Frankish-Muslim Relations in the Period of Nur Al-Din and Saladin (1158–92)

CHAPTER THREE Frankish-MusliM RELATIONS IN THE PERIOD OF NUR al-DIN AND SALADIN (1158–92) It has already been indicated that Nur al-Din’s capture of Damascus, Baʿlabakk and Shayzar between 1154 and 1157 had decisively altered the constellation of power relations in Syria, which had framed alliances since the First Crusade. Henceforward, the castles of the Nizaris in Jabal Bahra in central Syria formed the sole territory under Muslim rule which did not belong to Nur al-Din’s dominions. When the struggle for supremacy in Egypt turned out in favour of the Zengids in 1169, the encirclement of the Franks appeared to be complete and thereby the old-fashioned style of treaty and alliance policy to have come to an end. In fact, Egypt and Muslim Syria lay nominally in a single hand after 1169, apart from an inter- val between 1174 and 1183, which was not of great significance for power- politics. In the same measure as Nur al-Din from 1149 and later Saladin were able to extend their power in Syria, the kingdom of Jerusalem became their most powerful opponent. This process is reflected in the chronicles. William of Tyre comments on the inglorious course of the Second Crusade with the words, ‘From this day the situation of the Eastern Latins began to deteriorate’, because the enemies were no longer afraid of the Christian princes and the Franks would in future be attacked ever more boldly.1 With these words, William leads up to the description of Nur al-Din’s crushing defeat of Antioch and the death of Prince Raymond, saying, with reference to Nur al-Din’s coming into power in Damascus: ‘Our situation deteriorated thereby [. .]; since, instead of a powerless man, who was at our mercy (obnoxius) because of his weakness (debilitas), [. .] a stronger adversary was opposed to us.’2 The chronicler counted the success of the Zengid troops under Shirkuh in Egypt in 1168–69 as a further step towards the encirclement of the Franks. Following the enumeration of the advantages which the Frank- ish suzerainty over Egypt had guaranteed, i.e. peaceful trade, Fatimid tribute and security of travel, he goes on: ‘Now on the contrary all have 1 William of Tyre, XVII, IX, 771. 2 William of Tyre, XVII, XXVI, 803. 176 chapter three drawn a worse lot. The fair appearance is altered and our lyre is tuned to mourning. Wherever I turn, I find [only] suspicious adversaries. Access by sea is denied to the lovers of peace, the whole neighbouring region obeys the enemies and the neighbouring realms prepare themselves for our undoing.’3 William of Tyre saw the next end of a period five years later. He describes in retrospect the situation after Nur al-Din’s death in 1174 and the danger that Saladin will encroach on Syria from Egypt as follows: ‘We had to [. .] fear that if his possessions and realm are doubled, he will arise against us impetuously and weary us to yet greater effect [. .]. But our efforts have been [. .] foiled, since he has arisen against us so strongly by land and sea that if we did not seek to rise up by compassion from above, we should have no hope of resistance.’4 Directly afterwards, William investi- gates the reasons leading to the apparent decline of Frankish power in the East. He recognizes in the first and second place the sinfulness of his own generation and their lack of military skill. In addition, at this point (1174) all the neighbouring realms are in the power of one ruler—a teleological process which began with the loss of Edessa to Zengi and has advanced to the establishment of the Ayyubid realm of Egypt and Syria.5 William thus interprets the history of the Latins in the East since the Second Crusade as a time of progressive decline of power, accompanied by a continual concentration of power on the Muslim side, which was also partially the decline’s cause. His analysis finally culminates in a gloomy description of the situation in 1184.6 A similar model of history was used in the Islamic historiography of the thirteenth century. This appears most clearly in the words with which Ibn Wasil, paraphrasing a passage of Ibn al-Athir, introduces his account of the Frankish attack on Damietta in 1169: ‘When Saladin [. .] conquered Egypt [. .] and Nur al-Din’s armies established themselves there, the Franks were sure of their ruin and certain that the coastland was on the edge of a sloping shore, undermined because of the Muslims.’7 Modern historians have taken over William of Tyre’s assessment directly or indirectly. The Damascene jurist al-Sulami’s demand at the beginning 3 William of Tyre, XX, X, 957–8. 4 William of Tyre, XXI, VI, 1014–5. 5 William of Tyre, XXI, VII, 1015–6. 6 William of Tyre, XXIII, Praefatio, 1132. 7 Ibn Wāṣil, I, 179 based on Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, XI, 351. Cf. Abū Shāma, Rawḍatayn, I/2, 456..

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