Journal of THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

ISSN 0312-5807 VOLUME 19 NUMBER 4 NOVEMBER 1993 The Australian Naval Institute Inc.

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The main objects of the Institute are: to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the navy and the maritime profession, to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the navy and the maritime profession, and to publi sh a journal. The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit making. All publications of the Institute will stress that authors express their own views and opinions, which are not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters. The membership of the Institute falls in the following categories: Regular Membership - open to members of the RAN or ANR and persons who, having qualified for regular membership, subsequently leave the service. Associate Membership - open to all other persons, not qualified to be regular members, who profess an interest in the aims of the Institute. Honorary Membership - conferred upon persons who have made a distinguished contribution to the navy or maritime profession or rendered service to the Institute. DISCLAIMER VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS JOURNAL ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHORS AND NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, THE CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF OR THE INSTITUTE. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The Australian Naval Institute is grateful for the assistance provided by the corporations listed below. They are demonstrating their support for the aims of the Institute by being members of the "friends of the Australian Naval Institute" coteri e: Australian Defence Industries Rockwell Systems Australia Blohm+Voss Stanilite Electronics Computer Sciences of Australia GEC Marconi Jeumont Schneider Division Westinghouse Electric Atlas Elektronik (Australia) CelsiusTech Ansett Australia Thomson Sintra Pacific Scientific Management Associates Telecom JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

ISSN 0312-5807 VOLUME 19 NUMBER 4 NOVEMBER 1993

DEPARTMENTS From the Editor 2 From the President 3 Letters to the Editor 6 Washington Notes 9 Book Reviews 63 Book of the Quarter 67 Advertising 68 Guide to Authors 69 Counci1 of the ANI 70

FEATURES

The Development of Maritime and Maritime Air Forces in the Region Commander James Goldrick, RAN 17 Women in Surface Combatants Lieutenant Commander Peter Jones, RAN 23

Strategic Implications for Australia and the Region of Developments in Maritime Power in East, Southeast and South Asia Captain Jack McCaffrie, RAN 29 HMAS Rustbucket Lieutenant Jon Sparks, RAN 41 The Rationale for the Naval Control of Shipping in New Zealand Commander S.M. Duff, VRD* RNZNVR 45

A Fall from Favour: HMAS Australia, 1913 to 1924 Ray Jones 53

Cover Photograph - Naval Photographic Unit - Sydney 2 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 FROM THE EDITOR Dick Sherwood also reflects the balance that I highlighted I would try to achieve as editor. That said, however, I would still lament the fact that I receive very little input from the younger members of the naval fraternity, although hopefully that may change in the future, especially if the steady increase in younger members joining, continues into 1994 and beyond. Turning to what this issue brings, I am confident we offer some good stimulating reading over the holiday period. There are two excellent papers of Maritime Force Developments in our region, one by the old AN I Journal veteran - James Goldrick, and the other by another past member who has returned to the fold - Captain Jack McCaffrie. But perhaps the most interesting and perhaps topical piece is the one by Peter Jones. It of course is about the It is now a little over twelve months issue of women serving in combatants. since I took over the reins from Don There is also a good article by a Agar as the editor of the journal, and younger member on possible future it has been a very rewarding one directions for ship's husbandry and an indeed. Like most things in life though historical piece on HMAS Australia I. the fruits that we get to enjoy are The Photographic Competition continues usually from the seeds so carefully to run, but members should be mindful sown by those who preceded us. In this of the deadline date for entries (see respect I owe much to Don and the the notice on page 5). We once again Editorial Board which oversaw the offer a Book of the Quarter in the form movement towards the new style journal of the Navy Annual, and at a very and in trying to overcome some of the competitive price to our members. problems associated with obtaining suitable material for publishing and Finally, a reminder about the Annual which had plagued the editor for some General Meeting on Thursday 24 February time. 1994 and of the need to check the top left hand corner of the mailing label The first journal that I saw to to ascertain financial state, with production contained material obtained renewals due for those who have a from a variety of sources, and although figure less than 94. These should be excellent in its content was not paid by the end of March 1994. specifically commissioned for the Journal, and in one case had been To all our readers from all involved in published elsewhere. Additionally, I putting together the journal in 1993 lamented at the time of having no may we wish you a Merry Christmas and a material for the next issue, February prosperous 1994. I trust we have been 1993. able to bring to you some satisfaction throughout 1993, and I personally look Of course since February this year we forward to going back to being a have been lucky with material and this contributor during 1994 and beyond. issue reflects articles that were written especially for the journal and November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 3 FROM THE PRESIDENT Don Chalmers There is much though to be achieved - we do provide a forum for debate - a forum in which I encourage you all to participate and one which all our members should encourage others to join. As the Asia Pacific region develops and aligns I wonder how we as a maritime trading partner and medium maritime force might become more actively engaged. Will our own self reliant journey provide us with a niche naval equipment market and can we use that to our advantage. Are we going to see instability in the South China Sea? Do we need to be involved and in what sort of regime? Is there a place for UN maritime peacekeeping or will coalition maritime forces acting in loose association in support of UN Security Council Resolution be the future modus operandi and how might these concepts be applied This will be my last introduction as in, say, the South_ China Sea? President of The Institute, for, as Our region is becoming more maritime many of you will know, I relieved Rear orientated, we have to build a Maritime Admiral Walls as Maritime Commander on Bridge Into Asia and we need to 6 December, and due to the Council understand how we can best influence being Canberra based will of necessity and be constructively engaged in the had to resign. emerging maritime awakening of our Much has been achieved by a very neighbours to the North. vibrant Council during the last 2 I look forward to The Institute making years. Membership is growing, we are a significant contribution. I thank you financially in a sound state, the all for having me as your President for coterie of friends is increasing, the the last two years or so and I thank journal is moving towards being a the Council for their hard work. quality flagship and our involvement in maritime seminars as a co-sponsor has Good luck. progressed. *.-a

