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The People Mobilized: the Mozambican Liberation Movement and American Activism (1960-1975)

The People Mobilized: the Mozambican Liberation Movement and American Activism (1960-1975)

THE PEOPLE MOBILIZED: THE MOZAMBICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN ACTIVISM (1960-1975)

A Dissertation Submitted to The Temple University Graduate Board

In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

by Carla R. Stephens August, 2011

Examining Committee Members:

Teshale Tibebu, Advisory Chair, History Richard Immerman, History Harvey Neptune, History Lee V. Cassanelli, External Member, History, University of Pennsylvania

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© Carla Renée Stephens 2011 All Rights Reserved

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ABSTRACT

The anti-colonial struggles in were the most internationalized wars on the continent. Involved were people from across the globe and across the socioeconomic and political spectrums – Chinese Communists and Portuguese right-wing ,

American black nationalists in the urban North and South African white supremacists, cold warriors and human rights activists. The Liberation Front

(FRELIMO), was the only national liberation movement in the to receive aid from the , the , and the People‘s Republic of . I contend that, because both FRELIMO and relied on support from the international community to wage war for over a decade (1964-1975), the anti-colonial wars in lusophone Africa were not only armed struggles, but also cultural and rhetorical battles.

FRELIMO‘s program of socialist revolution which heralded human rights and social justice through education, non- racialism and gender equality resonated with the international shift to the left of the 1960s. Counterpoised were the Portuguese right-wing corporative dictatorship which espoused a ―Lusotropical‖ for its

African overseas provinces, and the white supremacist regimes of Southern and

South Africa that militarily and economically dominated Southern Africa. This dissertation focuses particularly on the relationship between FRELIMO and the activists of the black freedom struggle and the New Left in the United States. It will show the significant contributions that American activists made to Mozambican liberation, as well as the impact that this transnational movement had on the entire Southern African region, iii on U.S. foreign policy, and on the United States‘ domestic social and political landscapes.

I explore issues of , , and modernity within a context using the lenses of race, class, and culture in the United States and southern

Africa during the long Sixties. I also examine the significance of religious organizations and the moral imperative that underpinned the global advocacy supporting southern

African independence. The development of a transnational network of activists that reached from rural Africa to the White House provided the leverage needed for southern

Africans and their international allies to topple the Portuguese dictatorship and, eventually, end South African .

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This manuscript would not have come to fruition without the support and encouragement of the history faculty of Temple University. Sincere thanks to Teshale Tibebu, Richard

Immerman, and Harvey Neptune for your questions, comments, critiques, and belief in the value of this research. My appreciation also to Bettye Collier-Thomas and Kenneth

Kusmer for your scholarly example; to Beth Bailey for stewardship in both the craft and art of writing; Dieu Nguyen and Peter Gran for expanding my historical perspective; and, to David Farber and Arthur Schmidt for planting the seeds of inspiration from which this manuscript has grown. I appreciate the thoughtful comments regarding nationalism and myth-making of Lee Cassanelli from the University of Pennsylvania. I express my deepest gratitude to Ben Talton. Without your mentorship this study would not have been possible. Thanks for connecting me to the network. Vangeline Campbell, Rosa

Grier, and Patricia Williams provided much needed administrative support – you are the gears that make the motor run smoothly.

I am also grateful to those archivists whose knowledge, patience, and generosity have enriched my scholarship. Special thanks to Kenneth Grossi at the

Archives who assisted me in procuring a Frederick Artz Summer Fellowship and opened the treasure chest of the Herbert Shore Collection. Without you, I could not have rediscovered the greatness of . Equally significant were the contributions of archivist Stephen Plotkin and Research Grant Coordinator Jane Lindsay

v who assisted with the John F. Kennedy Foundation grant and supported my research at the Kennedy Presidential Library.

David Easterbook, Kevin Leonard, Patricia Ogedengbe, and Janet Olson navigated for me the vast holdings at the Northwestern University Archives – the

Melville Herskovits Program of African Studies (PAS) and Africana Library collections.

That the university digitized the PAS lecture series recordings in time for my research visit was exceptional support for me personally and also provides an invaluable resource for all Africanists. I shall return. Thanks to Adelaide Wachman and the Temple

University Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy for granting the Marvin

Wachman Endowed Research Fellowship that made possible my research in

Chicago/Evanston. Other archivists and librarians that have assisted with this research include: David Murray, Thomas Whitehead, and Aslaku Berhanu at Temple University;

Stephen Fullwood and Mary Yearwood at the Schomburg Center for Research in Black

Culture; and Jon Roscoe at the Nixon Presidential Library in College Park, MD.

I am indebted to those men and women whose oral histories and correspondence provided me with a more intimate sense of time and space, of motivations and tactics, and of the freedom dreams. Earl Brown, Janet Mondlane, Prexy Nesbitt, João Nhambiu, and Robert Van Lierop -- the time and insights that you shared supplemented the documentary evidence, filling in some of the silences of the archives. You brought the history to life.

The support and encouragement of friends and family provided the spiritual scaffolding I needed when confidence and inspiration faltered. Jason Bartlett, Ben

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Brandenburg, Susan Brandt, Alex Elkins, Lindsay Helfman, Matt Johnson, Nan Morgan,

Steve Nepa, Dolores Pfeuffer-Scherer, and Dan Royles engaged me in invaluable discussions and reflections on this and other scholarly work. Roberta Meek, you are my soul sister. Helen and Alexis Stephens endured my absence with gentle patience.

Sharon, yours is the light that guided me throughout the marathon. It is done.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ...... iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS …..………………………………………………………….v LIST OF ACRONYMS…………………………………………………………………...x TABLE OF FIGURES ...... xiii INTRODUCTION ...... xiv

CHAPTER

1. PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM IN MOZAMBIQUE: MYTH AND REALITY...... 1 , Luso-tropicalism and the Myth about Portuguese Colonialism ...... 7 African Resistance to Early Portuguese Colonialism ...... 17 From to Indigenato: African Labor and the Portuguese Economy ...... 22 The Web of Oppression: Forced Labor in Portuguese East Africa ...... 35

2. O BRADO AFRICANO (THE AFRICAN CRY) --MOZAMBICAN NATIONALISM AND PAN-AFRICAN ACTIVISM ...... 43 W.E.B. DuBois and Early American Advocacy for Colonial Reform in Mozambique 52 Mozambican Nationalism and a New Pan-Africanism ...... 67 Education and Afro-Asian Solidarity ...... 72

3. EDUARDO CHIVAMBO MONDLANE -- THE SOUL OF MOZAMBICAN LIBERATION...... 81 Mondlane in ...... 89 Mondlane in the United States ...... 96 North American Assembly on African Affairs ...... 102 Mondlane and Race Relations in the United States ...... 114 Mondlane at the ...... 122

4. KENNEDY‘S BALANCING ACT – MOZAMBICAN LIBERATION, THE FOURTH DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE ...... 129 Education: ―The Keystone in the Arch of Freedom and Progress‖ ...... 137

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Balancing Africa -- Act I: The 1961 East African Airlift Coalition ...... 142 Balancing Africa -- Act II: The Southern African Students Program ...... 151 Balancing Africa -- Act III: Genesis of the Mozambique Institute ...... 155 Balancing Portugal ...... 164

5. THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND MOZAMBICAN LIBERATION: THE LIBERAL YEARS ...... 170 The ACOA, the United Nations, Portugal and Lusophone African Independence .... 181 THE ACOA and African American Support of Mozambican Liberation ...... 199

6. THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND MOZAMBICAN LIBERATION -- THE RADICAL YEARS ...... 213 ACOA Support of Mozambican Liberation: The Cases of Robert Van Lierop and Prexy Nesbitt ...... 218 ACOA Support of Mozambican Liberation: The Nixon Administration ―Tilt‖ and a Shifting Repertoire of Contention ...... 233 ACOA Support of Mozambican Liberation: Israel, Palestine, and the Road to ...... 245 A Luta Continua and the Global Black Freedom Struggle ...... 253

CONCLUSION ...... 264 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 282

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAI African-American Institute ACOA American Committee on Africa AFSAR Americans for South African Resistance AMSAC American Society of African Culture ANC African National Congress ANLCA American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa CAA Council of African Affairs CAP Congress of African Peoples CECAF Council for Educational Cooperation with Africa CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIO Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization COBATAME Committee of Black Americans for Truth about the Middle East

COINTELPRO FBI Counterintelligence Program CONCP Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas -- Conference of Nationalist Organizations from the Portuguese Colonies

CORE Congress of Racial Equality ECU Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs FOR Fellowship of Reconciliation FRAIN Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência Nacional – African Revolutionary Front for National Independence

FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique --Mozambique Liberation Front

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IIE Institute of International Education ILO International Labor Organization KIEC Kurasini International Education Center MAC Movimento Anti-Colonista – Anti-Colonial Movement MANU Mozambique African National Union MID South African Military Intelligence Organization MPLA Movimento Popular de Liberação de – People‘s Movement for the Liberation of Angola

NCC National Council of Churches of Christ NESAM Nucleus of Mozambican Secondary Students NSC National Security Council NUSAS National Union of South African Students OAAU Organization of Afro-American Unity OAU Organization of African Unity OMM Organization of Mozambican Women PAFMECA Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa PAIGC Partido Africano da Independência da Guinéa e Cabo Verde - - African Party for the Independence of Guinea and

PFLP for the Liberation of Palestine PIDE Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado – International Police for the Defense of the State

PRWM Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana – Mozambican National Resistance SAS Students‘ Afro-American Society SASP Southern African Students Program SCLC Southern Christian Leadership Conference SDS Students for a Democratic Society SNCC Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee xi

UDENAMO União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique – National Democratic Union of Mozambique

UNAMI União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente – African National Union of Independent Mozambique

UNCF United Negro College Fund UNEMO União Nacional das Estudantes Moçambique – National Union of Mozambican Students

UPA União das Populações de Angola – Angolan People‘s Union

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development WCC World Council of Churches WNLA Witwatersrand Native Labor Association ZANLA Zimbabwean National Liberation Army

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TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Cartoon found in 4 August 1949 issue of (South Africa) ...... 93

Figure 2 (1975) ...... 259

Figure 3: President receiving a $42,000 check from Robert Van Lierop...... 274

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INTRODUCTION

On 3 , Dr. Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, president of the Mozambique

Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique -- FRELIMO), was assassinated in Dar-es-Salaam, . He was killed by a mail bomb delivered to him at the beachfront home of Betty King, an American businesswoman and friend of the Mondlane family. Coverage of the assassination of a political leader is always newsworthy; however, much of the commentary regarding this tragic event in newspapers across the

United States is particularly notable. Many papers, especially the African American press, compared Mondlane with icon, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. who had been killed less than a year earlier.1 Significantly, some in a nation still grieving the assassinations of King and the Kennedy brothers counted among them the now largely forgotten leader of a southern African liberation movement.

Two years later, in August 1971, Robert Van Lierop, an attorney from , waited in for safe passage for himself and two other African Americans to

Dar-es-Salaam. From there he would travel into the of Mozambique, an area reputedly controlled by FRELIMO. His mission was to film a documentary depicting the guerilla war for independence being waged against the Portuguese that had begun on 25 September 1964. Nearly a year before, in order to prepare for his journey to

1 ―African Guerilla Chief Assassinated,‖ carried in both the Los Angeles Times and Washington Post, 4 February 1969; Columbus Citizen Journal, 5 February 1969; Louis Martin, ―The Big Parade: Editor Recalls Late African ‗Revolutionist‘,‖ Chicago Daily Defender, 8 February 1969, 3. The article was also printed in the 15 February 1969 edition of the New Pittsburgh Courier, 6. Oberlin Alumni RG 28, Box 724, Oberlin Collegge Archives (OCA). xiv

Mozambique, Van Lierop had stopped practicing law. He declined the opportunity to represent the estate of electric guitar legend Jimi Hendrix in order to work as a waiter in the radical enclave of Greenwich Village while raising funds, mostly from church groups.2 Van Lierop had no film-making experience, yet his 30-minute documentary, A

Luta Continua (The Struggle Continues), became a classic short film used by a global network of activists to publicize and mobilize support for anti-colonial/anti-apartheid movements in southern Africa.

These vignettes raise compelling questions regarding the interconnection between an emerging Mozambique and the United States. How did this Mozambican revolutionary become something of an American cultural icon for that moment in 1969?

Why would an African American attorney, a son of immigrants, leave a lucrative career and risk his life to create a documentary? How did this amateur film become not only

―an important organizing tool for peace, solidarity, and anti-imperialist groups around the country,‖ but also a tool to teach rural Mozambicans about FRELIMO?3 In short, why and how did Mozambicans gain access to and leverage American support in their nationalist struggle? Furthermore, how did Americans, especially but not solely those of

African descent, use the Mozambican liberation movement as a mobilization tool for domestic as well as international contestation? This transnational history of the

Mozambican liberation struggle, with its particular focus on the relationship between an emerging Mozambique and the United States, provides the ideological, political and social milieu from which we may derive the answers.

2 Robert Van Lierop, May 15, 2009. 3 Victoria Missick, ―Mozambique Perspective,‖ World Magazine (November 27, 1976): M-10. xv

This exploration of the Mozambican revolution and American activism shows: (1) the impact of international social, cultural, and political influences on the shape of the

Mozambican liberation movement; (2) the mutually supportive interactions among international leftist groups, human rights organizations, and African liberation movements; and, (3) the diasporic identity and solidarity that expanded the black freedom struggle in the United States to a transnational movement. It demonstrates not only the ways in which a transnational advocacy network developed and supported Southern

Africa, but also the impact of the national liberation movements in Southern Africa on

United States foreign policy and its domestic sociopolitical landscape.

As African historian Frederick Cooper explains in his historical survey of Africa since 1940, the answers to questions regarding recent African history are not simple and cannot be understood by merely examining the events of that period, in this case the

1960s and early 1970s, or the places of Mozambique and the United States alone. The answers are rooted in the complex history of colonialism, African/black nationalism, , and the Cold War. As a result, this study contributes to various historiographies, including African, African American, and U.S. Foreign Relations.

This African history analyzes the crucial transnational nature of the multifaceted

Mozambican liberation movement. Most scholarship regarding the Mozambican liberation movement focuses on the political, economic, and military struggles between

Portugal and FRELIMO within an international context.4 A significant lacuna in this

4 Witney Schneidman, Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal‘s (Lanham: University Press of America, 2004); Barry Munslow, Mozambique: The Revolution and Its Origins (: Longman, 1983); Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (Atlantic Highlands: Zed Books, 1990); M. D. D Newitt, Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years (London: C. Hurst, 1981); xvi scholarship is an examination of the Mozambicans‘ effective mobilization of international allies and the impact of the advocacy in support of Mozambican liberation on local and global societies.5

To unpack the ways in which the cultural and political, global and local, are intertwined in this history, this study addresses two aspects of transnationality within the

Mozambican liberation movement: cultural internationalism and the mobilization of a transnational advocacy network. Historian Akira Iriye has defined cultural internationalism as ―a variety of activities undertaken to link countries and peoples through the exchange of ideas and persons, through scholarly cooperation, or through efforts at facilitating cross-national understanding.‖6 Due to the repressive nature of

Portuguese colonialism, particularly during the 41 years of the (New State) dictatorship, the liberation movement developed outside of Mozambique and its leaders were forced to marshal foreign assistance to achieve political self-determination in 1975.

This mobilization by the small, elite group of Mozambicans who escaped the oppressive colony is largely an untold story. During the Sixties era, Mozambicans garnered the assistance of a transnational advocacy network that spanned the globe and straddled the

Cold War ideological divide. To serve as both its mobilization and nation-building

William Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); Norrie Macqueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire (London: Longman, 1997). 5 The exceptions are the histories of the significant Scandinavian support for southern Africa published by the Nordic Institute of African Studies. Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa (Uppsala, : Nordic Institute of African Studies, 2000); Tor Sellström, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999); Liberation in Southern Africa: Regional and Swedish Voices: Interviews from Angola, Mozambique, , South Africa, , the Frontline and Sweden (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999). 6 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 3. xvii strategy, FRELIMO developed a socialist program of racial and gender equality that was so enmeshed in the revolutionary zeitgeist of the era that proponents would claim the

Mozambican movement as a vanguard organization. Consequently, FRELIMO was the only African national liberation movement in the 1960s to receive aid from the United

States, the Soviet Union, and the People‘s Republic of China.

Mozambicans‘ waged not only an armed struggle against Portugal, but also a successful cultural and rhetorical battle that enabled FRELIMO to sustain its 10-year guerilla war of attrition while initiating its nation-building project. In order to craft their own national identity, both domestically and internationally, Mozambicans refuted the prevalent myth that Portuguese colonialism in Africa had existed for 450 years, was non- racist, and was destined to ―civilize‖ the indigenous population.

In addition to its fervent anti- that allied it ideologically with other

European powers and the U.S., Portugal fought to retain its own identity as a powerful imperial nation by reinforcing the longstanding myth with the theory of luso-tropicalism.

This philosophy by Brazilian anthropologist Gilberto Freyre posited that Portugal‘s

Moorish past was the root of its non-racialism and placed it in the vanguard of a new multicultural global society. In order to dismantle colonial rule, FRELIMO and its international allies had to first destroy this myth.7

To do so, Mozambican nationalists and their allies created an alternative territorial history portraying black Mozambican resistance to colonial oppression. Despite vast differences of ethnicity, language, religion, and class, the shared experience of oppression

7 Regarding the legacy of the myth of Portuguese non-racialism and its impact on post-colonial studies, see Tony Simoes da Silva, ―Raced Encounters, Sexed Transactions: ‗Luso-tropicalism‘ and the Portuguese Colonial Empire.,‖ Pretexts: Literary & Cultural Studies 11, no. 1 (July 2002): 27-39. xviii and struggle became a basis for the imagined Mozambican community. This new national history was published in newsletters, journals, and books. It was also discussed at conferences, in African Studies programs, and before the United Nations. Counterpoised were writings of the Portuguese right-wing corporative dictatorship that espoused its luso-tropical civilizing mission for its African ―overseas provinces,‖ as well as the white supremacist regimes of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa that militarily and economically dominated southern Africa.

Helping to shape the Mozambicans‘ rhetoric were other African nationalists who, throughout the Cold War period, attended conferences with anti-colonial leaders from around the globe. They discussed and debated the issues of nation-building, international and regional cooperation, economic development, world peace in the nuclear age, and their political status within the context of an international system dominated by the

United States and Soviet Union. Although most scholars have focused on the political implications of these conferences, it should be noted that these Third World actors also stressed cultural and moral issues. These human rights issues served as the glue that held together unlikely alliances among the diverse conferees. These nationalists, in denouncing imperialism and capitalism, strove to craft the humanist moral standards that could define progress in the evolving order.

Among the network of progressive advocates of Mozambican liberation was also a diverse group of Americans. These American activists are highlighted because of the

United States‘ leadership position in the international system following World War II and the United Nations‘ role as the forum of international contention between Portugal and

xix supporters of Mozambican self-determination. In addition, the powerful synergies between the Mozambican liberation movement and the domestic black freedom struggle in the United States allow for exploration of the local impact of the transnational anti- colonial advocacy.

This text traces the international movement and exchange of actors needed to affect domestic changes within both Mozambique and the United States. The

Mozambican and African American actors also used their dual cultural understanding to redefine their socio-political position vis-à-vis the West. Thus, the study expands the recent scholarship that situates the Civil Rights Movement in its global context. It shows the mutually supportive relationship between Africans and African Americans during the second half of the 20th century. In so doing, the work bridges the histories of black internationalism from 1935-1960 and the era, traditionally considered the decade of 1966-1976.

The writings of such historians as Penny Von Eschen, James Meriwether, Brenda

Gayle Plummer, and Carol Anderson have shown that U.S. government red-baiting severely damaged the black internationalism of the 1930s and 1940s. This internationalism promoted solidarity among oppressed people of color around the world and black members of academic, civil rights, labor, and religious organizations in the

United States.8 The strident demands for human rights associated with black radicals

8 Carol Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Penny M Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism,1937-1957 (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1997); James Hunter Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935-1961, The John Hope Franklin series in African American history and culture (Chapel Hill [N.C.]: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill, [N.C.]: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Window on Freedom: xx were cut off as such influential civil rights organizations as the NAACP shed their radical membership in order to negotiate with the federal government for domestic political reforms.

Although the repressiveness of the Cold War era destroyed such organizations as the Council of African Affairs (CAA) and National Negro Congress (NNC) which had placed the domestic black freedom struggle in an international context, this transnational perspective persisted. Such influential members of these organizations as labor and former NNC leader A. Philip Randolph and Rayford Logan, of the CAA and Pan-African

Congress Association, continued their advocacy for black self-determination as members of the multicultural American Committee on Africa (ACOA).

The investigation of this continuity begins with the ideological underpinnings of the relationship between the United States and Mozambique which, since the interwar years, was founded upon Americans‘ understanding of the ancestral relationship between

Africans and African Americans. Although Mozambique lies on the Indian Ocean,

African American engagement with the African anti-colonial movement can be traced to the legacy of slavery that has been explored under the rubric of the Black Atlantic. As suggested by Paul Gilroy in his iconic text, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double

Consciousness, the dual nature of such diasporic subjects as Mondlane and Van Lierop allowed them to survive between the places and cultures they encountered in their pursuit

Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). xxi of Mozambican independence from Portuguese colonial rule.9 Through this diasporic lens our perception of Africans in America, whether sojourners or citizens, expands from that of helpless victims of oppression to one of transnational subjects whose middle passages contribute to a national and global cultural hybridity.

This contribution by diasporic actors was intentional and purposeful. In

September 1970, the second president of the Mozambique Liberation Front, Samora

Machel, expressed such purpose in a speech regarding FRELIMO‘s dedication to education. He stated that this education ―ought to give us a Mozambican personality which feels no subservience, which assumes our reality, and which is able, in contact with the outside world, to assimilate critically the ideas and experiences of other peoples, in turn giving them the fruit of our reflection and experience.‖10 FRELIMO strove simultaneously to create a national, regional, and global culture of social justice and racial equality.

In waging its battle for independence, the Mozambican movement contributed significantly to the history of southern Africa. Long before the formation of the Frontline

States alliance of Angola, , Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe in

1980, African leaders understood that the key to achieving majority rule in southern

Africa was first supporting independence in Mozambique and Angola. This strategy was formalized at a summit conference of fourteen East and Central African states in ,

Zambia in April 1969. All conferees, except , agreed to support southern African

9 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993); James T Campbell, Middle Passages: African American Journeys to Africa, 1787- 2005, The Penguin history of American life (New York: Penguin Press, 2006). 10 The Mozambique Institute, Mozambique and the Mozambique Institute (, 1972), 2. xxii liberation beginning with the lusophone states, followed by Southern Rhodesia (later,

Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (later, Namibia), and culminating in a non-violent confrontation with the militarily superior South Africa.11 It was even earlier, in 1962, that the Conference of Nationalist Organizations from the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) first articulated that Mozambique was a buffer against the possible spread of the South

African apartheid culture, and the potential for an independent Mozambique to support the nationalist movements in such white supremacist territories as Rhodesia and South

Africa.12

During this Cold War period, issues of social justice and racial equality dovetailed with nationalism and national security within this complex discourse regarding the anti- colonial/anti-apartheid struggles in southern Africa. This is particularly true regarding

Mozambican and American advocates‘ appeal to and contention with the United States government. To explore this complexity, this work contrasts U.S. foreign policy regarding southern Africa and Portugal during the Kennedy and Nixon administrations.

Scholarship regarding the United States‘ involvement with southern Africa by such noted scholars as Thomas Borstelmann, Piero Gliejeses and Thomas Noer focuses primarily on the conflicts in Angola and South Africa that reveal how racial solidarity and national security interests shaped U.S. foreign policy more than human rights considerations

11 N. M. Shamuyarira, ―The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa: Full Commentary on the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969,‖ African Review 1, no. 1 (1971): 67-79. 12 CONCP, ―To the Nationalists of Mozambique,‖ in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, eds., The African Liberation Reader, vol. 1 (London: Zed Press, 1982), 116-117. xxiii during the Cold War.13 This discussion of the United States‘ relationship with FRELIMO complicates this perspective.

The issue of lusophone Africa placed the Kennedy administration between the proverbial immovable object – its NATO ally, Portugal – and the perceived irresistible force of decolonization. Due to its liberal ideology and the personal relationships that

Eduardo Mondlane developed with policymakers, the Kennedy administration used overt programs to provide covert support to FRELIMO.14 This aid included educational programs funded by the State Department, USAID, and foundations, as well as funding from the CIA channeled through private organizations and individuals. Although this aid was small relative to the cointinuing, though diminished, economic aid to Portugal, the administration‘s initial financial investment allowed FRELIMO to establish an educational and healthcare facility which enabled the nationalist front to simultaneously fight a guerilla war and begin its nation-building project over the decade of armed struggle.

This aid damaged the administration‘s diplomatic relationship with the Salazar regime in Portugal. Kennedy weighed his anti-colonial position against the United

States‘ crucial need for the military bases in Portugal‘s Islands. That the Azores

13 Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid‘s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, Envisioning (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Thomas J Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Africa, 1948-1968 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985). 14 Martin Staniland, American Intellectuals and African Nationalists, 1955-1970 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 20 and 68-69; Edward H Berman, The Ideology of Philanthropy: The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983); Evelyn Jones Rich, ―United States Government-Sponsored Higher Education Programs for Africans: 1957-1970 with Special Attention to the Role of the African-American Institute‖ (Dissertation, New York: , 1978). xxiv were needed in support of the 1961 Berlin crisis, 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and the then ongoing crisis in the former brought the liberation struggles in the lusophone African territories momentarily to the center of the global Cold War.

President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and the

Nixon administration‘s ―tilt‖ toward the white supremacist regimes in southern Africa brought an end to both overt and covert support of southern African liberation movements. This shift, as well as the continuing U.S. fighting in and a reinvigorated Pan-Africanism within the black community, prompted a more radical, militant anti-colonial/anti-apartheid advocacy.

Although there have been discreet studies of the Mozambican liberation movement, U.S. foreign policy regarding southern Africa, and activism during the 1960s, there have been few texts that chronicle and analyze the transnational anti-colonial/anti- apartheid network that supported Mozambican liberation. This study explores the diverse viewpoints regarding Mozambican liberation of organizations and actors in Portugal, the

United States, and Mozambique. Its purpose is to highlight the cultural, political, diplomatic, and rhetorical battle over the sovereignty of Mozambique which begins in the interwar years, with the rise of the right-wing dictatorship of Portuguese Prime Minister

António de Oliveira Salazar and escalates with the anti-colonial movement following

World War II. Because Portugal‘s intransigence is at the center of the Mozambican liberation struggle, this conversation begins in Chapter One with an examination of the roots and nature of Portuguese imperialism.

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Chapters Two and Three introduce the early intersection of a nascent

Mozambican nationalism and the black freedom struggle in the United States. Chapter

Two shows the emergence of Mozambican nationalism in the early 20th century, and its first appeal for global support through the 1921 and 1923 Pan-African Congresses. From this early appeal, Pan-African solidarity became a hallmark of this movement and

Portugal‘s forced labor regimen and lack of educational opportunities for black

Mozambicans became the target of the transnational network of Mozambican liberation advocacy.

Chapter Three provides a biographical sketch of Mondlane who, for over a decade in the United States, inspired the development of the American node of the transnational advocacy network. By his mere existence in the United States as an educated and cultured Mozambican who denied being Portuguese, Mondlane defied the Portuguese myth of cultural superiority. As a result, beginning in the early 1950s, there were two

Mozambiques – a Portuguese East Africa that Portugal claimed to be an and the emerging Mozambique that, for much of the world over the next two decades, was Eduardo Mondlane.

The second half of the study depicts the international context of the Mozambican liberation movement through the long Sixties. It examines the efforts of the transnational network of activists to influence the foreign policy of the Kennedy through Nixon administrations. The federal government, alternately, strove to balance the United States‘ creed supporting self-determination and its national security considerations in its foreign policy toward Portugal and the lusophone African colonies.

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Chapter Four explores how Kennedy used the issue of African independence to gain much needed political support from the African American community without alienating Southern Democrats. The liberals in the administration worked with activists to assist southern African nationalists because of their fear of Communist subversion, their belief that self-government was an inherent right, and their understanding that the

United States had a responsibility to shepherd the development of the global South.

Chapters Five and Six drill down to the interplay between the Mozambican liberation movement and domestic U.S. activism. Using social movement theory, these chapters highlight the advocacy of the American Committee on Africa and affiliated organizations that began supporting African liberation in the early 1950s. The ACOA was nearly ubiquitous in its support of African liberation, creating coalitions with a multitude of disparate organizations – from religious and human rights organizations to student and black freedom movement groups to political, educational and cultural societies. The chapters trace the changes in its advocacy which follows an arc of contention similar to the domestic black freedom struggle. The ACOA shifted through the 1960s from liberal multicultural support for non-violent decolonization on the continent to radical protests against the federal government and multinational corporations. The discussion of black leftists in Chapter Six focuses specifically on the work of two ACOA members, Robert Van Lieorp and Prexy Nesbitt, as representative of the black internationalists who supported Mozambican liberation. These case studies show the shift of the arena of contention by Afro-Americans from the federal government to Congress and from political to socioeconomic pressure. They elucidate points of

xxvii continuity and division within the black freedom struggle. They also show that the relationship between Africans and Afro-Americans in the new international Pan-African movement was inverted from that of the first five Pan-African Congresses – Afro-

Americans were now using the African liberation movements as models for their own contestation.

The lack of historical research regarding the transnational network of activists who supported Mozambique liberation – including liberal policymakers, religious and secular human rights advocates, Pan-Africanists, and radicals – is a gap in the scholarship regarding the global Cold War. This study only begins to fill that gap. It is essentially a biographical sketch of the transnational movement that traces the ways that an emerging

Mozambique affected and was shaped by the Cold War from its beginnings in the wake of World War I through Mozambican independence in 1975.

xxviii

CHAPTER ONE: PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM IN MOZAMBIQUE: MYTH AND REALITY

A perfect expression of our national consciousness, and a close affirmation of the colonizing temperament of the Portuguese [is designed] for the aggrandizement of Portugal … and to make clear to the rest of our position as a great colonial power. 1

-- António de Oliveira Salazar regarding the Colonial Act of 1930 --

In the early months of 1960, the so-called ―Year of Africa,‖ cooperative laborers in northern Mozambique participated in small, isolated labor strikes to protest forced labor and price fixing by the Portuguese government. Although these strikes were generally uncoordinated, some strike organizers were members of a fledgling nationalist organization, the Mozambique Makonde Union. On 14 , Portuguese administrators sent policemen to invite villagers to address their complaints directly to the provincial governor, luring suspected agitators to a meeting in the village of Mueda in the Cabo Delgado province. The governor had prepared for this meeting by hiding a company of troops outside of the administrative building where hundreds of petitioners would be waiting. After a pretense of hearing the petitions of some of their leaders, the governor attempted to arrest suspected agitators. When the demonstrators resisted the arrests, the governor ordered the troops to fire on the assembly, reportedly killing over five hundred people.2

The Mueda Massacre, like the Sharpeville Massacre that had taken place in neighboring South Africa two months earlier, signaled both Blacks in southern Africa

1 Adrian Hastings, Wiriyamu: My Lai in Mozambique (Maryknoll, N. Y: Orbis Books, 1974), 17. 2 Eduardo. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), 117-118. 1 and the international community that the white minority governments would violently defend whites‘ dominance of the region. This differed sharply from the events across the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. By the date of the massacre in Mozambique, three sub-

Saharan countries had already been granted their independence by Britain and , and sixteen others were expected to achieve majority rule by the end of the year. By

September 1964 when the armed struggle in Mozambique began, Africans in the colonies of Great Britain, France, and Belgium had won their independence. Of the European imperial powers, Portugal alone held tenaciously to its African possessions.

Most studies of the nationalist struggles in the lusophone territories attribute the

Portuguese intransigence largely to economic factors. Although some scholars mention briefly Portuguese use of the civilizing mission to justify its colonialism, few give the cultural argument the centrality that was attributed to it by the Portuguese elites themselves. Taking into account such quotes by António de Oliveira Salazar as the one which opens this chapter, this study contends that the most compelling reason for

Portuguese intransigence was Portuguese nationalism.3 It demonstrates why

Mozambican nationalists and their global allies waged a rhetorical battle against the

Portuguese myth portraying black Mozambicans as uncivilized savages. The Portuguese civilizing myth erased the culture, history, and humanity of the peoples indigenous to the territory that would become Portuguese East Africa, now known as Mozambique.

3 One previous study which does prioritize the cultural argument is Thomas Henriksen, ―Portugal in Africa: A Noneconomic Interpretation,‖ African Studies Review 16, no. 3 (December 1973): 405-416. For a study regarding the role of culture in French resistance to Algerian independence, see Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France, 2nd ed. (Cornell University Press, 2008). 2

Therefore, the revolutionary work of Africans and their American allies was to restore the history, culture and humanity of black Mozambicans and to belie the Portuguese myth.

The longevity of its colonial empire and its "civilizing mission" were part of

Portugal‘s national identity. This was especially true during the Estado Novo (New

State), the corporative dictatorship that lasted over forty years (1932-1974). The two

New State prime ministers, António de Oliveira Salazar (1932-1968) and his successor,

Marcelo Caetano (1968-1974), insisted that the African territories were not colonies at all, but ―overseas provinces,‖ integral parts of Portugal. Yet the Portuguese government denied the basic civil rights to the black African majority.4 It is unsurprising that lusophone Africans engaged in over a decade of armed combat which only ended with the overthrow of the New State regime in 1974.

Underpinning Portuguese intransigence were two major factors: 1) a nationalist myth that characterized its colonial empire as egalitarian and non-racial, lasting nearly five centuries; and, 2) Portuguese economic underdevelopment. As a result of these factors,

Portugal was in a double bind. As one of the poorest countries in Europe, Portugal needed the revenue and resources from its colonies. More significant to this study is the fact that Portugal‘s economic underdevelopment made it difficult for the country to sustain its imperial mission without substantial investment by other countries. In order to maintain its nationalist and imperial myth, Portugal wove an intricate web of economic entanglements – at home, primarily with Great Britain; and, in Africa, with Britain, South

4 The designation of the Portuguese territories as ―overseas provinces‖ in 1951 was likely prompted by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru‘s efforts to annex the Portuguese territory of after Indian independence. India successfully annexed Goa in December 1961. 3

Africa, and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). These factors contributed to the unique and inhumane character of Portuguese colonialism, as well as its persistence.

The myth of Portuguese non-racialism which professed a cultural, not racial, superiority over the colonized subjects is significant. It was part of the prevalent

―civilizing mission‖ rhetoric throughout the colonial period in Africa. Although early 20th century black and mixed-race elites sought to reform the institutions of white dominance by first adopting Western cultural norms, following World War I black nationalists rejected and contested this rhetoric throughout the .5 Black intellectuals have asserted that cultural domination may be the most essential element of imperialism.6

Mozambican scholar Aquino de Bragança and American historian/sociologist Immanuel

Wallerstein point out that by the mid-1960s few people agreed with the political and economic justifications for colonial rule. They state that the colonial ―argument that was always most effective was the cultural one – the conqueror as the bearer of .‖7

This argument was not only effective with supporters of colonialism, but also with the colonized who came to doubt their own worth as a result of the colonial conquest.8 There were elements of this ―civilizing mission‖ in all Western imperialism, especially that of

5 For more regarding the Afro-Asian contestation of the civilizing mission during the late 19th and early 20th century, see Michael Adas, ―Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission,‖ in Christopher J. Lee, ed., Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives, 1st ed. (Ohio University Press, 2010). 6 Amílcar Cabral, ―National Liberation and Culture,‖ in J. Ayo Langley, Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa (Rowman & Littlefield (Non NBN), 1979), 703-721; Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000); , Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays, New Evergreen ed. (New York: Grove Press, 1988), 31-44. 7 Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds. Bragança and Wallerstein, The African Liberation Reader, 1:138. 8 Fanon, Toward the African Revolution, 35. 4 the French who coined the term.9 Unlike others, however, Portugal used its Moorish past to assert that its claim of cultural superiority was not racist in nature. Because Portugal used this myth of cultural superiority to justify the political and economic dominance of its colonial subjects, Mozambican nationalists and their international allies engaged in a cultural, as well as political and military, battle for over a decade.

In order to provide foundational information for comprehending the clash of worldviews represented by the liberation struggles in southern Africa during the later part of the 20th century, this chapter begins with the mythic cultural representation of

Portuguese imperialism in East Africa through the 15th century epic poem, Os Lusíadas

(The Lusíads). The values represented in this epic reflect the objectives of the Portuguese

―civilizing mission.‖ In the 1930s, as Salazar was consolidating his authoritarian regime, world renowned Brazilian cultural anthropologist and sociologist Gilberto de Mello

Freyre was articulating the theory of Luso-tropicalism. In this theory, Freyre advanced the case for the enduring Portuguese identity as being one of a modern, Catholic,

European imperial power. This theory lauds Portugal‘s multicultural historical legacy and completes the myth regarding the nature of Portuguese colonialism by attributing to it a benign, non-racial character. This perception of Portuguese colonialism was shared by most of the international community until the global conflicts and communications revolutions of the 20th century prompted greater interest and provided opportunities to investigate the African colonies.

9 See Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 5

Many Africans and Western scholars have created alternative histories that assisted the Mozambican national liberation project.10 During the 1960s and early 1970s, these advocates continued the work of earlier anthropologists and Africanists who refuted the myth surrounding European imperialism and colonialism by restoring the history of the southern African , peoples, and cultures. These scholars proved that although Vasco da Gama landed in East Africa in the late 15th century, the Portuguese presence was limited to a few coastal forts and inland slave farms until the late 19th century. Significantly, this work shows how such Bantu peoples as the Shona and Nguni continued both armed and non-violent resistance to colonialism until the region was

―pacified‖ in 1920.

This chapter examines the history of oppression -- slavery, land alienation, and a forced and migratory labor regime -- and resistance of the peoples of Mozambique. It shows the Portuguese government‘s efforts to administer its colony through inefficient and oppressive modifications of the British system of indirect rule and French policies of assimilation. These efforts significantly delayed the development of Mozambican nationalist consciousness.11

10 Perry Anderson, ―Portugal and the End of Ultracolonialism - Part 2,‖ New Left Review I/16 (August 1982): 88-123; Allen F Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique (Berkeley: University of Califonia Press, 1976); Raúl Bernardo Manuel Honwana, The Life History of Raúl Honwana: An Inside View of Mozambique from Colonialism to Independence, 1905-1975 (Boulder, Co: L. Rienner, 1988); Douglas L. Wheeler, ―Gungunyane the Negotiator: A Study in African Diplomacy,‖ The Journal of African History 9, no. 4 (1968): 585-602; Basil Davidson, African Genius Social & Cultural History (UNSPECIFIED VENDOR, 1969); Basil Davidson, East and Central Africa to the Late Nineteenth Century (Prentice Hall Press, 1968); by Basil Davidson, Africa in History, 2nd Printing 1969 ed. (Macmillan Company, 1969); Basil Davidson, The Lost Cities of Africa (Little, Brown, 1959). 11 Newitt, Portugal in Africa, 95. Newitt stresses the point that Africans were not simply objects to be manipulated by Portuguese colonial policies. He points out that Portuguese policies were unevenly administered throughout the territory, so that there were some Africans who were not adversely affected. Others, he notes, were complicit with the policies and acted in their own self-interest. While these are important points, Newitt also confirms the perspective stressed in this chapter, that ―There was never any 6

As a result of the colonial oppression and economic interdependence of

Portuguese East Africa with the neighboring white supremacist regimes, Mozambican nationalists began their organized opposition to Portuguese imperialism largely outside of the territory. The chapters that follow explore the ways that these Mozambicans engaged global advocacy to help topple Portuguese colonialism.

Imperialism, Luso-tropicalism and the Myth about Portuguese Colonialism

Kings likewise of glorious memory Who magnified Christ and Empire, Bringing ruin on the degenerate Lands of Africa and Asia … -- Os Lusíadas, Canto One –12

The enduring myth regarding Portuguese imperial power was first established in Luís

Vaz de Camões‘ classic epic, Os Lusíadas (The Lusíads), first printed in 1572.13 The narration of this Homeric epic glorifying 15th-16th century Portuguese navigation begins with a speech by Jupiter that lauds the Lusus (Portuguese) as a people destined for greatness because of both their historic victories over the and Castilians and their

"discovery" of the new lands and peoples in Africa and Asia. Camões portrays the

Portuguese navigator, Vasco da Gama, as an Odysseus-like mariner whose voyages down the west coast of Africa, around the Cape of Good Hope, and on to India are ordained by

Jupiter, supported by Venus, but opposed by Bacchus. Camões, the first renowned statement of, or commitment to, the paramountcy of African interests, as there was in British Africa. Instead the aim was to integrate the Africans with Portuguese society, making them Catholic, Portuguese in nature, and part of a wage-earning, market-oriented economy.‖ (100) 12 Luís de Camões, The Lusíads, trans. Landeg White (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3. 13 Josiah Blackmore, Moorings: Portuguese Expansion and the Writing of Africa (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), xix. Blackmore describes Os Lusíadas as ―Portugal‘s most developed expression of the ideologies of empire that resides at the heart of the country‘s literary and cultural canons and of its identity as a voyaging, seafaring nation.‖ 7

European artist to travel south of the equator, completed this poem while on his own voyage to Goa in 1553-1570, including time spent in Mozambique. Goa, a territory on the Indian subcontinent, was at the heart of a trading system spanning the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. Camões‘ voyage ended just a decade before

Portugal fell under the rule of following King Sebastiáo‘s defeat at Alcácer-Kebir in in August 1578. The poem is, in a sense, an elegy for the Portuguese Golden

Age, just as Salazar‘s adoption of this national poem as propaganda in support of the imperialism of his own regime preceded the end of the Portuguese colonial empire.14

A brief analysis of this 16th century epic of the so-called New Age will show how the poem reflects cultural elements of the Portuguese imperialism that endured through

1975 and the end of the New State regime of Salazar and Caetano. The quote from the second verse of The Lusíads that opens this section of the chapter shows how Camões depicted Vasco da Gama‘s voyage as both an economic venture for trade with the Indies and a civilizing mission -- that is, a Christianizing mission. Although the historic voyage

(and the Portuguese history glorified by da Gama throughout the epic) is embedded in a framework of Roman mythology, The Lusíads is, at its heart, a story of the clash between the established Islamic empire and the encroaching Christians in Africa and Asia. Early commentary on the epic went so far as to equate Jupiter with the Christian God, Venus with a guardian angel (in her aspect of Venus Felix) or the Virgin Mary (in her aspect of

Venus Verticordia), and Bacchus with Satan.15 That the poem was not censored by the

14 Camões, The Lusíads, ix, xxv-xxvi. 15 Venus Felix is the Roman goddess of good fortune and Venus Verticordia is the protector of women‘s chastity. Camões was inspired in his choice of Venus as the patron of the Portuguese (unlike Homer‘s choice of Athena), since she is also the mother of Aeneas, Virgil‘s hero of the Aeneid, as well as Venus 8

Portuguese Inquisition (1540-1821) is proof of its Catholic merit. Yet, the pagan framework cannot be dismissed, because it had its own epistemological purpose.

Scholarship regarding The Lusíads points out Camões‘ use of Roman mythology in tribute to Homer and Virgil and the poem‘s justification of Portuguese imperialism, but it is more. During the period of its composition, the Portuguese were developing a stronger allegiance to nation, no longer only to a monarch or the Church. Camões‘ poem places the fledgling Portuguese nation securely in Europe, celebrating Portugal‘s Western cultural heritage and denouncing its Moorish roots. Of interest is translator Landeg

White‘s note that Camões, in Cantos 3 to 5, moves the reader ―as in no other Renaissance poem from the world of religion to the world of science.‖16 Ironically, the world of science is represented through Vasco da Gama‘s use of the astrolabe, an innovation mastered by Islamic Spain (Andalusia). Thus, with The Lusíads, Camões is doing very heavy lifting. He not only associates Portugal with the greatness of the Roman and Greek empires, but shows the Portuguese that they have surpassed both through Catholicism and modernity. By pitting his heroes against the Moors (Camões does not clearly differentiate among the Muslims in East Africa, North Africa, or Southeast Asia), he is able to appropriate the intellectual and scientific advances of Islam in medieval Europe while also lauding the religious and military advances of 16th century Europe. He boldly declares Portugal‘s manifest destiny to rule the new worlds discovered by da Gama, those

―degenerate lands of Africa and Asia,‖ and in so doing, coalesces Portuguese

Victrix, the goddess of victory in war. He reinforced his cultural message through his choice of Bacchus as the oppositional god of the East because, although one of the twelve gods of the Roman pantheon, Bacchus was a foreign god and associated with hedonism. 16 Camões, The Lusíads, xi. 9 nationalism, imperialism, and Catholicism. Thus, for early Portuguese nationalists and, later Portuguese elites, its imperial mission was an integral part of Portugal‘s national identity.

The conviction that the Portuguese were destined to create an egalitarian, non- racial global society was renewed in the 20th century through the theory of Luso- tropicalism espoused in the 1930s by Gilberto de Mello Freyre. That Freyre attended some of the most prestigious educational institutions in the world, studied with the most prominent cultural anthropologists of his time, and was a renowned scholar in his own right supported the rapid global acceptance of his theory. Freyre, born in in 1900, received his undergraduate degree from Baylor University and his M.A. from Columbia

University where he studied under Franz Boas, Franklin Henry Giddings, Carleton J.H.

Hayes, and Edwin R.A. Seligman. He then continued his studies at Oxford University and the Sorbonne. Upon his return to Brazil, Freyre pioneered the and social departments at the University of Rio de Janeiro (later, the National

University of Brazil).

Through the 1930s-1940s, Freyre became an international authority on Brazilian history, sociology, , and race relations. Freyre was nominated for the Nobel Prize for Literature (1948) and suggested for the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on race relations. He also served in the United Nations, first as a member of

UNESCO and then, in 1949, as a Brazilian delegate to the General Assembly and a member of the Committee on Cultural and Social Matters. In 1954, the United Nations requested that he, as a leading authority on anthropology, write a report on race relations

10 in the Union of South Africa in comparison with that of Brazil, Latin America, and the

United States. As a result of his academic and political work around the world, Freyre‘s theory of Luso-tropicalism, now generally discredited, was respected not only in Brazil and Portugal, but also globally.17

Freyre postulated that the Portuguese were leaders who, as a result of their historical legacy of racial intermixing with the Moors, were destined to establish a non- racial, equitable global society. In his iconic text regarding 15th and 16th century

Portuguese colonialism in Brazil, Casa-Grande & Senzala, first published in 1933,

Freyre claimed that the Portuguese were the least cruel and most successful imperialists because they fraternized with the natives and African slaves ―with no absolute ideals, with no unyielding prejudices.‖ He continued to explain that this lack of prejudice, coupled with the small number of colonizers and lack of Portuguese women among them, led to ―a voluptuous contact with the exotic woman‖ and .18 Freyre further discussed the resulting social regression of the colonizers and subsequent development of a feudal then aristocratic society. Significantly, for Freyre, miscegenation was the key element that qualified the Portuguese for leadership of a non-racial society, particularly in

17 Gilberto Freyre and American Council of Learned Societies, The Masters and the Slaves (Casa-Grande & Senzala) a Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1956), iv-x; David Cleary, Race, Nationalism, and Social Theory in Brazil: Rethinking GIlberto Freyre, Working paper, Transnational Programme of the Economic and Social Research Council (Oxford: University of Oxford, n.d.), 8-12, http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/cleary.pdf. 18 The cruel nature of this ―voluptuous contact,‖ which was in many cases forced upon indigenous and African women must be mentioned, although an analysis of this relationship is beyond the scope of this study. For primary documents detailing Brazilian slave women used as prostitutes and wet nurses, and the exploitation of slave women by their masters, see Robert Edgar Conrad, Children of God‘s Fire: A Documentary History of Black Slavery in Brazil (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1983), 129- 139 and 174-178. For information regarding the enduring impact of the concept of Luso-tropicalism in post-colonial studies, see Tony Simoes da Silva, ―Raced Encounters, Sexed Transactions: ‗Luso- tropicalism‘ and the Portuguese Colonial Empire,‖ Pretexts: Literary & Cultural Studies 11:1 (2002): 27- 39. 11 comparison with the British and their colonies (including the United States and South

Africa) which had inherited a Puritanism that inhibited racial mixing.

For Freyre, it is the mestiços, or mixed race descendants of the Portuguese colonials who would engender the non-racial society. Freyre lauds mestiços‘ syncretism, the ability to integrate the strengths of different cultures and, subsequently, surpass their progenitors. He includes the Portuguese, who he suggests are of mixed race. This point is significant because, when the theory was adopted by Portuguese Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar in defense of Lusitanian colonialism, Salazar elided the importance of miscegenation, steering closer to Camões in heralding Portugal as a modern European

(e.g., white) nation.19 In Southern Africa, this attitude, as well as economic need and a common, fervent anti-communism, led Salazar to increase the interconnection and interdependence of Mozambique with the white-supremacist nations of South Africa and

Southern Rhodesia.20

Salazar initially objected to Freyre‘s hypothesis, because, although glorifying the colonizers of the 15th and 16th century as in The Lusíads, Freyre disparaged the more contemporaneous Portuguese colonial whose ―economic realism [had] rounded out into

19 William Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 13-14; Freyre and American Council of Learned Societies, The Masters and the Slaves (Casa-Grande & Senzala) a Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization, 186; David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the NewWorld (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Children of God‘s Fire; Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West, 13-14. Freyre‘s hypothesis, which concentrated on northern Brazil and domestic slavery, has been disputed by historians such as David Brion Davis and Robert Edgar Conrad. See David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) and Robert Edgar Conrad, Children of God's Fire: A Documentary History of Black Slavery in Brazil (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1983). 20 Salazar did this despite his fear that the South Africans wished to annex Mozambique and his disdain for apartheid. For more, see Paulo Corriea and Grietjie Verhoef, ―Portugal and South Africa: Close Allies or Unwilling Partners in Southern Africa during the Cold War?,‖ Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 37, no. 1 (2009): 50-72. 12 mercantilism, avarice, a crude materialization of all of life‘s values.‖21 Moreover, Salazar opposed miscegenation and understood that Freyre‘s portrayal of Portuguese colonial interracial relationships bore little resemblance to the situation in Mozambique in the 20th century. By the 1890s, when the Portuguese began to consolidate their power in

Mozambique, such colonial administrators as António Enes (1894-95), Mousínho de

Albuquerque (1895), Henrique Mitchell de Paiva Couceiro, and Eduardo Ferreira da

Costa (1896) were adamantly opposed to miscegenation which they perceived as undermining Portuguese efforts to establish colonial authority.22

In 1952, in order to educate Freyre about the state of colonialism in Portuguese

Africa, Salazar invited him to tour Portugal‘s African possessions. Freyre, like other visitors to Mozambique, was convinced of Portuguese non-racialism by the lack of racial tension perceived by observers. Following the tour, he reasserted his theory of luso- tropicalism, disappointing supporters of African liberation. These included a small group of American academics and religious advocates who had begun to dispute the enduring construction of Africa as the ―Dark Continent‖ and Africans as uncivilized.

Anthropologist Marvin Harris, in his 1958 study of colonialism in Mozambique,

Portugal‘s African ―Wards‖: A First-Hand Report on Labor and Education in

Moçambique, contested Freyre‘s theory. He detailed reasons that visitors to Mozambique could be misled by the Portuguese claim of racial harmony.

21 Freyre and American Council of Learned Societies, The Masters and the Slaves (Casa-Grande & Senzala) a Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization, 186. 22 David M. Abshire, ―The Portuguese Racial Legacy,‖ in David M Abshire and Michael A Samuels, eds., Portuguese Africa: a Handbook (New York: Praeger, 1969), 102. 13

Harris wrote that censorship, the secret police, and severe punishments including beatings and deportation, were effective methods used by the Portuguese for controlling the African population. Although Portuguese administrators practiced their own system of segregation similar to that in the United States and Union of South Africa, he asserted, it was unnecessary to post signs designating ―White‖ or ―Non-White‖ because legal and economic barriers had effectively segregated public spaces. Harris used an example of the price of a bus ride in Lourenço Marques which was unaffordable to the average

African, costing a quarter of his/her daily wage, that would resonate with Americans two years after the 1955 had successfully challenged the practice of racial segregation of public transportation in the American South. Also familiar to

American audiences were his examples of the zoning laws and rents that codified residential segregation, and a 9:00 curfew for Africans that assured the safety of Whites at night.

Harris‘ report further suggested that had Freyre had the opportunity to speak with local Africans, fear of reprisals by the Portuguese administrators would have prevented them from complaining of mistreatment. Freyre‘s tour did not, however, include the rural areas inhabited by forced laborers or the mines where black Mozambicans were subjected to long hours, dangerous work, and inhumane living conditions. The colonial administrators showed Freyre the urban spaces of Lourenço Marques where Blacks labored at the same menial tasks performed by Blacks in cities around the world.23

23 Bragança and Wallerstein, The African Liberation Reader, 1:149; Marvin Harris, Portugal‘s African Wards; a First-Hand Report on Labor and Education in Mozcambique, Africa Today Pamphlets 2 (New York: American Committee on Africa, 1958), 4. 14

Clues explaining Freyre‘s surprising approval of Portugal‘s colonialism in Africa may also be found in his paper presented in June, 1965 at the University of Sussex. In this paper, entitled ―The Racial Factor in Contemporary Politics,‖ Freyre described the growing political power of peoples of color and expands on his theory regarding the role of mestiços in engendering a non-racial society through their ―meta-racial‖ consciousness and their roles as bridges between the former white colonizers and the colonized.

Importantly, Freyre began his argument with issues that underpinned the fears of white policymakers throughout the world with regard to the liberation of Afro-Asian nations and self-determination for peoples of color: the ―de-whitenization‖ of most of the world and threat of a global race war. In regards to the former, Freyre cited the ―rising tide of colour;‖ that is, the rapid relative increase in the population of non-white peoples in non-

European territories ―where there was, during the 19th century, through immigration and domination, a considerable increase of Europeans and whites and of their values.‖

Although his argument regarding the possibility of race war was not explicit,

Freyre described the relationship between race and revenge, with particular attention to the ―ethnic groups in Asia and Africa, and also in the United States.‖ He continued, ―For these a new political status – that of national states – in some cases, and the struggle for full citizenship, or for separatism, in other cases – is giving an opportunity for the expression of revenge against past racial tutelage and the former subordination to white groups.‖ Although the paper has liberal elements and reflects Boasian views of cultural

15 , averring that race is socially constructed, not biological, and supporting Afro-

Asian liberation under certain circumstances, Freyre also voiced conservative fears.24

Those opposed to African independence believed that Africans had not been sufficiently ―tutored‖ in European culture and politics. Freyre, in his discussion of positive examples of African liberation movements, made his point more clearly, distinguishing ―areas such as Nigeria and , where Negroes have already revealed a capacity for self-government and for national originality‖ from the more radical and violent political situation in the ex-Belgian Congo. The Brazilian scholar went so far as to use the term ―retour aux sources,‖ associated with the revolutionary leader of the national liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies of Guinea- and Cape

Verde, Amílcar Cabral. He used this term, ―return to the source,‖ to highlight the difference between those leaders of color who promoted an ―exaggerated racial pride‖ and the political leaders who would ―harmonize extremes, using racial, or cultural-racial, pride only, in so far as it may stimulate cultural creativity or political originality.‖ In short, Freyre implied that whether as a result of their lack of sufficient tutelage, a desire for revenge, or exaggerated racial pride, some ethnic groups could ignite a race war. As will be shown in a later chapter regarding United States foreign policy, this was an enduring fear of some whites, particularly in regard to Southern Africa in the 1960s and

1970s.25

As early as his 1952 tour of lusophone Africa, Freyre shared Salazar‘s belief that the ethnic groups there were unprepared for independence. Salazar propagandists took

24 Gilberto Freyre, The Racial Factor in Contemporary Politics (London: published for the Research Unit for the Study ofMulti-Racial Societies at the University of Sussex by MacGibbon & Kee, 1966), 11-15. 25 Ibid. 16 advantage of this opportunity to leverage Freyre‘s international reputation and appropriate aspects of luso-tropicalism in support of Portugal‘s civilizing mission in

Africa. Thus, Camões‘ myth of the glorious 16th century and Freyre‘s updated theory of luso-tropicalism were used by Salazar to bolster both Portuguese nationalism and colonialism during the Estado Novo.

In the wake of the War and during the period of burgeoning Third

World nationalism and anti-colonial fervor, this ideology substantiated Salazar‘s claims to Portuguese East Africa as an extension of Portugal. Following the creation of the

United Nations and its adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in

December 1948, the luso-tropical assertion of Portuguese colonialism became particularly significant. Throughout the period of the armed struggle, such officials as

Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira continuously proclaimed Portuguese respect for human rights over the 450 years of its empire. It mattered little that the territory known as

Portuguese East Africa had not truly come under Portuguese control until the early 20th century; or that slavery, forced labor, and forced cultivation were hallmarks of Portugal‘s

African empire.

African Resistance to Early Portuguese Colonialism

To fully understand the tactics used by the transnational network of activists who supported Mozambican liberation to change world opinion and increase pressure on

Portugal to prepare its colonies for independence, one must first understand the nature of

Portuguese colonialism. As early as the 1920s, human rights organizations, Africans, and people of African descent advocating for colonial reform focused on two pressure points

17

– Portugal‘s forced labor regime and colonial education. In disproving the Portuguese myth of civilizing mission and non-racialism, activists demonstrated both the inhumane nature of colonialism and its racist nature. In support of Mozambican nationalism, they also supported Africans in proving the existence of rich pre-colonial African civilizations, as well as African resistance to the Portuguese invasion and settlement. As will be shown in later chapters, the resulting shared history of oppression and resistance among the

Mozambican peoples helped as a basis for Mozambican nation-building. It also invigorated a resurgence of black nationalism in the United States in the 1960s.

The first Portuguese presence on the southeast coast of Africa occurred with the landing of the navigator, Vasco da Gama, en-route to India in 1498. However, the traders that followed remained on the eastern coast of the territory. Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, the Portuguese conquered the ports and fortresses of Arab-Swahili merchants in order to secure the Portuguese dominance of the sea route to the East Indies and the lucrative spice trade. Ilha de Moçambique became the capital of Portuguese East Africa, which was administered from Goa, the Portuguese possession in India. The Portuguese established a trade network in ivory, gold, and, by the 18th century, slaves.26

Yet, until the late 19th century, the Portuguese controlled only the few ports along a narrow band of coastal area. Colonial administrator Mousínho de Albuquerque described the situation in his book, Moçambique, stating, ―The administrative processes by which our colonies have been governed, or rather, disgraced, may be summed up as conventions and fictions.‖ He went on to describe the fictitious colonial administration

26 See Abdul Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory in : Integration of an East African Commercial Empire into the World Economy, 1770-1873. (London: James Currey, 1987). 18 as ―reserve officers without a reserve; battalions and companies without officers or soldiers; professors without schools and schools without pupils; missions without missionaries; priests without churches and churches without parishioners; even a medical service without doctors …‖27

Significant for Mozambican nationalists and American black cultural nationalists in the 1960‘s is the understanding that Portugal‘s infiltration and eventual control of

Mozambique was not the simple matter of dominance of a superior race or culture over savages implied by The Lusíads. From the 16th-20th centuries, the Portuguese traders, settlers, and conquerors used various tactics to negotiate or fight against such kingdoms as Shona and Gaza. Neither all negotiations nor all battles ended in Portuguese victories.

