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The Philippines: Militancy and the New Bangsamoro

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The Philippines: Militancy and the New Bangsamoro The Philippines: Militancy and the New Bangsamoro Asia Report N°301 | 27 June 2019 Headquarters International Crisis Group Avenue Louise 149 • 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 • Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Preventing War. Shaping Peace. Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Militancy in Mindanao and the Battle for Marawi ........................................................... 3 III. Challenges for the Bangsamoro ........................................................................................ 7 A. Guerrillas to Governors ............................................................................................. 7 B. “Normalisation” and Decommissioning .................................................................... 10 C. Bangsamoro Autonomy: An Antidote to Extremism? ............................................... 12 IV. Islamist Armed Groups Outside the Peace Process ......................................................... 14 A. Central Mindanao/Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters ..................................... 14 B. Lanao del Sur/Maute Group ...................................................................................... 15 C. Basilan and Sulu Islands/Abu Sayyaf Group............................................................. 16 D. Misuari’s MNLF ......................................................................................................... 18 V. Government Responses .................................................................................................... 20 A. Martial Law and Military Operations ........................................................................ 20 B. Local Governments’ Reintegration Efforts ................................................................ 21 C. Marawi’s Rehabilitation ............................................................................................. 22 VI. Priorities for the New Autonomous Region ..................................................................... 24 A. Military Operations .................................................................................................... 25 B. A Peace Dividend ....................................................................................................... 26 C. Political Outreach ...................................................................................................... 26 D. Decommissioning ...................................................................................................... 27 VII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 29 APPENDICES A. Map of Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao .................................... 30 B. About the International Crisis Group .............................................................................. 31 C. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Asia since 2016 .................................................. 32 D. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................ 33 Principal Findings What’s new? A new autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao marks the cul- mination of 22 years of negotiations between the Philippine government and the secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). This breakthrough fol- lows a five-month battle in 2017 for Marawi City by pro-ISIS fighters who, though on the defensive, still pose a threat. Why does it matter? The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region should repre- sent the end of the Moro conflict with the Philippine state. Proponents portray it as an “antidote to extremism”. But the new administration has to confront a corrupt, inefficient local bureaucracy, clan conflict and ongoing violence by pro- ISIS groups. What should be done? The Bangsamoro government, with Manila’s and donors’ support, should respond to the grievances of those in Muslim Mindanao sceptical of the new autonomous region, help 30,000 MILF fighters return to civilian life, try to win over Islamist armed groups outside the peace process and redouble efforts to deliver social services. International Crisis Group Asia Report N°301 27 June 2019 Executive Summary The inauguration in March 2019 of a new autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao marks the culmination of a decades-long peace process between the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Advocates for the new region promote it as “the antidote to extremism”. Indeed, Filipino lawmakers passed legislation setting up the autonomous region in part due to fear, after a five-month battle in Marawi city in 2017 between Philippines forces and local groups aligned with the Islamic State (ISIS), that delays in the peace process were fuelling militancy. Military operations have since ground down ISIS-linked groups, but those groups could still disrupt the transition or gain recruits from its failure. Priorities for the new Bangsamoro transition authority include delivering quick wins in service provision, reaching out to Mindanaoans sceptical of the new autonomous region, helping MILF fighters return to civilian life and continuing efforts to win over armed groups that reject the peace process. For their part, the Philippine armed forces should avoid military tactics that displace large numbers of civilians. The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao should represent the end of the Moro struggle for self-determination and the resolution of the conflict between Moros and the Philippine state. The new autonomous region’s leaders must now fulfil the political aspirations of 3.5 million Muslim Mindanaoans. But the tran- sition faces many challenges. The region has a long history of separatist fronts frac- turing when peace deals are reached and splinter groups taking up arms again against the state and their former allies. Such fragmentation, if repeated, could create new recruiting opportunities for Islamist militants, including those associated with ISIS. The MILF itself must undertake the fraught task of transforming from rebel movement into political party and government. It must decommission fighters and commanders, many of whom will likely resist giving up weapons given the number of other armed groups still active and the prevalence of arms in Mindanao. Armed groups outside of the peace process pose the gravest security threat to the new autonomous region. Several proclaim allegiance to ISIS; most profess also to fight for Moro independence. The five-month battle for Marawi City in Lanao del Sur province in 2017 represented the high-water mark of a pro-ISIS alliance that united fighters from Mindanao’s three largest ethnic groups, the Tausug, Maranao and Magu- indanao. Since the Philippine armed forces ousted the militants in October 2017, ISIS-linked groups have been under heavy military pressure in mainland Mindanao, as well as the island provinces of Basilan and Sulu, where loosely organised factions of the Abu Sayyaf Group hold out. Despite this pressure, groups that pledged fealty to ISIS have staged several damaging bombings over the past year and continue fighting the security forces. Manila’s response has been predominantly military. Its recapture of Marawi, in- volving artillery and airstrikes, left much of the city centre in ruins. Locals resent the lack of reconstruction since then. After the Marawi siege, aggressive operations have continued against small bands of militants, leaving most of them weakened but in places displacing large numbers of civilians. Congress has three times extended mar- tial law – instituted in Mindanao on the first day of the Marawi siege – most recently The Philippines: Militancy and the New Bangsamoro Crisis Group Asia Report N°301, 27 June 2019 Page ii until the end of 2019. Officials argue that martial law is necessary because existing counter-terrorism legislation is inadequate. Critical to countering the appeal of Islamist militancy is a successful transition to autonomy, initially via the interim Bangsamoro Transitional Administration which is run by the MILF and will govern the region until elections in 2022. In this effort, it faces an enormous challenge amid high expectations. Greater autonomy, accounta- ble and representative leadership, and redressing “historical injustices” against the Moro should erode at least some support for militants who tap into those grievances, among others, to recruit. The new regional authorities also need to act quickly to de- liver services, curb corruption and show that peace brings dividends, tasks for which they will need donors’ support. Perhaps most urgently, given that those authorities neither control local governments nor command their own regional police force – both still report to Manila – they and the Philippine government need to agree on how the new region will shoulder its responsibility for security and governance. Specific steps that could bolster the new Bangsamoro region’s prospects for suc- cess include: The Philippine armed forces should avoid tactics that cause displacement and gen- erate local anger. Aerial bombardments and artillery fire may have been neces- sary to dislodge militants from Marawi, but are less suited to the operations in rural areas that have
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