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It outsmarts the most sophisticated mines I he DYAD Emulation Sweep: a key part of ADI's Minesweeping and Surveillance System, in use with the Royal Australian Navy The DYAD sweep of ADI's Minesweeping and conditions and is in service with the Royal Surveillance System (AMASS) can be configured to Australian Navy. The system is supplied and produce the magnetic and acoustic signatures marketed solely by ADI. of ships of all types. Because these signatures are Whether deployed as a comprehensive system completely ship-like, the mine acts as if an actual or used individually, the self contained elements vessel has passed over it and the sweep will defeat of AMASS provide the most cost effective even the most modern mine logic. minesweeping system available. The DYAD sweep is just one element of For further information contact: General AMASS, which complements existing minehunting Manager, Australian Defence Industries Ltd, Mine techniques to counter both moored and ground Warfare Development, 10-12 Brisbane Avenue, (influence) mines. Because of the versatile and Barton, ACT 2600, Australia. Tel: +61 6 270 6756. modular nature of AMASS and the fact that Fax: +61 6 270 6797. specialist towing ships are not required, AMASS provides a comprehensive and cost effective mine countermeasures capability. The system, which was initially developed by the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation, has been proved under operational ADI November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 5

FILM AUSTRALIA

The Australian Naval Institute and Film Australia Present the Inaugural Naval and Maritime1.

PHOTOGRAPHIC CONTEST.

The Australian Naval Institute and Film 6. Full captions and the Australia are proud to cosponsor the photographer's name, address, and inaugural Naval and Maritime ANI membership number must be Photographic Contest. printed or typed on a separate sheet of paper and attached to the The contest is open to both amateur and back of each print or to the professional photographers who are transparency mount. (Do not write members of the ANI. The winning directly on the back of the print. photographs will be published in a 1994 No staples pi ease.) issue of The Journal of the Australian Naval Institute. Cash prizes will be 7. Entries may not have been awarded as follows: previously published, and winners may not be published prior to 1st Prize $500 2nd Prize $300 publication in the Journal of- the 3rd Prize «200 Australian Naval Institute. Prior Honourable Mention 100 each publication could result in relinquishment of prize awarded. ENTRY RULES 8. Only photographs accompanied by 1. Each photograph must pertain to a self-addressed, stamped envelopes naval or maritime subject. (The will be returned. photo is not limited to the calendar year of the contest). DEADLINE: 28 FEBRUARY 1994. 2. Limit: 5 Entries per member. 3. Entries must be either black-and- Write for details or mail entries to: white prints, colour prints, or NAVAL & MARITIME PHOTOGRAPHIC CONTEST colour transparencies. ANI PO Box 80 4. Minimum print size is 127mm x Campbell ACT 2601 178mm. Phone: 266 6873 5. Minimum transparency size is 35mm. (No glass mounted transparencies please.) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 LETTERS TO THE EDITOR The Editor Journal of the Australian Naval Institute HMAS Voyager - Dr Tom Frame Voyager well before the arrival of Captain Duncan Stevens in January 1963, While I have no wish to prolong the I judged that those who served in the debate over my book Where Fate Calls: ship throughout that period, such as The HMAS Voyager Tragedy which was Rear Admiral Sir David Martin, would be prompted in these pages by J.A. a much more reliable source of Robertson [Journal of the ANI, August information. I do not agree that J.A. 1992], I want to use Sam Bateman's Robertson was in any special position unfortunate letter [Journal of the ANI, to make judgements about the Cabban August 1993] attacking my rejoinder to Statement other than the incident Robertson [Journal of the ANI, May described in the statement which 1993] to make several points about the referred to him. And in that matter, as discipline of history that do need seem I have already written, it is purely a to be understood. matter of accepting J.A. Robertson's Sam Bateman alleges that in writing word about what happened over that of about the HMAS Voyager tragedy, I got Cabban. 1 'two things wrong . His description of As for the second matter of opinion what I got 'wrong' relates to two mentioned by Bateman, that of disputed matters of opinion. This criticism is signal traffic between Melbourne and illogical. It seems to me that opinions Voyager prior to the collision, I are neither right nor wrong. We might should mention that I was much say that one opinion is to be favoured persuaded in arriving at my conclusions over another because it is more by Captain John Robertson's own compelling or persuasive. We might say interpretation of this aspect. In the same thing in relation to Captain Robertson's private papers, to judgements or assertions. Bateman which I was given complete access by should have said that he could not his family, there was a comprehensive accept my conclusions because the analysis of what might have occurred on opinions and judgement on which they Voyager's bridge. In developing a range were based were unconvincing, or of possible scenarios, Captain whatever other ground he had in mind. Robertson was assisted by a number of But his criticism, albeit wrongly put, senior officers. As one of the most contains another issue on which I wish experienced communicators serving in to comment. the RAN at that time, I felt that The first matter of opinion criticised Captain Robertson's opinions carried a by Bateman concerns my alleged failure great deal of weight which ought to be to have captured 'the 'scuttlebutt' of reflected in my conclusions. I was also the period, particularly with regard to able to explore more fully some of the the veracity of the Cabban statement'. technical details with the Fleet Does he mean by this that I should have Communications Officer of 1964, the given greater credence to mess deck then Lieutenant Commander John Snow, buzzes, unverifiable hearsay and whose knowledge and recollections of unsubstantiated innuendo? And from whom the period and the people was should I have elicited this 'evidence'? invaluable. Having canvassed the expert opinion of Captain John Robertson and In researching Where Fate Calls I made Commodore John Snow, in addition to a point of immersing myself in the mood familiarising myself with the full of the period. This included speaking range of theories which emerged during with the majority of the Voyager the four year life of the controversy, survivors and with anyone else who had I welt entitled to make some strong first-hand knowledge of Voyager 1963-64 conclusions about what might have commission. As J.A. Robertson departed occurred. November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 7