For example, in 1560, a Catholic mission led by the Jesuit Father Goncalo da Silveira, was sent to Monomotapa to convert the royal family. Suspicions developed after Father da Silveira had baptized the king and his family, and the missionary was tried as a sorcerer and executed. Efforts by the Portuguese military to avenge this murder over the next decade were also repulsed by the Monomotapa, Tonga, and Barue peoples.28

27 Quoted in Hastings, Wiriyamu, 16-17. 28 First, Ruth, Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1983), xxi-xxiii; Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, 13-14; Allen F. Isaacman, ―The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique,‖ Africa Today 22, no. 3 (September 1975): 39; Hastings, Wiriyamu, 15; D. N Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, 900-1850: An Outline of Shona History (New York, N.Y: Holmes & Meier, 1980), 123-126. Scholars have suggested that Camões may have attributed to da Gama‘s voyage the circumstances surrounding the execution of Father da Silveira, which occurred during his own travels to Goa. A note regarding the author of Black Gold: Ruth First was a South African antiapartheid activist, a jailed in August 1963 who went into exile in London following her release. First was married to renowned antiapartheid activist, , the Communist chief of staff of , the armed segment of the African National Congress. First returned to southern Africa as the Director of Research of the Center for African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University in Mozambique and was assassinated there with a letter bomb from the South African security police on 17 August 1982. For more regarding Ruth First and her early anti-apartheid activities, see First, Ruth, 117 Days: An Account of Confinement and Interrogation under the South African 90-Day Detention Law (New York: Penguin Books, 2009 [1965]). 19

Mozambican resistance most often took the forms of armed struggle, tax evasion, and emigration. The armed revolts, including twenty-two recorded in the period of 1878-

1904, were precipitated by anger over forced labor, increased taxation, forced cultivation, sexual abuses, and military conscription.29 Violent resistance by the peoples of the

Zambezi valley in the northern provinces continued to disrupt components of the colonial system until 1920. The history of armed resistance in southern Mozambique produced one of the territory‘s most legendary heroes, (also Gungunyane), ruler of the

Gaza kingdom,.

The Portuguese and Africans lived in relatively peaceful coexistence until the late

19th century. The Portuguese presence in the southern part of Mozambique was limited to a fort and military outposts in the environs of Lourenço Marques. Occasionally, the

Portuguese military garrison was called upon to settle disputes between rival chiefs, and one such dispute led to the final wars of pacification in the south. Enraged by a

Portuguese dispute settlement, Chief Nwa Matibjana and his allies attacked a military post at Hanguana and the fort of Lourenço Marques, hanging the fort commander,

Dionízio Ribeiro. The Portuguese military counterattacked and routed Nwa Matibjana‘s forces. The Portuguese government appointed António Enes as royal commissioner to

Mozambique. To exercise more control over the southern region, Enes moved the colonial capital from Ilha de Moçambique to Lourenço Marques in the south. Mousinho de Albuquerque was appointed governor of that district.

29 Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique, 97-118; A. Adu Boahen, UNESCO General : Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880-1935, vol. VII, Abridged. (University of California Press, 1990), 297-298.. 20

Enes launched a war against the insurgents, Nwa Matibjana and Chief Mahazule, using both Portuguese soldiers and such African allies as chiefs Sigaúle, Ngwanaze, and

Nwa Ngundjuana. Although the insurgents had some tactical success, the superior weaponry of the Portuguese assured their victory. They burned and razed the land, and imposed taxes, leading some chiefs to emigrate into South Africa.

Mahazule and Nwa Matibjana sought asylum with Gungunhana. Gungunhana, who is lauded as a great hero for his battles against the Portuguese from 1895 until 1898, was also known for his ruthlessness in consolidating and maintaining his own empire.

Until the Portuguese demanded that he turn over the insurgent chiefs and violate Nguni tradition, Gungunhana had been an ally of the Portuguese and, because of an 1885 treaty, was regarded as a subject of the Portuguese monarch. The understood the Portuguese intention to use the treaty to secure land concessions and mineral rights in

Manicaland and stated that, ―the paper [treaty] is good only for fishing for lands.‖30

Gungunhana exemplifies the complex circumstances encountered by traditional rulers during the colonial period in southern Mozambique. He leveraged his relationship with the Portuguese to protect him from his traditional enemies, to support him in his conquests, and to negotiate with the British South Africa Company that threatened

Portuguese sovereignty in southern Mozambique. For over a decade, Gungunhana deftly managed this relationship, until the Portuguese commanders used his refusal to extradite the insurgents as an excuse to declare war on the powerful ruler. With his defeat, they gained control of the Gaza kingdom and inherited the existing system of alliances and vassalage of the defeated Mozambican leaders. The military resistance of the Africans in

30 Quoted in Wheeler, ―Gungunyane the Negotiator: A Study in African Diplomacy,‖ 587. 21 the south ended with the death of General Magigwane and the capture and deportation of

Gungunhana.31

Even after those in the southern provinces ceased their armed struggle against the more powerful Portuguese military, Mozambicans throughout the territory continued to resist Portuguese subjugation through emigration, sometimes with whole crossing the border to settle in South Africa and southern Rhodesia. Mozambicans also created maroon societies in inaccessible and inhospitable areas such as the coastal swamps or mountainous areas along the Mozambique-Rhodesia frontier. A testament to the brutality and inhumanity of the Portuguese system of colonialism is the fact that more

Africans emigrated from the colonies of Angola and Mozambique, both legally and illegally, than any other colonies on the continent.32 This resistance was inspired by the exploitation of African labor through the international trading of slaves, the regional

―leasing‖ of migratory African laborers to the South African mines, and the institutionalization of forced labor within the territory.

From Slavery to Indigenato: African Labor and the Portuguese Economy

Parallels between African-American and Mozambican history that would be exploited by

20th century American advocates of racial equality are evident in the chronicle of the

Portuguese slave trade and the regimen of forced labor and oppression of black

Mozambicans that followed emancipation. By the 17th century, Portuguese settlers had

31 Honwana, The Life History of Raúl Honwana, 38-41. 32 Raúl Honwana, The Life History of Raúl Honwana: An Inside View of Mozambique from Colonialism to Independence, 1905-1975, 33-46. Honwana relates a story in which, in 1933, Chief Santaca took many of his people into South Africa in protest of onerous taxation and inequitable payments for native cotton. Also see Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: The Revolution under Fire, 2nd ed. (Atlantic Highlands: Zed Books, Ltd., 1990), 17. For emigration statistics from Mozambique during the 1950s, see Perry Anderson, ―Portugal and the End of Ultracolonialism – Part 2,‖ New Left Review, I/16 (July-August 1962):94. 22 begun moving inland along the valley where they acquired vast tracts of land and instated the feudal prazos, large agricultural estates supported by slave labor and protected by slave armies (achikunda). Miscegenation took place, generally among the lower class prazeros. This exploitation of African women was not, however, indicative of Portuguese virtue as espoused by Freyre, but reflected a method by which Portuguese traders gained power over and disrupted traditional society. The miscegenation that took place on the prazos and the fact that prazeros acted much like tribal chiefs prompted complaints by colonial administrators that prazeros had ―gone native.‖33

Although perceived by the administrators as a degradation of Portuguese culture and status, the prazeros actions did not indicate an integration of the Africans and

Portuguese colonials. For example, the African social structure was disrupted by the power that sometimes accrued to African women and their children as a result of their relationships with prazeros. The Portuguese, Goan, and, later, mestiço (or, mizungu) landowners retained power over the slaves, and violently reinforced their dominance.

Such elite prazeros as Sisnando Dias Bayão and António Lobo da Silva fought Shona leaders, took the Africans‘ , gold and silver mines, and enslaved the people. Yet, despite growing Portuguese influence, the Tonga and other African peoples of the

33 For more regarding prazeros, see Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, ―The Prazeros as Transfrontiersmen: A Study in Social and Cultural Change,‖ The International Journal of African Historical Studies 8, no. 1 (1975): 1-39. Isaacman makes a significant distinction between the elite and lower class prazeros. He notes that the elite prazeros maintained the culture and traditions of Portugal, sent their children to be educated there, and intermarried to sustain or increase their families‘ prestige. He describes the lower class prazeros as transfrontiersman who engaged in miscegenation, adopted some of the African cultural practices, and created a zone of cultural hybridization. As a result, by the end of the 19th century and the consolidation of Portuguese political power in large parts of Mozambique, there was little Portuguese presence inland along the Zambezi valley. 23

Zambezi valley continued their armed resistance against Portuguese violations of indigenous political and religious practices through the 18th and early 19th century.

With the growth of the demand for slaves in the 18th century, the Portuguese established a system of slave-trading, at first primarily with the French plantation-owners on , and then with owners of Brazilian sugar and cocoa plantations, and gold mines.34 By the 1820s, nearly three thousand slaves per year were being exported from

Quelimane to Brazil and Cuba, and the Portuguese government tripled the export duty on slaves. In 1836, liberal Portuguese Prime Minister Sá da Bandeira issued a decree abolishing the slave trade throughout the Portuguese possessions, but found the decree impossible to enforce. Even after the British began anti-slavery patrols in the

Mozambique Channel in 1842, the trade from Mozambique continued with as many as twenty thousand slavers per year going to Réunion, and then Madagascar and Cuba in the

1850s and 1860s. Before the abolition of slave-trading in Portugal‘s African colonies in

1869, estimates of more than one million slaves had been sold through Mozambican ports. Even into the 1880‘s slaves were being illegally traded from Mozambique, possibly as many as four thousand per year. In 1854, the status of liberto (free man) was created, ostensibly to support the transitioning of slaves into freedom, but the word was used more often to camouflage continuing slavery. Libertos remained obligated to slave labor for seven years and, even after that period, remained severely restricted. Moreover, the

1869 decree that declared all slaves libertos required that they continue to work for their masters until 1878.

34 Slave-trading through the Arab/Swahili trade network already existed in East Africa prior to the arrival of the Portuguese, with most of the slaves going to the Middle East and Southeast Asia. 24

As with the system of Black Codes, vagrancy laws, and sharecropping in the southern United States following the abolition of slavery, abolition brought little change to the lives of the African laborers. Beginning in1878, new laws were promulgated by the Portuguese that required former slaves to contract their labor to their former owners.

By 1899, the Native Act institutionalized forced labor. This was further solidified in the

1914 indigenatos Act, as well as the 1928 Codigo do Trabalho Indigena (Native Code), and the 1930 Acto Colónial (Colonial Act). All these oppressive laws were meant to apply exclusively to black Africans.35 The indigenatos designed a system of labor management by dividing the population of the colony between ―non-natives‖ and

―natives‖ (indigenas). Article 2 of the Colonial Act links the indigenatos to Portugal‘s national identity and civilizing mission, stating, ―It is part of the Portuguese Nation‘s organic essence to carry out its historic role of possessing and colonizing overseas domains and civilizing the natives found in them, while also exercising the moral influence that is promised by the Ecclesiastical Benefice of the Orient.‖36 This system may seem to lend some credence to the Portuguese claim of non-racialism since ―non- natives‖ could be Portuguese, Asian, mestiços, or . However, the greater truth is that only black Africans were indigenas and subject to the forced labor, taxation, punishments and indignities associated with the indigenatos.

35 First, Black Gold, xxiii. For more information regarding post-abolition efforts by Southern whites to control former slaves, see John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans, 8th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 250-259 and Jacqueline Jones, The Dispossessed: America‘s Underclasses from the Civil War to the Present (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 13-44. 36 Quoted in Ellen W Sapega, Consensus and Debate in Salazar‘s Portugal: Visual and Literary Negotiations of the National Text, 1933-1948, Penn State Romance studies (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), 117. 25

Economic factors precipitated by the loss of revenues from the slave trade forced

Portugal to lease land and labor in Mozambique to foreign investors. In the 1870s, large plantations such as the Sena Sugar Estates, which was owned by British investors, were established through the integration of old prazos and the appropriation of native land by non-Portuguese settlers. In 1891, one-third of the country was controlled by two chartered companies: the Mozambique Company, which controlled the provinces of

Manica and Sofala, and the which leased the provinces of Niassa and

Cabo Delgado. In 1891, the Mozambique Company (owned largely by British, and

French investors) was granted a fifty-year charter and sovereign rights over 62,000 square miles and its inhabitants. The company compelled Mozambican men to work on the sugar plantations or public works, and women were forced to grow cotton for the concession. That same year, the Niassa Company (owned largely by German investors) was issued a twenty-five year charter and earned its revenue by recruitment of labor for the South African mines and through taxation (hut tax) of the African population. A third charter company, the Zambézia Company (French), was given land in the and

Tete provinces, although without the administrative rights of the former two.

Each company had a monopoly on commerce, mining, construction, postal services, and the distribution of land. Much of these were used for agricultural ventures such as sugar and cotton plantations. As a result of these charter company concessions, by the 20th century, Mozambique‘s economy was dominated by Britain and South Africa.

Capital investments also came from and, to a lesser extent, France. Joseph

Hanlon dubs the economic phenomenon of Portuguese colonialism, ―shopkeeper

26 colonialism.‖ Indeed, the British dominated not only the Mozambican colonial economy, but also that of Portugal.37

Portugal‘s poverty relative to the other imperial nations and its relative underdevelopment made Portuguese colonialism different from that of other imperialist powers such as Britain, France, or even Belgium which had the most notorious forced labor regime. The major difference was the Portuguese government‘s continuous and systematic exploitation of Mozambican labor through a system of forced and migratory labor until the end of the New State in 1974. The greatest contributing factor to

Portugal‘s industrial underdevelopment was the profitability of colonialism itself -- first with the spices from the East Indian colonies such as Goa and , and then with the sugar, gold, and diamonds from Brazil. This history of profit from colonialism contributed to Portuguese intransigency in granting independence to its African colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Principe, and Sao Tome -- regardless of whether these African colonies were, in fact, profitable.38 The African colonies were important for Portugal to meet its balance of payments, as a market for

Portuguese commodities, and as a source of gold through its labor arrangements with

South Africa.

As late as 1950, little more than a decade prior to the armed insurrections in the lusophone colonies, agriculture remained the largest part of the Portuguese economy

(50%), with industry accounting for only 24%. Despite the high percentage of manpower

37 Hanlon, Mozambique: The Revolution under Fire, 15. 38 Macqueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa. 7. The actual economic value of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique varied according to several factors, including the world market, the efficiency and effectiveness of Portuguese administration, and the status of its economic relationship with South Africa. 27 devoted to agriculture, Portugal could not feed itself, importing much of its wheat, corn, sugar, and potatoes. The 1703 Methuen Treaty exchanged Portuguese wine exports to

England for imported English textiles. This inhibited the growth of the Portuguese wool industry and retarded the expansion of its cotton industry. Because of its small industrial base, Portugal, unlike any other modern European empire, exported quasi-raw materials such as cork and wine, while importing a larger portion of its manufactured goods.

Despite Salazar‘s early efforts to close its door to foreign investment during the Estado

Novo regime, Portugal had the greatest penetration of foreign capital of all European countries, particularly by Britain. For instance, ‘s public transportation system was run by a British company and its principal refinery was controlled by the

French.39

Portuguese dissident António de Figueiredo notes that at the turn of the 20th century, over 60% of Portuguese adults were illiterate. The illiteracy rate remained at over 40% in 1960. He states that the majority of the Portuguese population, including his own family, were peasants and fishermen. As in Portuguese East Africa, most of the land was owned by the few, with 235,000 acres being owned by only four of the largest

Portuguese landlords. Figueiredo points out that the same amount of land was owned by well over fifty thousand small farmers. Not only did the Portuguese elite control much of the land, but it actively continued to appropriate land from small farmers. Figueiredo points out that ―between 1938 and 1951, according to the archives of the Registo Predial

39 Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West, 33. 28

(Land Registry), more than half a million small farms were incorporated into big estates.‖40

British historian Norrie MacQueen implies that the position of the Portuguese peasant majority under the repressive Estado Novo was comparable to that of colonized

Africans. Although it is true that the majority of Portuguese peasants were illiterate, impoverished, and oppressed, Figueiredo, who immigrated to Mozambique at age seventeen, provides an anecdote that illustrates the important difference. He states that as soon as he arrived in the colony he ―realized that the African was not in good social shape either. Passing an elderly African whom I had seen in my new home, I took my hat off and was promptly reprimanded as a fool who would let the white community down.‖

The white settler explained that, despite his poverty, Figueiredo‘s white skin privileged him to a higher than any person of color in Mozambique. Figueiredo understood that ―Here the people of my social level were not called ‗poor‘ – they were called ‗natives.‘ Their condition was not a result of ‗unfortunate circumstances,‘ they were ‗savages,‘ and it would take them many centuries before they could even attain the status of ‗poor‘.‖41 To maintain their superior position, therefore, many of the peasant immigrants to Mozambique, ostensibly there to ―civilize‖ the ―savages,‖ were invested in degradation and the exploitation of black Mozambican labor.

In 1962, the year following the launching of the Angolan insurgency, British historian Perry Anderson summarized the relationship between Portuguese underdevelopment and its colonial policies in his three-part series of articles for New Left

40 Antonio de Figueiredo, Portugal and Its Empire: The Truth (London: Gollancz, 1961), 51-53. 41 Ibid., 18-19. 29

Review, ―Portugal and the End of Ultracolonialism.‖ He states that the ―largely pre- industrial infrastructure, feudal ownership patterns, military paramountcy, and a torpid fascism [beginning in 1932]‖ determined a specific system of colonialism. He dubs this system ―ultra-colonialism – that is, at once the most primitive and the most extreme modality of colonialism.‖42 [emphasis in the original]

Portuguese ―ultracolonialism‖ was similar to that of other colonial powers in

Africa in its use of indirect rule, like that of the British, and a policy of assimilation, like that of the French. Because of Portugal‘s poor implementation of indirect rule and its destruction of the chieftancy, however, many rural villages were left without leadership or were exploited by local Portuguese administrators (chef de postes). Moreover, despite the codification of the assimilation policy in 1954, very few Mozambicans received the education necessary to achieve this status.43 In many cases, the benefits associated with becoming an (previously, civilisado) were illusory.44 A brief overview of the

Portuguese colonial administration and the educational system in Mozambique will show why the vast majority of black Mozambicans were trapped in the agricultural, unskilled, compulsory and migratory labor regimes.

Like other European colonial powers in Africa that did not have the manpower to manage their colonies directly, the Portuguese exercised indirect rule through traditional chiefs (régulos). These régulos were coerced through the use of superior weapons or

42 Perry Anderson, ―Portugal and the End of Ultracolonialism, Part 1,‖ New Left Review, I/15 (May-):84-95. Through his use and emphasis of the word ―primitive,‖ Anderson turns the Portuguese civilizing mission on its head. 43 Notably, the Portuguese codification of its assimilation policy occurred just four years prior to the independence of the first Francophone West African country, Guinea. This was also a year before Portugal‘s acceptance to the United Nations. 44 Newitt, Portugal in Africa, 138-141. The first legislative efforts to create the status of civilisado began in 1917. 30 persuaded through leveraging of existing rivalries and enmities among the rulers to work on behalf of the Portuguese. In many cases, the Portuguese removed the established leaders and replaced them with their own chiefs, with total disregard for the religious or cultural sanctity of the kingship. The régulos were generally expected to maintain order, to manage the collection of taxes, and to ensure that men under their rule worked. If the régulos did not do so, the Portuguese administrators would replace them. This system was inefficient and distanced the Portuguese administration from effective communication, interaction, and collaboration with the rural masses. Moreover, the system destroyed chiefly influence in a way distinctive to Portuguese colonial rule. 45

The provincial administrators had an increasingly overwhelming list of responsibilities associated with the control of nearly every aspect of the black

Mozambicans lives. For instance, under the 1954 Estatuto Indigna das Provincias de

Guine, Angola e Mocambique, no ―native‖ could seek employment anywhere without first obtaining a special permit from the administrator. No ―native‖ could visit another country except South Africa or Rhodesia without authorization by the administrator who verified that the visit was for employment purposes. In order to make these controls effective, the law stipulated that all such persons should carry special ―passes‖ wherever they were, including their own villages, and were prohibited from being seen in public places after certain hours of the evening. The laws were so intrusive that black

Mozambicans could not even slaughter their own cattle, sell, or give them away without

45 Bailey, Norman, ―Government and Administration‖ in Abshire and Samuels, Portuguese Africa: a Handbook, 139-140. Newitt describes a different situation in which there was no regulo (traditional chief) in the hierarchy of Portuguese colonial administration, but only the village headmen (regedors). Newitt, Portugal in Africa, 104-105. 31 the special authorization of the Portuguese authorities. Although they could establish bank accounts, they could not withdraw their money without the permission of the local administrator.46

To give credence to the myth of racial equality across their empire, the

Portuguese, like the French, ascribed to a system of assimilation. The assimilation system had as two of its requirements that black Mozambicans be employed, and speak, read and write Portuguese fluently. There were neither the educational opportunities nor the resources available for the vast majority of African children to learn Portuguese. In

1950, in the capital Lourenço Marques and its environs – the area in which the majority of those Africans qualifying as assimilados were located -- only 1% of the African male population could speak Portuguese and only 1% of those could write it. A tenth of that number of African women would meet the literacy criteria. In fact, in 1958 official statistics cited illiteracy for Mozambicans at 97.8%.47 The claim of racial equality based, in part, on the ability of Africans to fulfill these requirements becomes more absurd when one considers that, in that same year, over 40% of Portuguese citizens in the

(and an even greater percentage of settlers) were illiterate.48 The claim, nevertheless, served two very important purposes: 1) to support the Portuguese claim that Mozambique was not a colony but an overseas province, an important distinction following the 1960

United Nations Declaration of Decolonization; and, 2) to create tension within the

46 Eduardo C. Mondlane, ―The Kitwe Papers: Race Relations and Portuguese Colonial Policy, with Special Reference to Mozambique,‖ Africa Today 15, no. 1 ( 1968): 16. This paper was also given by Mondlane at the International Seminar on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa, which was organized by the United Nations and held in Lusaka, Zambia from 24 July to 4 August 1967. 47 Munslow, Mozambique., 63. 48 Anderson, ―Portugal and the End of Ultracolonialism - Part 1,‖ New Left Review I, no. 15 (June 1962): 87. 32

African population and inhibit the growth of nationalism and organized dissent against the colonial regime.

The high level of illiteracy among the black Mozambicans can be attributed to the educational system devised by Portugal that designed to create a compliant labor force.

The Portuguese authorized the to educate Mozambicans through the

Concordat and Missionary Accord of 7 May 1940, enacted by the Missionary Statute

Decree-Law No. 31,207, dated 5 April 1941. The provisions of these documents codified the historically complementary interests of the Catholic Church and the Portuguese governments in the colonies as had been espoused by Camões in The Lusíads over three centuries earlier. While the foundation of the relationship was ideological – each entity expressing its desire to ―civilize the natives‖ – it was also political and economic. The

Concordat and Missionary Agreement called for state subsidization of the missionary institutions, including missionary stipends, travel expenses, tax exemptions, and retirement pensions for priests and missionary staff. Bishops, who had to be approved by the Portuguese government, were compensated at the same level as colonial governors.

The State also granted land for the establishment of missions in three dioceses at

Lourenço Marques, , and Nampula. The Catholic Church would, in turn, spread

Portuguese culture by teaching exclusively in the . Non-Portuguese missionaries were authorized, but were required to be fluent in the Portuguese language and agree to ―renounce the laws and courts of their nationality of origin and submit to the laws and courts of Portugal …‖49 Although Article 3 of the Missionary Statute Decree also discusses the education of European settlers, 95% of whom were Roman Catholic,

49 Hastings, Wiriyamu, 148. 33

European children were not taught in mission schools, but at secular State-run institutions.50

The relationship between Church and State and the Church‘s role in the colonies was stated explicitly in Article 2 of the Missionary Statute which reads, ―The Portuguese

Catholic Missions are considered to be institutions of imperial utility and to possess an eminently civilizing sense.‖[emphasis mine]51 This ―imperial utility‖ included preparing

Mozambicans for the forced and migratory labor regimes. The high level of Mozambican illiteracy is not surprising when one considers the details of the colonial policy cited in the Political Constitution regarding the education of Africans as reflected in Article 68 of the statute which states that ―… plans and syllabuses will aim at the perfect nationalization and moralization of the natives and the acquisition of habits and skills of work … such moralization to include the abandonment of sloth and the training of future rural workers and craftsmen who can produce enough for their needs and social liabilities.‖ The article continues to dictate that it would not be educators but the government that would ―indicate what technical knowledge is most suitable for teaching to the natives.‖52

Even by the 1950s, when only 6% of black Mozambicans attended school, the

Portuguese government did not consider African education as involving more than three or four years of schooling. Africans first attended rudimentary schools run by the

Catholic Church. These first three years of a child‘s schooling were meant to provide training in Portuguese language, elementary introduction to arithmetic, reading and

50 Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, 71. 51 Hastings, Wiriyamu, 145. 52 Ibid., 151-152. 34 writing; however, religious training was considered paramount to reading, writing and arithmetic. Following the third year, Africans would have to take an examination to qualify to enter elementary school. Acquisition of a rudimentary education certificate qualified Africans ―to seek work in the most menial of jobs in government and business offices requiring knowledge of Portuguese.‖ In 1960, no plans existed for training

Africans beyond elementary school (standards three and four), except for offering a few basic courses in carpentry, shoemaking, agriculture and nursing. The government also discouraged the creation of special high school programs by private humanitarian or religious organizations.53 As a result of the political control of the Portuguese government and the social control exercised by the Catholic Church over the education of

Mozambicans, it was unlikely that most Blacks would have the opportunity to progress in colonial society. The Portuguese ―civilizing mission‖ was, in fact, a mission to develop a compliant labor pool. This mission included not only an education in rudimentary work skills but also an economic and cultural regime that objectified Mozambicans.

The Web of Oppression: Forced Labor in Portuguese East Africa

The god that is being cheated, [back to] my mother. [Chorus which follows each line sung by the leader] Lasher, mechanical loader (shovel)! I work without pay, myself. The white men of Joni have got me. I work without pay, my father. Because it is the black skin working, my father. They point with fingers; I am tired, father.

53 Memo by the Africa Committee of the National Council of Churches (author and date unknown) regarding Education in Mozambique and the attachment to a Confidential memo on ―Present Conditions in Mozambique,‖ 1May 1961, Box 15, Folder 13, PHS . It is likely that the author of both the education memo and the present condition attachment was Eduardo Mondlane, reporting on his 1961 return to Mozambique. 35

I am suffering, I am exhausted indeed! I came to Joni because of poverty, indeed! I earn half escudo per day. Because I am the god that is being cheated. The Boers make us work; I am exhausted, father. Miners work song, ―Xikwembu xa Muhliwa‖54

The system of forced and migratory labor in lusophone Africa created a web of oppression for black Mozambicans. As a result of its dependence upon the capital of the other imperial powers and South Africa, by 1897 Portugal had established a dual economy in its colony. Male Mozambicans in the south (below the 22° parallel) were ostensibly leased to South Africa as mine workers while the women maintained family plots (shambas). Northern Mozambicans were subject to a system of forced labor on the plantations of the foreign-owned chartered companies and such public works as the building of roads, railways, harbors and port facilities.

During the early 20th century, Mozambique became the largest exporter of labor in southern Africa. Voluntary migration of Mozambicans to South Africa to work in the mines had already begun in the 1850s due to the territory‘s transitioning to a cash economy and recruitment by South African agents. Interviews with miners and their families reveal the societal changes wrought by the shift to a cash economy and the resulting labor regime. Throughout Mozambique, the Portuguese requirement that

Mozambicans pay taxes in cash forced the Africans to work for the colonial administration, the Charter companies, and/or the mines, as well as convert much of their farmland to growing cash crops. Such traditional exchanges as the bride-price (lobolo) also became cash exchanges. Africans were prohibited from becoming merchants. They

54 First, Ruth, Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant, 83. 36 were forced to purchase manufactured goods and agricultural materials from the

Portuguese or other foreign traders. Even if black Mozambicans were able to produce enough crops to sell, they were forced to do so at far lower prices than those commanded by Portuguese farmers, settlers who had appropriated large tracts of the best farmland. In order to earn enough to pay taxes and purchase necessities, including farm equipment, seeds, and livestock, most Mozambican men in the south went to the mines. 55

By the end of the 19th century, this labor was being bartered to South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Southern Rhodesia for guaranteed revenue associated with the leasing of Mozambique‘s railway and harbor facilities. Governor Mousínho de Albuquerque first regulated the migration of black Mozambicans to South Africa in 1897, bringing recruitment and taxation under greater Portuguese government control. The 1899-1902

South African War shut down mining in the and necessitated the renegotiation of these regulations between the Portuguese and the British. This 1901 Modus Vivendi established the taxation of miners (braçal) and the requirement that miners return to

Mozambique at the end of their one-year contracts. These miners were subject to compulsory labor (chibalo) upon their return, making the exploitation of migratory laborers of great economic benefit to Portugal.

Additionally, the Portuguese negotiated a secret agreement giving the

Witwatersrand Native Labor Association (WENELA or WNLA) a monopoly on the recruitment of Mozambicans. The Portuguese received two pounds sterling in gold bullion for each African delivered. This agreement also aided the Portuguese in managing Mozambican labor so that there were enough laborers to serve both the mines

55 Ibid., 136-162. 37 to the south and the Charter Companies and agricultural estates (latifúndios) north of the

22° parallel. The 1909 Convention added the guarantee that 50% of the seaborne traffic from the Rand would be routed through the port of Lourenço Marques. These conventions continued to be renegotiated periodically (Conventions of 1928, 1961, and

1964), with changes to the length of contracts (12-18 months), number of recruits

(100,000 – 80,000), percentage of seaborne traffic (50%-40%) and method of payments.

As a result, by the 1960s and the renewal of African armed resistance against

Portuguese colonialism, at least one-third of the labor force in the South African mines was Mozambican. An estimated two-thirds of able-bodied Southern Mozambican men were working in foreign territories.56 In addition to the labor in the South African mines, thousands more Mozambicans were laborers on South African plantations, farms, and the houses of white settlers, as well as in the Northern and Southern Rhodesian copper mines and plantations. More than 100,000 northern Mozambicans sought employment in

Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and . These workers labored on plantations, railways and harbors, and as servants in European and Indian homes.57 This pattern of migratory labor had a devastating effect on Mozambican society.

During the twelve to eighteen months of a mine laborer‘s contract, these men were absent from their families, unable to clear fields or build huts and granaries for the women and children who sowed and cultivated the crops. In addition to the physical loss,

56 Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West, 24; First, Ruth, Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant, 212-218. Importantly, the 1928 Convention established the deferment of payment to miners in gold. In 1961, the distinction between natives and non-natives was ostensibly removed, but there was little change in the recruitment and regulation of miners other than the change of the regulatory body from the Department of Native Affairs to the National Institute of Labor. 57 FRELIMO, ―Some Facts about the ,‖ Mozambican Revolution 8 (July 1964). These facts were excerpted from a speech by Lourenco Mutaca, FRELIMO Secretary of Finance, at an economic seminar in Pyong Yang, . 38 this absence had a severe emotional impact on Mozambican families. Women suffered abandonment, instances of husbands returning from ―Joni‖ with new South African wives, and periods of destitution set in when men did not send money home. In some cases, this destitution resulted from the method of deferred payment devised by the

Portuguese and South African governments which often cheated miners.58 Consequently, some women resorted to prostitution in order to pay the head taxes (mudende) and hut taxes.59 Additionally, in many cases, the loss was a permanent one. Between 1902 and

1940, over 81,000 Mozambicans died as a result of mining accidents and disease (43,000 in the first twelve years alone), with the likelihood of thousands of other fatalities due to the long-term deleterious effects of mining.60 There was little, if any, compensation to the families for the death or disability of miners.

For young black Mozambican men in the South, there was a sense of fatalism, resignation, and powerlessness regarding their futures – the majority of them would spend most of their adult lives as miners and/or laborers on the latifúndios of white landowners. In fact, under the 1899 and 1928 Native Labor Regulations, those men not lost to mining and farming in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were otherwise required to work on cotton concessions, public works, or plantations.

Peasants in the northern provinces of Mozambique were subjected to forced cultivation by cotton concession companies. They were victims of violent reprisals for failing to meet quotas. They suffered from famine as cash crops replaced subsistence

58 First, Ruth, Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant, 136-162. 59 Honwana, The Life History of Raúl Honwana, 118. 60 Mondlane, Eduardo, ―Mozambican Contract Labour in South Africa,‖ in Bragança and Wallerstein, The African Liberation Reader, 1:189. 39 farming.61 The 1899 Native Labor Regulations made unemployment illegal. It imposed the head tax, and required all Africans to carry identity cards (carderneta) showing their work and tax records, much like the pass laws in apartheid South Africa. Beginning in

1928, António de Oliveira Salazar, then the Portuguese finance minister, institutionalized the chibalo system of forced labor for cotton production. The 1930 Native Labor

Regulations extended forced cotton cultivation to all indigenas. Because of the economic disruptions caused by the Second World War, in 1942 all black Africans were ordered to work six months for the State.62

Although inhumane forms of forced labor existed in other colonies such as French

West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, and the Belgian Congo, these practices did not contribute substantially to the economies of the metropole, or they attenuated after the

Second World War with the maturation of colonial financial systems. In the Portuguese colonies, forced and migrant labor, ostensibly part of Portugal‘s civilizing mission, provided the foundation of the economies. In 1961, when violence erupted in Angola, the first of the lusophone colonies to initiate an armed liberation struggle, there were four categories of forced labor: correctional, obligatory, contract, and ―voluntary.‖

Correctional labor was the penalty for African noncompliance with the indigenato, including non-payment of the head tax. Other penalties for non-compliance

61 For more regarding forced cotton cultivation, see Allen Isaacman, ―Peasants, Work and the Labor Process: Forced Cotton Cultivation in Colonial Mozambique 1938-1961,‖ Journal of Social History 25, no. 4 (Summer 1992): 815-855. Importantly, Isaacman demonstrates that even within the tightly regimented Mozambican labor regime peasants retained a degree of autonomy. 62 First, Black Gold, xxii-xxvi and Hanlon, Mozambique: The Revolution under Fire, 15-17. Regarding forced cultivation, see Anderson, ―Portugal and the End of Ultracolonialism – Part 2,‖ 92. A similar system of forced cultivation was practiced by the Dutch in regards to cultivation in Java in the 18th century, see Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History, 8th ed. (Crow‘s Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2000), 84. 40 with the indigenato included designation by the provincial administrator as ―undesirable‖ and exile to São Tomé or Principe. Obligatory labor could be imposed by the government for public works when there were not enough ―voluntary‖ workers. The only groups officially exempt were those under 14 or over 60, the sick and the invalid, employed Africans, recognized chiefs, workers on their first six months home after contract work, and women. Despite these official exemptions, women, children, the elderly and workers on leave were all subjected to obligatory labor by corrupt administrators.

Contract labor was the most important and widely used form of forced labor.

Native Labor Regulations stated that all Africans who could not prove that they had been employed for six months of the past year were liable to compulsory labor for the

Portuguese administration or private employers. Anderson points out that ―five of the seven proofs of non-idleness involve[d] prior integration with the colonial economic or administrative system.‖ The last two categories required African farmers to own fifty or more head of cattle or be certified as ―agricultor africano‖ by the State, requirements that would be met by less than 5% of African males. Therefore, 95% of African males were subject to contract labor for minimal wages, generally 50 escudos ($1.75) per month.63

Contract laborers were coercively recruited by the colonial administration for work on plantations. In 1961, urban contract laborers could earn as much as $6.00 per month.

Voluntary labor differed little from contract labor. Laborers contracted directly with employers instead of submitting to government coercion, and so were able to choose

63 FRELIMO, ―Shibalo (Forced Labour) Camouflaged,‖ Mozambican Revolution 3 (February 1964):5. 41 the location of their work. This allowed these workers sometimes to work in areas near their families. However, their wages were even lower than contract laborers.64

Although the Portuguese administrators continued to promulgate regulations that entrenched black Mozambicans in the oppressive colonial migratory and forced labor regimen, Mozambicans continued to engage in both non-violent and armed resistance.

Examples include the 1917 Barue Revolt, and the non-violent protest demonstrations that resulted in the 1960 Mueda Massacre. Yet these protests by black Mozambicans yielded no reform from the colonial regime. Black Mozambicans would have to seek support from reformers, nationalists, and compassionate allies outside of Mozambique.

The next chapter begins the examination of the development of nascent

Mozambican nationalist organizations in the early 20th century. These organizations would begin to reach first to other lusophone territories through newspapers. Later, they would expand their network and connect with other Africans and members of the African diaspora.

64 Anderson, ―Portugal and the End of Ultracolonialism - Part 2,‖ 90. 42

CHAPTER TWO: O BRADO AFRICANO (THE AFRICAN CRY) -- MOZAMBICAN NATIONALISM AND PAN-AFRICAN ACTIVISM

The entire world is witness to the fact that it is completely reasonable for us now to dare to say in the face of this wave of corruption: ENOUGH!1 -- João Albasini –

The early armed struggles of Africans against Portuguese consolidation of imperial domination ended by the turn of the 20th century. Yet, resistance continued in many other ways. As mentioned in the last chapter, many of the rural peasants and poor urban

Africans continued to exercise everyday resistance through emigration, work slowdowns, and sabotage. This chapter explores the attempts at organized resistance by black

Mozambicans beginning in the early 20th century that would set the stage for both the establishment of FRELIMO in 1962 and the role of American activists in the

Mozambican liberation movement.

Mozambican Nationalism, the cultural and political imagining of a community free from Portuguese oppression and exploitation, grew first among mission-educated

Blacks and mestiços. Later it gained ground among cooperative workers of the cotton concessions, and migratory laborers exposed to nationalist organizations in other territories. These efforts were suppressed by the Portuguese authorities, at first, administratively through such legislation as the indigenato. Following the Second World

War, the New State regime came under growing international pressures from other

1 Excerpt from the inaugural 25 December 1908 edition of O Africano quoted in Jeanne Marie Penvenne, ―João dos Santos Albasini (1876-1922): The Contradictions of Politics and Identity in Colonial Mozambique,‖ The Journal of African History 37, no. 3 (January 1, 1996): 422. 43 colonial powers and the United Nations, as well as internal pressure from pro-democratic forces within Portugal and its colonies, to prepare its colonies for independence. In defiance of this pressure, Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar used several methods to suppress nationalism. These include fomenting ethnic and class divisions among the black population, using the Portuguese secret police to create an increasingly repressive environment, and use of state violence. As a result, the three nationalist organizations that would unite to form FRELIMO were established outside of

Mozambique.

These exiles and dissidents from Mozambique were not alone. The transportation, communications, and technological revolutions of the 20th century made it possible for these Mozambicans to meet and discuss their shared experience of oppression, and to organize a program of opposition to colonialism in a transnational context. They established links with other Africans and people of African descent. In exile and at such gatherings as the Pan-African Congresses (1919, 1921, 1923, 1927, and

1945) and the All-African People‘s Conferences (1958, 1960, and 1961), educated and dissident members of the African diaspora developed an anti-colonial rhetoric based upon the ideals of democracy, equality, and social justice espoused by the imperial nations.

They used this rhetoric to enlist the support of white allies, especially missionary organizations and liberals, and to appeal to such international bodies as the League of

Nations and United Nations. They also developed such philosophies and strategies for racial uplift as Négritude and African .

44

Portugal‘s forced labor regime and the lack of a viable educational system within the Portuguese colonies were two aspects of the oppression suffered by Mozambicans that drew the attention of the West. This was largely because of appeals by missionary and other non-governmental organizations. Provision of education and the removal of forced labor were the locus of reform efforts in the 1920s. They would become the points of attack on Portuguese colonialism for FRELIMO and an international cadre of liberal and revolutionary activists in the 1960s.

Through a discussion of the early reform efforts, this study demonstrates the transnational nature of the black freedom struggles in the 1920s. It shows how the famous philosophical differences between W.E.B. DuBois and both Booker T. Washington and

Marcus Garvey were reflected in the advocacy on behalf of Mozambique. The divisive issues of class, inclusive or exclusive black nationalism, and vocational/traditional vs.

Western liberal arts education apparent in the struggle of the 1920s resurfaced in the Pan-

African movement of the 1960s. Additionally, this discussion of the second and third

Pan-African Congresses (1921 and 1923) and the 1958 All-People‘s and 1960 Afro-

Asian Solidarity conferences highlights two moments in the evolution of the African cry from one for reform in the 1920s to anti-colonialism and cultural nationalism in the late

1950s and early 1960s. It demonstrates that, from the early 1920s, the African cry regarding forced labor and education was a Pan-African one.

This African cry was first expressed after Portugal consolidated its power in southern Mozambique in the late 19th century. Portugal was finally able to overcome armed resistance in several ways: militarily (with the advent of the Maxim gun);

45 legislatively, by promoting the immigration of white settlers to the colony; and, by cultivating a small number of Africans to support the Portuguese colonial administration.

Through education and patronage, the colonial administration slowly succeeded in isolating and alienating some black and mestiço men, who would later qualify as civilisados or assimilados, from the large peasant and small working class African population. Many of the uneducated or undereducated Africans perceived this black bourgeoisie to be traitors or collaborators, Africans ashamed of their ―African-ness‖ and seeking to become ―black Portuguese.‖ To the extent that the Portuguese civilizing myth linked opportunity to Portuguese culture, educated Blacks and mestiços strived to prove their Portuguese-ness. For many, however, this acquisition of Portuguese culture did not have to come at the expense of their African-ness. Even then, it brought them only a limited success, especially as more white Portuguese immigrated to Mozambique.

The Life History of Raúl Honwana, the biography of an assimilado who became an interpreter for the colonial administration in the early 20th century, complicates the perception of assimilados striving to be black Portuguese. For Honwana, assimilation was a mechanism for coping with the most heinous abuses of colonialism because, theoretically, assimilados were exempt from the hut tax and forced labor. They remained, however, subject to the labor system that excluded them from most skilled labor and all managerial positions, capped their wages far below those earned by whites doing the same work, and subjected them to indignities at the hands of Portuguese employers and resentful poor settlers.

46

Viriato da Cruz, an early secretary-general of the MPLA, in an article originally published in Revolution, No. 6, February 1964, entitled, ―Angola: Quelle Independence,‖ also challenges the view of assimilados as collaborators and distinguishes between two groups of assimilados. The first was a group of civil servants and employees in commerce and industry who rejected colonialism because of the exploitation they suffered within the colony. The second group enjoyed a privileged position and,

―because of their social condition, their education, their psychology, and the social functions to which they aspire[d],‖ displayed behavior similar to that of the petty bourgeoisie. Da Cruz alleges that those within this group who opposed colonialism did so because of patriotism for a more autonomous state, self-interest, or even solidarity with indigenas.2 As a result of the rejection of colonialism by some of both types of assimilados, their political consciousness, and their social position, early nationalist and anti-colonial organizations began within this community of educated Africans and mestiços.

Challenging the issue of ―laws of exception,‖ that is, the legal and social constraints placed on the indigenas by the colonial government, provided an early platform for protest by leading ―grandes familias of color‖ in the early 20th century.

These grandes familias of Lourenço Marques were descended from the earlier trading communities. Some of these were black Mozambicans who were the grandchildren of caravan leaders, important traders, and chiefs who had been allied with the Portuguese.

2 Honwana, The Life History of Raúl Honwana, 13-16; Bragança and Wallerstein, The African Liberation Reader, 1:76.. The perception of assimilados as traitors is further belied by the fact that important members of FRELIMO and future Mozambican presidents and Armando Guebuza were both members of assimilado families. 47

These families also included mestiços who were the grandchildren of prazeros and influential African women who had been the common-law wives of Portuguese founders of empire in Mozambique.

Prior to the 1890s, few distinctions existed between ―legitimate‖ offspring and the mestiço children of whites. Mestiço was not a category on birth certificates, and elite mestiços shared the privileges of their white fathers, being called brancos da terra, or local whites. By the turn of the century, as legislation was being passed that distinguished Portuguese nationals from indigenas, this group of predominately Catholic,

Portuguese-speaking Afro-Europeans and Afro-Goans understood that, despite the

Portuguese myth of its civilizing mission, it was racial, not cultural, distinctions that were the barrier against political and socioeconomic opportunity in Mozambique. The passage of legislation creating the category of assimilado in 1917, in part meant to assuage the feelings of these elites, only highlighted the racial distinction and warned farsighted black elites of the impending loss of power and status.3

As a result of their growing frustration, these nascent black elites formed the

Grêmio Africano (), a social and civil organization that provided a support network and social space in which its members could feel a sense of racial and cultural dignity. The African Union was formed in Lourenço Marques between 1906 and 1908.

3 Jeanne Penvenne, ―‗We are all Portuguese!‘ Challenging the Political Economy of Assimilation: Lorenco Marques, 1870-1933,‖ in The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, ed. Leroy Vail (Berkeley: Currey University of California Press, 1989), 260-264, http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft158004rs/. Penvenne points out that the Grêmio‘s membership was diverse and although the majority were Catholic mestiços who spoke Portuguese; others, like the esteemed Estácio Dias, were Africans educated in the Protestant missions who spoke Ronga. He also notes that the original assimilation legislation is PP317, dated 9 January 1917, but was modified in 1919, 1929, 1921, 1923, and 1927. Allen Isaacman notes on page 20 of his Introduction to The Life History of Raúl Honwana, that, in 1906, Muslims had organized their own organization, Kuate Ahwane Swafo, which was short-lived because of ethnic divisions between Indian Muslims, African Muslims, and Muslims of mixed race. 48

Some scholars would contend that the Grêmio was not a nationalist organization because it was not political. Yet this discussion of the Grêmio reflects Partha Chatterjee‘s argument regarding the development of a national culture. Chatterjee explains in The

Nation and its Fragments that, in order for colonial subjects to create their unique,

―modern‖ national culture that is not Western, they must first develop ―their own domain of sovereignty within colonial society‖ by dividing social institutions and practices into domains of the material and spiritual.4 In the material realm, the Grêmio adopted the

Portuguese definition of civilization. However, in the early 20th century, the organizers also tested the Portuguese myth of racial egalitarianism by proclaiming their Portuguese- ness. As more European immigrants arrived in the capital and the white population increased from less than 1,000 before the turn of the century to nearly 10,000 by 1930, competition for the higher-paying jobs, fertile land, and licenses and concessions grew more intense. As a result, the black elites lost socioeconomic ground. The new-comers, some of whom were illiterate and unskilled, used their whiteness as a badge of superiority to all non-white Mozambicans.

In 1908, as part of its bulwark against further erosion of the black elites‘ position, the Grêmio began publishing a newspaper, O Africano. It was a mouthpiece speaking for the oppressed Africans and keeping educated Mozambicans apprised of world events.

Importantly, regarding the ―spiritual‖ realm of the developing black Mozambican nationalism, the paper was published in both Portuguese and Ronga. The Grêmio‘s use

4 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, Princeton studies in culture/power/history (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993), 6; Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1983); Benedict R. O‘G Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006). 49 of Ronga asserted the editor‘s belief that the African language/culture was equal to

Portuguese.5 It also allowed the Grêmio to reach the widest audience: the Portuguese- educated Africans throughout the lusophone territories and literate local Mozambicans who could also read the Ronga text to indigenas. Using allusion and sarcasm, as shown in the following quote, written during the ‘ 1922-1923 investigation of the institution of slavery worldwide, the editors pressed for reform in such issues as forced labor:

We must say, in the service of truth, that slavery as such does not exist at least in the Province of Mozambique. The police unconstitutionally seize peaceful citizens on the pretext of not having a [labour registration] tag, and then rent us out to anyone needing labour. This … isn‘t slavery. We don‘t really know what it is, but … it isn‘t slavery …6

The newspaper also helped to integrate the non-white population of all the

Portuguese territories through the creation of a shared culture among the educated lusophone African elite.7 Editors of O Africano, including João dos Santos Albasini and his brother José Francisco Albasini, opposed the discriminatory nature of the assimilation law and called for the extension of the ―privileges‖ of citizenship offered to assimilados to all Africans. The Albasini brothers were educated mestiços, sons of a mestiço father,

João Albasini, and black mother, granddaughter of the head of the Maxaquene clan. In

5 Ironically, the written Ronga language is itself part of the colonial legacy. Henri A. Junod, a Swiss missionary in the Lourenço Marques area created a reader, grammar and ethnographic work on the ―Ronga people‖ between 1894 and 1897. In doing so, he did not take into account the various language variations of southeastern Africa and created a ―‖ in an area where Africans identified by clan and chieftancy. Patrick Harries, ―Exclusion, Classification and Internal Colonialism,‖ in The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (London: Currey, 1989), 85-91. 6 Penvenne, ―‗We are all Portuguese!‘ Challenging the Political Economy of Assimilation: Lorenco Marques, 1870-1933,‖ 272. Quoted from O Brado Africano, October 14, 1922. 7 Ewumbue-Munono Churchill, ―The Mass Media and Regional Integration in Africa,‖ Africa Media Review 5, no. 1 (1991): 19 and 21. Churchill notes that such newspapers as O Brado Africano and Diario de Mozambique perpetuated a security community, that is, they focused on positive articles and down- played negative issues. 50 addition to the land and privilege of their parents, the brothers were greatly influenced by their familial relationship with the former head of the Mozambique postal service, Goan

José Aniceto da Silva. Thus the journalists grew up with connections to and insight regarding the white Portuguese, Ronga-speaking population, and Goan elites of southern

Mozambique. Regardless of their privileged beginnings, intellect, and talent, however, it was their African heritage that defined, and limited, the Albasini‘s position in the society of Lourenço Marques.8

By 1918, O Africano was replaced by O Brado Africano which continued the work of its predecessor before being muzzled by the Salazar regime. A press law promulgated on 3 September 1926 required that the directors of all colonial newspapers have a bachelor‘s degree and have no position in the colonial administration. Because there was no university in Mozambique and no black Mozambicans had yet been accepted to the , none of the members of the Grêmio qualified to direct the paper. Some sympathetic Portuguese assumed the leadership of the newspaper so that it lasted for nearly a decade longer. In 1936, after Salazar had more fully developed his censorship bureau, O Brado Africano, as well as over fifty other newspapers in the colony, was silenced.9 The elites of the Grêmio were not, however, the only Mozambicans advocating for colonial reform.

8 Penvenne, ―João dos Santos Albasini (1876-1922),‖ 429-433. 9 Boahen, UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII, Abridged Edition, VII:299; Honwana, The Life History of Raúl Honwana, 91; Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, 106. The Gremio Africano evolved into the Associação Africana. Under pressure by the Salazar regime, the Associação became more conservative and, as a result, there was an outgrowth of the more radical Instituto Negrófilo (later Centro Associativo dos Negros de Moçambique). 51

W.E.B. DuBois and Early American Advocacy for Colonial Reform in Mozambique

Organized by a small group of Mozambican intellectuals in Lisbon in 1920, the Liga

Africana (African League) represented Mozambique within a network of colonized peoples throughout Africa, Europe, and the United States who were considering the reform or destruction of colonialism. Consequently, the development of Mozambican nationalism occurred within a transnational context. The Liga participated in the Second and Third Pan-African Conferences, convened by W.E.B. DuBois, and held in London,

Brussels and in 1921, and in London and Lisbon in 1923.10 It is significant that the

Liga supported not only national unity in opposing Portuguese colonialism, but the Pan-

Africanist vision of unity of all oppressed black people around the world.11 That it was the African Americans who were the leaders of the Pan-African movement of the early

20th century is notable because, as will be seen in later chapters, following the Second

World War, it is the Africans who assume the leadership.

Memorializing this early interaction between Mozambicans and African

Americans, a relationship that would be renewed and expanded in later decades, on 3

November 1923, O Brado Africano published an article regarding a visit with the Liga

Africana in Lisbon by a young Rayford W. Logan. Logan, a renowned Howard

10 W.E.B. DuBois reports in the December 1923 edition of The Crisis that the Third Pan African Congress, although not well organized, took place in London and Lisbon. The Crisis 27:2 (December 1923): 57. O Brado Africano, however, states that the Liga Africana was contacted too late to organize a meeting there. Robert A. Hill, ed., ―Article in O Brado Africano [Lourenco Marques, 3 November 1923]: Visit to Lisbon by a Representative of the Negro International, Interview with the ‗Tarde‘,‖ in The and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, vol. 10, Africa Series (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 131-133. W.E.B. DuBois, "To the World‖ (Manifesto of the Second Pan-African Congress), The Crisis 23:1 (November 1921): 7 and ―Why a Pan-African Congress,‖ The Crisis 22:5 (September 1921): 221-222. 11 Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, 105. 52

University historian whose advocacy on behalf of African independence would continue into the 1960s, was, like the Albasini‘s, born in a southern capital city – Washington,

D.C. -- to a mixed- race family. Born in 1897, the year following the infamous Plessy vs.

Ferguson Supreme Court decision, Logan, too, grew up in a period when racial discrimination was being institutionalized. Education was the key to upward mobility for black Americans, just as it was for black Mozambicans. Logan worked hard to gain admittance to Washington‘s M Street High School (later, Dunbar High School) the most prestigious African American high school in the country, and then Williams College.

Although experiencing some racial discrimination during college which dampened his belief in the possibility of achieving racial equality in the United State, the discrimination and abuse that Logan suffered during World War I military service destroyed all such hope. Logan was so enraged by his ill-treatment that he became one of the growing

African American expatriate community in Paris following the war, but found little relief from discrimination. Ironically, although his light complexion and command of the

French language enabled Logan to ―pass‖ as white as he traveled around Europe, he continued to suffer various forms of xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and derogatory remarks about African Americans from those who made assumptions about his racial, ethnic, or national identity.12

While in Paris, Logan was recruited to Pan-Africanism by W.E.B. Dubois and assumed the difficult position of interpreter and mediator between DuBois and

Senegalese intellectual and politician Blaise Diagne – between the American and French

12 Kenneth Robert Janken, Rayford W. Logan and the Dilemma of the African-American Intellectual (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993), 3-47. 53 factions that vied for leadership within the Pan-African Congress.13 As the twenty-six year old Deputy Secretary of the Pan-African Association, Logan was in Portugal to arrange for the Third Pan-African Congress to be held in Lisbon and London.14 During an interview Logan, accompanied by the president of the Liga Africana, Dr. José de

Magalhães, related the mission of the Pan-African Congress as an effort at ―reconciliation of white and black races for progress and justice.‖15

In the interview for O Brado Africano, Rayford Logan further explained that the

Second Pan-African Congress had been called to negate accusations that the Pan-African

Association was affiliated with the philosophy of Marcus Garvey and ―negro

Bolshevism.‖16 The journalist noted the vehemence with which Logan denounced

Garvey‘s ideas, as well as his promotion of those ideas, as ―very stupid.‖ 17 This article

13 Ibid., 52. 14 W.E.B. DuBois, ―Opinion,‖ The Crisis (The Crisis Publishing Company, Inc., n.d.). Following the Second Pan African Congress, DuBois reports that he left the planning of the third in the hands of a French secretary, M. Isaac Béton, who was unable to successfully plan the event. DuBois, however, states that, in order to continue the building of momentum achieved in the first two congresses, the third congress would be held. It is reported that, although the third congress was poorly attended, the resolutions of the London Manifesto from the 1921 Pan African Congress were renewed. 15 Hill, ―Article in O Brado Africano [Lourenco Marques, 3 November 1923]: Visit to Lisbon by a Representative of the Negro International, Interview with the ‗Tarde‘,‖ 131. 16 It is likely that Dr. José de Magalhães was also the representative of the Liga Africana who attended the 2nd Pan African Congress in Paris as reported by Jessie Redmon Fauset, ―Impressions from the Second Pan African Congress,‖ The Crisis 23:1( November 1921):15-18. DuBois distancing himself from ―negro ‖ would bring him under fire by such influential black Marxist anti-colonialists as the Trinidadian George Padmore. Within the next decade, however, DuBois would shift politically to the left, eventually joining the Communist Party in 1961. He would, in 1942, become a founder of the African solidarity organization, the Council for African Affairs, with such reputed Communists as Paul Robeson. Rayford Logan, a liberal, would also be a member of the organization. By 1945, DuBois and Padmore (who left the Communist Party in 1934), worked together in organizing the Fifth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, and attended by renowned African nationalists such as and . For more, see George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism (Garden City: Doubleday, 1971), and Penny Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-Colonialsm 1937-1960 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). 17 Hill, ―Article in O Brado Africano [Lourenco Marques, 3 November 1923]: Visit to Lisbon by a Representative of the Negro International, Interview with the ‗Tarde‘,‖ 131-133. Logan would become a leading scholar of African American history, spending over forty years with the history department of 54 does not explicitly reflect the Mozambican editors‘ feelings regarding the differences between DuBois and Garvey, but a tacit agreement with Logan can be implied by this silence.

The editors were familiar with Garvey‘s black nationalist program. Four years earlier, O Brado Africano had published two articles praising the launching of the Black

Star Steamship Company. DuBois himself praised the steamship line as a brilliant idea, though poorly executed.18 The Mozambican news articles were followed, on 30 July

1921, by a more negative piece entitled, ―Garveyism – The Good Side and the Bad Side,

Invective and Vituperation.‖ The latter recounts two articles in foreign presses – one by

Herbert DeLisser of the Kingston Daily Gleaner and the other by DuBois in The Crisis.

Both items characterize Garvey as a charlatan and fanatic. DeLisser focused on Garvey‘s militancy, his call for ―40 million negroes‖ to fight for freedom, ―not in an academic way, but by using their strong arms.‖ DuBois facetiously described the ―hoard of scoundrels and bubble-blowers, ready to conquer Africa, join the Russian Revolution, and vote in the

Kingdom of God tomorrow.‖ Although the foreign writers and the O Brado Africano editors pointed out positive aspects of the Garveyist program, they denounced his methods as impractical and possibly corrupt. DuBois asked for practical steps toward

Howard University, from 1938 until his death in 1982. Logan also served as an assistant to the director (1932-1933) and as director of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History (1950-1951). 18 W.E.B. DuBois, ―The Black Star Line,‖ The Crisis 24 (September 1922): 210. Dubois states, ―…a definite plan to unite Negrodom by a line of steamships was a brilliant suggestion and Garvey‘s only original contribution to the race problem.‖ He then goes on to cite apparent fraudulent financial reporting by Garvey regarding various steamerships. 55 racial uplift and questioned the value of ―collecting the pennies of the ignorant poor in shovelfuls and refusing to account for them, save with bombast and lies.‖19

The philosophy of mestiço editors João and José Albasini regarding race relations during this period prior to the rise of Salazar and the New State in Portugal was clearly aligned with the radical egalitarianism of DuBois.20 Like DuBois‘ Talented Tenth, the members of the Grêmio ―perceived themselves as the natural leaders of the majority population, civilized people who were moral, principled and knew how to civilize.‖ They asserted both their identity as middle-class Portuguese nationals and stressed their own superior position to both working-class and uneducated whites, and educated blacks who were Muslims or did not speak Portuguese.21

Members of the Liga, who had come to Lisbon under the patronage of Portuguese elites, were also receptive to Logan‘s discussion of the status of race relations in the

United States which reflected DuBois‘ so-called racial romanticism. Logan stated that racial prejudice existed in the southern states in the form of segregation, while averring that there was a ―big movement on behalf of negroes‖ in the North. As evidence, Logan described industrialist John D. Rockefeller‘s financial support of Atlanta Baptist College

19 Robert A. Hill, ―Article in O Brado Africano [Lourenco Marques, 3 November 1923]: Visit to Lisbon by a Representative of the Negro International, Interview with the ‗Tarde‘,‖ 231-232. The DuBois article referenced in O Brado Africano was in The Crisis 22:1 (May 1921): 8. 20 For more regarding radical egalitarianism and other black political ideologies, see Michael C Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 15. 21 Penvenne, ―‗We are all Portuguese!‘ Challenging the Political Economy of Assimilation: Lorenco Marques, 1870-1933,‖ 269. Allen Isaacman, on pages 20-21 of his introduction to The Life History of Raúl Honwana, notes that this air of superiority led Africans to leave the organization on two occasions. On the first, in 1920, the Africans formed an African National Congress of Mozambique with its own bilingual journal, Dambu dja Africana. Issacman also notes that, importantly, the ANC of Mozambique may have been the first African organization in southern Mozambique that was essentially political. Also significant is its ties to the South African ANC and to Clement Kadalie‘s Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICWU), the most powerful labor movement in South Africa at that time. There are indications that Kadalie and others associated with the ICWU were influenced by Garvey and the UNIA. 56

(later, Morehouse College) and Spelman Seminary (named after Rockerfeller‘s wife,

Laura Spelman Rockefeller).22 Like the Mozambicans, Logan, who had grown up among the black upper and upper-middle class in the nation‘s capital, lauded the existence of a

Negro elite, ―embracing artists, teachers, doctors, lawyers, financiers, traders, and industrialists.‖ He went on to explain that this elite ―aim[ed] at the cooperation of the white race in the progress of the negroes.‖ This aspiration included the Pan-African

Association‘s efforts to ―establish in all countries support movements among whites for negro demands.‖23 Such aspirations were clearly in line with those of the Liga.

