” 2002 AR UNE FFP REPORTS 3, J W Century UMBER st N PERSPECTIVES FROM THE AMERICAS
NTERNAL ON I MILITARY INTERVENTION TO
Building Peace in the 21 CONFERENCE SUMMARY ESPONSES R EGIONAL The Fund for Peace “ The Fund for R
The Regional Responses to Internal War program is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and is being carried out in partnership with the Stanley Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of The Fund for Peace. Future conferences will focus on similar issues, with perspectives from regional opinion leaders in Asia and Europe. ILITARY NTERVENTION IN NTERNAL ARS FFP REPORTS M I I W
ADVISORY COUNCIL REGIONAL RESPONSES TO INTERNAL WAR PROGRAM
Chair: Major General (retired) William L. Nash
The Honorable Morton Abramowitz Lt. General (retired) Nicholas Kehoe The Century Foundation Board of Trustees - The Fund for Peace
Elizabeth Andersen Susan King (ex officio) Human Rights Watch Carnegie Corporation of New York
Kenneth Bacon Dr. Robert Legvold Refugees International Columbia University
Nina Bang Jensen Dr. R. William Liddle Coalition for International Justice Ohio State University
Elizabeth Becker The Honorable Princeton Lyman New York Times The Aspen Institute
Roberta Cohen Susan Collin Marks The Brookings Institution Search for Common Ground
Karen DeYoung The Honorable Robert B. Oakley The Washington Post National Defense University
Stephen J. Del Rosso, Jr (ex officio) Dr. Michael O’Hanlon Carnegie Corporation of New York The Brookings Institution
Dr. Francis Deng The Honorable Thomas Pickering The City University of New York Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Dr. William J. Durch John Prendergast The Henry L. Stimson Center International Crisis Group
Dr. Donald Emmerson David Shorr Stanford University The Stanley Foundation
Michele Flournoy The Honorable Richard H. Solomon The Center for Strategic & International Studies United States Institute of Peace
Dr. Allan E. Goodman Dr. Frederick S. Tipson Institute of International Education Markle Foundation
Dr. Louis W. Goodman Kenneth D. Wollack American University National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
The Honorable Lee Hamilton Casimir Yost The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Georgetown University
The Reverend J. Bryan Hehir Dr. I. William Zartman Catholic Charities USA School of Advanced International Studies
The Honorable H. Allen Holmes Georgetown University
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
OVERVIEW 1 THE CONFERENCE 2 PROTECTING PEOPLE 5 A UN OBLIGATION 5 LEGALITY VS. LEGITIMACY 6 PREVENTION AS CURE 7 POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS 10 ADVICE FOR THE UNITED STATES 12 CONCLUSION 13 CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS 14 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 16
INSERTS
SHORT TAKES ON RECENT CONFLICT IN THE AMERICAS 3
PERSPECTIVES ON MILITARY INTERVENTION 7 BY DR. FERNANDO CEPEDA ULLOA
A CONVERGENCE OF MEANS? 11 HEMISPHERIC SECURITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 BY DR. RAFAEL FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO
MISSION STATEMENT
The mission of The Fund for Peace is to prevent war and alleviate the conditions that cause war.
The Fund promotes education and research for practical solutions. It is a consistent advocate of promoting social justice and respect for the principles of constitutional democracy. ILITARY NTERVENTION IN NTERNAL ARS FFP REPORTS M I I W
OVERVIEW to address internal crises in the region. They placed significant hope in the ability of newly democratic In the Americas, it is unlikely though not governments to absorb civil unrest and manage the impossible that problems of fragile political systems tug and pull of internal political disputes. By the and weak economies will deteriorate into end of the conference, however, after participants had humanitarian emergencies requiring international discussed a number of hypothetical and ongoing military intervention. This is the conclusion reached trouble spots, the group called for a strengthening of by a group of distinguished regional opinion leaders regional mechanisms to address internal strife. The who met from April 7 – 10, 2002 at Airlie Conference conference ended with the group issuing an agreed- Center near Warrenton, Virginia. upon document entitled “Conference Highlights” (see Clear-eyed about the uphill battle the region faces page 14) that provides regional guidelines for against drug trafficking, corruption, the gap between intervention, which “although considered by most the rich and the abjectly poor, and the growing to be rare and exceptional, cannot be excluded from prevalence and lethality of urban crime, the group the spectrum of possible regional reactions to did not see any of these problems erupting into the humanitarian crises caused by civil war, collapsed kind of mass violence that has been seen, for example, states, or governments unable or unwilling to protect in Somalia, Rwanda, or East Timor. The international their citizens.” This shift in stance by the group community’s intervention in Haiti in 1994, in the wake suggests that sustained dialogue had the effect of of three to five thousand civilian deaths, was perceived sharpening the participants’ sense of potential risk as the exception that proves the rule. in the region. At the meeting, the group of leaders from Both the discussion and the “Highlights” that academia, government, the military, the media, and emerged were considered an important departure nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) added their from the past. A number of participants commented voices to the ongoing and immensely controversial that both internal crises and military intervention are global debate on military intervention for humanitarian extremely difficult to discuss in the region. Many purposes. For two days, the group probed the issue were surprised that an “emerging consensus” on of military intervention under the auspices of The anything related to military intervention in Fund for Peace program on Regional Responses to humanitarian crises could be achieved and that the Internal War. The meeting benefited from the discussion “had gone this far.” December 2001 release of the report of the The Fund for Peace conducts a number of International Commission on Intervention and State programs in the areas of conflict prevention, human Sovereignty (ICISS). The report recommended that rights and justice, and peace-building. In the the international community adopt the concept of “a Regional Responses to Internal War program, The responsibility to protect” civilians rather than pursue Fund is probing ways in which regions agree and a “right to intervene” in sovereign states in differ in their approach to the difficult problem of exceptional circumstances.1 how to react to internal conflicts when diplomatic Early in the conference, many participants argued and other non-military measures have failed to deter that the Americas had adequate existing mechanisms imminent or ongoing mass killing of civilians. In
