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The Philippines: Running in Place in Mindanao

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The Philippines: Running in Place in Mindanao Policy Briefing Asia Briefing N°88 Jakarta/Brussels, 16 February 2009 The Philippines: Running in Place in Mindanao I. OVERVIEW (BJE). An arrangement that the current constitution would permit would be unacceptable to the MILF because it would entail too much central control; the Six months after the collapse of autonomy negotiations MILF, to be credible to its own supporters, has to between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) secure greater self-government and control over more and the Philippines government, low-intensity conflict land and resources than was obtained in a 1996 agree- continues but moves are under way to resurrect talks. ment by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), It is not clear whether negotiations will resume and if the group from which it split in 1981. President Arroyo’s they do, with what agenda. Certainly no settlement is opponents believe she would exploit any effort at “char- likely during the remaining tenure of President Gloria ter change” to try and extend her own term in office, Macapagal Arroyo; the two sides are too far apart, the so no moves in that direction are even thinkable until potential spoilers too numerous, and the political will after a new president is elected in May 2010. At present, too weak. The best that can be hoped for is progress none of the possible contenders seem to consider the around the edges. peace process a priority. The priority should be a ceasefire in central Mindanao Even then, there will still be conservatives worried that would allow displaced civilians to return home. It about dismemberment of the republic, powerful non- would also help to strengthen the structure for talks to Muslim groups in Mindanao with no desire to come ensure that if and when another agreement is reached, under Moro control, and a military convinced it can it will have a better chance of surviving than the ill-fated crush the guerrillas. The Arroyo government made no Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain effort to bring these groups on board while the MOA (MOA-AD or MOA) that was dead on arrival in August was being negotiated, nor did it make any effort to 2008. Two measures already underway deserve more defend the agreement reached by its own peace panel. attention: consultations that would allow potential It is unlikely to have much political will to deal with spoilers to raise concerns in a way that could feed into the spoilers as the 2010 elections approach, and it is the negotiations, and development aimed at strength- questionable whether any successor government will ening human resources in the proposed autonomous have more – but a contact group of interested donors region. could give it much-needed incentives. Consultations and dialogues are not going to help unless they are Even if these aims were achieved, the task of reaching focused enough to provide creative new options to a formal agreement is daunting. A Supreme Court ruling negotiators or concrete reassurances to nervous non- in October 2008 that the MOA was unconstitutional Moros. makes it impossible to go back to the August text, even though the MILF continues to insist it is a “done In the meantime, military operations against three “ren- deal”. If it decides to resume talks, the MILF will have egade” MILF commanders continue in a large swathe to decide whether it will go for a revised agreement of central Mindanao, with relatively few deaths but large- on land or a final “comprehensive compact” that scale displacement. The military says the operations incorporates key principles from the MOA. Publicly, will cease when the three, whose units were involved the MILF insists that a separate agreement on land in attacks on civilians, are captured or the MILF turns must come first, but if the right formula were found, it them in; the MILF says it should be up to an inter- might be more flexible. national monitoring team to determine whether the men were responsible for ceasefire violations. Both sides face None of the political obstacles that killed the MOA have internal pressure to take an uncompromising stance, but been removed; if anything, positions have hardened. The there are several ways out of the stalemate, and a good Supreme Court decision effectively makes constitu- mediator could find them. tional change a prerequisite for any power-sharing arrangement between Manila and the future Moro Forward movement on some of the side issues should homeland – known as the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity lead to no illusions, therefore, that a final settlement is The Philippines: Running in Place in Mindanao Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°88, 16 February 2009 Page 2 in sight but it could build confidence and improve the bers had been frustrated by their inability to function atmosphere for negotiations. Getting a ceasefire in cen- effectively, especially