However, while the African Americans continued to pressure the United States government and white Americans to live up to their creeds of equality, the Mozambicans‘ efforts were severely repressed. The instability of the Portuguese economy and government following the global economic depression which prompted the rise of

Salazar and the New State destroyed even the remotest possibility of such future collaboration between Portuguese and black elites in the development of Mozambican peasants.

Logan‘s assertions to the Liga Africana are supported by the three defining documents regarding Pan-Africanism that resulted from the 1921 Pan-African Congress: the Statuts of the Pan-African Association (declared 8 December 1921), ―To the World: the Manifesto of the Second Pan-African Congress,‖ and the much shorter ―Manifesto to

22 Hill, ―Article in O Brado Africano [Lourenco Marques, 3 November 1923]: Visit to Lisbon by a Representative of the Negro International, Interview with the ‗Tarde‘,‖ 131-133. 23 Ibid., 132. 57 the League of Nations.‖24 The Statuts states as its political aim that the Pan-African

Association would ―strive to call the attention of competent authorities of the various

Powers entrusted with the destiny of the Race, to the need of maintaining friendly relations with it, and of allowing and granting to it the same rights as those accorded to their other citizens or subjects.‖ That is, the Blacks from Africa, Europe, the United

States, and the Caribbean organized to negotiate with the imperial powers for reform.

The "Manifesto to the League of Nations," a much abbreviated and less controversial document than ―To the World,‖ goes further, calling for a movement by the international community toward majority rule for Blacks in territories controlled by the

European colonial members of the League of Nations. It also requests that the League of

Nations‘ International Bureau of Labor investigate the labor practices in Africa, alluding to colonial forced labor practices. Notably, however, DuBois blamed the concessionary companies, not the Portuguese government, for the exploitation of black Mozambicans.

This differs somewhat from his commentary in an article, ―Why a Pan-African

Congress,‖ published only three months earlier in which he reported on the granting of land by the Portuguese to the Mozambique Company and indicted Portugal for the resulting forced labor regime that he equated with slavery.25

DuBois‘ pardon of the Portuguese government likely arose from the fact that

Portugal sent high-ranking government officials, including the then current and former

Ministers of Colonies, to attend both the Second and Third Pan-African Congresses. It

24 Clarence G. Contee, ―The ‗Statuts‘ of the Pan-African Association of 1921: A Document,‖ African Historical Studies 3, no. 2 (1970): 412. 25 . W.E.B. DuBois, "To the World,‖ 7 and ―Why a Pan-African Congress,‖ The Crisis 22:5 (September 1921): 221-222. 58 reflects the ambiguity of DuBois and other middle-class African Americans in the decades before African independence regarding race-based solidarity with Africans.

Based upon his Crisis article, ―Pan-Africa in Portugal,‖ DuBois was swayed by the civility of Portuguese hospitality. His article relates little about the discussions of colonial reform that occurred during the Lisbon meeting, but goes on at great length about the luxury of the accommodations and ―the singularly striking‖ audience of African students from six African colonies, Goa, and the United States.26 Additionally, despite his indictment of forced labor in Mozambique, in ―To the World,‖ DuBois perpetuated the Portuguese claim of non-racialism, stating that ―Portugal and Spain have never drawn a legal caste line against persons of culture who happen to be of Negro descent.‖ This claim was further proved by an anecdote about white Portuguese waiters serving the black conferees, a circumstance which rarely occurred in the United States in 1923.

DuBois even averred that Portugal had a ―humane code for the natives.‖27

Regardless of where he placed the responsibility for forced labor in the

Portuguese colonies, by March 1923, DuBois was claiming as a triumph of the 1921 Pan-

African Congress the commencement of an investigation of slavery by the League of

Nations in 1922. DuBois; Crisis literary editor Jessie Redmon Fauset; Haitian delegate to the League of Nations Louis Danté Bellegarde; and the head of the Swiss African

Society. René Claparède personally delivered the "Manifesto to the League of Nations" to

26 W.E.B. DuBois, ―Pan-Africa in Portugal,‖ The Crisis 27 (February 1924):170. The students were from Angola, San Thomé (Sao Tomé), Mozambique, Guinea, Nigeria, and Cape Verde. DuBois erroneously includes Ajuda which was a suburb of Lisbon. Malyn Newitt points out that it was a former governor- general of Mozambique, Freire de Andrade, who attended the first Pan-African Congress in 1919 and that there were no Portuguese delegates to the fourth congress in 1927. Malyn Newitt, Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981), 145. 27 W.E.B. DuBois, ―To the World,‖ 8. 59

Albert Thomas, Director of the International Bureau of Labor.28 Also petitioning the

League of Nations on this matter were the British Anti-Slavery Society and the Swiss

Bureau for the Defense of Natives which specifically denounced forced labor in

Mozambique.

Unsurprisingly, the inquiries by the League of Nations in 1922-1923 addressed to colonial governments were not answered satisfactorily. For instance, Portugal claimed that its labor laws were ―perfect‖ and that its ―natives enjoyed complete liberty.‖ As a result of the resistance to these efforts, the League of Nations assembled a Temporary

Slavery Commission in 1924 which, although largely hamstrung by political considerations associated with the imperial nations, debated the meanings of slavery and expanded its definition to include forced labor.29 In 1927, the League of Nations adopted a Slavery Convention which was supplemented by the United Nations in 1956 to include

―institutions and practices similar to slavery.‖ Indeed, the tactic of placing a complaint regarding forced labor before an international regulatory body set a precedent replicated forty years later by DuBois‘ heir to the Pan-African movement, Ghanaian president

Kwame Nkrumah. Chapter 5 contains a detailed account of Nkrumah‘s 1961 complaint to the International Labor Organization of the United Nations which resulted in the end of de jure forced labor in Mozambique. It would, however, require an armed struggle and the collapse of the New State regime before Portugal‘s forced labor regimen would end.

Forced labor was not the only aspect of colonialism criticized by the 1921 Pan-

African Congress. ―To the World‖ is the most provocative of the three documents issued

28 W.E.B. DuBois, ―The Pan-African Congress and Native Labor,‖ The Crisis 25 (March 1924): 200. 29 Suzanne Miers, Slavery in the Twentieth Century: the Evolution of a Global Pattern (Rowman Altamira, 2003). 60 by the Congress because it clearly indicts imperialism in all of its aspects. The document's message is that world salvation depends upon social justice and racial equality, and that the colonial powers had a responsibility to support, instead of exploit, so-called ―backward‖ peoples. It demands that this support be in the form of quality education, cultural and religious freedom, as well as political and economic self- determination.

The importance ascribed to culture in these documents is not surprising considering that the president of the Pan-African Association was then Blaise Diagne, who was not only a politician but also a poet. Scholar Brent Hayes Edwards, in his influential text regarding Africans and Afro-Caribbeans in Paris during the 1930s, The

Practice of Diaspora, discusses Diagne's relationship to such intellectuals as Léopold

Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, and the Nardal sisters. Edwards also examines the interactions between this community and the New Negro movement in the United States, pointing out that both groups were striving to redeem black culture, to transform the perception of black culture from primitive to modern, from uncivilized to civilized. The documents promote intellectual and moral growth through the spread of culture and the creation of a large ―elite‖ of leaders with ―high ideals.‖30 The key to creating such an elite class of leaders was believed then, as now, to be quality education.

During the 1920‘s, in addition to W.E.B. DuBois and the Pan-African

Association‘s efforts to provoke reform through the League of Nations, other international non-governmental organizations were advocating for reform of colonial

30 Contee, ―The ‗Statuts‘ of the Pan-African Association of 1921,‖ 412; Brent Hayes Edwards, The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black Internationalism (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003); Russell G. Hamilton, Voices from an empire (U of Minnesota Press, 1975), 168. 61 education in Africa. One such organization, the African Education Commission, was sponsored by an American foundation, the Phelps-Stokes Fund, and the International

Education Board. It toured East and West African territories in July 1920-August 1924 in order to present the conditions of ―native‖ education … with suggestions for their improvement.31 The findings of the Commission were not critical of colonialism.

However, the Commission did provide a framework for a greater number of Africans to receive an education, albeit to allow the imperial nations to groom both a larger cadre of

African leaders for the system of indirect rule and a more pliable labor force.

The work of this Commission had unexpected results. Among the members of the

Commission was James Emman Kwegyir Aggrey, a Gold Coast intellectual who had spent much of his life in the United States. Africanist and education historian Kenneth

James King has noted that one of the reasons that the Commission‘s chairman, Thomas

Jesse Jones, invited Aggrey to join the otherwise all-white research group was in response to the Second Pan-African Congress that had been called by his arch-rival

DuBois.32 Aggrey, who had come to the United Stated on an African Methodist

Episcopal (AME) Church scholarship, shared Jones belief in religious and industrial education for Negroes, both in the southern United States and Africa. In addition, Aggrey

31 African Education Commission, 1923-1924, Education in East Africa; a Study of East, Central and South Africa by the Second African Education Commission Under the Auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, in Cooperation with the International Education Board (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1970), xiii. 32 Kenneth King, Pan-Africanism and Education: A Study of Race Philanthropy and Education in the Southern States of America and East Africa, Oxford studies in African affairs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 145. 62 scholar Edwin W. Smith, writing in 1929, praised the young African‘s ―constructive attitude towards the perplexing problems of racial relations.‖33

This conciliatory attitude, an avid desire for cooperation between the races, has led many scholars erroneously to deem Aggrey to have been ―depoliticized‖ by his educational experience in the United States.34 It was not only his American education, but his Christian mission education which underpinned Aggrey‘s racial romanticism.

Aggrey was a believer in ―Christ‘s law of non-resistance,‖ and used humor to cover his anger regarding racial injustice.35 Aggrey did, nonetheless, express his politics, sometimes fiercely, as with his own repudiation of Marcus Garvey‘s militancy.36 More often, Aggrey cloaked his political messages in cultural pronouncements of race pride or coded them in parables. During his travels with the Commission, he spoke of a restless

Africa which stood for self-realization, that represented ―power just breaking through.‖37

Such African nationalists as Malawi‘s Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Nigeria‘s Nnamdi

Azikiwe, and ‘s Kwame Nkrumah credit Aggrey with inspiring them to work toward such an African breakthrough. Mozambican nationalist Eduardo Mondlane, whose early life history and disposition bear a striking resemblance to Aggrey‘s, would also admire Aggrey. These leaders, however, represent the exceptions rather than the majority of colonial subjects trapped in educational systems which promoted agricultural and vocational curricula.

33 Edwin William Smith, Aggrey of Africa; a Study in Black and White (New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc, 1930), 144. 34 James T Campbell, Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church Inthe United States and South Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 250. 35 Smith, Aggrey of Africa; a Study in Black and White, 56. 36 Ibid., 122. 37 Ibid., 118. 63

Thomas Jesse Jones, the chairman of the African Education Commission was an advocate of ―educational adaptations,‖ that is, education that ―draws out the power of the

Native African and fits him to meet the specific problems and needs of his individual and community life.‖38 Jones was the Director of Research at the Phelps-Stokes Fund and had taught at Hampton Institute.39 Like Gilberto Freyre, Jones studied sociology at

Columbia University under Franklin Henry Giddings.40 He believed in Anglo-Saxon superiority. He also believed, despite his association with Booker T. Washington, that

African Americans were genetically incapable of exercising political power. He thought that the African American masses needed industrial education in order to evolve to participate in the American democracy. As a Protestant minister, Jones was of the opinion that religious education was the most important for Negroes. In 1913-1917, he headed a General Education Board study of Negro education in the South and published a report, Negro Education: A Study of Private and Higher Schools for Colored People in the United States. The report disdained the liberal education programs of such institutions as Fisk and Howard.41 The models recommended by the African Education Commission for the educational adaptations to promote industrial and agricultural education were the

Hampton and Tuskegee Institutes in the United States.42

38 African Education Commission, 1923-1924, Education in East Africa; a Study of East, Central and South Africa by the Second African Education Commission Under the Auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, in Cooperation with the International Education Board, xvii. 39 Edward H. Berman, ―American Influence on African Education: The Role of the Phelps-Stokes Fund‘s Education Commissions,‖ Comparative Education Review 15, no. 2 (June 1971): 132-133. 40 Jones also encouraged Aggrey to study with Giddings, which he did, earning a doctorate in sociology in 1924. 41 Donald Johnson, ―W.E.B. DuBois, Thomas Jesse Jones and the Struggle for Social Education, 1900- 1930,‖ The Journal of Negro History 85, no. 3 (July 1, 2000): 78-81. 42 In 1924, James E. K. Aggrey would become the first Vice Principal of the Gold Coast‘s Achimota College, an educational model which combined secondary and college education and vocational with some 64

In the June 1926 edition of The Crisis, DuBois criticized the African Education

Commission report just as he had Jones‘ 1917 study of Negro education in the South.

Contrary to Jones, DuBois called for ―a change in attitude on the part of the world toward

Africa.‖ He called for a program that promoted ―modern education of the natives aiming at intelligence as well as technique, and carried out by indigenous schools and native students trained in culture[d] lands.‖43 DuBois‘ call would echo later among African nationalists at the Afro-Asian and Pan-African conferences of the late 1950s and early

1960s.

Although its recommendations regarding vocational education for Africans is not surprising, the Commission‘s 1925 report was not completely predictable. Expectedly, the Commission noted the British colonial government‘s ―genuine efforts … to realize the ideals of the authority and responsibility of the mandate.‖ Its recommendations included greater cooperation between government and mission schools, including grants, some administrative changes, and that the Department of Education make decisions regarding what languages should be taught and used in teaching.44 In comparison, the findings and recommendations of the Commission regarding Mozambique are telling, especially considering the Commission‘s clear Western imperialist bias.

core liberal arts courses in a co-ed institution. Discussions of the shortcomings of the report, including the Commission‘s racist educational philosophy, can be found in the following texts. W.E.B. DuBois, ―Education in Africa: A Review of the Recommendations of the African Education Committee,‖ The Crisis 32, no. 2 (June 1926): 86-89; Martin H. Y Kaniki, ed., Tanzania Under Colonial Rule (London: Longman, 1980), 236-275. 43 W.E.B. DuBois, ―Again, Africa,‖ The Crisis 23 (April 1922): 251-252. 44 African Education Commission, 1923-1924, Education in East Africa; a Study of East, Central and South Africa by the Second African Education Commission Under the Auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, in Cooperation with the International Education Board, 188-192. 65

The Commission lamented that the colony ―presents colonial and educational problems that seem almost insoluble.‖ These problems included the lack of sufficient colonial administration, especially in the territories of the concessionary companies, the profusion of migratory labor, and the lack of government support for mission education

(this in a period before the 1940 Concordat). Also significant is its statement that

―Rumours of forced labor have been heard in other colonies, but nowhere have they been sufficiently definite and persistent to warrant mention as an obstacle to Native development.‖ It continues with statements that presage Perry Anderson‘s characterization of Portuguese ―ultracolonialism.‖ The Commission states, ―Elsewhere, too, there have been definite guarantees that the appearance of force would be severely condemned and eradicated. Unfortunately in the Portuguese Colonies it has not been possible to find any adequate guarantee that forced labor cannot exist.‖ In summation, the Commission avers, ―There are problems of economics, of hygiene and sanitation, agricultural development, roads and highways, the effective and humane use of labor, land tenure and political administration, that are worthy of consideration by the most experienced students of colonial policies.‖45

The Commission‘s findings regarding the Portuguese colonies can be attributed, at least in part, to the experiences of Aggrey. So notable are these experiences that

Edwin Smith quoted extensively an entry in Aggrey‘s journal, dated 9 February 1921.

Aggrey described in horrified detail a scene of starving and hopeless men, women, and children being forced to build a road ―that an auto runs over only once in a long, long while.‖ Supporting Anderson‘s future appellation of ultra-colonialism, Aggrey wrote that

45 Ibid., 312-313; Smith, Aggrey of Africa; a Study in Black and White, 160. 66 seeing Africans working on roads was not uncommon, but that these ―little boys and girls‖ appeared to be nearly starved to death and ―not naked but unclothed in rags of strips of skin or bark.‖46

Unfortunately, this international commission‘s call for such interventions in

Portugal‘s African colonies came during the most instable period of modern Portuguese history as the Republic gave way to the repressive Estado Novo. Instead of initiating colonial reform, the Portuguese government leveraged racial, ethnic, and class cleavages among Mozambicans, effectively suppressing the growth of organized resistance from

1925-1940. By mid-century, the colonial administration had erected even greater obstacles to fledgling in its so-called overseas territories.

Although the attempts by such organizations as the Pan African Congress

Association and African Education Commission to mobilize international pressure on the

Portuguese government to end forced labor and improve its colonial education system yielded no results in the short-term, they provided the framework for future advocacy, particularly by the American Committee on Africa, detailed in Chapters 4-6. This new

Mozambican nationalism would no longer be a cry for colonial reform, but for the end of

Portuguese colonialism and the building of a new nation. Because of the intransigence of

Salazar and the repressiveness Portuguese administration, this new nationalism would emerge outside of Mozambique, among a new generation of Pan-African nationalists.

Mozambican Nationalism and a New Pan-Africanism

46 Smith, Aggrey of Africa; a Study in Black and White, 160. 67

In defiance of the post-World War II spirit of burgeoning nationalism throughout the colonized world, supported by the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the 1945 Charter of the

United Nations, the Estado Novo regime further tightened its repressive control over its

African colonies. In 1945, the Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International and State Defense Police, or PIDE) was established with headquarters in all of the

African territories.47 In 1951, territories which had formerly been part of its ―Colonial

Empire‖ became integrated as ―overseas provinces‖ and whites (many unemployed or imprisoned) were encouraged to immigrate to the colonies. In addition to efforts by

Portuguese officials to limit educational opportunities for Africans, certain black elites were now encouraged to attend university in Lisbon in order to inculcate them with lusophone culture and to inhibit the growth of nationalism within the tiny bourgeois and intellectual community. Like the educational reforms recommended by the African

Education Commission, Portugal‘s efforts to control lusophone African intellectuals had unintended consequences. In Portugal, these students found new influences, ideas, and networks. Instead of being more strongly influenced by the Portuguese, these young black intellectuals gained access to non-Portuguese European society as well as intellectual and political currents that encouraged a transnational struggle for African self-determination.

While in the metropole capital, future lusophone African revolutionary leaders such as Eduardo Mondlane and of FRELIMO, and and Mario Pinto de Andrade of the MPLA met at a Center for African Studies, the Casa

47 The PIDE replaced the PVDE (Polícia de Vigilância e de Defesa do Estado or State Defense and Surveillance Police) that had been established by Salazar in 1933. 68 dos Estudantes do Império (House for Students of the Empire). This center was founded in the spring of 1950 by Amílcar Cabral, who would become Secretary-General of the

Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the

Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, or PAIGC). The Center radicalized its membership with activities that included the monitoring of international political developments and discussions of works by francophone African writers, black American intellectuals, and the publications of Asian independence movements.48 Scholar and filmmaker Manthia Diawara describes, in The Search for Africa, the spirit imbued in the works of such francophone writers as Césaire and Fanon, a spirit not only of nationalism, but of revolution. He states ―The idea that Negritude was bigger even than Africa, that we were part of an international moment which held the promise of universal emancipation, that our destiny coincided with the universal freedom of workers and colonized people worldwide – all this gave us a bigger and more important identity than the ones previously available to us through kinship, ethnicity, and race.‖ The power of

Africa sensed by Aggrey a quarter-century earlier was surging. Breaking the chains of colonialism, Christianity, racial self-hate, and tribalism, this new generation of Africans felt themselves in the vanguard of cultural internationalism. Diawara continues, ―The awareness of our new historical mission freed us from what we regarded in those days as the archaic identities of our fathers and their religious entrapments; it freed us from race and banished our fear of the whiteness of French identity. To be labeled the saviors of humanity, when only recently we had been colonized and despised by the world, gave us

48 John Fobanjong, ―Articulating Cabral‘s Regionalist and Pan-Africanist Vision in the Age of Globalization,‖ in The Life, Thought, and Legacy of Cape Verde‘s Freedom Fighter Amilcar Cabral (1924- 1973): Essays on his Liberation Philosophy (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd., 2006), 151. 69 a feeling of righteousness, which bred contempt for capitalism, racialism of all origins, and tribalism.‖49

As will be seen in Chapter 3, the life and philosophy of Eduardo Mondlane and

FRELIMO‘s program reflect this revolutionary spirit.50 Marcelino dos Santos, future vice president of an independent Mozambique, was (and continues to be) possibly the most influential radical in FRELIMO. Dos Santos, whose father was an active member of the

Centro Associação Africana, shared his family‘s dedication to supporting a unified struggle for social justice and racial equality in Mozambique. Dos Santos spoke the language of revolution of this period – poetry.51 As a poet, dos Santos‘ works appeared in O Brado Africano and were, with those of MPLA leader, Agostinho Neto, part of anthologies published by the Casa dos Estudantes do Império in Lisbon.

In 1950, after the first arrest of Neto and departure of Mondlane, dos Santos left

Lisbon for Paris. There he lived among the influential intellectuals, writers, artists and founders of the Négritude movement associated with the literary journal, Présence

Africaine. These intellectuals included Léopold Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, and Léon-

Gontran Damas. The African diasporic cultural influences on dos Santos can be seen in the second stanza of a poem written in 1953:

49 Quoted in the introduction by Robin D. G. Kelley to Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, 26. The ideology of Négritude, especially as espoused by Senghor, would be opposed, because the ideology was perceived as reifying European values and philosophies, as an ―anti-racist‖ , or as proposing a diasporic unity that denied the difference among black people. Babacar Camara, Marxist Theory, Black/African Specificities, and Racism (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), 37-38 and 49-52. 50 The Angolan members of the Center were also affiliated with the Angolan Communist Party (which would become the MPLA in December 1956) which had been a cell of the Portuguese Communist Party since 1948. 51 Robin D.G.Kelley, introduction to Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, 17-18. Kelley cites Césaire‘s 1944 essay, ―Poetry and Cognition‖ as representing ―one of his most systematic statements on the revolutionary nature of poetry.‖ 70

And if it is my voice that is heard, if it is I who still sing, It is because I cannot die, But only the moon hears my anguish ...

I am there in America also, Yes, I am ... if I am here, vibrantly alive in the voice of Robeson and Hughes, of Césaire and Guillén, Godido and Black Boy Reborn ...

If I am here, a solid incarnation, the conscious of men, who composed the poems, of life and death, of the end of night, and the coming of the day.52

In 1957, with other Africans from the lusophone colonies, dos Santos founded the

Anti-Colonial Movement (MAC), an organization developed to coordinate the campaign for independence from Portuguese colonial rule. This influential organization would change its name twice, becoming the Conference of Nationalist Organizations from the

Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) at a meeting in Casablanca in April 1961. He was elected permanent secretary-general charged with coordinating nationalist activity in an effort to force an immediate end to colonial rule. From CONCP's headquarters in Rabat, dos

Santos assumed his role of publicizing the nationalist struggle for an international

52 Eduardo Mondlane, Panaf Great Lives (London: Panaf Books Ltd, 1972), 98-100. Dos Santos honors Americans Paul Robeson and Langston Hughes, as well as Afro-Cuban Communist poet, Nicolás Guillén Batista. He also mentions two works of fiction regarding the oppression of black men: Richard Wright‘s Black Boy and Godido e outros contos (Godido and Other Tales) by Mozambican writer, João Dias. Godido, the first collection of Mozambican historical fiction depicting the life of a colonial subject, was published by the Casa dos Estudantes do Império. 71 audience.53 One forum for dos Santos, as well as other exiled Mozambicans, to engage with other African and Asian nationalists as they shared and debated ideas regarding nation-building and international diplomacy were the solidarity conferences held throughout the global South during the years of FRELIMO‘s formation.

Education and Afro-Asian Solidarity

Since education is one of the most important agencies of social cohesion and economic progress, the right of the individual to educational facilities should be recognized. The state must enact the necessary laws of compulsory (elementary) education for all children, with all corollary provisions, adequate to the fulfillment of its obligations. The principle of equality of educational opportunities for all citizens, regardless of race, religion, sex or financial ability, must be effectively applied with all its implications and ramifications. Organized campaign[s] to combat illiteracy among adults must be launched on a nation- wide basis for the re-education of citizens.54 - Excerpt of the Declaration of the Afro-Asian Peoples‘ Solidarity Conference –

Following the Second World War, Afro-Asian nationalists attended a multitude of conferences in which they discussed and debated the issues of nation-building, international and regional cooperation, economic development, world peace in the nuclear age, and their political status within the context of an international system dominated by the United States and Soviet Union. Perhaps the most famous Asian-

African Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia from 18 – 24 April 1955.

Sponsored by the governments of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, the conference was attended by representatives of the governments of 24 other countries, including five African territories. The final communiqué of the Bandung Conference

53 ―Marcelino dos Santos Biography | Encyclopedia of World Biography Biography,‖ BookRags, n.d., http://www.bookrags.com/biography/marcelino-dos-santos/; V. G Shubin, The Hot ―Cold War‖: The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 7-8. 54 Afro-Asian Peoples‘ Solidarity Conference, Afro-Asian Peoples‘ Solidarity Conference, Cairo, December26, 1957-January 1, 1958 (: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1958), 254. 72 included a section on cultural cooperation that refuted the imperial nations‘ civilizing missions by declaring the status of Asia and Africa as the ―cradle of great religions and civilizations.‖ The Bandung nations lamented the loss of cultural contact due to colonialism and also the suppression of their national cultures by racialism.

Like the Pan-African Congresses nearly a quarter of a century early, these conferees suggested that a remedy to this cultural alienation and underdevelopment was the establishment of educational, scientific, and technical institutions. These attendees, however, were not relying on the ―attention of competent authorities of the various

Powers entrusted with the destiny of the Race‖ to provide these institutions.55 They called for the support and sharing of resources by the most advanced attendees (e.g.,

People‘s Republic of China, , and ). In recognition of those peoples who remained oppressed, the representatives stated that ―such facilities should also be made available to the Asian and African people in Africa, to whom opportunities for acquiring higher education are at present denied.‖ For the nationalists, these pronouncements were aligned with and integral to their political declarations regarding self-determination and human rights, as well as their statements of economic cooperation. For instance, the latter section of the communiqué concerning economics specifically included the exchange of experts and the establishment of training and research institutes. 56

Two years later, in the ―spirit of Bandung,‖ a conference of Afro-Asian non- governmental organizations took place in Cairo from 26 December 1957 – 1 January

55 Clarence G. Contee, ―The "Statuts" of the Pan-African Association of 1921: A Document,‖ 412. 56 Carlos P Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung (Chapel Hill: Univeristy of North Carolina Press, 1956), 95- 97; Kweku Ampiah, The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: The Reactions of the US, UK and Japan (Folkestone, UK: Global Oriental, 2007), 224-225. 73

1958. Unlike Bandung, the Soviet Union was present and provided the impetus for this

Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference attended by representatives of 45 Afro-Asian countries. Notwithstanding the Soviet and Chinese presence, the attendees clearly pronounced their non-aligned stance. Future Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat, then deputy speaker of Egypt‘s National Assembly, delivered the keynote address in which he reaffirmed the political stance adopted by those at the Bandung Conference. He stated,

―The neutralism in which we believe means that we should keep aloof from international blocs and at the same time make positive efforts to bring about a rapprochement between those blocs.‖57 Although also adopting the other political, social, cultural, and economic resolutions of Bandung, the Declaration of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference was far more specific regarding the significance of education. The representatives made a long series of recommendations regarding educational institutions and programs, including those in the epigraph.

In the Preamble to the section of the Declaration entitled, ―On Cultural Exchange and Cooperation,‖ the representatives clearly state the reasons for the 25-point recommendations, including their effort to debunk the civilizing mission myth and to reassert their cultural heritage. They stated that ―civilization is a common heritage which no one nation can monopolize and to which all men have an inherent right, and that all nations should cooperate wholeheartedly to develop, enrich and propagate it to the utmost

57 Quoted in Colin Legum, Bandung, Cairo and ; a Report on the First Conference of Independent African States (London: Africa Bureau, 1958), 7. 74 possible extent so that all men, regardless of their race, colour, environment or religion may partake of its benefits.‖58

To that end, the representatives prescribed the development of educational institutions and programs that preserved and disseminated Afro-Asian languages, arts, and letters. Particularly, the conferees requested the inclusion of Afro-Asian studies in school syllabi with an emphasis on the commonality of these nations‘ historical experience and developmental needs. They called for the creation of a historical and geographical encyclopedia on the history of African and Asian nations and peoples

―explaining the contribution of every people to its national culture and the part it played in the prosecution of its national struggle …‖59 Other ways in which the conferees wished to assure the ―re-education‖ of their citizens as prescribed in the epigraph, included recommendations that:

8. …Afro-Asian governments should pay special attention to the teaching of the principal languages of Africa and Asia … 11. …the governments of member- nations should spare no efforts for the abolition of illiteracy. … 17. …[the governments should ensure] the revision of text-books used in Afro-Asian schools, with a view to removing incorrect information due to imperialist influence …60

These themes are echoed in the 17-point program for cultural and educational cooperation in the Declaration of the Conference of Independent African States. The conference, hosted by President Kwame Nkrumah, began on Africa Freedom Day, 15

April 1958, and included Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia,

58 Afro-Asian Peoples‘ Solidarity Conference, Afro-Asian Peoples‘ Solidarity Conference, Cairo, December26, 1957-January 1, 1958, 257-258. 59 Kevin Kelly Gaines, American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era, The John Hope Franklin series in African American history and culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 149. W.E.B. DuBois would be commissioned by Ghanaian President Nkrumah as the executive director of the Encyclopedia Africana in 1961. 60 Afro-Asian Peoples‘ Solidarity Conference, Afro-Asian Peoples‘ Solidarity Conference, Cairo, December26, 1957-January 1, 1958, 260-261. 75 and the United Arab Republic. The eight nations vowed ―to promote and facilitate the exchange of teachers, professors, students, exhibitions, educational and cultural and scientific material‖ to improve cultural relations between African states and to assert their

―African Personality.‖61 To ensure the authenticity of the pedagogy, conferees also expressed their desire for Africans to be taught about Africa by Africans.62

Although not a participant in these three conferences, Marcelinos dos Santos, as a representative of MAC, attended the Afro-Asian Writers‘ Conference at Tashkent in

October 1958 and the January 1960 Second All-African Peoples‘ Conference in Tunis where similar educational resolutions were made.63 Mozambicans would benefit from the debates and resolutions passed, and the growing Pan-Africanism espoused by such leaders as Nasser, Nkrumah, and Nyerere. These leaders and such organizations as the

Tanzanian and Kenyan African National Unions would provide models and material support to CONCP and early Mozambican liberation organizations. Thus, the conferences of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the Pan-African impetus that inspired them, were a part of the transnational framework of influences and developments that were shaping and producing the Mozambican struggle for freedom.

61 Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonizationand Development with Particular Reference to the African Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1965), 79. ―African Personality‖ is an amorphous and contested term. Like Negritude, such detractors as claim that the term is too much a reaction to the ―othering‖ of Africans by Europeans, therefore, reifying racialism. In this case, I am using the term as it was espoused by Kwame Nkrumah who understood ―African Personality‖ to be ―defined by the cluster of humanist principles which underlie the traditional African society.‖ 62 Legum, Bandung, Cairo and Accra ; a Report on the First Conference of Independent African States, 28 and 22. 63 John A Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1969), 42-43; ―All- African‘s People‘s Conferences,‖ International Organization 16, no. 2 (Spring 1962): 432. At the Tunis conference, the Anti-Colonial Movement (MAC) was renamed the African Revolutionary Front for National Independence (FRAIN). 76

These Pan-African conferences were a crucial forum for expatriate lusophone

African nationalists to gain knowledge about the struggles for self-determination being waged throughout the continent and to mobilize support for their own nascent independence movement. Rural and poor urban Blacks within Mozambique learned of the independence struggles in other territories from migrant laborers, South African newspapers, and radio broadcasts. The relationship among migratory and forced labor, potential anti-colonialism, technology, and education is succinctly described in an assessment of Mozambique provided to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk by Consul

General Thomas K. Wright in 1963. He stated, ―A tour of duty with the Portuguese military or work in the mines of South Africa with much better wages and better health and working conditions together with the advent of the transistor radio is slowly but surely spreading the word ―out back‖ about the real or imaginary advantages of town life, not the least of which is a chance to acquire some ―book learning.‖64

An article in a popular radical South African news bulletin, Contact for United

Non-Racial Action, entitled, ―Your Radio Can Take You to Free Africa,‖ details how easily Africans could access radio stations in other parts of the continent using a transistor radio. The article notes that all that was needed was a ―radio and 40 feet of aerial wire trailing along the gutter of the home …,‖ and details which stations could be reached using different lengths of wire.65 Radio stations with programs accessible to

Mozambicans in the early 1960s included Radio Brazzaville, broadcasting from the

64 Wright to Rusk, 16 September 1963, National Security Subject Files, Box 142A, Mozambique folder, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKL). 65 ―Your Radio Can Take You to Free Africa,‖ Contact for United Non-Racial Action Newsletter, 4 October 1963 (6:20): 2. William B. Lloyd Papers, Box 4, Folder 10, Northwestern University Africana Library (NWU-AL-WBL). 77 capital of the former French Congo, which had a Portuguese news service twice daily; the

People‘s Republic of China‘s Radio Peking which broadcast in simple and clear

Portuguese several times daily; and, the Lusaka Station of the Central African Federation which had several broadcasts in Ndebele (a Zulu dialect) which many southern

Mozambicans understood.66

Other transnational influences in the development of nationalism in Mozambique were the anti-colonial struggles of other Portuguese territories. In 1961, the Angolans began their armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism. That same year, the leaders from the Makonde tribe in northern Mozambique, an that straddles the

Tanzanian-Mozambique border, formed the Mozambique African National Union

(MANU) in Mombasa, Kenya. MANU was comprised of a coalition of several smaller groups, including the Mozambique Makonde Union which had been decimated by the

1960 Mueda Massacre. MANU was led by Mozambican nationalists who had escaped persecution by the PIDE, including its president, Matthew Mmole, and its secretary- general, Lawrence Malinga Milinga. Besides its acronym, MANU resembled the

Tanzanian nationalist organization, TANU (Tanganika African National Union), and the

Kenyan organization, KANU (Kenya Africa National Union), in its political organization. Because of the strength of the Makonde, its location, and its affiliation with these successful nationalist organizations, MANU was one of the most important groups in the coalition that established FRELIMO a year later.

66 Attachment to a Confidential memo on ―Present Conditions in Mozambique,‖ dated 1May 1961, (possibly from Dr. Robert Parsons to Theodore Tucker), RG8, Box 15, Folder 13, The Presbyterian Historical Society (PHS). Although unsigned, it is clear that the author of this document was Eduardo Mondlane, reporting on his 1961 return to Mozambique. This document was also attached to General Consul Thomas Wright‘s 16 September 1963 letter to Secretary of State Rusk. 78

The smallest of the three groups was the African National Union of Independent

Mozambique (UNAMI), formed by Mozambicans exiled in Nyasaland (later, Malawi).

Its membership was from the which bordered Malawi and which would become the target area for FRELIMO infiltration into Mozambique following Malawian independence in 1966. It was a letter from UNAMI leader José Baltazar da Costa

Changong‘a in early 1961 that inspired Eduardo Mondlane to return to tour Mozambique under the aegis of the United Nations.

Many of FRELIMO‘s leaders would be chosen from UDENAMO, an organization established in October 1960 by migrant laborers and disaffected students from central and southern Mozambique living in Southern Rhodesia. Among these leaders was Marcelino dos Santos, who joined the Paris branch of this organization, thus acting as a liaison between UDENAMO and CONCP. The important consideration of who would lead a unified Mozambican liberation front also came under CONCP‘s purview, as well as that of the influential Pan-Africanist leaders, Nkrumah and Nyerere.

At a conference held on 13-15 June 1962, CONCP urged the three exiled

Mozambican liberation organizations to unite and to act. The CONCP leaders cited

Mozambican nationalists‘ responsibility to ―the struggle for the urgent liquidation of

Portuguese colonialism‖ because Mozambique was the most populous and one of the richest lusophone colonies. 67

67 CONCP, ―To the Nationalists of Mozambique,‖ in Bragança and Wallerstein, The African Liberation Reader, 1:116. 79

Chitofo Gwambe, the head of UDENAMO and a frontrunner for the leadership of a unified liberation front, was suspected of collaborating with the PIDE. CONCP’s censure of Gwambe provided the opportunity for Eduardo Mondlane, a Mozambican intellectual who spent over a decade studying and working in the United States, to return to Africa and assume the leadership of FRELIMO. Throughout the 1960s, Mondlane and the network of American activists he developed during his time in the U.S. would use the fight against Mozambican illiteracy and Portugal’s forced labor regimen to mobilize international support for FRELIMO.

80

CHAPTER THREE: EDUARDO CHIVAMBO MONDLANE -- THE SOUL OF MOZAMBICAN LIBERATION

Mondlane is an honest man, however he is not a politician, but a missionary … Mario Pinto de Andrade (early leader of the MPLA)

Everyone knows and we know that FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane is an American, but now there is no [other] man in Mozambique who could lead this struggle and around whom the forces struggling for independence could unite … Mondlane up to now is the only man – educated, who has connections and influence abroad … Marcelinos dos Santos (CONCP Secretary-General)1

The life and work of FRELIMO‘s leaders, especially Mondlane, provide a framework through which to study the role of the organization and its revolution during the 1960s and 1970s.2 The opening statements by lusophone African nationalists in a discussion with a Soviet representative of the Afro-Asian People‘s Solidarity Organization in 1963, are true to a certain extent. Yet, they neither express the full nature of FRELIMO‘s leader nor how these attributes contributed to his development of a revolutionary platform and transnational network of supporters. Mondlane confronted the monumental task of leading both the destruction of colonialism and the creation of a new society in

Mozambique. This task was complicated by Mozambique‘s position as a so-called frontline states bordering on the redoubt of white supremacy, South Africa and Southern

1 Quoted in Shubin, The Hot ―Cold War,‖ 121-122. 2 Samora Machel, the second president of FRELIMO stated that ―More than anyone else, Eduardo Mondlane symbolized our struggle to free Man from the colonial yoke and from obscurantism.‖ Samora Machel, ―Educate Man to Win the War, Create a New Society and Develop our Country,‖ a speech before the Second Conference of the Department of Education and Culture, September 1970, in Mozambique: Sowing the Seeds of Revolution (: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1981 [first published by the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola & Guine, London]), 33. 81

Rhodesia. To do so, Mondlane applied methods espoused by such leaders and intellectuals as Ghana‘s Kwame Nkrumah, Franz Fanon, and fellow lusophone nationalist

Amílcar Cabral. He evaluated what was best in traditional society and among the competing modernities represented by Western capitalism and Eastern communism (as practiced by both the Soviets and Chinese). Mondlane advocated a non-racial, socialist revolution that would destroy colonialism and tribalism, as well as promote universal education and equality for women. This advocacy won Mondlane and FRELIMO the military support of socialist and Communist countries, and the financial and propaganda support of an international network of activists and humanitarian organizations. It also earned FRELIMO the vilification of the fascist Portuguese government, its NATO allies,

South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and even some black Mozambicans.

Like many other African leaders of his generation, Mondlane‘s life and philosophy were shaped, in part, by the global upheaval and transformation following the

First World War. Born in the interwar years, Mondlane grew up in the period when

Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar consolidated his right-wing corporatist dictatorship, first as the Minister of Finance in1926, and then as Prime Minister. Salazar created his authoritarian regime in reaction to the chaos of the previous Portuguese

Republican period (1910-1926), the carnage of World War I, and the global economic depression of the 1920s-1930s.3 As shown in the last chapter, at the same historical moment when Salazar tightened governmental control over the colonial economy and the

3 António Ferro, Salazar; Portugal and Her Leader (London: Faber and Faber limited, 1939), 26. During the republican period (1910-1926), there were eight Presidents, over forty Cabinets, and over twenty uprisings. Salazar‘s dictatorship insulated Portugal from the destabilizing effects of the global economic depression. 82 lives of native Mozambicans with the indigenato, members of the African Diaspora were expressing their solidarity through such events as the Pan-African Congresses. They asserted their cultural and political nationalism in the Harlem Renaissance and the

Négritude movement of Senghor, Césaire, and Damas. Although it is not clear how much Mondlane was influenced by early Pan-Africanism and Négritude, a poem that he wrote in 1942 praising the renowned Gold Coast (later Ghana) scholar and missionary,

James E. K. Aggrey, makes it clear that the young man had been exposed to the celebration of Blackness and African culture espoused by these movements even before his time at the Center for African Studies in Lisbon.4

Such sentiments were significant since, despite his noble birth, Mondlane experienced fully the inequalities of a colonial subject. As a child, he witnessed his mother being underpaid for her small harvest raised in the poor soil of their shamba and overcharged for cheaply made products by Asian merchants. His interest in politics was stimulated by his mother‘s continual references to Portuguese oppression. His uncle, a paramount chief in southern Mozambique, died after serving twenty-five years in prison for opposing the Portuguese system. Mondlane also missed the fraternal guidance of his older brothers who went to the South African mines to escape chibalo labor. The women of his family were often jailed because the men in South Africa did not pay their head taxes.5 As a young man, Mondlane was himself jailed in Lourenço Marques for

4 Chitlangou, Chitlangou, Son of a Chief (Westport, Conn: Negro Universities Press, 1971), 203. Mondlane quotes Aggrey‘s vision for a united and modern Africa, ―I put my hand before my eyes and I see in Africa, from north to south, from east to west, bridges and roads and hospitals and schools, and thousands of men and women living a new life; and all that comes from Christ. Only the best is good enough for Africa.‖ 5 Biographical information provided to Oberlin College by Eduardo Mondlane on 1 December 1966, RG 28, Box 724, Biographical Information folder, OCA. 83 forgetting his carderneta: ―Domestic worker‘s labour card, with photograph and fingerprints; receipt for the last payment of tax; the certificate provided by the Prefecture at Manjakaz [also, Manjacaze]; [and,] his pupil‘s certificate, signed by the missionary, proof that the bearer was a scholar.‖6

Through educational opportunities in Protestant missions, Mondlane was able to escape some of the ravages experienced by his family as a result of the migratory and forced labor requirements of Portuguese colonialism. As a young man, his participation in religious youth organizations (mintlawas), developed his leadership and organizational skills. His exposure to such simple modern conveniences and services enjoyed by ―non- natives‖ as medical clinics also made Mondlane critical of certain elements of traditional society, including harmful practices of traditional healers, exploitative traditional leadership, and gender inequalities. Mondlane‘s mission education allowed him to journey around southern Mozambique, experiencing both the rural and urban lifestyles and developing relationships with Africans and Europeans. It also prepared him for future travels throughout Africa, Europe, Asia, and the United States.

Mondlane‘s experiences in South Africa, Portugal, and the United States exposed him to Afro-Asian nationalism and varying forms of racial injustice -- from apartheid in

South Africa, to Jim Crow in the southern United States, to European ethnocentrism and paternalism. The twelve years that he spent in the United States were particularly transformational. He arrived there in 1950 as a Methodist Crusade Scholar with aspirations to become a sociologist and a mission leader. He left in 1963 to become the president of the Mozambican Liberation Front.

6 Chitlangou, Chitlangou, Son of a Chief, 184. 84

Although his educational experiences, marriage, and acquaintance with key people who would become his allies in Mozambique‘s armed struggle against Portugal would greatly benefit him, Mondlane‘s ties to the United States would also call into question his revolutionary qualifications. Despite being considered moderate and pro-

American by some, Mondlane‘s objective was to create in FRELIMO a vanguard organization that would bring about revolutionary change in not only Mozambique, but all of Africa.7

Mondlane was born on 20 June 1920 in a small village in the District of

Manjacaze, the former capital of the legendary Gaza emperor Gungunhana. His father was Nwadjahana Mussengane Mondlane, a Tsonga chieftain who died when Eduardo was a young child. With the chief‘s death, the village began to disintegrate. A majority of the adult male villagers went to work in the South African mines of the Northern

Transvaal. As shown in the first chapter, this migrant work exemplified South Africa‘s central position in the regional economy. Mondlane had a deeply personal understanding of the impact of this migratory labor on black Mozambican families. One of his older brothers died from lung disease contracted in the mines of ―Joni.‖ Another was killed working as a contract laborer on the docks in Lourenço Marques.

Mondlane also told stories about his eldest brother, Tiago Magulan . These stories reflected the despair of black Mozambican men and the corruption of traditional society by colonialism. Mondlane told of Magulan‘s alcoholism, his physical violence and abusiveness, and his efforts to sell his sisters and daughter for his own profit, instead of

7 Henriksen, Thomas H., ―The Revolutionary Thought of Eduardo Mondlane,‖ Geneve-Afrique 12, no. 1 (January 1973): 51. 85 using the bride-price to benefit his family and assure his children‘s futures as was customary. Magulan, reputedly a fair village headman when not under the influence of alcohol or misery, died in a brawl in middle life.8 Magulan, like many black

Mozambicans, was a victim of the proliferation of cantinas selling cheap Portuguese wines to Africans. These cantinas supported Portugal through revenue from licensing, fees and fines paid by drunken Mozambicans. The colonial administration also benefited from the steady supply of unpaid correctional laborers arrested for drunken and disorderly conduct and then forced to work on urban sanitation projects, construction and roadwork. Blacks were neither trained for this work nor hired but criminalized, while whites who frequented the cantinas were not arrested and were frequently escorted home.

Adding insult to injury, the fines Africans had to pay for drunkenness were used to help pay for the municipal police force.9

Until he was twelve years old, Mondlane worked as a goat and cattle-herder and farmer on the family plot. It was, in part, these early experiences that rooted Mondlane in the peasant culture, an important element that legitimized his leadership of a revolutionary organization that would espouse ―People‘s Power.‖ Despite his frequent and lengthy absences from Mozambique throughout his life, Mondlane continued periodically to renew his connection with the rural peasantry, to ―return to the source.‖10

8 Chitlangou, Chitlangou, Son of a Chief, 123-126. 9 Penvenne, ―‗We are all Portuguese!‘ Challenging the Political Economy of Assimilation: Lorenco Marques, 1870-1933,‖ 273. 10 The concept of ―return to the source‖ was advocated by Amilcar Cabral, the leader of the PAIGC and the foremost theorist of anti-colonialism in lusophone Africa. Like Franz Fanon, Cabral stressed the need for the African bourgeoisie (and members of the African diaspora) to be connected to the culture of the masses. Although there is a need for ―re-,‖ Cabral is not advocating a return to tribalism or the rejection of progressive Western elements. He calls for a synthesis of the best of both worlds. In a memorial speech regarding Mondlane given at in 1970, Cabral stated, ―… we pay 86

Mondlane‘s religious training and education contributed to the development of his revolutionary thought, skills, and nearly universal appeal as a leader. When he was twelve, Mondlane‘s mother, Makungu Muzamusse Bembele, sent him to be formally educated.11 She advised him that his father had died trying to recover the traditional power of the people of Mozambique, and that he should go to school ―in order to understand the witchcraft of the white man, thus being able to fight against him.‖12

Although from a non-Christian family, Mondlane attended primary school at the Swiss

Presbyterian Mission.

Mozambican historian Teresa Cruz e Silva suggests that the Swiss Mission was a better alternative than the Portuguese schools run by the Catholic Church. The 1940

Missionary Accord between the Portuguese government and the Vatican were designed to indoctrinate Africans to lives of deference to the Portuguese.13 In addition to the

Portuguese language, Catholic schools taught the history and geography of Portugal.

Africans learned nothing of their own lands and peoples. Many Protestant missionaries, who the Portuguese government suspected of sympathizing with black Mozambicans, were expelled from the Portuguese colonies and South Africa in the 1960s and 1970s.14

homage to the politician, to the freedom fighter, but especially to the man of culture. Culture acquired not only during the course of his personal life and in the halls of the university, but culture acquired mainly in the midst of his people, in the course of the struggle for the liberation of his people.‖ Amílcar Cabral, ―National Liberation and Culture,‖ in Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa 1856-1970: Documents on modern African political thought from colonial times to the present, J. Ayo Langley, ed. (London: Rex Collins, 1979): 720. 11 Mondlane‘s mother died a year later, when he was 13 years old. 12 Interview with Ronald H. Chilcote, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California – Riverside, August 1965, RG 30/307, Series 6, Box 2, Reel 1 (microfilm), OCA and Biographical Notes by Eduardo Mondlane to Oberlin College, 1 December 1966, RG 28, Box 724, OCA. 13 Munslow, Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins, 63. 14 Harry Greenberg, Missão Metodista (Methodist Episcopal Mission) at Chicuque to Rev. C. Melvin Blake, Division of World Missions, 12 October 1962. In an attachment, entitled, ―A Chronicle of Events in the Life of Methodist Missions in Mozambique, Particularly in Relation to Mission Schools,‖ Max V. 87

Prime Minister Salazar continuously portrayed Protestants as outside agitators. In an address to the Mediterranean Congress of Culture in June 1964, Mondlane pointed out that the membership of FRELIMO‘s Central Committee was either Catholic or had come from Catholic families.15 He avers that these leaders did not learn about the need for organized resistance to Portuguese colonialism from Europeans but from their own suffering.

Education became a key issue for FRELIMO. Similar to their complaints regarding the Portuguese educational system, the nationalists believed that the education the peasantry received within traditional society was also designed ―to keep the youth under the sway of old ideas, to destroy their initiative.‖16 Additionally, the formal primary education of Blacks in Mozambique was inferior even to that available in other former colonial states.17

After completing primary school in 1936, Mondlane went to Lourenço Marques where he worked as a servant in a hospital and, with the support of André-Daniel Clerc of the Swiss Presbyterian Mission, became a preacher and youth instructor. During this time, Mondlane‘s understanding of the oppression suffered by black Mozambicans under

Portuguese colonialism deepened. He was also exposed to such nascent urban resistance organizations as the Associação Africana (formed in the 1920s) and the Instituto

Kemling reports of the ―years and countless instances of discrimination, harassment, intimidation, suppression of worship … , hand beatings, --- imprisonment, and exile‖ experienced by missionaries, RG 59, Mozambique Church folder, National Archives and Records Administration – College Park (NARA II). 15 Eduardo Mondlane, ―The Role of the Church in Mozambique‖ in Bragança and Wallerstein, The African Liberation Reader, 1:172. 16 Machel, ―Education,‖ 34. 17 Helen Kitchen, ―Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane,‖ Africa Report, 12:8 (November 1967), 50. 88

Negrófilo formed by young Africans who separated from the Grémio Africano.18

Mondlane‘s formal education continued in secondary school despite age and financial restrictions that barred most Africans from secondary school admission. He attended the

Methodist Episcopal Mission at Cambine, where he was trained in agriculture (dry-land farming) and English. Then, in 1944, he continued his studies at the Douglas Lain Smit

Mission School at Lemana in the Northern Transvaal, where he sharpened his skills and continued to preach. In 1948, he graduated from the mission school and was awarded a scholarship from the Mozambique Christian Council to attend the Jan

Hofmeyr School of Social Work and the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg where he majored in sociology.19

Mondlane in South Africa

While in South Africa, Mondlane befriended members of the African National Congress

(ANC) Youth League, including Walter Sisulu and who was a law student at Witwatersrand.20 The mutually supportive relationship between the two liberation movements established at this time would become the basis for future violent confrontations between independent Mozambique and apartheid South Africa. With other Mozambican students from Protestant educational backgrounds, Mondlane formed

18 In the 1920s, such nascent nationalist organizations as civic and mutual-aid societies included the Centro Associativo dos Negros de Moçambique and the Instituto Negrófilo. Henriksen, Thomas H., ―The Revolutionary Thought of Eduardo Mondlane,‖ 40. Mondlane notes that mestiços tended to join the Associação Africana, while black Africans were concentrated in the Centro Associativo. Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, 106. 19 Cruz e Silva, ―Swiss Mission,‖ 189-194; Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, Preface entitled, ―Resistance and Revolution in the Life of Eduardo Mondlane‖ by Herbert Shore; Helen Kitchen, ―Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane,‖ 31; and Theodore L. Tucker, Memo of Scholarship Aid to Eduardo Mondlane since 1948, 28 March 1957, RG8, Box 15, Folder 15, PHS. 20 Sheridan Johns and R. Hunt Davis, Jr. eds., Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle against Apartheid, 1948-1990/A Documentary Survey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 20. 89 a students‘ organization, the Nucleus of Mozambican Secondary Students (NESAM).

This organization would include future FRELIMO Politburo members and presidents of post-colonial Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano and Armando Guebuza.21 Although it was established as a cultural organization to serve the African community, NESAM became politicized, in part, because of the harassment it received from the PIDE.22 This organization was one of the first to establish a network of educated young nationalists. It grew into an underground movement providing a small revolutionary cadre for

FRELIMO in Lourenço Marques.23

In 1949, Mondlane was caught up in the post-World War II rising tide of black nationalism, anti-communism, and the hardening of white supremacy in southern Africa.

In 1948, Dr. Daniel Malan and his Nationalist Party had become the leaders of South

Africa and institutionalized the repressive apartheid system. The next year, Mondlane was deported back to Mozambique and arrested under suspicion of subversion. Although most scholars concur that apartheid was the underlying reason for Mondlane‘s deportation, different details of the event have been proffered. Most scholars concur that it was his establishment of the NESAM that prompted the Portuguese authorities to request that Mondlane‘s South African residence permit be revoked.24 Dr. Darrell

Randall of the Methodist Church Division of Foreign Missions, along with Dr. Emory

Ross, Executive Secretary of the National Council Churches of Christ Division of

21 Hanlon, Mozambique: The Revolution under Fire, 24. 22 Cruz e Silva, ―Swiss Mission,‖ 194-195. 23 Mondlane, Struggle, 113-114. 24 Spartacus, ―Mondlane: Early Days in South Africa,‖ in Bragança and Wallerstein, The African Liberation Reader, 1:20. 90

Foreign Missions, who were instrumental in procuring a university scholarship for

Mondlane, offered a more complex explanation.

Randall, who taught Mondlane at the Jan Hofmeyer School of Social Work, reported that his student was deported because Mondlane was elected by white students as a representative of the university‘s social studies department at a National Student

Conference.25 In a letter requesting that Mondlane be considered for a Methodist

Crusade Scholarship, Randall states that on 15 June 1949, the South African government sent him, as Mondlane‘s missionary representative in the country, a letter requesting that

Mondlane leave the country within two weeks. More intriguing is his statement that

Field-Marshal Jan Smuts, the South African elder statesman who was defeated by Malan in the 1948 election, unsuccessfully supported Mondlane before the South African parliament in 1949.26

Randall‘s analysis of the circumstances of Mondlane‘s deportation provides insight regarding both the prevailing American view of race relations in southern Africa in the mid-20th century and the early anti-apartheid activity in South Africa at that time.

Randall states, ―The facts of this particular case illustrate so clearly the tragedy that is

25 Darrell and Mildred Randall to David Finke, American Friends Service Committee, June 1950, RG30/307, Mondlane, Mozambique, Africa, Selected Correspondence, Box 2, Miscellaneous Folder (1933, 1958-1958, 1969), OCA and Darrell Randall, ―The Case of Eduardo Mondlane, The Christian Advocate, 27 April 1950, 12, RG8, Box 15, Folder 15, PHS. Randall also worked at the United Nations as associate executive director of the Department of International Affairs of the National Council of Churches from 1958-1961. He, reputedly, was a consultant for President John F. Kennedy and Attorney General Robert Kennedy prior to their travels in Africa. In North Africa, Randall is said to have engaged in discussions with . Patricia Sullivan, ―Darrell Randall: Professor, Apartheid Foe,‖ Washington Post, 12 September 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2008/09/11/AR2008091103502.html (15 January 2010). Although not attributing Mondlane‘s deportation to this incident, André-Daniel Clerc reported that the Executive Commission for NUSAS elected Mondlane as a representative of first year students at a conference in Cape Town. Quoted in Cruz e Silva, ―The Influence of the Swiss Mission on Eduardo Mondlane (1930-1961),‖ 195. 26 Darrell Randall to Dr. J. Earl Moreland, 10 January 1951, RG 8, Box 15, Folder 15, PHS. 91 taking place in that part of Africa, which threatens to eventually embroil half the continent in a race-civil-war.‖ To prevent such devolution into race war, such multiracial organizations as the South African Joint Council of Africans and Europeans, the South

African Institute of Race Relations, and the National Union of South Africa Students first fought for Mondlane to continue his education. Failing in that, they collected funds in

South Africa to help pay for his transportation overseas.27

Dr. Phillip V. Tobias, then president of the National Union of South African

Students (NUSAS), confirms the support for Mondlane, with a nearly unanimous vote

(700-4) to protest the actions of the immigration authorities. The NESAM also requested that the Governor-General of Mozambique intervene on Mondlane‘s behalf. Tobias contends that the South African Minister of the Interior, Dr. T.E. Donges, refused to renew Mondlane‘s permit, which had been routinely renewed every six months since

Mondlane began his studies in South Africa in 1944. This was part of the apartheid government‘s first efforts to exclude black African students from the multi-racial university.28

The protests of the NUSAS elicited warnings from such Nationalist government officials as Minister of Economics Eric Louw who conflated racial issues with anti-

27 Darrell Randall to Dorothy Smith, Director of Appointments, Oberlin University, 2 January 1953, RG 30/307, Mondlane, Mozambique, Africa, Selected Correspondence, Box 2, Miscellaneous Folder (1933, 1958-1958, 1969), OCA. 28 Tobias, Phillip V., ―A Little Known Chapter in the Life of Eduardo Mondlane,‖ Geneve-Afrique 16, no. 1 (January 1977): 122-124; ―Donges Deports a ‗Foreign Native‘: Wits. Students Protest,‖ The Guardian (South Africa), September 8, 1949, Southern Edition edition; ―NUSAS Stands by Academic Equality,‖ The Guardian (South Africa), July 21, 1949, Southern edition edition; ―Students Resist Threat of Apartheid: NUSAS Jubilee Conference Opens in Cape Town,‖ The Guardian (South Africa), July 14, 1949, Southern Edition edition. Tobias states that, in 1949, 188 black students were enrolled in Witwatersrand. Although seemingly a low number (4% of the student population), this was remarkable considering the fact that most black Mozambicans were unable to attend even secondary school. 92 communism (see Figure 1). Per the cartoon‘s caption, Louw threatened, a year before the passage of the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, to require ―ultraliberal‖ or

―leftist‖ organizations to register as was done in the United States, ―the world‘s most democratic and freedom-loving country.‖29 The university and the NUSAS resisted these efforts for twelve years until, in 1959, the apartheid laws were applied to the entire university system.