I do not believe that I would have policy is as sickening as it is varied those conclusions to any great uncritical. Senator Evans even gains extent on the basis of an opinion accolades for attempting "to leave offered by J.A. Robertson. This is not behind Australia's colonialist to imply that he does not possess an dependant and isolationist image". expert opinion. He certainly does. But it is to say that every historian must It is too common to find papers reeking choose his sources carefully as the of the attitude that Australian constraints of time and travel makes strategic thinking began with Paul some selectivity unavoidable. Dibb. It is a little surprising to find, this in an essay that purports to There is one other aspect of Bateman's provide a historical overview of an letter worthy of critique. Historians aspect of Australian strategic policy. are always keen to refute the heresy There is no reference to a single espoused by people not trained in the Australian policy document or statement discipline of history that the view of that predates the 1987 white paper. someone 'who was there' is to be preferred over the carefully researched According to the essay: and refined interpretation of the "In the past the region has been historian. I can detect this heresy in characterised by relative Bateman's letter. He inters that stability...", a feature supposedly because J.A. Robertson was service in changed since the end of the Cold the Navy at the time of the Voyager War. Which past? For most of the tragedy, he is in a much better Cold War the region was rife with position to pass authoritative comment insurgency, rebellion and military on any and every aspect of the confrontati on. collision and its aftermath. Recent changes in the "global It needs to be understood that personal security stage... have to consider involvement in an event is not a their own security far more necessary precondition for being able seriously than in the past". to write about it as history. When this Strangely, I find it difficult to is appreciated the written record of imagine that the end of the Cold the RAN will be freed from some of its War has had as large an impact on earlier rather notorious subjectivity. the region as the less recent withdrawal of British forces from ANI Silver Medal Essay - Martin Dunn east of Suez, the Guam Doctrine, or Alchemy lives! The last issue of the the fall of South Vietnam. Journal published the ANI Silver Medal "the central theme of the [1987] winning essay (August 1993). Lead might white paper is the adoption of a be more appropriate for what is self reliant defence posture set presumably the best the Navy can offer. within a framework of Australia's The essay is directionless and regional and international disjointed, toadies the official line, alliances and agreements". The is devoid of innovation and, of course, innovation here must be is written in the driest style Service particularly subtle as I cannot writing can provide. distinguish it from the concept of self-reliance described in the 1976 Back in 1965, T.B. Millar observed that white paper. the unofficial slogan of the then only staff college was "cooperate to Before Gareth Evans, Australia's graduate". Millar explained: "As an approach to regional security "was officer rises higher in the service, based on alliances with Britain and the fruits of conformity become more the United States", we were seen as attractive; the penalty for non- "dependant and isolationist". conformity or indiscretion so much Evatt, Spender, Hasluck, et al, greater". This essay lives up to that must be turning over in their ideal. The enthusiasm for Government collective graves. Australia was 8 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993

