concerns than the ciples that had long guided the old Indian frontier constabulary.

January-February 2007 — 29 Using the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) is sometimes a relatively easy affair, such as the transfer of au- construct, U.S. forces secured the Philippine Islands sufficient- thority in Grenada and Panama. More long-term examples of ly enough to allow a quasi-independent Philippine government U.S. military involvement while enabling civil authorities are to assume control. Initially, the U.S. Government understood that the Korean Peninsula and the Philippine Islands. Transitioning subduing the insurgents would require more than military force.39 from U.S. military rule to civilian rule in the Philippines over a Commanders understood, and ordered their men to respect the 48-year period serves as an example of successfully executing a people and their customs; they imposed strict discipline, forbid- phase V operation. ding looting and wanton destruction, and punishing those who committed such crimes. They paid cash for supplies requisi- The United States established the Schurmann Commission ear- tioned, ly to help set conditions for Filipino self-determination, and rec- opened schools, built roads, refurbished markets, and ommended the establishment of the institutions for a civilian do- established municipal governments under native officials that 47 40 mestic government. Even though by 16 March 1900, fighting were largely based on established Spanish traditions and laws. in insurgency territory was still far from over, a second Philip- Commanders also realized that information and impressions pine Commission was established to give the newly formed Phil- were more valuable than actual military size. U.S. forces were ippine executive and legislative branches authority to adminis- stretched thin and it was necessary for commanders to leave in- 48 surgents with the impression that they faced a more powerful ter the islands. military force than actually existed. “The Filipinos,” wrote Brig- In 499 statutes issued between September 1900 and August adier General Theodore Schwan in the fall of 1899, “are in iden- 1902, the Taft Commission swept away three centuries of Span- tically the same position as the Indians of our country have been ish governance and installed in its place the laws and institutions for many years, and in my opinion must be subdued in much the of a modern civil state, establishing a code of law, a judicial sys- same way, by making them realize fully the futility of armed re- tem, and elective municipal and provincial governments.49 The sistance, and then win them by fair and just treatment.”41 Field Philippine Organic Act of 1902 extended the protections of the commanders pushed their subordinates to take the offense in the United States’ Bill of Rights to Filipinos and established a na- belief that psychological factors would play an especially im- tional bicameral legislature.50 The lower house was the popular- portant role in irregular warfare.42 Finally, the U.S. military was ly elected Philippine Assembly and the upper house was the able to use the geography of the Philippines to deprive insur- Philippine Commission, appointed directly by the President of gents of their economic base. the United States.51 Following U.S. practice, the Philippine Or- The U.S. Navy conducted a blockade of the islands’ unregulat- ganic Act imposed the strict separation of church and state and ed coastal traffic — absolutely essential in an archipelago lack- eliminated the Roman Catholic Church as the official state reli- gion.52 ing roads.43 The blockade prevented both foreign arms shipments and ended the inter-island trade necessary for the insurgents to The first elections to the Philippine Assembly were held in raise funds.44 A critical component of the United States’ success- July 1907 and the first session opened on 16 October 1907.53 es in this phase was civic action, conducted while engaged in The Jones Act of 1916 carried forward the Philippine Organic combat operations.45 Building schools and roads, while conduct- Act of 1902.54 An elected Philippine Senate replaced the ap- ing counterinsurgency operations, was more of a policy of attrac- pointed Philippine Commission and the former Philippine As- tion, rather than attrition, in the battle to defeat the insurgency.46 sembly was renamed the House of Representatives.55 As before, the U.S. President appointed the governor general, responsible Phase V: Enable Civil Authority for the executive branch. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 The final phase of campaign planning involves enabling civil established the commonwealth of the Philippines, which at the authorities and disengaging U.S. forces from a conflict, which end of a 10-year transition period would become the fully in- dependent Republic of the Philippines.56 A plebiscite on the constitution for the new republic was approved in 1935 and the date for national independence was set for 4 July 1946. Aside from the onset of the Japanese invasion in 1941 and subse- quent liberation by allied forces, indepen- dence occurred as promised. Summary By 1907, at the conclusion of major com- bat operations in the Philippines, the Unit- ed States had gone to war against Spain ill-prepared, and had emerged as a major global player, modifying many of the con- stabulary tactics and strategies that were used against the Plains Indians.57 When viewed from a military context 100 years later, the lessons learned from the Phil- ippine war offer valuable examples into the complexities of localized insurgencies and indigenous resistance to foreign in- “Moroland consisted of mostly Muslim people on Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago who were fluence. More importantly, how the U.S. fiercely independent and never accepted Spanish rule. Not only were the Moros different in their re- military conducted the war offers not a ligious beliefs, but they differed in their laws, customs, and languages from the people of the Chris- model, but indicators as to how a nation tianized north. The Moros were xenophobic and political patchwork of feuding clans. The United deals with complex military and political States was faced with an enemy that had no central government or leadership to influence.” situations.

30 — January-February 2007 Aguinaldo and other insurgent Lessons to be Learned leaders, January 1899. Force Size Following Commodore Dewey’s victory on 1 May 1898 at Manila Bay, using his force of 1,743 men against the Spanish fleet, the immediate question for President McKinley became “what next?”58 Dewey’s only directives were to defeat the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay and to invest in the city of Manila. This initial action was loosely consistent with the United States’ new stra- tegic policy of obtaining bases in the Pacif- ic island chain (Oahu, Samoa, and Guam, following Manila), mapping a course to the untapped East Asian economic markets.59 Following Spain’s surrender of Manila to U.S. forces four months later, President McKinley did not gain an adequate ap- preciation of the developing situation in the Philippines. Conflicting reports ad- vised him that Philippine revolutionists were fighting for annexation to the United “Soon after Emilio Aguinaldo was captured and swore his allegiance to the United States, Con- States first and their independence was gress authorized the President to proceed with establishing a civil government in the Philip- secondary. Initial Philippine enemy forc- pines. Growing political pressure on President McKinley, which focused on the real and perceived es were between 80,000 and 90,000 regu- methods used by the U.S. military to execute the war, helped expedite the change.” lars, with an additional estimate of 30,000 to over 300,000 people in local organiza- tions throughout the Philippine provinc- es.60 U.S. Army troop strength to begin the initial convention- Army until the final year and a half of the war to become profi- al war against the insurgency was over 20,000.61 It peaked at cient in executing its pacification policies. Although the U.S. 70,000 men in 1900, and averaged 40,000 during the 1898- military averaged 40,000 men in country, the dispersion of the 1902 periods. U.S. Army over the vast archipelago was so great that the con- State volunteers bore the brunt of the early conventional war in sequent shortage of officers usually permitted only one for each 1899; U.S. volunteers assisted with the ensuing guerrilla war, and garrison. This officer was often times a young lieutenant who the Regulars settled into full responsibility of the pacification was required to perform a full range of duties, which included effort only after struggling with counterinsurgency tactics dur- supervising municipal government, civil affairs, and police func- ing the first two years of the war.62 Virtually all Army Regular tions. His duties also included preparing forces to repel night at- combat units during this time served in the Philippines.63 Only tacks and/or mount offensive field operations against insurgents 15,000 U.S. soldiers were required to garrison the islands by and ensuring the population did not support them. The young 64 officer’s troops were often recruits or volunteers with little or no 1903, less than a year following the official end of the war. 66 This number steadily declined over the next decade, although military experience and training. Some garrison commanders U.S. forces were required to keep the Moros living in Mindanao were able to devote most of their time to valuable civil projects; others were involved in daily, violent defensive and offensive (including the Sulu archipelago) in check until the start of World 67 War II. Therefore, the United States dedicated an average coun- clashes in the central and southern islands. Other commanders terinsurgency campaign force four times larger than the force experienced both ends of this spectrum and had to find middle required to topple the Spanish regime in the Philippines. This ground from which to operate. It was often up to the individual force size was consistent with the counterinsurgency tenet of commander’s discretion and direction to identify the proper coun- bringing enough coverage to positively affect a given geograph- terinsurgency and/or pacification tactics in his region to achieve ic area. Effective counterinsurgency campaigns are manpower overall campaign success — many little wars also occurred in intensive. John M. Gates’ study of the Philippine war implies that the Philippines. even more U.S. forces committed to counterinsurgency opera- Extensive decentralization of the countrywide pacification ef- tions may have shortened the length of the war. fort from higher headquarters in Manila existed due to the is- land’s geography. Again, this reality placed additional individu- Decentralized Counterinsurgency Operations al responsibility on the shoulders of young commanders. Even and Individual Effectiveness though benevolence was the official Manila pacification policy, Native Filipinos were primarily of Malayan and some Indone- young commanders became all important to determining what sian descent, and could be loosely categorized into eight ethnic methods were actually employed. Overall, the policies followed Christian divisions, two non-Christian groups (Mohammedan by each region or garrison in the last year and a half of the war and primitive pagan in Mindanao, Mindoro, and Palawan), and were effective. Negritos, who were non-Malayan and located in the interior 65 Tour lengths of at least one year greatly enhanced the ability of highlands over the whole length of the Philippines. This is the these young commanders to establish the required community country profile the U.S. Army was up against with native insur- relationships for executing the appropriate counterinsurgency gent forces present on every major island group. and/or pacification tactics.68 Autonomy for these commanders Through differing trial and error pacification practices, which resulted in overall success. In the end, U.S. officers with mini- were sometimes egregiously fatal for both sides, it took the U.S. mal training functioned effectively in almost any assigned ca-

January-February 2007 — 31 porters. The arrest and conviction of these individuals provided further evidence to the townspeople that the U.S. Army was capable of protecting them, and when they cooperated with the Army, protection in- creased. The United States’ pursuit of insurgents from these locations cut off their supply lines, kept them off balance, and detached them from popular support.72 Insurgents lacking popular support could not main- tain operations against opposing forces. Their terrorist activities soon backfired as the population began to feel more se- cure under U.S. auspices.73 Once this oc- curred, the Filipinos could support the United States without having to pay the previously inevitable consequence of be- ing victimized by revolutionary terrorists. Separating the population from the insur- gents was crucial to ending their influence in towns, thereby destroying the system by “The U.S. Army did not begin to succeed in pacification operations until they widely deployed and which they obtained sanctuary, supplies, dispersed their units into strategic garrisons under Major General MacArthur’s General Order 100, and information.74 which provided security for townspeople from terrorism and intimidation from insurgents. Simulta- neously, U.S. forces pressured and isolated the insurgents from these new vantage points, and in- Eventually, municipal police organiza- creased the internal surveillance of their respective municipalities to detect agents, terrorists, and tions manned with Filipinos were estab- supporters.” lished, followed by the Philippine Con- stabulary, which was assigned to highly populated areas to provide for their own self-defense. This development further in- pacity when provided with proper guidance and permitted suf- creased municipal security, and because the Filipinos felt even ficient flexibility in making decisions based on their own initia- safer, they were more likely to support the United States and tive and judgment.69 withdraw support from the insurgents. Insurgent surrender rates increased remarkably. Transfer from Military to Civil Authority Protecting the civilian population is a core counterinsurgency Soon after Emilio Aguinaldo was captured and swore his alle- tenet, which is required before all other follow-on tactics can suc- giance to the United States, Congress authorized the President ceed within a campaign. For comparison purposes, in early cas- to proceed with establishing a civil government in the Philip- es of gains made in municipalities in 1900 through benevolent pines. Growing political pressure on President McKinley, which pacification policies, they were more than offset by insurgent focused on the real and perceived methods used by the U.S. terror tactics and the inability of the United States to provide military to execute the war, helped expedite the change. Wil- protection. The protection given the population by the United liam Howard Taft was installed as civil governor on 1 July 1901, States in 1901 made them understand that peace under Ameri- providing him executive authority throughout the archipelago, can control was a reasonable alternative to continued war and except for the territory inhabited by the Moros.70 the uncertain goal of independence. The native population be- came a U.S. weapon in the war against the insurgents.75 The work of Taft’s civil authorities’ commission helped bring about conciliation between the Americans and the Filipinos. Pseudo-operations76 Most Filipinos desired some freedom from the restrictions of martial rule, which were easily invoked under the military’s gov- The effectiveness of the U.S. Army was greatly improved by ernorship. Ironically, the benevolent programs initiated by the the use of indigenous personnel. They were trained for and served civil government were almost invariably a continuation of ef- effectively in the same Filipino-American units as U.S. service- forts begun by the U.S. Army. At times, even to Taft’s dismay, men.77 Their use began in the first year of the war. Captured or he had to rely on the remotely located garrison commanders, surrendered enemy personnel, well treated, often became invalu- who often asserted authority Taft believed they did not legally able and loyal allies.78 Many Filipino soldiers succumbed to the possess, to execute his civil policies in the remote areas already United States’ offer of money for the surrender of their weap- pacified.71 ons.79 The indigenous population was also used later in the pac- ification effort as popular support shifted to the United States Population Protection and from the insurgency. Once protection for the towns increased, even more Filipinos were willing to aid the United States as The U.S. Army did not begin to succeed in pacification opera- guides, scouts, agents, and spies.80 tions until they widely deployed and dispersed their units into strategic garrisons under Major General MacArthur’s General Operations in which friendly forces were disguised as the en- Order 100, which provided security for townspeople from ter- emy were most productive.81 Of course, the most famous case rorism and intimidation from insurgents. Simultaneously, U.S. of using friendly, former insurgent officers disguised as the en- forces pressured and isolated the insurgents from these new emy was General Frederick Funston’s expedition to capture Emi- vantage points, and increased the internal surveillance of their lio Aguinaldo in northern Luzon in early 1901. This event helped respective municipalities to detect agents, terrorists, and sup- shift the momentum of the war toward achieving U.S. strategic