Figure 1: Cartoon found in 4 August 1949 issue of The Guardian (South Africa)

29 ―Warning to the NUSAS,‖ The Guardian (South Africa), August 4, 1949, Southern Edition edition, 1. Louw referred to the Alien Registration (Smith) Act of 1940. In 1949, eleven members of the American Communist Party were tried and convicted under the Smith Act. In 1950, the McCarran Internal Security Act which more specifically targeted Communists was passed, despite efforts by President Truman to veto the act. In South Africa, by 1952, the Guardian newspaper, the leftist anti-apartheid weekly which published this cartoon, had been forced out of circulation by the Nationalist government through the Suppression of Communism Act. 93

In an effort to safeguard university autonomy and its multiracial character, the

Registrar of Witwatersrand University I. Glyn Thomas sent Mondlane‘s examinations to

Mozambique where he completed and passed them. The importance of this incident is revealed in Mondlane‘s expression of gratitude when he said, ―After the way the

Witwatersrand University has treated me, I can never be regarded as anti-white.‖30 Thus, these events broadened Mondlane‘s understanding of oppression from a racial to a systemic and socioeconomic one, and his desire for a non-racial society was solidified.

This understanding would align his vision for an independent Mozambique with that of an American liberal polity and religious and human rights organizations. It would later also place him in contention with members of FRELIMO who advocated for an exclusive black nationalism.

In 1950, the mission officials -- Randall, Ross, and Clerc -- helped to procure a scholarship for Mondlane from the ―significant African American power broker‖ Dr.

Channing Tobias of the Phelps-Stokes Fund.31 Randall lamented that there were no

Protestant Africans with a college education in Mozambique, and he hoped that support for Mondlane would improve the image of the missions with Mozambicans.

Diplomatically, Ross suggested that, although the scholarship was from an American foundation, Mondlane, a Portuguese citizen, should attend the University of Lisbon, particularly since the Division of Foreign Missions had a section in the Portuguese

30 Tobias, Phillip V., ―A Little Known Chapter in the Life of Eduardo Mondlane,‖ 123. 31 Janken, Rayford W. Logan and the Dilemma of the African-American Intellectual, 83. Emory Ross was also president of the Board of Trustees of the Phelps-Stokes Fund. 94 capital.32 Michael Testa, Executive Secretary of the Presbyterian Committee on

Evangelical Cooperation in Portugal (Junta Presbiteriana de Cooperação em Portugal), became Mondlane‘s advisor in Lisbon.

The Portuguese government also offered Mondlane a scholarship for study at the

University of Lisbon. However, if he accepted Mondlane would have been required to serve as part of the colonial administration upon completion of his education.33

University officials made this offer in response to a suggestion by the Portuguese attorney general who had read the PIDE report of Mondlane‘s arrest upon his return from

South Africa. In the attorney general‘s analysis of the report, Mondlane: 1) was politically a threat to the colony; 2) had been infected with a Communist virus which might affect others, especially the young people who were members of NESAM; and, 3) had the embryonic spirit of black nationalism which should be uprooted as soon as possible in order to prevent it from affecting others amongst the African people. He suggested two courses of action: that Mondlane be put under strict surveillance by the police; and, if possible, Mondlane should be given a scholarship to study at a Portuguese

32 The Phelps Stokes Fund was established in 1911 by the will of Caroline Phelps Stokes based on her lifelong concern for the educational needs of the underprivileged. Programs supported by the fund include the African Student Aid Fund, Booker Washington Institute of Liberia, South African Institute of Race Relations, American Indian College Fund, United Negro College Fund, and the Association of Black American Ambassadors. ―Phelps Stokes Fund: History and Legacy‖ at , accessed 7 February 2008. Note that the South African Institute of Race Relations was another group that protested Mondlane‘s deportation. Darrell Randall also was a field officer for the institute. Phelps-Stokes Fund president, Tobias Channing, would become a member of the national committee of the American Committee on Africa. 33 André Daniel Clerc to Emory Ross, 21 April 1950. Clerc states, ―They [Portuguese officials] offered to help Mondlane to get a Portuguese bursary. But such an offer, coming in this moment is, at least, ambiguous. It is a way of putting a hand on Mondlane and to take him out of our influence,‖ RG 8 Box 15, Folder 15, PHS. 95 university in order to keep him away from the African population and to see if he could be ―cured‖ of his intellectual and political proclivities.34

Unsurprisingly, while he was a student at the University of Lisbon, the first full- blooded black Mozambican to attend the university, the PIDE continued to harass

Mondlane and others associated with the Center for African Studies. Mondlane was arrested several times and kept for hours or days for questioning. Mondlane later claimed that before these events he had thought of himself only as an academic, and that it was the PIDE labeling and harassment that germinated his identity as a nationalist. Unwilling to bear the continuing harassment, Mondlane requested that his Methodist Crusade scholarship be transferred to an institution in the United States. Darrell Randall made inquiries that resulted in Mondlane‘s acceptance at Oberlin College in Ohio. On 15 July

1951, Mondlane flew to the United States in order to attend the intensive training program at the Africa Program of the Kennedy School of Missions at Hartford Seminary in preparation for his studies at Oberlin.35

Mondlane in the United States

Father Eduardo, We pray for your leaving for America To pursue your studies. Lord, bless his studies To help all Blacks. We are praying to Lord Jesus To give us more like this. Lord of heaven, go along with him to Europe.

34 Eduardo C. Mondlane, ―The Struggle for Independence in Mozambique‖ (presented at the Southern Africa in Transition Fourth International Conference, Howard University, April 11, 1963), 16. This conference was sponsored by the American Society of African Culture (AMSAC), an organization affiliated with the ACOA and American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa discussed further in Chapter 5. 35 Letter from Michael Testa to Emory Ross, 11 June 1951, RG 8, Box 15, Folder 15, PHS. 96

We sons of Africa, We are tired of slavery, We will be free With the strength of Jesus Christ …36 - English translation of a portion of a Tsonga song sung at a farewell service for Mondlane in Maússe, Mozambique --

Upon his arrival in the United States, Mondlane began advocating on behalf of African liberation. He tirelessly lectured around the country, attended Christian conferences, participated in summer camps, spoke at churches, and wrote for publications. As early as

1952, he was invited to represent Africa in a UNESCO conference on the problems of underdeveloped and dependent countries.37

On 6 January 1952, Mondlane participated in an NBC radio broadcast of the

University of Chicago Roundtable entitled, ―Africa in the Modern World,‖ hosted by

Africanist Edwin Munger.38 The other discussant was his future professor at

Northwestern University, Melville Herskovits. The objective of the broadcast was to dispel the image of Africa as the ―Dark Continent‖ and to provide a more factual and positive account of the status of Africa and Africans. Surprisingly, Mondlane was very reserved in his responses to questions about both Mozambique and South Africa. He offered little criticism of Portuguese colonialism, a reflection of Mondlane‘s reluctance to incite a negative Portuguese response, and of his desire to return to Mozambique as a missionary and teacher after completing his studies. Through such speaking

36 Teresa Cruz e Silva, ―The Influence of the Swiss Mission on Eduardo Mondlane (1930-1961),‖ Journal of Religion in Africa 28, no. 2 (May 1998): 197. 37 Cruz e Silva, ―Swiss Mission,‖ 199. 38 According to an article published on 27 December 1968 in the Pasadena, CA newspaper, , Edwin Munger would be considered for the position of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the Nixon administration. Vernon McKay Papers, Box 10, Folder 4, (NWU-AL- VM). 97 engagements, however, Mondlane was honing his diplomatic skills and his ability to tailor his advocacy to his audience, an ability that would lead such militant revolutionaries as Ché Guevara and Amílcar Cabral to question his revolutionary commitment.39

This same reserve is reflected in the essay on Mozambique that Mondlane contributed to the collection of essays, Africa in the Modern World, edited by University of Chicago scholar Calvin W. Stillman and published in 1955.40 The essay relates the basic demographic and historical information about the territory with no real commentary regarding the experience or status of colonial subjects. Mondlane quite successfully avoids offending the Portuguese authorities. Indeed, in the 16 April 1958 edition of O

Diaria de Noticias, the Portuguese daily newspaper in Lourenço Marques, Simoes de

Figueiredo published a glowing review of Mondlane‘s essay. Figueiredo stated that the piece was ―a notably apt synthesis of the politico-social situation in Moçambique, which in spite of containing one or other inexactitudes, has its worth for the sobriety and objectivity with which were described some of the most fundamental problems.‖ While complimenting Mondlane‘s prestige, he continued that ―Illustrious and brilliant Negroes also do not constitute news today. Although their number is proportionately inferior to that of any other ethnic group, we all know that it is due to complex economic and political circumstances, in fact a transitory phase in the history of humanity which only

39 In a 2 November 1979 interview with Herbert Shore, British journalist Colin Legum noted that Guevara considered Mondlane an ―armchair revolutionary.‖ He reported that the Tricontinental Press in Cuba accused Mondlane of being a CIA agent. Legum found Mondlane‘s flexibility to be one of his greatest strengths. RG 30/307, Series 5, Box 1, Conversations with Margaret and Colin Legum folder, OCA. 40 Calvin W Stillman, Africa in the Modern World, The Harris Foundation lectures 1953 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 233-244. 98 the least enlightened and those devoid of humanitarianism would wish to see lengthened.‖ Although the author mentioned that Mondlane‘s early brilliance ―inspired the necessary financial help for the continuation of his university studies …,‖ a phrase that insinuates that the Portuguese provided this funding, he does not mention the role of the Protestant missions. He went on to say that this situation deserved special stress ―Not because it constitutes proof … that, wherever an opportunity exists for development of the inborn qualities of a brilliant human being, regardless of the simplicity of his social conditions or his racial pigmentation, it will reveal itself in an imposing manner in front of those who, unaware of the accidental advantages of their social powers, nurture the illusion of their individual or collective superiority.‖ The article ended by pointing out that Mondlane appeared to show his pride in being Portuguese and affirmed ―to him that we also are proud that he is a Portuguese.‖41

This article is an example of the ability of Portuguese writers and officials to articulate their agreement with liberal and/or humanitarian sentiments while continuing to hold fiercely to the status quo. It is also one of several attempts that Portugal made to reclaim its prodigal son. Reading Mondlane‘s essay, one could easily imagine that it was written by a loyal colonial subject. However, anyone who had read other writings by

Mondlane would have difficulty believing that he was the author.

41 Translated copy of article sent from Eduardo Mondlane to George E. Simpson, RG 30/64, Series 2, Box 2, Eduardo Mondlane folder, OCA. Copy also sent to Melville J. Herskovits. In his reply, Herskovits notes that ―I scarcely recognized you in the translation of the article from the Lourenço Marques paper that you sent me … he certainly paints a picture of you that I found it not too easy to recognize.‖ Herskovitz to Mondlane, 22 May 1958. Melville J. Herskovits Papers, Series 35/6, Box 79, Folder 21, Northwestern University Melville J. Herskovits Library (NWU-MJH). 99

This essay was not the only piece by Mondlane published in 1952. He also authored an editorial regarding colonialism in the Portuguese territories for the New York

Times. To safeguard his identity, Mondlane wrote the article under the pseudonym,

Vincent Robertson. This article reflected Mondlane‘s future writings on the subject and expressed his true discontent with the oppressive nature of Portuguese colonialism.

Mondlane also presaged his work as FRELIMO president – his focus on education and his exhaustive efforts to influence world opinion in support of anti-colonialism.

In this piece, Mondlane criticized Portugal for the lack of educational opportunities in its colonies. There was not a single college and, in Mozambique, not a single high school for the 6 million Africans. ―There are two high schools which are supposed to take care of both white and Negro education, but, as of six months ago, there was not a single full-blooded African in them.‖ Betraying the identity of the article‘s author was Mondlane‘s statement that there were only ten full-blooded Africans at the

University of Lisbon while he was there, and that in the other two Portuguese universities there were even fewer.42

Mondlane appealed to American liberal sensibilities when he pointed out that the

Portuguese had said on the international stage that they were more interested in the spiritual welfare of Africans than improving the conditions under which Africans lived.

He went further in his indictment by exposing Portugal‘s continuing forced labor regime, echoing the tone and message of João Albasini 30 years earlier. He wrote that ―by law there is no forced labor in Portuguese territories, but thousands of laborers are sent to the

42 Vincent Robertson, ―Colonization in Africa,‖ New York Times (1857-Current file), August 18, 1952. 100 islands of São Tomé and Principe in the to work on cocoa plantations.

There is nothing voluntary about this recruitment.‖43

The compelling reason for Mondlane‘s article was revealed in the concluding paragraph. He explained, ―The new Constitution of Portugal has turned the African territories into . This means that if Portugal should happen to be accepted as a member of the United Nations she would not have to submit reports to the

United Nations on her actions. … In view of Portugal‘s record in Africa, it is high time that an international commission stud[ied] the economic, political and social conditions in

Portuguese Africa and present [its] findings to the court of world opinion.‖44 For the rest of his life, Mondlane would strive to present the facts of Portuguese colonialism before the international community and would mobilize a transnational network of actors to support him in this task.

In June 1952, Mondlane was the opening guest speaker at the North American

Assembly on African Affairs held at Wittenberg College (Springfield, OH), reputedly the largest conference regarding Africa held in the United States to that date. There

Mondlane, for the first time, spoke on behalf of the Mozambican people before an international audience, including officials of the Portuguese government. It was

Mondlane‘s first tentative request for support from the West, and an indictment of the myth of the Portuguese civilizing mission.

43 Ibid., 16. 44 Ibid. Portugal was admitted to the United Nations in 1955. As will be seen in Chapter 5, the question of Portuguese reporting on its ―overseas provinces‖ would occupy the Trusteeship Council and special committees for the rest of the decade. 101

North American Assembly on African Affairs

This Assembly took place in the years between two of the most influential gatherings of

Africans outside of the continent in the early period following the Second World War -- seven years after the Fifth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, UK and three years prior to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. Organized by the

National Churches of Christ (NCC), the theme of the gathering was ―The Role of Racial

Factors in the Changing Economic and Political Scene‖ on the continent. Its 344 participants included representatives from religious institutions, academia, foundations, national governments, and the United Nations. In this period leading up to the decolonization of the continent, 34 Africans from 13 different areas of Africa were present, many of them students at universities in the United States or affiliated with missions in Africa.

These Africans participated in this transnational and multicultural dialogue about race and its significance in an emerging Africa with key policymakers. Witnessing the event were media personnel. In attendance were 23 Europeans, including José Nunes de

Oliveira, former Governor General of Mozambique, and George Braga de Oliveira,

Secretary of the Portuguese Embassy in Washington, D.C. Members of the Africa

Branch, Division of Research for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs of the

United States Department of State also attended, including the Division Chief, William

O. Brown, and Robert Breunig of the International Press Service.45 The stated purpose of the assembly was not to formulate policy regarding the continent, but to open a dialogue

45 Dr. William O. Brown would head the African Studies department at Boston University where Janet Mondlane would earn her Master‘s degree. 102

– ―to find ways of acceptable communication and sharing of insights and influences which might be gained … with thousands of Christians in government, industry, school and church throughout Africa …‖46

Such conferences as this one provided Mondlane with the opportunity to engage in discussions with Africans from other areas of the continent, as well as Europeans and

Americans, regarding the issues, challenges, and status of African demands for colonial political and socioeconomic reform and/or independence. Throughout the late 1940s,

African elites and workers in the British and French colonial territories had used strikes and colonial rhetoric regarding development and citizenship to position themselves to achieve greater self-determination.47 Such contact was imperative for the future leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front, since Prime Minister Salazar had effectively suppressed the growth of both an effective black elite and labor movement in the lusophone territories.

Christianity provided the context for the gathering, but the political nature of the meeting was made clear by Emory Ross who justified the leadership of religious institutions in providing a forum for considering the changing racial, economic, and political conditions in sub-Saharan Africa. He stated that ―the most numerous, oldest and most widely settled North American representatives throughout the whole of Africa are the Christian missionaries. … No other group, official or unofficial, exceeds them in the

46 North American Assembly of African Affairs and National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of America, Africa Is Here; Report of the North African Assembly of African Affairs, Held at Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio, June 16-25, 1952 (New York: Africa Committee of the Division of Foreign Missions of the Churches of Christ in the U. S. A, 1952), 4. 47 Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present, New approaches to African history (Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 38-53. 103 cumulative, current and comprehensive knowledge of African peoples‘ potentials and problems.‖48 Whether this historical legacy of Christian missions benefitted or harmed

Africans more is highly contested. However, the contribution of missionaries to international understanding of the continent and its people is irrefutable.49 Ross added that missionaries also had the longest and broadest relationships with Europeans concerned with Africa.50 Thus, as will be seen continuously throughout this study, Ross shows how transnational religious institutions bridged the political and the cultural in their advocacy. This was especially true in the lusophone colonies where the Catholic

Church was subsidized by the Portuguese government and, thus, was invested in the continuation of Portuguese colonialism. No wonder Prime Minister Salazar blamed the

Protestant Churches for inciting revolt in the colonies.

Ten years before he assumed leadership of FRELIMO, Mondlane had an opportunity to hear and participate in the debate between Africans and both religious and secular representatives of the colonial powers regarding the status of colonialism and nationalism throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Representatives of liberal and evangelical

48 North American Assembly of African Affairs and National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of America, Africa Is Here; Report of the North African Assembly of African Affairs, Held at Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio, June 16-25, 1952, 3. 49 Eduardo C. Mondlane, ―Christian Mission Under Test,‖ Archways (December 21, 1952): 18. Mondlane discussed briefly some of the negative aspects of missionary work in Africa in this article published in the YMCA-YWCA publication. Mondlane lamented that missionaries separated the spiritual from the material needs of Africans and sought only converts. He also noted that missionaries discouraged Africans from involvement with politics while Europeans created colonial institutions. RG 30/307, Series 6, Box 2, Reel 1, OCA. Perhaps the most strident denunciation of Christianity‘s role in the exploitation of black people throughout the world is contained in the ―Black Manifesto,‖ issued by SNCC‘s at Riverside Church in New York in 1969. For more see, ―Churches: A Black Manifesto,‖ Time, 16 May 1969, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,902585,00.html (5 September 2010). 50 Johnston, Richard J. H., ―Christian‘s Unity Held World Need,‖ New York Times, July 17, 1952, 55. This article notes that Dr. Ross expressed his belief that ―little use was being made of a great American resource in this country‘s 15,000,000 Negroes in aiding and influencing Africa.‖ The article also summarized a report lamenting that only 40 Negroes were serving as missionaries, and not all of those in Africa. 104

Christian organizations expressed their hopes and fears for the continent. Theirs was a familiar refrain that would be echoed by Gilberto Freyre a decade later. Although most

European and American conference presenters accepted the notion of African independence, they sought to dictate the terms under which such liberation was granted.

They advocated for a multi-racial (although rarely multicultural) society and stated their concerns that Africans were not prepared for independence. These white Christians lamented that some Africans were advocating replacement of white supremacy with black supremacy and voiced their fears that if Africans were not granted their freedom, they could ignite a global race war. In short, they agreed that the system should be reformed, but feared revolution. These conferees debated the definition of words that comprised the rhetoric of African liberation, such foundational terms as ―imperialism,‖

―colonialism,‖ and ―exploitation.‖ In an effort to negotiate the timeline for granting independence and to protect the physical well-being and socio-economic interests of white colonials, they sought to redefine the relationship between the colonial powers and

Africans.

Notably, there was also an undercurrent in some of the European presentations that was not directed at Africans or Africa. When L. Bruce Greaves, Secretary for Africa of the Conference of Missionary Societies in Great Britain and Ireland, argued for caution in the use of such terms as colonialism, he mentioned the 1951 Iranian nationalization of

Anglo-Iranian Oil. Greaves recalled an American judge who had described this event and the rise to power of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq as ―the end of colonialism‖ in Iran. Greaves asked, ―Did he [the judge] mean all the foreign

105 investments abroad was colonialism, and, if that is the case, was the stationing of

American factories in this country an example of colonialism, or did he mean that investment in Asia was colonialism, or only the investment of Britain in Asia?‖51

As will be detailed later, for the next two decades, the Portuguese government, especially the Foreign Minister Franco Noguiera (1961-1969), would continue to use the tactic of deconstructing American liberal rhetoric to counter the propaganda of the liberation movements in lusophone Africa and the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations.

Noguiera would also fan European resentments at the United Nations and in NATO meetings in an effort to resist the Kennedy administration‘s pressure on Portugal to consider self-determination for its African territories.

The conferees indigenous to the continent proclaimed the right of Africans to govern themselves. They pointed out that the imperial powers had forced a worldview and lifestyle upon indigenous Africans, compelled them to provide the labor in support of that Western lifestyle, and then disparaged Africans for their lack of progress. Most conferees pointed to appropriate education as the key to preparing Africans for self- government and economic development, not education limited to religious practice or unskilled labor. Just as the Europeans and Americans discussed their fear of a possible global race war igniting in Africa, especially southern Africa, the Africans expressed

51 North American Assembly of African Affairs and National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of America, Africa Is Here; Report of the North African Assembly of African Affairs, Held at Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio, June 16-25, 1952, 79. President Truman had refused to support the British in overthrowing the Mosaddeq government. A little over a year after the North American Assembly on African Affairs, on 19 August 1953, President Eisenhower approved the CIA operation (Ajax) that deposed Mosaddeq. 106 their own fear that the South African apartheid system could spread north and be adopted by other colonial territories.

The address by Zachariah Keodirelang ―Z.K.‖ Matthews, president of the Cape

Province branch of the ANC, gave credence to these fears as he discussed the Malan government‘s consolidation of its power and the diminishing rights of non-whites. Not only did Matthews offer a thorough analysis of the status of race relations in his homeland, but also the resistance to the apartheid system and the strategy of non-violent protest then being launched by the ANC and the South African Indian Congress. This

Campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws, described by Matthews as ―a passive resistance campaign against discriminatory laws to which non-whites are subjected in

South Africa,‖ was precipitated by the Malan government‘s implementation in 1950 of the Suppression of Communism Act and the Separate Representation of Voters‘ Act. The latter legislation virtually disenfranchised the Colored population (the same tactic of separating Blacks from the general voting rolls had been effective since 1936). When the

South African Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional in March 1952, the

Nationalist government merely created another superior court, the High Court of

Parliament, to overrule that decision. 52 The power of the Nationalist government was, therefore, virtually unchecked by legal and political institutions. For the victims of apartheid, civil disobedience, as practiced by Mohandas Gandhi in South Africa nearly a half century earlier (and which had proven successful against the British in India), was a viable resistance tactic.

52 Ibid., 32-40. 107

Ironically, in his appeal Matthews quoted former South African Prime Minister,

Field Marshal Jan Smuts. As Chancellor of Cambridge University following his loss to

Malan in 1948, Smuts had stated that ―Our task is not to withdraw from the world but to live our faith and apply it in political decisions under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.‖53

This integration of the religious and political is also evident in the addresses of the

Mozambican and Portuguese representatives, Eduardo Mondlane and José Oliveira.

These speeches provide evidence of the relationship between black Mozambicans and the

Portuguese a decade before the establishment of FRELIMO.

Mondlane‘s address, ―Brotherhood is the Test,‖ is a seemingly simple, but layered, plea for people in the West to acknowledge the humanity of Africans and their rights to political, economic, and cultural self-determination. The address shows that

Mario de Andrade‘s statement which opened this section, that Mondlane was not a politician but a missionary, implied a separation which Mondlane himself did not make between his Christian and political beliefs.

Mondlane began his speech with questions that link the religious, socioeconomic, and political. He asked, ―What does the Christian ethic say about racial discrimination, political domination, [and] economic exploitation by one Christian nation of another?‖

He went on to relate examples of domination and exploitation, stating that ―governments enact laws arbitrarily and take land from the Africans without conscience,‖ and that

―more and more labor is demanded from Africans, yet they [governments] refuse him the rights of fair bargaining with his employer.‖ Then he asked, ―What would he [Christ] say

53 Ibid., 40. 108 to those responsible for the economic life of multitudes of Africans, starving on the doorsteps of the ruling Europeans?‖

It is Négritude that Mondlane evoked when he asserted the cultural changes being wrought on the continent as the most compelling problem facing Africans.54 He said that,

―It does not matter how tenaciously an African may try to hold to his people‘s culture; so long as there are forces working around him, forces that are continually challenging his own traditional mores, he is bound to succumb to change and adopt many aspects of this foreign way of life.‖ With this statement, Mondlane did subtly what Césaire and Fanon did much more explicitly in such works as Discourse on Colonialism (1950) and Black

Skin, White Masks (1952) which lament the black man‘s alienation from himself caused by colonialism.

He did not yet go so far as to echo Senghor‘s belief that culture is not the condensed expression of politics and economics but their foundation. He did not invoke

Cabral who espoused that the domination of a people could not be accomplished, no matter the physical manifestation of that domination, without the ―permanent, organized repression of the cultural life of the people.‖55 Before this audience, Mondlane did describe the ―disorientation‖ of Africans attempting to adopt or assimilate to European

54 Eduardo C. Mondlane, ―Old Roots in African Educations,‖ in America‘s Emerging Role in Overseas Educations, ed. Clarence W. Hunnicutt (Syracuse: Syracuse University School of Education, 1962), 16; ―Southern Africa and the World: Senghor and the Portuguese-A Luso-African Commonwealth?,‖ Southern Africa, July 1969, 4. While it is unclear regarding Mondlane‘s early understanding and acceptance of Négritude, by 1962, he exhibits an ambiguity regarding the concept. In this essay, Mondlane calls Négritude a ―political mystique.‖ He, seemingly begrudgingly, admits that the concept may have been important for helping colonized Africans to understand the value of their traditional culture, but also appears to agree with other critics about the concept being too rooted in without stressing practical action. There may have also been some attempt by Mondlane to distance himself from Senghor who would, by 1969, be advocating on the international stage for a Luso-African Commonwealth. 55 Cabral, ―National Liberation and Culture,‖ 703. 109 culture. He also challenged the Portuguese ―civilizing mission‖ by expressing the higher morality of traditional African society and indicting the inhumanity of Western civilization.

Finally, Mondlane acknowledged the material support and the social work of

American and European churches in Africa. He also asserted that most American

Christians, although willing to give money and goods, did not accept Africans as human beings. He asked for greater support for black Mozambicans‘ socioeconomic development, but also expressed their need for social justice and human dignity, a call that would resound throughout the Civil Rights Movement in the United States.56

Mondlane‘s subtle denunciation of Western hypocrisy and his religious appeal contrasted sharply with the dogmatic and overtly political speech by Oliveira.

A member of the Overseas Portuguese Council and Inspector General of Overseas

Administration, Oliveira‘s rhetoric reflected the official Portuguese stance that remained virtually unchanged for the next two decades. Oliveira‘s address, ―Citizenship is

Earned,‖ opened with the myth of the Portuguese civilizing mission, pronouncing the nonracial nature of Portuguese overseas policy and Portugal‘s ―missionary vocation and intuitive ecumenical instinct of fraternity and human understanding.‖ He continued, unapologetically, to point out that Portuguese law distinguished between citizens and

―natives,‖ ―that is to say, civilized and non-civilized.‖ He went on to compare the granting of citizenship to unassimilated Africans with giving ―firearms to children for playthings,‖ and stated that the Portuguese had ―the greatest interest in helping the

56 North American Assembly of African Affairs and National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of America, Africa Is Here; Report of the North African Assembly of African Affairs, Held at Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio, June 16-25, 1952, 16-17. 110 children [to] reach maturity.‖ He justified the then recent Portuguese policy deeming its colonies as overseas provinces by professing the need for political unity, a single community of citizens not dependent upon geographical unity.

This sentiment directly reflects that of Gilberto Freyre. In an article entitled,

―What is Lusotropicalism,‖ first published in 1955 in Présence Africaine, the MPLA‘s

Mario de Andrade (under the pseudonym Buanga Fele) quoted Freyre‘s 1940 text, O

Mundo que o Portugues Criou (‗The World that the Portuguese Created‘). Freyre stated that ―Portugal, Brazil, Africa, , , the Azores, and the Cape Verde

Islands constitute today a community of sentiment and culture.‖ Moreover, Freyre continued with an analysis that such a community was proof that the Portuguese were

―the most Christian of modern colonizers in its relationships with so-called inferior people …‖57 Furthermore, Oliveira stated that it was this political unity that underlay the alleged lack of nationalism in Angola and Mozambique. Importantly, Oliveira reminded the audience that ―Soviet communism … does not hesitate to incite fanatic nationalism as a means of achieving division which then permits domination by the Russians.‖58

In the early Cold War period, this argument resonated powerfully with those

Western Europeans and Americans present, particularly those Americans from the State

Department who had survived the purge associated with the second and

McCarthyism. This is not to say that José Oliveira‘s statement was meant merely as an appeal to the sensitivities and fears of the Americans. It reflected the vehement anti-

57 Bragança and Wallerstein, The African Liberation Reader, 1:150. 58 North American Assembly of African Affairs and National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of America, Africa Is Here; Report of the North African Assembly of African Affairs, Held at Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio, June 16-25, 1952, 41-44. 111 communism of the Estado Novo and Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar‘s belief that communism was ―the great heresy of our age.‖59

Nor was Oliveira the only person to raise the specter of communism in the

Assembly. An entire session of the Assembly was devoted to Communism in Africa.

Contrary to Oliviera, Ross and Dr. James H. Robinson, the pastor of the Church of the

Master in Harlem and founder of Operations Crossroads Africa, both suggested that it was imperialist exploitation and colonial oppression that allowed Communists ―to make capital for their own cause‖ and ―strengthen[ed] Communist propaganda.‖60 An unnamed African speaker expanded upon this by stating that ―If one says that communism thrives on slavery and poverty and disease and ignorance, one has at the same time been shown the way to defeat the threat.‖61

Also in opposition to Oliveira‘s implication that it was the Africans' childlike nature that made them vulnerable to communism, K.A.B. Jones-Quartey of the Gold

59 António de Oliveira Salazar, Salazar, Prime Minister of Portugal Says (Lisbon: SPN books, 1939), 53; Ferro, Salazar; Portugal and Her Leader, 27. In fact, when asked about censorship in the New State, Salazar explained that his government was designed to protect Portugal against international Communism. He stated, ―Against this ideological imperialism – as dangerous as any other form – the Censorship is surely a lawful means of defense. All measures of protection are deemed lawful when a country is threatened by foreign invasion.‖ 60 North American Assembly of African Affairs and National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of America, Africa Is Here; Report of the North African Assembly of African Affairs, Held at Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio, June 16-25, 1952, 3 and 113. Dr. James H. Robinson would become a member of the American Committee on Africa. Operations Crossroads Africa was a precursor to and feeder organization to the Peace Corps. It was founded in 1954 to allow United States college students to work at the grassroots level with Africans. In 1964, Robinson appeared, at his own request, before the House Subcommittee on Un-American Activities to testify regarding his former association with alleged Communist organizations such as the Council on African Affairs and with Communist City Councilman from Harlem, Ben Davis. Robinson requested the interview in order to address suspicions by the government that might threaten his position as Vice-Chairman of the Advisory Council for the Peace Corp (Lyndon Johnson had been Chairman) and on the Advisory Committee of the State Department regarding Africa. ―Testimony of Rev. James H. Robinson, Hearing, Eighty-Eighth Congress, 2nd Session, May 5, 1964,‖ http://www.archive.org/stream/testimonyofrevja00unit/testimonyofrevja00unit_djvu.txt (January 2010). 61 Ibid., 136. 112

Coast (later, Ghana) warned that the fear of communism in the West had grown to a near hysteria. Finally, Z.K. Matthews provided an example of the threat to civil liberties and to

African nationalism posed by fervent anticommunism. He described the South African government‘s Suppression of Communism Act passed the same year that a similar

Internal Security Act was enacted in the United States. Matthews reported that the law was felt by Africans to be less about Communists as being directed against any person thought to oppose government policies, alluding particularly to the apartheid system.62

Thus, at this Christian conference, Mondlane was exposed to the arguments of

Americans, Europeans, and Africans regarding the Western fears of communism in

Africa. His understanding would be reflected in the non-aligned stance of FRELIMO that yielded the organization support from both the East and West. In fact, in the early years of its existence, FRELIMO would dispute the contention by both the East and West that

Africa provided a base for the competing ideologies. During an appearance before the

United Nations Committee on the Portuguese Territories in 1962, FRELIMO would state that ―Africa is an African base against hunger, poverty, ignorance, disease, East and West ideology‖ and that it is ―for the preservation and salvation of its inhabitants.‖63 Despite the efforts of Africans to deny the paternalistic claims of the West that, because of their child-like or primitive nature, Africans were susceptible to Soviet manipulation, the

United States would continue to base its foreign policy with the continent on this misperception. As a result, Mondlane, FRELIMO, and their advocates would leverage this perspective in their anti-colonial efforts.

62 Ibid., 135-137. 63 FRELIMO, ―Why Mozambican Revolution,‖ Mozambican Revolution 1 (December 1963):2-3. 113

Furthermore, throughout the Assembly, Mondlane was exposed to the conflation of anti-communism and racism by many cold warriors, a strategy he had already encountered in South Africa and Portugal. As expressed in the conference‘s theme,

Mondlane gained insight regarding the role of race as a socioeconomic and political factor. He would continue to contend with racial challenges throughout the rest of his life, challenges exacerbated by his sojourn in the United States during the reinvigoration of the black freedom struggle in the 1950s and early 1960s.

Mondlane and Race Relations in the United States

In the summer of 1952, Mondlane was again a speaker at Methodist Youth Conference camps in Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, West Virginia, and South Dakota, and at an Interdenominational Youth Conference at Purdue. Importantly, these early tours of the United States gave Mondlane an opportunity to witness race relations in the country. This life experience supplemented the academic understanding of race relations, as well as the , that Mondlane was gaining at Oberlin. Among the courses to took was those taught by John Milton Yinger and George Eaton Simpson, authors of Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and

Discrimination.64 In a letter to Emory Ross in December 1952, Mondlane remarked,

―My experiences in the South have left me with a lot of faith in the future change of the

Southern White‘s racial bigotry. It is sad to see how so many otherwise fine and sincere

Christians could be prejudiced against the people of other races. A great deal is being

64 Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane Biography, Oberlin College Archives Holdings Finding Guide, http://www.oberlin.edu/archive/holdings/finding/RG30/SG307/biography.html, accessed 8 January 2009. Yinger and Simpson ―co-authored Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination (Harper Brothers, 1953), a modern classic now in its fifth edition.‖ , accessed 23 May 2010 114 done, but a lot still has got to be done in order to come [to] what some of us would like to call a Christian attitude to other people who have a different skin color.‖65

Notably, Mondlane‘s tenure in the United States spanned the early period of the modern Civil Rights Movement which scholars have traditionally periodized from 1954-

55 -- beginning with such events as the Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka decision and the Montgomery Bus Boycott -- to 1966 and Stokley Carmichael‘s call for ―Black

Power‖ at the Meredith . The final chapters of this dissertation expand on the work of other recent scholars of the period in disputing this periodization.

Particularly, the work challenges a simplistic perception of a break between Civil Rights

Movement and Black Power advocacy. The mid-1950s did, however, mark a new phase in the black freedom struggle, particularly in the relationship between advocates of social justice and racial equality, the federal government, and the media. Mondlane witnessed this shift and like the members of the Grêmio Africana and Americans DuBois and

Martin Luther King, Jr., expressed a certain racial romanticism regarding the situation for

Blacks in the United States.

In a 1962 essay for the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, entitled ―Woodrow Wilson and the Idea of Self-Determination for Africa,‖ Mondlane explained that the foundational laws of the United States make it possible for American Negroes to ―boast a good number of advances in many areas of life,‖ although these advances were not made without difficulty. Even though ―Some members of the majority groups whose privileged position is being threatened are actively engaged in maneuvers aimed at obstructing the Negroes‘ efforts,‖ Mondlane averred that if the basic laws of the country

65 Mondlane to Ross, 15 Dec 1952, RG 8, Box 15, Folder 15, PHS. 115 did not express equality as an ideal, little would have been accomplished.66 The

Mozambican‘s attitude regarding the position of African Americans is understandable considering the plight of his black countrymen and the unchanging codification of their oppression in Portuguese law. This optimism remained despite, or perhaps because of, his frequent experiences of racial discrimination in the United States.

In a 1977 article entitled, ―A Little Known Chapter in the Life of Eduardo

Mondlane,‖ published in the Swiss journal Genéve-Afrique, the NUSAS‘ Phillip Tobias compared the racist treatment that Mondlane experienced in South Africa and the United

States. He related a story regarding a visit to Northwestern University in 1956. Tobias was invited by the renowned Africanist Melville Herskovits to dine with members of his department, including Mondlane. When they reached the Evanston, Illinois restaurant, the party was refused service, an experience shared by many African diplomats in the

United States during this period.67 Of interest was Herskovits‘ response – a call to the local NAACP. Tobias reported that, as a result of the lawsuit filed by Herskovits and the

NAACP, the restaurateur was forced to desegregate the establishment.68

Mondlane also had an opportunity to witness the tactical development of the Civil

Rights Movement through his continuing Christian outreach and ministry. In January

1960, Mondlane was a discussion leader at a meeting of the Student Volunteer Movement

66 Eduardo C. Mondlane, ―Woodrow Wilson and the Idea of Self Determination in Africa‖ (Woodrow Wilson Foundation, April 2, 1962), 15-16, RG 30/307, Subseries 6, Box 2, Reel One, OCA. 67 For more regarding this issue and its effect on American foreign policy with Africa, see Michael Krenn, ―The Unwelcome Mat: African Diplomats in Washington, D.C., during the Kennedy Years‖ in Window on Freedom, 163-180; Gaines, American Africans in Ghana, 86-87. Gaines relates a story during the Eisenhower years of a Ghanian diplomat, Komla Gbedemah, being refused service at a Howard Johnson‘s restaurant in Delaware that ―ironically initiated high-level discussions between the two nations [the United States and Ghana] on vital U.S. economic assistance. 68 Tobias, Phillip V., ―A Little Known Chapter in the Life of Eduardo Mondlane,‖ 123. 116 and the National Student Christian Federation at the University of Ohio in Athens. There were in attendance over 3,500 people, including 100 Africans. Organizers stressed the need for action on behalf of social justice domestically and abroad, some explicitly denouncing imperialism and racism.69 Among the speakers were Martin Luther King, Jr. and who had, less than a year earlier, launched an Institute on Nonviolent

Resistance to Segregation. Sociologist and historian William Minter, an advocate of southern African liberation who would become a teacher at the FRELIMO secondary school in 1966, was among the conferees.70

Mondlane‘s most profound and life-altering experience of racial discrimination in the United States concerned his relationship with Janet Rae Johnson. It was while speaking at a Methodist camp at Geneva, Wisconsin in 1951 that Mondlane met his future wife, then a 17-year-old from the small town of Downer‘s Grove, Illinois and a student at Miami University in Ohio. The two were engaged in 1954. Although this engagement took place the same year as the historic Brown vs. the Board of Education decision, it was over a decade before the Supreme Court banned state miscegenation laws in the 1967 Loving vs. the Commonwealth of Virginia case. In 1954, over half of the

69 ―2,500 Students to Attend Volunteer Movement Confab,‖ Atlanta Daily World, December 19, 1951, 1. Mondlane also had participated in the 16th Quadrennial Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement meeting at the University of Kansas, in Lawrence, KS, on 27 December - 1 January. There the participants discussed ―the relationship of the church to such problems as colonialism, communism, and nationalism abroad, and racial problems and social injustices at home." 70 David Finke, American Friends Committee, to George Houser, 7 August 1970. Finke, an associate of Darrell Randall, mentions that he met Eduardo Mondlane at this conference. William Minter, Gail Hovey, and Charles Cobb Jr, No Easy Victories: African Liberation and American Activists over a Half-Century, 1950-2000 (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2007), 22; , Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63, 1st ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 259-260. 117 states in the U.S. had laws against miscegenation.71 Unsurprisingly due to both the racial and 14-year age difference, from its beginning, the relationship between the two had been resisted by Johnson‘s parents. The Johnsons had gone so far as to threaten to cut off financial support while Janet attended Miami University and to try to block her admission to Northwestern University.72 The couple, upon the announcement of their engagement, then faced strong opposition from others, including some of those church officials who had made it possible for Mondlane to study in the United States.

Most detractors expressed concern about how the proposed marriage would affect

Mondlane‘s plans for the future. When Eduardo Mondlane was first awarded a scholarship to leave Mozambique, it was to become a sociologist and missionary who would work in his homeland. In an experience similar to his deportation from South

Africa, as a result of the engagement Mondlane lost the Methodist Crusades scholarship that he had held since July 1951. Indeed, there were those in the Methodist Church who called for Mondlane to be deported because of his proposed marriage.73 Most church officials in both the United States and Africa believed that his marriage would make it nearly impossible for him to work on the continent. With the support of Herskovits,

71 Barbara Cruz and Michael Berson, ―The American Melting Pot? Miscegenation Laws in the United States,‖ OAH Magazine of History, Summer 2001, http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/family/cruz- berson.html. 72 Eduardo Mondlane to George Carpenter, 20 August 1956, RG8, Box 15, Folder 15, PHS. 73 Robin Wright, ―Janet Mondlane of the Mozambique Institute: American ‗Godmother‘ to an African Revolution,‖ APF Newsletters of Robin Wright, May 12, 1975, http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF001975/Wright/Wright03/Wright03.html.>, accessed 23 May 2010; Theodore L. Tucker memo of scholarship aid to Eduardo Mondlane, 28 March 1957; Letter from Ira Edmond Gillet (The Methodist Church Division of World Missions) to Eduardo Mondlane, 10 October 1955, discusses New York members of the church wanting to kick Mondlane out of the country because of his relationship with Janet Johnson (particularly a Rev. Thomas Archer O‘Farrell, a missionary who had done work in Rhodesia). ―We are both aware that some members in NY came from the South where a mixed marriage is one of the most terrible things that human beings can do.‖ RG30/307 Series 5, Box 4, Janet Mondlane folder, OCA. 118

Mondlane applied for and was awarded a scholarship from the Carnegie Foundation to continue to pursue his doctoral studies. Nevertheless, Mondlane‘s difficulty with church officials related to his engagement did not end with this funding dispute.

In early 1956, Mondlane, then a doctoral student at Northwestern, wrote to the new director of the National Council of Churches Division of Foreign Missions, George

W. Carpenter, to request a Social Science Council Research Scholarship to study the

Rastafari in Jamaica. He was advised that he should do his fieldwork in Africa. In June, arrangements were made for Mondlane to begin work in the Belgian Congo (later

Democratic Republic of Congo) on 1 October. He was to do a sociological study of the function of the church and its ministers in one or more urban areas.74 This opportunity would have placed Mondlane in the midst of an African territory in transition. Possible urban communities for study by Mondlane included Elisabethville, Mulungwishi, Dondi,

Lobito, Landa, and Leopoldville. That year, the Mouvement National Congolese, a faction of which would be led by future Congolese Prime Minister , was established. A year later, two of these cities, Elisabethville and Leopoldville, would hold municipal elections in which black Congolese could vote and hold office.

The plans for Mondlane‘s work in the Congo changed when, in late July 1956, he and Johnson announced their intention of marrying before Mondlane assumed his post.

Bishop Newell Snow Booth of the Methodist Church in Elisabethville feared that

Mondlane would be a political liability, in part because of his marriage to a white woman. He advised Carpenter that it had been difficult enough to make arrangements to

74 Theodore L. Tucker memo of scholarship aid to Eduardo Mondlane, 28 March 1957, RG 8, Box 15, Folder 15, PHS. 119 get Mondlane, a black man, appropriate housing within the European city. The reaction to the interracial marriage would be such ―that his work might be compromised with both the government and state people.‖ Booth was also cautious regarding Mondlane‘s

―insensitivity to advice given in his best interest.‖75

The Swiss Mission‘s André-Daniel Clerc, too, opposed the marriage, explaining that the Mozambique Christian Council, which had first financed Mondlane‘s higher education, disapproved. Clerc stated that, despite the fact that new religious leadership training centers were being established at Ricatla and Khovo, there was no position for

Mondlane in Mozambique.76

In a 1975 interview, Janet Mondlane also described the difficulties the two experienced as an interracial couple in Boston in the late 1950s. There she was pursuing her master‘s degree in the African Studies department at Boston University, headed by

William O. Brown, while Mondlane was at Harvard University doing research for his dissertation proposal. She explained that they could not find housing themselves, but

75 Booth to Carpenter, 26 October 1956, RG8, Box 15, Folder 15, PHS. 76 Tucker memo of scholarship aid to Eduardo Mondlane, 28 March 1957. Clerc had pronounced his opposition as early as June 1954 when he expressed concern that Mondlane was breaking a commitment to a Mozambican woman, Georgette Libombo, with whom Mondlane once had a long-term relationship. Of interest is the fact that, in 1950, Clerc had disapproved of Mondlane marrying Georgette, because of a disagreement with Georgette‘s father, described as a well-to-do and influential African in Lourenço Marques. Clerc to Ross, 16 June 1954 and Clerc to Ross, 1 March 1950. Clerc‘s concern was not only regarding the racial issues associated with Mondlane‘s marriage, but also the tightening of Portuguese repression of potential Mozambican nationalism. Cecil Scott of the Liga Evangélica de Ação Missionária e Educacional (Evangelical League of Missionary Action and Education or ―Lisbon Liga‖) notes in a letter to George Carpenter, 9 October 1956, that the Portuguese might hold Mondlane because he ―owed taxes and because of the prominent part that he played in various conferences on African affairs in the United States where he was critical of Portugal,‖ RG 8, Box 15, Folder 15, PHS. 120 with the assistance of Boston University, found a ―miserable place for which we paid a tremendously high price.‖77

Despite all of this adversity, Mondlane‘s unwavering Christian belief in the good of humankind was rewarded. The Mondlanes were married 15 October 1956 on the west side of Chicago. The marriage ceremony was held at Warren Avenue Congregational

Church, the family church of Prexy Nesbitt, who would become a fervent advocate for southern African liberation. Nesbitt‘s activist family had welcomed the harried couple when they first arrived in the Chicago area three years earlier. The pastor who performed the ceremony was Rev. Edward Hawley, Eduardo Mondlane‘s former roommate at

Oberlin College. Hawley would also travel to Africa in the early 1960s where he would support the Mondlanes in his work as Pastor for Refugees at the Christian Council of

Tanzania. In the United States, Hawley would become the editor of Africa Today, one of the most influential journals on Africa during the 1960s. Sadly, Hawley would also deliver Eduardo Mondlane‘s eulogy in February 1969.78

Also supporting Mondlane‘s optimism was the fact that he and many of his former supporters in the Methodist church continued to interact despite the damage to their relationship. In fact, André-Daniel Clerc suggested that Mondlane might be suited to work for an international organization such as UNESCO. The Commission of the

Churches on International Affairs supported Mondlane‘s bid for a UNESCO position, as

77 Wright, ―Janet Mondlane of the Mozambique Institute: American ‗Godmother‘ to an African Revolution‖; Mondlane, ―The Struggle for Independence in Mozambique,‖ 16. Mondlane worked with sociologist Dr. Samuel Stouffer and famed psychologist, Dr. Gordon Allport on the issue of role conflict for his dissertation proposal. 78 Edward A. Hawley, ―Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane (1920-1969): A Personal Memoir,‖ Africa Today 26, no. 1 (Qtr 1979): 19-24; Minter, Hovey, and Jr, No Easy Victories, 91-92. 121 did Darrell Randall, and his former professors -- Herskovits and Wendell Bell at

Northwestern, Simpson at Oberlin, and Dr. Calvin Stillman. In early 1957, Mondlane also contacted the United Nations Trusteeship division and was offered a position on 29

March 1957. During this period, Mondlane again received an offer from the Portuguese government. Dr. , a member of the Portuguese delegation at the United

Nations and future Minister of Overseas Territories, offered both Eduardo and Janet

Mondlane positions in the Escola Superior do Ultramar (School of Overseas Portugal) in

Lisbon. As with the Portuguese offer of a scholarship for university study, Mondlane refused.79

Mondlane at the United Nations

Mondlane began working for the United Nations as a Research Officer in the Trusteeship

Department that managed the political situations in Tanganyika, the Cameroons and

South West Africa (later, Namibia). It was during this period that Mondlane established close relationships with Prime Ministers Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and of Tanganyika. These men greatly influenced Mondlane and provided invaluable assistance to FRELIMO. The position provided him access to American government officials as well as other foreign diplomats from around the world. Significantly, the position also provided the opportunity for Mondlane to travel back to the continent, reconnect with rural Africans, and, eventually, visit his homeland.

79 Tucker memo of Scholarship Aid to Eduardo Mondlane, 28 March 1957 and Charles Perier to Frédéric Nolde, Director of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, 16 February 1957, RG 8, Box 15, Folder 15, PHS. 122

From the beginning of October 1960 to the middle of February 1961, Mondlane took part in a United Nations-sponsored plebiscite in the British-administered trust territory of the Cameroons. He was one of a 35-strong contingent of United Nations representatives who had been assigned to help supervise the preparations for a referendum that was to take place on 11-12 February 1961. There were 22 nationalities, including Europeans, Asians, North Americans, South Americans, Africans, and

Australians, among the representatives. The diversity of the contingent allowed

Mondlane to develop relationships, debate, and exchange ideas regarding colonialism and liberation with not only Westerners, but also with Yugoslavs and Soviets.80 Except for those representatives who were stationed at the two main headquarters, most were paired with British officers who were scattered throughout the more than 700-mile area of the

British Cameroons.

This plebiscite marks a turning point in Mondlane‘s life, transforming him from an intellectual, academic, and Western missionary to a fledgling African nationalist leader. During the four months of the plebiscite, Mondlane‘s responsibility was to supervise the British officers directly responsible for carrying out the plebiscite. He reported to the leader of the UN contingent, Dr. Djalal Abdoh of Iran, regarding the

British officers as they explained the voting process to the people. He also assisted in registering voters, spending two months in the northern region and two and a half months in the southern region.

80 Shore, Herbert, ―The Seed of the Mango: Resistance and Revolution in the Life of Eduardo Mondlane,‖ unpublished manuscript, RG 30/307, Series 4:2, Box 2. 123

In an article he wrote for Oberlin Alumni Magazine, Mondlane discussed the distinctions between the two regions of the territory which made the plebiscite challenging. This experience in the Cameroons stimulated his thinking about methods for preparing Mozambicans for political participation. He noted that the northern region of the Cameroons was mostly Muslim, while the southern region had a Christian majority.

The South was more literate and had more industry, while the majority of people in the

North were illiterate and the area was largely pre-industrial. Mondlane surmised that ―the existence of a fairly large number of alien institutions in the South, such as foreign

Christian missions, banana, cocoa, palm oil, lumber industries, and shipping activities, as against the lack of those in the North, may [have] be[en] responsible for the difference.‖

He also noted that ―during the registration period one of the most difficult problems was to persuade the women to register.‖ Mondlane explained that among the adherents to indigenous religions, women voters often out-numbered men. Among

Muslims in the North, however, it was not considered proper for a woman to be seen in public, let alone participate in public activities such as registering and voting. The solution was that Muslim women would be registered at night, when men could not see them, and then vote on a different day from the men.

Dealing with these profound cultural differences was significant for Mondlane, because Mozambique shared a similar cultural profile. Due, in part, to the history of colonialism in Mozambique in which the Portuguese segregated labor pools by dividing the country at the 22° parallel, there was a rural northern section with a larger Muslim population than the more populous, urban southern territory. Throughout his tenure as

124 president of FRELIMO, Mondlane would have to manage these cultural differences in order to prevent the disintegration of the liberation front – a problem that would plague other African liberation movements in Angola, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Mondlane was successful in consciously and continually integrating members from different areas of the country into the FRELIMO Central Committee and guerilla cadres. He laid the groundwork for the development and dissemination of a diverse yet unified political, national, and cultural community promoting Mozambican nationalism.81

Mondlane was also influenced by the training program in the Cameroons that permitted largely illiterate populations to become voters, a situation that José Oliveira had, at the 1952 Assembly, disparagingly equated to giving firearms to children.

Mondlane stated that political parties had some influence, but the most influential people were the traditional leaders. In the North, the chiefs were in favor of joining the Nigerian

Federation. 80% of registered voters went to the polls. In the South, the chiefs wanted to join the Republic of Cameroon. There 95% of the registered voters went to the polls. In both cases, the outcome of the votes was in accord with the wishes of the chiefs.

Mondlane wrote that ―the important fact is that the political leaders of the Cameroons rather than the political leaders of a foreign power, decided what the future of the country would be. This is for Africans a gain in their political existence. With more education and participation in their own economic, social and political life, they will learn to depend more and more on their own personal judgments.‖82 This experience would be

81 Henriksen, Thomas H., ―The Revolutionary Thought of Eduardo Mondlane,‖ 43-44. 82 Eduardo C. Mondlane, ―The United Nations in Action -- The Cameroons Plebiscite,‖ The Oberlin Alumni Magazine, October 1961, 5-7. 125 part of the inspiration for Mondlane‘s development of an educational facility, the

Mozambique Institute, in the first months of his presidency. 83

More generally, these four months provided a transitional period in which

Mondlane could experience ―re-Africanization.‖ The process continued when his United

Nations duties took him briefly to the besieged Belgian Congo, and then on to

Mozambique for the first time in eleven years.

Mondlane traveled around his homeland, preaching and reconnecting with both the rural and urban populations. He met with NESAM members, intellectuals, artists, leaders of rural cooperatives, miners‘ mutual aid associations, labor unionists, and others who had been unsuccessfully engaging in non-violent resistance to Portuguese oppression. Cruz e Silva reflects that ―for many, Mondlane‘s speeches brought for the first time an inter-ethnic appeal and the idea of a national struggle.‖84 Importantly,

Mondlane subtlety disputed the contention that he was ―an American,‖ as averred by

Marcelinos dos Santos. He was traveling under the auspices of the United Nations, accompanied by his white American wife.

In his memoir, Raúl Honwana related a story of Mondlane‘s speech at the Swiss

Mission where both attended a Sunday service during Mondlane‘s homecoming. The future leader of FRELIMO, who asked for permission to speak in Portuguese because it had been so long since he had spoken Tsonga, told a parable made famous by James

83 Although not mentioned by Mondlane, this vote was controversial. American Ambassador to Cameroon Leland Barrows explained in a 1971 interview that some Cameroonians protested the vote in the northern section of the country, citing undue influence by the Nigerians and/or British. President appealed to Barrows to speak with American policymakers to support him before the United Nations, but the United States instead supported the British. Leland Barrows recorded interview by William Moss, 4 February 1971, pp. 6-8, John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program. 84 Cruz e Silva, ―Swiss Mission,‖ 201. 126

Emman Kwegyir Aggrey. Aggrey‘s ―Parable of the Eagle,‖ as told by Mondlane, is the story of a chicken farmer who had found a baby eagle and raised it among his chickens.

As an adult, this eagle did not fly. The farmer told his friend, a naturalist, that he had been successful in making the eagle forget his nature, but the naturalist contested this claim. He stated that an eagle could not forget its nature and that he would prove his point. He picked up the eagle and threw it. Although the eagle opened its wings, it did not fly. The next day, the friend repeated the experiment and the eagle flapped its wings once before falling again to the ground. Unsurprisingly, on the third try, the eagle flapped its wings and flew away.

Spoken in Tsonga, this message would have been one of reassurance and encouragement to the Mozambican population. However, spoken in Portuguese, this parable was also a message to the potential nationalists like Honwana among the educated Mozambicans in the audience, as well as the colonialists.85 To them all,

Mondlane proclaimed that he, in the role of the eagle, remained a Mozambican, regardless of the years spent in foreign lands and among the Europeans of the missions.

He was, however, also advising the Portuguese that he would soon play the role of the naturalist and remind the Mozambicans of their own majestic and powerful nature.

Despite the expected arrests in the wake of Mondlane‘s travels, the future leader received an outpouring of requests that he return to lead the struggle for independence against the Portuguese. Mondlane returned to the United States where he fulfilled his commitment as an assistant professor of sociology at Syracuse University until 1963 when he returned to lead the Mozambican liberation movement. By the late 1950s,

85 Honwana, The Life History of Raúl Honwana, 144-145. 127

Mondlane had obtained much of the education and experience that he would need to foster FRELIMO‘s revolutionary platform and garner international support for the movement. His early childhood exposed him to the oppression of Portuguese colonialism. His schooling inculcated in him the value of education, both Western scholarship and vocational training. His time at the University of Lisbon exposed

Mondlane to radical politics and connected him with other lusophone African nationalist leaders as well as the Portuguese Communist Party. From his time in the United States, he gained insight into the workings of contemporary American society, as well as experience as a speaker on colonialism in Africa. He studied race relations both academically, with some of the most influential social scientists of the period, and through personal experience. Mondlane astutely developed contacts with other African leaders, with American activists, and with members of the U.S. State Department.

Mondlane also gained insight regarding the hardening Cold War. Through his work at the

United Nations, he forged relationships with people on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

The next chapter will examine the relationship of Mondlane and FRELIMO to the international community. It will explore the policy of the United States government regarding the lusophone African territories during the Kennedy administration to show the complex interplay among Cold War national security concerns, African decolonization, and Civil Rights Movement influences.

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Chapter Four: Kennedy’s Balancing Act – Mozambican Liberation, the Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy, and the Black Freedom Struggle

On June 29, 1959, at the banquet of the American Society of African Culture‘s (AMSAC) second international conference, two legislators spoke before a largely African American and African audience of artists, intellectuals, civic leaders, and African nationalists about the importance of Africa to the United States. The Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senator John F. Kennedy, delivered his first major speech regarding

Africa, entitled ―The United States and Africa: A New Policy for a New Era.‖ Inspired by an article published in 1958 by Massachusetts Institute of Technology economics professor Arnold Rivkin, Kennedy called for a ―Marshall Plan for Africa.‖ He envisioned African regional development being funded through multilateral cooperation among African, European, and American institutions.1 A key element of this plan was a proposed African educational development fund emphasizing personnel exchange and greatly increasing the number of African students being educated in the United States.

Relating this initiative to Cold War exigencies, Kennedy noted that such an investment

1 Winifred Armstrong to Arnold Rivkin, dated 13 June 1959, Winifred Armstrong Papers, Box 1, Africa documents folder, JFKL. Armstrong stated that she was drafting a speech for Senator Kennedy for the AMSAC conference and had found his proposal ―useful and provocative.‖ She wished to meet with him to discuss the proposal with ―several of the representatives of African countries.‖ Arnold Rivkin, ―An Economic Development Proposal for Africa: A New Multilateral Aid Organization,‖ International Organization 12, no. 3 (July 1, 1958): 303-319. 129

―would be repaid to this country many times over in increased goodwill, trade and national security.‖2

Following Kennedy on the dais was African American Congressman Charles C.

Diggs, Jr. (D-MI), a member of both the House Subcommittee on African Affairs and the

American Committee on Africa (ACOA). Many of the elements of Diggs‘ speech would be echoed by African American advocates for African liberation throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. He opened his speech by invoking the diasporic connection between

African Americans and Africans, thus uniting the domestic civil rights and African liberation movements into a single black freedom struggle. He negated the prevailing imperial civilizing mission rhetoric by lauding Africa‘s rich cultural contributions. Diggs then moved from the cultural to the political, attacking those cold warriors who

―underestimate[d] the African intelligence‖ with their contentions that Africans were the peoples most susceptible to Communist influence.

Responding to Kennedy‘s assertion of the importance of the emerging continent,

Diggs went on to prescribe the ways that African Americans could create and profit from political opportunities associated with expanding U.S-African relations. He advised

African Americans of their responsibility to pressure the government for increased diplomatic relations with African countries, to support Africa in the United Nations, and, especially, for increased financial and technical assistance to the continent. Significantly,

Diggs pointed out that African Americans could apply this pressure because ―the coveted

2 John F. Kennedy, ―The United States and Africa: A New Policy for a New Era‖ (presented at the American Society of African Culture Second Annual Conference, The Waldorf-Astoria, New York, June 29, 1959). 130

Negro vote [could] serve as an impetus to underscore proper attention to Africa‘s needs.‖3

These two politicians described a formula for what was perceived as a win-win- win proposition. The proposed use of educational initiatives, through what would be called the ―fourth dimension of foreign policy,‖ would allow for three positive outcomes:

1) the United States would gain influence with the continent on which, in 1960, 17 new nations would be born; 2) the African nations would receive desperately needed financial and technical assistance for their nation-building projects; and, 3) in addition to the domestic political power that African Americans were exercising in their movement for civil rights, Blacks could win influence in foreign affairs, particularly regarding Africa.

