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Foreword

am pleased to present this baseline study constraining factors, structural and sociocultural capturing the role and participation of wom- gains, and best practices in peacebuilding. A en in peace and security in Myanmar, Philip- riveting evidence of the study is the ability of pines, and Thailand to our partners and women to advance WPS notwithstanding their Istakeholders. This study is one of the trailblazing un/underrepresentation and limited space in the outputs of NP’s Women Peace and Security formal peace process. Women peacebuilders (WPS) flagship program in the ASEAN region underwent an ordeal to defy personal, socio- called Women-IMPACT or Women Creating Impact cultural, and structural barriers and dealt with on Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation. The diverse stakeholders and contexts to push for- program mainly aims to enhance the capacity and ward women’s agenda in the peace process. A participation of women-led CSOs and institu- best practice the study notes across the three tions in peace and security initiatives. Thanks to countries is the involvement of men in advancing the Mission of Canada to ASEAN, through its women’s agenda in the peace process and Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), the pro- related initiatives. gram has achieved a breakthrough as NP com- mences to broaden its reach and impact in the This study presents lessons learned and regional setting. conclusions to highlight the significant gains of women peacebuilding and emphasize the need Clearly, the realization of the program is a for concrete actions to implement and significant milestone for the organization. Unde- institutionalize WPS agenda in the three coun- niably, though, WPS mainstreaming remains a tries in particular and in ASEAN in general. It huge undertaking in the region, especially has put forward recommendations on WPS amidst the COVID-19 situation, requiring sus- mainstreaming to the following: 1. ASEAN inter- tained commitment and innovative cooperation governmental body in institutionalizing best prac- of various actors. Upon the conceptualization tices across its member states; 2. CSOs in build- of the program, NP strategically collaborated ing, strengthening, and sustaining gains in their with the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Recon- areas of operation; and 3. donor agencies for ciliation (AIPR) to contribute to the strengthen- more support in research, knowledge manage- ing of the latter’s mandate as women and gender ment, resource sharing, and implementation at -promoting institution on peace, conflict man- the country and community levels. agement, and conflict resolution in line with the ASEAN’s political- security community pillar and I hope this study would be of valuable use to our the Member States Joint Statement on WPS in partners and stakeholders as we work together the ASEAN. in advancing WPS in the region. This initiative is just the start of the mission. Let us strive to the This baseline study was conducted to demon- best of our capacity to translate the recommen- strate women’s role and participation in peace dations into real actions on the ground. and security, draw out a regional perspective and database through comparative examples of women’s participation in local peacebuilding initiatives, and identify possible courses of action in Delsy Ronnie, PhD mainstreaming WPS in the region. Despite its Head of Mission for Philippines and limitation to three countries, study findings Regional Representative for Asia provide substantial information on the patterns Nonviolent Peaceforce and trends in peace and security situation, roles 25 February 2021 and participation of women, enabling and

Acknowledgments

This report was written by Maria Josefa P. Petilla, PhD, an independent consultant, with her team, Maria Lourdes L. Aseneta and Patricia L. Adversario, for the Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) Philippines.

Special thanks to the women peacebuilders who took time to serve as participants in the study: Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, Jasmin Nario - Galace, Yasmin Busran- Lao, and Irene M. Santiago (Philippines); and Former Ambassador Nongnuth Petcharatana (Thailand).

Many thanks to all NP Philippines staff involved in the project: Carmen Lauzon-Gatmaytan (Program Coordinator-Focal Person for WPS), Aldrin C. Norio (Program Development Manager), and Dr. Delsy Ronnie (Head of Mission).

Also, many thanks to Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI) for making this project possible.

Contents

Foreword 4 Acknowledgments 5 Acronyms 8 List of Terms 10 Executive Summary 11 Chapter 1 Introduction 23 Background and Rationale 24 Questions and Objectives 26 Scope and Limitation 26 Framework 26 Methodology 27 Chapter 2 Case 1: Republic Union of Myanmar 29 Peace and Security Situation 30 Women in Peacebuilding 41 Enabling and Constraining Factors 43 Outcomes and Impacts 45 Best Practices 46 Lessons Learned and Way Forward 47 References 49

Contents

Chapter 3 Case 2: Republic of the Philippines 53 Peace and Security Situation 54 Women in Peacebuilding 62 Enabling and Constraining Factors 65 Outcomes and Impacts 66 Best Practices 68 Lessons Learned and Way Forward 69 References 71 Chapter 4 Case 3: Kingdom of Thailand 77 Peace and Security Situation 78 Women in Peacebuilding 82 Enabling and Constraining Factors 83 Outcomes and Impacts 86 Best Practices 87 Lessons Learned and Way Forward 88 References 90 Chapter 5 Patterns and Trends Across the Three Countries 93 Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recommendations 103

Acronyms

AIPR ASEAN Institute of Peace and Reconciliation ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations AWPR ASEAN Women for Peace Registry BPfA Beijing Platform for Action CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women CSO Civil Society Organization GIWPS Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security KII Key Informant Interview NAP National Action Plan NGO Nongovernment Organization NP Nonviolent Peaceforce SDG Sustainable Development Goals UNSCR Union Nations Security Council Resolution WPS Women, Peace, and Security

Myanmar Case AA Arakan Army ABSDF All Burma Students’ Democratic Front AFPFL Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League party AGIPP Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process ALP Arakan Liberation Party BGF Boarder Guard forces BWU Burmese Women’s Union CNF Chin National Front CSFoP Civil Society Forum on Peace (CSFoP) 21CPC 21st Century Panglong Conference DKBA Democratic Karen Benevolent Army EAO Ethnic Armed Organization GEN Gender Equality Network JICM Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting JMC Joint Monitoring Committee KIA Kachin Independence Army KNPP Karenni National Progressive Party KNU Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army KWPN Kachin Women Peace Network LDU Lahu Democratic Union MWO Mon Women’s Organization NCA Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement NCCT Nationwide Ceasefire Coordinating Team NDAA-ESS National Democratic Alliance Army NLD National League for Democracy

NMP New Mon Party NRPC National Reconciliation and Peace Centre NSCN-K National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang NSPAW National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women PNLO Pa-O National Liberation Organization PoVAW Prevention and Protection of Violence Against Women SD Senior Delegation SGBV Sexual and Gender Based Violence SF Shalom (Nyein) Foundation SSA/RCSS Shan State Army/Restoration Council of Shan State SSA/SSPP Shan State Army/Shan State Progress Party (SSA/SSPP) SWAN Shan Women’s Action Network TNLA Ta’ang National Liberation Army UPC Union Peace Conference UPDJC Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee UPWC Union Peacemaking Working Committee UWSA Wa State Army/Party WCDI Women Can Do It WIN-Peace Women in Peace WIP Women’s Initiative Platform WLB Women’s League of Burma WLC Women’s League of Chinland WN Wunpawng Ninghtoi WON Women’s Organizations Network

Philippines Case ARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao BARMM Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BIFF Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters BTA Bangsamoro Transition Authority CAB Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro CARHRIHL Comprehensive Agreement on the Respect of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law CBA-CPLA Cordillera Bodong Administration – Cordillera People’s Liberation Army CPE Center for Peace Education CPP Communist Party of the Philippines GPH Government of the Philippines GZOPI Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute IDPs Internally Displaced Persons ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency LPEs Localized Peace Engagements

MCW Mindanao Commission on Women MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front MNLF Moro National Liberation Front NAP National Action plan NDF National Democratic Front NDFP National Democratic Front of the Philippines NPA New People’s Army NSC-WPS National Steering Committee on Women, Peace and Security OPAPP Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process RPMM Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Managagawa ng Mindanao RPMP-RPA-ABB Rebolusyonaryong Partidong Manggagawa ng Pilipinas/ Revolutionary Proletarian Army/ Alex Boncayao Brigade- WAGI Women and Gender Institute WEAct Women Engaged in Action on UN Security Council Resolution

Thailand Case BNPP Barisan Nasional Pember-Basan Pattani BRN Barisan Revolusi Nasional CPGE Committee to Promote Gender Equality GEA Gender Equality Act MARA Patani Majlis Syura Patani NCWP Network of Civic Women for Peace PAOW Peace Agenda of Women PULO Patani United Liberation Organization WDS Women Development Strategy WPN Women’s Peace Network List of Terms

Areas of Engagement: spaces women are accorded in relation to peace and security. Best Practices: initiatives seen to have been effective and efficient in producing expected results and impacts. Constraining Factors: things that hinder women’s participation in peace and security. Enabling Factors: things that facilitate women’s participation in peace and security. Impacts: effects of engagement of women in peace and security. Initiatives: activities undertaken in relation to peace and security. Lessons: learnings in initiatives undertaken. Outcomes: results arising from initiatives. Participation: involvement or engagement Role: task or function. Socioeconomic Profile: demography, status, education, occupation, professional background, and others. 10

Executive Summary

n 2000, the UN Security Council adopt- security of civilians, and strengthening local ed Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 marking peace infrastructures across its program the beginning of the women, peace and locations in conflict affected areas in eastern security (WPS) agenda with its four and western Mindanao, has extended its Ipillars, namely, participation and representa- work in the SEA region with WPS as its tion, prevention, protection, and relief and flagship program. Under the auspices of recovery, in the Security Council. In 2008- Canada Fund, the program, Women Creating 2013, the Security Council adopted six Impact on Peacebuilding and Conflict Transfor- other related resolutions strengthening the mation (Women-IMPACT), mainly aims to articles in 1325 (Resolutions 1889 and 2122) enhance the capacity and participation of and highlighting conflict related sexual women-led CSOs and institutions in peace- violence (Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1960, building and non-violent conflict transfor- and 2106). mation. It covers three ASEAN countries, namely, Myanmar, Philippines, and Thailand. In November 2017, during the 31st ASEAN Summit in Manila, the Heads of State/ Part of the activities under the NP’s WPS Government of the ASEAN Member States program is the conduct of a baseline study issued a joint statement on WPS in the of women’s participation in peace and secu- ASEAN. The joint statement commits, rity in the said three countries. The study is among others, to promote a culture of meant to provide evidence of women’s role peace and prevention, gender equality, and participation in Myanmar, Philippines, gender perspective in all conflict prevention and Thailand; come up with a regional per- initiatives and strategies, full participation of spective and database through comparative women in peace processes, inclusion of examples of women’s participation in local WPS agenda in policies and programs against peacebuilding initiatives; and identify possible sexual and gender based violence before, courses of action towards mainstreaming during and after armed conflict, and to task WPS in the region. Study results could in- relevant ASEAN bodies to work together form and guide NP, its partners, and other to promote WPS agenda in the ASEAN re- concerned stakeholders in crafting and gion (ASEAN Joint Statement on WPS, implementing acceptable, appropriate and 2017). applicable strategies in WPS mainstreaming in the three countries in particular and the It has been more than 20 years since the ASEAN region in general. passage of UNSCR 1325 and more than three years since the 2017 ASEAN joint Given thus, this baseline study attempted to statement on WPS agenda. The Nonviolent answer and examine the following: 1. What Peaceforce (NP) Philippines, a nonpartisan is the peace and security situation, with international organization engaged in pre- focus on the location of women in such venting violence, increasing safety and situation, in Myanmar, Philippines, and Thailand?; 2. What is the socioeconomic

profile of women engaged in peace and pation. Opportunities, including space and security in the three countries?; 3. What are platform, resources, and enabling environ- the areas of engagement and initiatives of ment accorded women in these dynamic women in local peacebuilding?; 4. What are contexts allow and empower the latter to the enabling and constraining factors in render their share in attaining peace and se- women’s peacebuilding engagement and curity in their respective localities as individ- initiatives?; 5. What are the outcomes and uals and as part of a community. Their role impacts of such engagement and initiatives?; and participation, including their areas of en- 6. What are the best practices? and 7. What gagement and initiatives, determine the out- are the lessons learned and way forward to comes and impacts of their contributions to mainstream WPS across the three countries peace and security which, in turn, redound in particular and ASEAN region in general? to their various contexts.

The study limited itself to discussing the role In exploring the role and participation of and participation of women in peace and women in peace and security in Myanmar, security across the three countries, Philippines, and Thailand, the study gathered including women’s areas of engagement, perspectives mainly from desk and literature initiatives, enabling and constraining factors, review. Where feasible, it employed virtual best practices, and gains in peacebuilding. It key informant interviews (KIIs) to enrich the looked into the countries’ peace and data gathered from desk review. Used as security situation, to include a brief history instruments were case study and KII guides. of armed conflict, conflicting parties involved, effects on women and children, Published materials on the net, including government interventions to resolve the ASEAN-IPR’s publications, on WPS and armed conflict/s, and role of civil society in other related issues in the three countries peacebuilding. It delved mainly into participa- served as data sources in the desk review. tion and representation, one of the four Letter of invites, with guide questions and pillars of WPS agenda, even as it touched on consent form, were sent to 4-7 potential KII the other three pillars, namely, prevention, participants per country via email. A total of protection, and relief and recovery, as it five women peacebuilders, one in Thailand cited women peacebuilders who promote and four in the Philippines, accepted the in- the prevention and protection of women vite and served as KII participants. No one against violence and abuse and who assist in from Myanmar replied to the invite. The the provision of humanitarian aid in conflict participant from Thailand sent her responses affected areas. via email while virtual individual interviews with participants from the Philippines were The study followed a framework that posits conducted via Zoom, a popular cloud plat- the nature of the role and participation of form. women in peace and security of any country or region is largely determined by the indi- The study mainly used descriptive data vidual, communal, cultural, and structural analysis, as data gathered was largely qualita- contexts of the women concerned. The tive. It ran for a total of three months, dynamism and interplay between and among from November 1, 2020 to January 31, these various contexts within and without 2021. the women influence such role and partici-

Main Findings region (Myanmar, Thailand, and Philippines), Peace and Security Situation countryside, rural or depressed areas (Philippines), can be considered the root Ongoing armed conflicts highlight the cause or main driver of armed conflicts, even unending struggle of marginalized groups. as ethnic-religious hegemony, exclusion or Across the three countries, the ongoing violent extremism further fuel and exacer- armed conflicts between the government bate such conflicts. Complicated by various and rebel forces highlight the longstanding sociocultural gender norms, expectations, and often protracted struggle of marginalized and stereotypes (across the three coun- groups towards self-determination, self-rule, tries), inter communal or clan disputes autonomy, secession, equitable distribution (Myanmar and Philippines), or one-sided of wealth, and even the overthrow of the violence (Myanmar), the conflicts remain legitimate democratic government. Such unabated and continue to cause destruction struggle spans decades for various ethnic on the individual and communal life and minority groups in Myanmar, Moros, and property of the civilian populations. ideologically (Marxist/Maoist) indoctrinated rural poor in the Philippines, even as the Devastating effects of armed conflicts struggle of the Moros can be traced back to on women and children are similar across centuries under the Spanish rule. The strug- countries. gle of the Malay Pattani in southern Thailand Devastating effects of armed conflicts across is relatively recent, less than two decades, the three countries include indiscriminate even as their marginalization started more shootings and bombings on civilian popula- than a century ago with the signing of a tion, killings, physical abuse, mass displace- treaty between British and Siamese leaders ment, forced relocation, family separation turning over the then Sultanate of Pattani to and loss or disappearance of family mem- Siam sovereignty and forcibly assimilating the bers, loss of livelihood, sexual and gender Malay Pattani into the Thai culture. based violence, forced labor, human traffick-

ing, poor living conditions in refugee camps, Armed groups, such as the EAOs lack of access to basic needs and services, (Myanmar), the MILF/MNLF and NPA diseases, and mental health problems. (Philippines), and MARA Pattani and BRN Women and children bear the brunt of such (Thailand) supposedly represent and wage effects, even as the men become victims of war on behalf of these marginalized groups. violence as well. Countless documented and Ironically, there have been reports about undocumented human rights violations these same armed groups perpetrating vio- directed against hundreds and thousands of lence and preying on the very people they women and children have been committed are supposed to protect and fight for with impunity by armed actors, including (Myanmar). militias or vigilante groups, on both sides.

Political and economic control over Government peacebuilding initiatives vis territory complicated by sociocultural a vis UNSCR 1325 are inadequate. factors serves as main driver of conflicts. Concerned governments have initiated Political and economic control over territo- measures to resolve the conflicts, such as ry, including its people and rich natural re- declaring bilateral ceasefires (Myanmar and sources, located mainly in border-states or – Philippines) and peace talks (across three

countries) with concerned armed or insur- NSPAW as leverage to advocate for gent groups. Unfortunately, violations of women’s participation in the peace process. ceasefire agreements by government and The allocation of the 30 percent quota was rebel troops and stalling of peace negotia- an outcome of such advocacy. tions owing to disputes among stakeholders regarding peace process frameworks as well Thailand has no NAP on WPS but is party to as provisions and principles of peace the CEDAW and has the National Measures negotiations contributed to the worsening and Guidelines (NMG) on WPS. Women instead of resolving and mitigating the effects used the CEDAW to promote women’s of the conflict. human rights and call for a stop to violence against women in conflict areas. The NMG, Concerned stakeholders have expressed however, has yet to be properly implement- openness to settle differences and move the ed and used as leverage by women to peace process forward, even as governments advocate for their inclusion in the formal and rebel forces have remained unrelenting peace process. and continued to posture hard-line positions on certain issues, such as terms and condi- Local CSOs play varied roles vital tions on the peace process (Myanmar and in peacebuilding. Philippines), government labelling of rebel Across the three countries, CSOs, including forces as terrorists (Arakan Army in Myan- women’s CSOs, have played varied roles vi- mar and NPA in the Philippines), and rejec- tal in peacebuilding, despite limited space tion of BRN call for impartial mediators and accorded them in the formal peace process. international observers in the peace process CSOs’ limited participation includes as (Thailand). observers and technical advisers to concerned stakeholders, for instance, as repre- Government initiatives vis a vis UNSCR sentatives of EAOs in the Myanmar peace 1325 can be considered as relatively process. Outside the formal peace process, inadequate. Of the three countries, only the CSOs varied roles are as advocates, alliance Philippines has an NAP on WPS interfaced builders, educators or capacity builders, with the Magna Carta of Women, PDPlan communicators, community facilitators and 2011-2016, and Women's EDGE plan. It is mediators (across the three countries), un- now in the process of working on the official monitors of ceasefire or peace agree- implementation plan for the NAP. ments (Myanmar), and providers of support services and humanitarian aid (Philippines Myanmar has no NAP on WPS but has the and Thailand). National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women (NSPAW) that provides for Particular to Myanmar women’s CSOs is women’s participation in decision making on their role as researcher and documenter. various social issues at all levels, even as it They document human rights violations, has gaps, including lack of an implementation such as rape and torture, committed by plan. Also, delegates to the formal peace armed actors, and disseminate and project process issued a commitment allocating 30 such documentation nationally and interna- percent quota for women’s participation at tionally. They continue to monitor, all levels. Women’s groups used the document, and publish the progress of the

30 percent quota for women’s participation Women advance WPS amidst limited in formal peace dialogues. space in formal peace process. Women across the three countries have Women Peacebuilders and been accorded limited space in formal peace their Roles and Participation negotiations. Nevertheless, ingenious and resourceful as they are, they have been able in Peacebuilding to optimize such limited space to advance Women peacebuilders come from diverse the interests and needs of women affected backgrounds. by the armed conflicts. Outside the formal Women peacebuilders at the national and peace process, they have broadened the local levels come from diverse socio- available space and found other avenues for economic backgrounds, including education their engagements. and social class (across the three countries). In the formal peace process, however, In formal peace negotiations at the national women who are highly educated, well- or union level, women have served as connected in society, and founders and lead- negotiators, facilitators or mediators, ers of women’s organizations and allianc- technical advisers, observers, witness signa- es are able to participate, even as some tories but are not allowed to take part in were former student activists, rebel sol- decision making. In the Philippines, one diers, and victims of armed conflicts them- woman became the first woman signatory selves (Myanmar and Philippines). In the and chief negotiator to a top level peace Philippines, mainly women academics and agreement between the government and the professionals are at the forefront of high Moro rebels. profile peace negotiations. To address such lack of decision making Women remain underrepresented or power, particularly in Myanmar, women unrepresented in formal peace have utilized their cordial relationships with negotiations. male delegates to adopt policy recommen- Women have remained underrepresented dations on gender inclusion in peace pro- or unrepresented in formal peace negotia- cess frameworks. They have conducted back tions across the three countries. In Myan- channel discussions with concerned stake- mar, over the four rounds of the UPC/21 holders simultaneous with the ongoing CPC, percentage of women delegates dialogue and communicated to other ranged from 13 percent to 22 percent, still women on the ground the progress of far from reaching the 30 percent quota. In peace negotiations and stances of stake- the Philippines, in peace negotiations be- holders on issues for a more informed tween the government and MILF, 22 per- advocacy. cent of negotiators were women and 27 percent of total signatories were women. At the local or community level, particularly But these women were mainly on the gov- in Thailand, women with training from ernment side and none on the MILF side. In professional facilitators have promoted Thailand, over the three rounds of formal dialogues in their respective communities. peace talks, only armed actors and no Seen as trust builders, they have served as women were allowed to participate. facilitators of community dialogues between Buddhists and Muslims, or government

officials and villagers. In the Philippines, patrolled their communities to maintain seen as mothers of the nation, women have peace. They have gathered intelligence for assisted in conflict resolution in small scale security purposes, served as connectors disputes and in mitigation of clan-based between officials and the villagers, and as- conflicts. sisted in providing humanitarian aid to victims of the conflict. Some have joined the Women conduct varied and vibrant peacebuild- Thai army and have been sent as part of the ing initiatives in the informal peace process. UN international peacekeeping mission. Outside the formal peace process, women have engaged in advocacy, capacity building, In the Philippines, women have identified alliance building, research and documenta- and enhanced early strategic alliances with tion, information and communication, moni- men to push forward women’s agenda in the toring of ceasefire or peace agreement com- peace process as well as assisted in the pliance, early warning system, and provision rehabilitation and development of conflict of humanitarian aid. Some women have affected communities, even as they engaged joined the military and have been sent as in providing assistance to displaced people. part of the UN international peacekeeping mission. Knowingly or unknowingly, they Enabling and Constraining have used their socio-culturally constructed Factors in Peacebuilding roles, such as homemakers, caregivers, Women’s personal agency, international servers at gatherings, and others, to their and national frameworks, and support advantage. from outside the conflict areas and

international community enable In Myanmar, women’s CSOs have convened peacebuilding. peace forums to discuss among themselves Women’s individual qualities as trust build- gender related issues in armed conflicts, for- ers, able servers and workers, ability to mulate policy recommendations, and submit establish cordial relationships or strategic such recommendations to political dia- alliances with the men, and their conviction logues. They have conducted tea break ad- to take control of their life in relation to vocacy wherein they convinced concerned peace and security have facilitated their stakeholders or dialogue delegates to adopt peacebuilding activities. Women in Myanmar gender inclusive policy recommendations have rallied male friends and delegates to while serving tea during breaks. They have support and adopt their policy recommen- identified champions or progressives in gov- dations while serving tea during breaks. In ernment and parliament to support and the Philippines, women have tapped their push forward conflict affected women’s in- established alliances with men to advocate terest and needs in the peace process. for women’s agenda in the peace process.

In Thailand, with their ability to build trust, At the grassroots or community level, wom- collaborate, and engage with diverse stake- en in Myanmar have carried out indigenous holders, women have been able to make the early warning practices to mitigate the ef- government and the resistance movement fects of the conflict on the community and responsive to their proposals. unofficially monitored compliance of armed actors to the NCA. Women have used international frame-

works, such as the UNSCR 1325, CEDAW In Thailand, women have monitored and

(Myanmar and Philippines), and national husband and responsible for taking care of plans, such as the NAP on WPS (Philippines), the household, including children, parents, and the NSPAW and 30 percent quota and in laws. Men serve as head and bread- (Myanmar), as leverage to advocate for winner of the family or clan and leader of the women’s participation or gender inclusion in community. As head, breadwinner, and lead- the peace process. In Thailand, wary of er, men have the sole power and authority causing social friction, women have utilized to make decisions for the family, clan, and the CEDAW to advocate not for women’s the community. participation in politics and peace process but for women’s human rights, including an Societal structures, influenced by deep- end to violence against women. seated sociocultural discriminatory gender norms, expectations, and stereotypes merely Support from concerned sectors outside the condone or reinforce male domination in the conflict areas and the international communi- private and public spheres, specifically in poli- ty has served as impetus for women to con- tics. Such patriarchal power structures tinue and sustain their advocacies for conflict accord limited space for active women’s affected women’s interests and needs and participation. In Myanmar, for instance, project their plight at the national and inter- certain government posts are suitable only national levels (across the three countries). for men as stipulated in the constitution. In the Philippines, relatively strict division of Discriminatory gender norms, labor exists in the private and public spheres, patriarchal power structures, and including peace negotiations. There is a high biased personal perceptions and level of insecurity and personal threat for attitudes constrain peacebuilding. women participating in official peace negotia- Sociocultural constraints include the perceptions. In Thailand, the narrow scope of the tions that security is about war and war is peace process framework only allows the the domain of men. Therefore, the issue of participation of warring parties, with their peace and security is the men’s concern and assumed power to stop violence, in the beyond the women’s realm. Also, peace ne- negotiations, thus contributing to women’s gotiations require certain knowledge and exclusion. expertise. Therefore, poorly educated and with nothing to contribute technically, wom- Biased personal perceptions and attitudes en, who are mainly at the grassroots and in have constrained other women from engag- conflict affected areas, are kept from partici- ing in peacebuilding. Influenced by discrimi- pating in such negotiations. Only women natory gender norms and expectations, fear- who are highly educated, professionally ing community reprisals and censure, and trained and well connected in society have lacking in proper education and training, the leverage to take part but have been kept grassroots women have refrained from get- from decision making nevertheless. ting involved and participate in peacebuilding activities. Discriminatory gender norms, expectations, and stereotypes relegate and confine women Dynamics within and among women’s CSOs to the home and keep them from taking part or movements constrain peacebuilding in the public sphere. Women are supposed- across the three countries as well. Differ- ly docile, obedient and acquiescent to the ences in approach and strategies, including ideological and theoretical frameworks, and

competition for funds among women’s CSOs behavior of women from being submissive hamper work in WPS. and fearful to being assertive defenders of their family members and able facilitators of Significant Structural and dialogues between military and villagers. In Sociocultural Gains the Philippines, MILF leaders, with increased awareness of the importance of women in in Peacebuilding the peace process, became open to appoint- Women inclusion and empowerment, and ing women to leadership positions in the raising of gender related issues in peace Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim process as structural gains Mindanao (BARMM). Notable structural gains across the three countries are inclusion of women in peace Best Practices in Peacebuilding negotiations, albeit with limited role; em- In advocacy, best practices are: powerment of women, specifically at the In Myanmar grassroots level or conflict affected areas, Rallying male delegates to support women’s to actively participate in peacebuilding out- agenda in the peace process while side the formal peace process; and raising serving tea during breaks; and discussion of critical issues, including Identifying champions in government and roots of conflict and women’s human rights, parliament; needs and interests, in formal peace negotia- Building and utilizing cordial relationships tions. with male delegates to adopt their policy

recommendations; and In Myanmar and Philippines, an important Projecting the plight of women and children structural gain is the inclusion of gender in conflict affected areas based on well friendly provisions in the peace process researched evidence to the international frameworks and agreements. Specific to the community. Philippines are the government’s issuance of

EO 865 mandating the creation of the NSC In the Philippines WPS and the adoption of the first WPS re- Utilizing early strategic alliances with men; gional action plan in the Autonomous Region Civilianizing peace track and involvement in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). of women’s CSOs;

Popularizing and normalizing positive aspects Changed mindsets, attitudes, and of culture/religion in support of women’s behaviors as sociocultural gains participation in public decision-making; Socioculturally, an important gain in Myan- and mar is the changed mindset of grassroots Practising courage, competence, women on the peace process and their abil- and creativity by women leaders. ity to participate in the political sphere. In

Thailand, a significant gain is the changed per- In Thailand ceptions and attitudes on the women’s Watching language used: refraining from movement of concerned stakeholders in using terms that seemingly offend the government and resistance movement that sensibilities of the men, such as feminism enabled them to become more responsive to and gender equality; using terms such as the women’s proposals. Another significant social justice and women’s human rights in Thailand is the changed attitude and instead of women’s participation and

gender equality; applicable to certain stakeholders and con- Keeping men informed about goals and texts but may not be so to another. objectives of women’s movement; and Utilizing all available communication channels Enhancement and institutionalization to build peace among concerned of best practices stakeholders or conflicting parties. Enhancing best practices, especially indigenous, of women peacebuilders ensures In capacity building, the best practice across that a substantial part of the engagement is the three countries is focusing on building done. Institutionalizing such enhanced best the capacities of grassroots women (and practices completes the engagement and en- men) who are in most need of education and sures the sustainability of the gains resulting training in relation to peacebuilding. from such engagement.