32 — January-February 2007 objectives. Passing himself off as a captured U.S. Army private, ulace grows too great, a political decision designed to limit do- Funston led his operation on a grueling six-day, 110-mile jour- mestic uneasiness may be made and not necessarily in accor- ney to Aguinaldo’s sanctuary; the deceit was so complete the dance with the military plan. revolutionary leader never knew what hit him as he became a 82 Safety and security of the local people. Both in the Philippines U.S. prisoner. and Iraq, U.S. forces were initially viewed as liberators and had the support from the majority of the local populace. However, Force Recommendations as soon as the safety and security of the local population dissi- Joint and individual service doctrine will continue to develop pated, many persons transferred their allegiances to opposition and change over time, which will require leaders to stay abreast forces to increase their chances for personal survival. Opera- of current models and phraseology. However, there are a few tional planning must guarantee the safety and security of the lo- historical principles that if analyzed and implemented correctly, cal populace. Planners must allow for the possibility of an in- may lead to a successful military campaign. Although there is surgency to occur and use every option available to decrease the no one solution that applies from conflict to conflict, these ba- threat to the local populace. Again, peace will be difficult to ob- sic observations will greatly increase chances of success. tain if the local populace is in opposition to the forces present. Local ethnic, religious, and tribal beliefs. At the forefront of Send an overwhelming force. Planners and leaders must ac- observation is the knowledge that leaders gain about the indig- knowledge the fact that operations, especially when facing a pos- enous people of the country they are planning a campaign against, sible insurgency, will be manpower intensive. Those forces sent and how to include this knowledge throughout the planning and forward must possess an overwhelming amount of force. This operational processes. Evidence from past conflicts, such as the force is required to swiftly defeat an enemy and adequately American Revolution, Vietnam, and the war in Iraq, confirms provide safety and security to the local populace. This should be that ethnic, religious, and tribal relationships existing in partic- viewed as a prerequisite to entering phases IV and V; then, and ular areas have crucial implications on determining how an op- only then, should smaller troop levels be considered. eration progresses. This is extremely important when the opera- History has proven repeatedly that insurgency operations will tion advances to phases IV and V — during the initial stages of not end quickly. That said, military planners should not set a hard- the operation if religious beliefs are discounted, pacifying the and-fast timeframe for an operation. Allowances for lengthy op- population will be difficult at best. erations should be the norm; anything less is viewed as a bonus. The religious beliefs and values of the area may dictate how to This concept must be emphasized and accepted at all levels of carry out operations in one area, which may be vastly different government and the U.S. populace at large, as it directly ties into from that in another area of the same country. Operational plan- the will of the people at home. ning must acknowledge the area’s religious beliefs; however, Combat tours should be maintained at a year, if not longer, es- there is a fine balance between satisfying the religious beliefs of pecially during the end of phases III through V. This will ensure the ‘enemy’ and not risking lives of friendly military forces. that relationships built between military troops and the local Taken one step further, if leaders understand a particular moral populace will have a greater chance of enduring, and thus en- view of some religions, they will realize that some individuals are suring the support of the local populace. This will also allow willing to die for their cause to meet a higher calling. Not only greater “corporate knowledge” to be maintained in any particu- must the various religious beliefs and values be clearly under- lar area, thus increasing the chances for success. stood, one must also understand the dynamic population make- up of the country as a whole. Discontentment within a particu- Joint force planning and operations are a very dynamic and flu- lar country may be the root cause for operations being conduct- id process. No matter what the operation is named or how the ed in the first place. Just as is the case with religious knowledge, phases are labeled, there is one constant throughout time — understanding the dynamics of a population may greatly alter each conflict is unique and there is no cookie-cutter solution to one’s course of action, especially when planning and conduct- be applied. The observations listed above are constant through- ing phase IV and V operations. out any military operation, to include possible insurgent activi- ties. More importantly is the direct relationship that ties them all The will of the local people. The will of the people is also es- together — the relationship between people and time. Campaign sential during the planning and execution phases of an opera- planners and leaders must understand the people they are deal- tion — if the local populace does not believe that the United ing with and provide them with a sense of safety and security. States has their best interests in mind, operational successes This serves to garner the support of the local populace, and more will be hampered. Regardless of the operation’s purpose, the lo- importantly, the support of the U.S. populace as a whole. cal populace needs to be assured and reassured that the Unit- ed States will stick with it until the end, providing for a better Perhaps the most important aspect of a professional military is future that is compatible with its values. Without the will of the ensuring those in the future learn from the past. Following the local populace, peace will not easily be achieved, nor will it be end to hostilities in the Philippines, U.S. President Taft blocked enduring. the publication of Captain John R.M. Taylor’s five-volume book, History of the Philippine Insurrection, to avoid embarrassing The will of the American people. The will of the local popu- the Filipinos who gave the Americans legitimacy.83 This act by lace is not all that must be considered. Perhaps, more important- President Taft, no matter what the underlying reason, denied the ly is the will of the American people. This is perhaps the biggest U.S. military the ability to learn from past conflicts and better area that insurgents can exploit and use to their advantage. apply lessons learned in future military operations. While Americans are well educated in the facets of American politics, the American public at large is not content without a quick and decisive victory with minimal casualties. This is one area that the upper echelons of political leadership must aggres- Notes sively attack and pursue to maintain the support of the U.S. pop- 1“History: Republic of the Philippines,” WWW-VL History Central Catalogue, 20 June 2006, ulace at large. Politics are extremely important in running our online at http://vlib.iue.it/history/asia/Philippines/index.html, accessed 7 August 2006. great Nation, but ill-advised decisions can sometimes limit mil- 2Brian M. Linn, The Philippine War 1899-1902, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, itary effectiveness. If discontentment within the American pop- 2000, p. 328.

January-February 2007 — 33 3Neal Gaber, “A Splendid Little War,” Salon.com, 21 February 2003, online at http://archive. 55Ibid. salon.com/opinion/feature/2003/02/21/maine/index_np.html, accessed 2 August 2006. 56Ibid. 4 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860- 57John P. Langellier, Uncle Sam’s Little Wars: The Spanish-American War, The Philippine Insur- 1941, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 99. rections and Boxer Rebellion, 1898-1902, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsbrug, PA, 1999, p. 8. 5 Ibid. 58Jules Archer, The Philippines’ Fight for Freedom, Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1970, p. 45. 6 Ibid. As geographers have noted, the term Filipino is no more accurate in describing a people 59William J. Pomeroy, American Neo-Colonialism – Its Emergence in the Philippines and Asia, of one race and culture than is the term American. International Publishers, New York, 1970, p. 35. 7 Ibid. 60Ibid., p. 37. 8 Ibid., p. 108. 61Gates., p. 78. 9 Ibid. 62Linn, pp. 325-326. 10 Linn, The Philippine War 1899-1902, p. 15. Until the mid-19th century, Spanish rule remained 63Gates, p. 286. concentrated in Manila, while in the countryside, the poor and undermanned imperial government 64 ruled by confirming the authority of local chieftains and tribes. Ibid., p. 270. 65 11Ibid., p. 16. Conrado Benitez, History of the Philippines, Ginn and Company, Manila, RP, 1954, pp. 1-9. 66 12Ibid., p. 17. Gates, p. 284. 67 13Ibid., p. 110. Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, University 14 of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1951, pp. 137-145. Ibid., p. 119. 68 15 Gates, pp. 284-285. Ibid., p. 112. 69 16 Andrew D. Sens, A Summary of the U.S. Role in Insurgency Situations in the Philippine Is- Ibid. lands 1899-1955, American University, Special Operations Research Office, Washington, D.C., 17John Gates, School Books and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902, 1964, p. 23. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1973, pp. 163-164. 70Arthur S. Pier, American Apostles to the Philippines, The Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1950, 18Birtle, p. 102. pp. 30-31. 19Ibid. Ultimately, U.S. pacifying efforts during and after the insurrection allowed the Philippine 71Gates, pp. 272-273, 282. population a commonwealth status with their own president, legislature, and judicial system that 72Ibid., pp. 271, 278. set the foundation for a transition to full independence in 1946. 73 20 Sens, p. 24. Ibid., p. 159. 74 21 Gates, pp. 280-281. Ibid. 75 22 Ibid., pp. 271, 277-278, 281. Ibid. The Moro’s strong beliefs in Islam led many to launch attacks against infidels with the 76 assurance that death in combat would guarantee an entry into paradise. Defined: employing either former insurgents and/or indigenous personnel to combat remain- 23 ing insurgents using tactics of deceit (dressing and acting like the enemy). Ibid., p. 160. 77 24 Sens, p. 23. Ibid. 78 25 Ibid., p. 24. Ibid. 79 26 Gates, p. 275. Ibid. 80 27 Ibid., pp. 271-272. Ibid. 81 28 Sens, p. 24. Ibid. 82 29 Pier, pp. 20-24. Ibid., p. 161. The results of these reforms, which lasted right up to December 1941, paid long- 83 term dividends to both the Philippine commonwealth government and the United States. During William Marina, The Three Stooges in Iraq and the U.S.’s First Stooge, The Independent Insti- World War II, the Sulu islands were never completely occupied by Japanese forces and the Sultan tute, Oakland, CA, 14 October 2004. of Sulu kept the Stars and Stripes flying over his headquarters during the conflict. 30Ibid., p. 168. 31Ibid. Lieutenant Colonel Jayson A. Altieri, U.S. Army, is currently a future war- 32Ibid. fare planner, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Reston, VA. He re- 33Ibid. ceived a B.A. from Norwich University, and two M.A. degrees from Air 34Colonel Craig Bollenberg, “Standardized Campaign Phases,” Campaigning, Volume1, Issue University, Maxwell Air Force Base. His military education includes Joint 1, 30 September 2005, p. 2., online 4 August 2006, at http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/ Forces College, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air Com- jaws/JOINT_ADVANCED_WARFIGHTING_SCHOOL_Newsletter.doc. mand and Staff College, Jumpmaster Course, Combined Arms and Ser- 35 Ibid. vices Staff School, Cavalry Leaders Course, Armor Officer Advanced 36 Ibid. During the threatened U.S. invasion of Haiti in 1994, it can be argued that under the cur- Course, Airmovement Operations Course, Aviation Officer Basic Course, rent-phase model that phase zero (shape) and phase one (deter) were conducted. Phase two (seize the initiative) and phase three (dominate) were not required due to the capitulation of the Haitian and Air Assault School. He has served in various command and staff Military Junta. The coalition force then transitioned to phase four (stabilize). positions, to include operations planner, Multinational Corps-Iraq, Camp 37Ibid. Victory, Iraq; operations officer, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 159th Aviation 38Dr. Milan Vego, “Campaign Phasing and the New Joint Publication 5-0,” Campaigning, Joint Regiment, Iraq; XO, 1st Battalion (Training Support) (Aviation), 337th Advanced Warfighting School, Journal of the Department of Operational Art and Campaigning, Regiment, Fort Knox, KY; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Winter 2006, p. 5. Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 82d Aviation Regiment, Fort Bragg, 39Birtle, p. 118. Army Brigadier General Franklin Bell explained at the time, “Government by force alone cannot be satisfactory to Americans. It is desirable that a Government be established NC; and commander, Aviation Detachment, Joint Task Force Safe Bor- in time, which is based upon the will of the governed. This can only be accomplished satisfacto- der, Patuca, Ecuador. rily by obtaining and retaining the good will of the people.” 40Ibid., pp. 119-120. Lieutenant Commander John A. Cardillo, U.S. Navy, is a logistics action 41Ibid., p. 112 officer, J4, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, HI. He received a B.S. 42Ibid., p. 114. from Carnegie Mellon University and a M.S. from the Naval Postgradu- 43Ibid., p. 325. ate School. His military education includes Joint Forces Staff College, 44Ibid. U.S. Army Logistics Management College, Naval Supply Corps School, 45Ibid., p. 327. and Naval Nuclear Power School. He has served in various command 46Ibid. and staff positions, to include supply officer, USS Wadsworth FFG-9; 47“History: Republic of the Philippines,” WWW-VL History Central Catalogue, 20 June 2006. general supply and fiscal officer, Fleet Hospital Operations and Train- 48Ibid. ing Command, Camp Pendleton, CA; cargo officer and helicopter con- 49Ibid. trol officer, USS Rainier AOE-7, Bremerton, WA; and engineering watch 50Ibid. supervisor, USS Alaska SSBN-732(G), Bangor, WA. 51Ibid. 52Ibid. In 1904, the administration paid the Vatican $7.2 million for most of the lands held by the Major William M. Stowe III, U.S. Air Force, is currently a joint operations religious orders. The lands were later sold back to Filipinos. Some tenants were able to buy their staff officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Joint Command, land, but it was mainly the established estate owners who could afford to buy the former church Lisbon, Portugal. He received a B.S. from Ohio State University, a M.S. lands. from Lesley College, and an M.A. from the Naval War College. His mili- 53 Ibid. The Nacionalista Party of Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmena won the election and con- tary education includes Joint Forces Staff College, Naval Command and tinued to dominate Philippine electoral politics until 1941. The political success of the Nacional- ista Party was based on the skills of Quezon and Osmena in tying the traditional patron-client re- Staff College, and Squadron Officer School. He has served in various lations to the new institutions of the modern civil state. command and staff positions, to include director of operations, 55th Air 54Ibid. Refueling Squadron, Altus Air Force Base, OK.