never a tail to be wagged by the compared to their theoretical models. I great Western dog. On the contrary, was wrong. They simply served to much of our diplomatic effort aimed provide bibliography building. to make these otherwise uninterested allies pay attention The essay says that it "will provide to our region. historical evidence to suggest that Australia has used naval diplomacy in "Australia has abandoned equipment support of foreign policy objectives". and substitutionary [sic] forces After meandering through some current based assistance in favour of foreign policy and potted history of cooperative programs." There may be naval activity, including one longish a change of emphasis, but it is case study where we didn't, the essay hardly so dramatic. We still have ' concludes that we did. The reader is equipment projects: the Pacific thus left with only a suggestion. Patrol Boat and Iroquois to PNG, for example. We are still inclined At no point are the contemporary to send expeditionary forces to foreign policy and the associated naval Fiji, the Persian Gulf or Somalia activity discussed together, other than when it suits us. In the past we in the most general terms or the rather provided cooperative assistance, obvious case of the protest against and even supplied the Malaysians French nuclear testing. The essay with their chief of naval staff for freely draws inferences: "This was a period. clearly evident at the close of World War I... the expressed intent of The essay concludes that "Australia's arranging these visits is clear...'! strategic guidance, in the form of Mud might be clearer. DOA87 and Senator Evans' 1989 regional security statement is clear. Integrate While ship visits might be a form of with the region, invest and commit military diplomacy, they could also be resources." I'm sorry but it is not driven by considerations of training, clear to me - I must have different intelligence and morale. A ship visit copies of these documents. They deal does not in itself prove that naval solely with military and security diplomacy is being exercised. Sometimes relationships. Security policy is but a a very long bow is being drawn: the subset of foreign policy. There are inception of the colonial navies as a many Government statements and reports presence mission, the role of RAN ships on the economic importance of the in surrender ceremonies, etc. Asia-Pacific, but the essay quotes none Don't misinterpret me. I don't blame of them. Lieutenant Commander Marling for this. But enough of facts and their He, after all, succeeded in his aim: interpretation. What new thinking is having the RAN Staff College and the added by this essay? Australian Naval Institute proclaim his brilliance. The problem is systemic. When Sir James Cable and Ken Booth were Defence as an organisation wants to referred to early in the piece, I reward the compliant, the uninventive expected Australia's performance to be and the sycophantic. November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 9 WASHINGTON NOTES Tom A Friedman in the United States of America how it will continue to contract under the provisions of Secretary of Defence Les Aspin's "Bottom-up Review" of defence. We needed a thorough review of our defence establishment. For almost half a century, defence planning and defence procurement were centred on countering the forces of the Soviet Union. While the full impost of the break-up of the Soviet Union has yet to be realised, we know that we no longer face its tremendous strength along with that of the Warsaw Pact. So plans have to be redrawn and procurement restructured to provide the forces necessary to counter new threats to peace that seem to be cropping up on a daily basis. The review begun by asking the question of what we need defence for and what dangers face the United States now that I was browsing though thy "Business there is no Soviet Union. The Pentagon Opportunities" section of The Wall identified four such dangers: Street Journal recently when an opportunity nestled amidst offers to The first danger is from nuclear sell a John Deere agriculture equipment proliferation. Not proliferation in the business, a computerised bookkeeping old sense, namely how many nuclear and payroll processing service, a weapons the Soviets could deliver by frozen food storage plant and "the bomber or ICBM. The Defence Department ultimate monkey making machine" for now sees the nuclear threat as a small "intelligent, dedicated people with a number of weapons in the hands of need to make a lot of money" caught my terrorist organisations or states eye: delivered by unconventional means. Published reports have noted the FOR SALE Complete Projectile failure of our intelligence agencies to Manufacturing Process & Equipment of discover the extent of the Soviet NATIONAL DEFENCE CORPORATION...(3) nuclear armory. If you couple the real Fully Automated Twin 105mm HE inability to establish how many nuclear MI...Production Lines [Also Suitable devices the known nuclear powers have, for 80 to 120mm projectiles with coupled with the instability in the tooling changes] (1) 8" HE M106 former Soviet states, and combine this Projecti1e... Product!on Line [also with the increasing capacity of other suitable for 155 to 200mm projectiles nations to create and export nuclear with tooling changes]..RebuiIt and weapons, I would say the world is in at reconditioned to New specifications at least an equal amount of danger and a cost of over $32,000,000. All Four possibly more so than when the "good Lines are Currently in a high state of ol'Soviet Union" was around. readiness and available fo inspection to qualified buyers. The second danger is the ability to deal with regional bullies. Iraq and For some reason, this small advertise- North Korea are obvious examples. ment said a lot about the downsizing of the American defence establishment and Under the larger umbrella of threats to national security, dangers to democracy Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993

