Enemies, Adversaries & Unlikely Allies: Reimagining Agonal Democratic Theory Through a Classical Sociological Lens Philip Alexander Steiner A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Sociology, York University, Toronto, Ontario March 2021 © Philip Alexander Steiner, 2021 i Abstract: Set against the backdrop of increasingly polarized and dysfunctional political discourse within western democratic nations, this dissertation aims to consider the ways in which critical sociology can contribute to, and potentially expand, emergent accounts of an alternative radical democratic politics premised on productive contest. While the mainstream of democratic theory remains dominated by notions of deliberation, compromise, and consensus; a challenge has emerged out of a small but important paradigm of social and political theory - one that conceptually re-prioritized the political ideal of agon. Rejecting notions of post-political compromise or consensus, contemporary scholars of agonal democracy propose perpetually open contest, legitimated struggles, and irresolvable tensions as the proper and desirable content of ‘the political.’ Yet as richly as these varying accounts have mapped the political character of such agonal principles, very little attention has been paid to their implicit or explicit social dimensions. Through the creative adaptation of certain sociological perspectives of Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel, and Jürgen Habermas; this project attempts to rethink the social in the context of radical agonistic democracy. Taking up the work of Chantal Mouffe as an exemplar of this agonal paradigm, this project challenges the often- shallow accounts of the social, ultimately suggesting an alternative, though complimentary, theoretical vocabulary through which to explore the important, but consistently underexplored, social dimensions of a (re)turn to the political ideal of agon. Keywords: agon, the political, radical democracy, classical sociology, the social, Mouffe, Schmitt, Tönnies, Simmel, Weber, Habermas, critical sociology. ii For Barbara Higgins (1963 – 2021). Barb you will never know how much your kindness, friendship and steadfast support helped me and countless other students over the course of your life. Thank you. iii Acknowledgements This dissertation would not have been possible without a multitude of friends, allies, adversaries and enemies. Thanks to each of you for the love, support, challenges, and even pain that you contributed over the years. Special thanks to Dr. Philip Walsh who shepherded me through this project with intellectual rigor, patience, and mentorship; and to Dawn and Thomas Steiner who ‘borned me’ and were the original conditions of possibility for this and every other success. iv Table of Contents Abstract ……………………………………………………………... ii Dedication …………………………………………………………... iii Acknowledgements …………………………………………………. iv Table of Contents ……………………………………………………. v Introduction …………………………………………………………. 1 Chapter One Problématique: Limitations of a ‘Purely Political’ Account of Agonal Democracy ………………….. 6 Chapter Two Between Agon and Auslese - Recovering Political Contest through the work of Max Weber …………………. 59 Chapter Three Unfamiliar Territory: Looking Beyond the Canon to the Social Conditions of Possibility for a Radical Democracy Premised on Political Agon ……………………………. 94 Chapter Four On the Utility of Abstracting an Ethos of Social Agon: Thinking Agonal Democracy Beyond the Political ………… 155 Conclusion ………………………………………………………… 223 References …………………………………………………………. 230 v Introduction Let us assume. It is with these words that, just over a half century ago, that American moral philosopher John Rawls set the context for his now seminal treatise on justice and democracy in A Theory of Justice. Let us assume, Rawls suggested, that society is, more or less, a self-sufficient association of persons who recognize certain binding rules of conduct that govern their interactions, and, more or less, adhere to them. Let us assume, he continued, that these rules specify a system of cooperation designed to advance the good of those taking part in such democratic societies. Let us assume that society, here a moniker for modern wester democratic societies, is a cooperative venture oriented towards mutual advantage, and that conflict is not oriented towards whether to continue such cooperation, but rather focused on the quality and quantum of benefits distributed to each participant. Let us assume, in short, that the trajectory of modern western democracy is sound, and that the question of justice can be answered through the abstraction of interests and reasonable justifications amongst the imagined signatories to an essentially functional and well-ordered social contract. (Rawls, 1999: 4) Although some twenty years later, in his second most influential work - Political Liberalism, Rawls begins by accepting that his assumptions regarding a ‘reasonably well-ordered society’ might have been too generous, the underpinning premise - that western democratic societies are essentially well founded, maintained, and functional – continued to haunt the mainstream of political and social theories of democracy. This is because, far from creating such assumptions, those notions Rawls asked us all to assume in A Theory of Justice were 1 articulations of the something deeper and older – an underpinning confidence, perhaps to the point of arrogance, that the institutions and structures of modern western democracies, and with them, certain fundamental philosophical assertions about the nature and potential of conflict and consensus within them, were essentially good, and sound, and stable. Of course, in the decades since, many have challenged elements of Rawls’ work. Indeed, for over five decades, the majority of academic engagement with notions of democracy and justice, have positioned themselves for or against Rawls, and subsequently as time passed, vis a vis his most famous advocates and critics. Yet, for the most part, and even in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary, the underlying assumption that democracy is premised on consensus has remained woefully unchallenged. One very notable exception takes the form of radical (agonal) democratic theory. A small, but vibrant, subset of political theory – drawing heavily from political philosophy – radical democratic theorists fundamentally rejected the central role of consensus and stability underpinning the mainstream of post-Rawlsian democratic theory, instead prioritizing conflict and perpetual tension as the essential defining character of democracy, and politics more broadly. Building on a core distinction between antagonistic (destructive) and agonistic (productive) conflict within the body politic, these radical democratic theorists offered a new vision for western democratic societies – one which challenged and disrupted the stale confidence of the old guard. Yet, despite its many promises, the agonal democratic vision has not, I argue, lived up to its full potential. Narrow ontological accounts of the political, have overshadowed and shackled the transformative potential of a new democracy premised on an ideal of political agon – and have, systematically, led to dismissive or anemic accounts of any broader social context. 2 But for this pervasive dismissal of the social, or at its extreme, reduction of the social to mere sediment of ‘real’ political outcomes; the critical normative commitments underpinning agonal democratic accounts could well have made radical democratic theorists natural allies to a range of critical sociologist. Both groups focus on illuminating systemically obscured inequalities, injustices and power imbalances, and both are equally committed to opening new spaces – both conceptual and real – through which diverse perspectives and positions can be better recognized and considered. This is, I believe, a missed opportunity. Despite its shortcomings, I contend that the radical agonal democratic challenge represents an essential conceptual trajectory for anyone interested in equality, justice, and democracy. Though this body of writing has become trapped within a myopic and anemic conception of the social, the transformative potential of the agonal (re)turn and the possibilities it offers to expand the contemporary democratic imaginary are too important to abandon. To this end, this project looks to inject these radical democratic accounts with selected critical sociological insights to better consider and map what such accounts might offer both disciplines were they to take seriously their own obscured assumptions and necessary foundations vis a vis a more robust understanding of the social. Concurrently challenging the predominant logic of determinism in agonal democratic theory – under which the social is understood to be byproduct of political struggle – and exploring and expanding nascent assumptions and conceptions of the social within and around such accounts, I will aim to reprioritize a lost, but essential, question: what are the underlying social conditions of possibility for a radically emancipatory democratic order premised on the ideal of political agon? However, as opposed to traditional critique, I am proposing a different approach. Through a process of 3 creative adaptation, I am proposing to introduce selected classical and contemporary sociological insights, alternative understandings and conceptual