34 — January-February 2007 Integrating Cultural Sensitivity into Combat Operations

by Major Mark S. Leslie

“Guerrillas never win wars but their ad- The Army has come a long way on the our patrol base discussing various issues versaries often lose them.”1 subject of cultural sensitivity. All units of concern. As a result of this new-found deploying to Iraq are required a certain knowledge, we gradually adopted a more — Charles W. Thayer amount of cultural awareness training; sensitive approach, and were very suc- soldiers learn a little of the language and cessful at not only finding and eliminat- When cultural sensitivity or cultural a little about the culture. Units deploying ing insurgents and caches, but also fos- awareness is mentioned in regards to com- also train traditional combat skills at the tering and developing a good rapport with bat operations, it is often met with rolled individual, squad, section, platoon, and the local community. The intelligence we eyes or groans from those who execute company levels. collected because of these relationships the orders. Many often think that cultural was incredible, and often we (the advi- sensitivity is a weakness and is second- Prior to my last deployment, I had been sors) and our ING counterparts were the ary to actual operations — this is incor- in combat several times and assumed the only people local informants would trust. rect. Cultural sensitivity incorporated into only kind of cultural sensitivity I needed operations in Iraq is sometimes more valu- to understand was the rules of engage- What worked for our unit is not a cook- able than other more conventional weap- ment (ROE), not to mention giving the ie-cutter solution for all situations and all ons in the U.S. Army’s inventory. Soldiers enemy as little consideration as legally units. However, a few common themes of who are culturally aware and know how possible in regards to humanity; after all, cultural sensitivity, when integrated into to apply that cultural awareness on the he is the enemy, right? It did not take combat operations, can greatly influence battlefield are 21st-century warriors. In- long to realize that I had the wrong idea. the desired outcome. Cultural sensitivity tegrating cultural sensitivity on the bat- I spent the majority of my time in Iraq is not something that can be learned and tlefield is something we all must do, and living, working, eating, and fighting with then tucked away in a rucksack for use we must do it without putting soldiers at the Iraq National Guard (ING), 24 hours later — it must be instilled in your sol- risk. a day, and quickly came to realize that I diers, it must be in your training plan, and had to change my thinking if we were go- it must be used in everything you do on Being sensitive to the local populace and ing to be successful. respecting their culture is not a weakness. the battlefield in Iraq. I am not advocat- Soldiers should realize that their actions, Through daily, often personal interac- ing treating the enemy with kid gloves; deeds, and words during operations in Iraq tion, our soldiers saw U.S. units through when it is time to be brutal (when engag- are powerful tools. For example, it makes the eyes of the Iraqis. This perception was ing the enemy), then it is time to be bru- little difference if weapons are found or not only from Iraqi soldiers, but every- tal and eliminate the threat. However, all anyone is detained during a search opera- one from the average Iraqi farmer to lo- soldiers must be capable of making a ma- tion; your actions could determine wheth- cal “powerbrokers,” such as sheiks, coun- ture decision, at the precise moment, to er the residents of the house you are cil members, and police chiefs. Our unit switch back to nonkinetic or nonlethal searching stay friendly, remain neutral, leaders spent many hours with local citi- force. Integrating training scenarios where or become an enemy. zens in their homes, on the street, and at soldiers must make these decisions in a

January-February 2007 — 35 within your unit that neither the Iraqi people, nor Islam, are the enemy — in- surgents are the enemy. The importance of cultural awareness and putting that knowledge to use in the form of cultural sensitivity during combat operations in a counterinsurgency is put into perspective by Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Oper- ations. FM 3-07.22 defines an insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” The manual goes on to state that a counterinsurgency is, “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psycho- logical, and civic actions taken by a gov- ernment to defeat an insurgency.”2 This “Being sensitive to the local populace and respecting their culture is not a weakness. Soldiers should clearly point out to all command- should realize that their actions, deeds, and words during operations in Iraq are powerful tools. For ers and soldiers that our role in Iraq and example, it makes little difference if weapons are found or anyone is detained during a search op- Afghanistan is far more complicated and eration; your actions could determine whether the residents of the house you are searching stay challenging than past conflicts, which friendly, remain neutral, or become an enemy.” were clearly high intensity in nature. Our mission in Iraq is defined by more than simple military objectives — every few seconds will save lives on the streets that are not culturally sensitive must be soldier is a warrior statesman; an ambas- of Iraq, not just American lives, but Iraqi made; but whenever possible, care toward sador of our intent in Iraq to make it a safe lives as well. Below are suggested tech- civilians and treating the populace with and secure environment for all Iraqis. The niques for integrating cultural sensitivity dignity and respect is “the culture of our actions of every soldier during every en- into combat operations: organization.” gagement, verbal or otherwise, are criti- • Cultural awareness training. Sol- • Information operations (IO) train- cal in conveying this message. The ac- diers must know what is culturally ac- ing. This training should be conducted at tions of every soldier at every level dur- ceptable in Iraq. all levels, from private to battalion com- ing daily dealings with Iraqi citizens are critical. Perception is reality. If Iraqis per- • Language training mander. IO is a powerful tool and grasp- . Invaluable skill ing the concept of how to integrate it into ceive us as the enemy, with our only goal that serves well throughout your tour. daily operations is paramount. Knowing to eliminate the insurgent threat, we are Every unit has its language training chal- IO is the name of the game; incorporate doomed to failure. A counterinsurgen- lenges, but anything is better than noth- cy is a much more complicated war. Suc- ing. Knowing some of the language helps it at all levels of training. • cess is not defined solely by eliminating break down cultural barriers. Every soldier is a sensor. Every sol- insurgents; in fact, it is impossible with- • Leader training. Develop scenario- dier is an intelligence collector and must out the application of a much more com- based vignettes involving issues where understand that he could observe some- plex and difficult approach. FMI 3-07.22 force should or should not be used in thing important. Verbal engagements on puts the warrior statesman duties into per- the battlefield happen more than kinetic spective by clearly defining the endstate training exercises. engagements and must receive the same • and criteria of success: protect the popu- Rules of engagement and escalation amount of attention. Debriefings are crit- lation; establish local political institu- of force training (EOF). EOF and ROE ical. tions; reinforce local governments; elim- vignettes are culturally sensitive. Every • Civil affairs training. Conduct pre- inate insurgent capabilities; and exploit soldier will have to make a life-or-death deployment training on understanding information from local sources.3 In our decision within seconds. Understanding public works and how city governments unit’s battlespace, it is up to the maneu- ROE and EOF enhances soldiers’ chanc- work — including trash collection, water ver commander, with guidance from high- es of making the right decision. Put these works, and city council meetings. Co- er, to determine how to prioritize these scenarios in all levels of training. lumbus, Georgia, or Killeen, Texas, is no goals. However, it is a mistake to think • Diversify training events. Combine where near Mosul, Iraq, but they do pro- that all are not simultaneous events that ROE, EOF, role playing, and civilians on vide leaders a working model on which must be juggled daily. the battlefield into all tactical exercises. to base their “nation builder” role. Lead- To correctly fight a counterinsurgency in Ensure there are consequences for cultur- ers should attend local government meet- Iraq, we must change the culture of many al ignorance and rewards for incorporat- ings and observe how issues are brought of our units. Traditionally, as an Army, we ing cultural sensitivity into combat oper- up, discussed, and resolved in a small city focus on eliminating the insurgent threat, ations, without putting soldiers at risk. government. which is the easy part and only one part • Draw the line. Emphasize that cultur- • Embrace the culture. Difficult, but of the equation. The other prongs of at- al sensitivity in no way jeopardizes the not impossible. Understanding Iraqis and tacking a counterinsurgency are much lives of soldiers. Ensure that soldiers un- how they think, operate, and act is a com- harder and more difficult to accomplish. derstand that sometimes tactical decisions bat multiplier. It also reinforces the idea We must establish in our subordinates’

36 — January-February 2007 minds the whole concept of being there to protect the Iraqi people, much like the logo on domestic law enforcement vehi- cles, “to protect and serve.” Often, soldiers spend entire tours in Iraq with the mindset that all Iraqi citizens are potential threats — which is true — ev- eryone is a potential threat. However, ev- ery Iraqi citizen is a potential ally, poten- tial informant, and potential friend. To only consider them a potential threat is a mistake and will severely limit the unit’s capabilities. To best ascertain if an Iraqi citizen is a potential friend or foe, pay close attention to how they behave. Keep in mind that our actions have a huge im- pact on their decision between friend and foe. A unit that is culturally ignorant and makes no attempt to use cultural aware- “Through daily, often personal interaction, our soldiers saw U.S. units through the eyes of the ness training on the battlefield during Iraqis. This perception was not only from Iraqi soldiers, but everyone from the average Iraqi farm- daily operations is doing more harm than er to local “powerbrokers,” such as sheiks, council members, and police chiefs. Our unit leaders good for the overall picture — regardless spent many hours with local citizens in their homes, on the street, and at our patrol base discuss- of how many insurgents they eliminate. A ing various issues of concern.” counterinsurgency is not about eliminat- ing the threat, but more about eliminating support for the threat. If our actions, ei- ther knowingly or innocently, produce threat from the house, isolate the objec- in most cases, to be responsible for the more insurgents, then we are not accom- tive. Use all the normal precautions when attack because he realizes he will auto- plishing the goals set forth for defeating approaching the house, but instead of matically be presumed “guilty by prox- an insurgency in FMI 3-07.22.4 kicking open the door, simply knock. imity.” However, if you find incriminat- When the owner comes to the door, greet ing evidence, you have the option of de- Insurgents often create support for their him and ask to search his house. He will taining the individual. actions by eliciting us to overreact, and comply because he realizes that there are we often unwittingly fall into their plans. no real alternatives. Ask him to move his This is just one example of integrating For example, if an improvised explosive family to one room, and assign security cultural sensitivity into combat operations. device (IED) attack is initiated on a U.S. to that room. There are thousands of situations, but no patrol or convoy and a residence is locat- cookie-cutter solution, as the tactical sit- ed within a few hundred meters, what is We cleared houses according to stan- uation is different in every case. There are the patrol’s first reaction? Based on per- dard operating procedures: we thorough- a few rules of thumb that will apply to sonal experience and from talking with ly searched one room, requested the own- many situations in Iraq when conducting hundreds of other combat veterans, the er move his family members (children operations similar to the one above: normal response is to immediately raid and women) to that room, and placed the • Assuming there is no direct fire threat, that house. This is tactically sensible; if room under security. We then began a de- knock on the door, instead of kicking it the IED was within sight of the house, tailed search of the house and surround- in. then logically, the occupants of the house ing grounds. During the search, we asked must be responsible or know something. the owner, or a male family member, to • Whenever possible, allow the head of accompany us during the search to pre- household to give instructions to his fam- To ignore the residence would be irre- ily. sponsible; however, our actions and how vent any accusations of personal proper- we conduct the search and questioning ty theft. We also took great care not to • Allow the women and children to stay are more important. If we aggressively “trash” the house; the average Iraqi does inside in a central location (under secu- approach the house, kick open the door, not have a lot of material wealth, and for rity). us to destroy what little he has is not the conduct a search, and question the owner • Do not zip tie or question potential in- of the house, he will most likely claim to way to demonstrate our concern for those we are there to protect. formants/suspects in front of family or know nothing about the IED. Our over- other males to be questioned. reaction has just humiliated the owner While the search was underway, we • and proved to the local populace that the would quietly move the owner to an area If the decision is made to detain an in- message the insurgents spread through- that his neighbors could not see and asked dividual, allow him to get personal items, out Iraq is correct. One of the most com- if he knew anything about the IED inci- such as medicine, shoes, and glasses (un- mon messages spread by insurgents is dent. The owner may not know exact de- der security) — this serves well during that “Americans have no regard for you tails, or even be willing to share them tactical questioning; it shows you have or your property.” with you if he does, but he may give you humanity and are concerned for the wel- fare of the detained individual. Using the same scenario with a differ- bits of information that will be useful in ent approach can enhance conditions for finding those responsible. He is much • Depending on the situation, a gift to successful information gathering. For ex- more likely to assist you if you show him the family may be appropriate. Maybe a ample, assuming there is no direct fire dignity and respect. He is very unlikely, box of clothes for the children or some

January-February 2007 — 37 “…the gesture of good will and the care taken in searching his home, demonstrates respect for his property. Respecting the family and preserving the detainee’s dignity has far-reaching consequences in the community. The message that reaches the members of the community will confirm that a “bad guy” was detained, but his family and property were treated with respect and genuine concern was shown for the welfare of the family. This message supports one of the goals in defeating a counterinsurgency by ‘exploiting information from local sources.’”

