Reclaiming Democracy

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Reclaiming Democracy Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demeš, Editors RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY RECLAIMING RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demeš, Editors and Pavol Joerg Forbrig Postcommunism, with its exaggerated emphasis on the power of the economy, politics, law enforcement, justice and the media, can be seen, to some extent, as echoing the communist period. The patience of people has been enormous, but not without limits. Fortunately, the ethos of the anti-communist revolutions of 1989 and 1990, the natural self-organization of civil society and the international context made a return to totalitarianism impossible. Sooner or later, the situation in various postcommunist countries ripened into civic protest against the new abuses of power. From the preface by Václav Havel Reclaiming Democracy Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demeš, Editors RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe Copyright © 2007 by The German Marshall Fund of the United States and Individual Authors The opinions expressed in this book are those of individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the authors’ affi liation. Published by The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1744 R St. N.W. Washington, DC 20009 All Rights Reserved Cataloging-in-Publication Data Forbrig, Joerg, and Pavol Demeš (eds.) Reclaiming Democracy. Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe p. cm. ISBN 978 – 80 – 969639 – 0 – 4 (paperback) Printed in the Slovak Republic LIST OF CONTENTS PREFACE Václav Havel 7 INTRODUCTION Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demeš 9 PART I: CASES OK ‘98: A CAMPAIGN OF SLOVAK NGOS FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS Martin Bútora 21 GLAS 99: CIVIL SOCIETY PREPARING THE GROUND FOR A POST-TUĐMAN CROATIA Sharon Fisher and Biljana Bijelić 53 IZLAZ 2000: AN EXIT TO DEMOCRACY IN SERBIA Jelica Minić and Miljenko Dereta 79 ENOUGH! KMARA AND THE ROSE REVOLUTION IN GEORGIA Giorgi Kandelaki and Giorgi Meladze 101 IT’S TIME! PORA AND THE ORANGE REVOLUTION IN UKRAINE Vladyslav Kaskiv, Iryna Chupryna, Yevhen Zolotariov 127 PART II: COMPARISONS DIFFERENT AUTHORITARIANISMS, DISTINCT PATTERNS OF ELECTORAL CHANGE Vitali Silitski 155 CIVIC ACTION AND DEMOCRATIC POWER SHIFTS: ON STRATEGIES AND RESOURCES Pavol Demeš and Joerg Forbrig 175 YOUTH AND POSTCOMMUNIST ELECTORAL REVOLUTIONS: NEVER TRUST ANYONE OVER 30? Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik 191 THE ECONOMY AND DEMOCRATIC CHANGE: THE MISSING LINK? Robin Shepherd 205 COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOURTH WAVE OF DEMOCRACY Taras Kuzio 217 WHERE NEXT OR WHAT NEXT? Ivan Krastev 235 ABOUT THE AUTHORS 245 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 251 5 6 PREFACE Václav Havel The epochal social changes that took place in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s opened an avenue for millions of Europeans to live a dignifi ed life in liberty and democracy after decades under communism. Free elections, human rights, civic liberties, the rule of law, as well as economic transformation and an independent foreign policy were high on the agenda of all newly formed democratic governments. Yet while the formal establishment of democracy typically took only a matter of days, weeks or, at most, months, real democracy did not emerge easily. It is, indeed, an ongoing process, one that has not been completed even now. New generations, without the burdensome experience of life under totalitarianism, are only now emerging into adulthood. These new generations are only gradually moving into positions in the decision making process in their countries. The situation in countries that overcame communist dictatorship, and the various problems and obstacles they experience on their way to democracy, is called postcommunism. For long decades under communist rule, private property was not permitted, having been forcibly nationalized in dramatic circumstances after World War II. Similarly, public offi ce was accessible only to those linked to the governing ideology. Thus, the communist regime effectively destroyed the legacies of the older political and entrepreneurial classes, after generations that had developed a sense of responsibility for private property and respect for the rule of law. Hence, for the democratic governments newly formed after 1989, the renewal of a state fi rmly rooted in the rule of law and the enactment of an economic transformation process based on privatization were standard, but nevertheless, complicated tasks. The massive redistribution of property not only corrected some of the previous excesses, it also created tempting opportunities for a variety of economic adventurers. While new governments struggled to ensure the functioning of basic constitutional principles and the integration of their countries with the international community, the former nomenclatura used their experience, resources and contacts to their own advantage. They adapted to the new situation very quickly, taking positions in politics and the economy, justice and law enforcement, and the media, all the while retaining the networks they had inherited from the past. Strong social pressure for swift change meant that legislation was prepared and approved without suffi cient time for testing it out in practice. As a result, economic transformation often took place in uncertain and imperfect legal circumstances. 