In alliance building, the best practices specifi- Personal and collective agencies cally in Myanmar are knowledge management of women in peacebuilding and resource sharing. In early warning sys- Underlying all the best practices of women in tem, the best practice, also specifically in My- peacebuilding are the personal and collective anmar, is employing indigenous practices in agencies of the women, including their self- alerting villagers on looming armed encoun- confidence, conviction that they can ter to mitigate its effects. influence the peace process, trust and credibility they have built with other stake- Lessons Learned and Way holders, and their courage, inner strength, Forward to Mainstream WPS competence, resiliency, ingenuity, resourcefulness, and common vision of a gender Ownership of the peace process inclusive peace process, to effectively Ownership of the peace process by women respond individually and communally to stakeholders at all levels is crucial towards particular situation or challenge and direct building sustainable peace. Ownership re- the course of their life. Enhancing personal quires recognition, acknowledgment, and and collective agencies of women (and men), lived experience of the individual and com- especially at the grassroots, in relation to munal benefits of the peace process by the WPS through various capacity building and women, specifically those directly affected by other related activities is imperative. the conflict.

Countering of gender norms, Acceptable, appropriate and applicable expectations, and stereotypes strategies and initiatives Countering discriminatory gender norms, Certain contexts require certain acceptable, expectations, and stereotypes impeding appropriate and applicable peacebuilding women’s participation in peace and security strategies and initiatives. It is crucial to is a tall but doable order as evidenced by determine and employ acceptable, appropri- cases of intrepid Myanmar women defying ate and applicable strategies and initiatives in and countering such norms, expectations and dealing with diverse stakeholders and stereotypes, risking personal safety and secu- responding to diverse contexts to support rity. Influencing the personal agency of and advance women’s participation in peace women restrained by such norms and expec- and security. A set of strategies and tations as well as inspiring and encouraging initiatives may be acceptable, appropriate and

these women individually and communally to Structural changes necessary to move for- do the same require ongoing awareness rais- ward WPS mainstreaming across the three ing, education, and capacity building activities countries require the willingness, sincerity, with resource persons as much as possible and political will of incumbent governments from among renowned and experienced to institute and sustain such changes. grassroots women peacebuilders the former can identify with. Building on, strengthening, and sustaining of significant gains Sociocultural transformation requires an Building on, strengthening, and sustaining honest and serious assessment and recogni- significant gains in WPS need to be support- tion by concerned ethnic and religious ed by policies and legislations creating struc- groups of their customs and practices engen- tures and frameworks for the said purpose. dering marginalization of women in the pri- Even as they await the passage and proper vate and public spheres. Women and men implementation of needed policies and legis- peacebuilders in such ethnic and religious lations, stakeholders need to intensify efforts groups have the crucial role and responsibil- to strengthen and sustain the gains achieved ity to facilitate such assessment and recogni- especially at the grassroots level. tion and enjoin fellow members to evolve or enhance customs and practices that promote Conclusions equality among women and men. In the 2019-2020 WPS Index, the Philippines ranked relatively higher than Thailand and Contextualization of gender concepts Myanmar, with Myanmar lagging far behind. and frameworks Of the total 167 countries ranked, the Each country has specific sociocultural, eco- Philippines placed 90th with a WPS index nomic, and political contexts. Similar con- of .709; Thailand placed 92nd, with .707 WPS cepts and frameworks, such as on gender index, and Myanmar placed 150th, with .587 equality and feminism, may have different WPS index. meanings and understandings across countries owing to varying contexts. Such differ- Given thus, the three countries seem a long ing meanings and understandings are further way to even get to the top 50. Results of complicated in cases where such concepts this ASEAN WPS baseline study apparently and frameworks are foreign to a particular reinforce the three countries’ rankings. country and no equivalent terms in the native language exist. Therefore, contextualiza- Given the study findings, it can be said that tion of gender and feminist related concepts compliance to the UNSCR 1325 and fulfil- and frameworks vis a vis peacebuilding is im- ment of commitment to the 2017 joint state- perative in promoting and mainstreaming ment of the ASEAN in promoting WPS in WPS in particular countries. the region have been found wanting across the three countries. Decisive measures and Transformation of patriarchal structures actions have to be instituted and implement- excluding or limiting women in peacebuilding ed in terms of the four pillars of the WPS Transforming formal peace process struc- agenda, specifically women’s participation tures and frameworks excluding or limiting and representation. women’s participation across countries requires needed policies and legislations. WPS is not merely about women’s participa-

tion in the peace process. It is all about the Modalities of such initiative need to be well-being and empowerment of women adjusted given the global pandemic and ordained by nature to carry the burden of volatile political situation in Myanmar. Such bringing forth life to the world. The state of initiative can be considered an initial and the well-being of women determines the crucial step in engendering the “trust and state of the well-being of others in the synergy” among women leaders and family, community, and larger society as peacebuilders essential to move the well. mainstreaming of WPS forward.

WPS covers a whole gamut of issues cutting Recommendations across the physical, sociocultural, economic, To the ASEAN and political life of all across ages, sexual ori- Institutionalization of best practices entations, and gender identities, classes, rac- Institutionalization of best practices of es, creeds, and ethnicities. It is not a matter women peacebuilders is crucial in moving for women peacebuilders alone. Each one the mainstreaming of the WPS forward. A has a stake and has the duty and responsibil- common best practice of women across the ity to get involved. three countries is properly and cordially collaborating with the men to advance women’s interests and needs in the peace At the ninth and final session of the Decem- process. The ASEAN could perhaps institute ber 2018 AIPR and UN workshop on a policy enjoining concerned member states ASEAN perspectives in conflict management to institutionalize such best practice or find and conflict resolution in the region, H.E. space or body within its structure for the Marty Natalegawa, member of the UN Sec- institutionalization of such practice. Such retary-General’s high-level advisory board space or body may be composed of an equal on mediation and former Indonesian foreign number of women and men tasked to affairs minister, emphasized two essential develop and implement programs solely on characteristics in managing potential conflict the WPS agenda in coordination with ACWC or other relevant ASEAN bodies, or or resolving ongoing conflict in the region: serve as a funding window that processes trust and synergy at the national, regional, proposals on WPS from the different and global levels. Similarly, this study wishes ASEAN member states. to reiterate and underscore the same two essential characteristics to move forward Bridging of gap in access to information the mainstreaming of WPS within and across and communication and promotion countries in the ASEAN. of collaboration among women peacebuilders NP Philippines has recently started a learn- Access to communication and information is essential in women’s participation in peace ing exchange initiative on WPS aimed to in- and security. Women peacebuilders in crease understanding on activities, challeng- tracks 1 and 2 seemingly have had more es, and opportunities of emerging women access to relevant communication and leaders and increase communication and information on the peace process than collaboration among these women leaders women peacebuilders in track 3. Therefore, in Myanmar, Mindanao in the Philippines, and it would be best to institute policies or Southern Thailand. Activities under this initi- measures to bridge such gap in order to ative include exchange visits, capacity build- allow women in track 3 to gain equal access ing workshops, and public lecture on WPS. to such communication and information. Relatedly, it would be best to institute

policies or measures to promote collabora- To the Donor Agencies tion among women peacebuilders, especially Provision of more support for research, in track 3, across countries. knowledge management, resource sharing and implementation activities To the CSOs Research and documentation and knowledge Building on, strengthening, and sustaining management, resource sharing, and imple- of gains mentation are crucial towards a better un- Most best practices and significant gains in derstanding of and more effective response peacebuilding have been undertaken and to the situation and needs of victims, specifi- achieved outside the formal peace process. It cally women and girls, of armed conflicts. would be well for CSOs to build on, Therefore, there is a need to push for the strengthen and sustain such gains by stepping conduct of more of such activities across up their efforts and invest more of their re- the three countries. It would be well for sources, both human and material, to donor agencies to provide more funding address the needs, especially in capacity support in this area. building, in relation to WPS, in conflicted areas. A strong base is likely to positively influence the dynamics of the peace process all the way to the top.

Chapter 1 Introduction

Background and Rationale of stakeholders in all regions worldwide. n 2000, the UN Security Council adopt- More than 60 Member States, international ed Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 marking and regional organizations submitted re- the beginning of the women, peace and ports, 47 CSOs, academics and research security (WPS) agenda in the Security institutes provided inputs via a public web- ICouncil. Considered a landmark resolution site, and 317 CSOs in 71 countries served as and a crowning achievement of the global survey participants. The global study women’s movement, UNSCR 1325 recogniz- examines the successes, obstacles and es the importance of a gender perspective in challenges, and trends and priorities for ac- peace and security, the inextricable link be- tion (Coomaraswamy, 2015, p.13). tween peace and gender equality and women’s leadership (SIDA, 2015, p.1; Coomaras- Some successes the study findings reveal are: wamy, 2015, p.5). It “urges Member States 1. adoption of a comprehensive normative to ensure increased representation of wom- framework on sexual violence in conflict; 2. en at all decision making levels in national, understanding by international community regional and international institutions and and national governments of the importance mechanisms for the prevention, manage- of national and communal healing as part of ment, and resolution of conflict and “calls on holistic justice and accountability; 3. adoption all parties to armed conflict to take special of General Recommendation 30 on women measures to protect women and girls from in conflict prevention, conflict and post- gender based violence, particularly rape and conflict situations by the Committee on the other forms of sexual abuse, and all other Elimination of Discrimination against Wom- forms of violence in situations of armed con- en; 4. increase in the percentage of peace flict ((Coomaraswamy, 2018, p. 38 & p. 66).” agreements referencing women from 11 percent in 1990-2000 to 27 percent since the In 2008-2013, the Security Council adopted adoption of UNSCR 1325; 5. 67 percent of six other related resolutions strengthening six agreements resulting from peace talks or the articles in 1325 (Resolutions 1889 and national dialogue processes UN supported in 2122) and highlighting conflict related sexual 2014 contained references relevant to WPS; violence (Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1960, and 6. increase in the number of senior women 2106). The UNSCR 1325 with its related leaders within the UN; and 7. quadrupling of resolutions serves as an essential tool in ad- bilateral aid on gender equality to fragile vancing the WPS agenda with the following States. four pillars: participation and representation, prevention, protection, and relief and recov- Some challenges and obstacles in UNSCR ery (SIDA, 2015, pp. 1-2). implementation include: 1. very few actual prosecutions, particularly at the national lev- In 2015, to mark the resolution’s 15th anni- el on sexual violence; 2. real threat posed by versary, Coomaraswamy (2015), per SC res- the rise of violent extremism globally to the olution 2122, led the conduct of a compre- lives of women, including women peacebuild- hensive study entitled Preventing Conflict, ers; 3. only 54 countries with WPS national Transforming Justice, Securing Peace, on devel- action plans; 4. of the 31 major peace pro- opments in the 15 years of implementation cesses studied in 1992-2011, only nine per- of UNSCR 1325. Coomaraswamy with her cent of negotiators were women; 5. only 3 team held consultations with a diverse group percent of the military in UN missions were women with majority employed as support 24

staff; and 6. abysmally low funding for WPS the role of regional inter-governmental programs and processes across all areas of organizations and development partners in the agenda (pp. 13-15). advancing WPS agenda; and task relevant ASEAN bodies to work together to Some important principles pointed out are: promote WPS agenda in the ASEAN region 1. prevention of conflict must be the priori- (ASEAN Joint Statement on WPS, 2017). ty, not the use of force; 2. Resolution 1325 is a human rights mandate; 3. women’s par- It has been more than 20 years since the ticipation is key to sustainable peace; 4. per- adoption of UNSCR 1325 and more than petrators must be held accountable and jus- three years since the ASEAN joint statement tice must be transformative; 5. localization on WPS agenda. In early 2020, the ASEAN of approaches and inclusive and participatory Committee on Women (ACW) and the processes are crucial to the success of na- ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and tional and international peace efforts; 6. sup- Protection of the Rights of Women and porting women peacebuilders and respecting Children (ACWC) conducted a comprehen- their autonomy is important way to counter sive regional study on the current state of extremism; 7. the persistent failure to ade- implementation of the WPS agenda in the quately finance WPS agenda must be ad- ASEAN with support from the ASEAN- dressed; and 8. all key actors must play their USAID Partnership for Regional Optimiza- role. The study concludes with the following tion within the Political-Security and Socio- call to action: Understand great changes in Cultural Communities (PROSPECT) project the world in the context of women’s needs in collaboration with UN Women and the and concerns in specific conflict situations ASEAN Secretariat. Study results were ex- (p.15-16). pected to be finalized by November 2020 and launched before the end of the same In November 2017, during the 31st ASEAN year (US Mission to ASEAN, October 2020). Summit in Manila, the Heads of State/ Government of the ASEAN Member States The Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) Philippines, issued a joint statement on WPS in the a nonpartisan international organization en- ASEAN. The joint statement commits to gaged in preventing violence, increasing safe- the following: promote a culture of peace ty and security of civilians, and strengthening and prevention; continue addressing the local peace infrastructures across its pro- root causes of armed conflicts; promote gram locations in conflicted areas in eastern gender equality and reduce social inequalities and western Mindanao, has extended its between men and women; encourage the work in the SEA region with WPS as its flag- integration of gender perspective in all con- ship program. Under the auspices of Cana- flict prevention initiatives and strategies, and da Fund, the program, Women Creating Im- ensure full participation of women in peace pact on Peacebuilding and Conflict Transfor- processes; encourage the inclusion of WPS mation (Women-IMPACT), mainly aims to agenda in policies and programs for the pro- enhance the capacity and participation of tection of women and girls from sexual and women’s CSOs and institutions in peace- gender based violence before, during and building and non-violent conflict transfor- after armed conflict; build the capacity of mation. It covers three ASEAN countries, women as peacebuilders; engage men and namely, Myanmar, Philippines, and Thailand. boys with the broader WPS agenda; leverage

Part of the activities under the NP’s WPS What are the best practices in such en- program is the conduct of a baseline study gagements and initiatives? on women’s participation in peace and What are the lessons learned and way security in the said three countries. The forward in mainstreaming women, baseline study is meant to: 1. provide evi- peace and security across the three dence of women’s role and participation in countries in particular and ASEAN peace and security specifically in three region in general? ASEAN countries, namely, Myanmar, Philip- pines, and Thailand; 2. come up with a re- Scope and Limitation gional perspective and database through The study limited itself in discussing the role comparative examples of women’s participa- and participation of women in peace and tion in local peacebuilding initiatives, conflict security across the three countries, including prevention, mediation and peace negotia- women’s areas of engagement, initiatives, tions; and 3. identify possible courses of enabling and constraining factors, best prac- action for ASEAN-IPR (ASEAN Institute for tices, and gains in peacebuilding. It looked Peace and Reconciliation) in mainstreaming into the countries’ peace and security WPS in the region. Study results are situation, to include a brief history of armed expected to inform and guide NP, its part- conflict, conflicting parties involved, effects ners, and other concerned stakeholders in on women and children, government inter- the crafting and implementation of accepta- ventions to resolve the armed conflict/s, and ble, appropriate and applicable strategies to- role of civil society in peacebuilding. It delved wards WPS mainstreaming in the three mainly into participation and representation, countries in particular and the ASEAN one of the four pillars of WPS agenda, even region in general. as it touched on the other three pillars, prevention, protection, and relief and recovery Questions and Objectives as it cited women peacebuilders who pro- This study attempted to answer and mote the prevention and protection of examine the following: women against violence and abuse as well as What is the peace and security situation, assist in the provision of humanitarian aid in with focus on the location of women conflict affected areas. in such situation, in Myanmar, Philippines, and Thailand? Framework What is the socioeconomic profile of The nature of the role and participation of women engaged in peace and se- women in peace and security of any country curity in these countries? or region is largely determined by the indi- What are the areas of engagement and vidual, communal, cultural, and structural initiatives of women in local peace- contexts of the women concerned. Individu- building, conflict resolution, media- al context refers to the personal characteris- tion and negotiations; tics or qualities of the women, including per- What are the enabling and constraining ceptions, beliefs, values, norms, attitudes, factors faced by women in imple- and practices or behavior in relation to menting peacebuilding initiatives? women, peace and security. The communal What are the outcomes and impacts context refers to the perceptions, attitudes, of such engagements and initiatives? and practices in relation to women, peace

and security of the community the women other related issues in the three countries are part of or identify with. Such community served as data sources in the desk review. may be village, ethnic or religious group, civil In consultation with NP, the study initially society organization, or professional organi- set a total of 4-7 KII participants per country zation. Cultural context covers the beliefs, case. Invites, with KII guide questions and norms, values, expectations, customs, tradi- consent form, were sent via email. Only a tions, and practices, in a sense the total way total of five women peacebuilders, one in of life, shared with other members of the Thailand and four in the Philippines, accepted community they are part of or identify with. the invite and served as KII participants. No The structural context refers to the political, one from Myanmar replied to the invite. sociocultural, and economic structures of The participant from Thailand sent her re- the society at the local and national levels in sponses via email while virtual individual in- relation women, peace and security the terviews with participants from the Philip- women are in. pines were conducted via Zoom, a popular cloud-based peer to peer software platform. The dynamism and interplay between and among these various contexts within and Given the data gathered was mainly qualita- without the women influence such role and tive, this study used descriptive data analysis. participation. Opportunities, including space The study ran for a total of three months, and platform, resources, and enabling envi- from November 1, 2020 to January 31, 2021. ronment accorded women in these dynamic Data gathering was done in November-mid contexts allow and empower the latter to December 2020. Write up of individual cases render their share in attaining peace and se- and overall report was done in mid- curity in their respective localities as individ- December to end of January. uals and as part of a community. Their role and participation, including their areas of en- This report discusses the individual cases of gagement and initiatives, determine the out- Myanmar, Philippines, and Thailand. to comes and impacts of their contributions include the peace and security situation in towards peace and security which, in turn, the country, roles and participation of redound to their various contexts. women in peacebuilding, enabling and constraining factors, outcomes and impacts Methodology of peacebuilding initiatives, best practices, In exploring the role and participation of lessons learned and way forward in WPS women in peace and security in Myanmar, mainstreaming. It examines patterns and Philippines, and Thailand, this study gathered trends across the three countries, presents perspectives mainly from desk and literature conclusions, and offers recommendations. review. Where feasible, it employed virtual key informant interviews (KIIs) to enrich the data gathered from desk review. Used as instruments are case study guide and KII guide.

Published materials on the net, including ASEAN-IPR’s publications, on WPS and

References Norville, Valerie. (2011, January). The role Association of Southeast Asian Nations. of women in global security. Special Report (2017, November 13). Joint Statement on 264. Washington: United States Institute Promoting Women, Peace and Security in for Peace. Retrieved from: http:// the ASEAN. Manila, Philippines. Retrieved www.usip.org from: https://asean.org/joint-statement-on- promoting-women-peace-and-security-in- Swedish International Development Agency asean/ (SIDA). (2015, March). Women, Peace and Security. Gender Tool Box Brief. Stock- Bandura, Albert. (2001). Social cognitive holm: SIDA. Retrieved from: https:// theory: An agentic perspective. Annual Re- publikationer.sida.se/English/ view of Psychology. 52. Research Library pg. publications/159456/women-peace-and- XIV. Retrieved from: https:// security/ ssrlsite.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/ bandura-2001-social-cognitive-theory-an- UN Women National Committee Australia. agentic-perspective.pdf (No date). Women, peace & security. An introductory manual. Canberra: UN Wom- Coomaraswamy, Radhika. (2015). Prevent- en Australia. Retrieved from: https:// ing Conflict Transforming Justice Securing www.unwomen.org.au the Peace. A Global Study on the Imple- mentation of United Nations Security US Mission to ASEAN. (October 27, 2020). Council resolution 1325. USA: UN Wom- 3rd Meeting of the ASEAN Women, Peace en. Retrieved from: http:// and Security (WPS) Advisory Group. Re- wps.unwomen.org/en trieved from: https://asean.usmission.gov/3rd-meeting-of- Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace the-asean-women-peace-and-security-wps- and Security and Peace Research Institute advisory-group/ Oslo. (2019). Women, Peace and Security Index 2019/20: Tracking sustainable peace through inclusion, justice, and security for women. Washington, DC: GIWPS and PRIO. Retrieved from: http:// www.giwps.georgetown.edu

Chapter 2 Case 1 Republic of the Union of Myanmar

Peace and Security Situation border-states inhabited by ethnic minority BRIEF PROFILE OF MYANMAR groups, including Kachin, Rakhine, Shan, and he Republic of the Union of Myan- Kayin. mar, formerly Burma, is Southeast Asia’s northernmost country. It THE ARMED CONFLICT shares borders with China to the Nature of Conflict Tnorth and northeast, Laos to the east, Thai- Three types of conflicts exist in present day land to the southeast, Bangladesh to the Myanmar, namely, inter communal conflict; west, and India to the northwest. It covers a one-sided violence, including state violence; total land area of 676,578 sq km with a total and non-international armed or subnational population of 54,569,764 (Worldometer, conflict (Jolliffe, 2015:9; Burke, A., N. Wil- 2020). The country’s capital was moved liams, P. Barron, K. Joliffe, and T. Carr, from Yangon, formerly Rangoon, to Pyin- 2017). mana then to Nay Pyi Taw (Naypyidaw) in 2005. Nay Pyi Taw became the capital in Inter-communal conflict is mainly between 2006 (Steinberg, 2019). religiously and ethnically defined groups and perpetrated by militia groups. Violence can A multi-ethnic country, Myanmar has ap- be organized and large-scale involving de- proximately 135 ethnic and 108 ethnolin- struction of property and mass displacement guistic groups (World Population Review, or localized and small scale sometimes driv- 2020). The Burmans, mostly concentrated in en by rumors or misinformation. The in- the seven divisions, including Irrawaddy riv- fighting between and among ethnic armed er valley and coastal strips, comprise more groups over shifting alliances, rivalries, and than half of the population. Minority ethnic control of land and resources as well as the groups, such as Kachin, Karen, Shan, armed clashes between Buddhists and Mus- Rakhine, Mon, Kayan, Wa, and others, lims in Buddhist dominated states, such as mostly residing in the seven resource-rich Rakhine, can be considered classic examples border states, comprise one third of the of inter-communal conflicts. population (Warren et al, 2018; World Pop- ulation Review, 2019). Armed conflicts are One-sided violence in Myanmar involves at- mainly concentrated in the resource-rich tacks on unarmed civilian populations by armed groups, such as the Tatmadaw and Border Guard forces (BGF), pro- government militia, and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). Such violence can be in the form of armed actors’ failure to sanction abuses against civilians, including sexual as- saults and murder, heavy crackdown on civilians staging peaceful protest actions, and forcible displacement of entire civilian populations. The mass displacement and killings, bordering on genocide, of thousands of Rohingyas along the border with Bangladesh and mass displacement of thousands of Ka- chins in Kachin State are glaring examples of

such one-sided violence. The military’s clashes for years as various ethnic groups crackdown on peaceful protesters during and governance actors with overlapping the 1988 student uprising and the 2007 Saf- claims to land and resources have continued fron Revolution led by Buddhist monks to wage war with one another. The long against the repressive, oppressive and inept standing armed conflict between the govern- military regime are also examples of such ment’s military forces, the Tatmadaw, and one-sided violence. Unarmed civilians have EAOs can be traced back to the non- no means to defend or protect themselves implementation of the February 1947 from such violence. Panglong Agreement between General Aung San, a military hero from the fight for inde- Non-international or subnational conflict is pendence, and ethnic national leaders from exemplified by the ongoing armed conflict, the frontier areas of Shan, Kachin, and Chin. considered as one of the world’s longest- (Awng, Gum San, Mi Aye Khine, and Nyan running civil wars spanning over 70 years, Tun Aung, 2019, p.2). between the Tatmadaw and EAOs. The My- anmar government has attempted to find The Panglong Agreement articulates the peaceful solutions to recognition of the then Interim Bur- such conflict with mese government by the leaders from EAOs in recent years. the frontier areas as well as the latter’s The succeeding discus- resolve to cooperate with the said gov- sions in this section ernment towards independence and a focus on a brief history unitary government: “believing that of the conflict, its root freedom will be more speedily achieved causes or drivers, and by the Shans, the Kachins and the effects on civilians, spe- Chins by their immediate co-operation cifically women and with the Interim Burmese Government children, the peace (Panglong Agreement, February 1947).” process, role of CSOs It outlines the framework for the ad- in the peace process, ministration of the federated states, and issues and challeng- according rights and privileges es in the peace pro- “fundamental in democratic countries” cess. States affected to the citizens of the frontier areas by major non- (Panglong Agreement, February 1947). international conflicts It guarantees the self- determination are: Rakhine, Shan, Ka- and rights, including the right to secede chin, and Kayin. after a ten-year period, of ethnic minorities. Such agreement collapsed fol- Brief History lowing the assassination of General Aung of Conflict San in July 1947, shortly before the country The ever volatile peace and security situa- gained independence from Britain in 1948 tion in Myanmar is a complex dynamics of (Sakhong, 2017; Awng, Gum San, Mi Aye interlocking political, sociocultural, and eco- Khine, and Nyan Tun Aung, 2019, p.2). nomic factors adversely impacting its people, especially the women and children, for dec- Civil war broke out between the central ades. Myanmar has been ravaged by armed government in Yangon, led by U Nu of the

Anti -Fascist People’s Freedom League party mandate in the November 2020 elections, (AFPFL), and ethnic armed groups with the has continued to appoint, co-appoint, or ap- failure of the former to honor and implement prove most senior positions in the state or the provisions of the Panglong Agreement. regional governments (EMReF, 2019; Such war intensified after the 1962 military UNICEF,2014). Also, the status of the 2008 coup and has remained unabated up to the Constitutional amendments to incorporate present times. Infighting and disputes along the demands of ethnic minority groups re- ethno-national lines and on ideologies be- mains uncertain despite two separate amend- tween and among these numerous EAOs ment processes in 2013 and in 2019. Such have merely exacerbated the situation processes failed to produce significant results (EMReF, 2019, p. 17; Warren, Roslyn, Anna (EMReF, 2019; Fülscher, 2020). Applebaum, Holly Fuhman, and Briana Maw- by, 2018, p.15; Global Security, 2020; AIPR, Ethnic minority groups have limited access to 2015, pp. 85-87; Burke et al, 2017). political positions and continued to be side- lined in civil service positions in the central Root Causes of Conflict government. The Bamar ethnic elites in Yan- Root causes or drivers of conflict in Myan- gon and Nay Pyi Taw continue to dominate mar can be categorized into three, namely, Myanmar’s governance (Emah, 2020; EMReF, political, sociocultural, and economic. Politi- 2019). Meanwhile, EAOs and their affiliated cal factors include centralization or exclu- political parties pursue their economic and sionary patterns of governance; lack of con- political interests rather than actually repre- sensus on federalism; lack of freedom, de- senting the desires and needs of their respec- mocracy and democratic accountability; lack tive local communities (EMReF, 2019). of rule of law; and lack of governance capacity. Sociocultural factors include inter-group Rampant corruption, lack of the rule of law, intolerance, fear, and mistrust; ethnic or reli- and conflict within and between political par- gious exclusion; and lack of an inclusive na- ties manifest Myanmar’s lack of capacity for tional identity. Economic factors include re- governance (UNICEF, 2014). Perpetrating gional inequality, resource ownership or con- crimes with impunity against the civilian pop- trol, and conflict economy creating incentives ulation, such as murder, rape, disappearanc- for armed actors to perpetuate conflict. es, and the like, by the Tatmadaw, EAOs and militia groups, has merely strengthened the Political people’s perception that only armed organi- The ongoing conflict, which began following zations could ensure their security and pro- the collapse of the 1947 Panglong Agree- tection. Their identities have already become ment, has continued to be incited by in- so interlinked with armed groups represent- fighting and dispute between parties advocating them (EMRef, 2019). Corollarily, routine ing for autonomy and self-determination and violations of ceasefire agreements by parties those favoring centralized multi-ethnic state involved, such as the Tatmadaw and EAOs, with Yangon as seat of the government. Re- demonstrate the lack of respect of these par- latedly, lack of consensus on federalism and ties for the rule of law (EMReF, 2019; the highly centralized form of government UNICEF, 2014). Political repression, lack of have continued to fuel tensions. Despite sig- freedom, and lack of democratic accountabil- nificant reforms in recent years, the NLD ity further ignite the resolve of ethnic minori- government of Aung San Suu Kyi, given fresh ties to continue fighting against the military.

