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Airpower Got the Job Done in the Balkans Despite an Initial Strategy That Was—Among Other Things—Very Shortsighted

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Airpower Got the Job Done in the Balkans Despite an Initial Strategy That Was—Among Other Things—Very Shortsighted Airpower got the job done in the Balkans despite an initial strategy that was—among other things—very shortsighted. Airpower Made It Work By Rebecca Grant peration Allied Force started out on March 24 to be a short, sharp military response to a political event—the refusal of OYugoslavia to accept the Kosovo peace plan forged earlier during talks in Rambouillet, France. When the NATO USAF photo by SrA. Jeffrey Allen strikes began, 112 US and 102 allied strike aircraft were committed to the op- eration. Thirteen of NATO’s 19 nations sent aircraft to take part. NATO’s three newest members—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—did not join in. Greece, Iceland, and Luxembourg also abstained. The initial plan envisioned a few days of air operations against a carefully chosen set of about 50 pre approved targets. Target categories included air defense sites, communications relays, A pilot from the 510th Fighter Squadron at Aviano AB, Italy, on return from an Op- and fixed military facilities, such as eration Allied Force bombing mission. The 510th carried out numerous strikes on targets across Yugoslavia. ammunition dumps. No targets in downtown Belgrade were on the list for the initial strikes. Planners had data on far more than 50 targets, but the consensus in NATO would support only limited action. The alliance military campaign opened with the use of a formidable array of weapons. The Air Force’s conventional air launched cruise mis- siles and the Navy’s Tomahawk land attack missiles were launched against Yugoslavian air defense sites and com- munications. Two B-2 stealth bombers flew from Whiteman AFB, Mo., mark- ing the first use of the B-2 in combat. The B-2s flew more than 30 hours on a round-trip mission and launched the highly accurate Joint Direct Attack Munition against multiple targets. US and NATO fighters in theater main- 30 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1999 tained combat air patrols while others Theater of operations bombed targets. No one knew exactly what it would take to shake Serbian dictator Slo bodan Austria Hungary Romania Milosevic. Two statements made at the start of the campaign bracketed the range of ways it might unfold. Ljubljana Taszar Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon Aviano Slovenia said on March 23, “We have plans for Zagreb Voivodina a swift and severe air campaign. ... This Croatia Novi Sad will be painful to the Serbs. We hope, Cervia relatively quickly, that the Serbs will re- Rimini Belgrade alize they’ve made a mistake.” Bacon’s Tuzla comment echoed NATO’s collective Ancona Bosnia Serbia hope that a show of resolve would get Milosevic to accept Rambouillet. Amandola Sarajevo Sofia Italy Tough Talk Bul- ADRIATIC Montenegro Pristina The Supreme Allied Commander Eu- Kosovo SEA Podgorica rope, Army Gen. Wesley K. Clark, on Rome March 25 spelled out the other option at Skopje the other end of the spectrum. He said, Tirana Macedonia “We are going to systematically and San Vito dei Gioia del Colle Normanni progressively attack, disrupt, degrade, Albania devastate, and ultimately destroy these Brindisi forces and their facilities and support —unless President Milosevic complies Greece with the demands of the international MEDITERRANEAN SEA community.” Clark’s statement described what NATO airpower could do, given Present-day Yugoslavia time. But the air campaign had started from the premise that NATO wanted to try limited action to achieve its goals. How would Milosevic react? A White House “senior official” had already mulled over the possibilities: “As we contemplated the use of force over the past 14 months, we constructed four different models. One was that the whiff of gunpowder, just the By the time Milosevic backed away Kosovo created a mass of refugees that threat of force, would make Milosevic back from Rambouillet, his forces had battle- ignited world opinion. Estimates of the down. Another was that he needed to take field dominance in Kosovo. The Yugo- number of displaced persons jumped some hit to justify acquiescence. Another slav 3rd army was assigned to Kosovo from 240,000 in March to 600,000 by was that he was a playground bully who operations, along with reinforcements early April. Clark called it “a grim com- would fight but back off after a punch in from 1st and 2nd armies. About 40,000 bination of terror and ethnic cleansing the nose. And the fourth was that he would troops and 300 tanks crossed into on a vast scale.” Central Kosovo was react like Saddam Hussein. On any given Kosovo, spreading out in burned out largely emptied of its ethnic Albanian day, people would pick one or the