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October 2001, The Fund organized and hosted a pursue a self-serving agenda. Some saw new similar conference of high-level African leaders.2 democracies in the Americas as more capable than In the case of the Americas, it was clear early on past dictatorial regimes of weathering internal that The Fund’s request that the group try to minimize problems while others saw them as fragile and consideration of the role of the United States and vulnerable to the burdens and stresses caused by concentrate on regional approaches would prove poverty, economic uncertainty, and globalization. difficult to fulfill. There was an instinctive reflex to Along lines that interestingly split different age glance north on almost every issue. And the desire groups, another gap was apparent. The younger to circumscribe unilateral US action in the region members of the group were more optimistic about was an obvious undercurrent in the group’s improved relations between the United States and its discussion and touched almost every guideline that southern neighbors while others felt that interests, the conference developed. experiences and perspectives would continue to After the closed sessions at Airlie Center, the divide the hemisphere between a wary and resentful group participated in an Open Forum at the Carnegie South and an independently acting, unilateralist Endowment for International Peace in Washington United States. DC on April 10, 2002. Members of the policy Without dampening the fervor of the discussion community, as well as the press and academic experts, or its complexity, co-chairmen Major General were invited to exchange views with the participants. (retired) William L. Nash and Chilean Ambassador This report is based on the proceedings of the to the United Nations Juan Gabriel Valdes found areas entire three-day meeting as well as a lengthy of agreement as the group worked its way toward the questionnaire completed anonymously by the compromise that is reflected in the Conference conference participants. The words and the attitudes Highlights. they reflect are the participants’ own. Interpretations At the beginning of the meeting, many spoke of of them in this report and the analysis of their the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs collective impact belong solely to The Fund for Peace. of one another. “It is so strong that we do not even want to give opinions on what is going on in our THE CONFERENCE neighborhood,” one participant commented. On disputes between nations rather than within nations, Differences of opinion emerged from the group participants pointed out, the region has achieved early in meeting. Some participants expressed strong important successes through a mix of informal confidence in regional organizations while others, diplomatic initiatives and use of formal mechanisms. stimulated by comments from those now The Contadora process in Central America, the experiencing violent strife, felt that reforms were management of the Honduras-Nicaragua maritime crucial to bring regional organizations up to the task border dispute, and a solution to the lengthy dispute of meeting current challenges. Some worried about between Ecuador and Peru were all cited as examples protecting civilians from ongoing and potential of regional success. (See box on pages 3-4) But violence, while others were concerned about opening internal matters, such as the conflict in Colombia or the door to abuse by outside nations wanting to the economic turmoil in Argentina, have not been
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raised in the Organization of American States (OAS) threatened or human rights are violated. Participants or other regional forums. In Haiti, the United Nations spoke with pride of the successful hemispheric effort (UN) and the OAS worked together throughout the to oppose elected leaders such as Alberto K. Fujimori crises in the nineties and are now pursuing post- in Peru and Jorge Serrano in Guatemala when they intervention peace building. tried to circumvent constitutional processes. More As the meeting progressed, however, it became recently, threatened military coups in Paraguay and clear that the principle of non-interference, though Ecuador have also been halted in response to regional still strong, is clearly not sacrosanct. It has already governments’ condemnation. In addition, the Inter- been disgarded in some cases where democracy is American Commission on Human Rights, based in
SHORT TAKES ON RECENT CONFLICT IN THE AMERICAS The Central American Peace Process that year. Meanwhile, the Acuerdo Marco of January 1994 formalized the Group of Friends system, which would Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela came involve the governments of Colombia, Mexico, Norway, together in 1983 to form the Contadora Group which Spain, the United States and Venezuela in the peace pledged to help solve the crisis of ongoing conflict among process. With all these mechanisms in place, the final and within neighboring states in Central America. Shortly peace agreements were signed in December 1996. thereafter Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay joined them to form what came to be known as the Rio Group. Honduras-Nicaragua Maritime Boundary Dispute Supported by the diplomatic endeavors of the Rio Group, the heads of state of the Central American nations in 1987 Honduras and Nicaragua have been disputing established a “Procedure to Bring a Firm and Lasting boundaries for over 200 years. Numerous attempts to Peace to Central America.” This broad plan is often called demarcate the maritime boundary and settle the dispute the Arias Peace Plan, because it came about under the in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have not resolved leadership of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. the issue. It flared up again in 1999 in the wake of a In Nicaragua in 1988, continuously supported by the related Colombian/Honduran bilateral boundary Rio Group, the Sandinista government and the rebel settlement. Tensions rose to the point where Nicaragua Contras agreed to a cease-fire that eventually brought the imposed a 35% duty on all Honduran goods and brought civil war to a formal end in 1989 with the Tesoro Beach another complaint before the ICJ. By the end of 2000, an Accord, signed by five regional presidents. As part of OAS mission had considerably reduced tensions by this Accord, the OAS formed the International helping the two countries negotiate a series of agreements Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV), which to promote economic development and integration in the joined with the UN to supervise elections in 1990. The border area and confidence-building measures at sea. The CIAV brokered an agreement between the Contras and ICJ case is still pending. the new government and played a major role in the demobilization process that ensued. Peru-Ecuador Border Disputes In Guatemala, the Oslo Agreement in 1990 marked the beginning of the formal peace negotiations. It was The territorial dispute between Peru and Ecuador has signed by the National Reconciliation Commission and provoked deadly conflict repeatedly since World War II. the URNG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) Most recently, in early 1995, the two nations became and called for a series of meetings between the URNG engaged in an intense series of border skirmishes that had and various political parties, the social and civil sector, the potential of escalating to general conflict. Four nations, and the government and army. A representative of the Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States, named as UN Secretary General supervised this process. Early in Guarantors of the 1942 Protocol on the dispute, intervened 1994, the government and the URNG requested UN diplomatically to get the two nations to halt troop mediation and the UN mission, MINUGUA, arrived later mobilizations, suspend hostilities, and agree to an observer
