XIN in the XUNZI Hiu-Chuk Winnie Sung April, 2010
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XIN IN THE XUNZI Hiu-Chuk Winnie Sung April, 2010 Abstract This thesis examines the theories of action, decision-making and human nature in the Xunzi, an ancient Chinese text from the Warring States period (475 BCE-221BCE). It focuses in particular on Xunzi’s concept xin (heart/mind). The discussion begins with a challenge to a widely-accepted but often unsupported assumption in the literature that human desires (yu) are sometimes set in tension against (the intentions of) the heart/mind (xin) As a corollary of this view, it is also often suggested that yu is associated with a lack of morality, while xin is the moral capacity. This thesis proposes an original understanding of yu, that is, that yu is causally inert and hence does not stand in opposition to xin, as if yu and xin belonged to two separate human capabilities or areas of function. The discussion then proceeds to investigate the nature of xin. It is proposed that xin has a natural preference for certain objects and may, in that light, initiate action to pursue or even modify the pursuit (qiu) of these objects. On this view, the basis upon which xin deliberates (lu) is not necessarily a moral one. For Xunzi, making the right decision, and doing the right thing, is the result of xin being properly trained to know Dao. On this account, both desirable and undesirable behaviours are attributed to xin. The latter occurs because xin does not fully or appropriately know Dao. An underlying assumption is that once xin knows Dao, it simultaneously understands the importance of abiding by it and will set out to do so. An important implication of this way of understanding Xunzi’s conception of xin is that it also bears on the way we understand Xunzi’s theory of human nature (xing). Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Karyn Lai, my principal supervisor and teacher, for all the support, guidance and helpful advice she has generously given me throughout my candidature. I thank Karyn for all the assurance, patience and encouragement she gave me, which allowed me to explore different possibilities. And I thank her for all the knowledge and insights she has unreservedly shared with me. I would like to thank the University of New South Wales for the external research grant it provided, which permitted me to conduct eight months of research in Hong Kong. I thank the Research Centre for Chinese Philosophy and Culture, Chinese University of Hong Kong, for accepting me as a visiting graduate student and for allowing me to take part in the vibrant academic activities of their philosophy department. During this time, I had the opportunity to meet and learn from prominent scholars whose passion in Chinese philosophy has inspired me on both academic and personal levels. I would like to thank Professor Xiaogan Liu for kindly allowing me to audit two of his classes, in which I learned a lot about methodological issues from Professor Liu. I am deeply grateful for all the learning opportunities he gave me. I have benefited from discussions with Professor Roger Ames, Professor Kim-Chong Chong, Professor David Wong, Professor Chung-ying Cheng, and Professor Gu-ying Chen. I thank them for the useful suggestions they gave me in understanding Xunzi’s thought. I am grateful to Siu- fu Tang for sharing with me a bibliography of his dissertation and for allowing me to cite his unpublished work. I also benefited from discussing Xunzi’s thought with Doil Kim, Wai-wai Chiu, Kai-chiu Ng, Guanghua Lin and Leo Chan. My earlier papers related to this thesis were presented at the 2008 World Philosophy Congress, the 2008 Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Conference, and at the postgraduate philosophy seminar at UNSW. I thank the participants for their comments, especially Peter Wong, Jeremy Seligman, Koji Tanaka, Michaelis Michael, and Simon Lumsden. I am grateful to Professor Vincent Shen, from whom I received my first course of instruction in Chinese philosophy at the University of Toronto in 2004. Without Professor Shen’s help, I would not have been in a position to start my graduate studies in Chinese philosophy. I want to express my deep gratitude to Professor Jeffrey Riegel. I thank Professor Riegel for charitably taking his time to read the Xunzi text with me on a regular basis, for helping me to understand Xunzi, and for alerting me to other relevant aspects of which I was not aware. Professor Riegel’s in-depth and critical comments have shaped my way of reading and understanding