are seen as the third danger to the By 1999, the United States force United States. If the current democracy structure will be as follows: 10 active movement were to stall or be reversed, and five-plus reserve divisions in the the national security situation of the Army; 346 ships in the Navy, including United States would be considerably 11 aircraft carriers plus one carrier different. that is manned 20 percent by reservists and carrying a reserve air wing, and Secretary Aspin The fourth danger 45-55 attack submarines; 13 active and identified is the danger wrought by a seven reserve fighter wings plus up to weak economy. The Pentagon finally 184 bombers; and the Marine Corps will 1inked the economi c strength of the have five active brigades and one United States to i ts milltary strength, reserve division. The arms race may have helped bankrupt the Soviet Union, but it did not do us I find it hard to criticise the overall a heck of a lot of good either. plan as presented by Secretary Aspin. Many readers play the same war games The proposed size of the conventionally armed defence establishment is driven and run the same computer programs for Australia that American planners worked by the second danger, the risk of with in designing the Bottom-Up Review. regional conflicts. The Pentagon We can only hope that the games were determined that we need sufficient not rigged and that the computers were forces to meet an overseas presence in virus free. peacetime (primarily in Europe, Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia) plus Only one section of the report really a wide range of smaller scale concerns me while two others are what I operations that also will give us the consider real steps forward for the capability to fight and win two major servi ces. regional conflicts (MRCs) occurring nearly simultaneously. The plan will I continue to be concerned about the put us in a "win-win" situation instead Army's (and to a lesser extent, the of the current position of winning one Marine Corps') reliance on reserve MRC while holding the line in another forces, particularly in combat arms. In MRC until forces can be re-deployed to a world where American foreign policy bring battlefield victory ("win, hold, seems to be increasingly determined by win") . what is broadcast on CNN, the pictures of reservists being repeatedly torn The force structure under either the from their families and placed it "win-win" or "win, hold, win" scenarios harm's way could restrict the are very much alike. Under the former, President's ability to deploy forces. the primary losses are two regular Army How well, for example, would another divisions and two fully active aircraft mobilisation of Desert Storm veterans carriers. Under the latter, a be received? reserve/training carrier and the maintenance of the strength of the We have heard before how the Army Marine Corps somewhat redress the planned to improve the training of difference. I any event, to make all combat reserves. The Army now plans to this work, the following is necessary: enhance the readiness of brigades additional prepositioned equipment; rather than the whole National Guard additional airlift/sealift capability; divisions because it takes too long to improved anti-armour and precision improve readiness of full divisions. munitions; and improved Army National The Army may be on to something this Guard combat brigade readiness. Under time. We know the old way did not work. "win-win", however, the importance of But the jury still out on this one and additional prepositioned equipment and things do not look good for the particularly the expansion of lift defendant. capacity, is even more crucial because On a more positive note, and somewhat we will need to supply two major intertwined, is the provision for theatres of operations at the same enhanced lift capacity and the creation ti me. of a defence industrial policy. November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 11

I have never understood how the review calls for the building of an American aircraft industry, which additional Seawolf-cl ass submarine by provides civilian aircraft on budget the Electric Boat Company in order to and on time to the entire world, has maintain two nuclear capable such a difficult time doing the same shipbuilding facilities (which assumes for its own government. A cynic might that Newport News will continue to say that it is because the production build nuclear powered aircraft is for the government. carriers) so that skills needed to build submarines are not lost while a The C-17 is scheduled to be a successor new class of attack boats is being to the C-5 heavy transport. I say developed. "scheduled to be" because as I write its fate is being determined by I give DOD high marks for creating a Secretary Aspin. defence industrial policy. For the American government to create an Billions of dollars over budget and industrial policy in any sector of the years behind in development, the C-17 economy is a major change in direction. combines heavy lift capacity with the ability to take off and land on shorter As Secretary Aspin noted, the Defence runways than its predecessor (another Department's R&D budget allows it to aircraft plagued with cost overruns). develop amazing new technologies and it The problem DOD now faces is that it will continue to do so in the future. needs more heavy air transports because In the past, we have "weaponised" that the "win-win" scenario but we can technology while other countries have afford to by fewer of them. On the take-off products generated from our R other hand, with C-141s leaving service & D — from the fax machine to the and C-5s ready to be replaced, we VCR and commercialised it. From now cannot afford to go through another on, DOD will actively work with design process. Instead, as part of the civilian industry to see how American new defence industrial policy, firms can capitalise on the commercial Secretary Aspin should consider spin-offs of military R&D. This is a removing primary design and real "win-win" situation for the construction responsibilities from the civilian and defence sectors of the current contractor, McDonnell Douglas, economy. and assigning it to a competitor, like Earlier this year, President Bill Boei ng. Clinton promised that "the men and The American shipbuilding industry women who serve under the American flag already has benefited from the new will be the best trained, best industrial policy. While it is expected equipped, best prepared fighting force that some of the ships initially needed in the world, so long I am President." to enhance our prepositioning and heavy With tight budgets and "peace," this lift capacity will be taken up from promise may prove hard to keep. But the trade, other ships will have to be Bottom-Up Review provides a firm built and they will go a long way to foundation on which the President can save American shipbuilding capacity. build the solid, workable defence Even more important, the Bottom-Up establishment he has promised. A major partner in the rebirth of Australian shipbuilding

-...... •i Jw L.»VK

Australia's shipbuilding industry hand in hand with the principal players in owes its resurgence to a wide range of the defence industry and is a partner in the partnerships turned Ix-lwrcn major multi-billion dollar shipbuilding projects for Australian companies. the Royal Australian Navy's new Collins CSA, Australia's leading systems and Class Submarines and ANZAC Ships. software house, is the high technology This rebirth of a vital industry will partner, bringing a depth of experience bring additional benefits to Australia and and skills in test and training centres, companies in the partnerships, as they simulators and combat systems. turn their attention to the international Over the last 20 years, CSA has worked marketplace.