7 PREFACE Postcommunism, with its exaggerated emphasis on the power of the economy, politics, law enforcement, justice and the media, can be seen, to some extent, as echoing the communist period. Newly formed mafi as have often enough simply replaced the old communist authorities, not uncommonly brandishing nationalist fl ags and slogans. The patience of people has been enormous, but is not without limits. Fortunately, the ethos of the anti-communist revolutions of 1989 and 1990, the natural self-organization of civil society and the international context made a return to totalitarianism impossible. Sooner or later, the situation in various postcommunist countries ripened into civic protest against the new abuses of power. But, in each country this development took a different path and, therefore, one should not equate developments in Slovakia with those in Serbia or Georgia. I am delighted that this book is dedicated to the role of civil society in rising up against postcommunism. In my opinion, it is an injustice that these revolutions have not received their due share of attention, but have often remained in the shadow of those that preceded them in 1989 and 1990. Washington, January 2007 8 INTRODUCTION Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demeš Slovakia, September 1998: Parliamentary elections see the governing coalition of Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar, criticized domestically and internationally for his backsliding on democracy and isolationist policies, challenged by an alliance of opposition parties stressing their democratic and European aspirations. An energetic and polarized political campaign is accompanied by a broad effort of civil society groups to provide voters with information about the elections, to encourage their participation and to monitor the electoral process. A neck-and-neck race ensues. Eventually, 84 percent of voters turn out, and in an electoral competition deemed fair by the international community, the populist-nationalist Mečiar government is replaced by a democratic coalition government, under Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda. Croatia, January 2000: Parliamentary elections take place, ousting the Croatian Democratic Union of the recently deceased President Franjo Tuđman, whose nationalist and semi-authoritarian politics dominated the country since independence in 1990. In a civic coalition for free and fair elections, nongovernmental organizations rally voters for democratic change, provide election-related information and motivate citizens to cast their votes en masse. 75 percent of voters turn out on the day. In parallel, long-divided democratic opposition parties form two coalitions that win the elections and take offi ce under Prime Minister Ivica Račan. Serbia, September 2000: Through early presidential elections, nationalist strongman Slobodan Milošević attempts to prolong his rule, but is successfully challenged by Vojislav Koštunica, candidate of the newly united Democratic Opposition of Serbia. A broad civil society coalition provides voter information, calls on citizens to go to the polls and ensures election monitoring, while a youth resistance movement campaigns against Milošević’s quasi-dictatorship and demands democratic change. After the ballot is clearly manipulated in Milošević’s favor, protests break out and hundreds of thousands take to the streets, eventually forcing Milošević to resign and bringing the democratic opposition to power under President Koštunica, a result confi rmed by a landslide victory in parliamentary elections two months later. Georgia, November 2003: The “For a New Georgia” bloc of incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze, whose ten-year rule has increasingly led Georgia into political, social and economic crisis, is declared victorious in parliamentary elections. Suspicions of massive electoral fraud abound and are substantiated by independent election monitors. Over the days following the ballot, the political opposition, civil society and youth groups stage increasingly powerful street protests that reach their height 9 INTRODUCTION when protesters peacefully interrupt the opening session of the new parliament. As a result of what soon comes to be known as the Rose Revolution, Shevardnadze resigns
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