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Washington DC, and the Inter-American Court of Agreeing to the use of force by outsiders to quell Human Rights in Costa Rica have consistently violence within a state, however, was a difficult next become involved in selected domestic issues in step for the group to contemplate against the principle different OAS countries in pursuit of human rights of non-interference. The group did adopt the and justice. Most recently, on September 11 last year, language of the ICISS, explicitly accepting the OAS member states adopted a new Democratic international community’s “responsibility to protect” Charter that formalized the hemisphere’s civilians from massive abuse; but they stated in the determination to take collective action when Conference Highlights that the goal is best achieved democracy is threatened.3 in the short-term through diplomatic, economic and
force. The Ecuador-Peru Military Observer Mission Security Council reinstated an oil and arms embargo and, in (MOMEP) was staffed by troops from the four the end, authorized a multinational force led by US troops to Guarantor nations and funded by Ecuador and Peru. bring Aristide back to power. The two countries reached a final peace settlement in Crisis resurfaced in 2000 with an electoral dispute October 1998. involving the parliament. The OAS and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) tried to mediate problems Paraguay between the two Haitian political parties throughout 2001, when, on December 17, unknown gunmen attacked the The country has had a long history of coups and National Palace. The OAS and the Inter-American attempted coups. Most recently, in May 2000, a group of Commission on Human Rights agreed to investigate, and disaffected military and police officers attempted to the OAS established a mission to facilitate the resumption overthrow President Gonzalez Macchi. They attacked of negotiations between the government and opposition the Parliament building with tanks and took over several parties. radio stations, calling for the overthrow of the government. The rebels were rumored to be supported by General Lino Colombia Oviedo, who is wanted in the country in connection with the assassination of Vice President Luis Maria Argaña in A 40-year guerilla campaign to overthrow the government 1999 and an earlier coup attempt in 1996. The OAS escalated during the 1990’s. Large parts of Colombia’s Secretary General strongly condemned the coup, as did territory are not under the effective control of the the United States. Paraguay’s neighbors in the subregional government. Efforts by the government to negotiate with organization MERCOSUR (the Sourthern Cone Common the largest rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces Market) pointed out that any country wishing to be part of Colombia (FARC), have failed although negotiations of the trade and economic-focused group had to have a with a smaller group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), democratic form of government. The President was able are continuing. Right-wing paramilitary forces, organized to maintain control and officers loyal to the president as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), arrested the rebels. with ties to the army and police are hired by landowners to do battle with the insurgents. Recent battles between Haiti FARC and AUC have resulted in the deaths of large numbers of innocent civilians (approximately 3500 In September 1991, the democratically elected victims annually) caught in the crossfire. Both the president of Haiti, Jean Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown paramilitaries and the insurgents benefit from the illicit in a military coup, dragging the country into chaos. After drug trade. Elected in May 2002, President Alvaro Uribe the military agreed in principle to return the country to has pledged to take a tough stance against the insurgents. civilian rule, the UN Security Council dispatched the He has reiterated the plea of the previous administration United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for six months that the United States allow the assistance it provides to modernize and separate the military and the police force. against drug trafficking to be used in the government’s When the military government ceased cooperation, the fight against the rebels.
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other non-military measures. The group also agreed security and a humanitarian crisis. One participant that, in the longer term, measures must be taken to argued that Colombia is already “living a humanitarian address the root causes of conflict, including poverty tragedy of great proportions” in the midst of an and the gap between rich and poor in the hemisphere. ongoing battle among the government, two guerilla In the end, they did state that military intervention factions, and unlawful paramilitary groups. could not be excluded from the spectrum of possible Another participant talked about the case of Haiti. regional reactions to humanitarian crises. They called This participant said that the call for intervention it a “last resort” and a decision that “had to be made came from the Haitian people. The United States, on a case-by-case basis.” Several participants warned under UN auspices, came in 1994 and stopped the that settling internal conflicts is a complex and risky killing, but clearly the US was acting also to halt the process for everyone involved. “Military intervention refugee flow of desperate Haitians trying to reach can stop a conflict but cannot develop and fix a Florida. “We had a call for humanitarian assistance, society,” one said. Another warned that “military but we received a strategic, security-based response,” intervention can do as much damage as it prevents.” the participant observed. With those caveats in mind, the group worked hard A third participant pointed out, however, that in to design a framework of criteria that they thought some cases, the humanitarian purpose is clear. “There could be acceptable in the Americas if the worst were were no security reasons for intervening in Kosovo. to happen and no other option were available. Milosevic was no Hitler marching across Europe. What was happening on the ground was ethnic PROTECTING PEOPLE cleansing. They were massively abusing the [Albanian] population.” The group agreed that the only purpose of a legitimate military intervention for humanitarian A UN OBLIGATION reasons would be to protect civilians from mass killings and gross violations of human rights. They The UN Security Council has the first obligation eschewed mixing security issues with humanitarian to act in a timely manner to authorize the intervention, purposes. They considered, but rejected, military the group concluded in the Conference Highlights. intervention as a legitimate response to the overthrow The survey results provide a more detailed of a democratically elected government, arguing that breakdown of opinion. In the survey, more than 90 the region had multiple other ways to deal with such percent of the participants said that an intervention emergencies. The motivation behind the intervention could be justified by a unanimous vote of the Security was a key factor to be weighed in many people’s Council. That percentage is still 70 percent even if minds. “An intervention should always be in the only a majority of Security Council members support interest of the people and not in the interest of the the intervention.4 Participants showed great trust in intervening state,” as one participant put it. UN effectiveness as well, with 79 percent saying that Participants did note, however, that real world they either “completely” or “mainly” trusted the UN cases are not always clear. One participant pointed to successfully stop mass killings if they were to out that Colombia today has elements of both a occur in the Americas.