Computer Sciences of Australia Pty Limited A.C.N. 008 476 944 Sydney Canberra Melbourne Adelaide Auckland Newcastle Nowra • TURNKEY SYSTEMS • COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS • SIMULATORS AND TRAINERS • LOGISTICS SYSTEMS • NAVAI SHORE FACILITIES • ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS • COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS • AIRWAYS SYSTEMS • ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE SYSTEMS • AVIONICS SYSTEMS • WEAPONS SYSTEMS • SOFTWARE DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT. November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 13 The Development of Maritime and Maritime Air Forces in the Region. Commander James Goldrick, RAN

INTRODUCTION shipbuilding and aviation industries are a case in point. This paper is a survey of the development of maritime forces in South The Revolution in The Technology of and Southeast Asia. The focus is Maritime Warfare. This tends to primarily upon the ships and aircraft receive the least emphasis amongst themselves because they represent the commentators on the subject of security most accurate measurement of directions development in the region but it is in defence planning within the region. important nonetheless. Technological Nevertheless, this paper concentrates improvements have two important on trends rather than particular effects. First, information gathering countries or systems. It is also and management systems, both in terms important first, to establish the of individual units such as frigates or background to the developments in maritime patrol aircraft and of capability which we have seen in most, national strategic systems, have but not all countries in the region. developed to the point where the They are best summarised as follows: ability to gather and the ability to process information are vastly Economics. Most regional nations improved. The operational horizon - the possess an improved and improving distance out to which it could expect capacity to pay for capable and thus to sustain a picture sufficient to make expensive armaments. There is a clear tactical decisions •- of a frigate of relationship between continuing 1963 was in the region of 25 miles. It economic growth and the acquisition of is now approximately 200 miles and - modern arms, just as there is a dependent upon the systems to which it connection between stagnation and a has real time or near-real time access failure to acquire modern weapons. increasing all the time. One apparently Singapore, for example, has been able minor, but crucial element of this is to expand its armed forces considerably the proliferation of artificial aids to without much accompanying increase in position finding such as GPS NAVSTAR. the relative amount spent on defence To know where you are and where your because of the rate of growth in the consorts are is perhaps the most gross national product. The fundamental development in naval Philippines, on the other hand, have warfare since the invention of radar. been hamstrung in achieving any modernisation at all, while India The second effect is the unseen element represents an example of a country of ease of use. Not only do regional which has over-reached itself with nations have an ever improving human planned military programs out-running ability to operate high technology the capability of the economy to equipment. In a hardware sense, that support them. technology is increasingly easy to operate. A frigate built in 1963 Infrastructure. Nations which have combined high pressure steam turbine embarked upon the process of machinery and valve/analog based industrialisation possess an inherently weapons and sensors to produce a improved capacity to man, maintain and fighting machine which was capable but repair sophisticated weapons. There are intensely difficult to maintain and also motivations such as the desire to tune and impossible without large create a high technology industrial amounts of onboard stores and highly base which assist in promoting weapons expert maintainers. A frigate in 1993 and systems acquisitions. Or Habibie's has gas turbines or diesels -- easier to efforts in Indonesia with both 74 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993

maintain and operate - and solid state COMPARISONS control systems for both machinery and weapons and sensors. It is true that The accompanying graphs and tables the difficulties now come in the focus on the tonnage and numbers of software, but it is also true that turn ships and aircraft within the orders of key contracts can offer much. The battle of each nation. The reader contemporary warship can thus not only should look on these as indicating do more than its predecessor of 30 trends, rather than detailed facts. years ago, it can do it much more They are based wholly on open source easi1y. material, notably Jane's Fighting Ships with a leavening of other references. Security. In the last twenty years, The methodology for conducting a the focus in the region, particularly comparative examination of national in Southeast Asia, has moved away from armed forces is hard enough when the threat of internal insurgency or looking at the countries of the West; over-land assault to the maritime it is almost impossible elsewhere in dimension. The sea has become a the world. For example, there is no permeable border and illegal attempt to employ budgetary immigration, refugees and smuggling are information. The criteria by which perennial problems. There is thus an various countries draw up their defence increasing tendency to change the spending plans vary widely. In the case balance in regional defence budgets of nations such as China it has to be away from land forces to maritime and argued that the statistics are so air. It is, of course, a tendency that unreliable as to be useless. is not wholly welcomed by the politically powerful armies of several What these tables also cannot assess is regional powers, who have been used to the support infrastructure, the number regarding themselves as the premier days or hours spent at sea or in the service and the guardian of their air, the sophistication and frequency developing states. It is particularly of operational exercises, the level of interesting to watch the strategies training of billet personnel - and so which are being developed by Armies to on. The list seems almost endless. preserve their status - operational But they do indicate trends. Let us deployment forces and the United look first at the tonnage figures for Nations are often mentioned. Malaysia combatant craft and for support craft. is an example of this tendency. In order to include the important Resources and Boundaries. The concept coastal element, the figure of 100 tons of and the ability to exploit the standard displacement has been taken as Exclusive Economic Zone have changed a lower limit for both combatant and the nature of maritime strategy. support types. Nations are now not interested only in Graph 1, dealing with India and coastal defence but in the surveillance Pakistan, highlights the expansion of and control of fixed assets (such as the Indian Naval combatant forces from oil rigs) offshore and the dynamic 1983. The total has nearly tripled to resources within their EEZ, such as approximately 300,000 tons. By fisheries. The majority of the nations comparison, Pakistan has only undergone in the region have coastal or offshore incremental, albeit substantial territorial disputes with one or more increases. That there is another side of their neighbours. Most of these are of the coin for India, however, which minor questions in any context, but becomes clear when looking at the some - such as South Talpatty Island in support craft figures (Graph 2). The the Bay of Bengal between India and Indian tonnage has diminished Bangladesh and the vexed subject of the consi derably. Spratly Islands in the South China Sea - are not. It is particularly notable, in view of the suggestions that India has ambitions to deploy task groups and forces far afield, that the underway November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 15 replenishment capacity has not Graph 3 developed in any significant sense. COMBATANT CRAFT Only now, with one of only two fleet ABOVE 100 TONS tankers some 26 years old, is a third 14000 unit under construction. SRI LANKA 12000 BANGLADESH Graph 1 • BURMA 10000 COMBATANT CRAFT ABOVE 100 TONS 8000 300000

