Airpower got the job done in the despite an initial strategy that was—among other things—very shortsighted.

Airpower Made It Work By Rebecca Grant peration Allied Force started out on March 24 to be a short, sharp military response to a political event—the refusal of OYugoslavia to accept the Kosovo peace plan forged earlier during talks in

Rambouillet, . When the NATO USAF photo by SrA. Jeffrey Allen strikes began, 112 US and 102 allied strike aircraft were committed to the op- eration. Thirteen of NATO’s 19 nations sent aircraft to take part. NATO’s three newest members—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—did not join in. Greece, Iceland, and Luxembourg also abstained. The initial plan envisioned a few days of air operations against a carefully chosen set of about 50 pre­approved targets. Target categories included air defense sites, communications relays, A pilot from the 510th Fighter Squadron at AB, Italy, on return from an Op- and fixed military facilities, such as eration Allied Force bombing mission. The 510th carried out numerous strikes on targets across Yugoslavia. ammunition dumps. No targets in downtown Belgrade were on the list for the initial strikes. Planners had data on far more than 50 targets, but the consensus in NATO would support only limited action. The alliance military campaign opened with the use of a formidable array of weapons. The Air Force’s conventional air launched cruise mis- siles and the Navy’s Tomahawk land attack missiles were launched against Yugoslavian air defense sites and com- munications. Two B-2 stealth bombers flew from Whiteman AFB, Mo., mark- ing the first use of the B-2 in combat. The B-2s flew more than 30 hours on a round-trip mission and launched the highly accurate Joint Direct Attack Munition against multiple targets. US and NATO fighters in theater main-

30 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1999 tained combat air patrols while others Theater of operations bombed targets. No one knew exactly what it would take to shake Serbian dictator Slo­bodan Austria Hungary Romania Milosevic. Two statements made at the start of the campaign bracketed the range of ways it might unfold. Ljubljana Taszar Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon Aviano Slovenia said on March 23, “We have plans for Zagreb Voivodina a swift and severe air campaign. ... This Croatia Novi Sad will be painful to the Serbs. We hope, Cervia relatively quickly, that the Serbs will re- Rimini Belgrade alize they’ve made a mistake.” Bacon’s Tuzla comment echoed NATO’s collective Ancona Bosnia Serbia hope that a show of resolve would get Milosevic to accept Rambouillet. Amandola Sarajevo Sofia Italy Tough Talk Bul- ADRIATIC Montenegro Pristina The Supreme Allied Commander Eu- Kosovo SEA Podgorica rope, Army Gen. Wesley K. Clark, on Rome March 25 spelled out the other option at Skopje the other end of the spectrum. He said, Tirana Macedonia “We are going to systematically and San Vito dei Gioia del Colle Normanni progressively attack, disrupt, degrade, Albania devastate, and ultimately destroy these Brindisi forces and their facilities and support —unless President Milosevic complies Greece with the demands of the international MEDITERRANEAN SEA community.” Clark’s statement described what NATO airpower could do, given Present-day Yugoslavia time. But the air campaign had started from the premise that NATO wanted to try limited action to achieve its goals. How would Milosevic react? A White House “senior official” had already mulled over the possibilities: “As we contemplated the use of force over the past 14 months, we constructed four different models. One was that the whiff of gunpowder, just the By the time Milosevic backed away Kosovo created a mass of refugees that threat of force, would make Milosevic back from Rambouillet, his forces had battle- ignited world opinion. Estimates of the down. Another was that he needed to take field dominance in Kosovo. The Yugo- number of displaced persons jumped some hit to justify acquiescence. Another slav 3rd army was assigned to Kosovo from 240,000 in March to 600,000 by was that he was a playground bully who operations, along with reinforcements early April. Clark called it “a grim com- would fight but back off after a punch in from 1st and 2nd armies. About 40,000 bination of terror and ethnic cleansing the nose. And the fourth was that he would troops and 300 tanks crossed into on a vast scale.” Central Kosovo was react like Saddam Hussein. On any given Kosovo, spreading out in burned out largely emptied of its ethnic Albanian day, people would pick one or the other. villages and buildings abandoned by the population. We thought that the Saddam Hussein option