Sociocultural and EAOs in Northern Shan, Rakhine, and Attempts towards building a “Myanmar” na- Kachin is no exception; it has been caused tional identity, as stipulated in government more by economic rather than political in- policies of Burmanization or Myanmarization, terests of parties involved. EAOs, specifically have promoted the Bamar majority as supe- the non-signatories to the NCA, largely rior and institutionalized systematic discrimi- depend on the exploitation of natural nation against and domination of ethnic mi- resources, such as timber, precious metals norities, including their culture and language and stones, gas, oil, as well as production (EMReF, 2019; Ohmar, 2019). Anti-Muslim and exportation of narcotics, such as opium and anti-Rohingya sentiments have become and amphetamines, in the territories they apparent in some areas, such as in Rakhine control for their financial viability. Control State, where persecution, killings, and mass of natural resources in borderland regions displacement of the Rohingyas, considered as has engendered ethno-nationalism and cycles non-citizens and illegal migrants, allegedly of violence (Emah, 2020:1). Significant perpetrated by the Tatmadaw and radical- interests of the Tatmadaw, including former ized Buddhist movements (Ma Ba Tha and officers and their families, and the central 969), have earned international condemna- government have further complicated and tion. Such condemnation compelled Myan- exacerbated tensions in the resource-rich mar State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyii to territories (EMReF, 2019). appear and defend the country before the UN International Court of Justice in Decem- A new breed of ethnic national elites from ber 2019 (van Beek, 2019). Religious ten- the leaders of the EAOs has reportedly aris- sions between predominantly Christian Ka- en owing to economic rents such leaders chins with the Kachin Independence Army have been able to collect from the central (KIA) and Buddhist Bamars with militia and government’s exclusive exploitation of the Tatmadaw have fueled conflict in Kachin territories’ resources for development pro- state. jects, which, unfortunately, have not genu- inely benefited the ethnic minorities who Decades of armed conflicts, aggravated by inhabit the lands. Such lack of access to broken agreements and promises, have culti- development projects and their benefits has vated fear, mistrust, and intolerance be- further caused resentment and anger among tween and among the people across social the economically marginalized ethnic nation- and ethnic groups (EMReF, 2019). Such atti- alist population. tudes and sentiments have further increased tensions leading to the proliferation of Effects of Conflicts armed groups, thus making peace seemingly on Women and Children impossible to achieve. Also, media’s handling Women and children have always borne the of information on conflict, often inaccurate, brunt of the ravages of the primarily avoida- inflammatory and biased, has provoked ra- ble wars waged by men across countries and ther than quelled violence. across the ages. Myanmar women and children have not been spared from such a Economic plight; they continue to suffer the devastating Control of the vast natural resources of the effects of their country’s longstanding civil land has always been a main driver of armed war. These effects include sexual and gen- conflicts in Myanmar since time immemorial. der based violence, indiscriminate shelling of The ongoing conflict between the Tatmadaw civilian areas, burning of homes, physical 33

abuse, detention, torture, forced labor, hu- times are deliberately maimed, separated man trafficking, forced relocation, mass dis- from their families, forcibly recruited to the placement, killings, deliberate maiming of armed forces, sent to forced labor, such as children, family separations, poor living con- portering, or orphaned. Cases of sexual and ditions in refugee camps, including blocking gender based violence against men and boys of humanitarian aid, mental health problems, were also documented. and loss of livelihood (HRC, 2019; Ohmar, 2019; Lee, 2018; ICRC, 2015; Aye, 2015; Government Interventions SHRF and SWAN, 2002; Irrawaddy, 2020; to Resolve the Conflict Tawn, 2015, pp. 85-89). Myanmar central government has initiated interventions towards the resolution of the Rape of women and girls serves as weapon longstanding armed conflicts and attainment of war perpetrated by armed actors, includ- of considerable peace between and among ing the Tatmadaw and EAOs. It is used to the government, ethnic nationalities, and intimidate, sow fear, and punish the civilian armed actors, including the military, in the population. Documented cases of rape and country. These interventions include: 1. sign- gang rape involve extreme brutality and toring of ceasefires with 40 ethnic armed groups ture, such as beating, mutilation, and suffoca- in 1989-2010; 2. signing of bilateral ceasefire tion resulting in death. Exacerbating the agreements with 15 EAOs in 2011-2013; 3. plight of women victims of rape is the expe- drafting and signing of the Nationwide rience of shame and rejection following the Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with EAOs in assault. Perpetrators are never arrested and 2015; and 4. convening the Union Peace sent to justice. Conference (UPC), or the 21st Century Panglong Conference (21 CPC). Specific to With their husbands drafted to fight or de- women, peace and security issue, govern- tained as suspects by armed actors, women ment interventions include the provision of are forced to carry the burden of caring and 30 percent gender quotas in the peace pro- fending for their children, and sometimes cess at all levels, and adoption of the Nation- with dependent elderly parents. Young al Strategic Plan for the Advancement of women are lured into working across the Women (NSPAW) 2013-2022, which was border, with a promise of good pay and rooted in 1995 Beijing Platform for Action sometimes an opportunity to study, only to (BPfA) (Warren et al, 2018). end up as victims of human trafficking. Some are able to escape and return to the camps Ceasefires, Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, despite fear of getting ostracized and losing and Peace Dialogues family and community support. The quasi-democratic government of Presi- dent U Thein Sein started initiating measures Poor living conditions in refugee camps or in mid-2000s through a comprehensive na- relocation sites, including inadequate food, tional peace process at the local, state, and lack of water, access to proper sanitation, parliamentary levels. It formally called for a and essential items, and lack of basic services, peace dialogue among representatives of result in malnutrition and diseases especially government, major armed groups, and civil- among the children. Mental health problems, ians in 2011. It signed various bilateral such as post-traumatic stress, depression, ceasefire agreements with 15 different EAOs and anxiety are prevalent. Children often- in 2011-2013 (Min Zaw Oo, 2014; Aung,

2020). Prior to this, from 1989 to 2010, the Representatives of government, political military government reportedly signed parties, civilian population, Tatmadaw, and ceasefires with a total of 40 armed groups eight EAOs, out of the 18 major EAOs ex- (AIPR, 2018). In 2013, Thein Sein’s govern- pected, signed the NCA in October 2015. In ment attempted to consolidate various bilat- 2018, two more EAOs signed the NCA. eral agreements into a single Nationwide The initial eight EAO signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) (Aung, 2020; NCA are: Arakan Liberation Party (ALP); EMReF, 2019; Warren et al, 2018; Min Zaw Chin National Front (CNF); Democratic Ka- Oo, 2014). A team composed of 16 EAOs, ren Benevolent Army (DKBA); New Mon the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordinating Party (NMP); Pa-O National Liberation Or- Team (NCCT), was formed to serve as the ganization (PNLO); Shan State Army/ main EAO negotiating body. The NCCT Restoration Council of Shan State (SSA/ drafted the text of the NCA. RCSS); and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF). The two other EAO signa- The NCA serves as a ceasefire agreement as tories that signed in 2018 are: Karen Na- well as a framework for the ongoing formal tional Union/Karen National Liberation Ar- peace process. It seeks to “secure an endur- my (KNU); and Lahu Democratic Union ing peace based on the principles of dignity (LDU). The eight non-signatories are: Ka- and justice, through an inclusive political dia- renni National Progressive Party (KNPP); logue process involving all relevant stake- Kachin Independence Army (KIA); National holders” (NCA, 2015). Recognizing the Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA-ESS); principles of democracy and federalism, na- National Socialist Council of Nagaland- tional equality and right to self- Khaplang (NSCN-K); Shan State Army/Shan determination based on liberty, equality and State Proress Party (SSA/SSPP); Wa State justice, the NCA deems crucial the holding Army/Party (UWSA); Ta’ang National Liber- of a political dialogue, the Union Peace Con- ation Army (TNLA); and Arakan Army ference (UPC), as part of the political (AA). roadmap and forming a democratic federal union towards peace (NCA, 2015; Min Zaw The first Union Peace Conference (UPC) Oo, 2014; Minoletti and Sandi, 2018). It has was convened in January 2016, shortly be- three ceasefire monitoring and political dia- fore Thein Sein left office and following the logue mechanisms, namely, Joint Implemen- drafting of a framework for a political dia- tation Coordination Meeting (JICM); Joint logue process. Ten armed groups, consid- Monitoring Committee (JMC); and Union ered the most powerful, which did not sign Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC). the NCA were not able to participate in the The JICM implements the terms of the said dialogue (Aung, 2020; Pauli, 2020; NCA. The JMC monitors the agreement at Matheson, 2019; EMReF, 2019). the union, state, and local levels. The UPDJC serves as the secretariat for the UPC and is In 2015, following victory in the national responsible for important aspects of the elections, the newly installed government of process, such as pre-negotiations and con- the National League for Democracy (NLD), sensus building on issues to be brought be- led by State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, fore the UPC (EMReF, 2019:11; Warren et assumed the task of organizing and leading al, 2018). the peace process. Following Thein Sein’s UPC initiative, it convened the 21st Century

Panglong Conference (21CPC), a symbolic ing hostilities with signatory EAOs and the reference to the 1947 Panglong, in August EAOs’ acceptance of such principles would 2016. Three more political dialogues fol- break new ground for future compromise, lowed: in May 2017, in July 2018, and, the even as EAOs were encouraged by the pro- latest, in August 2020, shortly before the spect of continued peace dialogues under November general elections (Aung, 2020; the incoming government (Pauli, 2020). EMReF, 2019, Warren et al, 2018). As in the first UPC under Thein Sein, only signatory A few days after winning the November EAOs were allowed to participate in the dia- 2020 general elections, the NLD reportedly logue while non-signatory EAOs were invit- called on 48 ethnic political parties to join ed as observers (Minoletti and Sandi, 2018; the former in building a democratic federal EMRef, 2019:17; Joint Peace Fund, 2019). union towards ending the civil war. Ethnic parties invited include those representing Since the first round of 21CPC in 2016, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Shan, Rakhine, Mon, modest progress has reportedly been Kayan, Lahu, Ta’ang (Palaung), Kaman, achieved, including the agreed 37 principles Khami, Mro, Dainet, Tai Leng, Chin, Danu, for a future Union Peace Accord. Despite Zomi, Kokang, Dawei, Pao, Akha, Zo, Na- thus, the most powerful EAOs have contin- ga, Kayah, Lisu, Wa and Inn. The call was ued to refuse signing the NCA and conflicts seen as a positive step from the NLD to between the Tatmadaw and the EAOs in move the peace process forward. Some Shan and Rakhine States have intensified. parties, however, were skeptical and doubt- The pulling out from the negotiations of two ful such call would be able repair the rift most important and largest NCA signatory with ethnic groups the NLD’s vice chair, EAOs, the KNU and RCSS, after the July Zaw Myint Maung, created when he encour- 2018 21CPC owing to disagreements with aged voters to elect the NLD party instead the Tatmadaw on some proposals, has of an ethnic party during the campaign peri- stalled the peace process for two years od (Nyein, 2020). (Aung, 2020:3-4; Pauli, 2018;). The government of Suu Kyi attempted to break the two National framework and commitment year deadlock by convening the August 2020 on gender representation 21CPC in Nay Pyi Taw and sending invites The framework for the political dialogue to seven non-signatory EAOs. All 10 signato- provides for the reservation of 30 percent ry EAOs participated in but the seven non- to women’s participation in the selection signatory refused to participate, as their ally, process as well as in the working commit- the AA, which the government labelled as a tees of the UPDJC. Achieving, however, the terrorist organization, was excluded (Pauli, said 30 percent quota for women’s participa- 2020). tion in peace mechanisms has yet to be realized. Even as it has reportedly been improv- The August 2020 21CPC has reportedly ing, women’s representation at the Panglong achieved two things: adoption of a further 20 has averaged 20 percent while in the UPDJC, principles, and continuation of formal peace less than 17 percent (Warren et al, 2018). dialogues with the incoming government. Observers, however, doubt the additional 20 The NSPAW allows the government to fulfil principles the Tatmadaw proposed would its international policy obligations under the serve as breakthroughs to end the continu- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) space for their engagement in the first area and the BPfA. It calls for the improvement of has been limited. systems, structures, and practices to ensure women’s equal participation in decision- CSOs in the negotiated peace process have making and leadership at all levels of society served as observers in the UPC/21 CPC pro- through various measures, including the ap- ceedings and in consultative forums, such as plication of quotas. It calls for the increased national dialogues, the UPDJC convenes and participation of women in the development as advisors to EAOs in the UPC/21 CPC. and implementation of government policy, There are three types of national dialogues and for the allocation of sufficient budgetary, CSOs can participate in, namely, regional; human, and material resources by govern- ethnic-based; and issue-based. Issue based ment and non-government organizations for dialogues are civil society peace forums main- the range of activities and policies described ly for CSOs (EMReF, 2019; Paung Sie Faciity, in the plan (Warren et al, 2018). 2018:17).

Role of CSOs in Peacebuilding With limited space in formal negotiations, Hundreds of CSOs exist in Myanmar CSOs have found alternative and informal (EMReF, 2019; Paung Sie Facility, 2018; ADB, spaces, such as informally presenting their 2015; Lahtaw et al, 2014). Not all, however, policy recommendations to EAOs and politi- are engaged in peacebuilding. Those in the cal parties, acting as advisors to these parties regions are less concerned with the peace in the 21CPC, and contributing policy op- process than those in the States, especially tions as well as meeting with NRPC officials those heavily affected by armed conflicts through civil society forums on peace pro- (Paung Sie Facility, 2018). cess. With expertise in organizing, facilitation, and documentation at national level po- In its 2019 study, EMReF provides a compre- litical dialogues, CSOs provide technical as- hensive and detailed discussion on the role of sistance, such as facilitating and documenting CSOs in Myanmar’s peace process, including meetings in the peace process (EMReF, background of conflict from 2011 to 2018, 2019:44). enabling and constraining factors in CSOs’ work, and CSOs involvement and relevance Outside the formal peace process, CSOs in the peace process. The following discus- have engaged in early warning systems, moni- sion on the role of CSOs in the peace pro- toring of crimes and abuses, ceasefire moni- cess is largely culled from the said study, toring, research-based advocacy, in-person even as it occasionally cites Paung Sie Facility meetings, workshops, exchange programs, (2018). pro-peace media and dialogue, and problem- solving workshops. They have helped pro- There are three areas of peacebuilding CSOs tect civilians by advocating for their safety in in Myanmar engage in. These are: 1. formal moments of crisis, and mediating between peace negotiations (Track 1); 2. institutions civilians and armed actors. Civil society in- and forums supporting the official negotia- volvement in unofficial monitoring of bilateral tions (Track 2); and 3. peacebuilding outside ceasefire agreements and the NCA has gen- the formal peace process (Track 3). CSO erated important information about, and ac- peacebuilders have mainly engaged and con- countability mechanisms for, ceasefire viola- tributed in the first and third areas, even as tions across all conflict parties, thus support-

ing the reduction of violence at the commu- form (WIP), and Mon Women’s Organiza- nity level, and stabilizing the negotiated peace tion (MWO) (Warren et al, 2018; Ryan, process. 2019; PSF, 2016). These women’s CSOs have directly and indirectly participated in the Noteworthy is the initiative by NP Myanmar peace process. They have engaged in political in partnership with the United States Agency dialogues, advocacy, research, networking, for International Development (USAID) enti- information, communication, and capacity tled Women Contributing to Peace Mapping building activities. The section on women Project. Developed by the USAID’s Kann Let peacebuilding initiatives discusses women’s program, the project aimed to highlight the CSOs’ various peacebuilding initiatives in inclusion of women stakeholders from more detail. EAOs, government, civil society, media, and others in the peace process; encourage net- Issues and Challenges working and collaboration among these In the Peace Process women; and increase support for women Myanmar’s peace process has been fraught working on critical issues across the country with a number of issues and challenges from (US Embassy Myanmar, 2019; Nyein, 2019. the start (Aung, 2020; Emah, 2020; Pauli, 2020; EMReF, 2019; Mathieson, 2019). This With data collected in August 2018 - January section discusses some of these issues and 2019, the project identifies a total of 674 challenges which can be categorized into women from 383 organizations working on three main aspects, namely, minority ethnic peace across 14 states and regions. It has groups and rural communities; concerning produced maps of the 383 organizations, the NCA; and central government’s ap- areas of expertise of women, and actionable proach and stance. The first aspect includes: steps towards women’s inclusion in peace- marginalization of some ethnic groups and related activities. (Such maps can be accessed rural communities in the peace process; dis- online: https://ispmyanmarpeacedesk.com). connect between central government and rural or local communities; and lack of own- Women’s CSOs in Peacebuilding ership of the peace process among local Women’s CSOs in Myanmar are at the fore- communities. The second aspect includes: front in advancing the interests and needs of convincing all armed actors to sign the NCA; women, specifically those heavily affected by disputes on the process and NCA principles the conflict, in the peace process. Foremost between government and military and signa- among these women’s CSOs are the Wom- tory and non-signatory EAOs; inability of en’s Organizations Network (WON), Gen- JMC to resolve disagreements between mili- der Equality Network (GEN), Women in tary and NCA signatory groups; and demand Peace (WIN-Peace), Alliance for Gender In- for armed groups to accept restrictions in clusion in the Peace Process (AGIPP), Wom- their areas of operation. The third aspect en Can Do It (WCDI), Shan Women’s Ac- includes: NLD government’s bureaucratic tion Network (SWAN), Women’s League of approach; lack of neutrality. Burma (WLB), Shalom (Nyein) Foundation (SF), Women’s League of Chinland (WLC), On minority ethnic groups and Wunpawng Ninghtoi (WN), Kachin Women rural communities Peace Network (KWPN), Burmese Wom- Marginalization of some ethnic groups en’s Union (BWU), Women’s Initiative Plat- and rural communities in the peace process

Approximately 51 EAOs exist in Myanmar Religious mindsets inhibiting people (Aung, 2020). The central government with from participating in the peace process the Tatmadaw selected less than half, mainly Core values, such as acceptance of suffering major armed groups, to participate in the and liberation from attachment, keep many official negotiations. Only 10 of these major practicing Buddhists from engaging in active armed groups have so far signed the NCA. political resistance. Similarly, belief in the Such seemingly exclusive selection heightens power of forgiveness or punishment in the the grievance and perceptions of further afterlife keeps many practicing Christians marginalization of other ethnic groups and from seeing the value of participating in the undermines the legitimacy of the peace ne- present process. gotiations. Points agreed upon in the NCA have been seen as advancing the interests of On the NCA the Tatmadaw and certain ethnic elites and Convincing all ethnic armed groups have not necessarily reflected the lived reali- to sign the NCA ties, including concerns and demands, of Convincing all ethnic armed groups, espe- armed actors and ethnic groups unrepre- cially the strongest ones, has continued to sented in the negotiations as well as the ru- challenge the central government. Most of ral communities the conflicts have directly the strongest EAOs, accounting for roughly affected. 80% of all EAOs in the country and part of the Federal Political Negotiation Consulta- Disconnect between central government tive Committee led by the powerful UWSP, and rural or local communities have continued to refuse to sign the NCA Changes in the political, economic, and so- and to wage war with the Tatmadaw. Even cial systems have been instituted at the cen- as they have been allowed to attend the 21 tral government level. Such changes have CPC sessions as observers, these non- not been felt in the rural or local communi- signatory EAOs have not been allowed to ties, specifically in ethnic and border areas. participate in the talks and decision-making. Socioeconomic development has yet to They have rejected the NCA and called for trickle down to the grassroots level. fresh negotiations. Military actions in Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan States, such as building Lack of ownership of the peace process strategic roads through KNU territory in among local communities Kayin State, have further eroded trust and Years of repressive and oppressive military confidence in the NCA (Aung, 2020: 9-11; regime and laws curtailing dissent, such as EMReF, 2019). Unlawful Associations Act, have cultivated fear among the populace. People, particular- Exclusion of militias in the peace process ly in local communities have been wary to Related to the exclusion of other ethnic participate in peace process activities con- armed groups is the exclusion of militias in ducted or facilitated by CSOs for fear of the peace process. As discussed, conflict in getting apprehended and punished. They Myanmar does not merely involve the have yet to acknowledge and appreciate the Tatmadaw and EAOs; it involves inter- value of the peace process in their individual communal violence perpetrated by militia and communal life in order to allow them to groups as well. Their sentiments and de- own such process and participate willingly mands are not heard and acted upon by and actively towards its success. concerned stakeholders with their exclusion from the peace process.

Disputes on process and NCA principles revise the said committee’s structure or in- Continued refusal of the non-signatory EAOs clude international observers or advisers in to sign the NCA have been premised on disa- the ceasefire monitoring process. greements with the government and the Tatmadaw in the following: requirement by On the central government’s approach government and Tatmadaw for EAOs to sign and stance the NCA prior to participation in the peace NLD’s Bureaucratic approach to negotiations process; demand for armed groups to accept The NLD has allegedly been bureaucratic and major restrictions on their areas of opera- inflexible in dealing with formal peace negoti- tion, including withdrawal of AA from ations. It has given priority to formal talks Rakhine State; military code of conduct, de- over informal discussions, thus further mar- marcation, troop relocation, and ceasefire ginalizing and excluding non-signatory EAOs. monitoring; establishment of a single national armed forces, including future status of Lack of neutrality armed groups and possible integration into Its seeming lack of political will to challenge the military; non-secession and right to self- the military’s position and unwillingness to determination; and possible form of federal- make significant concessions to ethnic minor- ism. ities allegedly betray its position as broadly aligned with that of the Tatmadaw’s as well as Meanwhile, disputes between the govern- its partiality towards the interests of the Bur- ment and signatory EAOs over interpretation man Buddhist majority, thus further increas- on some interim arrangements in the NCA, ing resentment among EAOs (Aung, 2020; including coordination on programs and pro- Lahtaw, 2014). jects in EAO held territories on health, education, socioeconomic development, environ- The NLD government of Aung San Suu Kyi mental conservation, and drug eradication, has repeatedly assured the general popula- have stalled progress. NRPC has required tion of its commitment to pursue peace ne- EAOS to seek permission prior to imple- gotiations to resolve the country’s longstand- menting such programs and projects in their ing civil war, especially now that it has been respective territories. EAOs, on the other given fresh mandate by the people in the No- hand, have argued jointly agreed upon pro- vember 2020 elections. Some stakeholders, jects and initiatives should be a partnership. observers, and critics, however, have re- Also, they have accused the government of mained sceptical and doubtful such negotia- introducing laws, such as on land acquisition, tions could put an end to the conflicts. policies and programs affecting minority eth- Armed actors involved, specifically the nic groups without any consultation. Tatmadaw and EAOs, both NCA signatory and non-signatory, have refused to relent and Inability of JMC to resolve disagreements compromise their strong-held positions on between military and signatory EAOs the terms and conditions of the peace pro- Relatedly, the JMC, chaired by military offic- cess. Complex and multidimensional, conflicts ers at all levels, has been rendered inutile in in the country encompass not only conflict resolving disputes between the military and between the military and the EAOs but also signatory EAOs, thus further eroding trust inter-communal and one-sided violence per- and confidence in the peace process. The petrated by different armed actors, including military has rejected proposals from EAOs to militia and vigilante groups, against civilians.