Historian James Meriwether has shown in his article, ―‗Worth a Lot of Negro

Votes‘: Black Voters, Africa, and the 1960 Presidential Campaign,‖ how African independence became an important issue for the 1960 presidential candidates, Kennedy and then Vice-President Richard Nixon who were both vying for the votes of African

Americans. The controversial 1960 East African Airlift in which the Kennedy

Foundation donated $100,000 to transport 222 Kenyan students to study at American universities was especially beneficial for Kennedy‘s presidential bid.4

The organization that perhaps benefited most from the Kennedy administration‘s institution of educational support for Africa was the Mozambican Liberation Front

3 Charles Diggs, Jr., ―The Role of the American Negro in American-African Relations,‖ (presented at the American Society of African Culture Second Annual Conference, The Waldorf-Astoria, New York, June 29, 1959). 4 James Hunter Meriwether, ―‗Worth a Lot of Negro Votes‘: Black Voters, Africa, and the 1960 Presidential Election,‖ Journal of American History (Desember 2008): 737-763. Of interest is the fact that during the campaign Kennedy used some of Diggs‘ own points about the relationship between African Americans, Africa, and U.S. foreign policy when speaking before African American audiences on the campaign trail. 131

(FRELIMO). This support utilized federal government, private foundation, African

American, and African assets. Although meager compared to federal aid to Portugal, the humanitarian and educational assistance from the U.S. government created a channel through which FRELIMO would receive financial and technical assistance from a transnational network of activists. In the United States, this network reached from the churches to the boardrooms to the White House. The Mozambique Institute, an educational and healthcare institution initially funded by the Ford Foundation, became what American activists in the 1970s dubbed ―The Front for the Front.‖ Through the

Mozambique Institute, FRELIMO became the only African national liberation movement in the 1960s to receive financial and material support from the United States, the Soviet

Union, and the People‘s Republic of China.5

The genesis of the Mozambique Institute begins with Kennedy‘s understanding of education as ―the keystone in the arch of freedom and progress‖ both domestically and internationally.6 During the Kennedy administration, Africa was given more educational funding than any other geographical area. The first U.S. government program to support students from the Portuguese African territories was the Southern African Students

Program (SASP), created in response to events associated with the outbreak of the

Angolan armed struggle weeks after Kennedy‘s inauguration in January 1961. The SASP was a program designed to help future African leaders to acquire the skills to promote a smoother transition to self-government for rural Africans denied educational

5 Wright, ―Janet Mondlane of the Mozambique Institute: American ‗Godmother‘ to an African Revolution‖; Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 46. 6 John F Kennedy, John F. Kennedy on Education, ed. William T O‘Hara (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1966), vii. In his Foreword, Congressman John Brademas quotes President Kennedy‘s use of this phrase in his Special Message on Education, delivered 29 January 1963. 132 opportunities in such territories as Mozambique where nearly 99% of its indigenous population had no formal education. It was the only educational aid program during the

1960s in which the selection process was managed by the federal government, not the organization which administered the program.7 The reason for this level of federal government involvement is that the SASP was an overt program used for covert purposes.

The complexity of the diplomatic situation regarding the Portuguese colonies prioritized the use of private organizations to support the administration‘s educational initiatives which were an integral part of Kennedy‘s global development scheme. In June

1961, Portuguese Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar accused the Kennedy administration of financing ‘s ―terrorist‖ organization, the Angolan

Peoples‘ Union. As a result, Secretary of State Dean Rusk prohibited all ―official‖ contacts with nationalists in the Portuguese territories. The alternative adopted by the

United States government was to use private organizations and individuals to funnel government aid to the nationalists.8

Policymakers believed that educational and humanitarian aid could be given to

Angolan and Mozambican refugees through private organizations without raising

Portuguese ire. At the same time, the United States hoped to influence these students to promote a pro-Western allegiance when they returned to their territories to contribute to

7 Jones Rich, ―United States Government-Sponsored Higher Education Programs for Africans: 1957-1970 with Special Attention to the Role of the African-American Institute,‖ 127. 8 Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Alexis Johnson, 18 June 1961, prohibited contact with nationalists from the Portuguese African territories. Memo from Johnson to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Hilsman, 17 July 1961, regarding the continued funding of the UPA states that ―efforts will be continued to locate an individual or institution willing to assume on a strictly private basis the current payments.‖ Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1961-1963 Africa Volume XXI Portuguese Territories, Documents #350 and #352. 133 the nation-building project. Although not officially part of U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. government could also leverage this private aid to refugees to counter claims by Afro-

Asian anti-colonial and anti-apartheid advocates at the UN. These advocates complained that the United States supported only Portugal, its NATO ally, and was hypocritical in its rhetoric advocating African self-determination. Ironically, the accusations by these anti- colonial and anti-apartheid advocates actually bolstered U.S. government reassurances to

Portuguese officials that the United States was not supporting the nationalist movements.

As shown in earlier chapters, Americans had long been involved with the education of Africans -- as missionaries in the African territories, through the work of such foundations as the Phelps-Stokes Fund, and scholarships for such promising

Africans as James E.K. Aggrey, Malawi‘s first President , and Eduardo

Mondlane. The sponsorship of educational programs in support of Africans by the United

States government was also not new. Following World War II, the provision of educational opportunities to African students became a key component of both overt and covert U.S. foreign policy with Africa. The U.S. government sought to cultivate the future political, administrative, industrial, and educational leaders of African territories that would eventually shed colonial dominance. It further believed that such leaders would advocate for liberal democratic and free trade systems in their newly independent nations, providing a barrier against Communist infiltration. To support the needs of all of the countries emerging from colonialism, in February 1961, the Kennedy administration created the State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECU), headed by Philip H. Coombs, former director of educational programs at the Ford Foundation.

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Later that same year, Congress approved the Foreign Aid Act which enabled the administration to establish the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) designed to administer U.S. economic assistance programs. One of the early focuses of

USAID was educational initiatives for the leaders of newly-independent African countries.9 These educational opportunities were provided through both government agencies like the ECU, and private organizations affiliated with the government, including such reputable foundations as the Carnegie, Rockefeller, Ford, and the African-

American Institute.10

This strategy was particularly significant during the Kennedy administration which subscribed to Walt W. Rostow‘s modernization theory. Rostow, director of State

Department Policy Planning, used the economic and industrial development of the United

States, including an alleged ―take-off in growth‖ stage, as a model for economic development in the former colonized areas of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Rostow‘s text, The Stages of Economic Growth, which directly refuted Marxist theory of class struggle and placed the United States at the apex of societal development, complemented the fervent anticommunism of the outgoing Eisenhower and the liberalism of the new

Kennedy administrations.11

Such African nationalist leaders as Mondlane and, later his successor, Samora

Machel, valued education as highly as the Americans. They understood that an educated citizenry was essential to nation-building, an understanding gained, in part, from their

9 ―USAID: USAID History‖, n.d., http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html. 10 Berman, The Ideology of Philanthropy. 11 Michael E Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and ―nation Building‖ in the Kennedy Era, New Cold War history (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 135 own educational experiences. In his briefing to the National Council of Churches regarding his 1961 visit to Mozambique, Mondlane stressed the educational requirements of the Mozambican people, particularly their need for secondary school education. He outlined those needs which he hoped could be supported by the United States, either through its own aid programs and/or in negotiations with Portugal.12

The Portuguese government, too, understood the efficacy of education and the importance of the support the United States government and private organizations provided by funding these educational programs. As a result, it devoted significant resources to a propaganda campaign to discredit the efforts of the U.S. government and

American advocates supporting the Mozambican nationalists. Just as education was one significant point of contention, the central forum for debate was the United Nations.

It was there that, in 1961, the Kennedy administration publically attempted to advocate on behalf of self-determination for the lusophone colonies. The administration also made diplomatic attempts to persuade Salazar of the benefits of reforming its colonial policy, but to no avail. Salazar never wavered in his stance equating African nationalism with Communism, a stance which would later appeal to the Nixon administration. Such U.S. government advocacy for nationalists was undermined by Cold

War exigencies and national security concerns. The Portuguese controlled the Azores

Islands where the United States maintained military facilities considered essential to its national security. That the Azores bases were needed to support the transport and re- fueling of military aircraft, missiles, and other materials during the Berlin Crisis, the

12 Attachment to a Confidential memo on ―Present Conditions in Mozambique,‖ 1May 1961, (possibly from Dr. Robert Parsons to Theodore Tucker), RG8, Box 15, Mondlane folder, PHS. 136 near-cataclysmic Cuban Missile Crisis, and the on-going Congo crisis proved the value of these facilities.

Due to Cold War exigencies, renewing the Azores agreement became Kennedy‘s highest policy priority regarding Portugal and the lusophone African colonies. The administration also strove to ―build the frontiers of freedom‖ by continuing to use educational opportunities to support the African liberation struggle.13 This chapter provides a portrait of the complex and compelling international and domestic challenges that coalesced during the Kennedy administration and resulted in its pragmatic ―middle- road‖ or ―incremental‖ policy. It also highlights the perseverance and determination of

Mozambican leaders and American activists in their demands and their skill in optimizing the opportunities and assistance won.

Education: “The Keystone in the Arch of Freedom and Progress”14

Africans want a higher standard of living. Seventy-five percent of the population now lives by subsistence agriculture. They want opportunity to manage and benefit directly from the resources in, on, and under their land. They want to govern their own affairs believing that political freedom is the precondition to economic and social development. Most of all, they want education – for education is in their eyes the backbone to gaining and maintaining the political institutions they want. Education is the means to personal and national prestige. Education is, in truth, the only way to genuine African independence and progress.15 -- Senator John F. Kennedy--

13 John F. Kennedy Message to Congress, 21 March 1961, Winifred Armstrong Papers, Box 1, USAID folder, JFKL. In this speech, President Kennedy stated that the 1960s ―can be – and must be – the crucial ‗decade of development‘ – the period when many less developed nations make the transition into self- sustained growth – the period in which an enlarged community of free, stable, and self-reliant nations can reduce world tensions and insecurity.‖ 14 Kennedy, John F. Kennedy on Education, vii. In his Foreword, Congressman John Brademas quotes President Kennedy‘s use of this metaphor in his Special Message on Education, delivered 29 January 1963. 15 Ibid., 69. Excerpted from a speech entitled, ―The Educational Development of Africa,‖ delivered by Senator Kennedy at Wesleyan University in Lincoln, NE on 15 October 1959. 137

These opening quotes highlight John Fitzgerald Kennedy‘s belief in the power of education to improve the lives of all people. In his Presidential address to introduce to

Congress ―the most sweeping program for federal help to education ever advocated by an

American President‖ delivered in 1963, President Kennedy said, "Education is the keystone in the arch of freedom and progress.‖ Kennedy believed that federal funds should be made available to support education as part of both domestic and foreign policy.

The melding of domestic and foreign policy initiatives regarding African education by private organizations has a long history. Discussed briefly in the second chapter was the interconnection between American educational initiatives and those in

Africa in the 1920s. The Phelps-Stokes Fund was chosen to head the African Education

Commission, because it was considered the foremost authority on the education of

―backward‖ peoples as a result of its survey of educational challenges for Blacks in the

American South. The study‘s recommendation that the colonial educational systems in

Africa be based upon the Hampton Institute and Booker T. Washington‘s Tuskegee agricultural vocational training model was nearly a foregone conclusion.

These private initiatives were also connected with U.S. government policy. In the year following the first Red Scare in the United States, the chairman of the African

Education Commission, Dr. Thomas Jesse Jones, cited the prevention of the spread of

Communism into Africa as one of the reasons for the educational survey.16 Anti-

16 African Education Commission, 1920-1921, Education in Africa; a Study of West, South, and Equatorial Africa (New York: Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1922); African Education Commission, 1923-1924, Education in East Africa; a Study of East, Central and South Africa by the Second African Education Commission Under 138 communism would continue to animate the educational aid programming. In 1948,

Congress passed the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange (Smith-Mundt) Act which dictated the terms of the State Department‘s dissemination of information overseas, including educational, cultural, and technical exchanges, as a means of countering Communist propaganda. Sections 1437 and 1462 of the Act which require the

State Department to ―maximize the use of private agencies‖ are particularly significant since these provisions were proposed to protect the U.S. government from allegations of engaging in its own propaganda.17 Consequently, American foundations, including the

Phelps-Stokes Fund, the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford Foundation, and the African-

American Institute, would continue to play a major role in the development of educational systems in Africa.

Scholar Edward H. Berman has examined the role that foundations played in supporting and, in some cases dictating, U.S. foreign policy through their funding of educational and cultural projects. Berman makes clear that, despite the spirit of the

Smith-Mundt Act provisions allegedly designed to prevent a government monopoly on cultural and educational initiatives for foreign consumption, there was little separation between the government and private organizations. Particularly illustrative is the fact that many government policymakers were, or became, foundation officers. For instance,

Secretary of State Dean Rusk was the president of the Rockefeller Foundation before assuming office. Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles was a member of that

the Auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, in Cooperation with the International Education Board; Berman, ―American Influence on African Education.‖ 17 Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950 (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 122. 139 foundation‘s Board of Directors. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

J. Wayne Fredericks worked for the Ford Foundation prior to joining State.18

The provisions of the Smith-Mundt Act were also meant to protect U.S. citizens from government propaganda by prohibiting information designed for foreign audiences to be distributed domestically. Although the State Department may have abided by the letter of the law, Berman demonstrates that the relationship between government bureaus, foundations, and educational institutions defied the spirit of the Smith-Mundt Act. Such defiance is evident in the government‘s efforts to increase and control the American public‘s knowledge of Africa. It did so through the funding of the leading organizations and programs which disseminated information about Africa. Such organizations included the Council of Foreign Relations, which received a large portion of its funding from the

Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller foundations. Berman also notes that in 1961, 10 of 14

Carnegie trustees, 10 of 15 Ford trustees, and 12 of 20 Rockefeller trustees were members of the council.19 The foundation-funded African-American Institute published one of the most influential journals regarding Africa during the late 1950s and early

1960s, Africa Report. Also funded by the Carnegie Corporation was the first Program of

African Studies (PAS), established in 1948 by Melville J. Herskovits at Northwestern

University.

Attesting to the importance attributed by the United States government to area studies following the Second World War is the fact that between 1949 and 1964 the federal government invested nearly $76 million for research and training projects

18 Fredericks was also a trustee of Lincoln University, one of the educational institutions to sponsor the SASP. 19 Berman, The Ideology of Philanthropy, 36. 140 regarding Africa, including the expansion of African studies centers like the PAS with funds provided under the National Defense Education Act.20 As a result, the government relied upon the Africanists who taught and/or graduated from these programs to provide information and to guide policy-making for the continent.

Using Gramscian analyses, Berman describes American attempts at global cultural dominance, replacing the European civilizing mission with its own in the years following the Second World War.21 Because of Berman‘s focus on American policy, however, missing in the analysis is a discussion of the agency Third World actors gained during these transformative years. Such a discussion is important regarding this period of fervent African nationalism, when African leaders were highly sensitive to the danger of neocolonialism. The nationalists were not merely consumers of American or Soviet models of modernity. As discussed briefly in Chapter 2, anti-colonial African leaders met and negotiated with each other, seeking to create alliances across sometimes vast physical, ideological, and cultural distances. Such alliances were based, in large part, upon their common colonial experiences and their desire to protect themselves from becoming embroiled in the Cold War. Therefore, in addition to the option of accepting offers from the communist nations versus accepting American overtures, these leaders negotiated for better terms and/or adapted American offerings to suit their own purposes.

Kennedy‘s understanding of the importance of education to Africans was not merely a projection of his own beliefs, but reflected the pronouncements of Africans and other so- called Third World actors themselves.

20 Staniland, American Intellectuals and African Nationalists, 1955-1970, 29. 21 Berman, The Ideology of Philanthropy. 141

Balancing Africa -- Act I: The 1961 East African Airlift Coalition

In consultation with the African leaders, we must undertake now a comprehensive program mobilizing all our resources for a full attack on Africa‘s desperate need for education at all levels … the State Department must be instructed to inform the African leaders now assembling in New York of this undertaking and invite them to join in presenting to us a statement of their most pressing needs and overall requirements …22 -- Senator John F. Kennedy at opening of 1960 UN General Assembly –

In 1961, the ECU developed the Council for Educational Cooperation with Africa

(CECAF). CECAF was comprised of the International Institute of Education (IIE), the

African-American Institute (AAI), the African-American Students Foundation, the

United Negro College Fund (UNCF), and the Phelps-Stokes Fund. Associated members included the Africa Service Institute and the African Students Emergency Aid Program of the National Student Christian Federation. In addition to the support it received from the

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, this council also received financial assistance from USAID. The CECAF was established in order to organize and administer the third

East African Airlift. It would also be involved with the development of the SASP, although the coalition lasted only one year.

The composition of this council merits scrutiny. The coalition illustrates the confluence between the domestic and international black freedom struggles and the ways that the liberal Kennedy administration supported both, overtly and covertly, but on its own terms. For those African American academics, artists, and intellectuals involved, it shows a continuity of purpose from the efforts of the Pan African Congresses of the

1920s-1945. It also presages the ideological clashes between liberal Negro reformers who

22 Kennedy, John F. Kennedy on Education, 86. 142 sought to partner with policymakers and militant Afro-American revolutionaries who contended with the government during the 1960s.

The ECU and the IIE were newly established organizations designed to administer international educational aid. President Kennedy charged Philip H. Coombs with the difficult job of providing ―imaginative policy development‖ and a unified and

―vigorous direction‖ for the field of educational and cultural interchange. He was not only to manage the exchange programs within the State Department, but also to develop a policy to consolidate and guide the work of all federal agencies involved with the field.

As per the provisions of the Smith-Mundt Act, government initiatives were to be coordinated with the private sector. In addition to these domestic management duties, the

Assistant Secretary of State for the ECU was ―to exercise U.S. leadership on policies and programs of international organizations concerned with educational and cultural affairs.‖23 As the first person to assume such overwhelming responsibilities at a time of tremendous tumult, both internationally and domestically, it is unsurprising that Coombs resigned after little more than a year as Assistant Secretary.

The public explanation for Coomb‘s departure was his acceptance of a lucrative opportunity to return to the Ford Foundation as a consultant.24 Upon his departure, however, Coombs provided a report to Secretary of State Dean Rusk which offered greater insight regarding the difficulties he encountered during his short tenure, and guidance for the incoming Assistant Secretary. Coombs believed that the American

23 Philip Hall Coombs and Council on Foreign Relations, The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy; Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1st ed. (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Row, 1964), 2; Fred Hechinger, ―Education Linked to Foreign Policy,‖ New York Times (1857- Current file), March 12, 1961, 52. 24 ―Top Aide to Rusk Due to Resign,‖ New York Times (1857-Current file), April 20, 1962, 9. 143 public had a role to play in the field of international educational and cultural affairs. With the support of the Council for Foreign Relations, Carnegie Corporation, and Brookings

Institute, this report was expanded into the book entitled, The Fourth Dimension of

Foreign Policy. Coombs cited such challenges as bureaucratic obstacles, insufficient funding, and difficulties with determining the limits of government and private sector powers and responsibilities. There was, however, one recommendation that Coombs made regarding improved relationships between the government and private sectors that reveals government use of private organizations for covert activities. He states:

… government agencies, most notably the intelligence agencies, should avoid asking private organizations and scholars to do things which might compromise their integrity or jeopardize their future effectiveness. Fear that Congress might not approve the use of regular funds for certain legitimate and important purposes … makes it tempting to use unaccountable funds for the purpose, which automatically lends an air of intrigue and secrecy to an enterprise that by right should be in the open.25

The Kennedy administration‘s precarious balancing act between Cold War exigencies and social justice advocacy, as well as domestic and foreign policy, is evidenced by the involvement in the CECAF of two organizations founded by African

Americans, the African-American Institute and the United Negro College Fund. The

25 Coombs and Council on Foreign Relations, The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy; Educational and Cultural Affairs, 139. The CIA‘s use of private organizations and individuals to support such international cultural campaigns as Peace with Freedom and the Congress for Cultural Freedom would eventually create the feared difficulties for some. In 1969, Ramparts, a New Left publication, and the Black Panthers Newspaper, would publish an exposé regarding the CIA‘s activities in Africa, many of which were associated with educational programs. The AAI, one of the American organizations involved with the East African Airlifts and the SASP programs, and Tom Mboya, one of the African directors of the African-American Students Foundation which administered the Airlifts, would be implicated in this article. Schechter, Dan, Ansara, Michael, and Kolodney, David, eds., ―The CIA as an Equal Opportunity Employer,‖ Ramparts (June 1969): 25-33. It should be noted that most recipients were unaware that they were receiving CIA funding. It is unclear who did know and much of the information regarding this funding remains classified. This article was also published in Black Panther 3, 8:1-24 (14 June 1969): 10- 11.

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CECAF coalition also demonstrates how the East African Airlift project reflected the same understanding of the relationship between African and African American education as was evidenced by the Phelps-Stokes educational studies in Africa forty years earlier.

The ECU invited the UNCF to be a part of the Council to facilitate the placement of scholarship students at UNCF member colleges and universities. The UNCF had been incorporated in 1944 by Dr. Frederick Patterson, president of Tuskegee Institute, and Dr.

Mary McLeod Bethune, president of Bethune-Cookman College, among others. The

ECU invitation was a departure from normal procedure for both the government and the

UNCF. Previously, most federally-funded African exchange and scholarship students had been placed in private northern universities. Before joining the CECAF, UNCF executive director William J. Trent had traveled to Africa to recruit African students directly for UNCF‘s own small African scholarship program.

Trent‘s efforts to place a greater number of African students on behalf of the

CECAF presented challenges. Placement in educational institutions in the segregated

South proved difficult for those African students unaccustomed to living as an oppressed racial minority. The situation was also counterproductive to the State Department‘s objective of exposing the Africans to the benefits of the United States‘ liberal democratic values. Therefore, most of the Africans continued to be placed in private northern institutions. An orientation program developed by Trent was added for newly-arrived

African students and the African-American Institute supported this orientation role.26

26 Evelyn Jones Rich, Covert and Overt US Government Support for African Studies, vol. 455, Program of African Studies Lecture Series (Northwestern University, 1978). 145

The AAI was established in 1953 as the Institute of African-American Relations,

Inc. by scholars Horace Mann Bond and William Leo Hansberry.27 Bond was then the first African American president of Lincoln University and author of The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order. Bond‘s understanding of the relationship between education and the social status of Blacks in the United States was aligned with renowned African American social scientist, E. Franklin Frazier. These scholars believed that Africans in America had been socialized during slavery with some positive, but far more negative aspects of American society such as greed and violence. The systematic denial of educational opportunities had perpetually handicapped Blacks in American society. Bond lamented that, following Emancipation, African Americans were forced

―to make the wrenching transition from rural to urban life,‖ although it was they who

―had the poorest opportunity to acquire the accommodating techniques and skills and habits of culture that might have made for a smooth and easy transition.‖ 28 Bond wished to ease this transition for Africans.

Hansberry, a renowned Africanist at Howard University, likewise, was invested in supporting the education of future African leaders. Specializing in African civilizations,

Hansberry‘s scholarship, like that of famed historian and founder of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, Carter G. Woodson, lauded the technological and cultural achievements of pre-colonial Africa. In 1921, the year of the second Pan-

African Congress organized by his mentor W.E.B. DuBois, Hansberry announced his

27 Other founders included William Steen, James Grant, Robert W. Williams, Jr., and Henrietta Van Noy.William Leo Hansberry, Pillars in Ethiopian History: The William Leo Hansberry African History Notebook, ed. Joseph E. Harris (Washington, D.C: Howard University Press, 1974), 25. 28 Horace Mann Bond, The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order (New York: Octagon Books, 1966), 475. The first edition of this book was published in 1934. 146 desire to ―stimulate formal studies of Africa, to secure funds to publish source books for school use, and to establish a bureau to promote popular interest in black studies …‖

Nearly half a century before the cultural black nationalism of the , Hansberry espoused the belief that knowledge of the African past would build black pride and confidence. Indeed, thirty years before the Ford Foundation provided the funding for Howard University to launch its official program of African studies,

Hansberry had begun teaching such courses in ancient and medieval African history as

―Negro Peoples in the Cultures and Civilizations of Prehistoric and Proto-Historic

Times,‖ ―The Ancient Civilizations of Ethiopia,‖ and ―The Civilization of West Africa in

Medieval and Early Modern Times.‖29 As early as the 1940s, Hansberry was a fervent supporter of African independence while such colleagues as Rayford Logan advocated for the mandate system and a gradual transition to independence for African colonies.30

The AAI was a multicultural organization with a mission to assist African students in the segregated city of Washington, D.C. with adapting to American society, applying for funding, and excelling in the academic environment. Notably, during the early 1960s, two of the officers of the AAI were, or had been, associated with Eduardo

Mondlane -- AAI president and former executive director of the NCC Emory Ross, and

Edwin Munger, host of the 1952 ―Africa in the Modern World‖ radio show. Other officers were affiliated with the State Department and/or foundations. These included

AAI vice-president Lloyd V. Steere, former Consul General in Southern Rhodesia (later,

29 Hansberry, Pillars in Ethiopian History, 5-7. In 1927, Hansberry was a presenter at the Fourth Pan- African Conference in New York. 30 Janken, Rayford W. Logan and the Dilemma of the African-American Intellectual, 174. 147

Zimbabwe), Chester Bowles, and Alan Pifer of the Carnegie Corporation.31 Even after the disintegration of the CECAF, the AAI continued to partner with ECU in its administration of the Southern African Students Program.

In the midst of the modern Civil Rights movement, this partnership between the federal government and African Americans expanded African American advocacy from domestic into international policy. Historian Penny Von Eschen has argued that the anti- communism of the late 1940s successfully divided the activism on behalf of Africa by black leftists and liberals. She states that ―Although leftists and liberals shared the indictment of the exploitation of colonized peoples, leftists saw the problem as inherent in capitalist organization, whereas liberals sought a solution in antidiscrimination measures.‖32 Partnerships between the federal government, liberal, and African

American organizations such as the CECAF limited African American advocacy to liberal political reform, not the anti-capitalist demands for institutional change that included social and economic equity for former colonized peoples espoused by more radical advocates.

It is difficult to determine the feelings of Bond and Hansberry regarding their role in spreading American cultural dominance. It is likely that their understanding of the opportunities inherent in American liberal democracy mirrored that of Eduardo

Mondlane. Therefore, during the Kennedy administration, their access to federal funding and the ability of African Americans to participate in the support of African national

31 African-American Institute masthead in 1959 – other officers were Lansdell K. Christie, L. Gray Cowan, Dana S. Creel, John W. Davis, and E. Ladd Thurston. Box 87, Folder 1, African American Institute (1959- 1960), NWU-MJH. 32 Von Eschen, Race Against Empire, 108. 148 liberation was viewed as a positive evolution. It represented a continuation of the efforts of the Pan-African Association to develop partnerships between social reformers of

African descent and powerful white liberals. Rayford Logan, then a historian at Howard

University, a member of the African Studies Association and the American Committee on Africa, would continue to be a part of these efforts, although his mentor W.E.B.

DuBois, who had been in struggle for over half a century, had adopted a more radical agenda.33

The participation of the African-American Students Foundation in the council also reflects Kennedy‘s efforts to establish the partnership between Americans and

African leaders in the creation of these educational opportunities he espoused in his

―Education for African Freedom‖ speech at the 1960 opening of the UN General

Assembly excerpted in the epigraph. The African-American Students Foundation provides an example of the diverse nature of liberal transnational organizations which supported the black freedom struggle both domestically and internationally.

In 1961, the directors of the organization included African nationalist leaders:

Tom Mboya, then a representative of the Kenyan Legislative Council; Julius Nyerere,

Prime Minister of Tanganyika; , leader of the United Nationalist

Independence Party of (later, Zambia); and Joshua Nkomo, leader of the National Democratic Party of Southern Rhodesia (later, Zimbabwe). These leaders were allied in the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa

33 Logan and E. Franklin Frazier were two of the black scholars in attendance at the first African Studies Association conference held at Northwestern University 8-10 September 1958. Also present were representatives from the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations. Box 2, Folder 2 (ASA – 1958-59), NWU-MJH. 149

(PAFMECA) which had been formed in 1958 in order to coordinate the anti-colonial efforts of member countries.34 Members of the foundation from the United States included: celebrity activists Jackie Robinson, Sidney Poitier, and ; and, the wives of policymakers Chester Bowles and . Of interest is the fact that these and other members, including foundation president Frank Montero, and Cora

Weiss, were also affiliated with the American Committee on Africa, the advocacy group that will be the focus of the final two chapters of this study.35

Early in 1961, Montero, another African American specialist on Africa, spent six weeks visiting six African territories -- Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Uganda, Northern and Southern Rhodesia. He purposefully surveyed the need for educational scholarships within the African population of 28 million. In order to make his proposal for government support of this Airlift attractive to policymakers, Montero successfully adopted national security language. He explained that: 1) Soviet and Chinese

Communists were increasing their scholarship programs for African students; 2) the

United States would benefit from its role in preparing the future African leadership; and,

3) members of the PAFMECA had themselves, at a recent meeting, resolved to accept

U.S. support. The leaders believed that such aid would be mutually beneficial by helping the nationalist leaders to prepare Africans to assume administrative positions in the new governments, while also demonstrating to an international audience American support for

34 The first conference for the PAFMECA was sponsored by Julius Nyerere who was supported in organizing the conference by African American pacifist and activist, Bill Sutherland who emigrated to Dar- es-Salaam in 1963. 35 Kathleen Teltsch, ―U.S. Aide to Help Africans at U.N.,‖ New York Times, August 14, 1963, 6. In August 1963, Montero, who had worked for the and headed organizations dedicated to developing interracial housing, would be asked to head a new department at the United Nations to support African diplomats. 150

African self-determination. As an incentive for the government to increase its scholarship programs which had served only 1,192 sub-Saharan African students,

Montero cited specific announcements by Ghanaian and Kenyan leaders regarding a total of 5,000 scholarships available for African students in countries and the

PRC, as well as 2,000 scholarships to Al-Azhar University in Cairo.36

It is, in part, these national security considerations and the success of the previous two East African Airlifts that the 1961 Airlift received federal funding. The Cold War considerations also undergird the decision to employ a similar coalition of government, private, African American, and African organizations to administer a program for southern African refugees when Angola erupted into violence.

Balancing Africa -- Act II: The Southern African Students Program

In the summer of 1960, Mozambican Joáo ―John‖ Nhambiu accompanied his Angolan friends from the Caravelos Methodist Seminary to Lisbon‘s Aeroporto da Portela de

Sacavém. They went to bid farewell to Dr. Agostinho Neto, the future leader of the

MPLA and Angolan president, who was then an internationally renowned Angolan poet, intellectual, and nationalist. Neto, who had been arrested by the PIDE for suspected subversion, was being exiled by the Portuguese authorities to the Cape Verde Islands.37

Nhambiu was the son of a Methodist missionary. He was born in Maxixe, a village in

36 Montero, Frank C., ―To See African Need through African Eyes‖, March 1961. The resolution by the PAFMECA leaders, which Montero provided as an attachment to his report, did acknowledge the importance of the Airlift, but was not specific in its pronouncement of mutual benefit for the United States. In fact, and to Montero‘s point, the leaders declared their non-aligned status to clearly show that they would accept educational support from countries on either side of the Cold War ideological landscape. 37 António Agostinho Neto, Sacred Hope, trans. Marga Hoiness (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1974), xxx. Neto, who had been arrested by the PIDE on 8 June 1960 in and imprisoned at in Lisbon. It is while exiled in the Cape Verde Islands that Neto was named honorary President of the MPLA. 151 southern Mozambique where the first United Methodist Church mission was established in 1890. He, as well as two Mozambicans who would become founders of FRELIMO,

Pascoal Mocumbi and Joaquim Chissano, were newly arrived in the metropole capital where they had come to study at the University of Lisbon, just as Eduardo Mondlane had a decade earlier.38 Nhambiu was unaware of the danger associated with his participation in this event until agitation regarding the African colonies increased both in Portugal and in Angola throughout the year.39

On 7 May 1961, the PIDE searched the rooms of three students at the seminary; the students subsequently were arrested and held for ten days.40 Within the next two months, , later a field commander of the MPLA, his fiancée, and two other African students were also arrested.41 With the aid of a French ecumenical students group (Comité Inter-Mouvements auprès de Évacués, or CIMADE) affiliated with the

World Council of Churches (WCC), other seminary students began leaving Caravelos throughout the late spring and into summer. Nhambiu and his friends, determined to complete their studies, were reluctant to leave. They stayed, hoping that the assurances that the mission would protect them from PIDE harassment made by Cecil W. Scott,

38 would become the first FRELIMO Secretary of Information and Propaganda. Joaquim Chissano, then the president of NESAM, would be, among other leadership positions, the FRELIMO Minister of Defense (1964-1974) and President of Mozambique (1986 – 2005). 39 Cecil W. Scott to Theodore L. Tucker, 1 December 1960. Scott writes from Lisbon, ―As you know, there are constant demonstrations everywhere now in this country protesting against the ‗calunias‘ but none of us really know what has been expressed.‖ Salazar‘s tight censorship made it extremely difficult for the international community to learn the details of what was happening in Portugal or its colonies. Box 15, Folder 23, PHS. 40 Cecil Scott to ―John,‖ 15 May 1961. Officials at the Lisbon Liga had begun using pseudonyms for recipients and smuggling mail out of the mission to be posted abroad by foreign visitors for fear of the Portuguese Bureau of Censorship. ―John‖ is likely Theodore Tucker. Box 15, Folder 23, PHS. 41 Cecil Scott to Theodore L. Tucker, 10 July 1961, Box 15, Folder 23, PHS. Chipenda would later become a rival of Neto and would temporarily leave the MPLA for the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA). 152 director of the Liga Evangélica de Ação Missionária e Educacional (Evangelical League of Missionary Action and Education, or Lisbon Liga), were true.

In an effort to provide sanctuary for the students, Scott had contacted officials of the NCC and the U.S. Embassy in Portugal, as well as the newly-appointed Portuguese

Minister of Overseas Affairs, Adriano Moreira.42 The possibility of success lessened as the crisis in Angola escalated, and news regarding excessive violence by both the

Portuguese military and civilians in response to Angolan guerilla attacks leaked past

Portuguese censors.

Nhambiu was particularly uncertain of his situation, although it was not his territory that had erupted into violence. Yet, one of the students who had been arrested in

May was from Lourenço Marques. On 30 June 1961, at the urging of his Angolan friends and with the support of Methodist missionaries, Nhambiu, as well as Chissano and three other Mozambicans, finally agreed to leave the seminary with the Angolans. Dr. William

J. Nottingham, a missionary of the Disciples of Christ/United Church of Christ, led the group headed for the Portuguese-Spanish border en route to Paris. While passing through

Spain, they were detained by the Spanish police and jailed in San Sebastián, near the

French border. The newly-appointed American ambassador Anthony J. Drexel Biddle negotiated for the release of the Americans. The missionaries, however, refused to leave

42 Cecil Scott to Harriet Widman, 17 April 1961. Scott states that he had been trying to get an interview with Moreira and the Under-Secretary of Overseas Affairs, ―both of whom are old friends of ours and ones who have been many times in New York for UNO meetings.‖ Scott himself was arrested on 19 July 1961 under suspicion of having aided African students in their escape from Portugal. Phyllis M. Scott to ―Friend,‖ 22 July 1961, Box 15, Folder 23, PHS. (―Friend‖ is likely Theodore Tucker.) Scott was subsequently released and deported on 23 August 1961. 153 the jail without their African companions. The next day, the entire group was released.

Nhambiu made it safely to Paris where he was met by Eduardo Mondlane.43

It was this scenario that precipitated the creation of the Southern African Students

Program. The SASP partnership included the ECU, Lincoln University, the University of

Rochester, placement colleges and universities, the AAI, and the leaders of the southern

African liberation movements. The ECU contributed more than $10 million to the SASP between 1961 and 1975. It also partnered directly with liberation movement leaders, including Eduardo Mondlane, in recruiting and selecting students.44

Facilitating the selection process was the establishment of an AAI office in

Tanzania in 1961. Africanist E. Jefferson ―Pat‖ Murphy, who would become executive vice president of the foundation in 1965, opened the Dar-es-Salaam office. Murphy had been ―tossed out of South Africa‖ where he had been a visiting lecturer in at Fort Hare College. Because of this experience, Murphy hated apartheid and wanted to support majority rule on the continent. In 1962, he established a secondary school in Dar-es-Salaam, the Kurasini International Education Center (KIEC), as part of the AAI‘s East African Refugee Program. The KIEC served, among others, the large refugee populations from Mozambique and the .

Eduardo Mondlane, who was in Tanzania attending the 1962 congress where he was named president of FRELIMO, approved of this institution that would meet the

43 João Nhambiu interview with author, 6 November 2009. ―Joaquim Chissano Biography - Experienced Colonialism, Formed Political Interests, Formed and Joined Activist Groups, Rose to Leadership Positions - Mozambique, Africa, Portuguese, Country, and African‖, n.d., http://biography.jrank.org/pages/2902/Chissano-Joaquim.html. The National Security Country Files for Spain at the John F. Kennedy Library confirm that Biddle had been appointed Ambassador to Spain in March 1961; however, there are no documents confirming Nhambiu‘s recollection of the events in Spain. 44 Jones Rich, ―United States Government-Sponsored Higher Education Programs for Africans: 1957-1970 with Special Attention to the Role of the African-American Institute,‖ 127. 154 educational needs for at least a small portion of the Mozambican refugees in Dar-es-

Salaam. After establishing their own secondary school in Tanzania, the Mondlanes would work closely with the KIEC, sharing resources and providing complementary curricula for the Mozambican refugees. For example, the KIEC specialized in English language training, and the Mozambique Institute provided college preparatory classes in

Portuguese.45 The Kennedy administration‘s role in facilitating the establishment of the

Mozambique Institute is arguably the most valuable support that it made to the

Mozambique liberation movement.

Balancing Africa -- Act III: Genesis of the Mozambique Institute

―He could have been a Kennedy.‖ -- Robert F. Kennedy, referring to Eduardo Mondlane —

Most scholarship that discusses Eduardo Mondlane‘s relationship with the Kennedy administration begins in 1963, with the important events that led up to a meeting between

Mondlane and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. These events are also recounted here. However, Mondlane‘s relationship with officials of the State Department and other policymakers began years before 1963. As was seen in the last chapter, during the 1950s,

Mondlane participated in Christian conferences and public forums, and worked at the

United Nations where he met and developed relationships with such policymakers as

Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

African Affairs, J. Wayne Fredericks.

45 Janet Mondlane to ―folks,‖ 23 September 1963. Mondlane mentions that she had received some reference and textbooks from the AAI and her desire to have a set of encyclopedias for both the Mozambique Institute and KIEC, RG 30/307, Series 2, Box 1, Eduardo Mondlane to Janet Mondlane folder, OCA. Ibid., 123. 155

Fredericks met Mondlane at a meeting of the newly established African Studies

Association in the late 1950s. Like Pat Murphy, Fredericks hated the injustice of the apartheid system because of his own experience in the early 1950s. He had been sent by the Kellogg Corporation to establish a plant in Spring, South Africa and was angered by the institutionalized racial labor caste system that reserved skilled positions for white employees.46 His admiration for Mondlane stemmed from his first-hand understanding of the condition of colonial subjects in southern Africa. Consequently, he and Mondlane became close friends years before Mondlane assumed the leadership of FRELIMO.

Fredericks‘ description of Mondlane, from a 1979 interview, shows why the

Kennedy administration admired and covertly supported the nationalist leader. It also indicates why some leftists lamented that Mondlane was ―an American.‖ Fredericks explained that he understood Mondlane‘s aspirations were for ―human freedom, democratic ideals, and modernization.‖ That is, Mondlane‘s ideals were aligned with those of the liberal Kennedy administration. Like those leftist lusophone nationalists, however, Fredericks does not describe the fullness of Mondlane‘s .

As part of his humanism and democratic ideal, Mondlane was also a socialist and a revolutionary. He understood and admired the American Revolution. While a student in the United States, he also studied and respected the Bolshevik, Chinese, and Algerian revolutions. In addition, as a spokesman for the continent at events around the country, as a member of the United Nations, and from his own experience as a colonial subject, he had a deep academic and personal understanding of the African independence movement.

46 Jean Herskovits, ―allAfrica.com: Africa: Remembrance: J. Wayne Fredericks‖, n.d., http://allafrica.com/stories/200408230214.html. Herskovits, daughter of Melville J. Herskovits, also notes that Fredericks was a trustee of Lincoln University, site of the SASP program. 156

He admired Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Lumumba, as well as Mao Tse-Tung and Ho Chi

Minh. Most of all, Mondlane was a pragmatic and diplomatic nationalist who valued and was skilled in leveraging his relationships with powerful people.

The depth of the friendship between Mondlane and Fredericks is proven by the fact that Mondlane visited Frederick‘s Georgetown home the evening after returning from his tour of Mozambique in 1961. Mondlane wanted to discuss with Fredericks and his wife, Anne, the most life-altering choice of a lifetime full of such momentous decisions. He recounted the reception that he had received everywhere that he went throughout his homecoming tour. He expressed the desire of so many of his countrymen that he return to Mozambique to lead the fight for independence. Mondlane articulated his clear understanding of the danger for him and his countrymen associated with the struggle for independence. During his journey home, Mondlane had passed through the

―occupied city‖ of Leopoldville, Congo and had spent five days in Luanda, Angola where the armed independence struggle against the Portuguese began in February 1961.47

Throughout the night, he discussed with the Fredericks the needs of the Mozambicans and his own wish to return, despite the danger and the professional opportunities that he had in the United States. One such opportunity involved Fredericks, who had introduced

Mondlane to Harlan Cleveland, then a member of the Overseas Liaison Committee and the dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University where the Mozambican was hired as an assistant professor of social anthropology.

For his part, Fredericks understood well the methods of the PIDE and feared for his friend‘s life. He also lamented the change in their relationship that would result from

47 Mondlane, ―The United Nations in Action -- The Cameroons Plebiscite,‖ 7. 157

Mondlane‘s decision to lead the Mozambican liberation movement. During this conversation, he confided the difficulties of his own position. He told Mondlane how he,

Bowles, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams, and other

Africanists in the State Department were engaged in a heated debate with many

Europeanists who believed that the needs and concerns of the former colonial powers should continue to have priority in U.S. foreign policy. These Europeanists sought to retain the status quo; that is, the former colonial powers should continue to take the lead in international matters involving their former colonies. They were also concerned about solidarity within the NATO alliance, especially during the Berlin crisis.

The European Bureau had won a victory when, after a protest by the Portuguese at the outbreak of the Angolan conflict earlier that year, government officials were prohibited from contacting nationalist leaders in the lusophone colonies. There were members of the bureau, however, who recognized Portugal‘s weakness and the narrowness of Salazar‘s vision. They understood that the knew nothing of

Africa, had hardly ventured out of Portugal, and that he was clinging to a passed

Portuguese ―Golden Age.‖ Even the cold warriors among them understood the need for

Portugal, at the very least, to liberalize its colonial policy, and for the United States to develop relationships with nationalists. Thus, despite the protests, Fredericks continued his friendship with Mondlane and sought to convince other policymakers of the nationalist‘s invaluable attributes.

Fredericks believed Mondlane to be a ―man of enormous capability who was able to move competently in a number of worlds. He was a person who understood that you

158 had to organize people to modernize.‖ He recognized Mondlane‘s charisma, the depth of his historical and political knowledge, and his penchant for debate. Most importantly,

Fredericks appreciated Mondlane‘s fervent nationalism and that his years of experience in the U.S. enabled him to understand the complexity of the United States‘ international relationships. Mondlane knew that any support that he received from the United States would be limited by national security considerations and commitments to Portugal and

NATO.

Consequently, Fredericks introduced Mondlane to ―men of affairs,‖ including leaders in both the private and government sectors. Private citizens willing to assist the federal government in covert support of Mozambican liberation included a wealthy

Pennsylvania farmer Fritz Rarig, and Arthur Houghton, Jr., the corporate powerhouse and philanthropist who, among other accomplishments, created Steuben Glass and was director the of USX Corporation and New York Life Insurance Company. Importantly,

Houghton also chaired the IIE.48

Among policymakers, Fredericks facilitated meetings for Mondlane with the State

Department‘s Ambassador-at-Large, W. Averell Harriman and Attorney General Robert

F. Kennedy. Fredericks brokered these meetings in 1963 because he strongly believed in

Mondlane‘s nationalist vision. Because he and G. Mennen Williams had little success against the State Department Europeanist and military leaders‘ arguments in favor of

Portugal, Fredericks believed that FRELIMO needed the support of more powerful

48 Regarding Fritz Rarig, see letter from Rarig to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 16 April 1963, Attorney General Robert Kennedy Correspondence, Box 39, Mondlane folder, JFKL. Regarding Houghton, see J. Wayne Fredericks, interview by Herbert Shore, February 20, 1979, RG 30/307, 11-Mondlane, Box 6, Recording, OCA. 159 advocates. Not surprising, in light of the policy against contact between officials and nationalists from the lusophone colonies, neither Rusk nor Undersecretary George Ball would meet with Mondlane. Frederick‘s own job was jeopardized in April 1963.

While attending the ―Southern Africa in Transition‖ conference sponsored by the

American Society on African Culture (AMSAC) at Howard University, Fredericks and

Williams were photographed standing with Mondlane. This picture appeared in a local newspaper, leading to protests by both the Portuguese and the Europeanists at State.

Fredericks met with Secretary Rusk to defend his relationship with the nationalist leader and threatened to resign if prohibited from contacting his friend. He advised Rusk that the prohibition affected the United States‘ relationship with other East African leaders, including Tanzania‘s Nyerere, Northern Rhodesia‘s Kaunda, and Kenya‘s Kenyatta. This reasoning would be particularly important after the formation of the Organization of

African Unity and its African Liberation Committee in Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963.

This was not the first time that Rusk had heard this reasoning. Six months earlier,

Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams had made a similar plea for State officials to continue their contacts with southern African nationalists. In a memorandum, dated 23 October 1962, Williams had invoked Senator Kennedy‘s 1957 speech before the

Senate regarding the Cold War exigency of contact with nationalists. Kennedy had stated that ―instead of abandoning African nationalism to the anti-Western agitators and Soviet agents who hope to capture its leadership, the United States, a product of political revolution, must redouble its efforts to earn the respect and friendship of nationalist leaders.‖ Mennen continued to point out that the trouble that the United States was

160 having with the radical Ben Bella regime had resulted from the United States‘ neglect of the Algerian National Liberation Front at the insistence of France. Although Rusk submitted momentarily to the Africanists, he remained mindful of the strategic importance of the U.S. relationship with Portugal and cautioned discretion.

Fredericks contacted Harriman and urged him to see Mondlane. He knew that

―Averell agreed that the Portuguese should move toward creating an environment wherein the Africans could participate politically – whether it be a ‗French-type‘ relationship or completely independent would be up to them.‖ Harriman, who also lived in Georgetown, did agree to meet Mondlane at his home, a meeting that lasted two hours.

Fredericks reported that Mondlane would continue to meet with Harriman to discuss a

―broader, higher level view of the dynamics of U.S. policy with Europe, with respect to the Soviet Union, and with Africa.‖49

The meeting with Robert Kennedy on 2 May 1963 was notable because it took place in Kennedy‘s office. Fredericks contacted the Attorney General, briefing him on

Mondlane‘s background and his own perspective regarding U.S. policy toward southern

Africa. Kennedy agreed to meet with the nationalist leader and, when advised of State‘s injunction against officials publicly seeing southern African nationalists, Kennedy replied, ―I will see him in the office of the Attorney General of the United States. Bring him here and he will sit where you are sitting.‖ Reportedly, Robert Kennedy and

Mondlane continued to have a ―close sense of identification and understanding,‖ an

49 J. Wayne Fredericks, interview by Herbert Shore, cassette tape, February 29, 1979, RG 30/307, Subgroup II, Series 7, Subseries 1, Box 1, OCA. 161 identification which is reflected in the epigraph. Indeed, at the end of their first meeting,

Kennedy gave Mondlane a $500.00 check to help him and his family.50

As Fredericks had hoped, these meetings stimulated discussion within the

Presidential Task Force on Portuguese Territories in Africa that had been established early in 1962. Also prompting Task Force action were telegrams from Thomas K.

Wright, the American Consul General in Lourenço Marques, suggesting that

Mozambique was on the verge of violence. Of particular interest is Wright‘s very detailed assessment of the situation in Mozambique sent to Secretary of State Rusk and forwarded to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy in September 1963. Wright confirmed the existence in Mozambique of inhumane conditions reminiscent of ―19th century colonialism,‖ including forced labor and a 99% illiteracy rate. He also noted that the changes in the Organic Overseas Laws alleged to improve the status of indigenas were a fallacy. Wright stated that ―Now and for the foreseeable future one of

Mozambique‘s greatest needs will be in the field of education.‖ He recommended that

―We should leave no stone unturned to provide educational opportunities at all levels including president scholarships in other African countries and the United States.‖51

Consequently, the CIA, through the African American Institute, granted

Mondlane a $60,000 stipend for his proposed educational program. On 10 June 1963, the

50 Ibid.; Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 562. Eduardo Mondlane would return the hospitality, meeting with Senator Robert Kennedy in Dar-es-Salaam in June 1966. At the urging of J. Wayne Fredericks, Kennedy had accepted an invitation by the NUSAS to speak at its annual Day of Affirmation where he made a controversial anti-apartheid speech. Schlesinger writes regarding this second meeting between the two that ―Mondlane‘s account of the guerilla war against the Portuguese gave the Americans a chastening sense of how the must look to the Viet Cong,‖ 51 Telegrams from T.K. Wright to Rusk, 12 June, 17 June and 29 July 1963; Wright to Rusk, ―An Assessment of the Situation in Mozambique,‖ 16 September 1963, National Security Subject Files, Box 142A, Mozambique folder, JFKL. 162

Ford Foundation gave the Mondlanes a $99,700 grant for the creation of the Mozambique

Institute, a facility initially designed as a secondary school for Mozambican refugees in

Tanzania that would expand to provide not only educational, but also health services for refugees. The Mozambique Institute became the conduit for much of the international humanitarian aid to FRELIMO, including that of American activists, throughout the period of the armed struggle.52

This financial assistance to FRELIMO, no matter that it was granted through private organizations for humanitarian purposes, had diplomatic repercussions. Upon learning of the Ford Foundation grant in October 1963, the Portuguese Foreign Minister

Alberto Franco Nogueira lodged a complaint with the Ford Motor Company. Nogueira threatened to "give the circumstance the attention it deserves." Although the threat was vague, the corporation, which stressed that there was "no common control" between itself and the foundation, nonetheless, presented the foundation with the protest. It was the timing of the threat which is notable, because it was made just one month before the first passenger vehicle left the line of a new Ford assembly plant in Azambuja, Portugal.

Construction of the plant had begun in the fall of 1962. Significantly, its dedication on 6

January 1964 was made by Henry Ford 2d, the chairman of Ford Motor Company, and attended by Portuguese President Ameríco Deus Rodrigues Tomás and over two hundred

Portuguese officials.

In addition to avoiding a possible revelation of the Ford Foundation‘s involvement with covert government activities or any negative publicity that might be associated with the plant opening, the corporation also responded to complaints by the

52 Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 44-46. 163 owners of Ford dealerships in minority-ruled southern Africa. Consequently, the foundation found that the funds were given "an application alien to the foundation's intent." It agreed to consult with the Portuguese Foreign Minister before it made "any grants that could affect Portugal's African interests," and not to provide any further financial aid to the African American Institute.53

Balancing Portugal

The Alabama race riots have gotten front-page play in the Portuguese press side by side with the news of the race troubles in . Pictures of loyal Africans in Angola cheering white Portuguese administrators or hailing the Portuguese flag are coupled with pictures from Montgomery of white men beating or kicking American Negroes. …54 -- Excerpt of New York Times article, ―Lisbon Plays Up Alabama Strife‖ –

Portugal‘s protest to the Ford Motor Company is only one of many made against the assistance to FRELIMO by private American organizations through the 1960s until the dissolution of the Estado Novo in 1974. Portuguese intransigence was characterized not only by the immovability of the Salazar regime‘s position regarding Portuguese colonialism, but also its active defense of its policy. This defense included state violence to suppress African nationalists‘ non-violent and violent resistance within the colonies, and also efforts by the Salazar regime to influence international public opinion. This chapter focuses on the latter, because, like the African nationalist movements, Portugal relied heavily on international support for the resources to sustain its military ventures.

53 Special toTheNewYorkTimes, ―3 U.S. GROUPS HELP REBELS, LISBON SAYS,‖ New York Times (1857-Current file), September 13, 1964; ―Henry Ford 2d Dedicates Auto Plant in Portugal,‖ New York Times, January 7, 1964, 41 and 47; ―Did Ford Foundation Grant Aid to Mozambique Liberation Effort?,‖ Pittsburgh Courier, January 2, 1965, 5; ―Fund Yields to Portugal Complaint,‖ Chicago Tribune, December 19, 1964. Nogueira learned of the grant from an interview with Janet Mondlane by the Syracuse Herald Journal. 54 Benjamin Welles, ―Lisbon Plays Up Alabama Strife,‖ New York Times, May 28, 1961, 38. 164

Salazar and his adroit foreign minister, Alberto Franco Nogueira, used several methods to resist the pressure they received from the international community to prepare

Portugal‘s African possessions for independence. These methods included combating anti-colonial rhetoric in books and on the floor of the United Nations. As seen in the opening quote, Portugal also attacked, both publicly and privately, such sore spots in the

United States‘ foreign and domestic policies as domestic race relations, U.S.-Soviet détente, and the Vietnam War. The most effective weapon that Portugal used against pressure from the United States was the threat to deny the U.S. access to the Azores military base.

The Azores are strategically located near the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, along the flight paths between the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. In 1951, the

United States and Portugal signed a 5-year base agreement, renewed in 1957, which was due to expire on 31 December 1962. Consequently, the Kennedy administration‘s diplomacy with Portugal was a necessary balance between its support for the emerging

African nations, perceived to be an ideological obligation, and negotiating the renewal of the Azores base agreement, deemed crucial to national security. This diplomatic conflict was complicated further when violence erupted in Angola. The Portuguese military and civilians in Angola responded to violent forays by Africans, most armed with farm implements, with machine gun fire, napalm, and other weapons supplied by NATO.

Efforts by the United States to restrict such usage were hampered by the fact that, in correspondence exchanged during the negotiation of the original 1951 base agreement,

165 the United States had implied that it would allow Portugal ―to use NATO equipment in any Portuguese colony should it be necessary.‖55

That the United States used Lajes Field as a re-fueling station for fighter aircraft during the 1958 crisis in Lebanon and the 1961 crises in Berlin and the Congo proves the strategic importance of the Azores.56 Like J. Wayne Fredericks, many scholars have relegated the administration‘s perceived NATO obligations to Portugal and its pursuit of an Azores agreement as residue from the defunct international system that preceded the rapid decolonization of Asia and Africa and the newly-independent nations‘ political solidarity against imperialism. These scholars, many of whom were anti-colonial advocates, highlight Portugal‘s minor role in NATO, which was dominated by the United

States and the former Great Powers: Great Britain, France, and . They also point to the advances in aerospace technology that allegedly made the Azores base obsolete. Their arguments are valid when examining the administration‘s decisions solely through the lens of U.S-Portuguese relations under routine circumstances.

When military interventions were not threatened, Portugal had little power within the NATO alliance, and such long-range aircraft as P-3 Orions, first deployed in 1962, would not need to re-fuel in the Azores. These stable conditions did not exist during the early years of the Kennedy administration. Instead such major events as the Berlin and the Cuban Missile Crises affected policymakers‘ perspectives on the United States‘ role as leader of the free world.

55 Quoted in Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 9. 56 In July 1958, aircraft being sent to reinforce the USS Saratoga passed through the Azores, as did aircraft bound for West Germany in October-November 1961, and those used in the airlift from Stanleyville. 166

Soviet Premier ‘s June 1961 threat ―to ‗liquidate‘ Western rights‖ in Berlin by the end of the year forced the United States, and Kennedy personally, to increase its control over the NATO alliance. Consequently, the US relationship with the French and West German governments were strained at the same time as the Kennedy administration was trying to pressure Portugal into preparing its African territories for self-determination and to negotiate the Azores agreement. Portugal successfully used both European resentment and the United States‘ strategic need to re-fuel fighter aircraft destined for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East in the Azores to resist Kennedy‘s pressure. Thus, the Berlin crisis, considered a ―European problem,‖ had global implications, particularly regarding the nationalist movements in the African territories.57

In August 1961, the Kennedy administration restricted its military aid to Portugal.

It decreased its Military Assistance Program funding to under $5 million annually.

Consequently, West Germany, ―partly because it did not have to answer charges in the

U.N., replaced the United States as a chief supplier of aircraft and other military items.‖ Additionally, after withdrawing from NATO in 1966, the French

―placed no restrictions on where their ordnance could be used and surpassed other states in exporting arms to Portugal in the 1970s.‖58

Other global challenges equally affected the U.S.-Portugal-lusophone Africa relationship. The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated the power of a small emerging

57 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, Princeton studies in international history and politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999), 283-398. In addition to resistance to American dominance of NATO, Adenauer and De Gaulle wanted, but were denied, their own nuclear arsenals. 58 Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique‘s War of Independence, 1964- 1974 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983), 175. 167 nation to bring the world to the brink of nuclear war. On 24 October 1962, the day that

President Kennedy ordered the naval blockade of Cuba, he met with the Portuguese foreign minister. Before that meeting Dean Rusk briefed Nogueira on the situation and requested permission to use the Azores as part of a military perimeter against Soviet aggression. The severity of the damage to the U.S.-Portugal relationship during the

Kennedy administration is demonstrated by Nogueira‘s negative response.59

In the early 1960s, the possibility that the racial divisions in the Portuguese territories and southern Africa could erupt into an international conflict continued to hold credence with U.S. policymakers.60 The 1960 Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa, the

Congo crisis, and the escalating violence against activists in the black freedom struggles in the United States re-ignited fears of racial violence. There was fear that the solidarity of the Afro-Asian world with the struggles of "people of color" would escalate into a world-wide race war. The U.S. policymakers also feared potential White violence against black insurgence and communist infiltration. In a racist twist of logic, in such a case, cold warriors posited that it would be the Communists, not the white supremacists, who were fomenting violence.

Such sentiments persisted throughout the decade. Cold warriors in both the

United States and Portugal conflated black nationalism with Communism, asserting that

Blacks had neither the intelligence nor the skills to organize a rebellion.61 Racialized thinking outweighed the evidence to the contrary. Africans, aware of the military might

59 Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 34-36. 60 Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relationsin the Global Arena (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001), 152. 61 Vernon McKay, ―Southern Africa and Its Implications for American Policy,‖ in William Adams Hance, ed., Southern Africa and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 26. 168 of the South African, Rhodesian, and Portuguese regimes, developed a long-term and pragmatic approach to the challenge of white supremacy and minority rule in the region.

Africans partnered with like-minded Third World leaders to vote as an anti-colonial/anti- apartheid bloc at the United Nations. They united in the Organization of African Unity which, though largely ineffective due to ideological differences, successfully formed a

Liberation Committee that assisted with the funding of liberation movements. Such

African leaders as ‘s Ahmed Ben Bella, Guinea‘s Ahmed Sekou Touré, Ghana‘s

Kwame Nkrumah and Tanzania's Julius Nyerere provided military training, material support, and safe havens for the southern African political exiles.