6000

4000

2000

73 83 93

Graph 4

SUPPORT CRAFT ABOVE 100 TONS 73 83

14000 SRI LANKA 12000 Graph 2 BANGLADESH -BURMA SUPPORT CRAFT 10000 ABOVE 100 TONS 8000

6000

4000

2000

Graph 5

COMBATANT CRAFT ABOVE 100 TONS

The other neighbours of India, have also expanded their forces. However, expansion, even in Sri Lanka with its insurgency problems, is progressive but not excessive. All these Navies, even Bangladesh with its frigates, are coastal/EEZ oriented (Graph 3). There is, however, a sensible balance between support and combatant elements (Graph 4). There are similar characteristics in 73 the expansion progress among the three leading powers of ASEAN (Graph 5). •r Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993

Graph 6 numbers) have recently been revised to show more reasonable figures. Starved SUPPORT CRAFT of Russian support, Vietnam's Navy has ABOVE 100 TONS got nowhere and the Philippines have 45000 ^—INDONESIA yet to achieve a real start on their 40000 n THAILAND own long talked about naval - *• MALAYSIA 35000 reconstruction program. One point of 30000 interest is that Chinese support craft have increased in tonnage, but this is 25000 - so far - more in the wider areas of 20000 support (such as submarine rescue 15000 vessels) than in underway task group 10000 resupply (Graph 8). Indeed, not only has China disposed of one fleet tanker 5000 to Pakistan, but another has been put 0 into commercial service. 73 83 93 Graph 7

COMBATANT CRAFT Indonesia has rebounded from the ABOVE 100 TONS reductions which followed on the removal of the old Soviet ships from inventory, but its expansion has not been breakneck, nor has that of Thailand or Malaysia. Support craft (Graph 6), have not experienced the same sort of expansion. Despite some acquisitions, such as the two Malaysian logistic support ships or the recent purchase of a British Rover class tanker by Indonesia, none of these navies possess the capability to operate for long periods at a distance from their own waters. Not shown on this graph, because it is still building, is the Thai helicopter carrier from Germany. This certainly Graph 8 does represent a departure from SUPPORT CRAFT previous ASEAN purchases. It may well ABOVE 100 TONS be a prestige buy more than anything 200000 «- PHILIPPINES else, but the key to its use will be in 180000 its airgroup - both numbers and types. ' VIETNAM At the time of writing, there have been 160000 -o-CHINA reports in the Bangkok press of a buy 140000 of up to eight second hand AV-8B 120000 Harriers. 100000 The picture is more mixed with three 80000 other actors in the region (Graph 7). 60000 China's tonnage is actually on the 40000 decrease, but this results from a slow 20000 removal of very large numbers of light craft matched against a rather slower construction of frigates and destroyers. In addition, the open source estimates of 'Old Ming' (such as The final trio is Singapore, Brunei and the bloated Chinese submarine force Papua New Guinea (Graphs 9 & 10). The November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 17 most Interesting actor is Singapore - equipped units. The accompanying tables steady increases in combatant strength divide up these into surface to surface and also steady increases in support missile equipped ships and surface to strength. The other two nations have air units. The latter are significant been relatively static in their force because possession in any sort of size. Singapore, of course, has numbers, particularly of area defence adjusted its strategy from one of a systems, implies a readiness to operate poisoned shrimp - that is, focused out from under friendly air cover and purely upon territorial defence to a thus at a greater distance from home trade protection strategy that terri tory. encompasses the length of the Malacca Straits and out to 500 miles in the Table 1, highlights how few SAM South China Sea. equipped ships there are apart from India and China. The figures for Graph 9 Singapore are perhaps warming the bell a little on their plans to fit the COMBATANT CRAFT Victory class corvettes with a point ABOVE 100 TONS 18000 defence missile system. That will happen in the next couple of years. 16000 -SINGAPORE BRUNEI China is perhaps the most significant 14000 PAPUA NEW GUINEA development. While the lack of afloat 12000 support, mentioned earlier must impact