5 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS
But a number of participants hedged their such an eventuality. Unanimity on the part of OAS confidence in the UN in both discussions and in the members “would justify” an intervention, according survey. They cited instances in which the Security to 82 percent of the participants, but support fell Council had been blocked or had failed to react to dramatically to 39 percent if only a majority vote threatening situations in the past. “The UN Security from OAS members could be mustered. Council cannot be allowed to have the final word on The group knew well that it was crossing a intervention, even if that is what the law says,” one threshold, moving from what may be considered a participant argued. “When Kosovo came about, there “legal” authorization to a “legitimate” one. One was no question that the Russians were going to veto participant summed up the general feeling: “One [the intervention.] When they [Russia] pushed for a should pursue legality, but because of the vote afterwards to disapprove the intervention, they shortcomings of the Security Council, it is important lost 13 to 2.” to consider other means.” With that and other examples in mind, the group Without the approval of the Security Council, the recommended that should the Security Council fail General Assembly or the OAS, unilateral to act, alternative options include consideration by intervention was seen by the group as both illegal the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace and illegitimate, even in the face of mass killings. 5 Resolution process. Approximately 65 percent felt But opinion was divided on multilateral intervention. that a majority vote by the General Assembly would The group debated but did not reach agreement on “probably justify” action. whether an unauthorized military intervention by a Despite generally good marks, however, the UN “regional coalition of democratic states” could be clearly did not inspire complete confidence. One considered legitimate. The arguments on both sides participant offered the view that the Americas “have were strongly felt. more illusions” about the UN, simply because “we “What is the worst thing that can happen if a have not had the experiences in peacekeeping group of nations goes in unauthorized? That operations, or peace-building that Africa or other procedures have not been followed? No, the worst regions have had.” In the Colombian case, the thing that can happen is that thousands of people are experience with UN special envoys has been killed,” argued one participant. decidedly mixed, another participant observed, with “A collection of states cannot come together and public utterances by one UN representative which authorize themselves to intervene. This would go raised questions about his impartiality. down a road toward anarchy,” countered another. One participant used a hypothetical scenario LEGALITY VS. LEGITIMACY involving Guyana to present an argument against allowing unauthorized coalitions of the willing to If both the Security Council and the General intervene: “What if, sometime in the future, the Assembly fail to act, the group recommended that tension between the Indian community and the black the Organization of American States could also community rises to a point where racial killings are consider an urgent situation and act on it even though taking place, triggering international concern? the OAS Charter does not specifically provide for Venezuela takes the position that there is a spillover
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effect. And Colombia argues that both the UN and compromise language on the issue. No vote was taken, the OAS are moving too slowly. So they go in under because the participants did not want one. However, it a humanitarian pretext but in reality to seize was fairly clear from the lengthy discussion that a resources. Meanwhile, Barbados and Trinidad, who majority did not see unauthorized “coalitions of the have been opposing the intervention, ask either India willing” as legitimate interveners, even in extreme cases. or Nigeria to come to the assistance of the English- speaking population. You could have two ‘coalitions PREVENTION AS CURE of the willing’ fighting each other in that scenario.” Another participant disagreed. “Neither the By the end of the conference, participants were international community nor individual nations are strongly reiterating an early theme - the need to as eager to intervene as we sometimes think.” address problems early, before drastic action such as “The real risk we face in such cases of internal military intervention is necessary. Identifying threats conflict is an attitude in the region of ‘this is not my that might lead to conflict was seen as an important business,’ ” still another argued. part of the prevention process. Positions were simply too far apart to find “The potential for conflict in the region stems
PERSPECTIVES ON MILITARY INTERVENTION
BY FERNANDO CEPEDA ULLOA (EXCERPT FROM OPENING PRESENTATION)
The institutional architecture for security in the since 1995, including the work of the Office of the Americas was not appropriate for the Cold War period Representative of the High Commissioner for Human and it is even less so for the challenges of the post Cold- Rights, the active presence of the UN High War era and, now, in the aftermath of September 11. Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the role of The permanent crisis of Cuba, the war in Central special rapporteurs and the creation of the special America, the demise of the Noriega regime, not to speak advisor to the Secretary General. of Guatemala in 1954 or the Dominican Republic in 1964, The Cold War institutions in the region were created have not found Inter-American institutions (agencies, against the communist threat. Insurgencies and even treaties, conventions) at the center of discussion and economic and social crises were evaluated within a context conflict management. During the Falklands or Malvinas of great power rivalry. For example, the International War (1982), the expected Inter-American solidarity never Coffee Pact was opposed and the Alliance for Progress materialized. The US government openly helped the was supported by the United States as part of the battle United Kingdom and even Chile, we learned recently, against communism in Latin America. The overall provided strategic intelligence information to the British purpose was “the reduction and elimination of the menace government. The role of the Inter-American Treaty of of internal communist or other anti-US subversion.” That Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), also called the Rio Pact, general objective of security for the United States rather and of the other agencies (the Inter-American Defense than the security of other countries demanded “the ultimate Board) were non-existent. The Permanent Council of the standardization of Latin American military organization, OAS played only a rhetorical role. training, doctrine and equipment along US lines” In the post Cold War period, the UN has played a (Statement of Policy proposed by the National Security more significant role, for example in El Salvador in Council on US Objectives and Courses of Action with 1990-91 and in Haiti, from 1991 through the respect to Latin America, March 4, 1953). intervention and post-conflict reconstruction period and Likewise, the Cold War made interventions, military still today. The UN has also played a role in Colombia and otherwise, seem justified; Guatemala (1954), Cuba
7 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS from such problems as weak government, drug increasingly troublesome. He pointed to the trafficking, criminal gangs, transnational crime, “maras” in Central America, teen-age gangs that poverty and migration,” one participant said at the are “criminal, very savage, and the functional Open Forum. “These are the asymmetrical threats equivalent of insurgencies.” that characterize today’s security dilemmas.” Others described the problems in different ways: • Challenges can spill over borders, one argued. “What was once seen as a peasant problem is • One pointed to the weakness of political increasingly becoming an indigenous rebellion systems. “Several of us are worried about social against the state, a problem that has transnational and economic degradation as a whole that is giving characteristics. President Chavez in Venezuela way to new expressions of violent dissent and has said that no one will be able to defeat an could well lead to severe humanitarian crises.” alliance between Indians and the military.”