other type of gift. This may seem very Iraqi citizens. It is not easy to win the ly established government and pursue naïve, but the effect on the village and hearts and minds of people, but it can be peace. neighbors is surprising. accomplished by demonstrating human- ity and compassion in our everyday ac- It is important to separate the detainee tions. Every soldier should embrace and Notes from his family (remember, he is not the understand his role as an ambassador and 1Charles W. Thayer, Guerrilla, M. Joseph, c.1963. enemy yet). Our actions determine which intelligence collector for his command. 2U.S. Army Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-07.22, Counterin- path they choose. For example, the ges- Every soldier must understand that we are surgency Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- ture of good will and the care taken in not just in Iraq to fight against insurgen- ington, D.C., October 2004. searching his home demonstrates respect 3Ibid. cy, but to win over the population, which 4Ibid. for his property. Respecting the family is where the fight is won or lost. and preserving the detainee’s dignity has Major Mark Leslie is currently the deputy chief, far-reaching benefits in the community. More often than not, when insurgents Training and Organization, Stryker Transforma- The message that reaches the members choose to engage us with direct fire, we tion Team, Fort Benning, GA. He received a of the community will confirm that a are clearly the victor. The enemy choos- B.A. from Troy State University and is currently “bad guy” was detained, but his family es to fight as an insurgency because he is pursuing an M.B.A from Touro University. His and property were treated with respect incapable of defeating us militarily. He military education includes Infantry Captains and genuine concern was shown for the chooses instead to attack using hit-and- Career Course; Ranger School; Long-Range welfare of the family. This message sup- run tactics and then disappear into the Surveillance Leaders Course; Survival, Es- ports one of the goals in defeating a coun- population. To find such an illusive ene- cape, Resistance, and Evasion School; and terinsurgency by “exploiting information my, we must demonstrate through words, Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions to include, ob- from local sources.” If the people of the deeds, and actions at all levels that we, server/controller/trainer, 2d Battalion, 395th community feel you are genuinely con- not the enemy, have the best interest of Training Support (AC/RC), Fort Hood, TX; task cerned for their welfare and interest, they the Iraqi people in mind. force senior Iraqi National Guard advisor, 2d are more likely to approach you with in- Squadron, 7th Cavalry (2-7 CAV), 1st Cavalry formation on potential threats. Our victory in Iraq is not to just elim- Division (1CD), Fort Hood; commander, A Com- inate the insurgency threat, but to es- pany and Headquarters and Headquarters The fight in Iraq is not only with insur- tablish an environment where the Iraqi Company, 2-7 CAV, 1CD, Fort Hood; and S4, gents, but it is in the hearts and minds of people can affirm their loyalties to a new- 2-7 CAV, 1CD, Fort Hood.

38 — January-February 2007 Advice from a Former Military Transition Team Advisor by Major Jeff Weinhofer

Every leader in the U.S. Army is keenly camaraderie have a direct impact on its focused on the mission. A Special Forces aware of the mission to train Iraqi forc- ability to accomplish the mission. If a officer recommended that we create our es to assume security responsibilities for team cannot work together effectively, it own private sanctuary (our living area) their country. To accomplish this mission, cannot successfully advise an Iraqi bat- which no Iraqi soldiers could enter. In ret- a military transition team (MiTT) embeds talion. A MiTT functions much better as rospect, this was a great idea that pro- and trains with Iraqi forces, preparing a team than a group of individual mili- vided our team with a little bit of space to them to be self-sustainable tactically, op- tary advisors. Some teams naturally de- unwind and maintain our sanity. erationally, and logistically, so that they velop cliques within the team, and team can assume security responsibilities for leaders must be aware of this possibility Working with Coalition Forces Iraq. and immediately remedy the situation if Part of the responsibility of MiTT sol- it occurs. If the cliques are hindering the diers is to educate local coalition forces This article focuses on the inner work- mission, then remove the soldiers who on the capabilities and limitations of Iraqi ings of a MiTT, building relationships cannot work together. units. Many coalition units have a wealth with coalition partners, and the nuances of experience fighting insurgencies in ei- associated with training Iraqi soldiers. As Team leaders must also be aware of team ther Iraq or Afghanistan, but that experi- a MiTT team leader in Iraq, my team as- morale. As the deployment progresses, ence does not apply to Iraqi forces. MiTTs sisted the Iraqis in building a T-72 tank the frustration of working with Iraqis and embedded within Iraqi army units know battalion from the ground up, and trained the vast cultural differences take a toll on more about those units than do local co- the unit to become operational in less than everyone. Each team will likely have one alition forces. In the near term, military six months. After reaching transition read- or two soldiers who do not like working advisors must become subject-matter ex- iness assessment 2, the unit participated with Iraqis and would much rather be a perts on Iraqi forces. Eventually, there in three out-of-sector deployments in sup- member of a coalition unit. In this case, will be enough officers and noncommis- port of coalition force objectives and as- team leaders must remember that the mis- sioned officers in our Army, who have sumed a small battlespace for the remain- sion is training and developing Iraqi forc- served on military transition teams, to der of our tour. es, but not all of your time and emphasis share their knowledge across the force Team Dynamics should be put into the Iraqi unit at the ex- when they return to home units. pense of your advisory team. Such a prac- The interpersonal group dynamics are tice will only exacerbate tension that will Whatever the reason, MiTTs should different for every MiTT; some teams gel naturally develop among some advisors avoid alienating senior U.S. commanders together as a single unit over time and toward Iraqis. partnered in coalition units. While there some do not. Our team came together may be decisions that we strongly dis- about three months into the deployment. Team leaders must also find ways to agree with made by coalition brethren The nature of group dynamics and team maintain the team’s morale so they stay concerning our Iraqi units, we are still on

January-February 2007 — 39 the same team. Mutual un- a science. Good decisions derstanding is required here. from the top made every- Team leaders must keep in one’s life easier, especially mind that the job of field- the Iraqi jundi (soldier) at grade commanders is com- the bottom of the command plex in Iraq; not only must structure. For example, if the they fight against deadly in- commander made a decision surgencies, but they are si- that passed a common-sense multaneously responsible for test, despite better available developing Iraqi forces, in- options, I supported his de- cluding police and border cision because it was an patrol forces, in their areas “Iraqi decision.” I challenged of operation. decisions during our private Coalition battalions have meetings that made no com- hundreds of soldiers, all with mon or tactical sense. the necessary equipment and “Every leader in the U.S. Army is keenly aware of the mission to train Iraqi Since its inception, Iraq has support assets, as well as a forces to assume security responsibilities for their country. To accomplish this a history of being a warlike competent staff. A MiTT has mission, a military transition team (MiTT) embeds and trains with Iraqi forces, society, complete with mul- ten personnel with three preparing them to be self-sustainable tactically, operationally, and logistically, tiple military coups and wars. M1114 gun trucks; we must so that they can assume security responsibilities for Iraq.” Iraqis respond better to di- also live on a third-world in- rect orders or an authorita- frastructure. Building good tive, confident tone, as op- relationships with coalition posed to passive suggestions. units will only benefit advisor teams. For nous forces to fight in counterinsurgency When addressing the battalion command- example, coalition units provided our environments. er, always show him respect in public. In team with a generator (to maintain elec- private, it is acceptable to be more force- tricity during daily power outages), med- It is not uncommon for team leaders to ful with him in an effort to get him to fol- ical supplies, daily intelligence updates, serve as the Iraqi battalion commander’s low a preferred course of action. When- and maintenance support. advisor. I quickly noticed the legacy of ever the need arises to address lower- the Saddam Hussein regime and the old ranking soldiers, work through the com- Dealing with Iraqis Iraqi army — centralized decisionmak- mander or his designated representative. Dealing with Iraqis can be very frus- ing. Consequently, I focused the majori- ty of my time on advising my counter- trating; however, this is the MiTT’s pri- Helpful Hints for Working mary mission. Teaching Iraqis requires part and attempting to influence his deci- sions. Due to the complexity of working with Iraqi Forces patience and the ability to establish rela- • tionships with counterparts. Such rela- with Iraqis, this was not always success- Iraqis will not always take your ad- tionship building can be cultivated in a ful — working with Iraqis is an art, not vice, but there is no need to get upset — number of ways, such as talking business over dinner and chai, taking your Iraqi counterpart to visit his soldiers on a mis- sion, or a simple exchange of gifts. With every mission or task, each advisor should constantly assess the Iraqi force’s per- formance and devise a plan to gradually wean them from U.S. support so they can facilitate independent operations. Some military advisors have fallen into the trap of judging their successes by ac- tions on the battlefield, such as the num- ber of patrols conducted, the number of improvised explosive devices found, or the number of combat action badges awarded. This is the wrong yardstick to measure success. It is common knowl- edge that nearly all U.S. soldiers and of- ficers are competent and quite capable of mission success. MiTT mission success must be viewed through a prism that as- sesses the growth and effectiveness of the Iraqi unit with which they work. Some advisors and coalition units are too quick to jump in and fix problems without at- “Teaching Iraqis requires patience and the ability to establish relationships with counterparts. Such tempting to teach Iraqi units the process, relationship building can be cultivated in a number of ways, such as talking business over dinner as well as the purpose, for performing and chai, taking your Iraqi counterpart to visit his soldiers on a mission, or a simple exchange of certain tasks. The conventional Army can gifts. With every mission or task, each advisor should constantly assess the Iraqi force’s perfor- learn a few things from the Special Forc- mance and devise a plan to gradually wean them from U.S. support so they can facilitate indepen- es community regarding training indige- dent operations.”

40 — January-February 2007 that battle is lost. Get over it and prepare for the next one. When this occurred, some of the advisors on my team became a lit- tle unnerved; I reminded them I was the battalion commander’s advisor, not the leader of the 2d Tank Battalion. • Do not be afraid to take an occasional afternoon ejazza (vacation). When not on a mission, Iraqis nap from about 1430 to 1730, give or take 15 minutes, and since they are rested, they work late into the night. A great deal of business takes place after 2000 hours. Most Army lead- ers, complete with our type-A personali- ties, would be aghast at such an idea, but it seemed to be effective. Applying Amer- ican expectations to an Iraqi cultural trait will often result in disappointment. When not participating in this Iraqi tradition, I spent time doing physical training, catch- ing up on paperwork, and conducting team meetings. • The jundis frequently approach ad- visors and ask for favors or describe a “Since its inception, Iraq has a history of being a warlike society, complete with multiple military problem they want addressed. The advi- coups and wars. Iraqis respond better to direct orders or an authoritative, confident tone, as op- sor should immediately take the issue to posed to passive suggestions. When addressing the battalion commander, always show him re- the soldier’s chain of command and men- spect in public. In private, it is acceptable to be more forceful with him in an effort to get him to fol- tor them on how to handle the situation. low a preferred course of action. Whenever the need arises to address lower-ranking soldiers, You will probably have to protect the name work through the commander or his designated representative.” of the soldier for fear of command reper- cussion since such action is still frowned on in the Iraqi military culture. Fixing the problem yourself, although expedient, is to maximize participation and accommo- gradual drawdown of U.S. forces. Future a step backward in developing the unit. date afternoon ejazza. advisors should embrace the culture and Our goal is to build Iraqi soldiers’ con- • Training and mentoring the unit is the establish good relationships, constantly fidence in their own leaders versus the MiTT’s primary role, but advisors must assess the performance of your embed- Americans. In theory, if you do your mis- be vigilant to prevent the Iraqi unit from ded unit, and place some emphasis on sion effectively, you will gradually work becoming too dependent on the team. main taining the morale of your own team. yourself out of a job as the unit’s leader- There were several occasions where sup- Following these steps is easier said than ship matures and becomes more compe- port was deliberately withheld because done, but will certainly assist in enabling tent. mission success in this very important the team assessed the unit as capable of mission and complex environment. My • Assign every member of your team an accomplishing a certain task with their tour of duty as a MiTT was the most chal- Iraqi counterpart. A team may tend to fo- own internal assets and institutional lenging, frustrating, and yet rewarding of cus on the command group and primary knowledge. Although this caused some my Army career. staff of the embedded unit, but all team friction between me and the Iraqi battal- members need someone to advise. There ion commander, our relationship returned The author welcomes any comments in is no downside to an advisor providing to its normal level in a day or two. In the regards to this article at jeff.weinhofer@ one-on-one counsel to an Iraqi soldier — long run, I am quite certain this was the gmail.com. this can only help with the overall mis- right decision to facilitate the unit’s inde- sion. pendence. • • Never pass up an opportunity to train In preparation for out-of-sector deploy- Major Jeff Weinhofer is currently an assistant the Iraqis. In our battalion, personnel ments, advisors must be very involved in professor of military science, Department of the logistics planning process. Iraqis tend Military Science, Lehigh University, Bethle- shortages, leave cycles, and mission re- to only take enough supplies to last a few hem, PA. He received a B.S. from Slippery quirements practically wiped out the days, versus planning for a long-term de- Rock University and an M.A. from Lehigh Uni- chance of additional training, minus a ployment. We learned the hard way not versity. His military education includes Armor few staff elements. Our S3 advisor start- to give the unit a list of the recommend- Officers Basic Course, Armor Captains Ca- ed teaching officer professional develop- reer Course, Infantry Mortar Leaders Course, ment sessions on various military sub- ed classes of supplies to take; instead, a Combined Arms and Services Staff School, jects. Admittedly, there were only about precombat inspection must be conducted Ranger School, and Airborne School. He has five leaders present, but it was progress. to see what they actually load in their ve- served in various command and staff posi- hicles and connexes. tions, to include team leader, Military Transi- In theory, Iraqi forces present for the tion Team, 2d Iraqi Tank (T-72) Battalion, Taji, training can share what they learn with Although there may be flaws in imple- Iraq; commander, A Company, 2d Battalion, their peers and subordinates. The officer menting the advisor mission, the transi- 81st Armor Regiment, Fort Knox, KY; and liai- professional development sessions were tion team’s mission in Iraq is our best hope son officer, 2d Squadron, 12th Cavalry, 1st generally conducted in the late evening for securing the country and beginning a Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX.