Despite the challenges of Portugal‘s status as a NATO ally, the national security value of the Azores, and the racist culture that persisted in the United States, Kennedy took into account the demands of ―moderate‖ African and African American leaders. He practiced the fourth dimension of foreign policy and used educational and humanitarian aid to meet his ideological goals to create a ―decade of development.‖ As will be seen in the next chapter, this ideology opened the opportunity for such liberal multicultural organizations and African American coalitions as the American Committee on Africa and

American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa to extend the transnational advocacy network in support of Mozambican liberation up to the White House.

169

CHAPTER FIVE: THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND MOZAMBICAN LIBERATION: THE LIBERAL YEARS

―The aim of the American Committee on Africa should be to point out to the American people the growing importance of Africa, and to do everything possible to change American foreign policy in relation to the democratic struggle for self- government in Africa.‖1

In March 1952, two months before his arrival in the United States to attend the North

American Assembly on African Affairs, Z. K. Matthews of the African National

Congress of South Africa (ANC) began corresponding with George Houser, an American

Methodist Minister, a member of FOR and a founder of the Congress of Racial Equality

(CORE). Matthews and ANC general-secretary Walter Sisulu, asked for CORE‘s support for the proposed Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign to begin on 6 April, 1952.

This was Van Riebeeck‘s Day and the 300th anniversary of Dutch settlement in South

Africa. Houser had previously heard of the proposed campaign from fellow pacifist Bill

Sutherland and discussed the possibility of support with other activists – William

Worthy, , Manilal Gandhi, and Homer Jack. The group weighed human rights considerations against the ANC‘s association with the banned South African

Communist Party and the likelihood of the campaign remaining non-violent. Within days of the request, Houser, with other members of CORE, FOR, religious leaders and

1 Outline of the American Committee on Africa Prospectus, 12 September 1955, Executive Committee Minutes and National Office Memoranda, Microfilm Reel 1, Records of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA). 170 pacifists, established the Americans for South African Resistance (AFSAR) to publicize and raise funds in support of the Defiance Campaign.2

The affiliation between CORE and AFSAR meant that, from the early 1950s, the anti-apartheid/anti-colonial activism on behalf of self-determination in southern African and the re-energized black freedom struggle in the United States would be intertwined.

Not only were such renowned Civil Rights Movement leaders and organizers as A. Philip

Randolph and Bayard Rustin involved, but AFSAR adopted the rhetoric of the domestic movement in order to mobilize both the African American community and liberal white allies to support Africa in a period when many Americans, both black and white, remained ignorant of the continent.3 Although the ANC and the South African Indian

Congress postponed the beginning of the eight- month- long Defiance Campaign until 26

June 1952, AFSAR began its fund-raising with a mass meeting at African American

Congressman Adam Clayton Powell‘s Abyssinia Baptist Church in Harlem on Van

Riebeeck‘s Day.

The role of A. Philip Randolph in developing the fund-raising campaign is clear.

In 1941, Randolph, then the president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters -- one of the largest and most powerful African American labor unions -- organized the March on Washington movement. The movement lobbied President Franklin D. Roosevelt for integration of the armed forces and equity in government employment practices, resulting

2 George M Houser, No One Can Stop the Rain: Glimpses of Africa‘s Liberation Struggle (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1989), 10-13. 3 For more regarding African American ignorance, apathy, or antipathy regarding Africa and African affairs, see Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans; David Hostetter, Movement Matters: American Antiapartheid Activism and the Rise of Multicultural Politics, Studies in African American history and culture (New York: Routledge, 2006); The African American Voice in U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II, Race and U.S. foreign policy from the colonial period to the present 5 (New York: Garland Pub, 1998). 171 in the first Fair Employment Practices Committee. The AFSAR organizers purposefully used rhetoric reminiscent of the 1942 ―Double-V‖ campaign initiated by the African-

American newspaper, The Pittsburgh Courier, to mobilize African Americans to fight for victory over racial inequality at home and over enemies abroad during the Second World

War.4 AFSAR distributed leaflets characterizing the Defiance Campaign as ―a drive against Jim Crow in South Africa‖ and asked supporters to ―show the world we oppose

Jim Crow abroad as well as at home.‖5

In 1953, AFSAR members responded to support requests from African nationalists outside of South Africa by expanding the organization into the American

Committee on Africa (ACOA) and, in 1956, expanded its defense fund to a more general

Africa Defense and Aid Fund through which the organization provided humanitarian aid.

This multicultural advocacy group was designed to respond to the needs of Africans fighting colonialism and white supremacy across the continent. As stated in the epigraph, the ACOA‘s strategy for supporting African liberation was to expand Americans‘ knowledge of Africa and to influence U.S. foreign policy toward the continent.

This chapter examines the ACOA‘s centrality in American advocacy in support of

African liberation. The ACOA became the leading advocacy organization through these four tactics: 1) its continuous engagement with Africans; 2) its program of education, fund-raising, and political activism; 3) its development of a transnational network through coalitions that connected political, religious, business, and social institutions;

4 For more regarding the ―Double-V‖ campaign, see Beth Bailey and David Farber, ―The ‗Double V‘ Campaign in World War II Hawaii: African Americans, Racial Ideology, and Federal Power,‖ Journal of Social History 26:4 (Summer 1993): 817-844. 5 Houser, No One Can Stop the Rain, 14. 172 and, 4) its leveraging of the diasporic connections between the international and domestic black freedom struggles. The organization‘s longevity can, in part, be attributed to its leadership stability and the consistency of its mission, guided for its first quarter century by Executive Director George Houser. Additionally, the ACOA was continually infused with new energy and ideas through the changing membership of its executive committee.

The legitimacy of the ACOA, the basis for the trust and influence that the organization had with Africans, its global allies and policymakers, came from the

ACOA‘s relationship with African nationalists. The AFSAR‘s support of the 1952

Defiance Campaign and the ACOA‘s continuing support for the ANC was carried out in partnership with South Africans Z.K. Matthews, Walter Sisulu, , and Nobel

Peace Prize laureate, Chief Albert Luthuli. In April 1955, ACOA members Homer Jack and Congressman Adam Clayton Powell attended the Asian-African Conference in

Bandung, Indonesia. There they heard the participants express their aspirations, debate the issues, and seek solutions to the challenges of imperialism and decolonization. Those two, as well as A. Philip Randolph and Martin Luther King, Jr., were also invited guests of Kwame Nkrumah at the 6 March 1957 Ghanaian independence celebration, the first in sub-Saharan Africa.

The relationship the ACOA built with Kwame Nkrumah enabled Houser, Jack,

Montero, Scheinman, and John Marcum, the political science professor who would head

Lincoln University‘s Africa Program, to be fraternal delegates to the All African‘s

People‘s Conference in Accra in December 1958. This conference was the first in which many of the African nationalist leaders met each other, and also allowed the ACOA

173 members to meet and cultivate lasting relationships. This includes, for instance,

Scheinman and Montero‘s partnership with the leaders of the Pan African Freedom

Movement of East Central Africa in the African American Students Foundation.6

Working with these Africans to fulfill its mission, the ACOA established a broad three-point program: 1) education through publication of its journal, Africa Today, and distribution of pamphlets, as well as sponsorship of a speaker‘s bureau; 2) advocacy at the United Nations; and 3) projects in support of democratic actions by the peoples of specific African countries.7 For instance, in this period before the formation of

FRELIMO, the ACOA and Eduardo Mondlane continued to mount pressure against

Portugal through their efforts to influence public opinion in the United States and throughout the world.

Social movement theorists have described the interaction between actors from the political North and South within transnational advocacy networks as a boomerang pattern in which Southern actors seek to gain access to leverage, information, and funding. At the same time, First World groups seek credibility that ―they are struggling with, and not only ‗for‘, their southern partners.‖8 The ACOA claimed little credit for the triumphs of those people, organizations, and projects that it supported in Africa. The organization exemplified a First World organization within the anti-colonial/anti-apartheid movement

6 Ibid., 63-131. 7 Outline of the American Committee on Africa Prospectus, 12 September 1955, Reel 1, ACOA. Regarding the advocacy at the United Nations, a 1954 memo about the proposed aims and structure of the organization suggested that the ACOA would be assuming responsibility ―of seeing that our American delegation to the United Nations takes a deeper interest in Colonial matters and throws the weight of its influence more often behind the Colonial peoples rather than the Colonial Powers.‖ 8 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ―Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics.,‖ International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159 (March 1999): 93; Margaret E Keck, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1998). 174 by providing the African leaders with political leverage through access to policymakers, information, and funding.

The ACOA had its greatest access to policymakers in the late 1950s and early

1960s when the wave of African liberation was at its height and the ACOA‘s goals of supporting ―democratic actions‖ by African nationalists resonated with Kennedy administration objectives. By the end of the 1960s, the liberation movements in the lusophone territories were espousing a Marxist ideology and the Nixon administration was ―tilting‖ toward Portugal and the white supremacist regimes in southern Africa. As will be explored in the next chapter, this radical shift within both the African and domestic freedom struggles forced the ACOA to struggle through its own ideological divisions.

Through the exploration of the organizational development and advocacy of the

ACOA, particularly in support of southern African liberation, this chapter will demonstrate the significance of the organization not only because of its successes in affecting U.S. policy, but in its establishment of tactics that were emulated by anti- imperialist and anti-apartheid advocates for the rest of the century.

A central feature of the organization was the ACOA‘s educational program that consisted of information distributed through various print media, a speakers‘ bureau, and advocacy at the United Nations. One of the ACOA‘s most successful educational tools was its journal, Africa Today. Unlike the other influential journal concerned with issues on the continent, Africa Report, published by the Council of Foreign Relations, the editors of Africa Today were more autonomous from the influence of government

175 policymakers suggested by historian Edward Berman. These editors could more easily express views opposing U.S. foreign policy on Africa. First published in 1954, Africa

Today, was, as expressed by its first editor George W. Shepherd, Jr., ―the only political and economic commentary on African Affairs to be published regularly in the United

States.‖9 In addition to providing information about major events occurring in Africa, the publication gave voice to anti-colonial and anti-apartheid activists and scholars from the

United States and the continent. From its first issue, a four-page mimeographed newsletter, Africa Today demonstrated its consistent anti-colonial editorial perspective through articles detailing efforts by Africans to gain more political power and racial equality in the British colonies. Such articles went far to dispel the prevailing popular image of Africa in the United States as the ―Dark Continent‖ and of Africans as uncivilized and in need of redemption.10

In a period when the radical Kenyan freedom-fighters were depicted by some

Western writers as evil, cannibalistic savages, an Africa Today article about the so-called

Mau Mau insurrection, while critical of their violent tactics, portrayed the Kenyans as human.11 The ACOA pointed out that British oppression was a cause of the rampant violence of which Kikuyus were the greatest victims.12 It discussed the cooperation with

9 George W. Shepherd, ―Africa Today‘s 35 Year Chronicle of the African Freedom Struggle: An Editorial,‖ Africa Today 36, no. 1 (March 1, 1989): 3. 10 For more regarding the changing image of Africa from the 19th through the mid-20th century, see Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans, 11-26. 11 John Barkham, ―Life in a Land Untamed,‖ New York Times (1923-Current file), February 7, 1954, sec. BR, 25. This review of Alyse Simpson‘s book of the same name provides an example of the negative image of Africans depicted by some writers. Barkham writes, ―… it was before the Mau Mau began to carve up white men. In her day the Kikuyu were merely ‗raw and ignorant, the nearest things to monkeys‘.‖ 12 The ceasefire negotiated by General China lasted only three months and ended with the British arresting thousands of suspected insurgents. During the state of emergency called by the British in 1952, an 176

British peace-making efforts of jailed Mau Mau leader General China (Waruhiu Itote) and implicated colonial police brutality in escalating the violence. The article particularly highlighted the call by the British Parliamentary Delegation for greater

African representation in the Legislative Assembly.13 A second article detailed the future of political reform in Uganda, the territory in which the ACOA‘s first Executive

Secretary, George W. Shepherd, Jr. spent two years as a technical advisor creating agricultural cooperatives.14 As in the article on Kenya, the editors -- Shepherd, Lydia

Zemba, Robert S. Browne, Beatrice Holloway, and Keith Irvine -- emphasized the work of African nationalists to secure from the British political reforms that would lead to

African self-determination.15

The newsletter also reflected the editors‘ appeal to potential supporters of the

ACOA through its anti-communist rhetoric. Founders of the ACOA were aware of the political pressure being placed on the Council of African Affairs (CAA), an organization which began advocating for African liberation in 1937. Although the CAA represented a

estimated 80,000 Kikuyu were detained in camps and subjected to brutality. The death toll for Kikuyus during the eight year uprising has been estimated at nearly 14,000 (approximately 2,000 loyalists killed by the rebels), although this official estimate is believed to be low. The British suffered less than 50 killed. Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair: A History of Fifty Years of Independence, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 86. For the most exhaustive study of the British repression of "Mau Mau" and its supporters, and a much larger figure of Kikuyus detained by the British, see Caroline Elkins' Pulitzer prize-winning book, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya. (New York: Henry Holt, 2005). 13 ―Mau Mau Threat Grows,‖ Africa Today 1, no. 1 (April 1, 1954): 1-2. 14 Shepherd was working for the National Churches of Christ when assuming the position of Executive Secretary of ACOA while George Houser was visiting Africa for six months. Peter Weiss, ―American Committee on Africa: Rebels with a Cause,‖ Africa Today 10, no. 9 (November 1963): 38; ―Interview with George Houser,‖ interview by Lisa Brock, July 19, 2004, http://www.noeasyvictories.org/interviews/int02_houser.php. Houser states that the State Department had taken Shepherd‘s passport because, while working in Uganda, Shepherd had crossed into Kenya to investigate the Mau Mau Uprising. 15 ―African Self-Government in Uganda,‖ Africa Today 1, no. 1 (April 1, 1954): 3; Weiss, ―American Committee on Africa,‖ 38. 177 coalition of such leftists as CAA leaders Alphaeus Hunton, Paul Robeson and Max

Yergan with more liberal members such as Ralph Bunche and Rayford Logan, the CAA was charged with subversion under the McCarran Act in 1953. By 1955, the organization had disintegrated.16

Despite its efforts to insulate itself from red-baiting, the FBI began investigating the ACOA as early as 1955. Some people who received solicitation letters from the organization contacted the Bureau to inquire as to whether or not the ACOA was affiliated with communists. Others acted as informants. For instance, a ―Mr. Irwin S.

Rhodes, a prominent friend of the Cincinnati [FBI] Office,‖ provided copies of the

ACOA letterhead which ―reveal[ed] names which may often be found as affiliates of

Communist or front organizations ….‖17 Even members of the ACOA, contributors, and associates became informants for the Bureau.18 As a result, members of the ACOA suspected of communist affiliation were investigated by the FBI. For instance, in March

1960, the New York office of the Bureau provided information to FBI Director J. Edgar

Hoover regarding ACOA Board Chairman Reverend Donald Harrington who had made a speech favoring independence for Puerto Rico in 1944 and signed a petition requesting amnesty for persons convicted under the Smith Act in 1955. The report also cited ACOA

Treasurer George Edmund Haynes‘ previous affiliation with the Popular Front organization, the National Negro Congress, and former communist Max Yergan.19 In

16 Von Eschen, Race Against Empire. 17 SAC, Cincinnati to FBI Director, dated 19 March 1959, regarding the South Africa Defense Fund, American Committee on Africa FOIPA No. 1113855-000, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 18 Many of the Internal Security Reports contained in the FBI file on the ACOA have evidence of expunged names of informants. 19 SAC New York to FBI Director, 22 March 1960, FBI. 178 part as a result of a smear campaign against the ACOA launched by the Portuguese in

1961, the organization continued to be suspected of communist affiliation through the

1970s.

To deter accusations of Communist affiliation, the editors of Africa Today wrote commentary regarding Africa and Communism that was reminiscent of the report from the North American Assembly on African Affairs that had taken place two years earlier.

The organization sought to counter the claims of many cold warriors that Africans were particularly susceptible to communism because of their childlike or primitive nature. The

ACOA‘s claim was that ―moderate‖ African nationalists were capable of resisting communist infiltration. Furthermore, the ACOA echoed African nationalists in stating that any alleged African susceptibility to Communist influence could be attributed to the lack of Western aid or colonial oppression.

In an article regarding Ghana‘s road to independence, the editors stressed Prime

Minister Kwame Nkrumah‘s statement that Communists would not be allowed in the

Ghanaian government and his previous dismissal of alleged Communists from the trade union movement.20 Similarly, the journal quoted an Episcopal bishop from West

Virginia who had recently returned from South Africa and lamented the Malan apartheid government‘s oppression of the black population that the bishop feared would revolt.

Voicing fears which could also be heard in the White House, the bishop stated that ―if

20 ―Nkrumah Warns Communists on Gold Coast,‖ Africa Today 1, no. 1 (April 1, 1954): 2. 179

African order was withdrawn, would move in … [and] whoever controls South

Africa controls Asia.‖21

In addition to the articles regarding the resistance of Africans to potential

Communist influence on the continent, the newsletter leveraged liberal belief in

American responsibility for influencing Africans through the modernization process.

This edition ended with information about new and ongoing educational and developmental projects by Americans on behalf of Africans both on the continent and in the United States. These projects included technical assistance offered by the Foundation for International Economic Development; the International Development Placement

Association, an organization formerly directed by ACOA member and future president,

Peter Weiss; and, Ruth Sloane Associates, a consulting firm established by one of the

State Department attendees at the 1952 National Assembly that provided general information on Africa to businesses. Also touted was the work of the Committee on

Friendly Relations with Foreign Students, an organization noted to have assisted the growing numbers of African students in the United States.22

Arguably more effective in educating Americans regarding Africa was ACOA‘s strategy of bringing Africans to speak to American audiences. The ACOA broadened into the political sphere and the general public the efforts of the National Council of

Churches which had invited such African nationalists as Eduardo Mondlane to speak before congregations and at church conferences. The ACOA‘s speaking tours in the

United States for African nationalists, labor leaders and artists included churches and

21 ―Race Tensions Mounting in South Africa,‖ Africa Today 1, no. 1 (April 1, 1954): 2-3; Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 152-153. 22 ―Africo-American Projects Underway,‖ Africa Today 1, no. 1 (April 1, 1954): 3-4. 180 universities, conferences, meetings of the African Studies Association, before the United

Nations and with policymakers. These educated Africans discussed the issues that plagued their territories and communities, their peoples‘ aspirations and, most importantly, the work that Africans were doing to improve these conditions. These speeches not only won the audiences‘ sympathy, but also cast doubt upon the rhetoric espoused by many Americans and Europeans that Africans were unprepared for self- government. These speaking tours were also powerful tools for raising funds in support of African projects and on behalf of persecuted nationalists.

The ACOA‘s work at the United Nations began in 1954 when, represented by

A.C. Thompson, the organization gained non-governmental body status. That year, the

ACOA provided funding for Sylvanus Epiphanio Olympio of the All Ewe Congress in

French Togoland, then a trust territory, to become the first African petitioner to the UN.

It continued to support Olympio throughout the plebiscite process overseen by the United

Nations Trusteeship Division in 1957 and his election as the Republic of Togo‘s first prime minister in 1958, and then president in 1961.23 The United Nations was also the site of the ACOA‘s first advocacy on behalf of the lusophone African territories.

The ACOA, the United Nations, Portugal and Lusophone African Independence

In 1955, Portugal, along with 15 other nations, gained admission to the United Nations, placing the imperialist power at the fulcrum of the decolonization force. In that year,

Africa was represented at the United Nations by only Liberia and Ethiopia. Within the

23 Weiss, ―American Committee on Africa,‖ 38; George Houser and A.C. Thompson, ―French Togoland ‗Hot Potato‘ Passed to Fourth Committee,‖ Africa-UN Bulletin 1, no. 2 (December 28, 1956): 1. 181 next decade, 28 more countries from Africa would join the world organization. In 1955, before the approval of the 16 new members, 70% of the 60 UN member nations were from the Americas or Europe. By 1965, 63 of the 118 members were from non-European backgrounds.24 This growing majority of so-called Third World nations, with the support of such organizations as the ACOA, used the United Nations to exert pressure on

Portugal to grant independence to its African colonies.

In February1956, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag

Hammarskjöld, sent letters to the 16 new members requesting, under Chapter XI of the

UN Charter, that they advise the UN of any non-self-governing territories under their administration. By the end of the year, 13 of these new members, including Portugal, had replied that they had no such territories. In the first edition of its new, bi-weekly publication, the Africa-UN Bulletin, the ACOA expressed the sentiments of many members of the General Assembly in its call for Hammarskjöld to require Portugal to file reports regarding the social, educational, and economic conditions in its African territories. The ACOA based its request for such reporting, in accordance with Article

73e of the UN Charter, on ―the disturbing reports about ‗forced labor‘ amounting to virtual slavery which continue[d] to filter out of the Portuguese African territories.‖25 In

January 1957, the Fourth Committee of the United Nations, charged with handling issues regarding trusteeship and decolonization, began a debate as to whether the General

24 Christopher O‘Sullivan, ―The United Nations, Decolonization, and Self-Determination in Cold War Sub- Saharan Africa, 1960-1994.,‖ Journal of Third World Studies 22, no. 2 (2005): 105-106. 25 George Houser and A.C. Thompson, ―Information Concerning Non-Self-Governing Territories,‖ Africa- UN Bulletin 2, no. 4 (February 8, 1957): 3. 182

Assembly was empowered by the UN Charter to define ―non-self-governing territories,‖ and thus require both Portugal and Spain to file reports on their ―overseas provinces.‖26

This debate raged within the General Assembly for three years. Each time that the Secretary-General addressed the issue before the General Assembly, the question of the Portuguese territories, particularly Angola and Mozambique, would spark contention among the Assembly members. The United States was among those opposing the resolutions, stating that Portugal, the Administering Authority, should retain the right to decide. Portugal continued to maintain that the lusophone territories were non- contiguous provinces much like Puerto Rico about which the United States was not required to report. It argued that, because these overseas provinces were under

Portuguese sovereignty, the United Nations had no authority to interfere with their governance. In 1959, the United States was part of the Special Committee of Six appointed to investigate this matter regarding the obligation of members to submit information under Section 73e.27

In the midst of this debate, the ACOA published a report by Columbia University anthropologist Marvin Harris entitled, Portugal‘s African Wards: a First-Hand Report on

Labor and Education in Moçambique. This ―disturbing report‖ confirmed the oppressive nature of the forced and migratory labor regime in Mozambique. The publication, in its introduction, also specifically denied Freyre‘s theory of luso-tropicalism by exposing the

26 ―Questions Concerning Non-Self-Governing Territories and the International Trusteeship System,‖ in Yearbook of the United Nations 1956 (New York: United Nations, n.d.), 292-296, http://unyearbook.un.org/unyearbook.html?name=1956index.html. 27 For more regarding this debate, see the ―Questions Concerning Non-Self-Governing Territories and the International Trusteeship System.‖ section of the Yearbook of the United Nations from 1956 through 1960. The other members of the Special Committee of Six appointed in December 1959 to investigate this matter were India, Mexico, Morocco, the , and the . 183 institutional racism of the indigenato and within Mozambique‘s educational system.28

The ACOA made this pamphlet available to all UN delegations.29

In December 1960, the Special Committee of Six submitted its recommendations for approval by the General Assembly. Two of these 12 principles required reporting on

―territories geographically separate and ethnically and/or culturally distinct from the administering country‖ and defined full self-government as ―the attainment of independence, or free association or integration with an independent state.‖30 Before the

15 December 1960 vote on these recommendations, resolution 1542 (XV), the U.S. delegation to the United Nations was advised by the Eisenhower administration to oppose it.

Senator Wayne Morse, an ACOA member, was a part of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Trusteeship Council and opposed to the U.S. position supporting

Portugal. Morse traveled to Washington to urge Undersecretary for Political Affairs

Livingstone Merchant and Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon to reconsider this recommendation. This was the first time that the Portuguese UN question had been considered at the highest level of the State Department. Morse advised the policymakers of the resentment towards the United States that a negative vote would create with the

African nations, 17 of which had gained their independence in 1960. Although Morse did not convince the delegation to approve the resolution, the U.S. vote was changed

28 Harris, Portugal‘s African Wards; a First-Hand Report on Labor and Education in Mozcambique. 29 American Committee on Africa, Who Speaks for Africa, Africa Today Pamphlets (New York: American Committee on Africa, 1959), 30. 30 ―Questions Concerning Non-Self-Governing Territiories and the International Trusteeship System,‖ Yearbook of the United Nations 1960, 504-505. 184 from oppose to abstain.31 The resolution was approved by the General Assembly.

Portugal refused to comply.

Just as the ACOA and other affiliated organizations used the print media in their anti-colonial campaigns, Portugal began to publish its defense in its own books, pamphlets and, most frequently, in newspapers. Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira was one of the most influential authors to enter the public relations campaign on behalf of

Portugal. He published his book, As Nações Unidas e Portugal in 1961 in response to the anti-colonial resolutions being proposed by the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations and the Kennedy administration‘s tilt toward the emerging African nations during this period. The book was translated into English and published by a British firm in 1963 as

The United Nations and Portugal.32

Nogueira‘s reputation as a ―walking encyclopedia of United Nations procedure,‖ and ―scathing‖ in his defense of Portuguese policy was proven as he expounded in the text on the alleged misuse of the UN Charter by the organization‘s newest members.33 In particular, Nogueira questioned the changes in the application of Chapter 73 of the

Charter that had been designed for oversight. He pointed out that the United Nations had begun to use this chapter as a tool of interventionism which he posited as illegal.

More fundamentally, Nogueira debated the rhetoric of anti-colonialism, beginning with the fluidity of the definition of a colony. He lamented that the ―colonialism‖ that was taking place within such contiguous territory as the Soviet Union and India was not

31 Winifred Armstrong, ―Issues at the United Nations of Particular Concern to African States,‖ unpublished paper, n.d., Winifred Armstrong Papers, Box 1, Senator Kennedy Africa documents folder 1, JFK. 32 Franco Nogueira, As Nacoes Unidas e Portugal (Lisbon: Atica, 1961); Franco Nogueira, The United Nations And Portugal. A Study of Anti-Colonialism, 1st ed. (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1963). 33 ―Portuguese Diplomat,‖ New York Times, December 19, 1961, 18. 185 regarded as true colonialism.34 He pointedly struck at the United States when questioning the adopted definition of a colony as ―any territory which is not only administratively, politically and economically subordinate to another territory with which it has political ties, but also geographically separated from it, and inhabited by people of different race and culture.‖35 If such was true, he asked, why were Puerto Rico and Hawaii not considered colonies of the United States? 36

Nogueira ignored the principles in resolution 1542 (XV) regarding a peoples‘ right to choose ―free association or integration with an independent state‖ applicable to

Puerto Rico and Hawaii due to the referendums in 1952 and 1959, respectively, approving the Commonwealth and statehood status of these territories. Despite the apparent weakness of its argument, Portugal leveraged its strong position as a European nation-state and member of NATO. In their battle against the entrenched Portuguese dictatorship, such non-governmental opponents as the ACOA had to build and sustain a broad network that stretched from rural Africa to policymakers in the United States and

Europe.

A hallmark of the ACOA was its penchant for creating coalitions and spawning smaller organizations devoted to special projects, thus widening the network of supporters for the domestic and international movement. In addition to expanding the geographic reach of the network, these coalitions allowed organizations with differing focuses and constituencies, but with an overlapping interest in African liberation, to share

34 Nogueira‘s use of these particular examples reflected Portugal‘s anti-communism and its fury at India‘s efforts, which succeed by the end of 1961, to absorb the Portuguese colony of Goa. 35 Nogueira, The United Nations And Portugal. A Study of Anti-Colonialism, 58. 36 Ibid., 57-60. 186 resources. For example, in its early years, the ACOA was affiliated with religious, pacifist, human rights, civil rights, labor, and democratic organizations. Many of its early members, including George Houser, Bayard Rustin, and William Sutherland, were also members of FOR which had been developing its international network of human rights and peace advocates since 1914. Among its African American members, the ACOA benefited from the knowledge, experience, and contacts of Howard University‘s Rayford

Logan, former Pan-African Association Deputy Secretary and Council of African Affairs member; labor leader A. Philip Randolph, and scholar Horace Mann Bond of the African

American Institute. Early in the organization‘s history, the executive committee strategized ways to coordinate with other liberal organizations, including Americans for

Democratic Action, NAACP, American Civil Liberties Union, International League for the Rights of Man, American Association for the United Nations, and the Women‘s

League for Peace and Freedom.37 Although willing, when feasible, to support other organizations devoted to global anti-colonial efforts, the ACOA made it clear that its advocacy would be focused on African liberation.38

In its efforts to influence U.S. foreign policy the ACOA solicited the Kennedy administration‘s assistance to African liberation movements. One of its early offshoots was the African-American Students Foundation that administered the East African

Airlifts and Southern African Students Program. Despite these successes, the ACOA did

37 Memo from George W. Shepherd, ACOA Executive Director, 9 August 1954, Reel 1, ACOA. 38 In March 1955, Fenner Brockway, a British parliamentarian associated with the anti-colonial organization, World Movement for Colonial Freedom (formerly, Congress of Peoples against Imperialism) suggested a merger with the ACOA which was refused by George Houser because he wished to keep the organization‘s African focus. William B. Lloyd Papers, MSS 24, Box 5, Merger with ACOA folder, NWU-AL-WBL. 187 not approve of the government‘s ―middle-ground‖ policy that prioritized hard national security interests over humanitarian principles. Although having members of Congress on its national committee and participating in government-funded programs, the ACOA actively contended against government policies that supported imperialism and apartheid.

Additionally, in reaction to criticism for its elitism and the widening interest in Africa in the black community, the ACOA leadership sought as early as 1960 to expand its mobilization tactics and its activism to include more African Americans and the growing students‘ movement.

In March 1960, George Houser and Peter Weiss, then Vice-Chairman of the

ACOA, attended the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings in support of a proposed expansion of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, an extension that would provide for more foreign aid to Africa. In his statement, Weiss stated that the United States had ―been substituting a diplomatic juggling act for a dynamic policy towards Africa.‖39 Hoping to influence the presidential candidate to assert a more supportive policy toward Africa in the event of his election, Houser wrote to Senator Kennedy in October 1960. He highlighted the foreign policy areas of interest to independent African states that he felt should also become more of a priority for the U.S. government. Houser stated that

―…practically nothing has been said in this campaign thus far about the necessity for the

United States to back the independence of Algeria, the struggle for equality going on at an increased pace in the Union of South Africa, and the right of self-determination for the

39 House Foreign Affairs Committee, ―Statement of Peter Weiss, Vice-Chairman of the American Committee on Africa,‖ 11 March 1960, Winifred Armstrong Papers, Box 1, American Committee on Africa folder, JFKL. 188 people in Portuguese Angola and Mozambique.‖40 The latter two issues would become key targets of contention for the ACOA during the Kennedy years.

During the same month that Peter Weiss testified before the House Foreign

Relations Committee in support of greater economic aid to African countries, the international community was shocked by the eruption of state violence in South Africa.

In its response to the Sharpeville Massacre, the killing of seventy-two unarmed, nonviolent African demonstrators by the South African police on 21 March 1960, the

ACOA continued its tactic of intertwining its support for the black freedom struggle domestically and internationally. This protest also demonstrated the ACOA‘s effort to broaden its grassroots audience through its alliance with CORE. On 23 March 1960, a month after the famous sit-in by four North Carolina A&T freshmen at the Woolworth‘s in Greensboro, NC which launched the black student movement, fifty demonstrators picketed a midtown Manhattan Woolworth‘s to protest the exclusion of African

Americans from lunch counters in the South. These same picketers then marched a mile uptown to the South African consulate to protest the Sharpeville Massacre.41

With the outbreak of the armed struggle in Angola and the subsequent formation of Mozambican nationalist movements in 1961, the ACOA again focused much of its energy on southern Africa. The Algerian struggle, the crisis in the Congo, and the

Sharpeville Massacre subtly, but significantly, changed the advocates‘ emphasis on the non-violent nature of the African independence struggle. Some of those involved when

40 Houser to Kennedy, 19 October 1960, Winifred Armstrong Papers, Box 1, Africa documents folder 1, JFKL. 41 ―South Africans ‗Out to Lunch‘ as Shooting is Protested,‖ New York Times, 24 March 1960, 8, Swarthmore College Peace Collection ACOA Papers (SPCAP); Telegram from SAC New York to J. Edgar Hoover, 22 March 1960, an informant notified the FBI regarding planned demonstrations, FBI. 189 the ACOA was established were absolute pacifists seeking to support non-violent social change both internationally and domestically. Most were pragmatic pacifists who believed that a lasting world peace could only be achieved through alleviation of the causes of war, therefore, promoting social justice and racial equality.42 This acceptance of a broader definition of pacifism enabled the organization to accommodate the growing militancy, violence, and shift to the left occurring in the black freedom struggle.

These changes were particularly evident in the anti-colonial and antiapartheid struggles in southern Africa. The ACOA, recognizing the complexity of the situation for the U.S. government and Portuguese intransigence, brought to bear all of its methods of contestation – education, demonstrations, as well as advocacy at the UN and with policymakers. In affiliation with the International League for the Rights of Man, a consulting non-governmental organization of the United Nations‘ Economic and Social

Council, the ACOA provided Portugal‘s African Wards as evidence for Ghana‘s groundbreaking International Labor Organization (ILO) complaint against forced labor in lusophone Africa.

Reminiscent of the 1921 Pan-African Congress Manifesto to the League of

Nations, in January 1961, the Ghanaian government under President Kwame Nkrumah filed a complaint with the ILO stating that Portugal was in violation of the 1957

Abolition of Forced Labor Convention. This was the first time that such a complaint had been filed by one signatory of the convention against another under Article 26 of the ILO

42 For more regarding the various definitions and connotations of pacifism, see David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 6-11. 190 constitution.43 Portugal‘s immediate response to the complaint was denial, stating that the complaint contained only allegations with no supporting evidence. Although the ILO concurred, it convened a commission and allowed Ghana time to gather witnesses to the alleged violations.

In its two sessions held in July and September 1961, the commission heard 31 witnesses to which over 1,500 questions were posed. Among the witnesses for Ghana were Baptist missionaries and the renowned British journalist, author and African historian, Basil Davidson, an avid activist for southern African liberation. The commission also accepted communications from non-governmental organizations, including the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Anti-Slavery

Society, and the ACOA.44 Witnesses for Portugal requested by the commission included representatives from some of the largest plantations, including the Sena Sugar Estates,

Incomati Agricultural Company, and the Zambezia Company, as well as from the

Witwatersrand Native Labor Association.

The commission also traveled to Angola and Mozambique in December 1961 in order to see the working conditions and to speak with laborers in those countries. At the behest of the United Arab Republic, which in Pan-African solidarity had joined Ghana in the complaint in June 1961, the commission also considered visiting neighboring

43 International Labour Organisation, Portugal in Africa; Findings and Recommendations [from the] Report of the I.L.O. Commission on the Observance by Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) ([London: Portuguese Embassy, 1962), 5. Although Portugal had signed the 1957 convention, it had not signed the Recruiting of Indigenous Workers Convention of 1936 or the Contracts of Employment (Indigenous Workers) Convention of 1939 which both dealt with problems related to forced labor. 44 Elihu Lauterpacht, International Law Reports (Cambridge University Press, 1967), 309. 191 territories.45 Julius Nyerere, as the newly-elected Prime Minister of an autonomous

Tanganyika (which would gain its full independence on 9 December 1961) and the

Tanganyika African National Union invited the commission to tour their country. The commission, satisfied with the information received in its tour of the two Portuguese territories, declined.46

On 21 February 1962, the commission reached agreement on its findings and recommendations. Regarding Mozambique, it found that it was only in the area of forced cotton cultivation that Portugal was, at that time, in violation of the convention. The reason given for this finding was that the Portuguese government had promulgated legislation to begin reforming its labor policy after the ratification of the Abolition of

Forced Labor Convention. The commission also found that efforts to assure that practices were in conformance with law were not made until after the complaint filed by

Ghana. The Portuguese government had, throughout the summer of 1961, enacted legislation eliminating the most egregious provisions of the forced labor regime: 1) creating labor inspection services; 2) repealing forced cotton and castor-oil plant cultivation laws; 3) ending government recruitment of workers; 4) abolishing the system granting concessions exclusive rights to rice produced by Mozambicans, eliminating price fixing, and establishing minimum prices; and 5) repealing vagrancy laws punishable by correctional labor. The Portuguese government was also reprimanded because of testimony that some colonial subjects were compelled to work in order to meet excessive

45 Although ostensibly an indication of Pan-African solidarity, this intervention also reflects the rivalry between Nkrumah and Nassar for leadership of a united Africa. 46 Lauterpacht, International Law Reports, 295; Carol A. Johnson, ―Conferences of Independent African States,‖ International Organization 16, no. 2 (Spring 1962): 426. 192 tax obligations. As a result of its investigation, the commission made clarifying and broadly stated recommendations for Portugal to end the ―moral obligation‖ of

Mozambicans to work, the recruitment by colonial administrators of laborers for public works projects, and all compulsory cultivation. On 27 April 1962, in compliance with recommendations of the ILO commission, Salazar promulgated a new Overseas Rural

Labor Code.47 International advocates had, for the first time, successfully induced legislative reform in the Portuguese colonies.

These advocates could not, however, enforce the legislated reforms. As such, there was little change on the ground. For example, on 27 September 1961, the newly appointed Minister of Overseas Affairs, Adriano Moreira, made a speech before the

Mozambique Legislative Council in Lourenço Marques regarding the legislative reforms and what was at stake for Portugal. He stated that the Portuguese ―should be ill-advised if we did not mobilize all of our resources, capacity and imagination, in order to safeguard a patrimony which is the very raison d‘être of our nationality.‖48 Although the speech was ostensibly meant to advise the legislature of the necessity to comply with the new laws, it was laced throughout with thinly veiled allusions that the legislature should find ways to protect the status quo. For example, although the vagrancy laws were no longer punishable by correctional labor, employers continued to file civil suits against

47 International Labour Organisation, Portugal in Africa; Findings and Recommendations [from the] Report of the I.L.O. Commission on the Observance by Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), 3-32. 48 Adriano Moreira, ―Vigil of Arms‖ (Speech presented at the Mozambique Legislative Council, Lourenco Marques, September 27, 1961), 8. (Transcript was published in 1961 by the Agência-Geral do Ultramar in Lisbon.) 193 unemployed Blacks. The defendants would be fined and then, unable to pay the fines, would be sentenced to correctional labor for disobedience of a court order.

Similarly, changes in the Overseas Organic Law that officially repealed the indigenato and granted citizenship to all Mozambicans were merely paper reforms.

Former indigenas continued to be required to carry identification cards that clearly distinguished them from assimilados. In 1964, less than 2% of Africans were qualified to vote (according to official records, only 93,079 of an African population of 6,592, 994).49

Therefore, although the international community had successfully pressured Portugal into a posture of reform, the government‘s unwillingness to implement real change remained evident.

Marvin Harris‘ report was also used as evidence for the United Nations‘ Special

Committee on Decolonization, a 17-member committee formed on 27 November 1961.

The Committee held meetings throughout the summer of 1962 to consider the case of self-determination for Mozambique. This committee heard testimony from Mozambican nationalists representing the three nationalist movements in exile (MANU, UNAMI, and

UDENAMO) and Eduardo Mondlane, who was elected president of the united front during the period of these proceedings.50

As detailed in the previous chapter, members of the ACOA associated with the

African-American Students Foundation and African American Institute, as well as John

49 Eduardo C. Mondlane and William Minter, ―The Future of Mozambique‖ (presented at the Brazil and Portuguese Africa, University of California, February 27, 1968). and at a seminar for the Political Science department at the University College of Dar es Salaam on November 7, 1968), RG 30/307, Series 6, Reel 1(microfilm), OCA. 50 ―Situation with Regard to Implementation of Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonized Countries and Peoples,‖ Yearbook of the United Nations 1962, 63. D.M. Kunnunbaara and G.S. Zandemela represented MANU, José Baltazar da Costa Changong‘a of UNAMI, and of UDENAMO. 194

Marcum, also established and administered the SASP with African nationalists and the

State Department in 1961.51 At the end of the year, Marcum and Houser would travel to war-torn Angola to evaluate the status of the insurgency and to deliver 250 pounds of medical supplies to the UPA and Angolan refugees in the Congo. Upon their return,

Houser would distribute to the ACOA Executive Committee ―A Report on a Journey through Rebel Angola.‖ This confidential report detailed their 200 mile trek through northern Angola where they witnessed both the depravation and the unifying effect of the war on the Angolans in the 12 villages they visited.

In his analysis of the viability of the Angolan rebellion, Houser reported on the guerilla training of both men and women, the mobility of Angolan villages, and the weapons the UPA insurgents received from Algeria and Tunisia. To counter Portuguese claims that the rebellion was instigated by communists, he noted that none of the arms and munitions was from Eastern Europe but of German, British, and American manufacture. He also quoted Angolans stating, ―We love our country; we are not interested in communism.‖52

To dispute Portugal‘s claims that its African provinces were incapable of self- government, Houser discussed the seminal development of parallel institutions in the areas he alleged were controlled by the UPA. He stated that ―Nationalist-held territory is in a very real, if rudimentary sense, already self-governing.‖ Although admitting his limited knowledge of the extent of control by the UPA, by the Portuguese, and by other

51 For more regarding the ACOA‘s role in connection with the Angolan revolution, see Luis Rodrigues, ―‗Today‘s terrorist is tomorrow‘s statesman‘: the United States and Angolan Nationalism in the early 1960s,‖ Portuguese Journal of Social Science 3, no. 2 (2004): 115-140. 52 George Houser, ―A Report on a Journey through Rebel Angola‖, n.d., 8, ACOA microfilm, Schomberg Center for Research in Black Culture. 195

Angolan nationalist organizations, Houser reported that the UPA had established

―customs posts, a communications and information system, village councils, a party, a trade union and youth organizations … the beginnings of a political state.‖53

Prophetically, Houser described the animosity between the UPA and MPLA and the likelihood that it could erupt into a complex and violent conflict in the future. He states that ―Keen suspicions arising from differences of race, of economic station, of educational opportunity, will make future problems difficult of solution.‖ He further anticipated that ―Perhaps present organizational disunity opens the way for a future East-

West struggle in Angola.‖54 What he did not anticipate was that the Angolan conflict would create tensions within his own organization. Houser would, in the early 1970s, have to defend the ACOA‘s tradition of remaining outside of African organizations‘ internal politics against militant young African American members‘ demand that the

ACOA support only the MPLA.55

The division in the Angolan liberation struggle would also serve as a negative model for Eduardo Mondlane and the organizers of FRELIMO. Consequently, they would strive, with varying levels of success, to overcome similar differences of race, ethnicity, class, and education before launching the armed struggle in 1964. That

FRELIMO was, for the most part, the only viable national liberation organization simplified international support for Mozambican independence by such organizations as the ACOA.

53 Ibid. 54 Ibid., 10. 55Houser to ACOA Executive Board, April 1970, Robert Van Lierop Papers, Box 1, ACOA folder, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture (SC-RVL) 196

All of these activities by the ACOA would precipitate an attack by Portugal. To counter its efforts, Portugal created an advocacy group of Portuguese-Americans in New

England, the Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs, and hired a New York public relations firm, Selvage and Lee. The public relations firm was contracted in April

1961 by a group of approximately fifty Portuguese and foreign-owned businesses from

Angola and Mozambique known as the Overseas Companies of Portugal (OCP), but reported to both the OCP and the Portuguese government.

The Portuguese organizations appealed to American cold warriors and racists with contentions made through all available media that the Angolan rebellion was organized by Communist ―outside agitators‖ and perpetrated by barbaric African racists. These tactics were particularly effective in articles published in Southern newspapers and in the

Readers‘ Digest. In addition, they also published articles touting Portuguese multi- racialism penned by such conservative and anti-communist African Americans as Max

Yergan and George Schuyler in black newspapers like the Pittsburgh Courier.56 The

Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs also lobbied New England congressmen and State Department officials.

In July 1961, the chairman of the Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign

Affairs, Martin T. Camacho, petitioned President Kennedy with testimony defending

Portugal‘s ―enlightened multi-racial policy,‖ a term used repeatedly by the Portuguese in the media and at the United Nations. He implicated Communist agitation in the Angolan

56 David Henry Anthony, Max Yergan: Race Man, Internationalist, Cold Warrior (New York: Press, 2006), 231-236. In the late 1930‘s and early 1940s, Yergan was a leftist and co-founder of the Council of African Affairs, but by 1947 he had shifted far to the right. He became friends with former rival George Schuyler and the two were members of the Congress of Cultural Freedom until 1954. 197 uprising, while stressing Portugal‘s staunch anti-communism. Camacho pointed out that the Kennedy administration‘s votes in the United Nations regarding the situation in

Angola had placed the U.S. on the side of the Soviets and against its NATO ally.

Significantly, the petition charged that the ACOA was spreading Communist propaganda and condoning terrorism in its support for Angolan nationalism.

In November, Camacho also released a public statement attacking the ACOA for supporting communism and terrorism. He demanded a congressional investigation.57

Camacho also called upon such prominent political figures as Eleanor Roosevelt and

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. to resign from the organization.58 Unbeknownst to Camacho was the fact that the FBI had already investigated the ACOA three times since its inception in 1954 and, in November 1959, had found no justification for requiring its registration as a .59 Nonetheless, the State Department had John

Marcum removed as director of the university‘s federally-funded Africa Program. The

Portuguese government had demanded the elimination of the program altogether, alleging that it ―was a training ground for guerillas.‖ The State Department, however, ―agreed to continue funding the program out of fear that the [Angolan] students would go to

Moscow if it was closed.‖60

Houser‘s response to these accusations was a simple one, a refrain that would be repeated continuously by the ACOA and by FRELIMO throughout the dozen years of the front‘s freedom struggle. He stated, ―… that Portuguese rule in Africa has laid the seeds

57 Houser, No One Can Stop the Rain, 160. 58 Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, 1:186-187. 59 Thomas F. Spencer, New York SAC, to J. Edgar Hoover, Internal Security Summary Report, dated 22 December 1959. 60 Noer, The Cold War and Black Liberation, 91. 198 for its own destruction through its political repression of the great mass of people, its economic exploitation, its forced labor system, and its particular form of racism which does differ from the apartheid pattern of South Africa, for instance, but is nevertheless racist.‖61

THE ACOA AND AFRICAN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR MOZAMBICAN LIBERATION

In the anti-colonial and antiapartheid struggles in southern African, race was a powerful organizing principle and mobilization tool for both Africans and Americans. The lines of oppression between the white supremacist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia and their black majority populations were clearly drawn. Although the Estado Novo held fast to its rhetoric of non-racialism and touted its de jure reforms, anti-colonial activists continued to highlight the two areas of de facto racial oppression in the lusophone

African territories – the forced and migratory labor regimens and the educational system.

Even when the inhumanity of forced and migratory labor was difficult to prove, as revealed by the ambiguous findings of the ILO investigation, these institutions tied

Portugal economically to the white supremacist regimes. The unequal educational opportunities and literacy requirement for Mozambicans to exercise their right to vote resonated with American activists involved in the Civil Rights Movement. Yet, the use of racial politics also created tensions within the movement that would grow as the 1960s progressed. These tensions would plague both the ACOA, a multicultural organization

61 George Houser letter regarding Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs, 15 February 1962, Reel 1, ACOA. 199 led by a white man, and FRELIMO, an organization with a non-racialist program designed by an American-educated Tsongan.

The ACOA relied upon the influence of prominent leaders in the African

American community both to disseminate information and to raise funds. By 1960, the

ACOA boasted renowned members from a broad sector of the African American community, including Sadie T.M. Alexander, , Harry Belafonte, Robert S.

Browne, Rep. Charles Diggs, , Martin Luther King, Jr., Jackie Robinson,

Percy Sutton, and more. In its second celebration of Africa Freedom Day (15 April 1960) at Town Hall in New York, the ACOA used such African American speakers as

Thurgood Marshall, and African nationalists Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Julius Nyerere, and Kenneth Kaunda to raise $10,000 for the families of victims of the Sharpeville

Massacre.62 Alternately, the involvement of these prominent African Americans with the

ACOA expanded their influence with the U.S. government to include foreign policy issues and allowed them to solicit the federal government for more funding and employment in foreign relations-related fields.

Celebrity fundraisers sponsored by the ACOA at New York‘s Town and Carnegie

Halls and its multicultural leadership branded the organization as too liberal and elitist, a charge made by militant African Americans and grassroots organizers. Yet the ACOA took part in the event that historian Peniel Joseph characterizes as ―part protest demonstration and part funeral procession‖ at the United Nations organized by some of

62 Houser to , dated 20 June 1960. Houser also notes that $35,000 was raised for the Africa Defense and Aid Fund for the South Africa Treason Trial defense. 200

Harlem‘s leading activists.63 Joseph uses this demonstration as an example to date back

Black Power activism earlier in the decade than the traditional periodization of the movement that supposedly begins with Willie Ricks and ‘s declaration during the Meredith March against Fear in June 1966.

On 15-16 February 1961, African American men and women from fifteen organizations demonstrated against the perceived complicity of ACOA and the United

States‘ government in the assassination of the former Belgian Congo‘s first Prime

Minister, Patrice Lumumba. Historian James Meriwether argues succinctly that ―The slain Lumumba symbolized for broader black America the struggle of African nationalism and freedom against continued white exploitation and oppression.‖64 The demonstrators did not know at the time of the CIA‘s plot to assassinate Lumumba by poisoning his food or toothpaste.65 The black radicals did perceive that the rivals who killed the African prime minister were covertly supported by Belgium and, ―through more ambiguous diplomatic and intelligence back channels,‖ the United States.66

On the first day, sixty African Americans staged an impromptu, ostensibly non- violent, protest within the United Nations Security Council. On February 16, nearly two hundred demonstrated with placards and shouted slogans outside the United Nations building. Both demonstrations ended in violence. The United Nations guards struggled to eject protestors, and mounted police and patrolmen dispersed the demonstrators. This

63 Peniel E Joseph, Waiting ‘til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America, 1st ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 2006), 40. 64 Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans, 232. 65 Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa – from Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1982), xi-xiii. 66 Peniel E. Joseph, Waiting ‗Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006), 39. 201 violence prompted to characterize the event as a riot.67

Demonstrators and their supporters saw things quite differently. They saw their protest as a legitimate means of contention in the African American efforts to influence United

States foreign policy.

George Houser had met Lumumba at the 1958 All African Peoples‘ Conference and visited with missionaries concerned about Belgian colonialism in the territory on more than one occasion. Following the demonstrations, he spoke with reporters. Houser accurately characterized the protesters as black nationalists, not Communists, as portrayed by some newspapers.68 The next month, James Baldwin, then an ACOA member, also disputed the characterization of the demonstration as communist-inspired and the demonstrators as an aberrant minority of the black community. He declared that the black freedom movement in the United States was intrinsically linked to the struggle in Africa. Furthermore, part of the growing urgency and militancy of young African

Americans stemmed from their frustration that Africans were winning the struggle for self-determination, while they were sitting-in at lunch counters. Baldwin stated that

African Americans were thinking, ―At the rate that things are going, all of Africa will be free before we can get a lousy cup of coffee.‖69 Thus, not only was the ACOA instrumental in shaping American audiences‘ understanding of the emerging Africa, but

67 ―Riot in Gallery Halts U.N. Debate,‖ and ―U.N. Rioting Laid to Pro-Africans,‖ New York Times, 16 February 1961, 1 and 11. 68 ―Nkrumah Tells the Inside Story of Lumumba‘s Murder,‖ The Philadelphia Tribune, 18 February 1961, 1; ―Editorial Confirmed by UN Outbreak,‖The Philadelphia Tribune, 18 February 1961, 4. 69 By JAMES BALDWIN, ―A Negro Assays the Negro Mood,‖ New York Times (1923-Current file), March 12, 1961, 103. 202 the ACOA members and its affiliates strove to facilitate and mediate the discourse among

Americans about their relationship with the continent.

In 1962, the ACOA Executive Committee sought to leverage the power of race while attenuating its divisive effects by proposing a coalition of African American leaders to mobilize support for African liberation within the black community.70 The

ANLCA represented the most prominent Black leaders of that time –

(CORE), Martin Luther King, Jr. (SCLC), Dorothy Height (National Council of Negro

Women), A. Philip Randolph, (NAACP), and, (National

Urban League). The ANLCA hoped that the weight of their combined memberships would influence the Kennedy, then Johnson, administrations‘ policies in Africa.71

To crystallize its political agenda, the ANLCA first met in November 1962 for a much publicized conference at Columbia University attended by representatives of

SNCC, Operation Crossroads Africa (a black forerunner to the Peace Corps), Howard and

Lincoln Universities, the National Newspaper Publishers Association, and more. An article in the Chicago Defender noted that this was the largest gathering of ―top Negro leadership ever concentrated to examine U.S. foreign policy in terms of American Negro interests.‖ It noted further that ―the last similar meeting was convened as the First Pan-

African Conference, organized by Dr. W.E.B. DuBois in 1919.‖72 The similarity between the two meetings is an overstatement. There were few conferees from Africa and the Caribbean, and no Europeans participated in the ANLCA conference.

70 Hostetter, Movement Matters, 28. 71 Plummer, Rising Wind, 307. 72 ―Call 100 Top Leaders to 3-Day Summit Meet,‖ Chicago Daily Defender (Daily Edition), November 19, 1962, 17. 203

The conference did not provide an opportunity for members of the African

Diaspora to discuss the challenges they faced as an oppressed group. The ANLCA conference did, however, provide the opportunity for Africanists and advocates to educate the diverse group of African Americans from religious, civil rights, labor, professional/business, academic, and social organizations about the anti-colonial and anti-aparthied movements in Africa. For example, papers presented at the conference included one by John Marcum on Angola by George Houser on the Union of South

Africa, and Eduardo Mondlane on Kenya. That the Chicago Defender sought to highlight DuBois‘ legacy of activism on behalf of Africans is, nonetheless, tenable and significant. Also similar to DuBois‘ 1921 appeal to the League of Nations were the

ANLCA‘s efforts to use this advocacy to promote greater political power in international affairs for African Americans.

The ANLCA‘s resolutions exemplified the scope of its agenda by addressing foreign policy issues of both a domestic and international nature. The six major resolutions requested: 1) U.S. support for the reunification of ; 2) U.S. support for the liberation of Angola, Mozambique, and Southwest Africa (now, Namibia); 3) U.S. sanctions against South African apartheid; 4) State Department appointments of Negro citizens to high-level policy posts; 5) government recruitment of more Negro foreign service staff personnel; and 6) federal recruitment of more Negroes to top staff positions on American philanthropic foundations.73 Furthermore, the conference called for a

73 American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa Resolutions: Arden House Campus of Columbia University, November 23-25, 1962, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); M.S. Handler, ―Leading Negroes Agree on Goals,‖ New York Times, 26 November 1962, 17; Lou Potter, ―92 of Nation‘s Rights Leaders Meet in N.Y.: Historic Parley First Since 1921 Paris Conference,‖ The Philadelphia Tribune, 1. 204

December meeting with President Kennedy in order to discuss these matters. In his capacity as both a domestic and international leader, Martin Luther King, Jr. had a disappointing meeting with the President in mid-December 1962 when he went to discuss both U.S. policy in South Africa and the plight of African Americans in Birmingham.

On 14 December 1962, George Houser sent a memo to the ANCLA leaders briefing them on the challenges in southern Africa. He suggested, in addition to discussing the Congo crisis and economic sanctions against South Africa with the

President, that they add Portuguese Africa to the agenda. This suggestion was in response to the U.S. vote in the United Nations against a Fourth Committee resolution

1807 (XVII) calling for an arms embargo on Portugal, and for Portugal to grant independence to its African territories. The arms embargo was requested because of

Portugal‘s alleged use of NATO arms in Angola. Houser noted that the United States‘ response was that it had prohibited such use of NATO arms. Houser advised, however, that he had witnessed the use of napalm and bomb-casings marked ―Property of the US

Air Force‖ during his trip to the territory. He again stressed that the U.S. was in company with Portugal, Spain, and South Africa in its opposition to the resolution. He warned of the ―blow to U.S. prestige‖ such a negative vote represented.74

The ANLCA leadership met with Kennedy on 17 December to discuss challenges in Africa and, clearly, used Houser‘s briefing regarding southern Africa.75 According to

74 Houser to ANLCA call committee, 14 December 1962, Reel 1, ACOA; ―Questions Concerning the Non- Self-Governing Territories and International Trusteeship System,‖ Yearbook of the United Nations 1962, 416. 75 David J. Garrow, : Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004), 278; John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum White House Diary, 17 December 1962, http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/modules/diary , 16 April 2007. 205

Pulitzer Prize winning author Taylor Branch, the ANLCA ―requested a ‗Marshall Plan‘ of economic aid for the impoverished, newly independent nations‖ in Africa and ―pressed for American sanctions against South Africa‘s apartheid system.‖ Particularly, they discussed ―a recent United Nations proposal to curtail armed suppression by Portugal of independence movements in its colonies of Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese

Guinea.‖ While President Kennedy ―put his guests at ease by sharing their sensibilities,‖ the president also explained that NATO obligations made it impossible to discontinue arms shipments to Portugal.76

Although disappointed with the outcome of its meeting with President Kennedy, the ANLCA continued its efforts. It sponsored two other conferences, in 1964 and 1967, as forums where African Americans called for sanctions against South African apartheid, denounced U.S. actions in the Congolese civil war, and continued support of Portuguese colonialism, and offered to mediate in the Nigerian civil war. By September 1964, the conference, held at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C., had grown to 250 participants with a primary goal of making the views of America‘s 20 million Negroes an important element in the formulation of United States policy toward the newly independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa.77 The task was formidable.

Historian Terence Lyons asserts that President Johnson placed Africa on the back burner, slated to be handled by the State Department bureaucracy or, if possible, ignored.

However, ―when the Congo threatened to erupt into a major crisis in 1964, when African

76 Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63 (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1988), 684. 77 M.S. Handler, ―Negroes Ask Role in Foreign Policy,‖ New York Time, July 9, 1964, 15; ACOA Press Release, 30 July 1963, Swarthmore College Peace Collection ACOA Papers (SCPC-AP). 206 issues required a decision at the United Nations, or when domestic interest groups generated enough attention to make an issue salient, the president would address the continent.‖78 Johnson sent Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for African

Affairs G. Mennen Williams and US Ambassador to the U.N. Adlai Stevenson to address the concerns of the ANLCA as conference speakers. The New York Times stated that ―It was evident from the ranking American officials who attended the luncheon and the working sessions of the conference that the United States had come to seek domestic support for its policies in Africa.‖79 Despite Rusk‘s rhetoric criticizing South Africa‘s apartheid and Portuguese colonialism, he made no promise of action. While the policy- makers‘ attendance at the conference was a victory for the ANLCA, it may also have been an attempt by the administration to divert African American attention from U.S. covert operations in the former Belgian Congo that have come to light with the declassification of Cold War era documents.80

By 1967 the ANLCA‘s form of brokerage politics had become obsolete and its very name signified that it was no longer leading the Afro-American people. Though only lasting five years, the ANLCA was able to foster the appointment of African

Americans to ambassadorial posts in Africa – Mercer Cook as Ambassador to Niger and

David Bolen as Officer in Charge of Nigerian Affairs.81 It also helped to bring an end to

78 Terrence Lyons, ―Keeping Africa off the Agenda,‖ in Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968, Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 245. 79 M.S. Handler, ―Rusk Makes Plea to Negroes in U.S.,‖ New York Times, September 26, 1964, 2. 80 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2002), 131; Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 141-142. 81 Michael L. Krenn, Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department, 1945-1969 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 118-130. 207 the practice of refueling US Navy ships at Cape Town, because the South African government denied shore leave for Black crew members.82

One of the ambassadorial appointees, Mercer Cook, had a special relationship with ACOA and the ANCLA. Cook was one of the founders of the American Society of

African Culture (AMSAC) in 1957, which was affiliated with the Société Africaine de

Culture headquartered in Paris. The organization was composed of Black scholars, writers, artists, teachers and professionals. It included John A. Davis, professor at City

College of New York; Horace Mann Bond, former president of Lincoln University whose alumni include African leaders Kwame Nkrumah and Nnamdi Azikiwe; and, the ubiquitous James Farmer, the executive director of CORE, co-founder of the ACOA, and member of the ANCLA. Dedicated to the political, social, economic and cultural development of the Negro, especially in Africa and America, the society created an

African resource library, provided an information service and speakers bureau, and featured tours, fellowships, and exchange programs. 83 It also distributed the journal

African Forum and published the papers presented at its conferences. Although much of its work was scholarly and cultural, AMSAC also showed the politicized nature of cultural nationalism. Its conferences became key events in which Africans, African

Americans, intellectuals, artists, and political leaders exchanged information and ideas regarding U.S.-African relations.