• Another participant pointed to the similarities • Disappointment in democracy is growing, between organized crime and insurgencies as another argued. “There is a feeling that
(1957), Chile (1973), Central America through the expand military aid for the war on drugs in Colombia to Eighties and Grenada (1983) were all analyzed in the counterinsurgency redefined, now, as counterterrorism. United States in the context of ideological rivalry between During the post Cold War period, drug trafficking the United States and the Soviet Union. was seen by the United States as a salient security issue. The hemisphere’s security during the post Cold War But it is even more so after the events of September 11, as era is a different story. The communist enemy is negligible. terrorism and illegal drugs are now seen as two faces of the New security concerns have arisen, including drug same coin. trafficking, migration, and transnational organized crime. The new hemispheric anti-drugs institutional We have new sets of issues, new actors, and new institutions. architecture has been more active (though not yet effective) Colombia is a good illustration of the new type of than the conventional hemispheric security apparatus. internal war that is being well financed as a result of the However, as always, the unilateral and bilateral policies capture of resources, such as diamonds, timber, oil, and of the US government dwarf any multilateral effort of the illegal drugs.* In the case of Colombia, it is illegal drugs OAS and, of course, of the United Nations. The OAS and oil that fuel the armed conflict. approach simply doesn’t contemplate situations like the The Americas know well the security threat posed by Colombian drug and oil related conflict. the deadly and illegal business of drugs. The whole It is fair to say that the region has been likeminded in hemisphere is involved in different ways in an unequal the construction of the anti-drug institutional architecture. and, in appearance, endless “war on drugs.” The creation Alas! It is of little use. At the hour of truth, the US of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission unilateral approach prevails. Real action results only from (CICAD), the US certification process (now temporarily US decisions, money, pressure, threats, and conditionalities. suspended), the CICAD’s multilateral evaluation For good or for bad, this is an undeniable reality.
mechanism that makes progress reports on each country’s * efforts on the drug front, as well as a number of Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, Greed and Grievance, Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, International Development international conventions and agreements constitute the Research Council (IDRC), United Kingdom, 2000. new institutional architecture against the illegal drugs threat. And most recently, you see renewed US efforts in the Dr. Fernando Cepeda Ulloa Plan Colombia legislation and assistance, the Andean Universidad de los Andes, Colombia Regional Initiative (ARI) and the most recent proposal to Airlie Center, April 10, 2002
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Top: Dr. Isabel Jaramillo Edwards, Major General (ret.) Bill Nash, Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdés Middle left: Ms. Juanita León and Ambassador Francisco Villagrán de León Middle right: Mr. Ricardo Uceda and Ambassador Colin Granderson Bottom left: Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi and Dr. Fernando Cepeda Ulloa Bottom right: Colonel Jorge W. Rosales and Dr. Eduardo Stein
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democratic government has not delivered the also considered such issues to be so serious that they goods. There is a discrediting of traditional needed a thorough case-by-case investigation well parties and economic solutions. Vocalized beyond the scope of the conference. Two of the four violence is extending throughout different sectors working groups of the conference, however, were of society. But the protestors are not the enemy willing to discuss hypothetical situations and make – they are the population. They do not have jobs recommendations. The following list emerged from and some are going hungry.” a combination of Fund questions and participant responses in both the meeting and in private Paying more attention to the gap between the rich discussions at the margins of the conference. This and the poor countries, as well as the gap between menu is neither predictive nor exhaustive, but may be the rich elite and the poor majority within some useful to illustrate hypothetically the kinds of conflicts countries, should be a top regional priority, according that could evolve into humanitarian emergencies. to participants. “The United States does not see poverty The conflict in Colombia could further deteriorate as a security issue, but it is very much a security into an all-out civil war in which the government is problem for Latin America,” one participant argued. increasingly unable to protect its citizens. Some Regional structures should also exist in which argued that the Colombian situation is already a difficult domestic situations are discussed openly so humanitarian crisis that should trigger the that advice can be shared and support can be international community’s “responsibility to protect.” requested and offered. A regional early warning In Venezuela, the society and the military are capacity, a determination among political leaders to deeply split. The government is headed by a leader discuss emerging or future problems, and a who may not be able to bridge the multiple divides strengthened ability to take preventive measures were in the society and, in fact, may widen them to the all seen as lacking but clearly needed. point of conflict. “One of the problems in the Americas is that we In a post-Castro Cuba, succession disputes could think the society itself has to solve these problems. get out of hand and lead to violence. The “nightmare So we leave prevention to the sovereign government scenario” here, as one participant put it, is that the to resolve and then the disaster can happen,” one United States would intervene unilaterally under participant noted. the cover of pursuing humanitarian goals, but in reality to place a friendly government in power. POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS The situation in Haiti is still precarious. Deep poverty and political alienation could again spark During the meeting, The Fund urged participants high levels of violence. The post-intervention effort to think ahead about a number of scenarios where there by the UN and the OAS did not solve the humanitarian crises might occur in the hemisphere underlying causes of grave tension in the society. in the future. Many in the group were reluctant to Racial tensions in Guyana are a serious concern discuss potential situations because they were in the country and for its neighbors. concerned that the meeting would be misinterpreted No one in the group said that these situations would as supporting intervention in specific cases. They eventually warrant military intervention, but several did