Such conflicts require more than formal They have served as delegate to the UPC/21 peace negotiations to be resolved. Econom- CPC as observer or adviser, peace negotia- ic, including international trade and invest- tor, facilitator, or mediator. They have ments, and sociocultural factors need to be served as peace and women’s rights advo- looked into and addressed and a broader cates, educators, and capacity builders. process of dialogue and national reconcilia- These women are: Naw Zipporah Sein; Khin tion needs to be conducted towards a last- Ma Ma Myo; Mary Twam; Nang Raw ing peace. Zahkung; Nan Sandi; Saw Mra Raza Linn; Lway Aye Nang; Phyoe Phyoe Aung; Nang Women in Peacebuilding Lao Liang Won (aka Tay Tay); Khin Ohmar; PROFILE OF WOMEN PEACEBUILDERS May Sabai Phyu; Ja Nan Lahtaw; Mi Yin A number of women in Myanmar are active Chan; Dr. San San Aye; Zin Mar Aung; Dr. peacebuilders, even as they have been un- Wah Wah Maung; Mi Sue Pwint; Lway Aye derrepresented in formal peace negotiations Nang; Thin Thin Aung; Nang Phyu Phyu Linn; and their participation in formal peace dia- Nang Pu; Mi Kun Chan Non; Daw Doi Bu logues has been mostly relegated to discus- Nbrang; and Daw Mi Yin Chan. sions on social issues (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020; Khullar, 2019; Warren et al Unidentified and unrecognized are the many 2018). The 2019 NP Myanmar mapping women in local or grassroots communities project of women contributing to peace re- who have participated and made a significant veals that more than 670 women from about dent in peacebuilding outside the formal 400 organizations across 14 regions and peace process (Pepper, 2018). These are states have been involved in peacebuilding. ethnic minority women who rarely have the Of these women, however, only about a opportunity to get education, ordinary wives quarter has served as delegates to the for- and mothers who take charge of the chil- mal UPC (Nyein, 2019; US Embassy Myan- dren, parents and in laws, and of the entire mar, 2019). household.

Meanwhile, this baseline study has been able AREAS OF PARTICIPATION to identify a total of 24 women peacebuild- AND INITIATIVES IN PEACEBUILDING ers as they are featured in different pub- Myanmar women, including women’s CSOs, lished materials, videos, and interviews on have engaged directly and indirectly in and the net (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020; outside the formal peace process. They have National Endowment for Development, conducted various peacebuilding activities at 2020; Warren et al, 2018; PSF, 2016; Tawn, the national and local levels. In formal peace 2015; Search for the Common Good, n.d; negotiations, they have initiated the follow- AWPR-AIPR; GIWPS, 2014). Most of ing: helped negotiate the NCA; served as these women are highly educated, some negotiators and facilitators; served as ob- even schooled abroad, co-founders and lead- servers (including to NCA signing) and offi- ers of national and local women’s organiza- cial advisors to EAOs; monitored ceasefire tions and networks, and international peace implementation; and submitted policy rec- awardees. Some have held relatively high or ommendations resulting from discussions in leadership positions in government and in- civil society forums to the UPDJC (Council ternational organizations. A few were for- on Foreign Relations, 2020; Khullar, 2019; mer student activists and soldiers of EAOs. Warren et al, 2018; PSF, 2016).

the CSO Forum Working Committee and 8 Outside the formal peace process, women of the 75 members of the UPDJC Working have conducted various advocacy, infor- Com•mittee. It is noted some of these wom- mation, education, and communication initia- en have acted as conduits to and backchan- tives. These include: collection and dissemi- nel with other women, including women’s nation of information on issues concerning CSOs, on the ground, updating the latter on women’s advancement and needs; capacity the progress of the peace process and building of women leaders and women at the providing opportunities for targeted advoca- grassroots; advocacy for women’s participa- cy (Warren et al, 2018). tion in the peace process and protection of women; and provision of basic needs of Participation of six women in formal peace women and children in conflict affected are- negotiations is noted. Saw Mra Raza Lin of as (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020; the ALP and Naw Zipporah Sein of KNU Khullar, 2019; Warren et al, 2018; Pepper, were part of the 15-member senior delega- 2018). tion (SD) in the 2015 NCA signing with the latter serving as lead negotiator of the signa- In formal peace negotiations tory EAOs in succeeding peace talks As mentioned, only about a quarter of the (Warren et al, 2018; PSF, 2016). Ja Nan more than 670 women from about 400 or- Lahtaw and Nang Raw Zakhung of SF have ganizations across 14 states and regions served as technical advisers to the SD while identified in the 2019 NP Myanmar mapping Daw Doi Bu Nbrang and Daw Mi Yin Chan, project have been involved in the UPC both MPs, have served on the Union Peace- (Nyein, 2019; US Embassy Myanmar, 2019). making Working Committee (UPWC), the In the NCA signing, one out of 10 govern- government’s negotiating body (Warren et ment signatories, one in 24 EAO signatories, al, 2018). and two of 21 witness signatories were women (Warren et al, 2018; AIPR, 2015). In Outside formal peace process the 2015 negotiations, women comprised 5 As mentioned, outside the formal peace pro- percent of the total negotiators, and in Janu- cess, women have engaged in various advo- ary 2016 UPC, they comprised 8 percent of cacy, information, education, and communi- the total negotiators. Over the first three cation initiatives. They have lobbied confer- rounds of the UPC/21 CPC, women’s partic- ence delegates, specifically male, for issues ipation had reportedly increased. It was at concerning women’s advancement and 13 percent in the August 2016 UPC/21CPC; needs, such as strong legal protection against 17 percent in May 2017; and 22 percent in sexual and gender based violence (SGBV), July 2018. It, however, decreased back to 17 women’s inclusion in the peace process, and percent in the fourth round in August 2020. gender mainstreaming measures. They have consolidated women’s voices through fo- Women comprised 5 percent within Myan- rums and communicated such voices to mar’s NCA mechanisms and 9 percent of EAOs and officials in the peace process. the JCM members at the state level. They, They have conducted private meetings with however, had no representation at the un- representatives of the peace process and ion level JCM. In the February 2017 CSO identified champions, the most progressive Forum, women comprised about 37 percent ones, among government officials to advance of the total representatives. Meanwhile, their cause (Warren et al, 2018; PSF, 2016, women make up 10 out of 43 members of p.10; Pepper, 2018, p.68).

natory gender norms and expectations, Women have tracked and issued press patriarchal power structures, lack of national statements on the number of women direct- plan of action on UNSCR 1325, and frag- ly involved in peace negotiations as well as mented nature of women’s movement the number of submitted and adopted proposals on gender-equitable policies at the ENABLING FACTORS 21CPC. They have used ethnic politics in Reputable personal characteristics of women enjoining concerned armed groups to pro- Women’s personal characteristics, such as tect their women towards maintaining a trust builders and brokers, knowledge and strong ethnic nation. They have document- expertise in peace negotiations and conflict ed women’s experiences on the ground, in- resolution, credibility, integrity, and cordial cluding effects of conflict on women and interpersonal relationships with male col- their needs, as bases for drafting and submit- leagues involved in formal peace negotiating proposals towards a more inclusive tions, have facilitated advancing women’s peace process. They have empowered other interest and needs in the peace process. women through capacity building activities With knowledge and expertise on peace and to advocate for their own effective participa- international affairs and positive reputations, tion in peacebuilding. They have been in- some women have been invited to serve as volved in early warning systems, alerting fel- technical advisers in peace negotiations. low villagers of entry of troops, finding hid- Other women, on the other hand, have capi- ing places in the forest for women, children, talized on their cordial relationships with and elderly, assisting men to flee from the male colleagues who serve as representa- village, and the like (Warren et al, 2018; tives of EAOs in the peace process by rally- Ryan, 2019; AIPR, 2015). Meanwhile, wom- ing and convincing them to consider, accept, en’s CSOs at the grassroots level have pri- and adopt policy recommendations resulting oritised serving the needs of women and from discussions in civil society forums con- children in their respective conflict affected vened by women’s CSOs (Warren et al, ethnic communities (Pepper, 2018). 2018; AIPR, 2019).

Enabling and Constraining International and national frameworks Factors in Peacebuilding on women’s participation Women peacebuilders have encountered a International frameworks, such as the number of enabling factors and constraining CEDAW and UNSCR 1325, have served as in advancing women’s interests and needs in platforms for women from diverse back- the peace process (Council on Foreign Rela- grounds to collaborate on common issues, tions, 2020; Warren et al, 2018, pp.19-28; such as safeguarding women against conflict- PSF, 2019). Enabling factors include reputa- related sexual violence. ble personal characteristics of women peacebuilders; international and national The NSPAW, the country’s main policy doc- frameworks on women’s participation in de- ument on gender issues, has 12 priority are- cision making, including the peace process; as, namely, livelihoods, education and train- and support from the international commu- ing, health, violence against women, emer- nity. Constraining factors are biased person- gencies, economy, decision making, institu- al perceptions and attitudes of women re- tional mechanisms for the advancement of garding peacebuilding; sociocultural discrimi- women, human rights, media, environment,

43 and youth ((Ryan, 2019, p. 13; Warren et al, 2015; GEN, 2015).

2018). It has allowed women leaders to ef- Relatedly, women have to carry the triple fectively mobilize fellow women to partici- burden of caring for the children, parents and pate in the peace process and advocate for in laws, and household maintenance, thus women’s rights despite limitations, such as leaving no more room for them to enter the lack of implementation of the plan, its discon- labor force and participate in the public nect with the grassroots women’s move- sphere. Furthermore, they need to negotiate ment, and fragmented nature of the women’s multiple identities of ethnicity, class and gen- movement (Warren et al, 2018). der. They are not to go against traditions and their identities as part of an ethnic group, as The 2016 commitment by conflict parties to part of a social class, and as a woman. reserve 30 percent quota for women’s participation in the peace process at all levels Patriarchal power structures has allowed women to compel conflict par- Myanmar ranks 161 out of 191 countries in ties to fulfil their commitment and ensure terms of women’s representation in parlia- such agreed upon quota is reached. ment, and the second lowest in Southeast Asia based from the International Parliamen- Support from the international community tary Union (IPU) (Ryan, 2019, p.9). The Support from the international community in country’s 2008 Constitution stipulates certain the form of technical assistance, funding for public posts as suitable only for men, thus peacebuilding initiatives, or projection of limiting women’s access to powerful eco- their plight to the public at the national and nomic and political positions, even as their international levels, has allowed and even em- labor force participation rate is 75 percent. boldened women peacebuilders and their Such limitation makes them underrepresent- CSOs to continue and sustain their various ed in politics and security sector. They are peacebuilding initiatives amidst challenges. made to assume posts without decision making powers given their perceived lack of criti- CONSTRAINING FACTORS cal and decision making skills (Warren et al, Discriminatory sociocultural gender norms 2018). and expectations Discriminatory sociocultural gender norms Such structural limitations for women in the and expectations keep women from actively public sphere are also apparent in EAOs. engaging in peacebuilding. Cultural and reli- Women play subordinate roles in all EAOs gious norms and expectations vary across despite undergoing basic military training in ethnic groups in Myanmar. They, however, handling and using weapons and engaging in sustain the mindset that women are inferior the battlefield. They are not permitted to and powerless in relation to men. Men are take rigorous military training, told to follow expected to be the leader in both public and orders from the men, assigned in non- private spheres, head of the family, protector political committees, medical and administra- of the household, and decision maker. tive works, and the kitchen. In the frontline, Women, on the other hand, are quiet and they are not allowed to fight but rather skillful in household chores. Engaging in the tasked to encourage their male counterparts public sphere, specifically in politics, viewed and provide the latter with ammunition as violent and dangerous, is not for them. (Kolås and Meite, 2019, p.4). Moreover, they have no skills in critical think- ing and decision making (PSF, 2016; Nyein, Lack of NAP on the UNSCR 1325 is seen as

44 part of the reasons for the limited aware- Warren et al (2018): ness among the people, especially those in Sharing of technical knowledge, government, women’s rights groups, and expertise, and skills youth organizations, of the relevance and Contribution to the 2015 NCA, importance of the WPS (Iyer and Yoon, ceasefire negotiations and political 2020). For some women’s CSOs, a NAP dialogues as negotiators, co- could increase the effectiveness of their ad- facilitators, and official advisers to vocacy and facilitate the coordination of an EAOs; explicit WPS agenda inside Myanmar Development of NSPAW (Some women (Warren et al, 2018). leaders were involved in the development of NSPAW). Fragmented nature of women’s movement Draft legislation on Prevention and In the same manner that alliance building Protection of Violence Against consolidates and strengthens women’s voic- Women (PoVAW) bill that es, so also the dynamics within and among recognizes the need to protect women’s CSOs adversely affects to a certain women from all forms of violence extent the advocacy for women’s participa- (even as it was outside the peace tion in the peace process. Women’s move- process and was never passed). ment in Myanmar has been described as un- coordinated and disorganized with CSOs Advocacy divided into those established inside Myan- Inclusion of gender-friendly provisions in mar (“insiders”) and those established in ex- peace process frameworks, including ile during the junta years (“outsiders”). They a 30 percent quota for women’s have differing priorities depending on which participation in the peace process at level they operate. Grassroots CSOs are all levels; concerned with lack of access to justice for Joint decision-making provisions in the sexual violence and land grabbing while JMC ToR (Terms of Reference) CSOs working with international organiza- requiring all decisions related to JMC tions are wary of raising such issues that implementation be made jointly could result in alienating the government between the government and EAO (Warren et al, 2018, p.25). Competition for signatories; resources, with the Yangon based organiza- Raising and discussion of critical issues tions reportedly getting the bulk of the fund- and roots of conflict affecting ethnic ing, causes friction within the movement as minorities, including land rights, well. equitable sharing of resources, native tongue education, community Outcomes and Impacts security, forced displacement, gender of Initiatives in Peacebuilding based violence, and health care in the Through their various peacebuilding initia- political dialogues; tives or initiatives in and outside the formal Familiarization of peace process peace process, women, including women’s stakeholders with women’s CSOs, have been able to produce the fol- organizations, including their lowing outcomes and impacts as discussed advocacies. by Council on Foreign Relations (2020),

practices: Documentation and Information “Tea break” advocacy Dissemination Lobbying stakeholders in the formal peace Contribution to the UN’s listing of process while serving tea during breaks is a Myanmar’s military crimes of sexual strategy showing the ingenuity and creativity violence in armed conflict; of the women in convincing stakeholders to Better understanding of the extent of carry women’s interests and needs in the women’s participation in the peace negotiating table. Women are able to see process; and take every opportunity to advance their More informed advocacy for women’s cause. Their seemingly menial and insignifi- interests and needs resulting from cant task of serving tea becomes vital and communication of women directly significant in terms of advocating for the in- involved in the peace process re: clusion of gender-friendly provisions in the political stances of various individuals peace process frameworks. in the negotiations and updates on the progress of negotiations. Back channel discussions Conducting informal discussions with stake- Networking or alliance building holders simultaneous with the ongoing for- Consolidated and strengthened voices mal peace negotiations is a creative strategy and influence of women in the peace that allows women to optimize time and en- process. ergy as they participate in the political dialogues. Capacity building Changed women’s mindset on the peace Building of trust and confidence process and women’s ability to participate in Building trust and utilizing cordial relation- the political sphere; ships with male delegates in the negotiating Developed and enhanced of skills of table. This is another ingenious strategy that current and potential women leaders enables women to take advantage of their at the national and community levels. identity as a woman, a friend, and a colleague Increased knowledge and awareness of in a positive manner in order to change nega- WPS of women at the community tive mindsets and behavior as regards wom- level. en’s participation and other gender related issues in the peace process. Early warning system Mitigated effects of conflict on villagers Indigenous early warning system, or community members, including mechanisms and practices women, men, children, and elderly; Developing and employing indigenous sys- keeping villagers from getting caught tem, mechanisms and practices to alert the in the conflict. community on looming armed encounter are oftentimes assessed as effective and efficient, Best Practices as they are undertaken by communities in great need of such. Such indigenous mecha- in Peacebuilding nisms and practices manifest ownership of Given the various peacebuilding initiatives in the initiatives by community members them- and outside the formal peace process, this selves. study considers the following as best

streaming WPS in the country: Building alliances and networks Stakeholders’ ownership of the peace In a male dominated society that rarely lis- process, including peacebuilding initiatives, tens and responds to women’s voices, it is is crucial towards its success and sustainabil- quite imperative to consolidate and ity. Exploring and instituting gender inclu- strengthen women’s voices to become a for- sive indigenous peacebuilding initiatives, midable force in the transformation of struc- mechanisms and system towards the success tural arrangements promoting and institu- of the peace process can facilitate owner- tionalizing women’s marginalization. ship of the peace process.

Identifying champions Consolidating and strengthening Effective and efficient initiatives towards the women’s voices is imperative in a male improvement of the plight of marginalized dominated society in order to advance sectors, including women and children in women’s interests and needs. conflict-affected communities, require supportive government officials and MPs to Institutionalizing effective and efficient champion such initiatives and push for their peacebuilding initiatives is necessary in institutionalization. order to be sustained and adopted across sectors and at all levels. Such institutionali- Documentation and information zation requires champions in the govern- dissemination ment in order to be realized. Documenting and disseminating information on the progress of the peace process and Countering discriminatory sociocul- political stances of stakeholders to con- tural gender norms and practices com- cerned women on the ground. This strategy pletes the advocacy for a more gender inclu- is essential in keeping women’s organiza- sive peace process. Well-entrenched norms tions updated towards a more informed and and practices determine to a great degree effective advocacy and in encouraging and societal structures, including political, eco- mobilizing women to participate in the nomic, education, health, justice, and others. peace process. Information, communication, and ca- Capacity building across sectors pacity building are at the core of all peace- Conducting education and training in certain building initiatives both in formal and informal peacebuilding related areas or topics across peace process Advocacy, networking or alli- sectors at the community or grassroots lev- ance building, and early warning systems re- el is crucial in order to allow these sectors quire ongoing information, communication, to gain confidence, become empowered, and capacity building activities in order to be own the peace process, and take action to- effective. wards conflict resolution and the achievement of peace. Recommendations Recognizing the complexity of the problem Lessons Learned and Way of armed conflict vis a vis the peace process, Forward to Mainstream WPS this study focuses on only three urgent is- Based on the findings, the following are the sues with corresponding recommendations lessons learned and way forward in main- to move forward the mainstreaming of WPS

in the country. Basic across the recommen- practices on all aspects of the daily public dations is the intensification of information, and private life not only of women and girls communication, and capacity building initia- but of men and boys as well. tives. Intensifying information, communication, ca- Owning the peace process pacity building initiatives on the matter at all Is quite difficult to sustain and move forward levels, especially the grassroots, is therefore certain projects, including its objectives and crucial. Integrated in these initiatives is the initiatives, unless concerned stakeholders formation and training of core groups of in- and beneficiaries acknowledge the need for digenous communicators and capacity build- such projects and own these projects them- ers from among credible and reputable com- selves. There is therefore a need to intensify munity leaders and members. Capacity build- information, communication, and capacity ing sessions need to provide opportunity to building initiatives on the matter at the grass- participants to review and assess sociocul- roots level. Integrated in such initiatives are tural-religious practices in terms of their the indigenous practices already being done positive and negative qualities and effects on at the community level, such as on early the everyday life of the people individually warning system. If possible, form and train and communally. In so doing, participants core groups of indigenous women and men may be able to decide which norms and communicators and trainers from among practices to maintain and enhance and which community leaders and members with credi- to disregard and counter for their good and bility and respectability and who are, more the good of the community. or less, supportive of and active participants in peacebuilding. Members of these core Transforming patriarchal power groups will take charge of educating, encour- structures aging, and convincing their fellow community Changing well-ingrained power structures members, especially the women, to see the seems quite difficult to achieve and realize, as value of acknowledging and adopting the it requires changing mindsets, attitudes, and peace process as their own and get actively behaviors, (including the Myanmar 2008 involved in peacebuilding. constitution) that influence such power structures. Nevertheless, intensifying infor- Countering discriminatory gender mation, communication and capacity building norms and practices initiatives on the matter complemented by There have been cases of women defying creative and effective advocacy initiatives, discriminatory sociocultural gender norms including identifying champions who will push and practices that prevent them from active- the advocacy forward, could perhaps attain ly participating in the public sphere. Most of relative success especially at the community these women, however, are educated and or grassroots level which, in the long run, hold high positions in government and non- could produce a ripple effect on national government organizations. Countering such level structures. restrictive and prohibitive norms and practices should be done not only at the higher Measures to move forward the WPS need to echelons of society but more so at the grass- consider the global pandemic and volatile roots level. People across sectors and gen- political situation of the country -- recent ders need to be informed and educated military coup, arrest of government leaders, about the adverse effects of such norms and and violent crackdown of peaceful protesters

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Chapter 3 Case 2 Republic of the Philippines

Peace and Security Situation the insurgency of the New People’s Army BRIEF PROFILE OF THE PHILIPPINES (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist he Philippines is an archipelagic Party of the Philippines (CPP) is spread in country located in the southeast different parts of the Philippines from North coast of Asia, between Taiwan in to South (Uy, 13 December 2020.) the north and Borneo in the south. TIt is a critical entry point in the Association THE ARMED CONFLICTS of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) market Nature, History, and Root Causes and a gateway of international shipping and of Conflicts air lanes suited for European and American businesses. Comprised of 7,107 islands cov- Mindanao Conflict ering land area of around 300,000 sq km, it is Many forms of violent conflicts exist in Min- categorized into three major islands, namely: danao: communist struggle against the Philip- Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao (DOE, n.d.). pine government; feuds between families and clans (rido); struggle of indigenous communi- The Philippines is estimated to have 110.2 ties over rights to ancestral land; ideological- million in 2020 (World Population Review, ly-driven violent criminality and banditry; and n.d.). Luzon, the largest politically-motivated vio- island group, accounts lence. And the most per- for more than half of the sistent among these vio- entire population of the lent conflicts is the dec- country. Located in the ades-long protracted southwestern part of Lu- struggle of some Muslim zon is the capital of the groups over the right to Philippines, Manila. But self-determination for a the largest city is Quezon Bangsamoro homeland City. Both Manila and (Santiago, 2015). Quezon City are part of Metro Manila, a metrop- Although Christians are olis with a population of an overwhelming majori- almost 13 million people. ty in the Philippines, Min- The official spo- danao has for centuries ken languages of the been home to both in- country are Filipino and digenous peoples and English. Nineteen more Muslims called Moro languages are regionally (from the Spanish word recognized (Nations “Moor”) or Bangsamoro Online, n.d.) (the “Moro Nation”). One of the world’s longest running, the con- Mindanao is the second largest island in the flict in Mindanao can be traced back to the Philippines where the peace and security sit- colonial era from the 16th century until 1898 uation is most delicate, with a population es- where Moro sultanates fought against the timated at 24 Million in 2020, close to 24 per Spanish regime that dominated the northern cent of the Philippine population (Mindanao Philippines (Dwyer and Guiam, 2010). Peacebuilding Institute, 2020). Meanwhile,

Three groups comprise the Muslim sepa- In 1971, Nur Misuari founded the Moro ratists - the Moro National Liberation Front National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front goal of fighting the Philippine state for an (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf. The MILF and independent Moro nation. This led to the the Abu Sayyaf are breakaway factions of the Tripoli Agreement in Libya in 1976, bro- MNLF (BBC News, 2012). Muslims re- kered by the UN-backed Organization of mained dominant in their traditional heart- Islamic Conference which, however, failed lands of the Sulu archipelago, Maguindanao, to hold. In 1986, President Corazon Aquino and Lanao. However, their political influence personally met Misuari to hold peace talks in the rest of the island declined, and so by and in 1989, signed a law setting up the Au- the late 1960s, communal strife had intensi- tonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao fied (Dywer and Guiam, 2010). One signifi- (ARMM) that gave predominantly Muslim cant trigger event happened in 1968 during areas in the region a degree of self-rule and the time of President Marcos when at least semi-autonomy (BBC News, 2012). 28 young Moro military recruits were killed by their superiors when they refused to car- In 1996, President Fidel Ramos signed a sig- ry out their secret mission to infiltrate Sa- nificant peace agreement with the MNLF bah, in eastern Malaysia which was formerly ending 26 years of war that cost some part of the Sulu sultanate and is claimed by 120,000 lives. This paved the way for Mis- the Philippines. The incident, known as the uari to run for office and he was elected as Jabidah Massacre, spawned more unrest and ARMM governor the same year. Yet, a was a key motivation in the formation of number of splinter factions within the or- armed Moro separatist groups (Asia Foun- ganization resisted the call to disarm. In par- dation, 2017). ticular, the MILF, which split from the MNLF in 1981 after its leader, Salamat Hashim, split from the MNLF in 1978, rejected the 1996 agreement in favor of a push for full Bangsamoro independence that aims to create separate Islamic state in the southern Philippines (BBC News, 2012).

In 1997, President Fidel Ramos decided to change government policy by appointing civilians, instead of only retired military officers to the negotiating panel. Thus, the first civilian was also the first woman appointed to be a peace negotiator. Emily Marohombsar, the first and only female president of the Mindanao State University and a Muslim belonging to the Maranao ethnic group, sat in the negotiations as a full member of the government panel. Prior to that no woman had ever sat at the table since formal peace negotiations on the Bangsamoro question started (Santiago, 2015).