82 George M. Houser, ―Meeting Africa‘s Challenge: The Story of the American Committee on Africa‖ ACOA pamphlet, 1975, 5, ACOA Papers, Microfilm, Schomburg Research Center for Black Culture; Lyons, ―Keeping Africa off the Agenda,‖ 269. 83 John A. Davis, Southern Africa in Transition (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966), xii. 208

Following the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, John A. Davis stated, ―There are times when men of culture can no longer confine their interests to things cultural.84 The themes of the AMSAC conference on 22-26 June 1960 at the University of Pennsylvania were African Unities and Pan-Africanism. Here members of the ACOA, Rayford Logan and John Marcum, presented papers for the Pan-Africanism panel which was chaired by

Melville J. Herskovitz. Chairing the Education panel was another member of the advocacy network developed by Eduardo Mondlane in his decade in the United States,

William O. Brown, director of Boston University‘s African Studies Program. Notably, before becoming a key member of the Kennedy administration, Harvard professor W. W.

Rostow presented a paper on African economics at this conference.

AMSAC's ―Southern Africa in Transition‖ conference was held on 11-13 April

1963 at Howard University. It was devoted to ending European rule in the region, as well as U.S. Africa policy. In his essay regarding African American antiapartheid efforts, historian Milfred Fierce writes that ―among the 600 participants were diplomats, southern

Africa specialists, and an impressive contingent of African nationalist such as Oliver

Tambo, one of the current leaders of ANC in exile.‖ Fierce continues with a list of other

African nationalists, including ―Ndabaningi Sithole, one of the unsuccessful candidates for prime minister of Zimbabwe, and Eddison Zvobogo, a current cabinet minister in

Zimbabwe and one of Prime Minister Mugabe‘s chief lieutenants throughout the struggle for that country‘s independence.‖ 85

84 Plummer, 254. 85 Milfred C. Fierce, ―Selected Black Leaders and Organizations and South Africa, 1900-1977,‖ Journal of Black Studies (March 1987): 317. Of note is the fact that Eduardo Mondlane was an AMSAC member. 209

Eduardo Mondlane, an AMSAC member, had spoken at the annual conference held in New York on 24 June 1961. Then, he spoke as a member of the United Nations

Trusteeship Council. This 1963 conference was special, because it marked the first time that Mondlane spoke before the diverse and distinguished gathering as the leader of

FRELIMO. It is also significant because it is here that he was photographed with J.

Wayne Fredericks, the photo which prompted Fredericks to confront Secretary of State

Rusk regarding the State Department prohibition against meeting with African nationalists.

In 1969, AMSAC ceased to exist, discredited with allegations regarding CIA and

State Department funding. As anticipated by Assistant Secretary Philip Coombs of the

ECU in 1961, the CIA‘s use of private organizations had negative repercussions. The

New Left magazine, Ramparts, and the Black Panther Newspaper published an exposé of the CIA‘s funding of private foundations through its ―Peace with Freedom‖ and

―Congress for Cultural Freedom‖ campaigns. The editors admit that AMSAC members may have been ―unwitting instruments of CIA operations.‖ The exposé led to the organization‘s demise because of the CIA‘s repressive covert operations throughout the global South, including Zaire and Vietnam.86 Historian Kevin Gaines implies that, even if some of the recipients of AMSAC support suspected covert funding by the U.S.

86 Dan Schechter, Michael Ansara, and David Kolodney, eds.,―The CIA as an Equal Opportunity Employer,‖ Ramparts (June 1969): 25-33; ―The CIA as an Equal Opportunity Employer,‖ Black Panther 3, 8:1-24 (14 June 1969): 10-11. 210 government, the dearth of financial assistance elsewhere for field research in Africa made

CIA sponsorship of AMSAC a viable option.87

The ACOA, although not accused of CIA affiliation in either the 1969 Ramparts exposé or a similar story in February 1967, was implicated by association. A CIA briefing regarding the international reaction to the exposé noted that the media in South

Africa, annoyed that AMSAC and the African American Institute were two organizations that opposed its apartheid policy, was quick to link the ACOA with the CIA, ―an organization which even the U.S. press has not alleged to have CIA connections.‖88 The

National Student Association was another organization through which the ACOA hoped to expand its advocacy which also disintegrated as a result of a 1967 Ramparts article.

The ACOA was able to survive these erroneous allegations regarding CIA funding just as it did the accusations of communist affiliation. Bolstering George

Houser‘s denial of any CIA link to the ACOA was the breadth of the organization‘s network that included more militant organizations and members. Not only did the ACOA engage the National Student Association in its efforts, but it also worked with the

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the National Student Christian Federation, and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).89 The ACOA collaborated

87 Kevin K. Gaines, American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 48. The sixth of the resolutions proposed at the first ANLCA conference at Columbia University‘s Arden House in 1962 calling for appointments of African Americans to philanthropic foundations was undoubtedly meant to address this issue and was probably suggested by attending members of AMSAC such as James Farmer, John A. Davis, and Mercer Cook. 88 CIA Briefing regarding Foreign Press Reactions to Revelation about CIA, undated, CIA-RDP75- 00001R000100060032-6, FOIA request C02868831. 89 Houser to Paul Booth (SDS), Jim Forman and (SNCC), Bill Minter (NSCF), and others, dated November 1963, requesting support in pressuring U.S. government regarding Southwest Africa before the International Court, ACOA; SAC New York to J. Edgar Hoover, dated 5 March 1965, regarding 211 with the African American Institute established by Horace Mann Bond and William Leo

Hansberry; SNCC, the organization co-founded by Bond‘s son, Julian; and, Hansberry‘s famed militant niece, Lorraine. This flexibility would be invaluable as the black freedom struggle in both the United States and Mozambique took a sharp turn toward violence.

SDS participation in anti-apartheid sit-in at Chase National Bank. Also participating were CORE, SNCC, the National Student Christian Federation, and the Pan African Organization of the Americas. 212

CHAPTER 6: THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND MOZAMBICAN LIBERATION -- THE RADICAL YEARS

The story is often repeated; a moderate leader doesn‘t get the support he needs from the west and is either pushed leftward or removed from power and replaced with more irresponsible elements.1 --Whitney Young, Jr. –

This is certainly as true at home as it is abroad.2 -- Doris E.Saunders commenting on Young‘s statement –

The two opening epigraphs of this chapter by American journalists Whitney Young and

Doris Sanders refer to the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Eduardo

Mondlane. They were not the only journalists who made such comparison. Martin

Luther King, Jr. was cut down by an assassin's bullet in Memphis, Tennessee at 6:01 PM,

4 April 1968. Thousands of miles away, Eduardo Mondlane was killed by a mail bomb in

Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania at 10:45 AM, 3 February 1969. In an article entitled,

―Mondlane – Bringer of Unity,‖ published two days after his death, journalist David

Martin stated that the Mozambican leader ―should be remembered alongside men like

American Civil Rights leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, as a martyr in the fight for human rights.‖3 Reverend Ernest Smith of the World Council of Churches expressed the comparison between the two assassinated leaders most clearly: ―Here were two

Christians deeply committed to freedom and to justice with a profound sense of human

1 Whitney Young, ―To Be Equal,‖ Afro-American, March 15, 1964, 4. 2 Doris Saunders, ―Confetti: Who Leads the People,‖ Chicago Daily Defender (Daily Edition), March 19, 1964, 14. 3 David Martin, ―Mondlane – Bringer of Unity, The Standard (Tanzania), 5 February 1969. George Simpson Papers, RG 30/64, Series 2, Box 2, Eduardo Mondlane folder, OCA. 213 values. Living in danger, they were unafraid. … Living in racial hostilities, they were too great to be hostile. Living amid confusion, they had a vision which delivered light and hope.‖4 This sentiment was echoed again and again in newspapers across the United

States -- the Chicago Daily Defender, Washington Post, the LA Times, and even

Columbus, Ohio‘s Citizen Journal.5 Mondlane was counted among such great leaders as

King and the Kennedy brothers whose untimely deaths had profoundly shaken American society.

Examining other comments by Americans at the time of Mondlane's death provides examples of the appeal of Mondlane and the revolutionary program he established with FRELIMO. Each commentator has his/her own audience and message to convey through Mondlane‘s tragic death. The comparisons of Mondlane with King served to expand the popular images of both men. These writers not only reinforced the idea that Mondlane had adopted American liberal democracy, but expanded the image of

King from one limited to leadership of protest marches in the South to an international stage. They identified the nexus and continuum of the domestic civil rights struggles in

America with the global context and configurations of the modern black freedom struggle for human rights, self-determination, and racial equality. A good example of the synergy in the struggles of black internationalism is attested with Mondlane‘s question at the 1952

National Assembly on African Affairs of whether American Christians thought of

4 ―World Church Leaders Express Shock at Slaying of African Freedom Fighter.,‖ Afro-American, February 15, 1969, 22. 5 ―African Guerilla Chief Assassinated,‖ carried in both the Los Angeles Times and Washington Post, 4 February 1969; Columbus Citizen Journal, 5 February 1969; Louis Martin, ―The Big Parade: Editor Recalls Late African ‗Revolutionist‘,‖ Chicago Daily Defender, 8 February 1969, 3. The article was also printed in the 15 February 1969 edition of the New Pittsburgh Courier, 6. RG 28, Box 724, OCA. 214

Africans as humans, a query repeated in the 1968 declaration by sanitation workers in

Memphis, ―I AM A MAN.‖6

There were other commentators on the Mondlane assassination and how it compared with that of King. Ed Hawley, Mondlane‘s former Oberlin roommate who officiated at his in Tanzania, presents a revealing example. In his eulogy,

Hawley compared his fallen friend not only to King, but also to Malcolm X and Che

Guevara.7 Through this declaration, Hawley brought into question National Urban

League president Whitney Young‘s use of ―moderate‖ when describing these leaders in the epigraph. Hawley concurred with militant young activists, including some in the

New Left and Black Power movements, that there was a single, global, revolutionary struggle for human rights and self-determination being waged in the Third World.8 For some activists fighting for racial equality in the United States, this struggle encompassed both the ―Civil Rights‖ and ―Black Power‖ labels. Some militants who considered themselves ―black internationalists‖ bridged the schism between the liberal and radical aspects of the movement. Mozambican liberation supporters Robert Van Lierop and

Prexy Nesbitt were such examples.

This is not to say that there were not differences in tactics, confrontations, and/or violent contestations within the freedom struggles in both the United States and

Mozambique. In addition to the ideological reasons for conflict, there were generational

6 King was assassinated in Memphis where he had come to support this demonstration by sanitation workers wearing placards declaring their humanity and the rights inherent in that status. 7 Edward Hawley funeral service, RG 30/64, Correspondence, Box 2, Eduardo Mondlane folder, OCA. 8 Max Elbaum, Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao and Che (London: Verso, 2002); James Forman, The Making of Black Revolutionaries, Illustrated ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). 215 and class-based disagreements. Such disputes as those between cultural vs. revolutionary black nationalism are reflected in the commentary about Mondlane‘s assassination by

United Nations correspondent for the Philadelphia Tribune, Charles P. Howard. Howard discussed the conjecture by Africans at the United Nations that Mondlane was assassinated as a result of contentions among factions within FRELIMO.9 These factions included those members seeking more power within the organization who were ideologically aligned with the Soviets, Chinese Communists, or the West. Other factions sought political ascendency for their ethnic groups, or wished to retain the power of the chieftaincy and gender norms, or strove for an exclusive black nationalism in the movement.

Howard noted that these unnamed Africans drew ―a parallel between the strife within Frelimo and the conflicts that have broken out among some black militant groups.‖ He goes on to name specifically the violent disagreements between the Black

Panthers and both SNCC and Maulana Ron Karenga‘s Los Angeles-based cultural nationalist organization, "US‖.10 Such factionalism was also evident in the advocacy organizations supporting independence for the lusophone colonies in Africa, including among members of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA). For example, in the summer of 1967 two ACOA members, Bayard Rustin and Robert S. Browne, debated the efficacy of the strategies of integration or separatism in promoting progress for the black

9 Although unproven, the person most implicated in Mondlane‘s assassination is Lazáro Nkavadame, the leader of MANU who had been accused by FRELIMO Central Committee members of exploiting Makonde cotton cooperative workers for personal gain. It is believed that Nkavadame defected to the Portuguese in order to retain his position among the Makonde. 10 Charles Howard, ―United Nations Report: Dr. Mondlane May Have Been Assassinated by Rival Faction‖, February 15, 1969, 7. 216 community in American society at a public forum sponsored by the National Community

Relations Advisory Council (now Jewish Council for Public Affairs).11

Some of the articles eulogizing Mondlane were both personal and political, placing together under the ―humanist‖ umbrella issues of non-alignment, anti- imperialism, and anti-racialism. It is not surprising that for those Americans who knew him or had heard him speak, Mondlane embodied Mozambique, its colonial past and, most importantly, its potential as an independent nation. To Whitney Young, he was ―an incorruptible individual capable of leading his country out of the shadows of a dying colonialism.‖12 Journalists and policymakers alike understood that Mondlane, as described by David Martin, ―was probably the best known [liberation movement leader] on both sides of the ideological curtain and he tried more seriously than many other leaders to pursue a non-aligned policy, accepting moral and material succor from both

Communist and capitalist, Arab and Jew, black and white.‖13

Herbert Shore, another of Mondlane‘s close American friends, made a similar point when discussing Mondlane‘s funeral. Shore reflected on the fact that, at the end of the ceremony, he witnessed the ambassadors to Tanzania from the United States, Soviet

Union, and the People‘s Republic of China standing and talking together. He commented that Mondlane had promoted such peaceful communications across ideological and political differences. 14 As shown in Chapter 4, during the Kennedy administration, J.

11 Robert S Browne, National Community Relations Advisory Council, and A. Philip Randolph Educational Fund, Separatism or Integration, Which Way for America?: A Dialogue (New York: A. Philip Randolph Educational Fund, 1968). 12 Young, ―To Be Equal,‖ 4. 13 Martin, ―Mondlane – Bringer of Unity.‖ 14 Eduardo Mondlane: Humanism and Revolution, vol. 312, Program of African Studies Lecture Series (Northwestern University, 1972). 217

Wayne Fredericks and other State Department Africanists understood the expediency of

Mondlane‘s position in seeking support from all quarters. The Nixon administration, however, will be shown to have no such tolerance for FRELIMO‘s relationship with communist regimes. As a result, contention against the administration by radical advocates would escalate. All of these disparate reflections on Mondlane, and, through him, the Mozambican liberation movement, are relevant to the examination of the continuities and changes in American activism and U.S. government policy regarding

Mozambique in the 1960s through 1974.

This chapter addresses the role of American activists in their multifarious and determined support for FRELIMO and its struggle for Mozambican independence. It maps out the various strategies used by these activists in furthering their goal. Chief among these support networks was the American Committee on Africa (ACOA).

American Committee on Africa Support of Mozambican Liberation: The Cases of Robert Van Lierop and Prexy Nesbitt

At the moment there is very serious competition for the hearts and minds of black people in the United States over the question of southern Africa. This is linked to the growth of what might be called a transnational dimension to the traditional struggle in any particular country between the haves and have nots. In effect, both sides have begun to see their interests are extending beyond national boundaries. 15 -- Robert Van Lierop (1976) --

Robert Van Lierop was a militant black internationalist inspired by Malcolm X. He expanded his domestic work with such civil rights organizations as SNCC, CORE, and

15 Robert Van Lierop, ―Transnational Dimension,‖ Southern Africa Magazine (unpublished copy, possibly written in 1976). Box 1, Schomburg Center for Research on Black Culture, Southern Africa Collective papers (SC-SAC). 218 the NAACP to support international liberation struggles in Palestine and Mozambique.

Together with fellow ACOA members Robert S. Browne and Prexy Nesbitt, he sought to recharge the Pan-African tradition. He worked with the ACOA and also helped establish a Pan-African Solidarity Committee and African Information Service in Harlem. Nesbitt was an activist key to creating a node of the transnational, anti-colonialism/anti-apartheid network in the Midwest. Both Lierop and Nesbitt were radical black internationalists of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

These men mobilized within the black community. Unlike such revolutionary black nationalists as Imamu Amiri Baraka (formerly LeRoi Jones) and his Congress of

African Peoples (CAP), they also remained connected with progressive white allies.

Separatist CAPs rejected dealing with the United States government for its capitalist, imperialist, and racist policies and strove instead to develop parallel black institutions.

Black internationalists like Van Lierop and Nesbitt, on the contrary, challenged the

United States government in support of the international black freedom struggle both within and outside of the system.16 For example, Van Lierop testified before Congress in support of Mozambican liberation. He also supported the Polaroid Revolutionary

Workers Movement (PRWM) which pressured the Polaroid Corporation to change its sales and employment practices in South Africa. Nesbitt worked for the World Council of Churches Program to Combat Racism. He provided seminars on Southern African liberation for Third World youth and a notorious Chicago street gang, the Blackstone

16 Congress of African Peoples, African Congress; a Documentary of the First Modern Pan-African Congress (New York: Morrow, 1972). This text, edited by Imamu Amiri Baraka, is a compilation of the conference papers, speeches, and resolutions of the September 1970 meeting of the Congress of African Peoples held in Atlanta. 219

Rangers. In short, these young militants were cultural internationalists, working with such organizations as the ACOA and World Council of Churches to promote social justice and racial equality at home and abroad.

Robert Van Lierop began his support of African liberation in 1967 with his attendance at a summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in ,

Zaire. His energies were galvanized by the independence struggle in Mozambique after meeting Eduardo Mondlane in Tanzania during that journey. Van Lierop was impressed by the intellect, character, courage, and determination of the Mozambican nationalist.

The two discussed the need for greater publicity regarding the revolutions taking place in lusophone Africa. As a first step, Van Lierop took leaflets regarding FRELIMO and the

Mozambican revolution which he distributed outside of the OAU summit meeting.

Prior to this 1967 journey to Africa, Van Lierop, as a student at Hofstra

University and New York University Law School, had worked on issues of social justice and racial equality. As a member of the Long Island branch of CORE, he assisted with voter registration drives and advocated for fair housing and fair employment practices in

Nassau County, New York. Van Lierop and fellow activists also enlisted the assistance of the United Auto Workers union to raise money for and transport clothing to African

Americans in the South. He worked with civil rights leader in the Northern

Student Movement, a largely fund-raising branch of the Student Non-Violent

Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in New York.17 This Northern Student Movement was the brainchild of Peter Countryman, then a student at Harvard University. In 1964,

17 Minter, ―Interview of Robert Van Lierop,‖ 16 April 2004, at http://www.noeasyvictories.org/interviews/int07_vanlierop.php, accessed 15 February 2008; Biographical Information, Robert Van Lierop Papers, Box 1, SC-RVL. 220

Countryman enlisted the assistance of Malcolm X and to mobilize support for the Mississippi Freedom Party challenge in such northern cities as Boston,

Chicago, and New York. As recalled by SNCC advocate Fannie Rushing, this expansion of the ―Friends of SNCC‖ in the North ―taught people to come together and connect the local to the national and the national to the global.‖18

Van Lierop was born in Harlem in 1939. The son of immigrants, he had a global understanding. He credits much of his early interest in international matters, particularly his hatred of colonial oppression, to the stories told by his father, a former merchant seaman of Dutch descent from . In addition to his own experiences of seeing the abuse of Chinese rickshaw drivers by United States and the indignities forced upon Indians by the British, the elder Van Lierop passed on tales of his Dutch father‘s combat in the Boer War in South Africa. Van Lierop was one of the many Third

World advocates whose passion for and understanding of resistance to oppression was inflamed by the Cuban and Algerian revolutions in the late 1950s and early 1960s.19

Like many members of the Third World Left, Van Lierop‘s particular interest in

Africa was inspired by Malcolm X‘ 1964 and 1965 Africa tours. These tours included the militant Black Muslim‘s pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj). There he witnessed the solidarity among Muslims of different races. This, alongside the kindness of Saudi Arabian Prince

Faisal, transformed Malcolm X's world view. He derived a new systemic and institutional understanding of racial oppression.20 Malcolm X met with such African leaders as

18 Mike Miller et al., ―Up South Panel Discussion‖ (presented at the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 50th Anniversary Conference, Raleigh, NC, April 15, 2010). 19 Minter, ―Interview‖ and Box 1, Biographical information folder, SC-RVL,. 20 Malcolm X, The Autobiography of Malcolm X, 1st ed. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992), 325-348. 221

President Kwame Nkrumah, as well as expatriate Afro-Americans in Ghana during the first of his two tours of Africa and the Middle East in 1964. These meetings enhanced his

Pan-African understanding.21 His tours included stays in Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria. These tours enabled him to widen his Pan-African identity by including not only black Africans, but also those from the Arab world.22 Afro-American identification with Palestinian liberation is particularly interconnected with the ACOA‘s response to the shifting of the black freedom struggle and Robert Van Lierop‘s decision to travel to war- torn Mozambique in 1971. Just as the 1965 Watts riot violently proclaimed a change in the African American freedom struggle, Malcolm X‘ Africa journeys marked a transitional moment between the advocacy for African liberation by a generation of liberal Negroes and the emerging young militant Afro-American radicals.

An incident which illustrates this socio-cultural shift involves a key founding member of the ACOA. Soon after Malcolm X‘ 1964 trip to Africa, James Farmer also embarked on an African tour as a member of the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA) in order ―to develop a liaison between the new nations of Africa and the civil rights movement in America.‖ In his autobiography, Farmer states that he met with Malcolm X prior to this tour to allay rumors that his trip to Africa was meant to

―counteract‖ the militant‘s tour. 23 Despite the fact that during his trip Farmer severely

21 Gaines, American Africans in Ghana, 190-197. 22 Joseph, Waiting ‗Til the Midnight Hour, 104-106. 23 James L. Farmer, Lay Bare the Heart: An Autobiography of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Arbor House, 1985), 228. 222 criticized the Johnson administration for supplying aircraft to the Tshombe regime in the former Belgian Congo, the rumors endured.24

Malcolm X‘ trip to Africa was not the first time that he had politically connected the struggles of Afro-Americans and Africans. In 1963, he had proposed discussions on

Africa policy with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson,

―both of whom shunned him.‖25 Indeed, the efforts of black militants were not the only foreign policy proposals by black Americans rejected by the Johnson administration.

Involvement with foreign affairs by more moderate Civil Rights Movement advocates was also discouraged by the President who was concerned about ―racial lobbies.‖ For instance, despite the fact that Rusk attended the 1964 ANLCA conference, the implication of the policymaker‘s speech was that African Americans should support the

President‘s work to expand their opportunities as Americans as opposed to their growing focus on African solidarity.26

Malcolm X‘ Africa journey had placed him in a position to develop his own transnational network to fight imperialist exploitation and racial oppression. He was inspired to create a Pan-African non-governmental organization, the Organization of

Afro-American Unity (OAAU) which he modeled after the OAU.27 Malcolm X' short- lived organization, envisioned to be a social, political and economic entity that would

24 Schechter, Dan, Ansara, Michael, and Kolodney, David, ―The CIA as an Equal Opportunity Employer.‖ 25 Henry F Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960 (New York: W. Morrow, 1982), 145. 26 Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 76. 27 ―Organization of Afro-American Unity: A Statement of Basic Aims and Objectives‖ in Malcolm X: The Man and His Times, 1st ed. (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1990), 335-342. 223 link blacks in the United States with Africa, was poised to be a more effective successor to the ANLCA.

Through the OAAU Malcolm X wanted to bridge the growing ideological, generational, and class divisions within the African and Afro-American communities. In his study of this organization, African American Studies scholar and activist William W.

Sales, Jr. contended that ―In creating the OAAU, Malcolm X in the last eleven months of his life cultivated a three-fold constituency: a united front composed of progressive segments of the Black middle-class and activist proletarians in Harlem united around a community-based agenda of activism and struggle against the common forms of ghetto exploitation; allies in Africa and the Third World who could legitimize the international status of his organization; and adherents in the Civil Rights Movement who supported

Malcolm‘s overtures for rapprochement.‖28

The OAAU called upon African Americans to support the FRELIMO-led freedom fighters in Mozambique who had begun armed struggle in September 1964. The assassination of Malcolm X in February 1965 signaled the death of the OAAU. His plan to testify before the United Nations to call for an international investigation into the crimes committed against African Americans (for which he lobbied at a meeting of the

OAU and espoused in his famous ―Ballot or the Bullet‖ speech) was fulfilled by SNCC‘s

James Forman, founder of the Black Manifesto movement.29

Following his graduation from New York University Law School in 1967, Van

Lierop was prepared to heed Malcolm X‘ call for young Afro-Americans to support

28 William W. Sales, Jr., Malcolm X and the Organization of Afro-American Unity (Ann Arbor: U.M.I Dissertation Services, 1994), 236. 29 Hostetter, Movement Matters, 71. 224

African liberation movements. Van Lierop‘s destination was a summit meeting of the

OAU in Kinshasa, Zaire. He followed the links of the transnational network of anti- colonial/anti-apartheid activists, staying with friends in one country who would refer him to their own like-minded friends in another. Thus Van Lierop was able to visit Congo

Brazzaville, Senegal, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania. It was in Kenya and Tanzania that he had his fateful meetings with Eduardo Mondlane.30

Van Lierop first met Eduardo Mondlane at the home of a mutual friend in

Nairobi. Impressed by the charismatic leader whom he described as ―a very captivating and larger than life personality,‖ Van Lierop accepted Mondlane‘s invitation to visit when he traveled from Nairobi to Dar-es-Salaam. He stayed with Eduardo and Janet

Mondlane at the Mozambique Institute. There Van Lierop was inspired by FRELIMO‘s struggle and Mondlane‘s vision.

After returning from his trips to Africa and his first meetings with Mondlane, Van

Lierop became an assistant counsel to the NAACP. In 1968, he assumed the NAACP seat on the executive board of the ACOA, a position that he held for five years. The

ACOA was a well established node of the transnational advocacy network for social justice and racial equality in the United States and Africa. Therefore, this office provided

Van Lierop greater opportunity to increase his advocacy for African liberation.

By the time Van Lierop joined the ACOA, liberal support for the organization had waned. African independence and American aid had not brought democracy or modernization to the continent. Fear of communist infiltration had shifted from Africa,

30 Minter, ―Interview.‖ 225 which by the mid-1960s had largely reached political independence, to Vietnam.31 As a result, the ACOA redoubled its efforts to expand its mobilization within the black community and student movements, as well as to retain its traditional supporters in the churches, trade unions, and other liberal organizations. In a memo to the Executive

Board, executive director George Houser explained the need for broad-based support. He wrote, ―Our strategy must be one of injecting the southern African issues into the program of larger movements and organizations, black and white, liberal and radical.

Thus it is as relevant for us to relate to the NAACP as it is to the Panthers, to the churches and the trade unions as it is to the radical student movement. Which movement we relate to most effectively will depend primarily on what our immediate campaign and project is.‖32

A glance at volumes of Southern Africa: A Monthly Survey of News and Opinion, distributed by the University Christian Movement (May 1967-June 1970) and Southern

Africa Committee in New York (July 1970-April 1983), further reveal the strategies that anti-colonialism/anti-apartheid organizations like the ACOA used to ―inject the Southern

Africa issue into the program of larger movements and organizations.‖ Its May 1969 issue included a call by the prominent New Left organization, Students for a Democratic

Society (SDS), to ―support the guerilla struggle in southern Africa.‖ The

November/December 1970 issue contained a story regarding the socialist revolutionary black nationalist Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement as well as its regular monthly columns ―Churches & Southern Africa‖ and ―At the United Nations,‖ that

31 Staniland, American Intellectuals and African Nationalists, 1955-1970, 100. 32 George Houser to ACOA Executive Board, April 1970, Box 1, ACOA folder, SC-RVL. 226 appealed to less radical subscribers as well as provided valuable information for the militants. 33 Another of its regular columns, ―U.S. Involvement in Portuguese Colonies,‖ featured a diagram of two intersecting circles, one containing a dollar sign and the other a swastika in its header symbolizing the anti-imperialists‘ association of capitalism with fascism. Appearing in the February 1970 issue was an article by the renowned British journalist, author, and Africa historian Basil Davidson that compared troop deployment in Southern Africa to American deployment in Vietnam. That the author represented the

British Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guine and cited a pamphlet distributed by the Dutch Angola Committee shows not only the way in which the movement mobilized anti-Vietnam activists but also the breadth of the international community involved in the transnational network. 34

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Van Lierop was a key active board member who acted as a liaison between the ACOA and the black community. Domestically, Van

Lierop supported progressive African American issues, particularly the integration of educational facilities, a vital challenge for African Americans seeking self-determination.

For example, in November 1968, Van Lierop requested that the State Commissioner of

Education reject a Newburgh, NY plan for the elimination of racial imbalance in the public schools. Van Lierop did not believe that the desegregation plan would achieve

33 Of note is the article appearing in the November/December 1970 (4:11) issue which advised that the World Council of Churches had allocated $200,000 to 19 organizations fighting racism. Of those organizations, 8 were associated with African liberation movements, including $5000 to the Holland Angola Committee and the Dr. Eduardo Mondlane Foundation and $15,000 to the Mozambique Institute. 34 Southern Africa, 3:5 (May 1969), 4:2 (February 1970), and 4:11 (November/December 1970) Temple University Contemporary Cultural Collection. In addition to documents from committees in the United States, including the Committee for a Free Mozambique in New York and in Chicago, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, the catalogue also contains entries for the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa. 227 reasonable racial balance throughout the public school system. He felt that there should be more input from the African American community in the form of a ―citizens‖ advisory group and that the single black member of the Board of Education that proposed the plan was not enough representation.35 More significantly, in April-May 1968, and again in

April 1969, Van Lierop represented Afro-American students involved in protests at

Columbia University. 36

A detailed discussion of the Columbia uprising is outside the scope of this study.

However, it is significant that this multifaceted demonstration on 23 April 1968 integrated the radical anti-war activism of SDS with the radical black nationalist struggle of the Students‘ Afro-American Society (SAS) on Columbia‘s campus. Impetus for the demonstrations were many but included the refusal of Columbia‘s president, Grayson

Kirk, to accept student participation in university administration, on-campus recruitment by the United States Marines and CIA; and the proposed further expansion of the university, a perceived bastion of white privilege, into the Harlem area.

One of the spokesmen for SAS, Bill Sales, then a graduate student of International

Affairs, connected the local to the global in a speech embodying the revolutionary zeitgeist of 1968. Sales shouted, ―…if you‘re talking about identifying with the

35 ―NAACP Would Nix School Plan,‖ New York Amsterdam News, 30 November 1968, 30. This article was also printed in the 17 December 1968 edition of the Chicago Daily Defender, 7. 36 Sylvan Fox, ―Columbia Police on Negroes Cancel Strike,‖ New York Times, 17 April 1969, 42. This article provides insight regarding the interactions among black and white radicals and officials in support of Houser‘s observation regarding the rift between the white and black movements. The article states that a strike by black students had been supported by SDS; however, it appeared that the students had been misinformed about another demonstration by high school students scheduled to be held at Columbia University and cancelled the strike. The university‘s vice president for public affairs and other university officials ―were emphatic in making distinctions between the protest by black students which they identified as focused on legitimate issues and justifiable grievances, and the SDS protests which they consider ‗disruption for its own sake. The black students are not playing games of revolution for their own gratification. They are not suburbanites playing .‘.‖ 228

Vietnamese struggle, if you‘re talking about supporting German students, you don‘t need to go to Rockefeller Center …There‘s one oppressor—in the White House, in Low

Library, in Albany, NY. You strike a blow at the gym [to be built in Harlem], you strike a blow for the Vietnamese people.‖ He continued to interweave the local protest and anti-war struggle with the transnational black liberation struggle. ―You strike a blow at the gym and you strike a blow against the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

You strike a blow at Low Library and you strike a blow for the freedom fighters in

Angola, Mozambique, , Zimbabwe, South Africa.‖37

The demonstration that began with the 23 April rally escalated through April and

May when an estimated 800 student protestors had occupied five Columbia buildings.38

That the global perspective was maintained is evidenced by a photo in Up against the Ivy

Wall: A History of the Columbia Crisis published in 1969 and written by the staff of the

Columbia Daily Spectator. The photograph is of students standing on a ledge of the

Mathematics building beside a long banner proclaiming the occupied buildings as

―Liberated Zones,‖ the term used by FRELIMO to designate the northern provinces that, by 1968, the guerilla forces claimed to be under their control. Among the Afro-American demonstrators was Political Science doctoral student Prexy Nesbitt who, though not a member, had joined the protest by SAS students in Hamilton Hall. Nesbitt met Robert

37 Jerry L Avorn, Up Against the Ivy Wall; a History of the Columbia Crisis, 1st ed. (New York: Atheneum Press, 1969), 48. 38 New York Civil Liberties Union, Police on Campus: The Mass Police Action at Columbia University, Spring, 1968 (New York: New York Civil Liberties Union, 1969), 11. 229

Van Lierop on 30 April, when the civil rights attorney volunteered to represent the Afro-

American students occupying Hamilton.39

It was in the aftermath of this crisis that Nesbitt was impelled to Tanzania and his work on behalf of FRELIMO. Weeks after his arrest, Nesbitt‘s Columbia Faculty

Fellowship was withdrawn and he could no longer afford to remain at the university.

Nesbitt recalls decades later that it was within a week of his withdrawal from Columbia that he was drafted. In protesting being drafted to fight in the Vietnam War, Nesbitt fled to Tanzania in order to fight for Mozambican liberation.

After spending several weeks in London where he worked with Basil Davidson,

Polly Gaston, and the British Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and

Guiné, Nesbitt arrived at the Mozambique Institute. After expressing to the leadership of

FRELIMO his desire to fight, he was asked, ―Prexy, how is your Tsonga? How is your

Shona? How is your Makua? You can‘t do anything for us.‖ Mondlane stressed that part of FRELIMO‘s nation-building project required that only Mozambicans fight for

Mozambican liberation, a philosophical understanding that differentiated FRELIMO from other lusophone African nationalist movements.40 Instead of fighting in the guerilla war, Nesbitt took part in the rhetorical battle being waged against the Portuguese, working with FRELIMO Information Secretary Jorge Rebelo to write and edit

39 Ibid., 29. Police on Campus confirms Van Lierop‘s participation in the Columbia Crisis, reporting that he met 30 members of the Tactical Patrol Force as they arrived at 2:20 AM on 30 April 1968 to arrest the 83 black students in Hamilton. 40 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 87 and 227. One of the disputes between Eduardo Mondlane and Che Guevara was Mondlane‘s refusal to accept Cuban training of FRELIMO within Dar-es-Salaam or Mozambique. Mondlane also rejected Guevara‘s theory which he believed was not suited to Mozambique. Guevara believed that Mondlane exaggerated FRELIMO‘s military prowess against the Portuguese. Although it was probably true that Mondlane exaggerated, he also included as Portuguese casualties the black Mozambicans killed who served in the or for the PIDE. 230

Mozambique Revolution, and supporting the Mozambique Institute at a key juncture in

FRELIMO‘s history.

A major moment of dissension within FRELIMO resulted, in part, from a dispute between Mondlane and Mozambican students studying in the United States in 1967-1968.

The students were members of the National Union of Mozambican Students (UNEMO), an organization established in 1961 by Mondlane, Joaquim Chissano, and João Nhambiu to enable Mozambican students overseas to publicize the national liberation struggles of

Mozambique and to solicit scholarships for other Mozambicans. In 1967, Mondlane called upon UNEMO students who had completed their undergraduate studies to return to

Mozambique to be ―re-educated‖ through participation in the liberation struggle. Some of the students, however, wished to attain graduate degrees, as Mondlane himself had done.41 This dispute, in which the students defended their position with a personal attack on Eduardo and Janet Mondlane, was but one aspect of a power struggle that was taking place within FRELIMO. The dispute was instigated by an administrator at the

Mozambique Institute Father Mateus Gwenjere and FRELIMO Vice-President Uria

Simango.

In an August 2009 interview with the author, Nesbitt related that Gwenjere and

Simango were espousing an exclusive black nationalism, a race hate contrary to

Mondlane‘s non-racialist doctrine. Nesbitt‘s view is confirmed and expanded upon by

Mondlane‘s successor, Samora Machel who, in 1971 wrote of this incident, ―Having

41 Douglas L. Wheeler, ―A Document for the History of African Nationalism: A Frelimo ‗White Paper‘ by Dr. Eduardo C. Mondlane (1920-1969),‖ African Historical Studies 2, no. 2 (1969): 319-333; Douglas L. Wheeler, ―A Document for the History of African Nationalism: The Unemo ‗White Paper‘ of 1968, a Student Reply to Eduardo Mondlane‘s 1967 Paper,‖ African Historical Studies 3, no. 1 (1970): 169-180. 231 infiltrated its spies among us, the enemy fostered [among the students of the Mozambique

Institute] tribalism, racism, selfishness, ambition, elitism, ignorance, superstition, religious fanaticism and corruption.‖42 Nesbitt explained that Mondlane and FRELIMO had taught him not to base his politics on race, and stressed that the enemy of the

Mozambican people was not the Portuguese, but the system of colonialism. He had personally been approached by Simango who attacked Eduardo Mondlane‘s marriage to

Janet, a marriage that the Mozambican did not know had taken place in Nesbitt‘s family‘s church in Chicago. Simango also did not know that Eduardo and Janet had in the early

1950s been welcomed into the home of Nesbitt‘s aunt and uncle.

Nesbitt continued to relate that it was his time in Dar-es-Salaam that distanced him from the revolutionary black nationalism pronounced by the Black Power movement.

He rejected the Black Power label, preferring instead to be considered a black internationalist.43 Sadly, his tenure in Dar-es-Salaam ended in the wake of Eduardo

Mondlane‘s assassination and the controversy surrounding the leadership of FRELIMO that resolved with the ascension of Samora Machel to the presidency. He returned to the

United States at the moment when Eduardo Mondlane was being recognized as an international revolutionary hero.

To say that Nesbitt eschewed the Black Power label does not mean that he also rejected key tenets of the Black Power movement. As will be seen in later sections,

Nesbitt was a black radical who participated in the community-organizing tradition and was devoted to building capacity within the poor and working-class neighborhoods of

42 Samora Machel, Mozambique: Sowing the Seeds of Revolution (Harare: Zimbabwe Pub. House, 1981), 46. 43 Prexy Nesbitt telephone interview with author, 3 August 2009. 232

Chicago. He used the mobilizing methods honed by SNCC in the South in the early

1960s which became a hallmark of the movement. Upon his return to the United States in January 1970, Nesbitt was hired as the Chicago field organizer for the ACOA. Shortly after his arrival, Nesbitt, Van Lierop, and two other African Americans working for the

ACOA -- New York organizer Blyden Jackson, and Washington, DC director Charles

Hightower – instigated an identity crisis within the organization. ACOA had been established to promote African liberation by supporting democratic nationalist leadership and projects, but was now involved with radical movements both domestically and on the continent. The pressure by the African American staff and radical Board members was successful in part because of the shift in the population being mobilized by the ACOA, but also due to the drastic changes in the political environment.

American Committee on Africa Support of Mozambican Liberation: The Nixon Administration “Tilt” and a Shifting Repertoire of Contention

By 1970, the ACOA was experiencing financial difficulties, and it had lost all leverage with the White House. In 1969, the FBI investigation of the organization was renewed.

Added to the suspicion of communist affiliation was a concern that the ACOA was involved with militant black nationalists. The Bureau also requested that the Internal

Revenue Bureau investigate the African Defense and Aid Fund, specifically because of its support of the Mozambican representative to the United Nations, Sharfudine Khan.44

44 Regarding the concern with militant black nationalism, see FBI memo regarding William Clinton Kemp, 26 May 1969, FBI. Regarding IRS involvement, see IRS to FBI memo captioned ―The African Defense and Aid Fund of the American Committee on Africa RA – Angola-Mozambique,‖ 26 January 1970. James Forman relates a similar story of SNCC‘s harassment by the IRS in 1966 in Forman, The Making of Black Revolutionaries, 471-475. 233

These actions coincided with the major change in U.S.-southern Africa foreign policy associated with the Nixon administration. Beginning in April 1969, President

Nixon ordered a policy review regarding southern Africa. In December, at a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), papers outlining five possible policy options – particularly regarding South Africa – were presented. Options 4 and 5 called for stronger confrontation with the white-dominated regimes of Southern Africa, but were never seriously considered. Option 3, supported by the career Africanists in the State

Department, called for the continuation of the Kennedy-Johnson approach of rhetorical attacks on apartheid, arms embargoes and limited official involvement. Option 1, reminiscent of Dean Acheson‘s advice to President Kennedy regarding South Africa, suggested treating South Africa like any other sovereign state, irrespective of its internal affairs. The second choice was advanced by Roger P. Morris, NSC specialist on Africa; it received the support of Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.

Called the ―Communication View‖ by its proponents and the ―Tar-baby Option‖ by its critics, this National Security Survey Memorandum (NSSM 39) advocated the ―easing of the arms embargoes on South Africa and Portugal, a weakening of sanctions against

Rhodesia, and increased economic and political contacts with the government of South

Africa.‖ Such view was based on the theory that friendly persuasion would more likely lead to reforms than confrontation.45 Nixon enunciated the new program in his ―State of the World‖ message in Feb, 1970. It was implemented soon thereafter.46

45 Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, 239. 46 Memo from Roger Morris (NSC) to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, 13 May 1969; U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace: A Report to Congress by President Richard 234

This so-called ―tilt‖ toward the white supremacist regimes of southern Africa was also reflected in the Nixon administration‘s relationship with Portugal. Chapter 4 showed that the Kennedy administration had adopted an overt foreign policy that supported

Portugal while, at the same time, it exerted pressure on the Salazar regime to prepare its colonies for independence. It also covertly supported African nationalists in Angola and

Mozambique. But in March 1969, all contact with FRELIMO and Holden Roberto in

Angola was terminated. In April, Nixon made his departure from the Kennedy policy explicit in a meeting with Portuguese Foreign Minister Franco Noguiera at the White

House shortly before Noguiera‘s resignation. Nixon advised the foreign minister to ―Just remember, I‘ll never do to you what Kennedy did.‖47 Indeed, the Nixon administration both overtly and covertly supported the new Portuguese dictator, , who came to power when Antonío Salazar fell ill in 1968 and then passed away in September

1970.

In March 1970, Secretary of State William Rogers outlined a statement, more detailed than the February report to Congress, regarding the Nixon administration‘s foreign policy in Africa. Regarding the Portuguese colonies, Rogers specifically noted the 1961 arms embargo adopted by the Kennedy administration which the Nixon administration would continue to uphold.48 It did not.

A series of memorandums was sent in June and July 1970 from U.S. Ambassador to Portugal Ridgway Knight to Secretary of State Rogers regarding the sale of Boeing

Nixon, 18 February 1970, FRUS 1969-1976, Volume 5, documents 4 and 7; David Robinson, ―Alternatives to Nixon Policy on Southern Africa,‖ 1972 American Committee on Africa draft briefing paper. 47 Quoted in Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 112. 48 Letter from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, 26 March 1970, FRUS 1969-1976, Volume E- 5, Document 11. 235

707s to Portugal. These memorandums reveal that the U.S. State Department understood that the Portuguese government would be purchasing the planes for eventual use by the

Portuguese Air Force. According to a 16 June memo, Rogers met with the new

Portuguese Foreign Minister Rui Patricio and advised that the United States ―would have trouble with African nations if we sold Boeing 707s to the .‖ The

Secretary suggested that instead ―the sale be made to Portuguese commercial airline TAP and that TAP in turn could sell the same number of used equipment to the Air Force.‖

The Portuguese Secretary for Air Nascimento was consulted by Patricio, who was dealing directly with Boeing, so that arrangements could be made for the Civil Air

Division (―Direccao Geral de Aeronautica Civil‖) to purchase the planes. Additionally,

Patricio consulted the State Department seeking assurances that the U.S. would sell spare parts for planes in the future. In mid-July ―State expressed concurrence in sale of new

Boeing 707s with explicit recognition of the fact that these aircraft might later be leased or transferred to PAF.‖49 Portugal also bought Bell helicopters used for agricultural spraying of herbicides (e.g. Agent Orange) in southern Africa.50

Another point made in Rogers‘ March letter regarding U.S. policy was an assurance that the United States would abide by the United Nations trade sanctions against Rhodesia. As early as October 1969, however, the administration was aware of a

U.S. company scheduled to be tried by the U.S. Justice Department on criminal charges

49 Memos from Ridgway Knight to Secretary of State (Rogers), 16 June – 24 July 1970, NSC Country Files – Portugal (1969-1971), Box 701, Folder 2, Nixon Presidential Library, College Park. 50 Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 122. 236 in violation of those sanctions.51 As detailed by former National Security Advisor

Anthony Lake, the United States became one of only three members of the United

Nations to violate the 1966 call for economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. A year earlier, 's white-minority regime of Southern Rhodesia had illegally declared its UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) from Great Britain by excluding the black African majority population. Despite the fact that UDI violated international law, the United States Congress passed the Byrd amendment in 1971which called for the importation of chrome, ferrochrome, and nickel from Southern Rhodesia, ostensibly to save the U.S. stainless steel industry.52 Congressmen Charles Diggs and

John Conyers, members of the Congressional Black Caucus, and the ACOA challenged the legality of the Amendment. Nevertheless, the amendment was upheld on 31 October

1972 on the grounds that the President, with the support of Congress, has the right to violate treaties. Of interest is the point made by the court that Rhodesia was not a communist country, therefore making the violation of the sanctions tenable.53

The fight against the Byrd Amendment reflects the shift in tactics by the anti- colonial/anti-apartheid activists from pressuring the executive branch to focus more on the legislature. It also reveals some of the reasons for the ACOA‘s drive to mobilize the

51 Memo from Helmut Sonnenfeldt (NSC) to Kissinger, 31 October 1969 with subject, ―Relations with Portugal – State Taking a Collision Course.‖ Memo details situation in which an American company, Muller Co., had imported chrome after the imposition of sanctions, but offered fraudulent Portuguese documents to the Justice Department stating that the chrome had entered Mozambique prior to the sanctions. 52 See United Nations Resolution 253 [1968], Section 3(a) that calls for all member states to ―prevent the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Southern Rhodesia …‖ quoted in Anthony Lake, The ―Tar Baby‖ Option: American Policy toward Southern Rhodesia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 290. 53 Copy of the Decision in United States District Court Case No. 470F.2d461 available from Public Resources.org at < http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/470/470.F2d.461.72-1642.html>, accessed 6 January 2009. 237 black community on behalf of southern Africa. When the ACOA began its efforts to influence U.S. Africa policy, there were two black Congressmen, both of whom supported its antiapartheid agenda. In 1969, there were nine founding members of the

Congressional Black Caucus, including Michigan‘s Charles Diggs who had become the

Chairman of the House Sub-committee on Africa. Through greater African American access to higher education, the growth of the black press, and access of blacks to mass media, activists in the black community had more means to get their ideas heard than those of early civil rights activists.54

On 19 March 1970, Van Lierop testified before Congressman Diggs‘

Subcommittee on Africa. This was the ―first presentation of a Pan Africanist viewpoint in an official setting.‖55 Van Lierop stated that there was an active, growing, and informed anti-colonial/anti-apartheid movement in the United States.56 He pointed out how the movement could be used against the Nixon administration that was under siege by anti-

Vietnam activism.57 As an example, he reported on $35.5 millions in arms sales to South

54 speech in the documentary Nationtime, Gary, Dir. William Greaves, Narr. Sidney Poitier and Harry Belafonte, Perf. Amiri Baraka, Mayor Richard Hatcher, Jesse Jackson, et al. (New York: Your World Video, Inc, 1986). 55 Memo from Charles Hightower of the ACOA Washington office to Robert Van Lierop, dated 11 March 1970. Also appearing before the Subcommittee was the first leader of the PAIGC, Amílcar Cabral. In response to the questioning of Congressman Morse regarding South African support of Portugal, Cabral acknowledges South African troops in Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands. Congressman Dewinski (D- ILL) interrogated Cabral regarding PAIGC sympathy with the Viet Cong and Cuba. When asked if he would set up a , Cabral replied, ―We are fighting for a democratic state, one that will protect the rights of all the people without segregation, and without racism.‖ 56 The masthead for the Pan African Solidarity Committee include many illustrious Pan Africanists, activists and intellectuals, including Robert S. Browne, , Ossie Davis, Ruby Dee, C.L.R. James, Julian Mayfield, Betty Shabazz, Sam Anderson, St. Clair Bourne, and William W. Sales, Jr. Letter from Robert Van Lierop to Francisca V. Portela, United Nations Correspondent for Prensa Latina, 14 July 1970, SC-RVL. 57 Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1976), 385. Hodgson reports that November 1969 was the month in which the strength of the peace movement seemed to reach its peak and, on 3 November 1969, Nixon delivered his famous appeal to the silent majority. On 15 238

Africa from 1962-1968 in violation of the arms embargo instated by the Kennedy administration.

His most extensive testimony was on the situation in Mozambique and

FRELIMO‘s liberation of the Niassa and Cabo Delgado provinces. This information was provided to contradict Portuguese reports that FRELIMO had made no progress in its insurrection and that Portugal remained firmly in control of the entire country. Van

Lierop also protested American support of a proposal to build the Cabora Bassa Dam for a hydroelectric plant in southern Mozambique that would supply power to the oppressive regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa.58

Van Lierop informed the House subcommittee on the strategic importance of

Mozambique to Rhodesia, providing the landlocked country with an outlet to the Indian

Ocean. Mozambique was also vital to South Africa because of its deep harbors that shipped minerals from the mines in the Transvaal. More importantly, Mozambique was the source of labor for those mines. Van Lierop pointed out that the wages for the

Mozambican miners were not paid directly to them, but to the Portuguese government.59

Finally, he advised the subcommittee that the Portuguese government was in the unenviable position of having to balance its fight against black African nationalists, the discontent of its own colonists that resisted any efforts at liberalization, and South

November 1969, peace activists held a Moratorium demonstration with hundreds of thousands of participants. 58 An article in Southern Africa magazine reported that an American development company was lending Portugal $28 million for the construction. Additionally, the South African government would provide $49 million in the first four years of commercial operation of the dam ―The Portuguese Territories,‖ Southern Africa 3:11(November 1969), 23. 59 Robert Van Lierop draft testimony attached to Hightower 11 March 1970 memo, SC-RVL. 239

Africa‘s economic connection with Mozambique.60 Despite increased support from the

Nixon administration, the Portuguese New State regime would soon collapse under these many pressures.

Congressman Diggs stated that a review of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa was warranted in light of America‘s own self-interest. It is the leverage of the transnational advocacy network on behalf of African liberation that he applied when he wrote that

―U.S. self-interest is dramatized by the presence in our midst of over 25 million black citizens who are increasingly identifying with their cultural heritage and who are on the threshold of linking up with the goals of the African liberation movement. Once the struggle becomes internationalized in this fashion they may also expect support from their traditional allies in the labor movement, on the campuses, among the churches, and other liberal elements.‖ He continues, ―This will also give impetus to Africanists, foreign policy organizations, and the thousands of returned Peace Corps volunteers with interest in Africa. The activation of this kind of constituency is much nearer than many of our policymakers realize.‖61

60 It is important to note the Portuguese response to the considerable case built against it by the various social movements involved with African liberation. Africa Report printed a copy of an address delivered by Dr. Alberto Franco Nogueira, Foreign Minister of Portugal, at the National Press Club in Washington, DC on November 8, 1967. His rhetoric was eerily reminiscent of the justification for the enslavement of Africans used by Southern American slaveholders in the 19th century. The speech is rife with denials, paternalism, and accusations against outside agitators. For instance, he boldly states: ―Economic exploitation, race discrimination, cultural and social segregation have always been opposed by us during our centuries-old history in the African continent.‖ Later, he remarks: ―Africa has become the victim of the struggle for power in the world at large, of the cold war, each bloc wanting to deny Africa to the other more than to really care about African interests.‖ He goes on to show how the granting of African independence has been a failure, in part because Africans were not prepared for freedom. However, he denies that a large part of this failure was attributable to the exploitation, underdevelopment, and oppression suffered by Africans under colonialism. ―The View from Lisbon,‖ Africa Report, November 1967, 56-57. 61 Congressman Charles Diggs, Report of the Special Study Mission to Southern Africa, Report No. 91-610, 6 November 1969. Van Lierop was also one of the Ad Hoc Committee of Afro-Americans Concerned about U.S. Policy in Africa that published an ―Open Letter to the President of the United States‖ calling for 240

Diggs was not the only one who expressed these sentiments. In October 1969,

Winston Lord, aide to Kissinger and member of the NSC Planning Committee, had sent the National Security Advisor a memo asking that he consider the interrelationship between domestic and foreign policy, particularly regarding African Americans. Lord stated, ―We have long passed the time when we thought we could segregate foreign and domestic policies. One need only cite Vietnam, the scrutiny of the defense budget and foreign commitments in the glare of our domestic problems, and the pressures generated by television pictures of starving children in Biafra.‖ 62

Like Diggs, Lord anticipated the greater integration of the Black Power and student movements evidenced by such events as the Columbia crisis and pointed out that

―There are strong indications that during the next few years our policy toward Southern

Africa will loom as one of the most volatile foreign issues in terms of domestic public opinion.‖ [emphasis in the original] He continued, ―This administration already is in trouble on its civil rights policy at home. To move closer, or to appear to move closer, to the racist regimes of southern Africa will reverberate domestically and reinforce doubts about the commitment to racial justice in our own society.‖ His conclusion echoes

Diggs‘ statement. ―There will thus be heightened consciousness both of African heritage and of the U.S. Government posture toward the continent. Regular, as well as subterranean, media in the cities are already increasing black knowledge of these problems which traditionally have been the concern of white liberals. These currents

the Nixon administration to end support for Portuguese colonialism and South African Apartheid. New York Times, 13 December 1970, 197. 62 Memo Winston Lord to Henry A. Kissinger, 21 October 1969, NSC Country Files-Africa-OAU, Nixon Presidential Library, College Park. 241 flow at a time of renewed alliances between black and white militants, when the Black

Panthers, for example, explore cooperation not only with the NAACP, but even with whites. Ideology, as much as race, will be the source of pressure from radicals and liberals in the future.‖63 Van Lierop‘s testimony regarding planned activities by the Pan-

African Solidarity Committee (of which he was a founding member) in support of

African and African American unity was corroborated by these statements of Diggs and

Lord.

The efforts by Diggs and the ACOA, however, had little impact on the Nixon

White House policy toward Portugal or southern Africa. The rapprochement between the

United States and Portugal was cemented by the renewal of the Azores agreement on 9

December 1971. In return for use of the Lajes airbase for three years, the U.S. made

$436.5 million in credits available to Portugal, including $400 million of loans and guarantees through the Export-Import Bank and $36.5 million in commodities, ―non- military excess equipment,‖ education, and other items. The $400 million was eight times what Portugal received from the Export-Import Bank during the entire 1946-70 period and more than all loans to the entire African continent since 1946.64

The unpopularity of the Vietnam War and skepticism of the ideology of containment of communism challenged Nixon's foreign policy. What historian Robert

David Johnson calls the ―new internationalists‘ Congress,‖ rose up in "foreign aid revolt.‖ For instance, in 1972 Senator Clifford Case, a strong critic of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, introduced an amendment to the War Powers Act denying funds to

63 Memo Winston Lord to Henry A. Kissinger, 21 October 1969, NSC Country Files-Africa-OAU, Nixon Presidential Library, College Park. 64 Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 122-123. 242 implement the agreements on the Azores and military bases as executive agreements. He wanted them to be treated instead as treaties subject to Congressional review.65 Both George Houser and Robert Van Lierop testified at the 2 February 1972

Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the amendment.66 The President‘s veto of the Act was subsequently overturned by Congress, and the War Powers Act passed in

October 1973.67

The activism of Van Lierop and Nesbitt also illustrates another change in the methods used by anti-colonial/anti-apartheid advocates. Beginning in the late 1960s,

Afro-American and New Left radicals began demonstrating against such multinational corporations as Gulf Oil and Polaroid, banks, and universities which invested in southern

Africa. These activists had some success when appealing to what they perceived as the moral responsibility of these corporate citizens. In November 1970, Van Lierop wrote a letter to Edwin Land, President of Polaroid Corporation, in support of the Polaroid

Revolutionary Workers Movement (PRWM) which began an antiapartheid campaign against the corporation on 5 October 1970. On that day, the ten thousand employees at the Polaroid corporate headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts arrived to find the walls covered with mimeographed sheets stating, ―POLAROID IMPRISONS BLACK

65 Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 192; Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 190. 66 27 January 1972 ACOA Executive Board Minutes, ACOA. 67 Significantly, the Nixon administration demonstrated the continued usefulness of the Azores when it used the Lajes airbase in mid-October 1973 to supply emergency military aircraft to Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Before a new agreement could be negotiated, on 25 April 1974, the Armed Forces Movement overthrew Prime Minister Marcello Caetano and ended the Estado Novo. 243

PEOPLE IN 60 SECONDS,‖ an acerbic twist on corporate advertising of the Polaroid camera‘s ability to produce instant photographs. 68

The object of PRWM‘s protest was the sale of Polaroid film and its newest industrial product, the ID-2, to South Africa. The PRWM alleged that these products were being used in producing passbooks for black South Africans and enforcing apartheid. The corporation stated that the ID-2 was primarily used for making student identification cards and drivers licenses. Though the technology could be used for making passbooks, South African authorities denied such application. The PRWM, nonetheless, promoted a boycott of Polaroid products and demanded that the corporation end its trade with South Africa. In solidarity with the PRWM, Prexy Nesbitt was arrested while demonstrating against Polaroid at the International Amphitheatre in Chicago.

Polaroid‘s investment in South Africa was small, just $1.5 million out of $550 million in annual sales, and it prided itself as a progressive corporation. Therefore, in response to the PRWM‘s protest and the press coverage that it received, Polaroid created a fourteen-member committee (seven black and seven white employees) to study the issue. On 12 January 1971, the company announced a press conference and placed full- page advertisements in major newspapers regarding its proposed actions. It explained that its actions were not in response to the PRWM demonstration, but that Polaroid

―react[ed] to the question‖ raised by the protest. The corporate spokesman stated that

Polaroid was ―beginning an experiment in social action‖ that included pressuring

Polaroid affiliates in South Africa to dramatically increase the salaries of their black employees and by aiding education for Blacks. This educational aid included providing

68 Robert C. Maynard, The Washington Post, 17 January 1971, B2, Box 1, SC-SAC. 244 funding for the black-run Association for Education and Cultural Advancement, donating a monetary gift to a foundation to underwrite educational expenses for about 500 black students from elementary school through university, grants to assist teachers, and support for two exchange fellowships for Blacks under the U.S.-South African Leadership

Exchange Program. The crowning achievement of the PRWM protest was that the corporation also explained that it would discontinue sales to the South African government.69

The American Committee on Africa Support for Mozambican Liberation: Israel, Palestine, and the Road to A Luta Continua

The death of Eduardo Mondlane in February 1969, the Nixon ―tilt,‖ the revived Pan-

Africanism of the Afro-American left, and its sporadic alliances with the New Left all precipitated changes in the mobilization and tactics of contention of the ACOA.