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argue that the region should have the capacity to help and human rights. As a bottom line, even if little can nations address internal problems peacefully so that be done in the short-term toward solutions, the region military intervention would no longer be even a remote should have an institutional capacity to monitor possibility. In the case of Venezuela or Guyana, for internal problems and pay attention to them when example, the region could provide good offices or a the circumstances merit it. neutral forum in which problems could be discussed. Such a change will not be easy. “Multilateralism is In the case of Cuba, both the Caribbean Community used in the region to assert national interest, not to explore (CARICOM) and the OAS could offer some form of collective responses,” said one participant. “And major membership so that the country becomes integrated players have different attitudes about all kinds of issues.” into institutions that place a high value on democracy But the effort needs to be made. As the group
A CONVERGENCE OF MEANS? HEMISPHERIC SECURITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
BY RAFAEL FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO (EXCERPT FROM OPENING PRESENTATION) The nature of security has obviously changed, not component from the Americas is one way to go. Such only with the end of the Cold War, but also with the a development would not only solve the problems of advent of the terrorist attacks against the United States early warning and peacekeeping, but would also and its subsequent campaign against Al Qaeda. This contribute to the professionalism of regional militaries has resulted in a convergence of means with respect to and the modernization of their weaponry. security in the hemisphere. Although the perception Mexico is in a unique position to push forward a of who and what is the enemy may be somewhat new security agenda. Its bilateral agreements with the different, the required response is not. United States on such issues as the creation of smart The United States needs to increase its contacts borders and migration controls could serve as models with the security apparatuses in the region in order to for other multilateral and bilateral agreements in the strengthen intelligence capabilities. Second, it should region. Ultimately the purpose of such mechanisms seek the development of a regional cooperative strategy would be three-fold. First and foremost, such to defeat security threats. That would involve the agreements would probably imply modernization, tightening of loose migratory controls, the installation professionalization, and interagency cooperation, and/or modernization of air surveillance radars, something that Latin American nations have been multilateral and bilateral cooperation to improve police pushing for quite some time. Second, such smart border investigation capabilities, the professionalization of arrangements would not negatively impact trade. Third, armed forces, and finally the development of protocols the mechanisms would go a long way in dealing with to enhance coordination between armed forces and not only terrorism, but also drug trafficking and other civilians. Third, US policy makers must acknowledge types of regional and hemispheric threats. that an effective counter-terrorism strategy will require Progress can only be made if US policy makers regional economic stability. Linking economic stability recognize the specific needs of Latin American nations. to regional counter-terrorist efforts suggests an attempt In other words, the US must adopt a more cooperative to deal with the so-called “root” causes of terrorism. strategy. This will alleviate many of the historical and Better trained police forces, smart border perceptual problems in the region. The adage – you technology, improved military cooperation, and can catch more flies with honey than with vinegar – is attention to economic stability and efforts to eliminate one the United States should heed in every aspect of its abject poverty and close the gap between rich and poor relations with its regional neighbors. are all goals that will serve interests region-wide. The region could clearly benefit from a Dr. Rafael Fernández de Castro multinational peacekeeping force. A restructuring of Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México the US command system to include a multilateral Airlie Center, April 10, 2002
11 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS stated in the Conference Highlights, “there is a need intelligence regarding personal and infrastructure to strengthen global, regional and subregional targets of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of organizations to deal with internal armed conflicts Colombia (FARC). That said, some worried that as well as other problems that put populations at risk.” a new focus on intelligence might “resuscitate horrendous museum pieces from our military ADVICE FOR THE UNITED STATES history,” as one person put it.
The conference did not focus specifically on US • The United States must make a greater effort to policy, but comments on US behavior and stem the proliferation of small arms coming into recommendations for US policy permeated the two Caribbean and Latin American countries. Increased days at Airlie Center and easily surfaced at the Open numbers of illegally trafficked weapons are finding Forum meeting in Washington, DC. their way into insurgent groups and the hands of For example, observations on the post-September common urban criminals, making the protection of 11 security climate in the region divided participants civilian lives an even more severe problem. into roughly two groups. Pessimists feared that increased US attention to such issues as terrorism, drug • The problem of small arms is combined for trafficking, and immigration flows would “resecuritize” some Caribbean countries with the dilemma of the region, reinforcing disfavored military and domestic violent criminals being deported from the United security institutions that Latin American nations have States to their home islands. This creates a multiplier been trying to dismantle and reform as they pursue effect whereby criminal gangs are simultaneously democracy and human rights. growing in size and destructive capacity. A smaller number of optimists argued that there was a new convergence of interests and increased • While many basked in the emergence of opportunities to promote them in the region. A couple democratic governance in the region, some of these participants saw the new US relationship voiced strong criticism of a US tendency to focus with Mexico as changing the dynamics of the entire solely on elections without paying adequate region as it brings a more cooperative balance to a attention to civil and political freedoms, as well formerly antagonistic relationship. One participant as economic and social well-being. made much of President Bush’s ties with President Fox and had high expectations that President Bush’s • On Cuba, a number of participants expressed interest in Latin American affairs would continue frustration with US policy. “We can’t help you throughout his presidency and result in a more if your Cuba policy is driven by domestic cohesive and cooperative region. politics,” one criticized. Other points also emerged from the overall discussion: • Participants also criticized the US for not • Several participants expressed a strong desire paying attention to the impact that its public for increased cooperation on intelligence proclamations have on the situation on the ground gathering. Particular references were made to in Latin American countries. An example given
12 ILITARY NTERVENTION IN NTERNAL ARS FFP REPORTS M I I W