other. villages and buildings abandoned by the population. We thought that the Saddam Hussein option refugees. Paramilitary security forces Milosevic’s tactical gamble hit NATO was always the least likely, but we knew it from the Interior Ministry were engaged in a vulnerable spot. The allies were was out there, and now we’re looking at it.” in multiple areas across Kosovo. committed to limited air strikes, with no Milosevic ignored the initial NATO By early April, the KLA was blood- firm plans beyond a few days or weeks. airstrikes, just as he had flouted ied, and organized resistance in most Since fixed targets were the focus of NATO–backed diplomacy. CIA Di- of central Kosovo was diminishing. An the plan, NATO flew just a few pack- rector George J. Tenet had forecast American official said the government ages each night. There was nothing for weeks that Yugoslav forces could forces had carried out devastating at- that military force could do quickly respond to NATO military action by tacks, and the prospects for the KLA against the fully developed offensive. accelerating the ethnic cleansing. Now were dim. As US Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Milosevic gambled that his forces Michael E. Ryan commented, there would push ethnic Albanians and the The Tactical Blunder was no way that airstrikes alone could Kosovo Liberation Army out of But Milosevic’s gamble was also his halt the door-to-door killings that had Kosovo before NATO could react. major miscalculation. His push through been under way. On April 3, a Pentagon AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1999 31 official said of Milosevic’s campaign, Two Target Sets doctrine say that it is most efficient “He’s basically done.” In early April, NATO expanded and to hit enemy forces when they mass The plight of the Kosovo refugees clarified the air campaign plan, revising and maneuver at the beginning of op- stiffened NATO’s resolve. Now, the it to including simultaneous attacks on erations. In early April, NATO did not alliance would have to win. the two types of targets. Here was the have enough forces in theater to clamp To deprive Milosevic of his gains in heart of the air campaign as it would down on units of the regular Yugoslav Kosovo, the alliance would have to use be carried out over the next two-and- army (VJ) or the paramilitary special its air forces to meet goals that had just a-half months. police (MUP). NATO air forces had gotten much more difficult. The poli- Target set 1 included fixed targets been postured for combat air patrol tics of the situation meant that NATO of unique strategic value. It included and flexible strike packages against a missed the chance to let its airmen do national command and control; military limited set of targets, not for 24-hour it “by the book” and halt or disrupt reserves; infrastructure such as bridges, operations over dispersed forces. In Milosevic’s forces as they massed on Petroleums, Oils, and Lubricants pro- early April, it was possible to close the border and moved into Kosovo in duction, and communications; and the one engagement zone over some of the March. As Secretary of State Madeleine military–industrial base of weapons and ground forces for only a few hours a K. Albright explained on March 28, ammunition factories and distribution day. Under these conditions the Yugo- the new goal was to force Milosevic to systems. Serbia’s electric power grid slav forces could hide in buildings and back off by “making sure that he pays was soon added to the list. move at night. a very heavy price.” Target set 2, a high priority for Clark, Poor weather also limited air strikes. The first thing NATO needed was comprised the Serbian fielded forces— Brig. Gen. Leroy Barnidge Jr., com- more airpower. An additional five B-1 military forces, tactical assembly areas, mander of the 509th Bomb Wing, heavy bombers, five EA-6B electronic command-and-control nodes, bridges Whiteman AFB, Mo., told how one warfare aircraft, and 10 tankers were in southern Serbia and Kosovo, supply night, one of the wing’s B-2s en route already en route, along with more al- areas, POL storage and pumping sta- to the target was recalled because of lied aircraft. The aircraft carrier USS tions, choke points, and ammunition weather. That night “the weather was Theodore Roosevelt, veteran of Bosnia storage. Initial guidance focused on so bad, the whole war was canceled,” operations four years earlier, was due forces south of the 44th parallel, but he remarked. Weather was favorable to arrive with its battle group around soon, military targets north of the line only about one-third of the time—with April 4. also made the list. most good weather days coming late NATO also needed enough aircraft NATO was now pursuing a multi- in the campaign. to sustain 24-hour operations over the pronged strategy with its air campaign. Preservation of NATO’s cohesion dispersed Yugoslav forces in Kosovo.
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