January-February 2007 — 41 Arab Culture and History: Understanding is the First Key to Success

by Captain Ralph E. Elder

“I am not an Arabist, and history doesn’t The current emphasis on marksmanship the current era in the Middle East, Arabs matter here. We are rewriting history.” training for units deploying to Iraq is nec- are extremely knowledgeable of what has essary; however, you reach a point of di- brought them to this point.2 Moreover, — Unnamed staff member for the 1 minishing returns. Long, drawn-out gun- this history is primarily based on Islamic Coalition Provisional Authority fights are not the norm in Iraq these days; teachings and reflects their beliefs in the much time is spent interacting with civic will of God. Since the majority of the In military and political realms, the pos- and military leaders in an effort to rebuild Arab world is Muslim, this tie between sibility exists that some of us do not ap- infrastructure and establish the Iraqi army history, culture, and religion is extremely preciate the rich history and culture of not (IA). Additionally, the majority of the in- important — nothing exists without reli- only the Arab people as a whole, but more telligence reporting that takes place does gion. specifically Iraqis. This deficiency can- so at the local level. On a daily basis, com- For Iraqis, they have seen the results of not be allowed to continue, given the cur- pany-level leaders need to be armed with rent battle in Iraq that we are waging to working with the United States in the cultural understanding, not just aware- past. All too often, Arab nations and peo- “win hearts and minds.” Think about that ness, to be successful in Iraq. concept for a moment — how do you ple have been supported by the U.S. Gov- win hearts and minds? Overall, it takes a ernment, only to be cast aside when no knowledge base of the culture and peo- The Role of History longer needed. Simultaneously, we have ple with whom you will be interacting Many Americans are not keenly aware supported authoritarian regimes that have before you can begin to achieve success. of the history of the United States or its at times committed crimes against their Soldiers deploying to Iraq deserve, and founding fathers; the opposite is true in own people. Bottom line, the Arab world need, training and education on the com- the Arab world. With a complex history views us with a jaundiced eye and is sus- plex history and rich culture they will be starting in the age of the Caliphs and pro- picious of our intentions. The onus is on facing once they arrive. gressing through the Ottoman Empire to the Americans to make a good first im-

42 — January-February 2007 pression and show that we truly are there to help them. We do this by taking part in their culture, and by understanding, rather than simply dismissing, their per- spective on history. Cultural Immersion While many units deploying to the Mid- dle East do not have the time or inclina- tion to study the culture or history of the people with whom they will be working, a quick fix is “cultural immersion.” This term is loosely used to relay the fact that personal risk has to be taken daily to be- gin to understand the complexities of not only the culture you are thrown into, but the people and tribes with which you will interact for a year. Without putting that foot forward and extending the proverbi- al “olive branch,” we cannot truly hope “The current emphasis on marksmanship training for units deploying to Iraq is necessary; howev- to win hearts and minds. er, you reach a point of diminishing returns. Long, drawn-out gunfights are not the norm in Iraq these days; much time is spent interacting with civic and military leaders in an effort to rebuild in- The best opportunity for U.S. Army sol- frastructure and establish the Iraqi army (IA).” diers to become immersed in Arab cul- ture is by serving on a military transition team (MiTT). During Operation Iraqi Freedom III, our troop was tasked to toilets, and occasionally food, with our at the checkpoint; they had to learn to provide a MiTT to an IA company. We counterparts. This commitment showed communicate across languages and cul- trained and mentored IA soldiers until the IA soldiers that we truly were there to tures to achieve a common goal. Moving they could take over responsibility for the support them — they knew that if things our troop to the Iraqi compound gave us area we controlled — we put an “Iraqi got bad, we were not going to run and the opportunity to frequently get out in face” on the counterinsurgency fight. To hide on our forward operating base (FOB) the community. This was essential; vital accomplish this, our troop moved to the and eat ice cream. It also introduced our human intelligence was developed be- Iraqi compound. soldiers to Arab culture and Iraqis up cause local citizens were confident that For the foreseeable future, we would close and personal. No longer were they we would protect them. Over time, more share the same sleeping arrangements, yelling incessantly at the impatient Iraqi locals provided us with tips and leads that were previously unheard of in our area. Not only did improvised explosive device attacks decrease, but the number of caches discovered increased. Being present and playing a role in the commu- nity, while showing respect for the local culture, pays dividends. Ultimately, accepting great tactical risk and immersing ourselves in the culture and community, our troop enabled our IA brethren to become the first company in its battalion capable of independent operations; they planned and conducted operations with minimal oversight. The simple fact is that during the period we lived in the IA compound, bonds were built that lasted throughout the deploy- ment and all but guaranteed our success. Overall, immersing ourselves in Iraqi cul- ture paid great dividends. Training and Teaching I was the fortunate one in my troop; the U.S. Army sent me to the Peace Opera- “While many units deploying to the Middle East do not have the time or inclination to study the cul- tions Center in Zarqa, Jordan. This train- ture or history of the people with whom they will be working, a quick fix is “cultural immersion.” This term is loosely used to relay the fact that personal risk has to be taken daily to begin to understand ing afforded me the opportunity to im- the complexities of not only the culture you are thrown into, but the people and tribes with which merse myself in Arab culture, as well as you will interact for a year. Without putting that foot forward and extending the proverbial “olive providing me the added benefit of con- branch,” we cannot truly hope to win hearts and minds.” sulting other Arabs on how to best handle

January-February 2007 — 43 sensitive situations. We trained on every- cating junior NCOs, we have the capabil- soldiers will gain an understanding of thing from cordon and searches with real ity to infuse cultural understanding at the Arab culture, which will increase chanc- Jordanians, not just soldiers in MILES lowest levels within our ranks. es of success throughout Iraq’s commu- gear, to after-hours language classes. This Once again, due to the reduced likeli- nities and villages. opportunity proved invaluable; I devel- hood of high-intensity firefights in the oped a baseline understanding of the cul- current operating environment, a happy ture, which enabled me to immediately medium can be found between training immerse in theater. While not every unit for combat and teaching soldiers about the Notes has the time, money, or energy for this people with whom they will spend the 1Walter C. Rodgers, Sleeping With Custer and the 7th Caval- type of training, it is imperative that time ry, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 2005, p. next year of their lives. A good example, 198. and resources are devoted to developing 2 a baseline cultural understanding at the which has been somewhat effective, is us- Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy ing Kurdish-Americans at training cen- Terror, Random House Trade Paperbacks, New York, 2004, non commissioned officer (NCO) level ters. Some may think there is not enough p. xix. and below. Overall, staff sergeants and training time to effectively interact with sergeants will represent the unit on a dai- these “role players.” Always remember, Captain Ralph Elder is currently assigned to ly basis. every little piece of training that exposes the Materiel Requirements Directorate, Future soldiers to other cultures pays dividends Force Integration Directorate, Fort Bliss, TX. If units are afforded the opportunity to in the long run. He received a B.S. from the United States Mili- send soldiers to some type of cultural tary Academy. His military education includes training, they should seize the opportu- Overall, there are officers and soldiers Armor Captain Career Course, Scout Leaders nity to develop their own “subject-matter who resist the idea of learning about and Course, and Air Defense Officer Basic Course. experts.” For example, by sending an understanding other cultures. A resistance He has served in various command and staff positions to include, troop commander, B Troop, NCO to the training, the unit will have to learning goes against the grain of a 5th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 3d Infantry Divi- someone capable of educating its sol- well-educated and professional army. It sion, Iraq and Fort Stewart, GA; and platoon diers; not only will the NCO teach pro- is imperative to train U.S. Army units on leader, C Battery, 1st Battalion, 3d Air Defense fessional development classes to peers, the culture and history of the Iraqi peo- Artillery, 3d Infantry Division, Iraq, Kuwait, and but also to subordinates. Overall, by edu- ple. Furthermore, it is by immersion that Fort Stewart.

Leadership continued from Page 19

However, we need to throw emotional emotions. Hopefully, this article will stim- complish at least two things: gain experi- challenges at leaders and soldiers — the ulate some good discussion on this spe- ence at simultaneously dealing with emo- limit truly is our own imagination. For cific subject. tional stress and tactical stress (by rapid- example, the Ranger School approach ly changing between diverse missions); deprives soldiers of sleep and food to in- Despite all of our best efforts to train and leaders should know when they have crease their level of stress while conduct- leaders and soldiers for the rigors of fight- reached the point of being unable to con- ing hot and cold training scenarios. Lead- ing a counterinsurgency, it will not make trol their own emotions. Equally impor- ers can think of many other ways to get us experts on emotional control — that is tant, leaders should know when subor- inside soldiers’ heads and toy with their physiological. However, we need to ac- dinates have reached their inability to control emotions. Armed with this knowl- edge, we will be better postured to ac- complish the two difficult objectives of the counterinsurgency fight — kill the en- emy and win hearts and minds.

Major Jonathan Dunn is currently assigned as an instructor of International Relations, Depart- ment of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.A. from John Hopkins University. His military edu- cation includes the Armor Captains Career Course, Ranger School, Airborne School, and Air Assault School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include com- mander, Killer Troop, 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3/2 ACR), Operation Iraqi Freedom; regimental S4/assistant S4, 2d ACR, “Killing and winning hearts and minds simultaneously requires two seemingly contradictory men- Fort Polk, LA; support platoon leader, 2d Bat- talities. On one hand, soldiers must be the steely-eyed killers they train to be — able to identify an talion, 8th Cavalry (2-8 CAV), 1st Cavalry Di- enemy insurgent and drop him (or her, as the case could be) with a single, well-aimed rifle shot. vision (CD), Fort Hood, TX; and tank company Yet, at the same time, we expect these same soldiers to be smiling at the ‘friendly’ locals, partic- executive officer and platoon leader, C Compa- ularly children, sometimes even handing out candy or school supplies.” ny, 2-8 CAV, 1st CD, Fort Hood.

44 — January-February 2007 Armor Advances Worldwide by Professor Richard M. Ogorkiewicz

Current operational problems obvious- Japan is also developing a new tank, the 22,000 earlier tanks and approximately ly deserve priority attention; however, prototype of which is expected to be com- 400 T-90s, but their operational status is there remains a need to keep an eye on pleted in 2007. The current Japanese Type unclear. what is happening to armor worldwide. 90 is already an advanced tank with an This is all the more important in view of autoloader, which was the first to be ad- Although India started to develop an in- the number and variety of armored vehi- opted in any tank designed outside the digenous tank, the Arjun, more than 30 cles being developed and produced, in- former Soviet Union. Type 90 was also years ago, its efforts have failed. In con- cluding new battle tanks, which are be- the first tank to be produced with an au- sequence, to modernize its T-72 tank fleet, ing developed in the Far East by at least totracker in its fire control system. India procured from Russia 310 export three different countries. South Korea has versions of the T-90 and the T-90S, with already produced about 1,000 K-1 tanks, The third country in the Far East to de- an even more powerful 1,000-horsepow- designed by Chrysler Defense (now Gen- velop a new tank is China. This tank is a er engine, and will produce more under eral Dynamics Land Systems), soon af- further development of the Type 98, which license. To counter India’s tanks, Paki- ter General Dynamics Land Systems de- appears to be a mere clone of the Russian stan is producing the Al Khalid, which signed the M1 Abrams. In consequence, T-72 to the casual observer, but is actual- was developed in collaboration with Chi- the K-1 resembles the M1 in some re- ly a larger and much more advanced tank na and is very similar to China’s tanks. spects, but was designed to a Korean spec- with general characteristics that resem- Like that of the Chinese Type 98, its gen- ification, which resulted in it being pow- ble recent western tanks. eral configuration follows that of Rus- ered by a diesel engine instead of a gas Russia is reported to be developing a sia’s T-72 and T-90, and it is also armed turbine and equipped with a hybrid hy- new tank and has produced a number of with a 125mm smooth-bore gun with a dropneumatic suspension. South Korea T-90 tanks, which are a further develop- carousel-type autoloader and a remark- is now developing a new tank, the XK-2, ment of the T-72 with modern fire con- ably compact 1,200-horsepower opposed which will have a three-man crew and an trol systems and powerful 840-horsepow- piston, two-stroke diesel engine import- autoloader for its 120mm gun, and it is to er diesel engines. According to the Lon- ed from the Ukraine. be powered by a 1,500-horsepower Ger- don-based International Institute for Stra- Along with South Korea, Japan, China, man-developed MT-883 diesel engine. tegic Studies, Russia still has more than Russia, and Pakistan, Iran is producing a

January-February 2007 — 45 The most recent and significant IFV to appear, in prototype form, is the German Puma. This is the most heavily armored IFV to be built so far and consequently weighs as much as 89,500 pounds; al- though its weight can be reduced for air transport to 69,000 pounds by dismount- ing some of its modular armor. The only heavier infantry vehicle in use at present is the Israeli Achzarit, which weighs 97,000 pounds, but it is an armored in- fantry carrier, armed only with machine guns for self-defense.