refugees. Paramilitary security forces Milosevic’s tactical gamble hit NATO was always the least likely, but we knew it from the Interior Ministry were engaged in a vulnerable spot. The allies were was out there, and now we’re looking at it.” in multiple areas across Kosovo. committed to limited air­strikes, with no Milosevic ignored the initial NATO By early April, the KLA was blood- firm plans beyond a few days or weeks. airstrikes, just as he had flouted ied, and organized resistance in most Since fixed targets were the focus of NATO–backed diplomacy. CIA Di- of central Kosovo was diminishing. An the plan, NATO flew just a few pack- rector George J. Tenet had forecast American official said the government ages each night. There was nothing for weeks that Yugoslav forces could forces had carried out devastating at- that military force could do quickly respond to NATO military action by tacks, and the prospects for the KLA against the fully developed offensive. accelerating the ethnic cleansing. Now were dim. As US Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Milosevic gambled that his forces Michael E. Ryan commented, there would push ethnic Albanians and the The Tactical Blunder was no way that airstrikes alone could Kosovo Liberation Army out of But Milosevic’s gamble was also his halt the door-to-door killings that had Kosovo before NATO could react. major miscalculation. His push through been under way. On April 3, a Pentagon

AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1999 31 official said of Milosevic’s campaign, Two Target Sets doctrine say that it is most efficient “He’s basically done.” In early April, NATO expanded and to hit enemy forces when they mass The plight of the Kosovo refugees clarified the air campaign plan, revising and maneuver at the beginning of op- stiffened NATO’s resolve. Now, the it to including simultaneous attacks on erations. In early April, NATO did not alliance would have to win. the two types of targets. Here was the have enough forces in theater to clamp To deprive Milosevic of his gains in heart of the air campaign as it would down on units of the regular Yugoslav Kosovo, the alliance would have to use be carried out over the next two-and- army (VJ) or the paramilitary special its air forces to meet goals that had just a-half months. police (MUP). NATO air forces had gotten much more difficult. The poli- Target set 1 included fixed targets been postured for combat air patrol tics of the situation meant that NATO of unique strategic value. It included and flexible strike packages against a missed the chance to let its airmen do national command and control; military limited set of targets, not for 24-hour it “by the book” and halt or disrupt reserves; infrastructure such as bridges, operations over dispersed forces. In Milosevic’s forces as they massed on Petroleums, Oils, and Lubricants pro- early April, it was possible to close the border and moved into Kosovo in duction, and communications; and the one engagement zone over some of the March. As Secretary of State Madeleine military–industrial base of weapons and ground forces for only a few hours a K. Albright explained on March 28, ammunition factories and distribution day. Under these conditions the Yugo­ the new goal was to force Milosevic to systems. Serbia’s electric power grid slav forces could hide in buildings and back off by “making sure that he pays was soon added to the list. move at night. a very heavy price.” Target set 2, a high priority for Clark, Poor weather also limited air­strikes. The first thing NATO needed was comprised the Serbian fielded forces— Brig. Gen. Leroy Barnidge Jr., com- more airpower. An additional five B-1 military forces, tactical assembly areas, mander of the 509th Bomb Wing, heavy bombers, five EA-6B electronic command-and-control nodes, bridges Whiteman AFB, Mo., told how one warfare aircraft, and 10 tankers were in southern Serbia and Kosovo, supply night, one of the wing’s B-2s en route already en route, along with more al- areas, POL storage and pumping sta- to the target was recalled because of lied aircraft. The aircraft carrier USS tions, choke points, and ammunition weather. That night “the weather was Theodore Roosevelt, veteran of Bosnia storage. Initial guidance focused on so bad, the whole war was canceled,” operations four years earlier, was due forces south of the 44th parallel, but he remarked. Weather was favorable to arrive with its battle group around soon, military targets north of the line only about one-third of the time—with April 4. also made the list. most good weather days coming late NATO also needed enough aircraft NATO was now pursuing a multi­ in the campaign. to sustain 24-hour operations over the pronged strategy