ARMOR Janfeb2007 Covers.Indd

The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-07-1 Editor in Chief Features LTC SHANE E. LEE 7 Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for U.S. Forces Based on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction Managing Editor by Captain Daniel Helmer CHRISTY BOURGEOIS 12 Lebanon 2006: Did Merkava Challenge Its Match? by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF, Retired Commandant 15 Teaching and Learning Counterinsurgency MG ROBERT M. WILLIAMS at the Armor Captains Career Course by Major John Grantz and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl 18 The Challenge of Leadership ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- during the Conduct of Counterinsurgency Operations month ly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, by Major Jon Dunn ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Building 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. 20 Building for the Future: Combined Arms Ofﬁ cers by Captain Chad Foster Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- MOR represents the professional opinions of 23 The Battalion Chaplain: A Combat Multiplier the authors and does not necessarily reflect by Chaplain (Captain) David Fell the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information 26 Practical Lessons from the Philippine Insurrection presented in other official Army publications. by Lieutenant Colonel Jayson A. Altieri, Lieutenant Commander John A. Cardillo, and Major William M. Stowe III Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, ar mored 35 Integrating Cultural Sensitivity into Combat Operations cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battal- by Major Mark S. Leslie ion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron 39 Advice from a Former Military Transition Team Advisor head quarters, reconnaissance squadron head- by Major Jeff Weinhofer quar ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of 42 Arab Culture and History: Understanding is the First Key to Success the United States Army. In addition, Army li- by Captain Ralph E. Elder braries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for 45 Armor Advances Worldwide armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, by Professor Richard M. Ogorkiewicz organizations, and the training of personnel 48 Future of Armor for such organizations may request two cop ies by Captain Brian William Bradley by sending a request to the editor in chief. Reprinted from the November-December 1966 issue of ARMOR Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor 53 Army Seeks Recommendations for MCOE Patch, Crest, and Motto Center has proponency. That proponency in- 54 Mounted ManeuverNet cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these Departments systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; 2 Contacts any miscellaneous items of equipment which 3 Letters armor and armored cavalry organizations use 4 Commander’s Hatch exclusively; training for all 19-series officers 5 Driver’s Seat and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; 6 1st Armor Training Brigade and information concerning the training, logis- The Evolution of Land Mine Warfare Training for IET Soldiers tics, history, and leadership of armor and ar- by Captain Daniel Trost mored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at 50 Reviews those levels. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing ofﬁ ces. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, ARMOR, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. January-February 2007, Vol. CXVI, No. 1 USPS 467-970 “From My Position...” “The training of troops when intelligently directed is the greatest In his article, “Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for of morale builders, as they are quick to sense that they are being U.S. Forces on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction,” Captain prepared to meet effectively any emergency that may arise.” Dan Helmer describes an Israeli army that entered Lebanon as a highly effective low-intensity conflict force. Its soldiers were highly — Major General John A. Lejeune proficient at conducting raids, fixed-site security, and cordon and Reminiscences of a Marine, 1929 search missions, among others. This proficiency, however, came with a price. For a number of seemingly valid reasons, many ar- The armor force’s participation in the long war has forced it to mored units were unable to maintain their proficiency in tank gun- quickly adapt institutional and unit training so that tankers and nery and combined arms maneuver. As a result, what began as a cavalrymen can more effectively meet the daily emergencies Gen- fairly straightforward mission to seize key terrain quickly became eral Lejeune referred to. Soldiers departing the Armor School an exercise in casualty evacuation, vehicle recovery, and improvi- for operational tours leave Fort Knox with a much wider and, in sation. some cases, a much deeper understanding of the critical skills necessary for them to succeed on today’s battlefields than was Most military professionals understand that the U.S. Army has the case just a few years ago. Understandably, unit training has been very successful in conducting counterinsurgency operations. focused specifically on the unique challenges awaiting soldiers in Although many of these successes are very controversial by mod- theater. As a result, some of the combat skills we took for granted ern standards, they nevertheless are helpful in understanding the just a few years ago are not as sharp today as they once were. current conflict. The U.S. Army’s successful campaign in the Phil- ippines at the turn of the century is one of those history lessons that To put this situation in perspective, some of our tank companies we cannot afford to ignore simply because of some uncomfortable and cavalry troops will soon be commanded by captains who have truths associated with the conflict. As professionals, we must learn never participated in company-level maneuvers. Some of our tank to apply lessons that transcend time while avoiding the heavy- crews will be led by staff sergeants with only limited experience handed excesses of the past. In their article, “Practical Lessons with Tank Tables VIII through XII, and vague memories of their last from the Philippine Insurrection,” Lieutenant Colonel Jayson Altieri, mounted combined-arms live-fire exercise. In the short term, this Lieutenant Commander John Cardillo, and Major William Stowe III situation is manageable because enough institutional knowledge provide us with a large list of valuable lessons gleaned from one currently exists within the force to properly address any near-fu- of our first overseas experiences with counterinsurgency. ture contingencies. Over time, however, the armor force could begin to lose its proficiency in the core competencies that define the Balance is the key to providing our soldiers with the means to ef- unique contributions we bring to the fight. fectively meet the complex emergencies they will face today and the unpredictable emergencies of tomorrow. We can neither com- Some could argue that given our opponent’s limited capabilities, pletely abandon the hard-won lessons of our experience with coun- we really do not need to be as proficient in these skills as once terinsurgency in favor of dealing with a conventional threat, nor thought necessary to prevail in a high-intensity conflict. After all, can we allow core “kinetic” competencies to completely atrophy in we have yet to encounter an enemy who can match our firepower, an effort to defeat current irregular enemies. The intent of both of technology, training, or leadership. What happens though when we these articles and others included in this issue is to provide a small encounter a highly trained, disciplined, and well-led, but no less portion of the common intellectual basis necessary to begin the dis- asymmetric, enemy? Although many initial spot reports turn out to cussion that must occur if we are to strike the proper training bal- be false, it appears that the Israeli army encountered this unnerv- ance; future success depends on the outcome of this discussion. ing situation during its most recent combat operations in Lebanon this past summer. S.E. LEE By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official: JOYCE E. MORROW PETER J. SCHOOMAKER Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff 0630303 DSN prefix – 464- Points of Contact Commercial prefix– (502) 624- ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center Editor in Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) LTC Shane E. Lee 4087 MG Robert M. Williams 2121 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Christy Bourgeois 4582 BG Michael S. Tucker 7555 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Editor Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Vivian Oertle 2610 COL Russell Cloy 1101 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Art Director Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Mr. Jody Harmon 3923 CSM Otis Smith 4952 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Editorial Assistant Command Sergeant Major to DCG (ATZK-DCG-CSM) Kathy A. Johnson 2249 CSM Raymond Chandler 7091 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) COL Marlin Levendoski 1315 ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in edit- E-mail: [email protected] ing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or print- ed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Word, Rich Text Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development Format, or ASCII (please indicate wordprocessing format on disk or COL Richard G.

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