Unfortunately, from 1998-2001, the Philip- plex because MILF commander Ameril Um- pine government under President Estrada bra Kato broke away from MILF to form the declared an all-out war against MNLF, MILF, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters NPA, and RPMM (Rebolusyonaryong Partido (International Crisis Group, 2011). ng Managagawa ng Mindanao) instead of continuing the peace negotiations. He was In March 2014, the Government of the Phil- later impeached after being in office for just ippines and the MILF signed a peace agree- two years (Santiago, 2015). ment, which they called the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB). The In 2001, violence flared up again after MNLF implementation of the CAB had two main founder and first governor Nur Misuari, led a thrusts: 1) the political-legislative track that failed uprising. He was subsequently jailed, includes the drafting of the Bangsamoro but eventually released in 2008. That same Basic law (BBL), which when ratified, will year, Misuari was ousted as MNLF chairman. give rise to the legal creation of the Bang- Muslimim Sema succeeded him. Over the samoro Government that will replace the years, the MNLF is believed to have become current ARMM, and 2) the normalization weaker, and many factions have splintered track, which runs alongside and complemen- from the main group (BBC News, 2012). tary to the political-legislative work on the BBL (UNDP, 2017). In 2007, although tension with MNLF had declined following compromises between However, amid the high hopes on the CAB the government and Misuari, the armed con- which served as the basis of the BBL during flict continued with the Moro Islamic Libera- the Aquino Administration, the Mamasapano tion Front (MILF). In 2008, more than clash occurred on January 25, 2015 where 700,000 people were displaced after fighting 44 SAF were killed by MILF and the BIFF in broke out again when an agreement, which the municipality of Mamasapano in Maguinda- gave the MILF control over more than 700 nao. A total of 44 police officers, 18 MILF areas in the south, was ruled unconstitution- members, and five civilians died in the al by the Supreme Court (Dwyer and Mamasapano incident. Widespread public Guiam, 2010). anger suspended the deliberations on the draft BBL in Congress. Public distrust of the In November, 2009, Vice-Mayor Esmael peace process grew, and Congress failed to Mangudadatu along with journalists and sup- pass the legislation before Aquino’s term porters were massacred on their way to ended (Asia Foundation, 2017). provincial capital to file candidacy for gover- norship (Conde, 2009). The Maguindanao President Duterte unveiled a new approach massacre, a result of a political rivalry be- to the peace process shortly after he took tween Gov. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. and office in June 2016. He envisioned a new au- Vice Mayor Esmael Mangudadatu, is a clear tonomy arrangement negotiated with the case where a local level conflict had escalat- MILF, a seeming preparation for establishing ed into a state-insurgent electoral violence. a new federal constitutional framework (Asia Foundation, 2017). The Duterte administra- In 2010, Benigno Aquino III, son of former tion had a six-point peace and development President Corazon Aquino, became the agenda in line with the Philippine Develop- President of the Philippines. The protracted ment Plan (PDP) 2017-2022 strategy: 1. war in Mindanao became even more com- meaningful implementation of the peace

agreement with the MILF towards healing in cally-rooted prejudices against its minority the Bangsamoro; 2. completion of the imple- population—minority Muslims in Mindanao mentation of the remaining commitments and its indigenous peoples. The conflict in under the GPH-MNLF Final Peace Agree- Mindanao is ethno-religious-cultural, deeply ment; 3. accelerated signing and implementa- rooted in the economic deprivation caused tion of the final peace agreement with the by competing interests in land and other CPP-NPA-NDF; 4. immediate conclusion of natural resources, and identity issues emerg- the peace process with the CPA-CPLA and ing from the de facto second-class status of the RPMP-RPA-ABB; 5. implementation of much of the Muslim population (Parks et al, the peace promoting catch-up socioeconom- 2016). ic development in the conflict-affected areas; and 6. building of a culture of peace and con- Up until Philippine independence in 1946, flict sensitivity (UNDP, 2017). Although the Mindanao region had enjoyed wealth and peace talks temporarily broke down and relative autonomy despite continuous colo- both parties suspended ceasefires in Febru- nization of the Philippines by Spain and the ary 2017, the Bangsamoro Transition Com- U.S. Although the Mindanao conflict has mission was relaunched to revise the draft been perceived as a religious conflict be- legislation that would translate the provi- tween Christians, Muslims and indigenous sions of the peace agreement into law. people, it has its roots in indigenous resistance against political, economic, and cul- In May 2017, Islamic State-linked militants tural assimilation (Buenaobra, 2011). In Min- attacked the city of Marawi, situated on the danao, poverty and a lack of social oppor- southern island of Mindanao. It was the site tunity are both drivers and outcomes of of a bloody urban battle between ISIL fight- conflict (Dwyer and Guiam, 2010). ers and government forces prompting months of heavy combat that caused hun- While hopes were pinned on the signing of dreds of thousands to flee and left more Bangsamoro Organic Law in 2018 and the than 1,000 dead. In the evening of the at- successful vote in January 2019 paved the tacks, President Duterte declared martial way for the establishment of the Bangsamo- law across the entire island of Mindanao ro Autonomous Regional Government, eco- (Betteridge-Moes, Aljazeera, 2017). nomic hardship and political tensions and rido or clan wars have continued to persist In a continued effort for peace, President in Mindanao (Conciliation Resources, n.d.). Duterte signed the Bangsamoro Organic Law in July 2018 establishing the Bangsamo- Communist Conflict ro Autonomous Region (BAR), replacing the While this study mainly focuses on the Min- ARMM. The successful vote in the January danao insurgency, it is also important to 2019 referendum paved the way for the es- note that the Communist Party of the Philip- tablishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous pines (CPP), which aims to overthrow the Regional Government (BARMM) to govern Philippine government using guerrilla-style with greater financial autonomy and a more warfare insurgency, is considered one of the representative parliamentary system oldest communist insurgencies in the world. (Conciliation Resources, n.d.). The nature of conflict with the CPP is ideo- The heart of the conflict in the Philippines logical as it was established with Maoist lean- lies in economic marginalization and histori- ings and modelled after the agrarian revolu-

tion of the Communist Party of China (BBC engaged in bomb and gun attacks killing civil- News, 2012). The CPP has two related ians. Peace talks fell apart in February 2013 units: its armed wing, the New People's Ar- following failure by both parties to agree on my (NPA), which Jose Maria Sison estab- a joint declaration. In the same year, the lished in 1969; and its political arm, the Na- NDFP announced it would not resume seri- tional Democratic Front of the Philippines ous negotiations until President Aquino left (NDFP) (Francisco, August 22, 2016). office. In 2014, the government and CPP officials discussed the resumption of peace talks, With less international attention than the but disagreed on preconditions. In 2015, the Islamic forces, the NPA has been waging war government and Jose Maria Sison, CPP since the 1960s, and has engaged the gov- founder and leader, engaged in peace talks ernment in sporadic peace talks. It has been but In December the same year the govern- pushing for a more equitable distribution of ment decided to negotiate with NPA military Mindanao’s resources and greater attention leaders instead of the CPP (Project Plough- to social development (Dwyer and Guiam, shares, n.d.). 2010). Many of the NPA's senior figures, including its founder Jose Maria Sison, have Peace talks resumed in August 2016 upon lived in self-imposed exile in the Netherlands the release of 19 rebel leaders from jail by (BBC news, 2012). President Duterte. In February 2017, following the ambush of an army convoy by the Conflict between the NPA and the Philippine NPA, breaking a unilateral ceasefire that held government is rooted in the desire of the for five months, President Duterte scrapped NPA for “Filipino people’s right to national the peace talks. Two months later, in April, independence and freedom from the dictates both sides returned to the negotiating table, and impositions of US imperialism (CPP, 6 brokered by Norway, in the Netherlands and January 2017, par. 2).” The NDFP, the politi- agreed on a bilateral truce. Despite such cal wing of the CPP, aims “to address the agreed truce, fighting had continued roots of the armed conflict in the peace (International Crisis Group, 2019; Wikipedia, talks, based on the principles of national sov- 2020). ereignty, democracy and social justice (CPP, 6 January 2017. par. 2).” Despite constant In 2019, the Duterte administration officially attempts to hold peace negotiations with the announced the permanent termination of CPP and end the armed conflict, no final peace talks with the CPP/NDF/NPA (Roque, peace settlements had been agreed upon due 2019). In December 2020, the government’s to the contentious issues on sovereignty, re- anti-terror council labelled the CPP/NPA as lease of political prisoners, and CPP's inclu- a terrorist organization (Gonzales, 2020). sion in the terrorist list (Francisco, 2016). Effects of Mindanao Conflict Most high-profile formal talks between the on Women and Children government and the CPP were in Oslo in In its early stages, the Mindanao conflict has 2011 under President Benigno Aquino but no resulted in the neglect of gender concerns in clear agreement was reached. The following addressing peace and security issues. Since years saw unabated violent clashes, charac- women are often treated merely as conflict terized by low-intensity fighting between victims and passive receivers of protection, government forces and the NPA. The NPA the men dominate the high politics while

women remain merely on the periphery first in Asia that launched a NAP to imple- (JICA and GIWPS, 2016). ment UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820.

Due to the widespread view that armed NAP WPS 2010-2016 combatants are the primary drivers of peace Galace recalls how the NAP started in the and security, the analysis of the Mindanao cafe of Miriam College: “Mavic Balleza, Inter- conflict often conclude it to be a men’s arena national Coordinator of the GNWP some- where gender issues have little importance. time in 2007 just wanted to know how The crisis in Mindanao has generally neglect- CSOs are doing in terms of UNSCR 1325 ed women’s experiences when exploring po- (2000) and she needed a peace group to tential responses (Dwyer and Guiam, 2010). consolidate this. So, I called Prof. Miriam For example, the majority of internally dis- Coronel-Ferrer. We met up at Miriam Col- placed peoples are women and children. lege and the NAP WPS took birth with the Women are impacted by violence that does support of then Presidential Adviser on not affect the men in the same way such as Peace to the Arroyo government, Annabelle rape or economic and personal hardship if Abaya. The OPAPP adopted the plan (J.N they lose a male figure in their household to Galace, personal communication, 29 Decem- violence (Barron et al, 2016). Yet, women’s ber 2020).” experiences such as these are not addressed. The Philippines was the first country in Asia However, the need to involve women in to adopt a NAP. The NAP has four priority peace processes and solutions has been a areas: 1. ensure the protection of women’s central focus due to the number of female human rights and prevention of violation of victims of internal conflicts that have in- these rights in armed conflict and post- creased through time. The understanding of conflict situations; 2. build the capacity of women as crucial actors in conflict media- women to engender peace and reconstruc- tion, resolution, and prevention has also tion processes; 3. mainstream gender per- changed mindsets on the importance of the spective within the ongoing peace agree- role of women in peacebuilding. However, ments and security reform agenda; and 4. due to fragmentation along religious, ideo- institutionalize monitoring, evaluation, and logical, and class lines, women are pressured reporting on NAP implementation to subordinate discussions of their core gen- (PeaceWomen, 2010, p. 1). der issues to claims of nationalist or religious identity (Buenaobra, 2011). Launched on 1 March 2010, per Executive Order (EO) 865, NAP WPS created the im- Government Interventions plementing institutional infrastructure of the to Resolve the Conflict National Steering Committee on Women, In 2000, the landmark UNSCR 1325 on Peace and Security (NSC WPS). Thereafter, Women, Peace and Security called for the the Women Engaged in Action on UN Secu- increased participation of women in peace rity Council Resolution 1325 (WE Act 1325), processes and in all peacebuilding related a national network composed of women's activities. To implement UNSCR 1325, the rights, peace, and human rights organizations, UN Secretary called upon all UN member was established and became the main part- states to develop national actions plans ner of the government on various WPS (NAPs) outlining specific lines of national ac- initiatives (Maligalig, n.d.). tivity. In 2010, the Philippines became the 59

Amended NAP WPS 2014-2016 been undertaken in the Cordillera Adminis- The second generation NAP WPS intro- trative Region (CAR), Davao Region, and the duced amendments in 2014 to institutionalize Caraga Region (Rallonza 2018). a system to monitor, evaluate, and report on the implementation of the NAP WPS in or- In November 2020, Bangsamoro Women der to enhance accountability for successful Commission (BWC) launched the Bang- implementation and the achievement of samoro Regional Action Plan on Women, goals. The 2014 NAP WPS contains 11 ac- Peace, and Security (BM-RAPWPS) 2020- tion points and 37 indicators. It emphasizes 2022. The launching was the highlight of the use of indicators side by side action BARMM’s celebration of UNSC’s 20th anni- points with corresponding government body versary (ReliefWeb, 2020). identified to fulfill such indicators (PeaceWomen, n.d.). Role of CSOs in Peacebuilding As a bridge and neutral ground for warring On the amended NAP WPS, Galace parties, civil society has forged sustainable (personal communication, 29 December peace in Mindanao. As civil society includes 2020) recalls, “I remember Presidential Ad- a wide range of organizations, from develop- viser Ging Deles calling me one day and cri- ment NGOs to church-based groups and tiquing that the first generation NAP we au- business associations, it has strengthened thored was a big shopping list. I saw the inter-religious dialogues between Muslim and point of needing to trim it down and stream- Christians, created peace zones, and devel- lining the plans with greater clarity. So, NAP oped peace-promoting attitudes (Steven 2010 was amended, leading to the second Rood, 2005). generation NAP from 2014-16. CSOs, such as the Bantay Ceasefire (Ceasefire NAP WPS 2017-2022 Watch), were able to mobilize help in imple- NAP WPS 2017-2022 adopted a broader menting the ceasefire agreement. For exam- frame of addressing the situation of women ple, civil society groups helped the Arroyo in armed conflict and recognizing their con- government move toward peace in consulta- tributions to peacebuilding. Interfacing with tions leading up to the August 2001 cessation the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2017 of hostilities with the MILF. CSOs had been -2022, it serves as the explicit articulation of officially represented on the Local Monitor- the incorporation of the gender perspective ing Teams established under the Cessation of in the six-point peace and development agen- Hostilities and also had their own parallel da of the Duterte administration, specifically ceasefire monitoring process in Bantay Agenda 6, on building a culture of peace and Ceasefire (Ceasefire Watch). They had been conflict sensitivity (OPAPP, 2017). It has four praised by both government and the MILF as substantive pillars: 1. empowerment and par- impartial in analyzing accusations of violations ticipation; 2. protection and prevention; 3. of the terms of cessation of hostilities promotion and mainstreaming; and 3. moni- (Steven Rood, 2005). toring and evaluation. In September 2009, a large group of women In August 2017, ARMM Regional Action Plan and peace organizations submitted the Min- on Women, Peace and Security (RAP WPS) danao Women’s Framework for Civilian Pro- was launched — the first-ever regional in- tection, invoking UNSCR 1325, and pro- strument on WPS. Similar initiatives have posed the establishment of a Joint Civilian

Protection Authority with a 70 per cent fe- Issues and Challenges in Peacebuilding male membership. Additionally, most government negotiators for the peace talks in Mindanao Conflict 2008-2012 came from civil society, namely The Mindanao Conflict has led to massive the peace and human rights movements displacement, destruction of homes and in- (Reimann et al, 2012). frastructure, protracted war between the government and the insurgents, weak state CSOs have a major role in the whole um- presence, provincial and municipal govern- brella of peace work—not in peacekeeping ments controlled by the political elite and and peacemaking but in the bigger gamut of clan wars (rido). Apart from these challenges, peacebuilding which involves building struc- the violations of peace agreements through tures, partnerships and relationships that ad- the years have led to mistrust or guarded dress the root causes of conflict such as optimism creating more divisions among sep- peace education and coalition-building (J.N aratist groups. Galace, personal communication, 29 Decem- ber 2020). Women Engaged in Action on Although the BARMM was established in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (WE March 2019, violence has continued across Act 1325) was launched on November 17, Mindanao. In the first half of 2020 alone, 2010 in Miriam College with Dr. Jasmin 66,000 were displaced as a result of the con- Galace as its first national coordinator. WE flict. The 2017 Marawi siege, a five-month Act 1325 was launched as a national network battle between pro-Islamic State fighters and of civil society organizations to serve as a the Philippine military, destroyed much of primary civil society network that helps im- the city and displaced 400,000 people plement the NAP WPS. Civil society organi- (ACAPS, October 30, 2020). zations, namely, Sulong CARHRIHL, Center for Peace Education-Miriam College, Gaston The biggest obstacle in the peace process in Z. Ortigas Peace Institute (GZOPI) and Miri- Mindanao is not whether or not parties am College’s Women and Gender Institute could reach an agreement but whether or (WAGI) banded together to concretely bring not sustainable peace could ever be [the NAP-WPS] to the women most affected achieved. Such doubt has led to suspicion by conflict situations in the country among the general Filipino populace. Anoth- (“Shadow report,” 2016). er challenge is coming up with a detailed roadmap addressing the grievances of the As a result of the efforts of CSOs and sup- Bangsamoro. Only with active support of the port from negotiating parties, gender provi- constituents of the warring parties and the sions in the 2014 Comprehensive Agree- national government could this be attained. ment on the Bangsamoro are explicit in eve- Reaching a common ground for pursuing an ry substantive issue area, including provisions “autonomy/sovereignty” track is also a hur- for 5 per cent of official development funds dle demanding an openness to other worka- to be set aside for women’s programs, guar- ble solutions to address the problems of the antees for women’s political participation at Muslim minority that have worked out else- local and regional levels, and economic pro- where. Although peace processes have programs for decommissioned female armed duced good agreements, their effective im- rebels (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.). plementation demands a level of monitoring best performed by a neutral third party (Bacani, 2005).

Communist Conflict Women in Peacebuilding A challenge is the ongoing protracted war PROFILE OF WOMEN PEACEBUILDERS between the military and the left that began Women peacebuilders are composed of in the late 1960s and has led to massive ex- community women at the grassroots level trajudicial killings and political oppression. and high-level academicians, and government Although membership of the latter has and CSO leaders who have taken the cudg- weakened, estimated to have dwindled to els for a successful peace process. In the 4,000, encounters between the military and 1990s, many of the local Moro and indige- the NPA have spawned violence in different nous leaders were undergraduates steeped parts of the country. in peace education and advocacy. These community women in Mindanao engaged in Over 100,000 combatants and civilians have resolving community conflicts and small- died in the conflict since 1969, despite multi- scale disputes. They participated in activities ple efforts for peace across administrations. organized by local non-governmental organi- In 1972 alone, when Marcos imposed mar- zations which work to mitigate clan-based tial law to quell opposition, state security conflict, provide support to people displaced forces persecuted individuals perceived to by conflict, and train citizens in family-level oppose government policies. A total of dispute resolution.” (Dwyer and Guiam , 3,257 extrajudicial killings and 737 enforced 2010). To cite, a number of Moro women, disappearances were registered, and ap- like Hadja Giobay Diocolano, signed an proximately 35,000 were tortured and agreement with ACT for Peace Programme 70,000 incarcerated. Even as martial law of UNDP. Diocolano was one of the few ended in 1981, state violence has continued women MNLF combatants in the 70's but (Asia Foundation, 2017). eventually became the chair of Kadtabanga Foundation (Sunstar, 2010). Peace negotiations have continued to fail because of the lingering doubts on the status Women in the Mindanao peace process and sustainability of ceasefire agreements come from different fields. They have pro- with perceived violations on both sides. A vided leadership in crafting peace agree- broader challenge inherent in reaching peace ments and their implementing mechanisms. irrespective of the political will among war- They have influenced the peace negotiations ring parties are divisions in both camps – not only because of their substantive with some communists uncomfortable with knowledge but also because they have tech- certain aspects of a deal with the Duterte nical expertise and connections to con- government and the Philippine security forc- cerned constituencies (I.M. Santiago, person- es reluctant to acquiesce to a deal seen as al communication, 1 December 2020). too conciliatory. Given the complex security challenges and the current state of For the past two decades, a considerable COVID-19 in the country, it is unclear number of women peace advocates and key whether both sides would have the neces- actors have been CSO leaders, university sary staying power to get past the obstacles professors, academics, journalists/writers, they face (Parameswaran, March 31, 2020). lawyers, public servants, and corporate consultants. Many have post-graduate degrees abroad. Davao-based Irene Santiago is an international peace consultant and founder

of Mindanao Commission on Women from the south (Deles, 2014). (MCW), an NGO with Muslim, Christian and indigenous women as members (I.M. Santia- In 2011, the MILF panel appointed two go, personal communication, 1 December women, Bai Cabaybay Abubakar and Atty. 2020). Raissa Jajurie, as part of the Board of Con- sultants of the Bangsamoro. Bai Cabaybay Many highly accomplished academics in lead- Abubakar, a Maguindanaon, was the president ing state and privately-owned universities and of the Shariff Kabunsuan College in Cotaba- CSO leaders have served as women peace to City in 2011 (ABS CBN News, 2011). negotiators. Emily Marohombsar, a Maranao Raissa Jajurie, a Tausug lawyer and a known Muslim, is the first woman appointed as defender of Moro and Lumad rights, was the peace negotiator. She was the first and only Mindanao coordinator of the Sentrong Alter- female president of the Mindanao State Uni- natibong Lingap Panligal (SALIGAN), a non- versity. She sat in the negotiations as a full governmental organization for alternative le- member of the government panel and was gal services. She co-founded Nisa Ul-Haqq fi joined by Irene Santiago in the five-member Bangsamoro (Women for Justice in the government panel during the time of Presi- Bansamoro), an organization engaged in dent Arroyo (Santiago, 2015). Later, Profes- improving the lives of grassroots women sor Nieves Confessor was appointed chair of through trainings, community dialogues, the Philippine Government Panel negotiating researches, and policy advocacy (Peace with the CPP-NDF-NPA in 2005-2010. Women Across the Globe, Million. Philip- pines, n.d.). From the corporate sector, Annabelle Abaya, PhD, was appointed as secretary of the Of- In 2012, Miriam Coronel-Ferrer led the Phil- fice of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace ippine government team in peace negotia- Process in the Philippines in 2009. Using her tions with the MILF. She was the first—and vast experience and expertise in conflict res- remains the only—female chief negotiator in olution, she successfully reopened negotia- history to sign a major peace accord in 2014 tions on multiple deadlocked fronts with the (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.; Deles, CPP, NPA, and NDF during her tenure March 2014; Santiago, 2015). Yasmin Busran (Inquirer, 2012). In 2010, Abaya turned over Lao, a scholar of Islamic jurisprudence, joined the leadership as Presidential Peace Adviser the peace panel and became the presidential to Teresita Quinto-Deles. Deles made a assistant on Muslim affairs (Deles, 2014; Fer- comeback in OPAPP under Pres. Benigno rer, 2015). Aquino, Jr. after her appointment as the first woman Presidential Adviser on the Peace Women’s CSOs provided recommendations Process in 2003 under President Arroyo. She to the track-1 process, drawing on infor- served in 2005 and in 2010-2016. Jurgette mation gathered and consensus opinions built Honcolada served the OPAPP under the in parallel CSO talks (Council on Foreign leadership of Secretary Deles as member of Relations, n.d.) through WE Act 1325. Jas- the government peace panel for talks with min Nario-Galace was the executive director the CPP/NDF/NPA. During her time, the of the Center for Peace Education during this new GPH panel sought a balance in terms of period (J.N Galace, personal communication, geography and gender: two out of five mem- 29 December 2020). bers were female; and three out of five came

In 2016, USEC Gloria Jumamil Mercado, informal interventions (Chang et al, 2015). MNSA, PhD became the chair of the Philip- The first track involves direct negotiations pine Government Implementing Panel and between representatives of warring parties. the Undersecretary of the Office of the Pres- The second refers to activities with influen- idential Adviser on the Peace Process tial non-official persons on both sides. The (OPAPP) under the Duterte Administration. third involves grassroots actors and activities She is the first female commodore and on both sides. The track in between tracks 1 founding chair of the Women in National and 2, track 1.5, involves official and non- Development and Security (WINDS) official representatives of warring parties tak- (NDCP, n.d.). ing place in informal settings in a personal capacity. Track 1.5 has been quite useful in In February 2017, although the peace talks settling differences between conflicting par- with the MILF stalled and the ceasefire sus- ties during coffee breaks or casual conversa- pended, composition of the Bangsamoro tions in formal peace negotiations. Transition Commission (BTC) was 27 per cent women (four of the fifteen members). In Track 1, women’s participation has BTC was relaunched to revise the draft legis- evolved and progressed through the years. In lation translating the provisions of the peace 2010, Mindanao women did not have to abil- agreement into law (Council on Foreign Re- ity to participate in Track 1 negotiations lations, n.d.). (Dwyer and Guiam, 2010). Nevertheless, in the same year, Miriam Coronel-Ferrer Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) is became the lone female in the five-member the body tasked to govern BARMM until June peace panel and chaired the Philippine 30, 2022. It plays a crucial role in Bang- government panel under President Benigno samoro’s continuing assertion of the right to Aquino III in 2012. She was the first woman self-determination. It has a total of 16 wom- to be a signatory to a major peace accord en or 16.33 per cent of the total 98 mem- with the MILF as chief negotiator (Santiago, bers. The 12 women appointees comprise a 2015). In 2011, the MILF panel appointed powerhouse cast, including four lawyers and two women, Bai Cabaybay Abubakar and two civil engineers. Four occupy key posts in Raissa Jajurie, as part of the Board of Con- BARMM, two, in the Cabinet-- Raissa Herra- sultants of the Bangsamoro (Buenaobra, dura Jajurie as minister for social services, 2011). and one, Aida Macalimpas Silongan, as minister for science and technology. Karon heads Women have served as “trust” brokers in the RCWB while Laisa Masuhud Alamia is the formal peace process. Women at the minority leader of the parliament (Arguillas, negotiation table have facilitated the under- 2019). standing between the government and the MILF representatives. Moro women are bet- AREAS OF PARTICIPATION AND ter at preserving inter-ethnic alliances than INITIATIVES OF WOMEN men as conflict escalates (Council on Foreign IN PEACEBUILDING Relations, n.d.).