with its air campaign. Preservation of NATO’s cohesion dispersed Yugoslav forces in Kosovo. The goal was not just to demonstrate rested on several factors that defied Allied planners proposed an augmented NATO resolve and hope to coerce military logic but made political package of forces. This was known as Milosevic. It was to directly reduce sense. First, NATO casualties had the “Papa Bear” option, and it would and eliminate the ability of Yugoslav to be held to an extremely low level. more than double the number of strike forces to carry on their campaign of The allies came to the Balkan War aircraft in the theater. destruction in Kosovo. with sharply differing views on the Secretary of Defense William S. American military experience and Balkan political dispute, and com- Cohen captured the new mood of resolve after a meeting at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers on April 7 when he declared, “Whatever General Clark feels he needs in order to carry out this campaign successfully, he will receive.” Now the joint and allied air forces

faced a most difficult task. NATO air USAF photo by SSgt. Efrain Gonzalez had to take on the military both directly, at the tactical level, and indirectly, by hitting strategic targets in Yugoslavia as well as in Kosovo. Airmen would have to expand the roster of strategic targets and seek out and destroy both fixed military targets and mobile mili- tary forces, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces. Much of this would take place in close- battle conditions. Yugoslav forces were mixed in with civilians and refugees. The stealthy B-2 was not the only US bomber in the action. B-1 Lancers and vener- Military vehicles and forces hid in and able B-52 Stratofortresses, shown here on the ramp at RAF Fairford, UK, added around buildings. heavy firepower to Operation Allied Force. 32 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1999 manders feared that losing aircraft NATO was willing to contemplate. The Desert Storm had marked a leap could undermine NATO’s will to options for using ground forces never forward in capabilities in 1991, but continue the campaign. materialized. the Kosovo operation demonstrated The experience of Bosnia and am- that aerospace power had evolved into We’re Here to Help bivalence about political elements something far stronger. Many aspects of Moreover, each NATO government of the Kosovo crisis made it highly the Kosovo campaign resembled other could approve or veto targets. In the improbable that NATO would agree operations in the 1990s. But unique rules US, sensitive targets were forwarded as an alliance to fight Milosevic’s of engagement and the spectacular debut for White House approval, and similar army and special police with ground of new systems marked points of special processes took place in the capitals of forces. Also, the Russians made it interest in the campaign. All along, the Europe. “Each president of the NATO plain from the start that they would overriding challenge was to summon countries, at least the major players, [are stand against a ground force invasion. expeditionary airpower and unleash the given] an opportunity to at least express On April 9, Russian President Boris aircrews to carry out the missions they their judgment [on targets],” explained Yeltsin appeared on Russian televi- had been trained to do. Cohen in April. Some targets of high sion to warn against NATO bringing Operations began with constant com- military value were never released to in ground troops. bat air patrols over Kosovo and Bosnia. be added to the list for airstrikes. Clark did, however, move quickly Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Gen. Richard E. Hawley, then com- to deploy Army attack helicopters to assets were also on call. Then, strike mander of USAF’s Air Combat Com- Tirana. Twenty-four Apache helicop- packages, most with dedicated SEAD mand, spoke for many airmen when he ters plus 18 multiple launch rocket assets, would be assigned to specific said, in late April, “Airpower works best systems went into the busy airfield missions. Operation Allied Force in- when it is used decisively. Shock, mass along with nearly 5,000 soldiers. cluded combinations of NATO and US are the way to achieve early results. Pentagon spokesman Bacon described aircraft and some US–only packages. Clearly, because of the constraints in the deployment as “an expansion of NATO seized and held air dominance this operation, ... we haven’t seen that the air operation.” With their formi- from the start of the operation. How- at this point.” dable firepower, it was thought the ever, the operational environment for However, the tide was about to turn. Apaches could help in identifying and