Wheeled Armored Carriers Although some effort has been devoted “Russia is reported to be developing a new tank and has produced a number of T-90 to IFVs, activity in Europe has been fo- tanks, which are a further development of the T-72 with modern fire control systems cused in the past few years on develop- and powerful 840-horsepower diesel engines. According to the London-based Interna- ing and producing wheeled armored car- tional Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia still has more than 22,000 earlier tanks riers. The most successful of these carri- and approximately 400 T-90s, but their operational status is unclear.” ers is the Piranha, developed in Switzer- land by Mowag, a small independent company, until seven years ago when it was bought out by General Dynamics new tank, called the Zulfiqar, which has mm Bushmaster cannon; although the Land Systems. A total of about 8,000 Pi- much the same configuration as the Rus- Bofors gun model has recently been ad- ranhas and their derivatives have now sian T-72 and is armed with a 125mm opted for South Korea’s new IFV. been produced, mostly under license in gun. Canada, and they have been used as the Another IFV in production in Europe basis for the U.S. Stryker. Israel is also producing a new tank, the is a collaborative Austro-Spanish design Merkava 4, which is even better armored armed with a 30mm Mauser cannon, Other 8x8 wheeled armored carriers re- than the earlier versions of this unique, known in Austria as the Ulan and in Spain cently developed in Europe include the front-engine tank. Its 1,500-horsepower as the Pizarro. armored modular vehicle (AMV), pro- diesel engine makes it more mobile. As for the United States and Europe, no new tanks are being developed and the production of earlier designs is drawing to a close. Only a few more Leclerc tanks are to be built for the French army to fill its order for 406. Similarly, only small ad- ditional numbers of the German-designed Leopard 2 tank are to be produced in Greece and Spain, which have adopted it as their battle tank, along with nine other European countries, and most recently, Turkey and Chile. Infantry Fighting Vehicles In contrast to tanks, new lighter tracked armored vehicles are being developed and produced in Europe. This applies in particular to infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), the most notable being the Swed- ish CV9040, which has a high degree of mobility in difficult terrain. This IFV was originally developed specifically for the “As for the United States and Europe, no new tanks are being developed and the pro- Swedish army, but having proven itself duction of earlier designs is drawing to a close. Only a few more Leclerc tanks are to be superior to other IFVs in competitive tri- built for the French army to fill its order for 406. Similarly, only small additional numbers als, it has now been procured by five oth- of the German-designed Leopard 2 tank are to be produced in Greece and Spain, which have adopted it as their battle tank, along with nine other European countries, er European armies. However, the Swed- and most recently, Turkey and Chile.” ish army version has a 40mm Bofors gun and the export versions have a 30 or 35-

46 — January-February 2007 duced in Finland and already adopted by doned last year for the sake of greater cles, weighing between 44,000 and 55,000 the Polish and Finnish armies; the véhi- survivability, and FRES vehicles may pounds, and in all probability, wheeled. cule blindé de combat d’infanterie (VBCI), now weigh up to about 53,000 pounds, 750 are being produced for the French which will still make them transportable A similar approach is being adopted by army; and the Pandur, which has been in the A400M aircraft currently being the Swedish army. In its case, the heavy adopted by the Austrian, Portuguese, and developed in Europe as a successor to force is based on Leopard 2 tanks and Czech armies. Incidentally, the Pandur has the C130. The first of the FRES vehicles CV9040 IFVs. These vehicles will be the distinction of being produced by the are to be delivered to the British army in complemented by a modular armored tac- world’s oldest armored vehicle manufac- turing company, Steyr-Daimler-Puch in Vienna, Austria (now owned by General Dynamics Land Systems), which built an armored car in 1905. The Artec Boxer is the most recent 8x8 wheeled armored carrier for which a pro- duction order has been issued by the German and Dutch armies. It is also the heaviest, which has an adverse effect on its mobility in difficult terrain. The Box- er also has the dubious distinction of tak- ing 25 years to develop. This, as well as its size and weight, can be ascribed to the ill-effects political interference has on in- ternational projects, which in this case involved German, French, British, and Dutch authorities; consequently, the Box- er went from a 53,000-pound 6x6 vehicle to the 72,600-pound 8x8 vehicle. Wheeled armored vehicles are also being devel- oped in the Republic of China (Taiwan), Singapore, and South Korea. “In the meantime, the British army is retaining its fleet of 385 Challenger 2 tanks, which Progress in developing wheeled armored proved very effective in the capture of Basra in 2003, and form the core of the British vehicles has led some armies to believe army’s heavy force. However, there are plans to modernize them by replacing, at last, they should confine themselves to ar- their 120mm rifled guns with smooth-bore guns, which will make them interchangeable mored vehicles, excluding tracked ar- with other western tank guns.” mored vehicles. For example, the Belgian army intends to use nothing in the future but wheeled armored vehicles and has already sold most of its Leopard 1 tanks to Brazil. Canada’s army has been con- 2012, and will include 8x8 wheeled ar- tical system, or Splitterskyddad Enhets- sidering a similar policy but, very wisely, mored carriers and an unspecified num- plattform (SEP), incorporating an inter- appears to have changed its view and has ber of tracked armored vehicles. esting family of tracked and wheeled ar- decided instead to continue operating, at mored vehicles of about 38,500 pounds, In the meantime, the British army is which are to share many components, in- least for now, with its Leopard 1 tanks, as retaining its fleet of 385 Challenger 2 well as wheeled armored vehicles. cluding engines, electric transmissions, tanks, which proved very effective in the and interchangeable mission modules. capture of Basra in 2003, and form the Two tracked and one 6x6 wheeled SEP Future programs core of the British army’s heavy force. technology demonstrators have already However, there are plans to modernize been built. The British Army has not accepted the them by replacing, at last, their 120mm idea that future armies should only use rifled guns with smooth-bore guns, which There is a lot going in armor around the wheeled armored vehicles. It has decided will make them interchangeable with oth- world and the advances that are being that its future rapid effect system (FRES), er western tank guns. The British army made are well worth keeping an eye on. which will provide it with a medium force also plans to modernize its Warrior IFVs capability, should consist of tracked, as by replacing the 30mm cannon with a well as wheeled, armored vehicles. FRES more powerful 40mm cannon. is in some respects a more modest Brit- Richard M. Ogorkiewicz is currently a profes- ish equivalent of the United States’ fu- The French army also intends to retain sor, United Kingdom Defence Academy, Shriv- enham, England. He received a B.S. and an ture combat system (FCS). At first, Brit- a heavy armored force, equipped with its M.S. from the University of London. He also ish army leaders insisted that armored current Leclerc tanks, but plans to com- serves as a member of the Defence Scientific vehicles, developed as part of its FRES plement its force in the 2015 to 2025 time- Advisory Council, United Kingdom Ministry of program, be transportable in C130 air- frame with medium-force engin blindé Defence, and as a consultant to several ar- craft. However, this requirement was aban- médian (EBM) multirole armored vehi- mored vehicle producing companies.

January-February 2007 — 47 Pages from the Past: Future of Armor by Captain Brian William Brady

(Reprinted from the November-December 1966 issue of ARMOR)

If armor is to have a predominant role in the army of the future, it must train its officers to fight and survive in any type operation, ... nuclear or non-nuclear wars . . . against “wars of liberation.”

Editor’s Note: Although the author’s view of full-spectrum opera- of ar mor by the French in Indochina provides valu- tions clearly places this article in a mid-1960s context, he neverthe- able information on how not to employ armor in guer- less argues for a broadly based approach to training. Given the cur- rilla warfare. rent threat we are facing and the potential threats we may face, Cap- tain Brian Brady reminds us that the issues we are struggling with to- The old adage, “if someone wants to learn it, they can day are neither new nor unique. do it on their own time,” does not seem appropriate to a subject such as this. The primary reason is that many In view of the present world situation, this article is posts do not have sufficient research facilities to per- an attempt to stimulate the armor leaders of today so mit a detailed study of guerrilla warfare and its associ- that there will be armor leaders of tomorrow. ated subjects. The second reason is that of adequate “Armor is still fighting World War II on the European time to pursue the subject while performing another battlefields.” This statement was made by a guest lec- primary job. turer to a group of Armor officers at the Armor School A service school, not a specialized school, must in- at Fort Knox. clude instruction in counterinsurgency operations. This Since the Second World War and the development of is needed not only to stimulate the thinking of officers the atomic bomb, armor has placed its entire emphasis toward new concepts, but for the survival of the indi- on the development of equipment and tactics for the vidual acting in the role of an advisor or commander of nuclear battlefield. The training of its officers is also al- a rifle company in counterinsurgency operations. most entirely oriented toward this type of warfare. The instruction should start when the officer attends Armor must be prepared to fight not only on the nu- the Armor Officer Basic Course. This instruction should clear battlefield of Europe, but it must be able to par- then be continued at all levels of his military education. ticipate anywhere in the world in counterinsurgency By doing this, the officer is kept abreast of current doc- operations. It must not only de velop vehicles for these trine and technological changes as he progresses in his types of operations, but armor must train its officers to career. fight and survive in a counterinsurgency operation. The To cite what I believe is the unbalanced thinking of future of armor lies in its officers and noncommissioned armor and its preoccupation with fighting a nuclear officers, developing new concepts for its employment in war in Europe, I will use my schooling and training as limited war and counterguerrilla operations. If armor is an example. not able to be employed in this type of role, it will find itself becoming less and less “THE COMBAT ARM OF In 1962, when I attended the Armor Officer Basic DECISION.” Course, counterinsurgency operations were in their in- fancy. Nothing was included in the course of instruction The development of ideas requires that an individual concerning this type of operation. The course was en- become exposed to the problem, its beginnings, devel- tirely oriented toward fight a conventional war. After opment, and the lessons that were learned from opera- spending three years in Europe, I returned to CONUS tions against it. To be more explicit, I mean that in or- to attend the Armor Officers Career Course. The course der to fully understand these “wars of liberation,” an in- lasts nine months. Of these nine months, about forty dividual must have an understanding of the theory and hours are devoted to all the aspects of insurgency and meaning of communism, of how an insurgency begins counterinsurgency operations. The remaining eight and sustains itself through its various stages of devel- months and three weeks are spent teaching the tradi- opment. Of prime importance are the historical exam- tional concepts of employment of armor and its associ- ples of combating an insurgency to draw upon the les- ated weapons and communications systems. A nuclear sons that can be learned from them. A study of the use weapons program, leading to a prefix five, is also includ- ed in the curriculum. Captain Brian William Brady was commissioned in 1961 from The Univer- Is this enough to stimulate thinking and to learn how sity of Notre Dame. He graduated from the Armor Officer Basic Course in to fight in counterinsurgency operation. I do not think 1962. He was then assigned to the 3rd Battalion 37th Armor, Germany, where he served as a tank platoon leader, mortar platoon leader, support it is. The career officer must have a thorough knowl- platoon leader, battalion S4, and company commander. edge of the current concepts of armor employment and

48 — January-February 2007 the utilization of the combined arms team in all types Armor protection would have to be sacrificed to gain of conventional operations. The majority of instruction this weight reduction. However, since it can be assumed is rightly concerned with these concepts for they pro- that the insurgent will not present a tank threat, this is vide the foundation that the officer needs as he pro- possible. Mobility must predominate over armor pro- gresses in his military career. tection. The French in Indochina found that armor pro- But, a properly trained armored officer needs a de- tection was not of prime importance. In an ambush tailed understanding of the employment and capabili- when the first and last vehicles had a track shot-off, ties of infantry weapons. This training should not be mobility was of paramount importance. The French limited to classroom instruction, but should include fir- tanks did not have sufficient mobility to break out, and ing and field training. they were literally killed at leisure by the communists. Then, using the basic concepts of employment of the This increased mobility is also necessary for the tank combined arms team along with an understanding of to be able to support the infantry mounted in M113s. the capabilities of armor and infantry weapons, a de- Because of the trafficability of the M113 and future in- tailed program of instruction on the history of commu- fantry carriers, the present-day tank could not support nism and an analysis of past insurgent and counterin- them in many operations in which armor could strike surgent operations should be conducted. In the final the decisive blow. phase, seminars or round table discussions between Because of the lack of an armor threat, the caliber of students and qualified instructors should take place. the main gun could be 90mm or smaller. This would These forums would allow an exchange of new ideas on also assist in weight reduction of the vehicle. The tank both tactics and vehicles between officers, which would must include two highly reliable machine guns with a serve as a sounding board for badly needed ideas for the high rate of fire. employment of Armor in guerrilla warfare. Both the number of rounds and types of rounds can Besides tying itself to a conventional war in the train- be reduced. The tank should carry a HEAT round, for ing of its officers, the tanks of the future are being de- material-type targets, and a canister round for use veloped on the premise that the next war will be fought against mass attacks by infantry and in ambushes in Europe. The Sheridan and the U.S./FRG Main Battle where the exact locations of enemy troops are unknown. Tank are being developed for such a war. Security re- A more effective canister round must be developed. It strictions prevent a detailed analysis of these vehicles. should be effective at ranges up to fifteen-hundred yards However, their weight alone precludes their employment and have a large dispersion pattern. The space that is in an area such as Vietnam. gained by reducing the basic load of main gun ammu- Before proceeding with the type of vehicle armor needs nition should be used to store additional ammunition to develop in conjunction with the Sheridan and U.S./ for the machine guns. This will enable the tank to con- FRG Main Battle Tank, I will make some generaliza- duct frequent reconnaissance by fire missions to avoid tions that will apply to most areas where the United an ambush. States may be called upon to fight in a counterinsur- Traditional concepts of employment of armored divi- gency operation. sions and brigades in huge armored operations must A country that is most vulnerable to an insurgency is give way to concepts of employment of battalion- and an “underdeveloped nation.” It is basically an agrarian company-sized task forces. The nature of the terrain society. Industrialization is very limited. Because of its and the enemy armor can expect to fight dictate this poor economic structure, the land remains untouched change. A closer working relationship with the infantry once outside the large cities. The major road network is involving close mutual support of offensive operations very poor and sometimes nonexistent. The majority of and for security must be developed. these countries lie in a climate that is either hot and Security has always been a problem for tank units, and rainy or cold and snowy. And within most of these ar- it is compounded in a guerrilla war. New ideas, both eas, there is a combination of rolling plains, mountains, physical and electronic, need to be found. The possible and swampy areas. employment of mounted surveillance devices, which The point of this general ana lysis is to point out the would accompany the column as it moved, needs to be flexibility that armor must attain to carry out its mis- explored. To provide not only security, but to facilitate sion under varying conditions. These areas are entirely combined operations, the feasibility of a combined arms different from Europe. Roads which are essential for battalion should be investigated. armor to attain its maximum effects from its firepower There is no doubt that armor will be a dominant force and shock effect would not support fifty-ton vehicles for on the nuclear battlefields of Europe. But it must not sustained periods of time. Bridges are not built to sus- place its entire emphasis on a war that may never be tain the weight of an M60 tank. Once off the roads, ar- fought. If armor is to have a predominant role in the mor can expect to encounter terrain varying from jun- army of the future, it must train its officers to fight and gles and swamps to snow-covered mountains. survive in any type of operation. It must develop equip- To accomplish its mission in counterinsurgency oper- ment for employment against “wars of liberation.” It ations, armor must develop an entirely new tank or must be able to fight a nuclear and non-nuclear war in tank-like vehicle. This vehicle should be light weight, areas that are untrafficable to today’s tank. The devel- weighing less than thirty-five tons and have an imme- opment of new tactical concepts is vital. Armor must diate deep-water fording capability. Its ground pressure be able to fight not only in a war in Europe, but it must must be small in relation to its weight to enable it to tra- be able to fight effectively in an area such as Vietnam, verse swampy areas. if it is to remain the “COMBAT ARM OF DECISION.”