the Xunzi. I am grateful to him for sharing with me his insights into early Chinese thought and for allowing me to consult and cite some of his unpublished works. I must acknowledge the very large debt I owe to Professor Kwong-loi Shun. The guidance I received from Professor Shun during my stay in Hong Kong is of enormous value to me and extends well beyond my present study. I learned from Professor Shun the ways to conduct textual analysis and the importance of methodology. His advice has helped to define my research direction and influenced the way I think through issues in Xunzi’s thought and in early Chinese thought generally. I am grateful for the time he generously spent on reading my papers and for the numerous helpful suggestions he gave me. Finally, let me thank all my teachers who played different but equally meaningful roles at each stage of my life. I am very fortunate to have received so much guidance along the way. All the mistakes in this thesis are my own. I thank my friends and family for their support and care. I especially thank my husband Jack for his love and support. Most of all, I thank my parents for their love and encouragement of learning. Contents Conventions and Citations i Background 1 1 A Challenge to Antagonisitc Interpretations 1.1 Overview of Xin and Yu 10 1.2 Secondary Interpretations 18 1.3 Antagonistic Interpretations 29 1.4 Passage 22.5a 32 2 Xin and Yu 2.1 Making Choices 50 2.2 Relation between Xin and Yu 62 2.3 Further Issues 73 3 Orientation of Xin 3.1 Natural Inclinations of Xin 82 3.2 Zhic 89 3.3 Dao 95 3.4 Xin and Dao 113 4 Basis for Xin’s Judgement 4.1 The Issue 119 4.2 Five Interpretations 122 4.3 Two Bases 126 4.4 Proposed Interpretation 132 4.5 A Remaining Difficulty 141 5 Xin and Xinga 5.1 Xunzi on Xinga 144 5.2 Xunzi and Mencius 151 5.2.1 Mencius on Xin 156 5.2.2 Differences Between Xunzi’s and Mencius’s Xin 161 5.3 Four Complications 166 Conclusion 173 Appendix: Situating Xunzi’s Xin in Context 176 Character List 203 Bibliography 205 Conventions The main purpose of the present study is to investigate Xunzi’s thought through the concept of xin .1 Since my focus is on the concept of xin as it is presented in the text, I have set aside the issues concerning the authorship and chronology of Xunzi’s works and will continue to use the personal “Xunzi” in my discussion to refer to the ideas expressed in the text. The nature of this study does not call for a defence of or challenge to Xunzi’s thought, but rather a faithful representation of Xunzi’s view. I will mainly rely on conducting textual analyses of Xunzi’s thought by examining the connotations of terms, the meaning of particular passages, and the relation among passages. Since Xunzi has made it explicit that his project is to rectify many of the terminologies at the time, which he regards as problematic and as having caused people confusion, it is reasonable to assume that Xunzi is especially cautious with his definitions of concepts and that Xunzi could be using the terms differently from what is generally accepted at his time. This makes cross-referencing with other texts more difficult. Hence, I will be more careful when it comes to using materials beyond the Xunzi. Rather than using other texts to explain Xunzi’s view or substantiate my interpretation, I will rely on relevant information from related texts to strengthen my interpretation. I will avoid using Western philosophical notions to discuss Xunzi’s thought for two main reasons. First, this is an attempt to avoid imposing alien frameworks and concepts on Xunzi’s thought. Second, I would also like to avoid generalising Western philosophical concepts. For example, it could be tempting in my analysis of the relation between xin and yu to say that Xunzi’s conception of xin is different from the Western notion of dualistic body-mind framework. But if I were to make such a claim, I would risk defeating my own purpose in suggesting that Xunzi’s concept of xin is in some way akin to the concept of mind. At the same time, I would also be generalising the entire tradition of the philosophy of the mind under a dualistic body-mind framework, when there is in fact much debate and controversy about the relation between body and mind in 1 It is noted by many scholars that the text Xunzi is not the work of Xunzi alone. See Robert Eno’s detailed discussion of the nature of the Xunzi text (1990, pp.134-8). i the Western philosophical tradition as well. This is not to say that a meaningful comparative study between Xunzi’s concept of xin and the Western conception of the mind is not possible.