NATO airmen flying over Yugoslavia On April 23, the allies gathered in attacking Yugoslav military forces in held many challenges. Washington, D.C., for the long-planned Kosovo. A force of 12 USAF C-17s Yugoslavia’s air defenses could celebration of NATO’s 50th anniversary. flew more than 300 sorties to deploy present a considerable challenge, as They reaffirmed their commitment to the Apache force. NATO airmen well knew. Just before stick with the air war. Target approval In the end, the Apaches were never the air war began, USAF head Ryan procedures eased somewhat. The White used in combat. Two training accidents cautioned: “There’s no assurance that House announced a major force in- in late April and early May tragically we won’t lose aircraft in trying to crease, and now the campaign was on claimed the lives of two crewmen and take on those air defenses.” The air course toward its objectives. destroyed two helicopters. However, the defense system in Yugoslavia, espe- Combat deployments increasingly problems with employing the Apaches cially around Belgrade, was dense, demanded more aircraft and supplies. had been evident from the outset. To and mobile Surface-to-Air-Missiles In the midst of the surge, the air mo- reach the key areas of fighting, the added more complexity. bility forces of the US Air Force also Apaches would have had to fly 100 miles Targets in the integrated air defense began humanitarian relief operations. and more at low altitude over terrain system were included in the first night’s Al­bania’s capital city, Ti­rana, opened studded with Yugoslav military forces. strikes. However, even as NATO gained up its airfield and quickly became Small-arms fire, anti-aircraft artillery, freedom to operate, the Yugoslav air the aerial port for relief supplies and and shoulder-fired missiles from these defense strategy presented some un- for a heavy Army force of Apache troops would pose a constant threat to orthodox challenges. Reports suggested helicopters. the helicopters. that spotters used cell phones and a chain While the air campaign was gearing of observers to monitor allied aircraft up in intensity, talk of a ground invasion The Lion’s Share of Airpower as they took off. Many times, the air began. However, it was clear from the To carry out a sustained air campaign, defense system simply did not “come beginning that NATO had to keep dis- NATO tapped primarily the resources of up” to challenge NATO strikes. “Their cussion of ground force options off the the US Air Force. For the Air Force, the SAM operators were, in the end, afraid table. President Clin­ton said outright, “I commitment to the Kosovo campaign to bring the SAMs up and engage our do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo quickly went from a contingency opera- fighters because of the lethality of our to fight a war.” The Chairman of the tion to a Major Theater War. The Air [SEAD] aircraft,” Gen. John P. Jumper, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen. Henry Force had downsized 40 percent since commander, US Air Forces in Europe, H. Shelton, pointed out the military real- 1989. That meant that Kosovo strained remarked. ity that NATO estimated it would take the smaller force and tested its new anywhere from a low of 20,000 up to a concept for expeditionary operations. More Dangerous Than 1991? couple hundred thousand ground troops In late April, President Clinton called That was a mixed blessing. The to carry out a NATO military action in up reserve component forces to keep Yugoslavs could not prevent NATO Kosovo—numbers well beyond what the air war going. from attacking key targets, but they

AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1999 33 could—and did—make it tough to completely decimate the air defense system. Yugoslav air defenses were not efficient, but they were not dead, either. As a consequence, pilots often got warnings that SAMs were active while on their missions. An initial as-

sessment from pilot reports and other USAF photo by SrA. Jessica Kochman sources tallied almost 700 missile shots: 266 from SA-6s, 174 from SA-3s, 106 from man-portable systems, and another 126 from unidentified systems. One informal estimate concluded a pilot was more than twice as likely to be shot at by SAMs over Kosovo than in Desert Storm. Overall, NATO did not destroy as many SAM batteries as air planners would have liked. Preliminary data from the Joint Staff estimated that two out A1C Jason Fifield of the 393rd Bomb Squadron, Whiteman AFB, Mo., examines a of a total of three SA-2 batteries were rack of Joint Direct Attack Munitions before they are loaded onto a B-2 bomber during Allied Force. hit and 10 of 13 SA-3s were destroyed. However, early estimates cited