January-February 2007 — 49 Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, to mount attacks anything more than nuisanc- nica, as well as Tuzla and Tuzla airfield (where the New Challenges by Gabriel Wei- es. Therefore, the threat of terrorists using the U.S. forces would later establish “Eagle Base” mann, United States Institute of Peace, internet to launch attacks is more viable with in 1995 and 1996). Washington, D.C., 2006, 256 pp., $24.95 the next generation, where hacking tools will be more powerful, simpler to use, and accessible. When the Vance-Owen plan failed and the (hardcover) fighting escalated in early 1993, he was among In light of terrorists’ exploitation of the inter- the first westerners to see the effects of “ethnic In what must have been a significant under- net, Weimann concludes with policy recom- cleansing” firsthand. As a result of his (and his taking, Terror on the Internet is the premier ac- mendations, considering current criticisms of platoon’s) deeds on the ground in Ahmici, he ademic source documenting the relationship government measures as abusive to privacy was later called to testify at the International between terrorism and the internet. Gabriel and civil liberties. Measures taken to combat Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia when the Bos- Weimann led a project that targeted internet terrorism on the internet include internet ser- nian Croat instigators were put on trial. These sites from 1998 to 2003. All told, 4,300 sites vice providers providing oversight, self-polic- experiences, in addition to his service around serving terrorists and their supporters were ing (.org and .gov sites removing sensitive in- the world in operations and places, such as cataloged and analyzed. formation), private citizens as internet vigilan- Desert Storm, Northern Ireland, Germany, Op- tes, government regulation and monitoring, and eration Iraqi Freedom, and currently as the In chapter one, Weimann quickly examines journalistic ethics. the history of the internet and fundamentals of British Exchange Officer at Fort Knox, give him terrorism, and then links the two. He examines Prefacing that terrorism will not likely go away a unique and remarkably broad perspective on how terrorist organizations exploit the internet soon, Weimann submits that societies will learn both peacekeeping and combat operations. and countermeasures available to combat ter- to live with some amount of terrorism. There- Of particular interest to ARMOR readers are rorism. He establishes how terrorists rely on the fore, governments must find the “golden path” the author’s stories about and depiction of the internet to maintain their networked organiza- compromise to prevent abuse and protect lib- British army in Bosnia. He details amusing and tion where members are organized into semi- erties. However, he still offers recommenda- entertaining regimental traditions, as well as a autonomous cells with little control by a higher tions that include modifying the Patriot Act, self- few of the limited opportunities to unwind while headquarters. Weimann catalogs numerous policing, social responsibility, international col- in country. terrorist uses of the internet, including data laboration, proactive government presence on mining; data collection of potential targets; en- the internet, and promoting peaceful use. Gov- Also of note is the fact that the author is very abling network organization; recruitment of ernments have used the internet to transform effective at establishing a rapport with repre- fighters; supporters and sympathizers; instruc- the conduct of conflict from traditional insur- sentatives of all sides of the conflict. He suc- tions and online manuals; planning and coor- gencies to non-violent political campaigns. In cessfully used his limited Serbo-Croatian to not dination; fundraising; and for some organiza- an effort to promote peaceful uses of the inter- just de-escalate situations with irate locals, but tions, critical attacks against other terrorists. net, Weimann cites the example of the Iraqi to win them over as well. He made a real effort government providing an email address for in- to win the “hearts and minds” of both soldiers Chapter two explores the psychology of ter- surgents to communicate their concerns. rorism. Weimann uses psychology as a tool to and civilians alike. Many times, these new-won understand terrorists, decoding their motives, Dramatically well documented, Terror on the friendships were valuable in helping him ac- strategies, tactics, and impact. He asserts the Internet has significant value as an academic complish his mission, as well as provide crea- well-established dictum that the primary inter- resource. The sheer volume of source docu- ture comforts for him and his men. The points est of terrorists is the impact of their exploits to ments available made this seminal work an ar- the author makes on what the U.S. Army would a wider public. Following this argument, the in- duous undertaking. Moreover, supporting the- call “force protection posture” were especially ternet allows opportunities for exerting mass oretical sources cite heavyweights in the study informative. psychological impact. of terrorism research. However, the voluminous In spite of what could be considered tactical research needed to compose this project lent Chapter three, “Communication Uses of the successes by the author and those like him, less time preparing the policy prescriptions. Un- the United Nations’ mission in Bosnia was gen- Internet,” is the most significant portion of his fortunately, the policy recommendations pre- book. Weimann details numerous measures erally a failure, and the author admits it. In the sented seem paltry in comparison to the threat book’s final chapter, the author observes that used by terrorists, specifically, supporter dia- imposed by the current threat. logue, which conveys religious and ideological European countries, which comprised the ma- views and presents their causes. He presents JOHN P.J. DeROSA jority of forces on the ground, lacked the po- detailed analyses of several groups’ websites, litical will to commit the resources necessary which include Hezbollah, Hamas, Ansal al-Is- to end the war. The alternative — to allow no- lam, Al-Qaeda, Irish Republican Army, Revo- holds-barred warfare and let the war continue lution Armed Forces of Columbia, Japanese Cleanse Their Souls: Peace-Keeping in to its natural ending — was also considered to Aum Shinrikyo, and the insurgent groups of Bosnia’s Civil War 1992-1993 by Monty be politically unacceptable at home. Instead, Iraq. Providing a very useful framework for an- Woolley, Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., Barn- as the author observes, the participating Euro- alyzing website content, his analyses include sley, 2004, 232 pp., $60.00 pean countries attempted to find a “middle way,” the scope and content of terrorist websites and which tried to limit the war to confined areas their targeted audiences. As the objective of Cleanse Their Souls is a first-person narra- and reduce the suffering of the population. To terrorists is to generate publicity and draw at- tive describing the experiences of a young Brit- make this “middle way” work included compro- tention to their causes, the internet allows un- ish cavalry platoon leader in peacekeeping op- mises that were generally not accepted by all. censored and unfiltered versions of broadcast- erations during the war in Bosnia, 1992 to 1993. The author claims — rightly so perhaps — that ed events worldwide. His analyses uncover the The tale is very engaging, a quick and an en- it was the planned division of Bosnia into eth- expansive reach of terrorist propaganda. joyable read, instructive, and entertaining all at nically-based regions by the Vance-Owen plan once. The author was among the first British that served as one of the catalysts for the fierce The next task Weimann undertakes is an- forces in theater, where they served the Unit- round of fighting he witnessed in the spring of swering, “How real is the threat of cyber-terror- ed Nations, ostensibly to ensure the safe de- 1993. ism?” As in general terrorism research, “se- livery of food and humanitarian supplies to mantic precision” is lacking in evaluating cyber- starving civilians (typically Bosnian Muslims). The author observes this “middle way” also terrorism. Coining the term “cyber-angst,” Wei- The author and his platoon covered quite a lot served to dash the hopes of Bosnian Muslims mann suggests that the western media inflates of ground, the place names of which would for western intervention on their side, as well its real significance and promulgates the fear it sound familiar to anyone with service in Bos- as anger Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb inspires. He establishes that terrorists gener- nia. At different times, his missions took him to leadership at UN (mainly Western European) ally lack the means and human capital needed towns, such as Kladanj, Vitez, Zavidovici, Ze- meddling. It resulted in a gradual erosion of re-

50 — January-February 2007 spect for UN forces, which manifested in the soldier or student who wants a good introduc- perts on central Africa contributed one chapter non-compliance by entity armed forces with tion to these struggles will find a useful source each on various aspects of the conflict. UN forces demands. This made it increasingly here. difficult for UN soldiers to accomplish even the Crawford Young of the University of Wiscon- limited goals of their charter. Events would lat- Unfortunately, the book is far weaker in its pre- sin and author of two books on the Congo and er show that the failure to demonstrate resolve scriptions for the future U.S. military. Hammes Zaire (former name of the DRC) opens with a by UN forces in the face of repeated noncom- excoriates the Pentagon’s Joint Vision 2020, historical context of the conflict. He argues that pliance eventually resulted in the capture of a criticizing its overreliance on technology and the DRC is decolonization gone awry. The Bel- battalion of Dutch peacekeepers a couple years “network-centric” warfare as being out of touch gians, intent on remaining dominant in its for- later at Potocarri, and the massacre of thou- with current realities. But one suspects that mer colony, did not enable a stabilization of the sands of civilians in nearby Srebrenica. even the “geekiest” Pentagon staffer is now Congo’s first experimentation in democracy un- heavily focused on the Iraqi insurgency. And der Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. When The author’s conclusion is that, despite the although technology may not solve all of our Lumumba was assassinated, civil order was progress made to date in Bosnia, not much problems in Iraq, we would rather have it than kept only by UN peacekeepers, leaving rebel has really changed. He states: “Leave a Bos- not. Hammes also reveals a bit of parochialism forces and militia to incubate and spring to life nian main road and travel a short distance when after blasting the U.S. Air Force for its sin- when the UN left. Today’s Congo sees populist along a track and you will journey back in time gle-minded pursuit of super-expensive jet fight- movements not motivated by ideology, but ac- to a medieval land, where memories have not ers, he argues that the U.S. Navy needs more cess to diamonds, copper, and gold. been blurred by a decade of enticements… of its equally super-expensive ships. (How they The Balkans is not cured, it is in remission; the might help in Fallujah eludes me.) Jermaine McCalpin, a Ph.D. candidate at story is not over, another chapter has merely Brown University, discusses the hard birth the finished. How many years will elapse before Nevertheless, Hammes’ work does provide Congo had in June 1960. No sooner than in- this dormant volcano erupts again, before the thoughtful insights into the problems facing us dependence was declared, the nation’s army, inherent culture of this people is sparked to today in Iraq — and perhaps tomorrow else- the Force Publique, mutinied. This was due in fight and settle old scores once and for all? The where. His biggest problem may be that this no small part to the last Belgian military com- sentiments of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck work was published after history and has dem- mander, General Janssens, who told his Con- were probably right!” (Otto von Bismarck was onstrated that in many of his arguments, he golese troops that independence meant no quoted as saying, “The Balkans is not worth the was absolutely right. change for the military. This mutiny led to tar- life of one Pomeranian Grenadier.”). geting Europeans and an exodus of Belgian WILLIAM R. BETSON skill and capital. The decrease is apparent from COL (Retired), U.S. Army In conclusion, I enjoyed reading Cleanse Their 110,000 Belgians in 1959 to 20,000 in 1961. In Souls. It has interesting strategic and tactical July, Moise Tshombe led a successful seces- lessons that demonstrate both what to do and, The African Stakes of the Congo War sion of the Congo’s mineral rich Katanga prov- more importantly, what not to do. I recommend ince. Lumumba understood he could not sur- edited by John F. Clark. Palgrave Press, vive economically as a nation with Katanga’s it to anyone who has an interest in the Balkans New York, 249 pp., 2002, $75 (hardcover); and as a good background primer for some- secession and began courting the Soviets. one who is on his way there. Even if there is no also available in paperback, $24.95 This led to Lumumba’s brutal murder and to Balkans deployment in your immediate future, events in which the Congo’s first president, the book deserves a place on the bookshelf of More and more of our time as military profes- Kasavubu, was swept away in a coup by Colo- a soldier or a statesman. sionals is spent attempting to make sense of nel Joseph Mobutu. The author eloquently de- a multitude of conflicts around the world. In scribes the kleptocracy of the Mobutu years. In ANDREW D. GOLDIN many ways, the post-Soviet world was less 1996, a revolt by the Banyamulenge people CPT, U.S. Army, MDARNG complex than today, where we have a world in (Congolese Tutsis) opened the door for Ango- which tribal, religious, and ethnic conflicts have la, Rwanda, and Uganda to push Laurent Kabi- preoccupied much of America’s military histo- la’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Lib- The Sling and the Stone: On War in the ry in the past decade. This means finding a sin- eration of the Congo (ADFL) on a march to- gular book as a primer on a conflict becomes 21st Century by Colonel Thomas X. ward the DRC’s capital, Kinshasa. It was easy that much more important, and Associate Pro- when the ADFL seized metal mines in the cit- Hammes, Zenith Press, St. Paul, MN, fessor John Clark has edited a one-stop shop- ies of Goma and Kisingani, they had the ability 2004, 336 pp., $24.95 (hardcover) ping slim volume for a quick orientation into the to finance and outgun the Mobutu regime and conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Con- his army. Colonel Hammes has written an interesting go (DRC). and rather informative book about what he Kevin Dunn is an assistant professor of polit- sees as the preeminent form of warfare in the Why does the DRC matter? Although the U.S. ical science and gives an excellent biography 21st century — an evolved form of insurgency military is not directly involved in the Congo, of Laurent Kabila and how his son, Joseph, that he calls “fourth-generation warfare” (4GW). this is a conflict that is closely watched as it who rules Congo today, failed to establish new Defining 4GW as a form of war that “uses all has devolved into the neighboring countries of networks of domestic power in the DRC. He available networks — political, economic, so- Uganda, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Angola, relies on Angolan, Zimbabwean, and Namib- cial, and military” to convince the enemy that carving out the Congo for its vast mineral ian forces to keep him in power, and with re- his strategic goals are too costly, he notes that riches. Overnight, Uganda became a leading sources becoming scarcer, the Congo is a superior political will can defeat greater mili- exporter of gold in the late 1990s and others prize. It is as if the neighboring powers in the tary and economic powers. Citing the impor- have shipped off lumber, cobalt, diamonds, and Arab world carved out the Persian Gulf oil re- tance of understanding this “new” type of war- other natural resources. The UN peacekeep- sources to finance and fuel a civil war, while at fare, he argues that 4GW is the only type of ing force involves many of America’s allies, the same time, leaving a little extra for their own warfare we have ever lost. The possible lessons such as Tunisia, Uruguay, Pakistan, Morocco, domestic economies. This is an excellent vol- for our current struggle in Iraq are obvious. and over 40 other nations. What this means ume for those interested in expanding their is that these nations involved in the UN Mis- knowledge on the impacts of tribal warfare and At its best, the work provides cogent analy- sion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo regional conflict in Africa. Another reason to ses of the insurgent efforts of Mao and the Chi- (MONUC) have less troops to devote to other watch this conflict is that terrorism thrives in nese Communists, the Vietnamese, the Sand- contingencies or to the war on terrorism. The areas of chaos, and central Africa is in turmoil. inistas (perhaps the book’s strongest section), origin of this book was a conference held in En- and the Palestinians, describing how each tebbe, Uganda, in July 2000, which discussed YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENIEN group contributed to the evolution of 4GW. The conflict in the Great Lakes region; twelve ex- LCDR, MSC, USN