after the resumption of hostili- tral Mindanao would be an important achievement in ties in Maguindanao and Lanao which meant they could humanitarian terms alone. no longer travel to the areas they were supposed to be monitoring. A few members of the team pulled back to Manila; most went home. II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE BREAKDOWN The local ceasefire monitors, the Coordinating Com- mittees for Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), remained intact after the IMT departed.4 A senior official on the After the government’s dissolution of its peace panel government side said it continued to be fully function- in September 2008 and the Supreme Court ruling in al in areas covered by sixteen of the nineteen MILF base October, the Arroyo government announced a “new commands. The MILF heartland, however (roughly cov- paradigm” for peace.1 According to Executive Secre- ering the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, tary Eduardo Ermita, it would move from a focus on Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and “dialogue with the rebels to one of authentic dialogues Sarangani), was formally declared a no ceasefire zone with communities and stakeholders” and any negotia- and became the focus of the military’s “punitive oper- tion with the MILF “will be in the context of dis- ations” against “lawless” MILF forces.5 armament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)”.2 This was widely but probably mistakenly interpreted As the end of the year approached, the government, very in the media as meaning the government would only conscious of the negative international publicity it had resume talks if the MILF disarmed first, which was received as a result of the humanitarian situation and not going to happen. the plight of the displaced, as well as the Malaysian withdrawal, began a flurry of moves designed to show The breakdown of talks sparked an unusually high-level its commitment to peace. In November, it decided to diplomatic reaction. On 15 September, the Council of reconstitute its peace panel. On 2 December, it named the European Union issued a statement noting its con- Foreign Affairs Under-Secretary Rafael Seguis as the cern over the escalation of violence and possibility new chair. A veteran diplomat and negotiator, he is also that “civilian militias may become embroiled”, con- said to oppose to any outcome that would require demning attacks on civilians, and urging both sides to constitutional change. show restraint and return to the negotiating table.3 In early November, Robert Hannigan, security adviser to Additional members of the panel were announced on British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, visited Minda- 23 and 24 December, including two who had a reputa- nao, bringing lessons from the Good Friday agreement tion, according to one well-placed government official, that ended the Northern Ireland conflict. for being “anti-Moro”.6 One is the former mayor of General Santos City in Mindanao, Adelbert Antonino, Despite these initiatives, the International Monitoring who was appointed as the representative of Christians.7 Team (IMT) led by Malaysia, seen as a critical bulwark The second is Tomas Cabili, Jr of Iligan City, Lanao del of the peace process, left Mindanao on 30 November, Norte, described in the press as a “lawyer-business- despite a formal request from Manila to stay. Its mem- man”. Both are from politically influential families in 8 Mindanao. The other members are Ronald Adamat and Nasser Pangandaman. Adamat, an ethnic Teduray, 1 For background to the breakdown of the talks and the impli- was named to represent the lumads, or indigenous cations of the Supreme Court ruling, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing No 83, The Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao, 23 October 2008. For earlier analyses, see Crisis 4 There is a CCCH for each side, one for the MILF, one for Group Asia Report No80, Southern Philippines Backgrounder: the government, with main offices in Cotabato and outposts Terrorism and the Peace Process, 13 July 2004. For additio- in thirteen conflict areas. nal Crisis Group reporting on the Philippines, see Asia Reports 5 Crisis Group interview, with member of the government No152, The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter- side of the CCCH, Cotabato, 21 January 2009. terrorism in Mindanao, 14 May 2008; and No110, Philippines 6 Crisis Group interview, Manila, 21 January 2009. Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts, 19 Decem- 7 “Palace names 3 more panel members in talks with MILF”, ber 2005. Mindanews.com, 24 December 2008. 2 “Palace names 3 more panel members in talks with MILF”, 8 Antonino is the husband of a former representative in the Mindanews.com, 24 December 2008. Philippines Congress and father of another. His wife was 3 Council of the European Union, “Declaration by the Presi- known an activist against the Autonomous Region in Muslim dency on behalf of the European Union concerning the situa- Mindanao (ARMM).
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