kills of only three of about 22 SA-6s. “We interest spiked with dramatic televi- disrupt the functioning of the state—but learned from this war that it is a different sion pictures of the wreck­age clearly it all had to be done without targeting ball game when SAMs don’t come up showing the air­craft’s Holloman AFB, the populace. to fight,” acknowledged Jumper. The N.M., markings. The rules of engagement for Op- concept of operations for lethal SEAD USAF officials stuck to a policy of eration Deliberate Force in Bosnia in depended on targeting individual batter- revealing no details about the crash 1995 indicated that collateral damage ies as they begin to track and illuminate or the rescue. The loss of the F-117 would always be a dominant factor friendly aircraft. did not shake the commitment to in the execution of a NATO air cam- Offensive counterair actions scored employing stealth as 24 F-117s in the paign. Back then, NATO and the UN many successes. The Yugo­slav air force theater continued to perform tough approved a category of targets prior included frontline MiG-29s as well missions. SEAD was used routinely to the operation. Ryan, who was then as older MiG-21s and other aircraft. for all strike packages, as had been the commander of Allied Air Forces American pilots shot down five aircraft the custom in the Balkans since the Southern Europe, personally approved in air-to-air engagements and a Dutch shootdown of Capt. Scott F. O’Grady every designated mean point of impact F-16 got a MiG-29 on the first night. four years earlier. that was struck. Many more aircraft were destroyed on In the Kosovo operation, target ap- the ground. In one remarkable example, Supplement to Stealth proval and concerns for collateral a Tomahawk targeted and destroyed a In early July, Lt. Gen. Marvin R. damage became some of the stickiest MiG-29 fighter on the ramp. Esmond, USAF’s deputy chief of challenges for the alliance. The vast NATO also did well against Yugo­slav staff for air and space operations, displacement of refugees made the airfields. “One of the myths that was described it this way, “The question pilot’s job infinitely harder. “There’s dispelled in this conflict was that you I get frequently is, was ECM [Elec- little doubt in my mind that Milos- can’t close an airfield,” commented tronic Countermeasures] required for evic had no compunction at all about Jumper. “As a matter of fact, we closed stealth assets? The answer is no, it is putting IDPs [Internally Displaced almost all the airfields,” he said. not required—depending on the risks Persons] inside of what we felt to be Despite this overall success story, you want to put the aircrews at. If you valid military targets,” said USAF Lt. the loss of the F-117, known by the call have the capability, then the prudent Gen. Michael C. Short, NATO’s joint sign Vega 21, became one of the major person would say, why not suppress force air component commander. “And, media events of the war. On March 27, the threat with Electronic Countermea- in fact, a couple of times we struck the stealth fighter went down over Ser- sures as well as taking advantage of those targets and then saw the results bia. Sources cited evidence suggesting our stealth capability, which all totaled on CNN.” the airplane was hit by a Yugoslav SA-3 up to survivability for the platform. NATO released 23,000 bombs and missile active in the area at the time. That is simply what we did.” missiles, and, of those, 20 went astray Other reports hinted that the Serbs may Concern over collateral damage had a to cause collateral damage and casual- also have tracked the fighter optically profound impact on how NATO ran the ties. By far the most serious geopolitical using an intricate network of ground air war. A key part of the air campaign shock came from the accidental bomb- observers. A daring rescue retrieved strategy was to target Milo­sevic’s power ing of a Chinese Embassy building the pilot from Serb territory. Public base, shock the Serb leadership, and May 7. Reports suggested that sev- 34 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1999 eral JDAMs hit the building, crashing tions Center to obtain approval from technological sophistication of the through several floors, and killing three the one-star general on duty. NATO air campaign. Controlling it all Chinese nationals. The US apologized was the CAOC. According to Jumper, and said that intelligence sources had The 15,000-Foot Floor it is a weapon system in its own right. been using an outdated map of Belgrade Concern over the air defense threat The CAOC connected pilots and con- that pinpointed the wrong location. led Short to place a 15,000-foot “floor” trollers airborne over the battlespace Even so, the