Mondlane‘s assassination was a devastating blow to all of those members of the ACOA who had known him. This was evidenced by the ACOA memorial services held at the

Church Center for the United Nations in New York and in Washington, DC on 13

February 1969. Whether FRELIMO would survive his death was uncertain, especially when a triumvirate consisting of Marcelinos dos Santos, Uria Simango, and Samora

Machel was chosen to lead the organization. However, Simango, who continued to sow dissension within the organization in his quest for sole leadership, was expelled in 1970.

Samora Machel, former military commander-in-chief, rose to the presidency. That

Machel shared Mondlane‘s vision for Mozambique was quickly apparent, and the ACOA

69 Maynard, B3. Washington Post article does not include information regarding corporate sales which is mentioned in a 31 January 1971 Boston Globe piece, SC-SAC. 245 continued to focus much of its advocacy on behalf of FRELIMO. Surprisingly, it was not issues related to Africa that led the organization to a reassessment of its priorities and rededication to southern African liberation. The catalyst was the Israeli- Palestinian conflict.

On 28 June 1970, the A. Philip Randolph Institute sponsored a full-page ad in the

New York Times entitled ―Appeal by Black Americans for United States Support to

Israel.‖ This advertisement called for U.S. support in promoting peace in the Middle East by facilitating negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The signers pointed out that Israel was the most democratic nation in the Middle East and that most Arab countries were autocratic, with much of their populations living in abject poverty. They wrote, ―…the income from oil has been used to sustain wealthy sheikdoms – and often terrorist organizations as well – but rarely to relieve the suffering of the poor.‖ They went on to refute the arguments of militant Afro-Americans that the conflict could be defined in simplistic racial terms, giving examples of Arab oppression of black Sudanese and

Israeli foreign aid to African nations. This ad was signed by a host of black political, trade union, business and civic leaders, including such former and then current members of the ACOA as Congressman Charles Diggs, Bayard Rustin, A. Philip Randolph,

Dorothy Height, Roy Wilkins, and Frank Montero.70

These ―moderate‖ black Americans were largely middle-class activists from the early years of the black freedom struggle and the ACOA. This class and generational

70 ―An Appeal by Black Americans for United States Support to Israel,‖ New York Times, June 28, 1970. SNCC was one of the first Afro-American organizations to criticize Israel with an article, entitled ―The Palestine Problem,‖ by Ethel Minor published in the July 1967 edition of the SNCC newsletter. This article caused a flurry of accusations from Jewish organizations that the black community was anti-Semitic. 246 divide which plagued the wider struggle for racial equality and social justice could be seen in anti-colonial/anti-apartheid activism. Notwithstanding this larger trend, there were such notable exceptions as renowned Africanist and pioneer of African American

Studies St. Claire Drake‘s workshop at a 1970 CAP conference regarding Independent

Black Institutions and Robert S. Browne‘s co-founding of the Pan-African Solidarity

Committee. Browne's accomplishments included his debate with Bayard Rustin on behalf of Afro-American separation, his1969 establishment of the Black Economic Research

Center, and his 1971 creation of the 21st Century Foundation to promote black economic self-determination.

In response to the "Appeal," Charles Hightower, the young director of the

ACOA‘s Washington office, sent letters to some of the signatories criticizing their support for a ―settler colony‖ with economic and ideological ties to South Africa. This response caused a schism between Hightower, Nesbitt, Van Lierop, and Blyden Jackson

(field organizer in New York and New Jersey), on the one hand, and the ACOA Steering

Committee, on the other. The Steering Committee chastised Hightower for expressing a personal opinion using his ACOA title. In September 1970, Nesbitt confronted the

Executive Board regarding this matter and the difficulties faced by the Afro-American organizers in the black community asked to represent an organization headed by a white executive director. Furthermore, in the year following the Ramparts publication of ―The

CIA is an Equal Opportunity Employer,‖ the ACOA was suspected of receiving funding from the CIA. Increasing this suspicion was the ACOA‘s continuing support for UPA leader Holden Roberto although, according to Nesbitt, the MPLA was the most viable

247 liberation movement in Angola. Nesbitt and the others, surprisingly, were joined by

ACOA long-time president Peter Weiss in questioning the political stance of the ACOA.

He stated his willingness to step down to be replaced by a black leader. Weiss clarified, however, that the ACOA was not itself a ―movement organization,‖ but a resource to guide, support and facilitate the funding of appropriate organizations and projects.

By mid-1971, the ACOA had decided to support the MPLA exclusively in

Angola. It invited MPLA president Agostinho Neto, PAIGC president Amílcar Cabral, and ANC leader Oliver Tambo for speaking tours in the United States. Executive Board members A. Philip Randolph, Frank Montero, and William Scheinman were moved to the national committee, while such activist legislators as Bella Abzug, Charles Rangel,

Shirley Chisholm and Ronald Dellums were nominated as new members to that committee.

Nesbitt continued advocacy in the Chicago area. He arranged for Joaquim

Chissano and Armando Guebuza, future presidents of an independent Mozambique, as well as UN representative Sharfudine Khan, to meet with the Black Panthers, including

Bobby Rush, current Illinois Congressman. He also offered ACOA resources to the

League of Revolutionary Black Workers in Detroit. The ACOA became affiliated with such ―movement organizations‖ as the African Liberation Committee in New York and the Chicago Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique, and Guiné.

Although the organization decided that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was outside of the purview of the ACOA, some of its member continued to advocate for Palestinian liberation.

248

On November 1, 1970, Hightower, Van Lierop, and Lydia Williams of the ACOA were in the company of such Black Power advocates as Robert F. Williams, Rev. Albert

Cleage, Grace and James Boggs, Askia Muhammad Touré, and Francis Beal who signed a New York Times advertisement, entitled ―An Appeal by Black Americans against

United States Support of the Zionist Government of Israel.‖ Going contrary to the June

"Appeal" by the moderate group, these radicals proclaimed their ―complete solidarity with our Palestinian brothers and sisters, who like us, are struggling for self- determination and an end to racist oppression.‖ They also alleged that Israel was providing ―arms and other equipment to the Portuguese troops fighting against the

Angolan and Mozambican freedom fighters.‖ They called for Afro-American solidarity with the Palestinian people‘s liberation struggle.‖71

Robert Van Lierop was among a growing group of black internationalists that identified not only with Africa, but with the poor and oppressed peoples of the Third

World. It was work he did on behalf of Palestinians that led to his unlikely filming of A

Luta Continua. By 1970 Van Lierop had not forgotten a 1968 discussion he had with

Eduardo Mondlane and FRELIMO Representative to the United Nations Sharfudin Khan in New York regarding the filming of a documentary about the Mozambican liberation movement, a mission made more poignant by Mondlane‘s tragic death. Van Lierop had recruited Algerian nationalist, journalist and film-maker Boubaker Adjali to film the

71 Committee of Black Americans for Truth about the Middle East, ―An Appeal by Black Americans against United States Support of the Zionist Government of Israel,‖ New York Times, November 1, 1970; Lewis Young, ―American Blacks and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,‖ Journal of Palestine Studies 2, no. 1 (Autumn 1972): 70-85; Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East Since 1945, Updated ed., with a post-9/11 chapter. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 249 documentary, but Adjali became ill. Then, in September 1970, Palestinians hijacked four

New York-bound international flights with life-altering consequences for Van Lierop.72

Because of a dispute with director Roy Wilkins, Van Lierop no longer worked as assistant counsel to the NAACP, but was an associate with the Fleischer, Dornbush,

Mensch and Mandelstam law firm in Manhattan. Barbara Mensch, the 16-year-old daughter of Martin Mensch, a partner in the law firm for which Van Lierop worked and an ACOA board member, had spent the summer on a kibbutz in Israel. On Sunday, 6

September 1970, she was on the TWA flight from Germany to New York that was hijacked by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a faction of the

Palestine Liberation Organization, and taken to the Jordanian desert outside of Amman.

Mensch, aware of Van Lierop‘s support for those Palestinians who had become refugees in their own land, asked if the associate could contact his friends and get a message to her.73

Van Lierop called his friend, Paul Boutelle, Chairman of the Committee of Black

Americans for Truth about the Middle East (COBATAME). Boutelle forwarded the request to his contacts on the West Bank and tried to set up a telephone conversation for the attorneys with a representative of the PFLP. Mensch arranged with Aramco for a telephone line to Jordan, and he and Van Lierop were able to speak with the principal spokesman for the PFLP, Bassam Abu Sharif. Van Lierop, remembering the incident

72 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked a Swissair DC-8 from Zurich, a TWA Boeing 707 from Frankfurt, an El Al Israel Airlines 707 from Amsterdam, and a PanAm World Airlines 747 that was blown up in the Egyptian desert after the passengers had been evacuated. The Swiss and American TWA planes were taken to Jordan. Linda Charlton, ―2 Craft in Jordan,‖ New York Times, 8 September 1970, 1. 73 Van Lierop‘s association was public knowledge. He published a Letter to the Editor of the New York Times in December 1970 as a member of the COBATME. Robert Van Lierop, ―Zionist Logic on Palestine Issue Scored,‖ New York Times, 6 December 1970, 252. 250 nearly thirty years later, reported the following reply by Bassam to their appeal, ―How would you feel if we are willing to release this girl to you and her father, as a gesture of solidarity with and black people in the United States, and if we challenge the United States to drop its charges against Angela Davis? This would not be a precondition, but we would just challenge the United States to do so.‖74

Mensch agreed to Bassam‘s conditions and, despite the civil war that had been raging in Jordan since June 1970, also the Palestinian leader‘s request that he and Van

Lierop travel to Amman for the hostage release. Disregarding protests from the State

Department regarding the danger and the possibility that such a trip might have a negative impact on the on-going negotiations by the United States, British, West German, and Swiss governments, Mensch went to Cyprus, chartered a plane, and flew to Beirut.

The next day, he and Van Lierop boarded a Middle East Airlines flight to Amman.75

Once there, they met with Bassam at the Jordan Intercontinental Hotel and were informed that the situation had changed. Bassam advised them that the PFLP had learned of an impending attack by the Jordanian army, so the Palestinians had to move the hostages

(who were still in the airplanes that had been landed on a makeshift landing field on a hard plateau) to a safer location. On 17 September, the Jordanian army did begin shelling

74 Minter, ―Interview.‖ Though I have found no corroboration of Van Lierop‘s memory of the telephone conversation, the rest of his story is supported by a memoir by David Raab, Terror in Black September: The First Eyewitness Account of the Infamous 1970 Hijacking (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 136-137. The only discrepancy is that Raab‘s account reflects only one week of siege, while Van Lierop reports that it lasted ―a few weeks.‖ 75 Ibid. Memo from Popper (American Embassy in Nicosia) to Secretary of State Harold Saunders, dated 14 September 1970 states that Martin Mensch and Robert Frederick Van Lierop, ―a young black attorney with connections with the ‗radical movement‘ in the US,‖ had arrived in Nicosia on 13 September with intentions to proceed to Amman to negotiate the release of Barbara Mensch. Memo details how State tried unsuccessfully to dissuade the two. NSC Subject Files, Box 330, Press folder, Nixon Presidential Library -- College Park. 251 the nearby refugee camp. The Palestinians retaliated, firing on the hotel which was occupied by the Jordanian army as well as one hundred civilians (mostly Western journalists). For a week, Mensch and Van Lierop remained under siege before escaping to safety during the ceasefire that went into effect on 25 September.76

Van Lierop had risked his life to aid not only Martin Mensch, but the Palestinians who hijacked the airplanes. The PFLP claimed the hijackings were political statements to increase public awareness of the suffering of Palestinians on the West Bank, a claim supported by their apparent willingness to release Barbara Mensch. In addition, although the PFLP had exploded one of the planes in the Jordanian desert, the hijackers had not harmed any of the passengers and, between 26- 30 September 1970, released them all, including Barbara Mensch, unharmed. In fact, representatives of the International

Committee of the Red Cross had been allowed to take blankets and other supplies to the hostages during the crisis.77

After his return to New York, Van Lierop advised Mensch that he was going to resign from the law firm. The young radical had concluded that, if he could survive civil war in the Jordanian desert, then he could film a documentary in the liberated areas of

Mozambique. Therefore, he stopped practicing law for seven years and (while waiting tables at the Village Vanguard and with the support of other activists and churches) raised the necessary funding for A Luta Continua.78

76 Ibid. 77 Charlton, ―2 Craft in Jordan,‖ 16. 78 Minter notes that Peter and Cora Weiss and Carol Ferry provided the majority of the funding. He explains ―Peter Weiss, a lawyer associated with many progressive causes and a leader of the Center for Constitutional Rights, and Cora Rubin Weiss, president of the Samuel Rubin Foundation and a leading international peace activist, were financial supporters of the American Committee on Africa from its inception in the 1950s. Along with Carol Ferry and her first husband, they were also friends of Eduardo 252

A Luta Continua and the Global Black Freedom Struggle

[A Luta Continua] was smuggled into Portugal by FRELIMO. They used it there. It was also smuggled into South Africa. And prior to the Soweto uprising it was shown by Black Consciousness Movement and others in South Africa. And they began to use some of the slogans – a luta continua … the way Eduardo always signed his letters. That was why we chose that title.79 -- Robert Van Lierop (2004) –

In August 1971, Van Lierop and Robert Fletcher, a SNCC photographer, went to South

Yemen, then a radical state supportive of the Palestinian liberation movement, and waited for word from FRELIMO to travel to Dar-es-Salaam where they were joined by another

African American activist, Howard Fuller.80 Fuller, then known as Owusu Sadauki, was the director of an Independent Black Institution, Malcolm X University in Greensboro,

NC. He had come to Tanzania to speak about independent education for African people at a meeting sponsored by the National Committee of Black Churchmen. He would go on to become a founding member of the African Liberation Day Coordinating

Committee. This committee organized one of the largest gatherings of supporters of southern African liberation in 1972 in Washington, D.C.81

Speaking in 1976 of his time in Mozambique making the film Van Lierop stated,

―With the guerillas we marched 350 miles inside the liberated zone. The term ‗liberated zone‘ really meant that we were constantly defending the territory from repeated raids by the Portuguese colonial army. The trek was treacherous; however, I also experienced

Mondlane from his period in New York working in the United Nations.‖ The United Methodist Church, the Episcopal Church and the Presbyterian Church also contributed to the film. ―Interview‖ 79 Minter, ―Interview.‖ 80 Fuller was then known as Owusu Sadaukai, director of Malcolm X University in Greensboro, North Carolina and the national chairman and organizer of the first African Liberation Day March on Washington in May 1972. Minter, ―Interview.‖ 81 For more regarding Sadauki and his role in establishing the African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee, see Fanon Che Wilkins, ―In the Belly of the Beast: Black Power, Anti-Imperialism, and the African Liberation Solidarity Movement 1968-1975‖ (New York University, 2001), 134-145. 253 with the Mozambican fighters the happiness and joy that each day is a defeat for colonialism and imperialism.‖ He added, with comparison of the Mozambican struggle with the Vietnam War, ―In some ways, Mozambique was like Saigon, except the war had not reached the southern part of the country. There, the major task was to raise the consciousness of the people because up until the war‘s end, these areas had been controlled by the Portuguese colonists.‖82

This feeling of danger, camaraderie, and hope was evident in A Luta Continua.

Van Lierop also expressed these sentiments in the excerpts of his diary published in the

April 1972 issue of Southern Africa. Of particular note from the author‘s description of five days (9-13 September 1971) of his journey was his war commentary that supported the comparison between the nationalist wars being waged in Mozambique and Vietnam.

Van Lierop wrote of ―French and American-built‖ machine-gun helicopters, followed by fighter-bombers, which strafed the forests where he and his Mozambican companions hid in the dense foliage. Van Lierop‘s awe at participating in and supporting the Mozambican struggle is evident in his statement that he and his African American companions were

―seeing more than any non-Mozambican had seen so far.‖ He felt ―privileged to participate in the making of history.‖83 Indeed, Van Lierop assisted in the formulation of a new historical myth, an integral part of the nation-building process. He did so by creating a film that described the Mozambican nationalist struggle to international audiences. The film was also meant as a warning lesson to South Africa and Southern

Rhodesia, as well as a call to struggle for the oppressed Africans in these countries.

82 Missick, ―Mozambique Perspective.‖ 83 Southern Africa, 6:4 (April 1972). 254

Victoria Missick, a reporter for World Magazine, wrote an article in 1976 where she maintained that A Luta Continua was effective in domestic advocacy. She explained that ―The film became an important organizing tool for peace, solidarity, and anti- imperialist groups around the country. In that sense, A Luta Continua has made a special contribution to the mobilizing of millions of United States citizens against U.S-supported colonialism in Mozambique and South Africa, so much so that the title itself has become part of the movement‘s vernacular.‖84 Van Lierop remembers its efficacy in fostering international support of the anti-colonial/anti-apartheid movement.

The film‘s success may be attributable in part to the fact that it is able to convey its threefold message in just thirty minutes: 1) Mozambican nationalists are fighting a guerilla war against Portuguese colonialism, 2) the nationalists have a plan to build a better society for their people, and 3) the United States, its NATO allies, and multinational corporations are complicit in the continued oppression of the Mozambican people.

A Luta Continua opens with a reading of FRELIMO‘s Declaration of Revolution of 25 September 1964. In tune with the tradition of international advocacy on behalf of black Mozambicans that began during the interwar years, the film attacks the myth of 450 years of Portuguese domination. It points out that the renewed armed liberation revolution began in September 1964. However, the Mozambican people had been resisting Portuguese oppression since the 18th century institution of the prazo system. In the 20th century this resistance took the form of rural cooperatives, urban associations of artists, workers and students, and newspapers such as O Brado Africano. It noted that the

84 Victoria Missick, ―Mozambique Perspective,‖ World Magazine, November 27, 1976, M-10. 255 first shots of the armed struggle were fired four years after the 16 June 1960 Mueda

Massacre in which an estimated six hundred petitioners to the provincial governor were killed by Portuguese troops.

FRELIMO declared that the armed struggle was ―aimed at creating new men and new women,‖ and that it desired to begin a new social order that could be replicated throughout the entire continent. This new Mozambique was to be a place ―where there would be no hunger and where all men would be free and equal.‖85

Although Van Lierop‘s narrative does not provide details regarding FRELIMO‘s nation-building activities, it does provide highlights. Noteworthy is the movement‘s desire to change the status of women to one more equal to men, revealed through footage of the Female Brigade of the Mozambican guerilla army. The goal of women‘s emancipation was epitomized by , a wife of FRELIMO‘s second president,

Samora Machel, who fought as part of the Female Brigade. Women's contribution to armed struggle included transporting equipment, mobilizing the population, feeding guerillas, working clandestinely, teaching and nursing in camps in Tanzania, and fighting. Josina Machel was also a leader in agitating for stronger roles for women at top levels. She was involved in the education of recruits and organizing orphanages as the need grew with the toll of war. She emphasized the political activities of women in educating and mobilizing the population.86 Out of this brigade would grow the

85 Mondlane, The Struggle, 163. 86 Mary Ann Tétreault, ed., Women and Revolution in Africa, Asia, and the New World (Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 42. 256

Mozambican Woman‘s Organization (OMM) which sought to continue the work of emancipating African women from their traditional subservient roles.87

FRELIMO also sought to provide education for all, increase access to health care, and implement agricultural reform. Its motto, ―to die a tribe and be born a nation,‖ expressed the organization‘s nation-building efforts which included the development of a national culture that would integrate all and regions.

Van Lierop did not show the darker side of nation-building. Mondlane‘s memoir of the struggle is clear regarding the ruthlessness required in ending tribalism and regionalism, including the execution of chiefs who had ―allied themselves with

Portuguese power.‖ Mondlane also described the suffering of the people within the liberated areas caused by the lack of an infrastructure to replace the colonial system. He described a year when ―some 800,000 had to be served. First and foremost, their material needs had to be satisfied, an adequate food supply assured, and other important articles such as clothes, soap, or matches provided; then medical and educational services had to be established, and administrative and judicial systems organized.‖88 This suffering

87 A member of the Southern Africa Committee, Medea Benjamin, went to Mozambique in the 1970s as a nutritionist. She attended an OMM meeting and the following information was in her notes. In Mozambique of the 1970s, despite the efforts of FRELIMO to make changes regarding gender, the bride price still existed as did polygamy. Parents objected to sending daughters to school. A woman who married a non-Mozambican automatically lost her citizenship. FRELIMO was actively fighting these practices. They expelled men who had been/were polyamorous, fought against the bride price, greatly decreased prostitution (nearly eliminated), and established crèches in the city and countryside. Women were being taught construction, cultivation, sanitation, and nutrition skills. April 7 was National Women‘s Day, Box 1, Mozambican Women folder, SC-SAC. An essay by Kathleen Sheldon, entitled ―Women and Revolution in Mozambique: A Luta Continua,‖ in Women and Revolution In Africa, Asia, and the New World, notes that, although the OMM was considered in the vanguard of women‘s liberation, its responsibilities remained related to traditional female roles and women in Frelimo continued to be subordinate to men (34). 88 Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique (London: Zed Press, 1983), 42, 164-165, and 167. George Houser and Herb Shore, Mozambique: Dream the Size of Freedom (New York: The Africa Fund (associated with the American Committee on Africa), 1975), 43-52. 257 would lead some Mozambicans to lament the painful transition to independence, a change that many could not understand.89

Throughout this narration, Van Lierop and Fletcher filmed the Mozambican guerillas, most men and many women armed and dressed in uniform, proudly moving through the forest areas. However, there were others, rural peasants displaced by the rebellion and taken in by the guerilla army. The filmmakers captured scenes of guerilla medics treating the sick, and women educating children in orphanages, crèches, and shanty schools. What distinguishes the documentary is the rookie film-maker‘s ability, using the cinematique verité method developed by Jean Rouch, to portray scenes of abject poverty that also reflect hope. In this way, the film transcended the documentary- style depiction of mere facts to become a tool used by the revolutionaries to educate a largely illiterate population about the status of the liberation struggles and to give

Mozambican audiences a glimpse of the promise of independent Mozambican society. It had entertainment as well as cultural value. Additionally, the film‘s political and diplomatic message to the international community is also clear.90

Van Lierop ended the documentary with a history of colonization in Mozambique.

He indicted the United States and other European countries for supporting Portugal‘s rough exploitation of Mozambique's natural resources and its people. He also pointed out that Portuguese imperialism was being subsidized by the investments of such multinational corporations as Gulf Oil and by the United States leasing of the military

89 For a compelling portrait of the suffering and disorientation in post-colonial Mozambique, see Mia Couto, Sleepwalking Land (London: Serpent‘s Tail, 2006). 90 Diawara, Manthia, African Cinema: Politics and Culture, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, 88-90. 258 base in the Azores. Van Lierop particularly criticized the United States for its financial aid for Portugal‘s building of the Cabora Bassa Dam, the second largest in Africa. The majority of the hydroelectric power generated by the dam was to be used by neighboring apartheid South Africa.

Thus, in a 30-minute amateur film about FRELIMO and Mozambique, Van

Lierop was able to encapsulate the ideological essence of an international revolutionary movement. Domestically, Van Lierop recalled widespread distribution and screenings of his documentary in diverse venues in order to raise public awareness of the Mozambican revolution and to build international solidarity among people of color suffering from discrimination and oppression. The film was shown on a Navajo Indian reservation, in prisons, and, in 1973, at an outdoor screening in Harlem where he ―put some sheets as a screen … around 132nd Street … Guebuza was there, and Guebuza stood on top of a car to address the crowd.‖91 The participation by

FRELIMO revolutionaries helped to make the struggle more real Figure 2 Armando Guebuza (1975) for the film‘s audiences. Newspaper reports confirm other 1973 Courtesy of Robin Wright, The Christian showings -- at a benefit in memory of Patrice Lumumba sponsored Science Monitor, and the Alicia Patterson by the Pan African Students Organization in the Americas; the Foundation

African Liberation Support Committee at Columbia University; a

91 Minter, ―Interview.‖ Armando Guebuza was then the national political commissar for FRELIMO and took office as president of Mozambique in 2005. 259 memorial program for Malcolm X at the Uhuru Sasa School, an Independent Black

Institution, in Brooklyn, NY.92 Indeed, not only did Van Lierop‘s films promote a Third

World solidarity, but for Pan-Africanists and cultural black nationalists, they supported what Cabral termed a cultural ―return to the source‖ – that is, a ―re-Africanisation‖ of

Africans in America.93

The titles of Van Lierop‘s two films, O Povo Organizado (The People Mobilized) and A Luta Continua (The Struggle Continues) tell not only the story of the Mozambican revolution, but of the vast transnational advocacy network of activists needed to support it. As the first president of independent Mozambique, Samora Machel, wrote on the eve of Mozambican liberation, ―In view of the character and objective of our fight, our natural allies are essentially: the national liberation movements, and in these there must naturally be included countries recently liberated, especially in Africa; socialist countries; the labouring masses, especially the working class; and the progressive anti-colonialist and anti-Fascist forces in the capitalist countries. [emphasis added]94

As described in the works of such social movement theorists as Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Douglas McAdams, and Sidney Tarrow, information was the key weapon for changing hearts and minds for advocates battling entrenched social norms such as white supremacy.95 Beginning as early as 1951, Eduardo Mondlane represented

92 ―Plan Benefit In Memory of Slain Patrice Lumumba,‖ New York Amsterdam News, February 10, 1973, A9 and ―Malcolm X Memorial Program,‖ New York Amsterdam News, February 17, 1973, C1. The Uhuru Sasa School was an accredited private school established by cultural black nationalists in the Bedford- Stuyvesant neighborhood of Brooklyn. 93 Cabral, ―National liberation and culture,‖ in Unity and Struggle, 175. 94 Samora Machel, ―Liberation, State and Party‖ in Samora Machel: An African Revolutionary: Selected Speeches and Writings, Barry Munslow, ed. (London: Zed Books, 1985), 67. 95 Keck, Activists Beyond Borders; Doug McAdam, Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge studies in contentious politics (Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Sidney G Tarrow, The New 260 an emerging Mozambique and provided the information needed to initiate nearly a quarter century of struggle to reframe the world perception of southern Africa and mobilize support for its liberation. Activists on behalf of the anti-colonial/antiapartheid movement such as the committee members of the ACOA used the repertoire of contention of the era to garner support for their cause and apply pressure to governments and multinational corporations. These include demonstrations before the United Nations, marches on Washington, testimony at Congressional hearings, mainstream newspaper ads and editorials, publications in alternative presses, production of films and documentaries, organizing conferences and other forums in which Africans could provide testimonies, fund-raising events, and letters writing campaigns.

American transnational advocacy networks used strategies of mobilization found useful in the domestic social movements of which they were a part. They described apartheid and colonialism in terms of the segregated South, portraying Portugal and

South Africa as fascist ―Establishments,‖ and equating the armed struggle in southern

Africa with Vietnam. 96 On 25 September 1976, at the Black Leadership Conference on

Southern Africa, Congressman Charles Diggs, a staunch supporter of the anti- colonial/anti-apartheid movement, even connected the African liberation movements to the Bicentennial of the American Revolution.97

Transnational Activism, Cambridge studies in contentious politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 96 Of note is the fact that while early international efforts by Civil Rights Movement advocates used ―Jim Crow‖ to describe apartheid, later advocates for greater African American power in domestic matters flipped the metaphor and used the oppressive white supremacist regime of South Africa to describe the United States government. 97 ―The African American Manifesto on Southern Africa‖ in the African Heritage Studies Association Newsletter 3:2 (October 1976). 261

There were, however, challenges to the advocacy. Entrenched values such as white supremacy, anti-communism, profit-making, as well as the political weight of their opponents, including government and multinational corporations, were formidable.

Additionally, although various social movements found commonalities with the anti- colonial/antiapartheid movement, there were also political and social differences such as radical vs. liberal, black vs. white, and ―haves‖ vs. ―have nots,‖ etc., that strained or severed linkages between advocacy groups. Importantly, although Africans benefited from the support of American and European allies, such alliances from activists within capitalist/imperialist nations threatened their authenticity within their own constituencies.

Despite challenges which limited the immediate results of transnational advocacy, the efforts of extraordinary activists and organizations pressured American policymakers to consider ―soft‖ issues of racial justice as well as hard national security matters when making policy decisions regarding the continent. Domestically, these activists constructed the opportunity for African Americans to have a greater voice in U.S. foreign policy. Overt United States government actions taken in favor of human rights in southern Africa during the 1960s include censure of South Africa and Portugal before the

United Nations in 1960 and 1961, and an arms embargo against South Africa. Regarding

Mozambique and FRELIMO, such organizations as the African American Institute,

American Society of African Culture, and American Committee on Africa secured covert government and private funding for educational projects which supported FRELIMO‘s nation-building objectives. Pressures in Portugal from activists protesting the colonial wars in Africa helped to build a leftist constituency within the Portuguese military which

262 toppled the Estado Novo in 1974 and led to political independence for the lusophone

African territories.

263

CONCLUSION

Despite its rhetoric in support of self-determination proffered in the 1941 Atlantic

Charter, official United States cold war policy toward southern Africa had been skillfully pronounced at the United Nations in 1952. During the United Nations debate regarding a censure of South African apartheid policies, the United States called for ―member nations to leave the issue of race discrimination to the conscience of the South African people as the power of world opinion was far more influential than any UN resolution.‖1 Although this pronouncement securely closed the door to any United States government action overtly supporting black African nationalism in southern Africa, it cracked open a window of opportunity for Africans and a transnational network of activists to marshal

―the power of world opinion‖ and solicit both overt and covert assistance in combating colonialism in lusophone Africa and South African apartheid.

It is through this window of opportunity that Mozambicans gained access to and leveraged American support for their anti-colonial struggle. With the support of missionaries and the American foundation, the Phelps-Stokes Fund, Eduardo Mondlane arrived in the United States and began his rhetorical battle to change world opinion. For the twelve years that he spent in the United States, Eduardo Mondlane advocated tirelessly to change the image of Africa in the minds of Americans in order to mobilize support for Mozambican independence from Portuguese colonialism. In his advocacy,

1 Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 33. 264

Mondlane belied the entrenched Portuguese rhetoric espousing 450 years of colonial rule, non-racialism, and its civilizing mission.

As shown in Chapter 3, Mondlane arrived in 1951, a Christian liberal who spoke about Africa before religious conferences, camps, and congregations around the country.

He made radio appearances, spoke at academic conferences and historically black colleges, and taught in such universities as Northwestern, Roosevelt, New York

University, and Syracuse. In 1957, he began working for the Trusteeship Council of the

United Nations where he supported the independence efforts of trust territories while continuing to broaden his American advocacy network with connections to people in the religious, political, corporate, and civic sectors.

In 1961, after receiving a letter from African National Union of Mozambique

UNAMI leader José Baltazar da Costa Changong‘a requesting that he return to

Mozambique, Mondlane expanded his efforts. He not only continued to speak to

American audiences through churches, universities, American Society of African Culture

AMSAC conferences, ACOA speaking tours, and publications, but advocated with the

U.S. government and at the United Nations. Through this work, Mondlane and his allies mobilized a network of advocates within the United States that reached from the National

Council of Churches to the National Urban League, from the American Committee on

Africa to the United Nations, and from historically black colleges and universities to the

White House.

A key node in the anti-colonial/antiapartheid network within the United States with which Mondlane connected was the ACOA. The organization began its anti-

265 apartheid advocacy in 1952, the same year as the U.S. pronouncement at the United

Nations. In the 1950s, such multicultural human rights organizations as the ACOA worked to widen the window of opportunity. To fulfill its mission to educate Americans and affect U.S. foreign policy regarding Africa, the ACOA partnered with such Africans as Mondlane and formed coalitions with other liberal and human rights groups. One of its key mobilization tactics was to intertwine the African liberation struggles and the

Civil Rights Movement both rhetorically and through its modes of protest. The ACOA leveraged the diasporic solidarity between black people in the Americas and Africans that first gained international attention through the five Pan-African Congresses that began in the 1920s. The human rights issues that had mobilized the interwar Pan-Africanists resonated with American activists fighting for social justice and racial equality in the segregated South where disenfranchised black people worked as sharecroppers and civil rights activists opened . The 1960s advocates for Mozambican liberation adopted these issues of contention – Portugal‘s ―ultracolonialism‖ – its inhumane forced labor regimen and the lack of educational opportunities for black

Mozambicans. Adopted, too, was the strategy of protesting on the international stage before the United Nations. Through this integration of the international and domestic black freedom struggles Eduardo Mondlane and Martin Luther King, Jr. became equated as human rights heroes.

Social movement theorists have described the interaction between actors from the political North and South within transnational advocacy networks as a boomerang pattern in which Third World actors seek to gain access to leverage, information, and funding.

266

At the same time, First World groups seek credibility that ―they are struggling with, and not only ‗for‘, their southern partners.‖2 Mozambican leaders such as Eduardo

Mondlane actively solicited such support from American advocates, and, by so doing, engaged Western aid for their independence struggle with little fear of economic neocolonialism by the United States.3 Alternately, throughout the decade, the Americans expanded their mobilization tactics and sociopolitical identities for contention with the

United States government through liberal multicultural and radical Pan-African solidarities. African Americans, in particular, benefited from the diasporic identities that enabled them to broaden their domestic political demands from civil rights to pleas for human rights, rhetoric that had been curtailed by the Cold War repression of the

1950s.

The advocacy by the transnational network of Africans, African Americans, white liberals and human rights activists had its greatest leverage during the Kennedy administration. Anti-colonial and anti-apartheid advocates, including State Department

Africanists, adopted the anti-Communist and modernization rhetoric that resonated with the administration‘s own ideology regarding the 1960s as a ―decade of development‖ and

Africa as part of the ―frontier of freedom.‖ Although largely successful in changing world opinion regarding Portuguese colonialism, particularly through their advocacy at the United Nations, the window of opportunity to gain U.S. support for southern African

2 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Skikkink, ―Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics,‖ International Social Science Journal (March 1999), 93. 3 The use of the terms Mozambican(s) and Africans, unless otherwise indicated, refer to non-white persons. This is not meant to exclude those Portuguese allies who identified with the Mozambican liberation movements. This distinction becomes important during the early years of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) when there were disputes as to whether the struggle was against whites or against the system of colonialism. 267 independence began closing quickly due to global cold war exigencies. Nonetheless, the

Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) gained covert humanitarian support from the

United States, while also garnering military aid from Communist bloc nations.

Significantly, FRELIMO maximized the utility of U.S. assistance in its support of both its nation-building project and its guerilla war.

By the late 1960s, anti-colonialism and anti-apartheid activism remained the foci of the transnational advocacy network, but its membership and mobilization tactics had changed. The armed struggles in lusophone Africa captured the radical imagination of youth around the world. This was, in part, because of the African wars‘ resemblance to the Vietnam War. Che Guevara, an enduring radical icon, referred to the national liberation movements in the three Portuguese African colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau/Cape Verde in his 1966 Message to the Tricontinental Conference held in Havana, Cuba as ―three .‖ Guevara believed that such conflicts throughout the global South would strain imperial resources and eventually culminate in the destruction of imperialism. In addition to those more well-to-do white members of the

New Left, the young radical leftists in the United States included African-American,

Latino, and lower-class whites who identified their own lack of political and economic power with colonial oppression. These members of what historian Cynthia Young called the "Third World Left," particularly African Americans, saw the liberation movements and nation-building efforts in the lusophone colonies in Africa with awe and pride.4

4 Cynthia Ann Young, Soul Power: Culture, Radicalism, and the Making of a U.S. Third World Left (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). 268

Mozambicans and their international allies broadened their rhetoric from anti- colonial complaints against Portugal to global anti-imperialist and anti-white supremacist human rights claims that encompassed numerous conflicts around the world. Because of

Lisbon‘s intransigence, Eduardo Mondlane understood that a guerilla war of attrition would be necessary to attain self-determination for the Mozambican people. From such revolutionary leaders as , , and Che Guevara, he incorporated strategies for building political, educational, and health institutions while fighting a

Portuguese military force that grew from 35,000 to approximately 70,000 over the decade of armed struggle. He publically linked the Mozambican and Vietnam struggles through his expression of admiration for Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese National Liberation

Front. Mondlane acknowledged that world attention, including the interest and energy of

American anti-colonial activists and policymakers, was largely focused on the Vietnam struggle when he stated, ―We will not win our war until the Vietnamese win theirs.‖5 .

Strategies of resistance and nation building were not the only thing that the liberation movements in Mozambique and Vietnam had in common. Both were peasant societies fighting against modern military establishments. Indeed, the Portuguese military received its counterinsurgency training from the United States. It developed military organizations like that used by the U.S. military in Vietnam, including the

Centro de Coordinacão (Coordination Center), Centralizacão de Informacão

(Centralization of Information, and the Accão Psico-Social (Psycho-Social Action). 6

Furthermore, the Portuguese military adopted such tactics as the primary use of air power

5 Fredericks, interview. 6 ―In Mozambique,‖ Mozambican Revolution, 1:1 (Dec 1963):7-8. 269 and napalm bombs against black Mozambicans. Because it was impossible to distinguish between combatants and civilians, the killing was largely indiscriminate leading to such massacres as Wiriyamu, tellingly described by anti-colonial advocates as the My Lai of Mozambique.7 The Portuguese military also relocated peasants into secured villages called aldeamentos (strategic hamlets), ostensibly for the villagers‘ protection.8

These rhetorical and tactical changes in the Mozambican movement dovetailed with changes in the radical movements in the United States. Studied as a single liberation movement, the armed struggles of the lusophone colonies provide a lens for observing the solidarity among the New Left and Third World Left. By the early 1970s, these militant leftists contended with the Nixon administration in support of revolutionary change domestically and globally. The administration had not only expanded the Vietnam War to and Cambodia, but shifted foreign policy to support Portugal, with the renewal of the Azores agreement in 1971, and the white supremacist nations of Rhodesia and South

Africa. The contention shifted from direct challenges to the executive branch to lobbying

Congress and pressuring multinational corporations. Mozambique‘s frontline position and the Nixon administration‘s tilt in favor of white supremacists cemented the focus of the anti-imperialist and anti-apartheid activism.

Conversely, by examining the differences among the armed struggles in

Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau, one can also see the cleavages among factions

7 Hastings, Wiriyamu. 8 Kaúlza de Arriaga, The Portuguese Answer (London: T. Stacey, 1973), 39; Munslow, Mozambique, 46. De Arriaga avers that the aldeamentos were successful in protecting peasants from the communist-led terrorists and that the Portuguese military recruited from these secure villages. Alternately, Munslow describes the aldeamentos as concentration camps where peasants were forced to grow cash crops. 270 of these movements. By 1969, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) -- the largest

New Left organization in the United States, which had begun in 1962 with non-violent advocacy for popular democracy, student political empowerment, and social justice -- was being led by the Weather Underground faction that advocated violent revolution.

Black solidarity was being challenged by internal ideological discord and external harassment by the FBI‘s counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) designed to disrupt and neutralize militant black nationalist organizations.9 Within both of these movements, many women were growing increasingly discontent with their perceived treatment as second-class citizens.10 These tensions and cleavages within the young activist community were reflected in their advocacy.

Mondlane‘s humanist, non-racialist attempt to build an African socialist society appealed to many militant young radicals. There were those Afro-Americans, however, who rejected or challenged FRELIMO, primarily because Janet Mondlane was a white

American and FRELIMO accepted Portuguese members. These revolutionary black nationalists preferred Amílcar Cabral‘s PAIGC, with its Marxist-Leninist ideology, urban-based leadership, and exclusive black nationalism. FRELIMO‘s promotion of gender equality and the participation of the Organization of Mozambican Women appealed to many women mobilized within their own liberation movement in the West.

9 Brian Glick, The War at Home: Covert Action against U.S. Activists and What We Can Do about It (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 74. Glick provides copies of two COINTELPRO documents: 1) memo from J. Edgar Hoover to the Albany office regarding the establishment of the counterintelligence program targeted against black nationalist organizations, dated August 25, 1967; and, 2) a memo entitled ―Counter- Intelligence Program Black Nationalist Hate- Groups Racial Intelligence,‖ March 4, 1968. Of interest is, in addition to the militant and SNCC, and the leftist Revolutionary Action Movement, COINTELPRO targeted Martin Luther King‘s Southern Christian Leadership Conference. 10 Rebecca Klatch, A Generation Divided: The New Left, the New Right, and the 1960s (Berkeley: University of Califonia Press, n.d.), 158; ―Black Women‘s Manifesto‖ (Third World Women‘s Alliance, 1970), Documents from the Women‘s Liberation Movement, Online Archival Collection. 271

Thus, through studying this period of the Mozambique liberation movement and

American activism, one sees reflected the revolutionary zeitgeist of the Sixties era.

After nearly a decade of struggle and frustration, internal conflicts also threatened to disintegrate the Mozambican Liberation Front. Once FRELIMO had successfully

―liberated‖ the northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, the disputes regarding ethnic leadership, distribution of resources, and land ownership became profound.11

Leaders of the powerful Makonde ethnic group resented FRELIMO‘s Marxist program which divested them of power. Lázaro Nkavandame -- who had been a régulo, established economically successful rural cotton cooperatives, and led MANU -- violently opposed the ratification of FRELIMO‘s Marxist program at its 1968 Second

Congress. In 1969, Nkavandame defected from FRELIMO and joined the Portuguese.

He has been implicated in helping the PIDE to plant the letter bomb that killed Mondlane in Dar-es-Salaam on 3 February 1969.12

In May 1970 FRELIMO‘s Central Committee elected Samora Moises Machel to the presidency. Machel, like Mondlane, was born in the to a peasant family but was educated in a Catholic mission school. In 1952, Machel‘s first introduction to colonial resistance was through his training as a medical assistant in a progressive (democratic) white organization, the Associação dos Naturais de

Moçambique that opened its membership to people of other races. Historian Barry

11 There are disputes among scholars as to the extent to which FRELIMO successfully ―liberated‖ the northern provinces. George M. Houser avers that Niassa and Cabo Delgado were areas controlled by the guerilla army. Vines states that the level of control was exaggerated by activists, particularly after the Portuguese ―Gordian Knot‖ offensive of 1970. See Houser, No One Can Stop the Rain, 185 and Vines, RENAMO. For more regarding the Gordian Knot offensive, see General Kaúlza De Arriaga, The Portuguese Answer (London: Tom Stacey, 1973). 12 MacQueen, Decolonization, 44. Hanlon, Mozambique: the Revolution Under Fire, 31. 272

Munslow states that ―by the time of its banning in 1961 there were 10,000 members, including Indians, whites and a majority who were black.‖13 Machel met Mondlane during the 3-month visit in 1961. As a result of his visits with Mondlane, Machel was interrogated twice by the PIDE. In March 1963, expecting to be arrested by the PIDE for subversion, Machel travelled across Swaziland and South Africa to Botswana, then on to

Tanzania to join FRELIMO. By the end of 1963, Machel was the leader of the second group of FRELIMO fighters sent to Algiers for guerilla training.14

Upon assuming power in 1970, Machel deepened FRELIMO‘s commitment to a

Marxist-Leninist ideology. While acknowledging the support of ―progressive‖ Western nations and leftist activists, Machel renewed FRELIMO‘s ties to the Soviet bloc. He and the FRELIMO Central Committee continued striving to fulfill the revolutionary program designed to destroy Portuguese colonialism, to create a socialist nation promoting racial and gender equality, and to support the national liberation movements in South Africa,

South West Africa (now Namibia) and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).15 Following the 25

April 1974 bloodless coup by the Armed Forces Movement that ended the Estado Novo, the new Portuguese president António de Spínola negotiated cease-fires in the Portuguese colonies and, in Mozambique, the conditions for FRELIMO‘s transition to power (the

Lusaka Agreement of 7 September 1974). FRELIMO became the ruling party of an independent Mozambique on 25 .

13 Munslow, Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins, 69. 14 Iain Christie, Samora Machel: A Biography, 2nd ed. (Atlantic Highlands: Zed Books, 1989), 20-25. Joe Slovo, a white South African freedom fighter (he became Chief of Staff of the armed wing of the ANC and Chairman of the South African Communist Party was on his way into exile in Tanzania in 1963. He and 30 other ANC members were flying out of Botswana. They left one of the ANC members to allow Machel to join their flight in order to join FRELIMO. 15 For more regarding FRELIMO‘s support of the African National Congress, see Nadja Manghezi, The Connection: ANC Life in the World of Frelimo (Jacana Media, 2010). 273

FRELIMO‘s revolution did not end with its assumption of power in June 1975, as asserted by its motto ―A Luta Continua‖.16 In Mozambique, most of the Portuguese colonials evacuated the country, wreaking vengeful havoc in the destruction of the modern infrastructure (including homes, transportation, and industrial capital) that had been denied native Mozambicans under the colonial system. American activism in support of a post-colonial Mozambique also continued using much of the same tactics that began with the ACOA in the 1950s. Education of Americans regarding the post- colonial challenges in Mozambique and the continuing racial inequality in southern Africa, as well as lobbying of U.S. policymakers remained the primary strategies. In the 1970s and 1980s, the educational efforts included documentary films.

Due to the success of the early efforts of the transnational network of activists who intertwined the African and domestic black freedom struggles, the audience was largely the African American community.

Robert Van Lierop, who attended the Independence Day ceremonies in Maputo, created a second documentary to publicize the need for continued support of

Mozambicans after independence. Van Lierop produced this film both as a political and social documentary and as a tool for raising funds for a rural health center and maternity clinic in Mozambique for which there was a dire need. Like A Luta Continua, O Povo

16 Ironically, the name of the propaganda newsletter published by RENAMO was also ―A Luta Continua.‖ Vines, RENAMO, 34. 274

Figure 3: President Samora Machel receiving a $42,000 check from Robert Van Lierop. Organizado was used by Van Lierop to raise awareness of the fight against colonialism in southern Africa, to build solidarity with this cause within the community by showing parallels between the oppression suffered by black Mozambicans and black Americans, and to provide a model of black nation-building. Van Lierop appealed to African

Americans to support the Mozambique Film Project, stating that the project began with the premise that there were thirty million Blacks in the United States and that, though most were poor, even they could spend $1.00 on entertainment, thus potentially raising

$30 million. The Mozambique Film Project had a more modest goal of $40,000. 17

O Povo Organizado, a finalist in the Chicago International Film Festival and honored as ―The Best Film of 1977‖ by the Black Filmmakers, premiered throughout the

United States and Canada. 18 The film resonated with the rhetoric of revolutionary black nationalists. It was shown on television, at schools, in churches, and to small militant groups with the objective of promoting the understanding that the process of social revolution did not end when the gunfire stopped.

Demonstrating the continuing partnership between Africans and American activists, Mozambican Minister of Foreign Affairs and future president (1986-2004),

Joaquim Chissano attended the New York premiere on 25 September 1977, the 11th anniversary of the launching of FRELIMO‘s armed struggle. In keeping with Van

Lierop‘s vision for the film as a vehicle for building solidarity between the African

American community and revolutionary Africa, the majority of the $10.00 tickets for this premiere, which raised $14,000, were sold at the Liberation Bookstore in Harlem, and

17 Harry Amana, ―Filmmaker Leads Fundraising Efforts for Mozambique Hospital,‖ The Philadelphia Tribune, November 2, 1976. Van Lierop, ―Transnational Dimension.‖ 18 ―Van Lierop Wins Black Film Award,‖ New York Amsterdam News, 4 March 1978, D3. 275 ninety percent of the audience was African American.19 Mozambique‘s Ambassador to the United Nations (1975-1983), Jose Carlos Lobos, attended the 9 December 1976 San

Francisco premiere, which raised $6,000, as did famed African American activist and author, Maya Angelou.

Prexy Nesbitt also continued to support FRELIMO through his advocacy within the Mozambique Support Network ―to do forums and put out publicity about what was being done to Mozambique‖ and to discourage U.S. policymakers from supporting the war of destabilization that had been launched against FRELIMO by Southern Rhodesia

(now Zimbabwe.)20 By 1976, Mozambique was suffering not only the devastating legacy of Portuguese colonialism, but FRELIMO was plagued by internal strife. It also suffered regional and international resistance by anti-communist and white supremacist states.

These forces coalesced in the months following independence and boiled into a war lasting from 1977-1992.

FRELIMO‘s domestic problems were exacerbated by the devastation wrought by guerilla war, including the displacement and death of peasants who fed the guerilla army and suffered repercussions from the Portuguese army.21 Distrusting FRELIMO‘s assertion of racial equality and fearing its nationalization of private enterprises, the majority of white settlers returned to Portugal, destroying much of the modern infrastructure and siphoning technical knowledge from the new state. The party had

19 Roberta Washington, ―Documenting the Struggle in Mozambique: Profile of a Film-maker,‖ Southern Africa Magazine (April 1977), 31. 20 Prexy Nesbitt interview with author, 3 August 2009. 21 For more regarding Portuguese suppression of the liberation movement, see Arriaga, The Portuguese Answer. An event that received international attention was the Wiriyamu massacre of several hundred villagers by Portuguese in the Tete province in December 1972. MacQueen, Decolonization, 48 and Munslow, Mozambique: the Revolution and its Origins, 125. 276 tenuous control of the state‘s economy because most of its income came from contracted migrant labor and port usage agreements with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.22

FRELIMO also alienated many traditional leaders and peasants through its program for creating ―new men and new women‖ that included destruction of tribalism, promotion of equality for women, and redistribution of land.23 This domestic turmoil provided the opportunity for the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) to implement its plan, formed in 1973, to destabilize the Mozambican government.

Ken Flower, head of the CIO, plotted to create a subversive organization comprised of Mozambican dissidents, particularly disaffected Portuguese, after

FRELIMO and the Zimbabwean National Liberation Army (ZANLA) engaged in a joint offensive in the Tete province bordering Southern Rhodesia. Scholar Alex Vines explains in his iconic text regarding the destabilization efforts and resulting that ―these plans were revived in 1975, because of the now independent

Mozambique FRELIMO government‘s hostility towards the Rhodesian UDI, its support of ZANLA and its closing of Mozambique‘s borders with Rhodesia.‖24 The

22 Southern Rhodesia needed the Mozambican port of Beira to export goods, and South Africa used the harbors of the capital city. The Cabora Bassa in the Tete Province also supplied electricity exclusively to South Africa. Although the Cabora Bassa Dam supplied only 8% of the energy used by South Africa at this time, the dam was, from its inception, a Portuguese project meant to intertwine the Mozambican and South African economies further. The project was also leveraged by American activists to publicize the United States government‘s support for Portuguese colonialism because of EX-IM loans to Portugual that allegedly helped to fund the construction of the dam. An article in Southern Africa reported that an American development company was lending Portugal $28 million for the construction. Additionally, the South African government would provide $49 million in the first four years of commercial operation of the dam. ―The Portuguese Territories,‖ Southern Africa 3:11 (November 1969), 23. For more information, see Keith Middlemas, Cabora Bassa: Engineering and Politics in Southern Africa (London: Weidentfeld and Nicolson, 1975) 23 This was especially true in provinces such as Nampula, Manica, Sofala, Gaza and Inhambane where FRELIMO had made little penetration during the years of armed struggle. 24 Alex Vines, Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique, Rev. and updated ed. (York, [England]: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, 1996), 16. 277

Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), a Rhodesian anti-FRELIMO organization operating in Mozambique, masqueraded as a legitimate opposition party. Its anti- communist/pro-democracy propaganda appealed to certain right-wing factions in

European nations such as Portugal, West Germany and France, in the United States, and in South Africa.

Due to its own organizational crisis caused by the death of its leader, Andre

Matsangaissa, and the December 1979 agreement negotiating the transition to a legal government in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, RENAMO would have been destroyed were it not for the intervention of the South African military intelligence organization (MID).

South African support of RENAMO‘s early efforts at destabilization was small.

At the time of the organization‘s conception, the South African government under B.J.

Vorster had tacitly agreed not to support Mozambican dissidents if FRELIMO did not harbor militant Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) cadres and other ANC adherents. The situation changed, however, with the ascension of the militant Prime

Minister P.W. Botha and the increased incursions of the ANC into southern Mozambique in 1978. Botha espoused a ―Total National Strategy,‖ creating a buffer region around

South Africa to protect it from anti-apartheid forces (as well as resist the domestic Black

Consciousness movement).25 The MID began supplying weapons to RENAMO and propagandizing on behalf of the terrorist organization. By 1980, RENAMO had been successfully transferred to the auspices of the South African Special Forces. Under South

25 For more regarding the Black Consciousness Movement, see Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) and Johns and Davis, Mandela, Tambo and the African National Congress, 194-216. 278

African control, RENAMO concentrated its assaults on economic and communications targets. South African forces also made covert assaults on alleged ANC supply lines and facilities within the Mozambican capital of Maputo.

By 1983, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker had devised a policy of ―constructive engagement‖ in southern Africa that pressured South

Africa to reassess its strategy towards Mozambique. In part as a result of Crocker‘s diplomacy and the war devastation, P.W. Botha and Samora Machel agreed to negotiate a non-aggression pact, the on 16 March 1984, which called for the mutual end of support for opposition forces and respect for the sovereignty of each nation.26

The Nkomati Accord, although souring the relationship between FRELIMO and the ANC, failed to stop South African military support of RENAMO. In fact, RENAMO offensives intensified after the agreement. In 1985, RENAMO also created an office in

Washington, D.C., the Mozambique Research Center, to lobby for financing and political support from right-wing, anti-Communist organizations. The members of the

Mozambique Support Network combated the efforts by right-wing RENAMO supporters, including Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), White House adviser Pat Buchanan, Free the

Eagle (funded by the Heritage Foundation), the Center for International Private

Enterprise and Democracy, and the Committee for Survival of a Free Congress.27

Although the right-wing advocates had supporters within the Defense Department and intelligence agencies, the United States government did not officially provide aid to

26 Vines, RENAMO, 20 and Houser, No One Can Stop the Rain, 308. A copy of the Nkomati Accord is available on the Conciliation Resources website, < http://www.c-r.org/our- work/accord/mozambique/nkomati-talks.php>, accessed 6 January 2009. 27 William Minter, Apartheid‘s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994), 157. Prexy Nesbitt interview with author. 279

RENAMO. The work of the Mozambique Support Network and its impact on U.S. foreign policy during the Carter and Reagan administrations is a topic for further scholarship.

Revelations regarding RENAMO atrocities, including the Homoine massacre of over 400 people in July 1987, and the publication of the Gersony Report (the findings of

Robert Gersony, a US State Department consultant, in connection with his investigation of the refugee situation in Mozambique) slowed right-wing support of RENAMO to a near halt by 1990. It was not until the signing by Mozambican president Joaquim

Chissano and RENAMO leader, , of the Rome General Peace Accord on 4 October 1992 that war ended in Mozambique.

Forty-two years after FRELIMO‘s first president Eduardo Mondlane and Z. K.

Matthews of the ANC spoke at the 1952 North American Assembly on Africa, the tactics and perseverance of the network of American activists that they helped to mobilize were rewarded. The transnational nature of this network resulted in the transformation of both the African and American movements for social justice and racial equality. The early efforts of this transnational network inspired international pressures against colonialism in southern Africa in the 1960-1970s and, in the 1980s, sanctions against apartheid. This external pressure, combined with the internal pressure of black South Africans, precipitated the election of the ANC‘s Nelson Mandela to the South African presidency in May 1994, and the writing of the most democratic constitution in the world. Six

280 months later, on 27-8 October 1994, the first multi-party elections were held in

Mozambique, with the FRELIMO party retaining the leadership of the government.28

28 Joaquim Chissano became president of Mozambique after the death of Samora Machel in an airplane crash on 19 October 1986. 281

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INTERVIEWS

Brown, Earl Houser, George Mondlane, Janet Nhambiu, João Nesbitt, Prexy Van Lierop, Robert

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―Africo-American Projects Underway.‖ Africa Today 1, no. 1 (April 1, 1954): 3-4.

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———. ―The United Nations in Action -- The Cameroons Plebiscite.‖ The Oberlin Alumni Magazine, October 1961.

―Nkrumah Warns Communists on Gold Coast.‖ Africa Today 1, no. 1 (April 1, 1954): 2.

O‘Sullivan, Christopher. ―The United Nations, Decolonization, and Self-Determination in Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-1994.‖ Journal of Third World Studies 22, no. 2 (2005): 103-120.

Penvenne, Jeanne Marie. ―João dos Santos Albasini (1876-1922): The Contradictions of Politics and Identity in Colonial Mozambique.‖ The Journal of African History 37, no. 3 (January 1, 1996): 419-464.

Schechter, Dan, Ansara, Michael, and Kolodney, David, eds. ―The CIA as an Equal Opportunity Employer.‖ Ramparts (June 1969): 25-33.

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Shepherd, George W. ―Africa Today‘s 35 Year Chronicle of the African Freedom Struggle: An Editorial.‖ Africa Today 36, no. 1 (March 1, 1989): 3-5. e Silva, Teresa Cruz. ―The Influence of the Swiss Mission on Eduardo Mondlane (1930- 1961).‖ Journal of Religion in Africa 28, no. 2 (May 1998): 187-209.

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NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

―2,500 Students to Attend Volunteer Movement Confab.‖ Atlanta Daily World, December 19, 1951.

―3 U.S. Groups Help Rebels, Lisbon Says.‖ New York Times, September 13, 1964.

―An Appeal by Black Americans for United States Support to Israel.‖ New York Times, June 28, 1970.

Baldwin, James. ―A Negro Assays the Negro Mood.‖ New York Times, March 12, 1961.

―Call 100 Top Leaders to 3-Day Summit Meet.‖ Chicago Daily Defender (Daily Edition), November 19, 1962.

Committee of Black Americans for Truth about the Middle East. ―An Appeal by Black Americans against United States Support of the Zionist Government of Israel.‖ New York Times, November 1, 1970.

―Did Ford Foundation Grant Aid to Mozambique Liberation Effort?‖ Pittsburgh Courier, January 2, 1965.

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UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS

Armstrong, Winifred. ―Issues at the United Nations of Particular Concern to African States.‖ Unpublished paper, n.d.

Cleary, David. Race, Nationalism, and Social Theory in Brazil: Rethinking Gilberto Freyre. Working paper. Transnational Programme of the Economic and Social Research Council. Oxford: University of Oxford, 1999. http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/cleary.pdf.

Houser, George. ―A Report on a Journey through Rebel Angola‖, 1962.

Jones Rich, Evelyn. ―United States Government-Sponsored Higher Education Programs for Africans: 1957-1970 with Special Attention to the Role of the African- American Institute‖. Dissertation, New York: Columbia University, 1978.

Mondlane, Eduardo C. "Role Conflict, Reference Group and Race". Dissertation, Chicago: Northwestern University, 1957.

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———. ―Woodrow Wilson and the Idea of Self Determination in Africa‖. Woodrow Wilson Foundation, April 2, 1962.

Mondlane, Eduardo C., and William Minter. ―The Future of Mozambique‖ presented at the Brazil and Portuguese Africa, University of California, February 27, 1968.

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Mondlane, Eduardo. ―Old Roots in African Educations.‖ In America‘s Emerging Role in Overseas Educations, edited by Clarence W. Hunnicutt. Syracuse: Syracuse University School of Education, 1962.

———. The Struggle for Mozambique. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969.

New York Civil Liberties Union. Police on Campus: The Mass Police Action at Columbia University, Spring, 1968. New York: New York Civil Liberties Union, 1969.

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SECONDARY PUBLICATIONS

Abshire, David M, and Michael A Samuels, eds. Portuguese Africa: a Handbook. New York: Praeger, 1969.

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———. Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church Inthe United States and South Africa. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

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