Hawaii V. Mankichi, 190 US

HAWAII v. MANKICHI. 190 U. S. Syllabus. the patent be subject to cancellation, we see nothing to prevent the railroad company from again selecting the same land to make good its losses within the limits of its primary grant, no intermediate rights being shown to have accrued. If such be the fact, it would be useless to direct the cancellation of the patent, as it would become the duty of the land department to issue immediately a new one for the same tproperty. Ge7,mania Iron Company v. United States, 165 U. S. 379; United States v. Central Pacific Railroad Company, 26 Fed. Rep. 4:79. The decrees of the courts below are therefore reversed and the case remanded to the Circuit Court for the District of Ore- gon with directions to dismiss the bill. MR. JUsTICE IVoKENNA, having filed the bill in this case as Attorney General, did not participate in this decision. HAWAII v. MANKICHI. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII. No. 219. Argued Mlarch 4, 5,1903.-Decided June 1, 1903. In interpreting a statute the intention of the lawmaking power will pre- vail even against the letter of the statute; a thing may be within the letter of the statute and not within its meaning, and within its meaning, though not within its letter. Smythe v. Fisk, 23 Wallace, 374. In in- serting in the Resolution of July 7, 1898, annexing Hawaii, a provision that municipal legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States should remain in force until Congress otherwise deter- mined, Congress did not intend to impose upon the islands every clause of the Constitution, and to nullify convictions and verdicts which might, be- fore the legislature could act, be rendered in accordance with existing legislation of the islands but not in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, nor was such the intention of Hawaii in surrendering its autonomy. The conviction of one who, between August 12, 1898, and June 14, 1900, ac- was tried on information and convicted by a jury not unanimous, in OCTOBER TERM, 1902. Argument for Appellant. 190 U. S. cordance with legislation of the Republic of Hawaii existing at the time of the annexation, is legal notwithstanding it is not in compliance with the provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. THIS was a petition by iManldchi for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his release from the Oahu convict prison, where he -is confined upon conviction for manslaughter, in alleged viola- tion of the Constitution, in that he was tried upon an indictment not found by a grand jury, and convicted by the verdict of nine out of twelve jurors, the other three dissenting from the verdict. Following the usual course of procedure in the Republic of Hawaii, prior to its incorporation as a Territory of the United States, the prisoner was tried upon an indictment much in the form of an information at common law, by the Attorney Gen- eral, and endorsed "a true bill found this fourth day of May, A. D. 1899. A. Perry, first judge of the Circuit Court," etc. From an order of the United States District Court discharg- ing the prisoner the Attorney General of the Territory ap- pealed to this court. .I. Mdmund P. Dole, attorney general of the Territory of Hawaii, and -Mr. Solicitor General Richards for appellant. I. At the time of the cession, the Hawaiian Islands constituted a sovereign and independent nation, with a government of its own, republican in form, and a civilized system of law, civil and criminal, defining rights and affording remedies. The courts were open and due process of law provided. At the same time, as in some of our States, grand juries were not used nor unanimous verdicts required to convict. Republic v. Edwards, 11 Haw. Rep. 571, 579. The statute which enacts that a verdict by nine jurors is sufficient was held to be constitutional in T/ie King v. Andreas Camacho, 3 Haw. Rep. 385. By the treaty of annexation which was formally consented to by the Republic of Hawaii and submitted to this country, a cession was proposed upon certain terms and conditions which were stated. By the passage of the resolution of annexation the offer of cession was accepted and the islands annexed "as HAWAII v. MANKICHI. 190 U. S. Argument for Appellant. a part of the territory of the United States" upon the terms stated in the treaty and incorporated in such resolution. This resolution contains special provisions with respect to the public lands of Hawaii, the customs regulations and relations of the islands, the public debt of the Republic, the immigration of Chinese, and certain general and significant provisions securing the continuance of the government and laws of the Republic during the transition period and until Congress should provide a new and permanent government. II. That Congress had power thus to provide a temporary government, not subject to all the restrictions of the Constitu- tion, until it could frame a permanent government and incorporate the islands as a part of the United States, was held by this court in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244. That the resolution of annexation did not incorporate the islands within the United States and render them subject to all the limitations of the Constitution applicable throughout the United States, was evidently the view of the justices who constituted the majority of the court in the Downes case. The provision that "no Chinese, by reason of anything herein contained, shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Hawaiian Islands," is totally inconsistent with the theory that Congress intended by the resolution to incorporate the islands as an integral part of the United States, or extend the Constitution over them. III. The use of the qualifying words "not contrary to the Constitution of the United States," after the words "the municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands," did not carry the Constitution into the islands and render void and inoperative every provision of the law of the Hawaiian Islands contrary to any of its limitations. The Hawaiian method of indicting and convicting criminals was an integral part of the criminal law of the islands. The resolution provided that the existing "municipal legislation" should remain in force until Congress should otherise determine. There was no provision for mod- ifying or amending it. To strike down the law of criminal procedure was to deprive the government of Hawaii of the power to preserve order and protect persons and property. It OCTOBER TERM, 1902. Argument for Appellant. 190 U. S. is not to be presumed that either party to the contract of cession intended this. The interpretation placed by President McKinley upon the resolution of annexation appears in the instructions for the transfer of sovereignty in which he directed "that the civil, judicial, and military powers in question shall be exercised by the officers of the Republic of Hawaii as it existed just prior to the transfer of sovereignty." The status in the islands after the transfer of sovereignty under the resolution, is described by the Supreme Court of Ha- waii in the Edwards Case, 11 Haw. Rep. 571, 578. IV. If Congress had intended, by the resolution of annexation, to extend to the Hawaiian Islands our grand and petit jury system, it would have made some provision to that end. See the organic act "To provide a government for the Territory of Hawaii," passed April 30, 1900. 31 Stat. 141. In this measure Congress provided that the islands should be known as the Territory of Hawaii, sec. 2; established a territorial government, sec. 3; made all persons who were citizens of the Re- public of Hawaii on August 12, 1898 (the date of the transfer of sovereignty), citizens of the United States, sec. 4; and provided that the Constitution and laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, with certain exceptions, should have the same force and effect within said Territory as elsewhere within the United States, sec. 5. The organization of the islands, their incorporation as a Territory of the United States, and the extension to them of. the Constitution and laws of the United States, necessarily brought them, and for the first time, within the operation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and therefore required the enactment of the law amending the law of civil and criminal procedure so as to extend our grand and petit jury system there. If, by the resolution of annexation, the Constitution was ex- tended to the islands, and our grand jury and petit jury system put in force there, why were these provisions inaugwrating our grand jury and petit jury system inserted in the organic act? All these provisions look to the future. It is obvious that Congress, in making them, acted in the belief that the Ha- HAWAII v. MANKICHI.2 S201 190 U. S. Argument for Appellant. waiian law with respect to indictments and verdicts had con- tinued in force during the transition period and would remain operative until the organic act should take effect. V. But what was the meaning and effect of the qualifying words "not contrary to the Constitution of the United States," used in the resolution? It is argued they must be held to extend the Constitution, with all its limitations, or be rejected altogether. No such alternative exists. The words had a meaning, and the meaning is plain. They were not employed to extend the Constitution.

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