air campaign kept up on air operations. Flying at that altitude to the nerve center of the operation. high standards of accuracy. Defense reduced the effects of anti-aircraft fire Since Bosnia, the CAOC at 5th Allied Secretary Cohen said, “We achieved our and shoulder-fired SAMs. Aircraft Tactical Air Force in Vicenza, Italy, goals with the most precise application could dip below the limit to identify had grown from a hodgepodge of desks of airpower in history.” targets. For the most part, precision and unique systems to an integrated Pilots operated under very strict attacks were carried out with laser- operation. Its staff swelled from 300 rules of engagement. They were “as guided weapons that worked well from to more than 1,100 personnel. strict as I’ve seen in my 27 years [in that altitude. CAOC planners crafted the air task- the] military,” commented USAF Maj. Changes came from the highest ing order on a 72-hour cycle to plan Gen. Charles F. Wald, of the Joint political authorities, too, even after allocation of assets. But the strikes Staff’s Strategic Plans and Policy aircraft had taken off. One B-2 strike were executed on a much shorter cycle. Division and key Pentagon spokesman had to turn back when a target was Commanders were able to assign new during the operation. NATO was able denied en route. Short recounted how targets to strike aircraft and change to impose and live with the rules of at the last minute, one or two nations munitions on airplanes in a cycle as engagement because aircrew training could veto a target, causing packages short as four to six hours. and technical capacities of aerospace in the air to be recalled via airborne Increasingly, the CAOC served as the power permitted rapid conferences warning and control system aircraft pulse-point of aerospace integration, about whether to strike a target or not. and tankers. This played “havoc with linking up many platforms in a short Often, getting clearance to attack a a mission commander’s plan.” span of time. Multiple intelligence target required a pilot to make a radio While the short leash was frustrat- sources downlinked into the CAOC for call back to the Combined Air Opera- ing, it was also a sign of the incredible analysis. Operators integrated target information and relayed it to strike aircraft. Pilots could radio back to the CAOC to report new targets and get Aircraft Committed to the Effort approval to strike. 1,200 Jumper recounted how, in the CAOC, “We had U-2s that allowed us 1,000 to dynamically retask to take a picture of a reported SA-6, beam that picture Allies back to Beale AFB [in California] for a 800 coordinate assessment within minutes, and have the results back to the F-15E 600 USA, USN, USMC as it turned to shoot an AGM-130 [preci- sion guided munition].” This real-time tasking was a leap ahead of Desert 400 Storm operations. Over time, Predator USAF unmanned aerial vehicles were used in 200 a similar way via the CAOC and, with a brand-new laser designator, could 0 direct strike aircraft already flying in Jan. 1 Feb. 23 the engagement zone onto positively Rambouillet March 18 Talks end Talks end identified targets like tanks and armored personnel carriers. March 24 April 6 May 18 The B-2 flew 49 sorties, with a mix aircraft Allied Force 24-hour of two-ship and single-ship operations. begins strike ops plus-up begin All told, the B-2 delivered 650 JDAMs with an excellent, all-weather accuracy Deploying more aircraft to the theater was a key to making the campaign work. With rate. The targeting system allowed the new guidance in early April, NATO airmen had two target sets: targets of unique B-2 crew to select 16 individual desig- strategic value and Yugoslav army forces and their sustainment ele­ments scattered across Kosovo. Isolating and pinning the fielded forces required 24-hour cover- nated mean points of impact, one for age of the Kosovo engagement zones to detect and prevent organized movement. each JDAM carried. All that demanded more aircraft, and USAF bore the brunt of the surge. “This is the equivalent of a Major Theater War,” Secretary of Defense said at Measures of Effectiveness a briefing in late May. “It’s a major campaign on the part of the Air Force.” The B-2 crews proved first of all that they could operate effectively on

AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1999 35 missions that took more than 30 hours that.” Jumper said there was “a great attacks, Milosevic’s forces in Kosovo to complete. A folding chaise lounge deal more to talk about with regard were losing. Evidence of VJ and MUP behind the pilots’ seats and stashes of hot to information warfare that we were defections was mounting. Their fuel food on board helped the two-man crew able to do for the first time in this supplies were limited, and their resup- manage fatigue. At the same time, the campaign and points our way to the ply lines had been cut, and Milosevic bomber proved itself combat-worthy. future.” knew it would only get worse. More Using just six of the nine aircraft at By May, USAF had deployed another forces were slated to deploy, and two Whiteman, the 509th made every takeoff significant increment of forces. With months of good summer weather lay time and participated in 34 of the 53 air 24-hour operations under way the air ahead. Wald said, “This is a game tasking orders generated for Operation campaign was able to keep the pressure with as many innings as we want, and Allied Force. Every B-2 was launched on military forces in a much wider area I think [Milosevic] is running out of in “pristine” condition—meaning its of Kosovo via the “Kosovo engagement baseballs.” radar and infrared signature met low- zones,” updated terminology for the Around May 22, the pressure in- observable specifications, with no rough “kill box” concept pioneered in the creased again. Better weather and patches to degrade survivability. The Kuwait theater of operations in Desert more forces allowed NATO airmen to B-2 stood up to the demands of combat Storm. There were enough forces in ramp up the pressure on the Yugo­slav operations, sometimes taking as little theater to cover the engagement zones army. In about 10 days, bomb damage as four hours to refuel, rearm, and for about 20 hours a day. Strike aircraft assessment confirmed that NATO air- turn the jet in preparation for another tripled so that a total of 323 American men had doubled the number of tanks combat sortie. “It is an incredibly du- and 212 allied strike aircraft worked destroyed, hit three times the number rable, incredibly robust airframe. You against the two major goals of hitting of armored personnel carriers, and turn it on, and it just keeps running,” Serb military forces and striking targets hit four times as many artillery and Barnidge reported. of unique strategic value. Air forces mortar pieces. “We’re driving him to The secret new art of disrupting now attacked from all sides. Marine a decision,” announced Clark at the enemy military capabilities through F/A-18s flew missions from a base in end of May. cyber­space attacks appeared to have Hungary. Strike packages from Italy Also in late May the KLA began its been a big part of the campaign. Air could fly around Yugoslavia to ingress first large-scale offensive in more than a Combat Command stood up an in- from the northeast, surprising air de- year. About 4,000 troops pressed ahead formation warfare squadron in Fiscal fenses around Belgrade. from points along the Albanian border. 1996 to handle defensive protection The KLA’s Operation Arrow soon met of information and offensive informa- “Take Them Out” heavy resistance from Yugoslav artil- tion techniques at forward-deployed “The mission is to pin them down, lery and troops. In about two days, the locations. According to one report, the cut them off, take them out,” said NATO rebels were pinned down along Mount unit had its “combat debut” during spokesman Maj. Gen. Walter Jertz. Pas­trik. Heavy mortar and artillery fire the Kosovo operation and the Serbs “We have pinned them down, we have ensued and the KLA was “creamed” felt the impact. “They’re pulling their pretty much largely cut them off, and according to a senior US intelligence hair out at the computer terminals,” are about to begin to take them out.” official. said one unnamed official. “We know Under the relentless pressure of air The small-scale offensive reportedly helped NATO identify more Yugoslav military equipment in the immediate area. “As the VJ and MUP fire their artillery, they’re detected,” said Wald. “Then we’ll go ahead and attack them and destroy them.” Cohen emphasized that NATO was not coordinating op- erations with the KLA. Indeed, by this USAF photo by SrA. Jeffrey Allen time, NATO air attacks on Yugoslav military installations and forces were spread widely across Kosovo and southern Serbia every day and night, well beyond the localized effects of the KLA actions. By early June, military impact and a series of diplomatic events were coming together as powerful coercion. The diplomatic chain of events had started a few weeks earlier, with the G-8 meeting in Bonn on May 6. There, SrA. Aaron Fontagneres and SSgt. John Rodriguez of the 494th Fighter Squadron the major Western economic powers at RAF Lakenheath, UK, load a Mk 82 bomb onto an F-15E on April 7. Bad weather plus Russia agreed on a basic strategy hampered operations and forced cancellation of many sorties. to resolve the conflict. The European 36 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1999 At the same time, Yugoslav forces in The Cumulative Toll on Serb Mobile Targets Serbia were also feeling the pressure. 