was the announcement of helicopter sales to armed conflicts as well as other problems that put Colombia followed by discussion in the US populations at risk.” Congress. The lag between the announcement A new regional focus on internal problems of and delivery caused the FARC to accelerate its individual states will not come easily. The group attacks on the government and civilians in worked with great awareness that one legacy of US anticipation of the equipment’s arrival. involvement in the region is a deep belief in the principle of non-interference in one another’s affairs. • A few participants criticized the Inter-American That the history of unilateral US action affects Defense Board as a Cold War relic, which they felt regional opinion was clear. But whether a US should be revitalized as a truly hemispheric shadow will continue to stymie collective approaches organization with input from many countries.6 and regional cooperation to stem security crises that can arise from internal strife is an open question. CONCLUSION The region’s continued emphasis and common belief in the principles of democracy and respect for It is rare that meetings change minds. People human rights will serve it well as it addresses the often come to conferences with minds made up, an difficult issues surrounding regional responses to agenda to pursue, or a thesis to defend. This meeting internal war. “There is a sense in the region that was different. Some of the best thinkers from the sovereignty belongs to the people not to the region struggled to see one another’s points of view governments; this is both a cause and a result of and come up with a collective snapshot of the democracy,” an observer commented early on in the hemisphere that all would recognize. meeting. It would have been just as sound a note to Current problems emerged repeatedly in the summarize the sense of the meeting as the conversations - Argentina in economic freefall, Haiti proceedings wound down. still in turmoil, Colombia fighting a war against two guerrilla armies with a small and inept military linked Conference summary prepared by to a paramilitary as ruthless as the rebels, and Mary Locke and Jason Ladnier Venezuela where armed conflict between President Chavez and his opponents cannot be ruled out. 1 See the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty website for full report
13 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS
CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS
In the Americas, many countries have undergone a transition from authoritarian military rule to democratic societies. There is growing trust in the capacity of democratic institutions to address current problems. The responsibility to protect people in the hemisphere is best achieved, in the short term, through diplomatic, economic and other non-military measures. In the longer term, measures must be taken to address the root causes of conflict, including poverty and the gap between rich and poor in the hemisphere. Prevention to stem conflict is favored over use of force to deal with conflicts after they have broken out. Military intervention, although considered by most to be rare and exceptional, cannot be excluded from the spectrum of possible regional reactions to humanitarian crises caused by civil war, collapsed states, or governments unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, or actively and massively violating the rights of their citizens. Even if regional military intervention is a last resort, its possibility may make preventive efforts more credible. The group emphasized that every crisis is unique and should be considered on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, the group arrived at an emerging consensus on relevant guidelines for military interventions in the region. The purpose of military intervention should be to protect civilians from mass killings and gross violations of human rights. The United Nations Security Council has the first obligation to act in a timely manner to authorize the intervention. Should the Security Council fail to act, alternative options include consideration by the General Assembly under the “uniting for peace” procedure and by the Organization of American States, even though it is not provided for in the Charter. The group debated but did not reach agreement on whether military intervention by a coalition of states could be considered legitimate to address a humanitarian catastrophe in the event that all the previous organizations failed to discharge their responsibility to protect. Part of the group argued that such intervention could be acceptable provided there was an urgent need to act, the intervention complied with the rest of the requirements for legitimacy, and the states involved would consult immediately with the relevant organizations, with a view toward seeking approval. Others did not think that the probability of such a humanitarian catastrophe occurring in the region was likely. Even if it did happen, some argued that there would be no circumstance under which military intervention by a coalition of states could be considered legitimate without prior authorization by the United Nations and/or the OAS. Interventions should be carried out by a multilateral force, with troops preferably from the Americas. Individual states should not intervene unilaterally without authorization. Any intervention should adhere to the following guidelines:
• It must have a clear and genuine humanitarian purpose and stated objectives that define the benchmarks of success • Authorization to intervene must be quickly followed by implementation • It must be sustainable militarily
14 ILITARY NTERVENTION IN NTERNAL ARS FFP REPORTS M I I W
• It should be accompanied by a post-conflict peace building strategy that includes preventing renewed conflict as well as addresses the root causes of the conflict • It must have a reasonable prospect of success • It must be proportional to the ends • It must be sensitive to the social and economic impact, especially on women and children • The international community as a whole should bear the costs • It should not create a spillover effect in neighboring countries • Intervening troops should respect human rights
Nation states in Latin America have a tradition of upholding the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of one another. Attitudes toward intervention in humanitarian crises are also shaped by the experience of unilateral interventions in the hemisphere as well as the failure in the past to properly address gross violations of human rights. There has been some reluctance to discuss openly internal crises in the region in the proper multilateral fora. This is reinforced today by a deference to the legitimacy of newly democratized governments. The group believes that there is a need to strengthen global, regional and subregional organizations to deal with internal armed conflicts as well as other problems that put populations at risk. The impact of September 11 has led to a new context of discussion of security issues which should not be confused with problems posed by humanitarian crises. This is an opportunity for the region to seek a new convergence of principles and methods to realize peace and justice in the hemisphere. Nations in the hemisphere share a common belief in the principles of democracy and respect for human rights which is an advantage in addressing these difficult issues in the future.