Mindanao Conflict In formal peace negotiations between the Women have engaged in three major and government and the MILF, women repre- one in between tracks of peace in formal and sented 22 per cent of the total number of negotiators—two of the four government 64

negotiators, and 27 per cent of the total dren. Suffering so much in war can push signatories to the final agreement. There women to assert the necessity of non- were no women on the MILF side. Women violence (Santiago, 2015). Across the three served as advisors on both the government tracks, women have served as negotiators, and MILF teams (Council on Foreign Rela- mediators, consultants, trainers, community tions, n.d.). mobilizers, or monitors of the normalization process such as the decommissioning of fire- In track 2, most local women peace activists arms (Ferrer, 2015). have been involved in drawing on their personal and political convictions, courageously Communist Conflict tackling questions of social justice, human Since the stalling of formal peace talks be- rights, and gender-based violence (GBV). tween the government and the CPP/NDF/ The same positive trend of increased wom- NPA, no opportunity to incorporate women’s participation and leadership can be en’s participation in peace and security is- seen in track 3. Women-led CSOs have sues has been provided. In the protracted closely monitored the substance of formal peace process with the CPP, gender has not negotiations and ensured that negotiators been part of the formal agenda. In short, op- advocate for the priorities of groups previ- portunities for gender equality dialogues ously excluded from the process, including have been curtailed (OPAPP, 2016). such issues as access to basic services, women’s political and economic participa- Enabling and Constraining tion, and their protection from violence Factors in Peacebuilding (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.). ENABLING FACTORS To build public support, women’s groups Enabling factors in women’s participation have conducted grassroots campaigns to and leadership in peace initiatives are resili- gather input for the formal peace process, ence, capacity for organizing and network- relay updates to the public, and lead exten- building, women engagement in the informal sive national consultations to ease commu- and formal peace processes, and women nity fears regarding specific provisions to leadership in key positions. the peace agreement (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.). Local CSOs have focused The resilience of women survivors has im- their attention on mitigating clan-based con- pelled them to set up CSOs that empower flict, providing support to people displaced women through advocacy, literacy, and live- by conflict, and training citizens in small- lihood programs. Such has engendered the scale dispute resolution with high levels of capacity for organizing and network-building. women’s participation (Dwyer and Guiam, MCW, for instance, has advocated for a 2010). Mindanao peace agenda with a gender perspective eventually resulting in the Muslim women, in general, have been en- formation of the Mindanao 1325 gaged in peacebuilding as “mothers of the (Buenaobra, 2011). nation” since women have a unique perspective on the human costs of conflict and Another enabling factor is the public leader- often have an intimate view of the dispro- ship of women in peace negotiation process. portionate impact of armed conflict on chil- Miriam Coronel-Ferrer (2020) shared the favorable conditions of her appointment as

65 chief negotiator were a product of time and otyping of women as victims and uncritical cumulative reform initiatives. The persis- advocates for peace. Hierarchy, patriarchy, tence of the conflict with erstwhile sepa- gender bias, and lack of political will of the ratist Moro liberation forces and the various national leadership on valuing women and communist groups in the country has made gender equality have constrained women’s government realize and shift their perspec- participation (Lao, Yasmin B., personal com- tive that the sustainable solutions can only munication, 4 December 2020). be found by using broader human security lenses. Thus, expertise must come from pro- Influence of patriarchal practices precludes fessional fields other than from those with addressing peace and security issues, such as military backgrounds (M.C. Ferrer, personal violence against women (JICA and GIWPS, communication, 18 December 2020). 2016). Gender-based violence remains un- addressed in most peace negotiations and Mindanao peace process has made women’s agreements (UN Women, (2012). Imple- participation possible because women peace mentation of peace will remain lopsided in leaders have ensured that peacemaking is addressing its legal, social, and economic understood not only about ending war but concerns if women’s issues are framed in a also about building peace through the trans- manner replete with gender dynamics and formation of the political, economic and so- power relations (Reinmann, 2014). cial structures perpetuating injustice and deprivation. Peace has been pursued nation- Outcomes and Impacts ally and internationally using multiple tracks of Initiatives in Peacebuilding through CSOs, grassroots groups, and me- The impact of peacebuilding initiatives in dia—where women are significant actors. relation to the Mindanao and Communist Religion and culture have not come in the conflicts lies in the substantial changes in the way to achieve this end. Key actors have public leadership of women in all tracks of championed the role of women by using reli- the peace process at all levels. gion and culture, among others, as effective arguments for the inclusion of women Key milestones have been achieved through (Santiago, 2015). the amended 2014-2016 NAP: inclusion of

gender provisions in Philippine Government CONSTRAINING FACTORS and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Major constraining factors in women’s par- peace agreement; first woman chief negotia- ticipation in the peace process are the di- tor to sign the peace agreement with a rebel verse and limited concepts of human securi- group; and the adoption of the first Regional ty, cultural stereotyping, and patriarchal Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security practices. (RAP WPS) in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Rallonzo, 2020). The prevailing limited notion of security that only those in the midst of war and conflict Opening of avenues for women’s participa- are considered key players in WPS issues tion in the different processes has raised has constrained women’s participation in the awareness, especially within the MILF, on the peace process (I.M.Santiago, personal com- importance of political participation of wom- munication, 1 December 2020). Another en (J.N Galace, personal communication, 29 constraining factor is the sociocultural stere- December 2020).

The peace process in the Philippines has their peace consultations prior to the 2010 shown how local women have gained exten- formal peace negotiations with the MILF. sive experience as peace and change agents. Community women saved them in a situa- Meaningful women’s participation is evi- tion wherein a university head declared denced by women survivors who set up or- women should not be involved in peace- ganizations and associations of women advo- building, as they were too emotional. The cates to address political subordination, gen- women went to the microphone one after der-stereotyping, and violence against wom- the other and expressed their opposition to en. For instance, the MCW advocated for a his declaration. They emphasized that noth- Mindanao peace and development agenda ing in Muslim teachings say that women from women’s perspective. In 2010, Santiago were inferior and could not participate in of MCW provided gender training to mem- decision-making. bers of the International Monitoring Team which has been tasked by both negotiating Santiago (2015) noted that during the Minda- panels to monitor the ceasefire compliance, nao women’s peace summit in 2006, the civilian protection in conflict areas, rehabili- MILF representative told the women gath- tation and development of affected commu- ered there that women had no role in public nities, and socio-economic agreements be- decision-making. But five years later, in 2011, tween the government and the MILF he was proven wrong. The MILF appointed (Buenaobra, 2011). Raissa Jajurie as member of its Board of Consultants. She relates an interesting anec- Other successful outcomes are women’s dote behind Jajurie’s appointment: One day, participation and greater women leadership she happened to be riding in a car with a in track 1 peace negotiations. Among them member of the MILF. She told him she was are: Irene Santiago as member of the gov- interested in helping the MILF in the peace ernment peace panel negotiating with the negotiations. Before long, the chairman of MILF from 2001 to 2004, and as first chair of the MILF peace negotiating panel himself the panel implementing the Comprehensive asked to speak with her. He explained that Bangsamoro Peace Agreement; Prof. Nieves there was no injunction in the Qur’an against Confesor as chair of the government panel women taking leadership positions. Such in- negotiating with the CPP-NPA-NDF from cident shows how religion is no deterrent to 2005 to 2010; Teresita Quintos-Deles ap- the active participation of women in decision pointed as presidential adviser on the peace -making. The importance of building strategic process from 2010 to 2016; and Presidential alliances with men is also manifested in Ja- Assistant on Muslim Affairs Yasmin Busran- jurie’s story. The coming together of women Lao. Women served as heads of technical and peace groups “across the aisle” enabled working groups on normalization and wealth dialogues forging commitment to advance -sharing, secretariat, and legal team. Two WPS in the country. women, Jurgette Honculada and Lulu Tison, took part in the government peace panel for Such strategy has implications on the follow- talks with the CPP/NDF/NPA, and a woman ing: levelling on the meaning of “meaningful headed its secretariat (Deles, 2014). political participation of women;” understanding of peace and security beyond just Galace (personal communication, 29 Decem- ending war; debunking of the “hierarchy of ber 2020) recounted an experience in one of tracks” in peace negotiations; negating that

religion and culture are drawbacks to the notion that only those from the military or peace process and cannot be utilized to fur- have military background can be effective in ther pursue peace; and concretizing the the peace process (Ferrer, 2015). WEAct meaning of women leadership which does 1325, composed of different women CSOs not mean putting women at the helm not and NGOs spearheading the creation of the because of their gender but because of their NAP WPS, is proof of the impact of building competence. a sense of sisterhood among women. In the GPH panel for talks with the CPP/NDF/ Best Practices in Peacebuilding NPA, many members came from CSOs Best practices in women peacebuilding are: (Ferrer, March 2015). Politics and negotiat- 1. utilization of early strategic alliances with ing peace are so important that women men; 2. civilianization of the peace track and should not be left out and excluded. involvement of women’s CSOs; 3. popularization and normalization of the positive as- Popularization and normalization of pects of culture and religion; and 4. practice positive aspects of culture and religion of courage, competence, and creativity of supporting women empowerment. women leaders. Popularizing and normalizing positive aspects of culture and religion supporting women Utilization of early strategic alliances empowerment have allowed greater ac- with men ceptance of the women’s participation and This practice has helped overcome stereo- leadership (Ferrer, 2015). Rather than mak- types and changed power relations so that ing them as deterrents for WPS implementa- both men and women enjoy “parity of es- tion, culture and religion have been high- teem.” These alliances created a platform lighted as bases for ensuring sustainable for conversations and dialogues to build soli- peace in society. darity among diverse men and women. Alongside this view, Elisabeth Siattum, Nor- Practice of courage, competence, and wegian Special Envoy for the Philippine creativity by women leaders Peace Process, emphasized the following fac- Women leaders have practised courage, tors that helped in conflict resolution, par- competence, and creativity in peace advoca- ticularly in Mindanao: 1. importance of dia- cy and negotiation. Emma Leslie, director of logue; 2. long-term perspective; 3. parties the Cambodia-based Center of Peace and involved own the process; 4. partnership is Conflict Studies, affirmed that women need key; and 5. inclusivity (Siattum, 2015). to be prepared for the myriad of dynamics in the peace table. She commended the Philip- Civilianization of the peace track and pines for two things: having the political will involvement of women’s CSOs to locate and promote competent women Such practices have led to the enhancement into the process and “women bringing in of national institutional mechanisms and other women;” and creative use of UNSCR “homes” or various platforms for women’s 1325 in talking with the MILF to respect participation and have helped concerned UNSCR 1325 and have more women in stakeholders to veer away from the usual place.

Lessons Learned and Way however, cannot be the sole basis of the Forward to Mainstream WPS success of peace talks. Grassroots leaders are competent. The basis of their competence is not their formal education but their Mindanao Conflict community leadership experience and their Mindanao insurgency has been a long jour- indigenized culture and practices supporting ney for decades but sees the light of hope in the peace process. For instance, the ba- addressing its economic, political and cultur- baylans during the pre-colonial Philippines al implications. Rooted in the need for self- were considered spiritual leaders of the ba- determination and sovereignty which the rangays. In the North, peace pacts are led by Bangasamoro lost in the course of Philippine women who are the bodong peace pact history due to prejudices, injustice and hu- holders (M.C. Ferrer, personal communica- man rights violation have been committed. tion, 18 December 2020). Additionally, there Lessons learned in this long, arduous journey should be more Hadjay Diocolanos, Moro of peace with the Bangsamoro include: re- leaders from the ground who have given up spect for diversity; competency of women at their arms and have led sustainable peace all levels of the peace process; women must initiatives. be at all levels of peacebuilding; pragmatic moving away from traditional security; and Women must be at all levels leadership is key. of peacebuilding Women must be in all peace and security Respect for diversity platforms and spaces. “Women don’t just With diversity analysis apart from gender bring women’s perspective but bring the analysis, women need to carry through a perspective of other sectors, because they gender agenda regardless of religion, ethnici- are care-givers of children, parents, and fam- ty, social status, education, and ideology ilies.” (Y.B. Lao, personal communication, 4 which is fundamental to peacebuilding. Just December 2020) as men are not a monolithic race, so are women. Women are needed to keep peace by ensuring parties in conflict do not hurt each other, Competency of women in all levels “make peace” which the peace negotiators of the peace process and mediators do between parties of con- Women must be competent in all levels of flict, and build peace, which is a huge arena the peace process, both formal and informal that addresses the root causes of violence processes, from tracks 1 to 3 of the negotia- through social structures and policy advoca- tions. By including all women in training, cy CSOs do (J.N Galace, personal communi- planning, and implementation of various ac- cation, 29 December 2020). tivities, they develop their expertise, prove their capabilities, and earn the respect of Women from both parties of the negotia- men (Ferrer, 2015). As Santiago shares, “I tions are experts in coalition building. They was not included in the peace negotiating have advocated for the inclusion gender- table until I became an expert in ceasefire responsive provisions in the peace agree- (I.M. Santiago, personal communication, 1 ment. CSOs and grassroots women have December 2020).” been involved in the process. There has been greater participation of women in ac- Competence of educated women at the top, tivities organized by local CSOs working to

mitigate clan-based conflict, provide support Leadership is key to people displaced by conflict, and train citi- Leadership change in the Bangsamoro has zens in small-scale dispute resolution (Dwyer provided an opportunity to reinvigorate and and Guiam, 2010). seek new approaches to the peace process (Bacani, 2005). In the Bangsamoro peace Women’s role in public decision-making and process, MILF male leaders were open and peace negotiation process has been champi- supportive of the peace process, ready to oned by top-notched key players, such as listen and learn. Mohagher Iqbal, chair of the Miriam Coronel Ferrer and Raissa Jajurie. peace commission of the BTC, was a notable Indeed, these top-notched women key play- leader who knew his end-game of peace well ers have been few. They, however, have be- and was determined to take all the risks to come “powerhouse" influencers in highlight- attain it (J.N Galace, personal communica- ing gender issues and including gender per- tion, 29 December 2020). spective in the legislations of peace agreements. Communist Conflict While the peace process with the BARMM Pragmatic moving away has seen more opportunities for greater self- from traditional security determination and economic empowerment There must be a pragmatic moving away among the Muslims in Mindanao, failed nego- from traditional security to a broader view tiations with the CPP/NDF/NPA have taught of peace and security which covers human some lessons: importance of peace as a stra- security, where the focus in not just on the tegic decision; need for more expert women combatants but whole communities, has led in public leadership; and equal importance of to the interface of socio-economic, security, tracks 1-3. and political components in addressing the problem of violence (Ferrer, March, 2015). Importance of peace as strategic Ferrer said, “You can’t really have a perfect decision agreement, but you make an agreement If peace is the end-game and the goal for more imperfect if you don’t have the wom- both warring parties, it is much easier to sit en’s perspectives in that agreement, or if you in the peace table. Good faith, trust, sinceri- don’t have their interests and welfare also at ty, political will, and a clear strategic goal for the back of your mind as you negotiate all peace are important elements of a successful the different components: political, social, peace negotiation (J.N. Galace, personal economic, and cultural (Applebaum, 2016).” communication, 29 December 2020; Y.B. Lao, personal communication, 4 December Indigenized, community-driven initiatives are 2020). encouraged for gender-responsive local governance and collaborative politics that ad- Need for more expert women dresses the needs of the local community. At in public leadership the same time, national and international in- There is a need for more expert women in terventions and funding support are needed public leadership for all peace tracks. This to implement peace. Only then can robust does not mean simply substituting male lead- economic recovery address poverty to ers with females. Women leadership in pub- achieve sustainable peace. lic life must be normalized (M.C. Ferrer, personal communication, 18 December 2020). Women’s participation alone does not guar-

antee gender-sensitive peace agreements. armed groups. Peace process is not only There must be leaders involved in the deci- about ending war but also about transform- sion-making. In this regard, the NAP WPS ing the entire economic, political, and cultur- plan should be legislated (J.N Galace, personal relationships and systems to foster social al communication, 29 December 2020). justice and equality (Reinmann, 2014). Thus, even with failed peace negotiations of the Equal importance of tracks 1-3 top leaders and ceasefire violations, there is Tracks 1-3 are equally important for suc- hope. Localized Peace Engagements (LPEs) cessful peace processes. It is imperative to are milestones that can be conducted where reframe and move beyond Track 1- domi- key stakeholders, including the rebels, can be nated negotiations and initiate backdoor in- provided with opportunities to be produc- formal advocacy with grassroots elders and tive members of society again (Uy, 2020).

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Women have performed various roles that help foster peace and reduce tension among conflict parties. While they have never really given up their traditional roles as healers and caregivers, they have ably taken on new roles as dialogue facilitators and village patrollers.

Chapter 4 Case 3 Kingdom of Thailand

ethnic group. They live everywhere in Thai- Peace and Security Situation BRIEF PROFILE OF THAILAND land (Hayipiyawong, 2016, p.2). The latter is hailand, formerly Siam, meaning Land composed of Pattani Malays who live in of the White Elephant, is a Kingdom Southern Thailand with different culture, in Southeast Asia. It is bordered on language, and tradition from the former T group. west and northwest by Myanmar, on south- west by the Andaman Sea, on east and north east by Lao PDR, on southeast by Cambo- Although Thailand is middle-income, the dia, and on south by the Gulf of Thailand three provinces in the Pattani region are and Malaysia. On the south, the country among the underdeveloped areas. Poverty occupies a part of the Malay Peninsula. Thai- is widespread and household income is be- land shares maritime borders with India, In- low the average of rural Thailand donesia and Vietnam (Thailand, 2021). Thai- (Abdulsomad, 2017, p.16; Melvin, 2007, land is the only Southeast Asian country that p.17). Economic development in the south- was never taken over by a European power. ernmost provinces, also known as the Deep This is the reason why Thais call their coun- South, has been affected by the ethnic and try Muang Thai, meaning Land of the Free. religious conflict for more than a century. Its capital and largest city is Bangkok. The conflict is concentrated in an area along the Thai-Malaysia border, where majority of Thailand has an area of 513,120 sq km. the local population are ethnically Malay and It has an estimated population of Muslim (Burke, Tweedie, and Poocharoen, 69,799,978 people (UN Population 2013, p.1). Division, 2019), 93 percent of whom are Theravada Buddhist and 5 percent, Muslim (United States Department of State, Office of In- ternational Religious Freedom, 2019). Official language is Thai (Thailand, 2021). Majority of Malay Muslims live in Southern Thailand or Pattani, comprising the border provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathi- wat, and four Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla province (Hayipiyawong, 2016, p.2).

Pattani is home to a population of more than two million: 80 percent are ethnic Malay Muslims (Pattani Malays), THE ARMED CONFLICT the rest are mostly Thai Buddhists and Chi- Nature, History, and Root Causes nese (Abdulsomad, 2017, p.16). The Thai of Conflict Muslim community in the country is divided The conflict between Thailand and various into two groups: assimilated and unassimilat- Pattani Malay separatist groups can be ed. The former is composed of Thai Muslims traced back to more than a century ago, with similar culture to the Thai Buddhist when the Anglo-Siamese treaty was signed

78 in 1909 between British and Siamese leaders The late 1960s saw a resurgence of Islam

(Abdulsomad, 2017, p.42). This treaty drew a among Thailand’s Malay Muslim community border region between Pattani (then a sul- and further stoked the instability in the tanate) and the Malay states of Kedah, Kelan- south. “This close interrelationship may tan, Perak, and Perlis. Under the treaty, the have played a role in changing conflict identi- British turned over Pattani to Siam sover- ties from ethno-nationalism, which was at its eignty. In return, Siam gave up its territorial peak from the late 1960s to the 1980s, to … claim over Kelantan and recognized British more overt religious themes. Since the late control over the other Malay states of Ked- 1970s, the violence in Pattani has increasingly ah, Perak, and Perlis (Hayipiyawong, 2016, been characterized as between Buddhists p.3). and Muslims rather than between ethnic Thais and Malays (Melvin, 2007, p. 20).” With the turnover, the Pattani people were forcibly assimilated into the Thai culture. Ma- Some analysts suggest that Islamist terrorist lays were taught Thai history in schools; Ma- networks have played a role in reigniting the lay language (mother tongue for the majority insurgency and altering the character of the in Pattani) was replaced with Thai as the offi- conflict. But while the Pattani insurgents cial language. Malay culture and Islam were have adopted the language of jihad, they do discouraged while Thai customs and Bud- not espouse a global or regional jihadist dhism were seen as more developed. Thai agenda (Melvin, 2007, p.25). Buddhists governed Pattani. These national policies created “unequal structures and Even with the resurgence of Islam, religion is power relations” among the different ethnic, only a part of the Pattani conflict matrix. The social and religious groups in Pattani complex nature of the conflict in the south is (Abdulsomad, 2017, p.42; Horiba, 2014). rooted in a variety of factors. Insurgent leaders cite long-running grievances of the Malay Malay separatist groups opposed the Thai Muslim community with the Thai state. government policies and fought for inde- These include “systematic discrimination in pendence but were suppressed by military local governance, political marginalization, responses from the state. The insurgency forced assimilation to the national Thai iden- movement, which began in 2004, was based tity, and abuses of the local population by in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat and the security forces and state officials (Burke et southernmost four districts in Buddhist- al, 2013, p.2).” Melvin (2007, p.34) warns majority Songkhla province (Abdulsomad, the decentralized nature of the insurgency, 2017, p.10). the rise of Islamist ideology, the Thai Bud- dhist mobilization in the South, and the lack The early phase of the insurgency was fo- of a clear and effective approach to the con- cused on separating the Deep South from flict from the side of the authorities suggest Thailand and rejecting the assimilation poli- that the conditions are in place for a further cies of the Thai state. Armed groups and rapid escalation of violence. fronts which made up the separatist movement included the Barisan Nasional Pember- Effects of Conflict on Women Basan Pattani (BNPP), the Barisan Revolusi and Children Nasional (BRN), and the Pattani United Lib- More than 6,000 have died since the violence eration Organization (PULO) (Horiba, 2014). escalated in 2004. The violence came from all sides: insurgents attacked government

targets and civilians; Thai security forces ances against the Thai state were the latter’s were accused of rights abuses in counter- hard line policies to contain the insurgency insurgency operations. The impact was not in the south. These include the 1914 Martial only the loss of lives. With the loss of every Law Act first imposed in January 2004, then male head of household, the role of women replaced in July 2005 by an emergency de- dramatically shifted. cree called the 2005 Executive Decree on Government Administration in States of Between 2004 and 2017, about 19,516 vio- Emergency (Buranajaroenkij, 2019, p.71). lent incidents resulted in 6,653 deaths and 13,198 injured (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, p. 5). Martial Law was re-imposed after the 2006 These violent incidents mainly occurred in coup d’état. The 2008 Internal Security Act Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and adjacent parts is now in force in all conflict-prone areas. of Songkhla (Ganjanakhundee, 2020). With- Such laws allow military officials to hold sus- in the same period, 513 women were killed, pects without charge for at least 37 days. 75 women maimed, and 1,704 injured as a Security officials insist such laws are neces- result of shootings or bombings. Around sary and help contain the violence. Local and 84.5 percent of the victims were male international human rights organizations, household heads with an average of three however, maintain such laws perpetuate a dependents per family (Buranajaroenkij, reign of terror and injustice and have called 2018, p.5). Between 2007 and 2017, 9,226 for their repeal or revision. persons under the age of 25 lost a parent. Of this figure, around 200 persons lost both Peace Talks mother and father; 8,578 youth lost their The Thai government initiated peace talks father and 448 lost their mother (pp.5-6). for the first time in 2013, during the administration of Prime Minister Yingluck Although men were mainly the victims of Shinawatra. Three rounds of dialogue were violence, women bore several burdens in held with the main separatist group BRN or their households and communities. Women National Revolutionary Front, which con- who lost their husbands were forced to trols the majority of fighters on the ground, earn a living. Women whose spouses and but talks failed to yield results. The failure family members were charged with security- was due to poor management of the talks related offenses suffered separation from and the political turmoil in Bangkok relatives who feared the authorities. Fre- (Ganjanakhundee, 2020). In 2014, Yingluck quent visits from security officials were psy- was toppled by a group of generals sceptical chologically distressing for family members of the peace efforts. of suspects and former detainees. An average of three violent incidents per day dis- After the military took power, the military rupted women’s sense of security and peace junta restarted the dialogue process with in their homes, places of worship, schools, the coalition of the insurgent groups, Majlis markets, and hospitals (p.7). Syura Pattani (MARA Pattani). In April 2016, the talks stalled after the two parties could GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS not agree on the Terms of Reference for TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT the process. Hard line Policies Among the Pattani Malays’ enduring griev- Women’s groups pushed for a proposal for safe public spaces to be included in the

peace dialogue agenda in 2017. But the dia- struggling with the trauma of murders, rape, logue parties and the women’s group had detention, or disappearance of family mem- different concepts of what later became bers. Other groups try to prevent retaliato- known as the “safety zone” initiative ry violence by building channels of communi- (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, p.8). Representatives cation between divided communities through of the separatists to the peace talks also dialogue and meetings. changed several times since the talks began – from BRN to MARA Pattani during the 2015- For women, forming voluntary groups or 2019 period, and then back to BRN in 2020 joining relevant organizations helped ease the (Ganjanakhundee, 2020). impact of violence. Self-help groups and an informal network provided mental and social In January 2020, Gen. Wanlop Rugsanaoh, healing, as well as a source of economic aid. peace talks chief, said in a news conference in The Peace Agenda of Women (PAOW) Bangkok that Thailand wanted to have bilat- network, a major civil society organization eral talks first with the BRN, the most influ- (CSO), is composed of 23 women’s groups. ential group. Other groups, he said, could Established on April 28, 2015, it advocates join later (Ahmad & Lee, 2020, par.5). for women’s involvement in the formal peace Wanlop and Anas Abdulrahman (also known process and for the cessation of violence by as Hipni Mareh), a leader of the BRN, an- armed actors on both sides especially in pub- nounced during a joint press conference in lic spaces, such as schools, hospitals, places Kuala Lumpur on January 21 that the two of worship, and markets (Buranajaroenkij, sides were launching their first official direct 2019, p.71). The network developed a policy talks in years to be facilitated by Malaysia. paper on safe public spaces and submitted it to negotiating parties upon the resumption of Srisompob Jitpiromsri, director of a think the peace talks in September 2016 (NP un- tank known as Deep South Watch, howev- published document). er, said he did not know how far the peace talks could go. “We have to wait and PAOW is led by a core group of 30 women see.” (Ahmad & Lee, 2020, par.8). Bangkok from the Network of Civic Women for would neither recognize the insurgents on an Peace (NCWP). NCWP, also known as equal basis nor discuss political matters with Women’s Peace Network (WPN), has been them. The Thai government said it wanted an active proponent of safe public spaces to peace but would not change its position ensure the security of civilians from physical (Ganjanakhundee, 2020). It has consistently threat or acts of violence. It has an inclusive rejected BRN calls to involve impartial medi- membership with members coming from var- ators and international observers in the ious civil society backgrounds, including Mus- peace process and has long insisted on calling lims and Buddhists. It upholds the principles the conflict an internal domestic affair. of impartiality, non-partisanship and inclusivity—principles considered as basic require- ROLE OF CSOS IN PEACEBUILDING ments in building a broad-based peace con- Civil society groups have been crucial in stituency. It has been engaged in peace- providing various support and services to related activities since 2004 when a core victims and survivors of violence. Women group began its humanitarian work for vic- volunteers, some of whom were victims of tims of the armed conflict (NP unpublished violence themselves, reached out to families document). It has gained support from inter-

