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Comment Submitted by David Crawley Comment View Document Comment Submitted by David Crawley Comment View document: The notion that my social media identifier should have anything to do with entering the country is a shockingly Nazi like rule. The only thing that this could facilitate anyway is trial by association - something that is known to ensnare innocent people, and not work. What is more this type of thing is repugnant to a free society. The fact that it is optional doesn't help - as we know that this "optional" thing will soon become not-optional. If your intent was to keep it optional - why even bother? Most importantly the rules that we adopt will tend to get adopted by other countries and frankly I don't trust China, India, Turkey or even France all countries that I regularly travel to from the US with this information. We instead should be a beacon for freedom - and we fail in our duty when we try this sort of thing. Asking for social media identifier should not be allowed here or anywhere. Comment Submitted by David Cain Comment View document: I am firmly OPPOSED to the inclusion of a request - even a voluntary one - for social media profiles on the I-94 form. The government should NOT be allowed to dip into users' social media activity, absent probable cause to suspect a crime has been committed. Bad actors are not likely to honor the request. Honest citizens are likely to fill it in out of inertia. This means that the pool of data that is built and retained will serve as a fishing pond for a government looking to control and exploit regular citizens. An authoritarian government (for which we're at risk this election cycle) could easily abuse this information, and the networking/contact information it enables. Since government is regularly augmenting its security practice with private contractors, this information will also be available to those contractors, who may attempt to monetize information on private citizens as well, without explicit consent. Government does not delete acquired data without a requirement to do so, so this data, once collected, has an indefinite life, much longer than any proximate concern around cross-border travel. Further, the linking of traveler name and social media account destroys anonymity, for social media users who may be victims of domestic violence, whistle-blowers, confidential media sources, community organizers, or others with a need for anonymity. Finally, "optional requests" for information have a way of becoming requirements for information, through the expansion of government power that we've seen since 9/11, through inaction of people who could stop this, or through simple bureaucratic or programmer error. Please reject this change to I-94. Comment Submitted by Peio Powieur Comment View document: The proposal to ask applicants for social media information in Form I-94W is complete nonsensical. The proposal reflects: (a) a shockingly naive belief that travelers who are threats are of sufficiently low intelligence to provide authentic social media identifiers, (b) a disturbingly naive view that social media are a statistically valid and scientifically reliable source of information about anything, (c) a lack of concern for the invasion of innocent travelers' privacy counter to accepted and universal human rights principles, (d) a complete disregard for the effective use of taxpayer funds and government staff resources (following from the previous points), and (e) a complete lack of discussion about how the requested social media information will be used, how it will be kept secure, how long it will be retained, how it will be shared with other agencies, etc. I urge CBP to drop this ridiculous proposal and focus its resources on information sources and procedures that actually support thoughtful and accurate analysis and are respectful of travelers' privacy and security. Comment Submitted by Anonymous Comment View document: Adding an optional data field to request social media identifiers: 1. Invades the privacy of tourists who want to visit the USA without any benefit to security. 2. Since it's optional (so far) I suspect most will not provide social media identifiers. I wouldn't even if I had such identifiers. 3. It encourages other countries to implement similar rules, in retaliation, for US citizens visiting those countries. Do not implement these new rules. Comment Submitted by Anonymous (Concerned Citizen) Comment View document: I am in direct and absolute opposition to this latest invasion of privacy. It doesn't matter if I have "nothing to hide" or that it "doesn't affect me". This is a deliberate step towards a complete police state in this country. I will fight this tooth and nail, with every resource at my disposal, and so will every free thinking citizen. Comment Submitted by Bin Li Comment View document: Good idea! Also suggest to check the website www.wenxuecity.com, you will find a lot of anti-America Chinese living in the US. They need to be sent back home if they hate America and American values so much. Comment Submitted by Larry Menard Comment View document: I hope you make it mandatory. That should keep out a few undesirables. Comment Submitted by Anonymous (German Traveller) Comment View document: I am officially protesting against this new invasion of privacy which will yield no useful data but contributes to the ongoing madness of collecting data whereever whenever possible - with no RELIABLE information about how long the data will be stored or who else it will be related to. Comment Submitted by Randy Bush Comment View document: This is overly invasive of privacy and will yield no useful data. Comment Submitted by Tom Brover Comment View document: If this was in effect, I would refuse to hand over my social media information or hand over false handles. Comment Submitted by Anonymous Comment View document: Dear C.B.P. Regarding your proposal to include social media "identifiers" as part of ESTA online application. This is ludicrous and an unnecessary and non-essential intrusion into privacy, not to mention a waste of human plus material resources (paper or otherwise). It has the potential to create unnecessary lists of thousands (or hundreds of thousands) of 'persons of interest' that need to be 'vetted'. As if we don't have enough unnecessary surveillance already. If the relevant U.S. enforcement and intelligence agencies were communicating and sharing more information between each other, I doubt we would need to hear of this proposal. Even if it is proposed to make this an 'optional' question, what assurance do we have from DHS or Congress that declining to answer this question will not prejudice an ESTA application? None. Last year, Facebook and Google officials reportedly questioned the U.S. government over the need for U.S. intelligence or enforement agencies to pierce their encryption technology, suggesting it could lead to less accountability from law enforcement officials. Earlier this year there it was reported in the news of a suggestion from U.S. government to use "algorithms" on social media to try and detect terrorist content online. I do not think data mining is not the magic wand that will help here. A lot of false positives and unnecessary anguish could easily be generated from erroneously targeting what might be falsely perceived as potential offenders. Ditch this idea, DHS and Congress, and find more resourceful ways of utilizing existing resources. Comment Submitted by Matthew [Last Name Unknown] Comment View document: The scope of social media is unconstrained, which poses issues related to excessive government oversight, government accessibility of data, and feasibility of search. Starting with accessibility, many parts of modern social media are not publically available, or intentionally temporary, making it impossible for US customs to access, either technologically, or without forcing a hosting provider to give up access, which would likely lead to protests on the grounds of the Fourth Amendment. Even without existing court precedent, this type of search violates the spirit of the Fourth Amendment by "collecting social media data" that was intended to be private, as indicated by privacy settings/social media plat form expectations. Without coercing access to private areas, it is likely an unhelpful tool for finding any potentially nefarious activity. Continuing to feasibility, it is unlikely to feasible for a hand search of any social media accounts, so it is assumed any searches are most likely automated. This presents an issue as there are many different social platforms which use proprietary interfaces that would require custom software to search. This makes it impossible to cover all platforms reducing efficacy of data collected, and potentially increasing costs. Thus my primary concerns are related to A and E, in that customs cannot practically access the data, making the collection useless and/or ethically and potentially legally problematic, and also in its implementation likely being very expensive in attempts to actually collect/use the data. Although this legislation has no direct impact to me as an existing US citizen, I value privacy, and believe US customs processes are used as a model internationally, which would then affect me as I travel abroad. Dropping the addition of the social media field and keeping ESTA/I-94W the same is my proposed solution. Thank you for considering concerns that the public has on this topic. Jonathan Corbett 382 NE 191st St. #86952 Miami, FL 33179 June 29th, 2016 To: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Attn: Paperwork Reduction Act Officer Regulations and Rulings, Office of Trade 90 K Street NE., 10th Floor Washington, DC 20229-1177. Re: Request for Comments - Agency Information Collection Activities: Arrival and Departure Record (Forms I-94 and I-94W) and Electronic System for Travel Authorization (81 FR 40892) To Whom It May Concern: I am a civil rights advocate specializing in travel-related privacy issues.
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