454 (artillery First army, in the north, had 35 percent and mortars) of its facilities destroyed or damaged 222 while 2nd army, near the Kosovo bor- 280 (armored personnel der, had 20 percent of its facilities hit. carriers) Third army, assigned to operations in 240 Kosovo, had 60 percent of its fixed 200 facilities damaged or destroyed. The Joint Staff assessed that the air attacks had significantly reduced 3rd army’s 160 122 (tanks) ability to sustain operations. Belgrade was largely without elec- 120 tric power and about 30 percent of the military and civilian radio re- 80 lay networks were damaged. Across Yugo­slavia, rail and road capacity 40 was interdicted: Some 70 percent of road and 50 percent of rail bridges across the Danube were down. Criti- cal industries were also hard hit, Day 23 Day 36 Day 53 Day 60 Day 78 with petroleum refining facilities 100 Good Moderate Poor percent destroyed, explosive produc- tion capacity 50 percent destroyed or damaged, ammunition production 65 Source: CJCS briefing, June 10, 1999. percent destroyed or damaged, and aviation and armored vehicle repair at US Army Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed the immediate count of the results of the campaign on June 10. Better weather and 70 percent and 40 percent destroyed more forces exponentially increased the hits on tanks, armored personnel carriers, or damaged, respectively. and heavy artillery. Numbers subsequently confirmed by NATO on Sept. 16, 1999, Industrial targets and bridges were 93 tanks, 153 armored personnel carriers, and 389 artillery and mortars. would take a long time to repair. In many cases, electric power and com- munications could be restored more Union announced its appointment of be exposed to devastation. In late May readily. However, the combined effect President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari and early June, the impact on fielded had brought the war home to Belgrade as its special envoy for Kosovo on forces spiked. and restricted Milosevic’s ability to May 17. Under Ahti­saari’s auspices, employ his fielded forces effectively. the US, NATO, and Russia agreed to Heavy Losses On June 9, after last-minute wrangling a NATO–drafted plan in late May. On Destruction of armored personnel with Yugoslav military commanders, May 27, an international tribunal in carriers, artillery, and tanks continued Milo­sevic accepted the NATO condi- The Hague indicted Milosevic as a to rise “almost exponentially” in the tions. “I think it was the total weight war criminal—an indictment, as Cohen words of Shelton. He said the Yugo- of our effort that finally got to him,” pointed out, with no statute of limita- slav army forces lost 450 or about 50 said Short, the allied air commander. tions. Yugo­sla­via’s parliament voted to percent of their artillery pieces and The 78-day air campaign brought accept the plan on June 3. mortars to air attack. About one-third about an ending that seemed almost The air campaign was also hav- of their armored vehicles were hit: impossible back in March. Milosevic ing a devastating effect. Roads, rail a total of about 122 tanks and 220 agreed to a cease-fire, the withdrawal lines, and bridges across Yugoslavia armored personnel carriers. A later of Serb forces from Kosovo, the entry had been knocked out, halting the NATO assessment released Sept. 16 of an international force, normal flow of the civilian economy. put the numbers at 389, 93, and 153, the return of refugees, and Kosovar Good weather and long summer days respectively. These heavy losses meant autonomy within Yugoslavia. Kosovo ahead meant that more of Milosevic’s they could not effectively continue would remain within the sovereignty of country and his military forces would organized offensive operations. Yugoslavia. However, the international peacekeeping force would be armed and empowered. Rebecca Grant is president of IRIS, a research organization in Arlington, Va. She Military historian John Keegan has worked for Rand, in the Office of Secretary of the Air Force, and for the Chief wrote with some awe, “Now, there of Staff of the Air Force. Her most recent article for Air Force Magazine, “The Carrier Myth,” appeared in the March 1999 issue. This article was adapted from a is a new date to fix on the calendar: longer Air Force Association special report, “The Kosovo Campaign: Aerospace June 3, 1999, when the capitulation Power Made It Work,” published in September. of President Milosevic proved that a war can be won by airpower alone.” ■ AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1999 37