81 national organizations, such as UN Women prominent educational institutions, and are and Oxfam. It has worked closely with local well-connected with Bangkok and interna- CSOs and national NGOs, including media tional organizations (Abdulsomad, 2017, and academia, to support their activities p.57). These women tend to be leaders of (Buranajaroenkij, 2019, p.72). organizations or well-known female activists. Women with high positions within the peace NGO WePeace, founded in April 2004 by movement and who grew up outside of Pat- Pateemoh Pohitaedaoh, supports and em- tani also tend to be more critical of the con- powers women affected by conflict and vio- servative gender order in Pattani. lence. She also established women volunteer groups to provide assistance to women sur- Majority of the women are professionals vivors of violence. To date, NGO WePeace who earn a living in other fields (p.48). has more than 871 women volunteers from Women who are not yet financially stable do almost all villages in the southern provinces not care much about politics. Economic sta- (Pohitaedaoh, 2020). bility is essential to women’s political engagement (Abdulsomad, 2017, p.51). WOMEN IN PEACEBUILDING PROFILE OF WOMEN PEACEBUILDERS This study was able to identify six women Violence has transformed women in peace advocates: the late Jirapon Bunnag Thailand’s Deep South from that of victim to who played a crucial role in a secret peace that of a human rights defender or peace ac- talk between the government and separatist tivist (Buranajaroenkij, 2019, p.70). Victims groups (Isranews Agency, 2015); Senior of violence include those whose immediate Justice Officer Wanrapee Kaosaard who has male family members were either killed or served as the lone woman member of the six injured in violent incidents. Women who lost member technical working group for peace their husbands became breadwinners and dialogue panel; and Lamai Manakarn, assumed the role of their husbands as head Pateemoh Pohitaedaoh, Sunee Maha, and of household (Sukka, 2014, p.26). Others Suwara Kaewnuy who have served at the cared for family members who were disabled local level inter-agency coordination working by violence while others helped family mem- group (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, p. 41). bers who faced charges of security offenses. Jirapon Bunnag was a driving force behind Women recognize the importance of being the national language policy – a joint project involved in solving the conflict, as it affects between the NSC and the Royal Academy to their livelihood (Sukka, 2014, p.3). They formulate national language policy aimed at make up around 80 percent of those changing the attitude of majority of the Thai involved in peacebuilding projects people to accept the languages of other eth- (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, p.34). nic minority groups in the country. She died of cancer in 2015 (Isranews Agency, 2015). Women engaged in peace work come from many sectors -- government, commercial, AREAS OF PARTICIPATION AND academic, not-for-profit groups, media, and INITIATIVES IN PEACEBUILDING ordinary people (pp.33-34). Most women Women have performed various roles that joining women’s groups come from middle- help foster peace and reduce tension among class families, university graduates from conflict parties. While they have not given up

their traditional roles as healers and caregiv- achieve the mission of their organizations. ers, they have ably taken on new roles as Female paramilitaries have helped Thai au- dialogue facilitators and village patrollers. thorities reduce the violence (Buranajaroenkij, 2014, p.134). Women have been seen as trust builders. Women’s groups have reached out as impar- Women have been at the forefront of hu- tial agents to earn the trust of different manitarian assistance as healers and human groups and conflicting parties. They have rights defenders, offering help to victims af- tried to reduce tension between security fected by violence (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, officials and local people by creating commu- p.34; (Pohitaedaoh, 2020; Quinley, 2020). nication channels (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, Women’s groups have been involved in the p.36; Quinley, 2020; Permanent Mission of informal peace process as caregivers, educa- the Kingdom of Thailand to the UN, 2020; tors, leaders and providers of various ser- Conciliation Resources, 2015). vices (Abdulsomad, 2017, p.82; Conciliation Resources, 2015; Quinley, 2020). Women with training from professional facilitators have promoted dialogues in their Former Ambassador Nongnuth Phetcha- communities. Women’s groups initiated dia- ratana, who has spent 32 years in peace- logues between Buddhist and Muslim com- building, said female peacekeepers have a key munities, so each side could vent their griev- role in engaging communities and establishing ances and foster empathy and friendship rapport with local women through their in- (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, p.37; Quinley, 2020). telligence-gathering capabilities. Unlike their Women have acted as connectors by pro- male counterparts, female peacekeepers are moting dialogues between officials and villag- able to cross social and cultural boundaries ers. Through these dialogues, the latter have and gather valuable information on security been able to understand the responsibility (Phetcharatana, N., personal communication, and mission of authorities while the former December 23, 2020). have come to know the villagers’ problems and concerns during operations in the area The former director of the Devawongse (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, pp.37-38; Concilia- Varopakarn Institute of Foreign Affairs also tion Resources, 2015). said, “Women are usually attentive and caring which makes them sensitive to under- A number of Buddhist and Muslim women in lying social dynamics. Female peacekeepers conflict areas have joined their village securi- are usually capable of demonstrating empa- ty force to help guard their community. thy and understanding, which are greatly Women have also served as liaison between needed among local women, especially in officials and villagers to reduce tension and Muslim society where women are prohibited increase trust between conflicting parties from speaking to men.” She explained a ma- (p.38). jor task of female peacekeepers in the Unit- ed Nations Military Observer Group in India Women have monitored and patrolled their and Pakistan is conducting routine patrols communities to maintain peace. Some of for intelligence gathering, investigating and them have joined the Thai army. A study interacting with the locals. reveals female rangers, through the use of soft power rather than coercive power, are Thailand has deployed 14 female peacekeep- able to build relationships of trust and ers in three UN peacekeeping operations.

The Thai government said it was fully com- women being Muslimah -- a good Muslim mitted to UNSC Resolution 1325 on Wom- meant being a good mother, wife, and women, Peace and Security and would make eve- an (Buranajaroenkij, 2019, p.73). Women’s ry effort to expand the role and contribution groups have been involved in the informal of women in the UN peace keeping opera- peace process because of the need for them tions (Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of to serve as caregivers, educators, leaders and Thailand to the UN, 2020). providers of various services. Conflict has thrown women in their old roles but this Enabling and Constraining brings new responsibilities when they lose Factors in Peacebuilding their men in the conflict (Abdulsomad, 2017, p.82; Sukka, 2014, p. 11). ENABLING FACTORS Conflict has necessitated women to provide Experience of suffering has steered women care for the victims of violence but women to a new status -- from that of a victim of have provided more than that. Suffering has violence to an agent of social justice given women a new status from that of a (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, p.10; Conciliation victim to an agent of social justice, because Resources, 2015; Sukka, 2014, p. 11; Quin- women have several advantages. ley, 2020). Suffering has equipped women with knowledge and skills on non-violent ac- In conflict areas, women have more mobility tion, dialogue facilitation, special laws in the and easier access to certain places than the area, international humanitarian law, and in- men (Abdulsomad, 2017, p.82). Men expose ternational human rights frameworks. With themselves to higher risk if they actively en- such knowledge and skills, they have been gage in human rights advocacy able to monitor cases of their husband or (Buranajaroenkij, 2019, p.74). Women are sons prosecuted on security charges able to engage various groups, even the hos- (Buranajaroenkij, 2019, p.70). Knowledge of tile ones, and are highly committed to non- relevant laws and Thai language, aside from violent measures. Women are strongly moti- their own Melayu language, has enabled Pat- vated to restore security in their homes, tani women to help others in need, champi- farms, markets, hospitals, schools, and places on human rights, and promote peace and of worship (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, p.45). reconciliation (p.74).

Women’s ability to work with all actors and Relevant international and national laws and stakeholders has secured for them the trust frameworks allowing women to champion of diverse groups – from the Thai govern- human rights and promote peace and recon- ment and its sympathizers to the resistance ciliation are: CEDAW and its Optional Pro- movement. As evidence, both government tocol, Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA), and resistance movement have become re- Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), cer- ceptive to proposals of the women’s move- tain constitutional provisions clearly stipulat- ment to prioritize public safe spaces as a ma- ing equal rights of men and women, Gender jor agenda item in the talks (Buranajaroenkij, Equality Act (GEA) 2015 that establishes the 2019, p.74; Pohitaedaoh, 2020). Committee to Promote Gender Equality (CPGE), and the 2017-2021 Women Devel- Further paving the way for women’s involve- opment Strategy (WDG) (UN Women, ment in the peace process is the notion of 2020).

Another relevant national framework is the were invited based on their assumed power National Measures and Guidelines (NMG) on to stop the violence. Women exclusion in women, peace and security (WPS), the Pattani peace process reveals the domi- Thailand’s counterpart to the National Ac- nance of patriarchal power structures tion Plan (NAP) on WPS of other countries. (Abdulsomad, 2017, p.82). The NMG sets down an inter-departmental framework providing measures for adoption Many global peace processes, including in by relevant agencies to its operational plans Thailand, neglect women’s security concerns, and actions. It identifies the following key ex- because they are seen as distinct from the pected outcomes: 1. increased number of security concerns of the main conflict parties. women’s participation at all levels of peace Women’s security perspective is regarded as process; 2. better protection of women in a view from below and seen as different from conflict-affected areas; 3. inclusive and partic- the state’s security perspective, which is de- ipatory process for peace and security by picted as the view from above CSO, religious leaders, community, and the (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, pp.9-10). public; 4. mechanism established for women’s participation in conflict resolution Military’s role in politics and institutions is and peace process; and 5. availability another key factor in women’s limited politi- of central data base system on WPS (NP cal participation. The Thai state has sup- unpublished document). pressed the conflict in the south with a heavy hand. Pattani has been a militarized area since Apart from the above mentioned frame- 2004 with the declaration of martial law rule works, support and influence of international (Abdulsomad, 2017, p.24). To illustrate, in organizations have enabled the women’s the recent round of peace talks, the govern- movement to negotiate for gender equality. ment delegation was predominantly com- Academic institutions have supported wom- posed of male military officials. “The male en’s groups with empirical studies to shed dominance in the talks strongly indicates a light on women’s voices and roles and their problematic gender hierarchy, where individ- advocacy in the peace process uals adhering to militarized masculinities are (Buranajaroenkij, 2019, p.74). valued while people deemed to have feminine traits such as women and civilians are exclud- CONSTRAINING FACTORS ed (p.24).” Women have had to wage battle against a host of constraints, not least among them the Military plays a key role in Thai politics. As ingrained links between religion and culture of 2009, 18 military coups have taken place in dictating how a good Muslim woman should Thailand. ”Military masculinities are closely behave in society. Other limitations are: mili- connected to unequal power relations, the tary’s role in defining the scope of the peace- glorification of violence, dominance of men building process; lack of unity among wom- and subordination of women (p.24).” en’s groups; and lack of resources, education Research shows societies with a strong and training of women. culture of militarism and military masculinities are more likely to accept violence as a The limited scope of the peacebuilding objec- tool to exercise dominance. tive has contributed to the exclusion of women. Only main groups in the conflict Another main barrier to women’s meaningful

participation is lack of unity within the wom- Women’s participation in high-level negotia- en’s movement (p.60). Division among wom- tions is also hindered by their lack of educa- en’s groups is a reflection of the division in tion and training, despite their experiences Thailand’s civil society. Women’s groups and knowledge about the conflict have failed to formulate any clear overreach- (Abdulsomad, 2017 p.32; “Women’s leader- ing strategy and vision for advocating gender ship”, 2018). -inclusive participation. International and national funding for gender issues and women’s Phetcharatana (2020) said biases that perpet- rights suit the objective of many donors and uate gender inequality hampered women’s several women’s groups compete for it. participation in peacebuilding. Women are Women’s groups adopting the same objec- oftentimes seen as victims and uncritical ad- tives as their donors’ to obtain funding are vocates for peace (Phetcharatana, N., per- seen as mere tools of foreign actors (p.72). sonal communication, December 23, 2020). Meanwhile, women’s groups accepting funding from the military regime are regarded as A key cultural barrier is the idea of a “good” an extension of the government. They are Muslim woman. Being a “good” mother, a seen as a direct threat by organizations that wife, and a woman is a way of controlling expose misconduct of government agencies. women and preventing them from taking an Top women leaders have failed to unite active role in peacebuilding (Buranajaroenkij, various groups. No link between two camps 2019, p.73; “Women’s leadership”, 2018; of women’s groups seems to exist and Sukka, 2014, p. 24). Women cannot engage communication between them is poor. Such in social activism because a good woman is factors have diminished the potential of a supposed to be docile to her husband. Her united coalition negotiating for women’s priority is to take care of the needs of the inclusion in the peace process (p.61). household and look after the family. The men, as the main breadwinners, are the lead- The conflict has polarized civil society -- ers of their families. In order for men to groups seen as loyal to the government are exercise their leadership role, women have on one side while organizations close to the to become their followers (Abdulsomad, Pattani Malay population are branded as hav- 2017, p.65; “Women’s leadership”, 2018; ing ties with the independence movement. Neelapaijit, 2009, p.18). The latter are often suspected and intimidat- ed by state agents. Different ethnic, social Women have restrained themselves from and political groups seldom work together, taking active roles in the peace process be- other than in some projects initiated by for- cause of their understanding of religious and eign donors (p. 61). socio-cultural norms (Sukka, 2014, p.32). Challenging a religious is tantamount to di- On the individual level, a key constraint is rectly challenging the religion (Abdulsomad, the lack of resources. Women have to 2017, p.67). Strong links exist between reli- balance multiple responsibilities limiting their gion and culture making it difficult to distin- engagement in civil society (p.32). As noted guish the two (Abdulsomad, 2017; Sukka, earlier, women who are not yet financially 2014). Such links have profound implications stable cannot afford to be politically involved on the perceptions of women and men full time. Economic stability is a prerequisite about themselves and their role in society for women’s political engagement. (Abdulsomad, 2017, p.67).

Outcomes and Impacts the range of strategies that have worked for of Initiatives in Peacebuilding them.

Outcomes and impacts of women peace- Avoidance of focus building in the informal peace process are: 1. on women’s participation securing the trust of diverse groups and Some CSOs in the southern part of Thailand their receptivity to proposals of women’s apply the Convention on the Elimination of movement; 2. Change in negative attitude All Forms of Discrimination against Women and behavior of women; 3. reducing tension (CEDAW) mainly to advocate an end to vio- and violence, and promoting understanding lence against women but not to promote between conflicting parties. women’s participation in politics and the

peace process. This indicates women groups’ Trust in and receptivity of conflicting capability to use a compromise approach to parties to proposals of women’s avoid unnecessary resistance from men movement. (Buranajaroenkij, 2019, p.75). Women have been able to secure the trust of the government and sympathizers to the Strategically contextualized campaigns were resistance movement owing to their ability recommended in pushing for women’s hu- to collaborate with diverse groups. Such man rights in the south. As Fareeda Panjor, trust has allowed the government and a lecturer at the Center for Conflict Studies resistance movement to become receptive and Cultural Diversity at Prince of Songkla to proposals of the women’s movement to University, Pattani Campus said in Bura- prioritize public safe spaces as a major najaroenki’s study: “If women’s groups focus agenda item in the talks. on recognition and enhancement of wom-

en’s participation, it is likely to cause social Change in negative attitude friction (p.76).” and behavior of women

Knowledge and skills on laws and other is- Avoidance of gender stereotype sues relevant to the armed conflict and To include the impact of the conflict on peace process have transformed submissive women’s lives in the agenda of peace dia- and fearful women into assertive defenders logues, women’s groups in Thailand highlight of their family members and able facilitators their rights as political subjects rather than of dialogues between military and villagers. emphasize the feminine traits of mother-

hood. Studies show not using a gender ste- Reduction of tension and violence, reotype leads to greater legitimacy in the and promotion of understanding peace processes (Buranajaroenkij, 2020, p. With their ability to facilitate dialogues, 10). women have been able to reduce tension and promote understanding between the Watching the language military and villagers, thus averting the inci- Rosida Pusu, chair of the Southern Women dence of violence. Overcoming Violence Network, said her

group avoids using gender terms and femi- Best Practices in Peacebuilding nist language. (p.15) Some organizations Women’s groups have pushed their agenda deliberately refrain from using the terms through ways that have avoided unnecessary “feminism” and “gender” in their advocacy resistance from men. The list below covers (Buranajaroenkij, 2019, p.76).

Among Muslims in the Deep South, promot- are instrumental in facilitating and building ing women’s leadership can be controversial, trust, “Peace is a process rather than a goal. as majority of Muslims believe that only men We need to bear in mind that building peace can be leaders. Thus, it is important to adjust has building trust as its core. It takes time the language. For example, local groups avoid and persistent work to strengthen mentioning “gender equality.” Instead, they relationships and identify solutions towards use the term “social justice” in their advoca- reconciliation (Phetcharatana, N. personal cy (Buranajaroenkij, 2020, p.16). communication, December 23, 2020).”

Focus on common issues Keeping men informed Championing issues of public concern also Women’s groups extend their network by helps make dominant actors and other wom- forming alliances with powerful male figures en more receptive to demands and pro- (e.g. religious leaders, politicians, and social posals by women’s groups. Public issues activists). They keep men informed about could include education, the environment or the goals and objectives of their activism and politics where women highlight issues that exchange ideas with them to improve their affect all sexes and marginalized social groups network. Keeping potential actors informed – and are not limited merely to issues that is important and can reduce potential re- affect women (Buranajaroenkij, 2019, p.76). sistance (Buranajaroenkij, 2019, p.76; Pohi- taedaoh, 2020). Stress on skills, peacebuilder image Women’s organizations and peace move- Lessons Learned and Way ments in the southern provinces emphasize Forward to Mainstream WPS developing the knowledge and skills neces- Women’s participation in the peace process sary to promote social justice and security in in the Deep South has yet to become the everyday life instead of highlighting the num- norm because of ingrained sociocultural con- ber of women in the peace process ventions. Also, other issues need to be ad- (Buranajaroenkij, 2019, p.76). dressed: notion of security which tends to

emphasize security only from a military per- PAOW with NCWP has deliberately shifted spective; gender stereotypes; and involve- the image of women from that of a victim of ment of a partisan mediator. violence to that of a peace activist to promote them as potential actors for Decentralization of administrative peacebuilding (Buranajaroenkij, 2020, p.8). It power over the south advances its peace builder role to A key factor for the success of the peace stakeholders and the public through various process is Bangkok’s willingness to accept channels, such as hosting a local radio the decentralization of administrative power program, producing news reports for over the south (Ganjanakhundee 2020). An- television programs on the public other critical element to fruitful peace talks broadcasting agency, and engaging in is the broker. Malaysia should be regarded as activities organized by the government. a stakeholder, not a mediator. Malaysia has

never been non-partisan. Malaysia has Phetcharatana considers women brought the insurgents to the negotiating peacekeepers’ ability to build trust in areas table. Many insurgents with arrest warrants of conflict as best practice. Qualities, such as and bounty on their heads in Thailand have integrity, situational awareness, and humility 88

sought shelter in Malaysia. Some even hold (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, pp.45-46). dual nationality. (Ganjanakhundee, 2020). Cultural sensitivity and Recognition of women’s issues contextualization of feminism as political Engendering peace processes needs to be Every party must recognize and agree the sensitive to the culture and to the ways in issue of security is more than just a military which gender equality is understood by dimension. All parties must recognize stakeholders. In order for gender awareness women’s issues are political. Women’s and gender equality to be accepted by both issues are overlooked in peace talks that em- men and women, each country needs to phasize security from the military perspec- develop its own version of feminism tive. Women’s concerns are usually connect- (Buranajaroenkij, 2020, p.17). ed to the well-being and safety of their family and community. Such private issues tend Strategic plans and actions to be regarded as apolitical and therefore in women peacebuilding irrelevant to political negotiations Women’s peace networks need to strategize (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, p. 45). their plans and actions to be better able to challenge male dominance and avoid the Proper implementation of national gender traps of token participation and male frameworks and guidelines to ensure resistance (p.18). women’s participation in the peace process Avoiding the use of a gender stereotype as a The Thai government has adopted a number best practice promotes greater legitimacy in of frameworks and guidelines on WPS and the peace processes (p.10). Strategically gender equality, including the NMG, WDG contextualized campaigns have been recom- (2017-2021), and National Economic and mended. Women’s groups focusing on Social Development Plan (NESDP) 2017- recognition and enhancement of women’s 2021 that incorporates guidelines on gender participation is likely to cause social friction equality and women empowerment (Buranajaroenkij, 2019, p.76). It may also be (PeaceWomen, 2020). However, it has yet prudent to adjust the language, for example, to properly implement such frameworks and using the term social justice in place of the guidelines to realize women’s meaningful term gender equality. participation in both the formal and informal peace process. It is important to keep the momentum of social pressure on the inclusion of women’s Provision of education and training groups and their agenda in negotiations to to women strengthen their legitimacy, support and Women’s organizations and other institu- power (Buranajaroenkij, 2018, p.48). tions should provide training to develop Women must continue building on-the- knowledge and skills on peace, security and ground support networks in case of a need gender to diverse groups of women. A for social pressure through mass action to critical mass of skilled and knowledgeable raise public awareness and to get their women in peacebuilding is essential to the voices and interests heard and acknowl- visibility and recognition of women as active edged. participants in the peace process

“Peace is not an agreement, but a process. walks of life need to be ensured of partici- In this respect, we need to focus on pro- patory peacebuilding efforts through a moting and sustaining a constructive social broad consultative process (Phetcharatana, dynamic that promotes engagement be- N. personal communication, December 23, tween and within conflicted groups and 2020).” communities. Individuals from different

References publica- Abdulsomad, F.R. (2017). Women’s participation/334638125_The_Negotiation_of_Wom tion in the Patani Peace Process. [Unpublished en_in_Conflict_Situations_in_the_Deep_So master’s thesis].University of Amsterdam uth_of_Thailand

Ahmad, M. & Lee, N. (2020, February 04). Buraajaroenkij, D. (2018). Women and the Analyst: Thailand Sidelining MARA Patani Via Peace Process in the Deep South of Thailand. New Peace Talks with BRN. BenarNews. Re- Bangkok, Thailand: Peace Resource Collabo- trieved from https://www.benarnews.org/ rative, Center for Conflict Studies and Cul- english/news/thai/BRN-peace-talks- tural Diversity, Prince of Songkla University, 02042020194333.html Pattani Campus.

Buranajaroenkij, D. (2020). Challenges to Burke, A., Tweedie, P., Poocharoen, O. women's inclusion in peace processes in (2013). The Contested Corners of Asia: The Thailand and Myanmar. International Feminist Case of Journal of Politics, Vol 22, no 3, Jan. 21, 2020, Southern Thailand. The Asia Foundation. Re- pp. 403-422,doi:https:// trieved from https://asiafoundation.org/ doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2019.1698973 resources/pdfs/ SouthernThailandCaseStudyFullReport.pdf Buranajaroenkij, D. (2014). Changing Gender Roles Under Armed Conflict Conditions: Muslim Conciliation Resources. (2015). Women in Women’s Roles in the Public Sphere in Southern Peace Processes [Infographic]. https://www.c- Thailand. Paper presented at the Korea- r.org/news-and-insight/infographic-women- ASEAN Cooperation Project on Education peace-processes?utm_content=buffer and Exchange Program for Young Scholars in Women’s Studies (Phase 2), Penang, Malay- Ganjanakhundee, S. (2020, February 5). New sia. Retrieved from https:// Peace Talks in Southern Thailand: a New www.academia.edu/ 20420332/Chang Hope? Fulcrum. Retrieved from https:// ing_Gender_Roles_Under_Armed_Conflict www.iseas.edu.sg/media/commentaries/new- _Condi- peace-talks-in-southern-thailand-a-new-hope tions_Muslim_Women_s_Roles_in_the_Pub -by-supalak-ganjanakhundee/ lic_Sphere_in_Southern_Thailand Hayipiyawong, N. (2016). The Demand of Po- Buranajaroenkij, D. (2019). The Negotiation litical Rights: Case Study Special Autonomy Re- of Women in Conflict Situations in the Deep gion Status for Malay Muslim Patani in Southern South of Thailand. Social Science Asia, 5 (3), Thailand. [Unpublished master’s thesis]. Uni- 67-80. Retrieved from https:// versitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta. www.researchgate.net/

Horiba, A. (2014, January 23). Overview and www.thenewhumanitarian.org/ Context of Thailand's Deep South Conflict. feature/2020/09/24/Thailand-south-conflict- Retrieved from Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives: women-peace http://peacebuilding.asia/1226/ Súilleabháin, A. Ó. (2015, April 7). Benefits Inranews Agency. (2015, March 17). Death of Spread When Women Keep the Peace: Q&A a southern peace advocate. Retrieved from with Saisuree Chutikul. Retrieved from: { https://www.isranews.org/content-page/67- https://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/04/ south-slide/37253-jiraporn.html saisuree chutikul peacekeeping-women/ Sukka, V. (2014, December). Gender, Wom- Neelapaijit, A. (2009). Roles and Challenges en’s Livelihood in Conflict Area: A Case Study of for Malay Muslim Women in the Restive Pattani Province, Deep South of Thailand. Southern Border Provinces of Thailand. Con- Retrieved from: https:// ference on Religious Activism & Women’s Devel- www.mekonginstitute.org/uploads/ opment in Southeast Asia: Highlighting Impedi- tx_ffpublication/ ments, Exploring Opportunities (pp. 5-28). wps_2014_2_gender_women_livelihood_re v.pdf Centre for Research on Islamic and Malay Affairs Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Thailand. (2021, January 04). Retrieved from: Thailand to the United Nations. (2020, June https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/ 2). Thailand’s views on institution building and thailand.htm system-wide engagement. Retrieved from: UN Population Division. (2019). 2019 Revi- www.un.org: https://www.un.org/ sion of World Population Prospects. Retrieved peacebuilding/sites/ from: https://www.worldometers.info/world- www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/ population/thailand-population/ thailand_0.pdf United States Department of State, Office of PeaceWomen. (2020). Thailand. Retrieved International Religious Freedom. (2019). from: https://www.peacewomen.org/ 2019 Report on International Religious Free- content/thailand-15 dom: Thailand. Retrieved from: https:// www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on- Pohitaedaoh, P. (2020). From where I stand: international-religious-freedom/thailand/ “Buddhist and Muslim women are cooperat- ing to support the peace process in South- UN Women. (2020). Thailand. UN Women ern Thailand”. UN Women: Asia and the Asia and the Pacific. Retrieved from: https:// Pacific. Retrieved from: https:// asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/countries/ asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/news-and- thailand events/stories/2020/10/fwis-pateemoh- pohitaedaoh Women’s leadership, the missing ingredient for peace in Thailand’s southern border Quinley, C. (2020, September 24). Tired of provinces. (2018, March 2). Retrieved from: conflict, Thailand’s deep south women are https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/ on the front lines of peace. The New Hu- stories/2018/3/feature---thailand-southern- manitarian. Retrieved from https:// border-provinces

Women across the three countries have been accorded limited space in formal peace negotiations. Nevertheless, ingenious and resourceful as they are, they have been able to optimize such limited space to advance the interests and needs of women affected by the armed conflicts. Outside the formal peace process, they have broadened the available space and found other avenues for their engagements.