Left to right beginning at front: Pauline H. Baker, Rafael Fernández de Castro, Isabel Jaramillo Edwards, Eduardo Stein, Pedro Villagra-Delgado, Juanita León, Jason Ladnier, Jose Periago, Cheick Oumar Diarrah; Maria Inés Ruz, Luigi R. Einaudi, Marta Oyhanarte, Francisco Villagrán de León, Luis Escobar Faella, Paul Heinbecker, Leyla Werleigh, Hanseul Kang; Carlos Maria Zabala, Andrés F. Sáenz, Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, Fernando R. Tesón, Juan Rial, Ricardo Uceda, Juan Gabriel Valdés, Alison Wright; Claudette Werleigh, Raúl Benítez Manaut, Joris Vos, Cedric Grant, Jorge W. Rosales; Armando Vidigal, Krista Hendry, William L. Nash, Mary Locke, Colin Granderson, David Shorr, Luis Bitencourt 15 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS
CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS
CO-CHAIRS Andrés F. Sáenz (Colombia) Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, USA
Juan Gabriel Valdés David Shorr Ambassador from Chile to the UN Stanley Foundation, USA
Major General (retired) William L. Nash Dr. Eduardo Stein Former Foreign Minister, Guatemala Council on Foreign Relations, USA Dr. Fernando R. Tesón (Argentina) PARTICIPANTS College of Law, Arizona State University, USA
Dr. Raúl Benítez Manaut Ricardo Uceda Universidad Nacional de Mexico Instituto Prensa y Sociedad, Peru
Dr. Luis Bitencourt Constantino Urcuyo Brazil Project at the Wilson Center Office of the President of Costa Rica
Dr. Fernando Cepeda Ulloa Vice-Admiral (ret.) Armando Vidigal Universidad de los Andes, Colombia Navy of Brazil
Luigi R. Einaudi Pedro Villagra-Delgado Assistant Secretary General of the OAS Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Argentina
Luis Escobar Faella Francisco Villagrán de León Former Attorney General of Paraguay Center for the Defense of the Constitution of Guatemala
Dr. Rafael Fernández de Castro Claudette Werleigh Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México Former Prime Minister, Haiti
Colin Granderson (Trinidad/Tobago) General (ret.) Carlos Maria Zabala Former Executive Director of the OAS/UN International Civilian Army of Argentina Mission in Haiti CROSS-REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES Dr. Cedric Grant Former Ambassador from Guyana to the US Chan Heng Chee Ambassador from Singapore to the United States Paul Heinbecker Ambassador from Canada to the UN Cheick Oumar Diarrah Ambassador from Mali to the United States Maria Inés Ruz La Nacion, Chile Joris M. Vos Ambassador from the Netherlands to Portugal Dr. Isabel Jaramillo Edwards Centro de Estudios sobre America, Cuba THE FUND FOR PEACE STAFF Juanita León Semana, Colombia Dr. Pauline H. Baker, The Fund for Peace President, USA
Marta Oyhanarte Mary Locke, Program Director, Regional Responses to Internal Legislature of Buenos Aires, Argentina War Program, USA
Dr. Juan Rial Jason Ladnier, Program Officer, Regional Responses to Internal PEITHO Uruguay War Program, USA
Colonel Jorge W. Rosales Krista Hendry, Hanseul Kang, Jose Periago, Leyla Werleigh Army of Uruguay Alison Wright, Interns
Note: Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Participants attended as individuals rather than as representatives of their governments or organizations.
16 THE FUND FOR PEACE
REGIONAL RESPONSES TO INTERNAL WAR PROGRAM Perspectives on Who, When, Where and Why
Military interventions in internal conflicts raise legal, moral, and practical questions that the international community is still struggling to address. The United Nations and other actors in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas have had uneven success in dealing with internal disputes and self-determination conflicts that threaten regional stability. Some interventions have conformed to, and reinforced, existing international law and procedures while others have been more ad hoc in nature. Some interventions have been successful while others have been deeply flawed. Still others that, on hindsight, might have been successful in saving thousands of lives never materialized at all. The program is probing regional views on military intervention criteria, regional capabilities, and international assistance in dealing with internal war. It identifies areas of convergence as well as divergence within regions, drawing comparisons between regions to explore the unique mix of cultural, political, and security issues that are influencing decision-making. The program is focusing particularly on the experiences of the last ten years and how they have influenced opinion. This program is intended to enrich the global debate on the issue by providing new insights into the trend toward regional responsibility in peacekeeping, with a focus on where the crises have been occurring. The program is also assessing the implications of these findings for the United States as it debates its own foreign policy role and responsibilities in addressing humanitarian crises and self-determination disputes. Specifically, The Fund for Peace is probing regional views on five unresolved sets of issues:
n LEGITIMACY AND A GENCY: Should there be new criteria and agents or organizations to authorize legal military intervention? How would emerging norms relate to current international law and how would new agents work with the United Nations? n HEGEMONY: How are norms of intervention affected by the dominance of one or two powers in a region or by concerns about an emerging power with regional ambitions? n CHANGING SOVEREIGNTY: Has the question of military intervention to protect abused minorities and stop widespread violation of human rights created new concepts of sovereignty? Do these concepts differ among regions? n RESOURCES: What resources in each region are available or allotted to intervention? Are new mechanisms needed to increase capability and allocate resources in a more effective and equitable way? n REGIONAL ROLE: Can and should regional actors and multilateral institutions play a more significant role in responding to internal wars? How do uneven capabilities among regions affect the ability to act?
The program is sponsoring two more regional conferences in Washington, D.C. that will bring together some 35 participants from Asia and Europe to discuss views on military intervention. In each instance, the program will again organize an Open Forum where conference participants can exchange views with American experts and practitioners. It will also work to bring the complex components of this difficult issue before the American public.
Regional Responses to Internal War Program Program Director: Mary Locke Program Officer: Jason Ladnier [email protected] Ph: x212 [email protected] Ph: x235 The Fund for Peace 1701 K Street, NW – 11th floor Washington, DC 20006 Phone: (202) 223-7940 FAX: (202) 223-7947 www.fundforpeace.org