January-February 2007 — 51 LETTERS from Page 3

As Guard units demobilize now for the second Critically, this force will recruit specialists gen- tional Guard with one or two months of heavy time since 9/11, anticipate tremendous de- erally willing to deploy more often, but for short- training after mobilization will perform superb- clines in retention and recruiting. Why should er periods, not unlike the Air Force Guard and ly. If the time comes for the United States to anyone join or stay in the Guard when they will Reserve model. face another industrialized and heavily mech- not have the chance to maintain a civilian life- anized and armored foe, then the Nation will style? The current operating tempo (OPTEM- No one would suggest emasculating Active invariably have additional time to prepare and PO) puts the Active and Guard Components Duty forces by stripping every heavy weapons train to an even higher standard. head-to-head for recruiting young soldiers. If system. Certainly tanks, Bradleys, and can- one is going to be deployed constantly, then nons are required in limited numbers at the Soldiers will remain in components longer, as one will just join the Active Army in the first right time to prevent a Blackhawk Down from they will be doing exactly what they choose. If place. The current OPTEMPO also cuts into recurring. Every light brigade could have an el- they desire to serve shifts, there are two other prior service recruiting for the Guard. Soldiers ement of heavy support. It simply turns the par- distinct components as options: Guard and Re- will simply remain in the Active Component un- adigm upside down to say those skills become serve soldiers can rely on a stable civilian life til their enlistment expires and then they will be low density in the Active Army, while beefing until the time comes for strategic action, rath- done, not risking a series of deployments dur- up the Guard to be prepared to fight the total er than just throwing bodies into the breech to ing their Guard or Reserve tours. Critically, this war. It may be wise to maintain several brigades take the load off of the Active Army. of heavy combat punch in the Active Compo- force will specifically recruit the young men and Fundamental remissioning of the Active Duty, women who are willing to fight total war, most nent as a rapid response force for high-risk op- erations, where heavier defensive response National Guard, and Army Reserve will provide likely only once or twice in their careers, en- real choices for volunteer soldiers, place the abling them to build and maintain a civilian life. could be anticipated, but not more than can be floated to an appropriate beach within two appropriate firepower in the appropriate com- Army Reserve service would be an interme- or three weeks. If additional heavy equipment ponent, and improve strength throughout the diate position, attracting people willing to de- is required, then most likely, we will have time services by eliminating recruiting conflict be- ploy more often than the Guard, but less than for a truly national response, summoning the tween the elements. It will best position the the Active Army. Their skill sets would be most National Guard to fight the big war. United States of America to fight the GWOT, useful in support of the Active Army on longer while both building the greatest expeditionary missions, but could be sent out for a few months Some will argue the National Guard will not force and maintaining the best, most effective at a time. Civil affairs, psychological operations, be as proficient in heavy mechanized combat heavy, armored, mechanized force in the world. public affairs, transportation, engineering, and as the Active Army. That may be true, but it is medical services are among the skills most ap- also irrelevant. No force in the history of the ROGER T. AESCHLIMAN propriate for limited, but recurring, deployments. world has ever been as proficient as our cur- MAJ, U.S. Army, KSARNG They would most likely use these same skills rent full-time Army. The U.S. National Guard is currently second best, and with the enemies in their civilian careers and be trained to profi- Center Announces Writing Competition ciency to reduce mobilization-site training. we are going to face in the GWOT, a heavy Na- The Army Center of Military History has an- nounced the 2007 James Lawton Collins Jr. Special Topics Writing Competition. The Cen- BEST ter invites Army officers in the rank of major or below, including warrant officers, to submit orig- SAPPER inal, unclassified essays that describe the ac- COMPETITION tions of a small U.S. Army unit or team, no larg- er than a company, engaged in the Global War FORT LEONARD WOOD, MO on Terrorism. The essay should focus on a dis- crete action, such as a single patrol, firefight, battle, convoy, air support mission, advisory Mission: The Sapper Leader Course hosts the Engineer Regiment’s world-class Best Sapper team operation, medical mission, or engineer Competition 1-3 May 2007 to determine the best Sapper team in the Army. support action, but the effort discussed need not involve combat. Papers should generally not Eligibilty Phase I Events exceed 5,000 words and may not have been Two-person Sapper teams Teams take non-standard Non-standard PT Test published or submitted for publication else- physical fitness test MOUT Ballistic Breaching where. Submissions from multiple authors will be accepted. The essays will be evaluated by O-3(P) and below Weapons Range Phase II a panel at the Center. The first prize winner will Grenade Range be awarded $500 and the winner of the second U.S. Army AC, Guard, or Given a map, teams have 24 Demolition Written Exam Reserve, serving in a 21 prize will receive $250. Both awardees will also hours to find eight points/ Poncho Raft Swim receive a certificate of recognition signed by the series MOS or graduate of events and complete tasks the Sapper Leader Course 9-Line IED Report Army’s chief of staff, and their essays will be Phase III Buddy Rappel published in Army History. Submissions must Must furnish letter of Weapons Assembly be received by 1 April 2007. Competition en- preparedness signed by Given a marked route, Foreign Mine Identification rollment forms and further information about first O-5 in COC (see teams have 18 hours to Steel Cutting Demolitions the competition are posted at http://www.army. website) reach six stations and mil/cmh-pg/2007Contest.htm. complete tasks Counterforce Demolitions Timber Cutting Demolitions Phase IV AN-PSS14 Proficiency Correction: Marine Corps Teams run/walk a 9-mile 9-Line MEDEVAC Report Tank Battalion Commander List course for time Prussik Climb Mountaineering Knots The Marine Corps Tank Battalion listing in the November-December 2006 issue of ARMOR, 9-mile Run with sub-events page 47, reflects inaccurate battalion com- mander information. The information should Visit the Sapper Training Detachment website for read: commander, 2d Tank Battalion, LtCol Bi- additional information and to reserve your team slot anca; commander, 4th Tank Battalion, LtCol Winter; and inspector instructor, 4th Tank Bat- www.wood.army.mil/sapper talion, LtCol Vuckovich.

52 — January-February 2007 Army Seeks Recommendations for MCOE Patch, Crest, and Motto

The Army needs your design ideas for the Maneuver will continue to wear current shoulder sleeve and distinc- Center of Excellence (MCOE) shoulder sleeve insignia tive unit insignias, but soldiers working directly for the Ma- (patch) and distinctive unit insignia (crest) and motto. neuver Center of Excellence will wear the new insignia. Over the next five years, the Infantry and Armor Schools Armor and Infantry possess time-honored crests and will collocate at Fort Benning, Georgia, to become the shoulder patches that reflect the contributions, sacrifices, Maneuver Center of Excellence. This Center will be re- and spirit of each branch in support of the Nation. The sponsible for all Army land-based maneuver training de- challenge of the new insignia design lies in capturing the velopment, doctrine, capabilities development, and in- historical essence of each branch and their collective em- clude both Armor and Infantry proponencies. bodiment of maneuver as a principle of war. Hence, indi- The Maneuver Center of Excellence will be an Army sub- viduals wishing to help this effort are encouraged to think ordinate organization and needs a unique patch and crest. beyond a simple merging of the existing Armor and In- Personnel assigned to the Infantry and Armor Schools fantry insignia.

Submission Guidelines

Requirements: A clear, hand-drawn or electronic sketch of the shoulder sleeve insignia, distinctive unit insignia, and a short, succinct motto. The motto must be written in English and is limited to 26 characters (letters and spaces). Any cur- rent or retired military personnel and Department of Army civilian may provide input. Individuals may provide a sugges- tion for just one or two of the desired items if they prefer.

Format: Designs should be drawn on paper or provided as electronic files. Electronic files should be in JPG or BMP for- mat, and may be sent on diskette or CD-ROM via normal mail or as an e-mail attachment. All submissions must include the name, phone number, e-mail address, and mailing address of the individual submitting the designs and motto.

Submissions: Submissions will be accepted from 1 January through 31 March 2007 and may be sent via e-mail (no larg- er than 3 megabytes) to the following address:

[email protected]

Alternatively, input may be sent via normal mail to either:

ARMOR Magazine Headquarters, U.S. Army Infantry Center ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A (MCOE Patch) OR ATTN: ATSH-ATH 201 6th Ave., Ste. 373, Building 1109A Building 4, Room 451 Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721 Fort Benning, GA 31905-5000

Selection process

Submissions will be screened by the Maneuver Center of Excellence Board of Directors, which is chaired jointly by the Chief of Armor and the Chief of Infantry. The most suitable and acceptable concepts will be considered for forwarding to the Institute of Heraldry for final production of the patch and crest.

Acknowledgement

The individual(s) who submitted the shoulder sleeve insignia, distinctive unit insignia, and motto design that is selected by the board of directors will receive a framed final patch, while the top entries in each category will also receive an MCOE coin with certificate of recognition for top entries. These acknowledgements will be issued in the fall of 2008.

The Department of the Army (Army) will acquire ownership of all entries, and each submitter agrees that submission of a design constitutes (1) assignment to the Army of any and all rights in the design, including copyright, and (2) a disclaimer of any trade- mark rights. All entries become the property of the Army, and the Army will have the sole right, at its discretion, to alter or mod- ify any submitted design. By submitting a design, the submitter warrants that the design is original; that it has not been previ- ously published; and that it does not infringe upon the copyright of any other person or entity.

January-February 2007 — 53 When was the last time you entered the net?

How to Log on

- Go to the Fort Knox homepage at www.knox.army.mil - Click on the Mounted ManeuverNet link (right side of page) - Enter your AKO username and password at the prompt - Under the “Participate” section (left side of screen), click “Become a Member,” fill out the form and submit. You’ll have full access within 24 hours.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A Periodicals Postage ARMOR Paid at Fort Knox, KY, and 201 6TH AVE STE 373 Additional Mailing Sites FORT KNOX, KY 40121-5721 OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PB 17-07-1 PIN: 083670-000