CHAPTER 5 Patterns and Trends Across the Three Countries

Peace and Security Situation resources, located mainly in border-states Ongoing armed conflicts highlight or –region (Myanmar, Thailand, and the unending struggle of marginalized Philippines), countryside, rural or depressed groups. areas (Philippines), can be considered the root cause or main driver of armed conflicts, cross the three countries of even as ethnic-religious hegemony, exclusion Myanmar, Philippines, and Thailand, or violent extremism further fueled and the ongoing armed conflicts exacerbate such conflicts. Complicated by between the government and rebel various sociocultural gender norms, expecta- forcesA highlight the longstanding and often tions, and stereotypes (across the coun- protracted struggle of marginalized groups tries), inter communal or clan disputes towards self-determination, self-rule, auton- (Myanmar and Philippines), or one-sided omy, secession, equitable distribution of violence (Myanmar), the conflicts remain wealth, and even the overthrow of legitimate unabated and continue to cause destruction democratic government. Such struggle spans on the individual and communal life and decades for various ethnic minority groups property of the civilian populations. in Myanmar, Moros, and ideologically

(Marxist/Maoist) indoctrinated rural poor in Devastating effects of armed conflicts the Philippines, even as the struggle of the are similar across countries. Moros can be traced back to centuries Devastating effects of armed conflicts on under the Spanish rule. The struggle of the women and children across the countries Malay Pattani in southern Thailand is rela- include indiscriminate shootings and bomb- tively recent, less than two decades, even as ings on civilian population, killings, physical their marginalization started more than a abuse, mass displacement, forced relocation, century ago with the signing of a treaty family separation and loss or disappearance between British and Siamese leaders turning of family members, loss of livelihood, sexual over the then Sultanate of Pattani to Siam and gender based violence, forced labor, sovereignty and forcibly assimilating the human trafficking, poor living conditions in Malay Pattani into the Thai culture. refugee camps, lack of access to basic needs

and services, diseases, and mental health Armed groups, such as the EAOs problems. Women and children bear the (Myanmar), the MILF/MNLF and NPA brunt of such effects, even as the men (Philippines), and MARA Pattani and BRN become victims of violence as well. Count- (Thailand) supposedly represent and wage less documented and undocumented human war on behalf of these marginalized groups. rights violations directed against hundreds Ironically, there have been reports about and thousands of women and children have these same armed groups perpetrating vio- been committed with impunity by armed lence and preying on the very people they actors, including militias or vigilante groups, are supposed to protect and fight for on both sides. (Myanmar).

Government peacebuilding initiatives vis Political and economic control over a vis UNSCR 1325 are inadequate. territory complicated by sociocultural Concerned governments have initiated factors serves as main driver of conflicts. measures to resolve the conflicts, such as Political and economic control over territo- declaring bilateral ceasefires (Myanmar and ry, including its people and rich natural

Philippines) and peace talks (across three all levels. Women’s groups used the countries) with concerned armed or insur- NSPAW as leverage to advocate for wom- gent groups. Unfortunately, violations of en’s participation in the peace process. The ceasefire agreements by government and allocation of the 30 percent quota was an rebel troops and stalling of peace negotia- outcome of such advocacy. tions owing to disputes among stakeholders regarding peace process frameworks as well Thailand has no NAP but is party to the as provisions and principles of peace negoti- CEDAW and has the National Measures and ations contributed to the worsening instead Guidelines (NMG) on WPS. Women used of resolving and mitigating the effects of the the CEDAW to promote women’s human conflict. rights and call for a stop to violence against women in conflict areas. However. the Concerned stakeholders have expressed NMG, has yet to be properly implemented openness to settle differences and move the and used as leverage of women to advocate peace process forward, even as govern- for their inclusion in the formal peace pro- ments and rebel forces have remained cess. unrelenting and continued to posture hard- line positions on certain issues, such as Local CSOs play varied roles terms and conditions on the peace process vital in peacebuilding. (Myanmar and Philippines), government la- Across the three countries, CSOs, including belling of rebel forces as terrorists (Arakan women’s CSOs, have played varied roles Army in Myanmar and NPA in the vital in peacebuilding, despite limited space Philippines), and rejection of BRN call for accorded them in the formal peace process. impartial mediators and international CSOs limited participation includes as observers in the peace process (Thailand). observers and technical advisers to stakeholders, for instance, as representatives of Meanwhile, government initiatives vis a vis EAOs in the Myanmar peace process. Out- UNSCR 1325 can be considered as relatively side the formal peace process, CSOs varied inadequate. Of the three countries, only the roles are as advocates, alliance builders, Philippines has an NAP on WPS interfaced educators or capacity builders, communica- with the Magna Carta of Women, PDPlan tors, community facilitators and mediators 2011-2016, and Women's EDGE plan. It is (across the three countries), unofficial now in the process of working on the monitors of ceasefire or peace agreements implementation plan for the NAP. (Myanmar), and providers of support services and humanitarian aid (Philippines Myanmar has no NAP on WPS but has the and Thailand). National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women (NSPAW) that provides for Particular to Myanmar women’s CSOs is women’s participation in decision making on their role as researcher and documenter. various social issues at all levels, even as it They document human rights violations, has gaps, including lack of an implementation such as rape and torture, committed by plan. Also, delegates to the formal peace armed actors, and disseminate and project process issued a commitment allocating 30 such documentation nationally and interna- percent quota for women’s participation at tionally. They continue to monitor, docu-

95 ment, and publish the progress of the 30 Women advance WPS amidst limited percent quota for women’s participation in space in formal peace process. formal peace dialogues. Women across the three countries have been accorded limited space in formal peace Women Peacebuilders and negotiations. Nevertheless, ingenious and their Role and Participation resourceful as they are, they have been able to optimize such limited space to advance in Peacebuilding the interests and needs of women affected Women peacebuilders come from diverse by the armed conflicts. Outside the formal backgrounds. peace process, they have broadened the Women peacebuilders at the national and available space and found other avenues for local levels come from diverse socioeconom- their engagements. ic backgrounds, including education and social class (across the three countries). In the In formal peace negotiations at the national formal peace process, however, women who or union level, women have served as nego- are highly educated, well-connected in socie- tiators, facilitators or mediators, technical ty, and founders and leaders of women’s or- advisers, observers, witness signatories but ganizations and alliances are able to partici- are not allowed to take part in decision mak- pate, even as some were former student ac- ing. In the Philippines, one woman became tivists, rebel soldiers, and victims of armed the first woman signatory and chief negotia- conflicts themselves (Myanmar and Philip- tor to a top level peace agreement between pines). In the Philippines, mainly women aca- the government and the Moro rebels. demics and professionals are at the forefront of high profile peace negotiations. To address such lack of decision making power, particularly in Myanmar, the women Women remain underrepresented or un- have utilized their cordial relationships with represented in formal peace negotiations. male delegates to adopt policy recommenda- Women have remained underrepresented or tions on gender inclusion in peace process unrepresented in formal peace negotiations frameworks. They have conducted back across the three countries. In Myanmar, channel discussions with concerned stake- over the four rounds of the UPC/21 CPC, holders simultaneous with the ongoing dia- percentage of women delegates straddled logue and communicated to other women between 13 percent and 22 percent, still far on the ground the progress of peace negoti- from reaching the 30 percent quota. In the ations and stances of stakeholders on issues Philippines, in peace negotiations between towards a more informed advocacy. the government and MILF, 22 percent of negotiators were women and 27 percent of At the local or community level, particularly total signatories were women. But these in Thailand, women with training from pro- women were mainly on the government side fessional facilitators have promoted dialogues and none on the MILF side. In Thailand, over in their respective communities. Seen as the three rounds of formal peace talks, only trust builders, they have served as facilitators armed actors and no women were allowed of community dialogues between Buddhists to participate in. and Muslims, or government officials and villagers. Similarly, in the Philippines, seen as mothers of the nation, women have assisted

in conflict resolution in small scale disputes purposes, served as connectors between of- and in mitigation of clan-based conflicts. ficials and the villagers, and assisted in providing humanitarian aid to victims of the Women conduct varied and vibrant conflict. Some have joined the Thai army and peacebuilding initiatives in the informal have been sent as part of the UN interna- peace process. tional peacekeeping mission. Outside the formal peace process, women have engaged in advocacy, capacity building, In the Philippines, women have identified and alliance building, research and documenta- enhanced early strategic alliances with men tion, information and communication, moni- to push forward women’s agenda in the toring of ceasefire or peace agreement com- peace process as well as assisted in the reha- pliance, early warning system, and provision bilitation and development of conflict affect- of humanitarian aid. Some women have ed communities, even as they engaged in joined the military and have been sent as providing assistance to displaced people. part of the UN international peacekeeping mission. Knowingly or unknowingly, they Enabling and Constraining have used their socio-culturally constructed Factors in Peacebuilding roles, such as homemakers, caregivers, serv- Personal agency of women, international ers at gatherings, and others, to their ad- and national frameworks, and support vantage. from local and international communities

enable peacebuilding. In Myanmar, women’s CSOs have convened peace forums to discuss among themselves Personal agency refers to the totality of gender related issues in armed conflicts, for- one’s qualities to directly control events in mulate policy recommendations, and submit one’s life (Bandura, 2001). Women’s individ- such recommendations to political dialogues. ual qualities as trust builders, able servers They have conducted tea break advocacy and workers, ability to establish cordial rela- wherein they convinced concerned stake- tionships or strategic alliances with the men, holders or dialogue delegates to adopt gen- and conviction to take control of their life in der inclusive policy recommendations while peace and security have facilitated their serving tea during breaks. They have identi- peacebuilding activities. Women in Myanmar fied champions or progressives in govern- have rallied male friends and delegates to ment and parliament to support and push support and adopt their policy recommenda- forward conflict affected women’s interest tions while serving tea during breaks. In the and needs in the peace process. Philippines, women have tapped their estab- At the grassroots or community level, wom- lished alliances with men to push forward en in Myanmar have carried out indigenous women’s agenda in the peace process. In early warning practices to mitigate the ef- Thailand, with their ability to build trust, col- fects of the conflict on the community and laborate, and engage with diverse stakehold- unofficially monitored compliance of armed ers, women have been able to make the actors to the NCA. government and the resistance movement

responsive to their proposals. In Thailand, women have monitored and patrolled their communities to maintain peace. Women have used international frameworks, They have gathered intelligence for security such as the UNSCR 1325, CEDAW

(Myanmar and Philippines), and national husband and responsible for taking care of plans, such as the NAP on WPS (Philippines), the household, including children, parents, and the NSPAW and 30 percent quota and in laws. Men serve as head and bread- (Myanmar), as leverage to advocate for winner of the family or clan and leader of women’s participation or gender inclusion in the community. As head, breadwinner, and the peace process. In Thailand, wary of leader, men have the sole power and au- causing social friction, women have utilized thority to make decisions for the family, clan, the CEDAW to advocate not for women’s and the community. participation in politics and peace process but for women’s human rights, including an Societal structures, influenced by deep- end to violence against women. seated sociocultural discriminatory gender norms, expectations, and stereotypes, mere- Support from concerned sectors outside the ly condone or reinforce male domination in conflict areas and the international commu- the private and public spheres, specifically in nity have served as impetus for women to politics. Such patriarchal power structures continue and sustain their advocacies for accord limited space for active women’s par- conflict affected women’s interests and ticipation. In Myanmar, for instance, certain needs and project their plight at the national government posts are suitable only for men and international levels (across the three as stipulated in the constitution. In the Phil- countries). ippines, relatively strict division of labor exists in the private and public spheres, includ- Discriminatory gender norms, patriarchal ing peace negotiations. There is high level of power structures, and biased personal insecurity and personal threat for women perceptions and attitudes constrain participating in official peace negotiations. In peacebuilding. Thailand, the narrow scope of the peace Sociocultural constraints include the percep- process framework only allows the partici- tions that security is about war and war is pation of warring parties, with their assumed the domain of men. Therefore, the issue of power to stop violence, in the negotiations, peace and security is the men’s concern and thus contributing to women’s exclusion. beyond the women’s realm. Also, peace negotiations require certain knowledge and Just as women’s personal characteristics expertise. Therefore, poorly educated and have facilitated their peacebuilding activities, with nothing to contribute technically, wom- so also biased personal perceptions and atti- en, who are mainly in the grassroots and in tudes have constrained other women from conflict affected areas, are kept from partici- engaging in peacebuilding. Influenced by dis- pating in such negotiations. Only highly edu- criminatory gender norms and expectations, cated and professionally trained women, well fearing community reprisals and censure, and connected in society, have the leverage to lacking in proper education and training, take part but are, nevertheless, kept from grassroots women have refrained from get- decision making. ting involved and participate in peacebuilding activities. Discriminatory gender norms, expectations, and stereotypes relegate and confine women Dynamics within and among women’s CSOs to the home and keep them from taking part or movements constrain peacebuilding in the public sphere. Women are supposed- across the three countries as well. Differ- ly docile, obedient and acquiescent to the ences in approach and strategies, including

98 ideological and theoretical frameworks, and Meanwhile in Thailand, a vital gain is the competition for funds among women’s CSOs changed perceptions and attitudes of con- hamper work in WPS. cerned stakeholders in government and resistance movement on the women’s move- Significant Structural and ment allowing them to become more re- Sociocultural Gains sponsive to the latter’s proposals. Also in Thailand is the changed attitude and behavior in Peacebuilding of women from being submissive and fearful Women peacebuilders have been able to to being assertive defenders of their family achieve relatively modest but significant members and able facilitators of dialogues structural and sociocultural gains in relation between military and villagers. In the Philip- to WPS in their respective countries given pines, MILF leaders, with increased aware- their various initiatives amidst formidable ness of the importance of women in the challenges. peace process, became open to appointing women to leadership positions in the Inclusion of women, gender-friendly BARMM. provisions, women empowerment, and raising of gender related critical issues in Best Practices in Peacebuilding peace process as structural gains Best practices of women in peacebuilding are Notable structural gains across the three in line with their initiatives in advocacy, ca- countries are inclusion of women in peace pacity building, alliance building, and early negotiations, albeit with limited role; em- warning system. powerment of women, specifically at the grassroots level or conflict affected areas, to In advocacy, best practices are: actively participate in peacebuilding outside In Myanmar the formal peace process; and raising and Rallying male delegates to support women’s discussion of critical issues, including roots of agenda in the peace process while serving conflict and women’s human rights, needs tea during breaks; and interests, in formal peace negotiations. Identifying champions in government and

parliament; In Myanmar and Philippines, a crucial struc- Building and utilzing cordial relationships tural gain is the inclusion of gender friendly with male delegates to adopt their policy provisions in the peace process frameworks recommendations; and and agreements. Specific to the Philippines Projecting the plight of women and children are the government’s issuance of EO 865 in conflict affected areas based on well mandating the creation of the NSC WPS and researched evidence to the international the adoption of the first WPS regional action community. plan in the ARMM.

In the Philippines Changed mindsets, attitudes, and Utilizing early strategic alliances with men; behaviors as sociocultural gains Civilianizing peace track and involvement of Socioculturally, an important gain in women’s CSOs; Myanmar is the changed mindsets of grass- Popularizing and normalizing positive aspects roots women on the peace process and their of culture or religion in support of ability to participate in the political sphere. women’s participation in public decision-

making; and ate, acceptable, and applicable peacebuilding Practising courage, competence, strategies and initiatives vis a vis diverse and creativity by women leaders. stakeholders and contexts; 3. enhancement of best practices, especially indigenous; 4. In Thailand institutionalization of best practices; 5. per- Watching language used: refraining from sonal and collective agencies of women using terms that seemingly offend the peacebuilders; 6. countering of sociocultural sensibilities of the men, such as feminism gender norms, expectations, and stereotypes; and gender equality; using terms such as 7. contextualization of gender concepts and social justice and women’s human rights frameworks in particular countries; 8. trans- instead of women’s participation and formation of patriarchal structures; and 9. gender equality; building on and sustaining significant gains. Keeping men informed about goals and objectives of women’s movement; and Ownership of the peace process Utilizing all available communication channels Ownership of the peace process by women to build peace among concerned stakeholders at all levels is crucial towards stakeholders or conflicting parties. building sustainable peace. Ownership requires recognition, acknowledgment, and In capacity building, the best practice across lived experience of the individual and com- the three countries is focusing on building munal benefits of the peace process by the the capacities of women at the grassroots women, specifically those directly affected by level in relation to peacebuilding. It is the the conflict. women (and men) at the grassroots, in conflict affected areas who are in desperate need Acceptable, appropriate and applicable of education and training in order to be em- strategies and initiatives powered to get involved in peacebuilding for Certain contexts require certain acceptable, their own good and the good of their families appropriate and applicable peacebuilding and communities. strategies and initiatives. It is crucial to determine and employ acceptable, appropriate and In alliance building, the best practices specifi- applicable strategies and initiatives in dealing cally in Myanmar are knowledge management with diverse stakeholders and responding to and resource sharing. In early warning sys- diverse contexts to support and advance tem, the best practice, also specifically in My- women’s participation in peace and security. anmar, is employing indigenous practices in A set of strategies and initiatives may be ac- alerting villagers on looming armed encoun- ceptable, appropriate and applicable to cer- ter in order to mitigate the effects of the tain stakeholders and contexts but may not conflict. be so to another.

Lessons Learned and Way Enhancement and institutionalization of best practices Forward to Mainstream WPS Enhancing best practices, especially indige- Key lessons and way forward to mainstream nous, of women peacebuilders ensures that a WPS across the three countries underscore substantial part of the engagement is done. the importance of as well as the urgency of Institutionalizing such enhanced best practic- effectively responding to the following issues: es completes the engagement and ensures 1. Ownership of peace process; 2. Appropri- the sustainability of the gains resulting from such engagement.

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Personal and collective agencies enhance customs and practices that promote of women in peacebuilding equality among women and men. Underlying all the best practices of women in peacebuilding are the personal and collective Contextualization of gender concepts and frameworks agencies of the women, including their self Each country has specific sociocultural, eco- confidence, conviction that they can influ- nomic, and political context. Similar concepts ence the peace process, trust and credibility and frameworks, such as on gender equality they have built with other stakeholders, and and feminism, may have different meanings their courage, inner strength, competence, and understandings across countries owing resiliency, ingenuity, resourcefulness, and to varying contexts. Such differing meanings common vision of a gender inclusive peace and understandings are further complicated process, in order to effectively respond indi- in cases where such concepts and frame- vidually and communally to particular situa- works are foreign to a particular country and no equivalent terms in the native language tion or challenge and direct the course of exist. Therefore, contextualization of gender their life. Enhancing personal and collective and feminist related concepts and frame- agencies of women (and men), especially at works vis a vis peacebuilding is imperative in the grassroots, in relation to WPS through promoting and mainstreaming WPS in partic- various capacity building and other related ular countries. activities is imperative. Transformation of patriarchal structures Countering of discriminatory gender excluding or limiting women norms, expectations, and stereotypes in peacebuilding Countering sociocultural discriminatory gen- Transforming formal peace process struc- der norms, expectations, and stereotypes tures and frameworks excluding or limiting impeding women’s participation in peace and women’s participation across countries security is a tall but doable order as evi- needs to be supported and strengthened by denced by cases of intrepid Myanmar women related policies and legislations. Structural defying and countering such norms, expecta- changes necessary to move forward the tions and stereotypes, risking personal safety mainstreaming of WPS across the three and security. Influencing the personal agency countries require first and foremost the will- of women restrained by such norms and ex- ingness, sincerity, and political will of incum- pectations as well as inspiring and encourag- bent governments to institute and sustain ing these women individually and communally such changes. to do the same require ongoing awareness raising, education, and capacity building activ- Building on, strengthening, ities with resource persons as much as possi- and sustaining of significant gains ble from among renowned and experienced Building on, strengthening, and sustaining grassroots women peacebuilders the former significant gains in WPS need to be support- can identify with. Sociocultural transfor- ed by policies and legislations creating struc- mation requires an honest and serious tures and frameworks for the said purpose. assessment and recognition by concerned Even as they await the passage and proper ethnic and religious groups of their customs implementation of needed policies and legis- and practices engendering marginalization of lations, stakeholders need to intensify efforts women in the private and public spheres. to strengthen and sustain the gains achieved Women and men peacebuilders in such especially at the grassroots level, in conflict groups have the crucial role and responsibil- affected areas. ity to facilitate such assessment and recognition and enjoin fellow members to evolve or

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Compliance to the UNSCR 1325 and fulfilment of commitment to the 2017 joint statement of the ASEAN in promoting WPS in the region have been found wanting across the three countries.

WPS covers a whole gamut of issues cutting across the physical, sociocultural, economic, and political life of all across ages, sexual orientations and gender identities, classes, races, creeds, and ethnicities. It is not a matter for women peacebuilders alone. Each one has a stake and has the duty and responsibility to get involved.

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CHAPTER 6 Conclusions and Recommendations

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the four pillars of the WPS agenda, specifi- Conclusions cally women’s participation and representa- n the 2019-2020 WPS Index (GIWPS, tion. 2019, p.1), the Philippines ranked relative- I ly higher than Thailand and Myanmar, WPS is not merely about women’s participa- with Myanmar lagging far behind. Of total tion in the peace process, even as this study 167 countries ranked, the Philippines placed focuses on the role and participation of 90th with a WPS index of .709; Thailand women in peace and security across the placed 92nd, with .707 WPS index, and Myan- three countries. Indeed, it is all about the mar placed 150th, with .587 WPS index. A well-being and empowerment of women or- WPS index of 1 is the best possible score. dained by nature to carry the burden of The WPS Index systematically measures and bringing forth life to the world. Certainly, ranks as well as provides insights into pat- the state of their well-being determines the terns and progress on women’s well-being state of the well-being of others in the fami- and empowerment worldwide. It under- ly, community, and larger society as well. scores that countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full WPS covers a whole gamut of issues cutting and equal rights and opportunities in all as- across the physical, sociocultural, economic, pects at all levels. and political life of all across ages, sexual orientations, and gender identities, classes, Given the WPS rankings, the three countries races, creeds, and ethnicities. It is not a seem a long way to even get to the top 50. matter for women peacebuilders alone. Results of this ASEAN WPS baseline study Each one has a stake and has the duty and apparently reinforce the three countries’ responsibility to get involved. rankings. Women peacebuilders across the three countries had gone to great lengths to At the ninth and final session of the Decem- confront and somehow break personal, ber 2018 AIPR and UN workshop on sociocultural, and structural barriers and had ASEAN perspectives in conflict management to deal with diverse stakeholders and and conflict resolution in the region, contexts to push forward women’s agenda H.E. Marty Natalegawa, member of the UN in the peace process. Secretary-General’s high-level advisory board on mediation and former Indonesian Given the study findings, it can be said, com- foreign affairs minister, emphasized two es- pliance to the UNSCR 1325 and fulfilment of sential characteristics in managing potential commitment to the 2017 joint statement of conflict or resolving ongoing conflict in the the ASEAN in promoting WPS in the region region: trust and synergy at the national, have been found wanting across the three regional, and global levels (AIPR, 2018, p. countries, even as the Philippines has already 27). In the same manner, this study wishes adopted a NAP on UNSCR 1325 and has to reiterate and underscore the same two started working on its implementation plan. essential characteristics, trust and synergy, Decisive measures and actions have yet to to move forward the mainstreaming of WPS be instituted and implemented in terms of within and across countries in the ASEAN.

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NP Philippines has recently started a learn- non-confrontational stance in rallying the ing exchange initiative on WPS specifically men to their side, thus gain the latter’s trust, aimed at increasing understanding on activi- confidence, and support. Therefore, the ties, challenges, and opportunities of emerg- ASEAN could perhaps issue a policy enjoining women leaders as well as increasing ing concerned member states to institution- communication and collaboration among alize such best practice or find space or these women leaders in Myanmar, Mindanao body within its structure for the institution- in the Philippines, and Southern Thailand. alization of such practice. Such space or Activities under this initiative include ex- body may be composed of an equal number change visits, capacity building workshops, of women and men tasked to develop and and public lecture on WPS. Modalities of implement programs solely on the WPS such initiative need to be adjusted given the agenda in coordination with ACWC or oth- global pandemic and volatile political situa- er relevant ASEAN bodies, or serve as a tion in Myanmar. Undoubtedly, however, funding window that processes proposals on such initiative could be considered an initial WPS from the different ASEAN member and crucial step in engendering the “trust states. and synergy” among women leaders and peacebuilders essential in moving the WPS Bridging of gap in communication and forward. information access and promotion of collaboration among women peacebuilders Recommendations Access to communication and information is his study surfaces a number of issues essential in women’s participation in peace and challenges on WPS across the and security. Women peacebuilders in T three countries. It, however, wishes tracks 1 and 2 more than women peace- to underscore the following issues with cor- builders in track 3 seemingly have had more responding recommendations to particular access to relevant communication and infor- stakeholders in WPS mainstreaming in the mation on the peace process. Therefore, it ASEAN region: would be best to institute policies or measures to bridge such gap in order to al- To the ASEAN low women in track 3 to gain equal access Institutionalization of best practices to such communication and information. Institutionalization of best practices of Relatedly, it would be best to institute poli- women peacebuilders is crucial in moving cies or measures to promote collaboration the mainstreaming of the WPS forward. A among women peacebuilders, especially in common best practice of women peace- track 3, across countries. builders across the three countries is properly and cordially collaborating with the To the CSOs men in the peace process. Women have uti- Building on, strengthening, lized their cordial relationships (Myanmar), and sustaining gains early strategic alliances (Philippines), and Most of the best practices and significant worked well (Thailand) with the men to ad- gains in peacebuilding have been undertaken vance the interests and needs of women in and achieved outside the formal peace conflict affected areas. They have postured a 105

process. The bulk of peacebuilding work, the projecting violations committed by armed fight as it were, has been on the ground. It actors against the rights of women and girls would be well for CSOs to build on, in conflict affected areas. Therefore, there is strengthen and sustain such gains by stepping a need to push for the conduct of more of up their efforts and invest more of their such activities not only in Myanmar but also resources, both human and material, in the other two countries. It would be well in addressing the needs, especially in capacity for donor agencies to provide more funding building, in relation to WPS in conflict affect- support in this area. ed areas. A strong base is likely to positively influence the dynamics of the peace process This study covers three ASEAN countries all the way to the top. In situations wherein only. Conducting similar studies to cover a top-down approach is unlikely, a bottom other conflict affected ASEAN Member up approach, its opposite, might be more States will allow for the establishment of a feasible and effective. more complete picture of the role and participation of women in peace and To the Donor Agencies security as well as the crafting and imple- More Support for research, knowledge mentation of appropriate policies and pro- management, resource sharing, and grams by concerned stakeholders towards implementation activities WPS mainstreaming in the region. Research and documentation and knowledge management and resource sharing are crucial towards a better understanding of and more effective response to the situation and needs of victims, specifically women and girls, of armed conflicts. Study findings reveal only women peacebuilders with their CSOs in Myanmar have been able to maximize such strategies, specifically in surfacing and

“Two essential characteristics in managing potential conflict or resolving ongoing conflict in the region are trust and synergy at the national, regional, and global levels.”

- H.E. Marty Natalegawa,

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Nonviolent Peaceforce Philippines Main Office House # 003, General Luna Street Rosary Height IV, Cotabato City 9600 Tel/Fax: (+63 64) 421 1977 Website: www.nvpf.org

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