10000 upon the Chinese Navy's ability to operate at long distances from China, 8000 the multiplication of Surface to Air 6000 missile equipped units on this scale is congruent with expressed intentions to 4000 ensure a capability to dominate the 2000 South China Sea. The difficulty, as

0 China seems to be discovering, is that 73 83 93 indigenous development of anti-air missiles designed against fast moving targets with any kind of electronic Graph 10 counter-measures capability is no easy matter. SUPPORT CRAFT ABOVE 100 TONS The second point concerns surface to 600 surface missiles. The numbers are SINGAPORE expanding, and the sort of missiles BRUNEI 500 PAPUA NEW which are at sea are increasingly more GUINEA sophisticated and long ranged. But - 400 note how long missiles have been out in the region. Several countries had them 300 at sea 20 years ago (indeed, Indonesia had SSM at sea 30 years ago). The first 200 Exocet missiles have been in the region for 20 years. So it is both untrue and 100 unfair to simply add the numbers of missile sales to the region up into one 0 t huge mass and suggest that there is a 73 83 93 proliferation problem. On the other hand, it will be obvious Missile Numbers. Tonnage figures give from the figures that there has been an the reader some useful indicators of increased pace of acquisition of development. But we also have to look surface to surface missiles over the at some other methods of measurement. last decade. This can be taken as Firstly, the numbers of missile indicative of development of a range of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993

TABLE 1:

SSM EQUIPPED SAM EQUIPPED HELO CAPABLE SSM NUMBERS UNITS UNITS UNITS AT SEA

1973 42 119 CHINA 1983 255 1 9 839 1993 276 22 19 1176

1973 2 6 INDIA 1983 26 14 17 98 1993 29 39 59 115

1973 PAKISTAN 1983 4 1 1 8 1993 18 7 16 60

1973 VIETNAM 1983 8 32 1993 9 3 34

1973 BANGLADESH 1983 1993 9 28

1973 12 1 24 INDONESIA 1983 7 9 28 1993 14 9 25 80

1973 8 1 1 40 MALAYSIA 1983 8 1 2 24 1993 10 9 32

1973 SINGAPORE 1983 6 30 1993 12 6 6 84

1973 1 THAILAND 1983 6 1 27 1993 13 7 5 83

1973 1 8 BRUNEI 1983 3 6 1993 3 6

1973 PHILIPPINES 1983 1993 3 November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 19 capabilities, the direction of which is is that, as the area which a weapon can indicated by another grouping included covers increases with the square of its in the table - units with the capacity range, the difficulty of hitting the to operate a helicopter. right target increases as a cube. What is this direction of development? Looking at some of the figures in Simply put, the more sophisticated detail, particularly those relating to navies are increasing their abilities the powers of ASEAN, it can be noted to conduct surveillance within their that Indonesia, for example, as with areas of military interest which match tonnage, displays less remarkable the increasing range of the weapons growth figures since 1973 because of which they possess. This is both the removal of the old Soviet built inevitable and logical. The requirement missile craft from inventory - but the to control Exclusive Economic Zones, numbers are on the increase, as are was mentioned earlier in the paper. To those of Singapore. Malaysia seems less increase what can be loosely termed the remarkable, particularly in view of the 'radius of territorial imperative' from SSM figures, but it should be the 3 or 12 miles which were typical appreciated that the very high figures before the United Nations Convention on for 1973 include the primitive and very the Law of the Sea to 200 miles does short ranged SS-12 missiles fitted to require an order of magnitude British built fast attack craft. improvement in the ability to gather and manage information and apply force. Again, we can see the correlation The same tendency exists with between national economic growth and developments in maritime air forces. the improvement of the armed forces. The Philippines can, as yet, boast no There is a rider to this, however, surface to surface missile armed craft. which also modifies earlier comments in Even the three helicopter capable units this paper about the ease of use of new included in the 1993 figures are systems. As Navies increase their reach conversions of American World War II and secure systems with longer range built escorts. capabilities, the requirement for associated systems increases if such Vietnam is clearly, as yet, not going capabilities are to be properly anywhere very fast - although I wi11 exploited. Thus there is a question of admit that the open source figures cost and there is also the question of remain of somewhat doubtful training and infrastructure reliabi1ity. development. For example: there is a Numbers and Ages. Table 2, shows the world of difference in the tactics, and numbers of vessels in major categories thus the systems and operating and, particularly important, the procedures, between what is required to average age of combatants. Noting that exploit the 20 mile range Exocet the effective service life of a missile and what is required to get the destroyer or frigate with half-life most out of the 70 mile range Harpoon modernisation seems to be in the region missile. With the latter you must have of 25 years, it is fair to suggest that a remote targeting platform to get the an average age of over 15 years in the over the horizon firing range - hence combatant fleet suggests block the need for a helicopter/and or obsolescence and funding problems for maritime patrol aircraft. You have to the Navy concerned. Force levels for practise extensively with these the future will only be sustained aircraft to get the procedures right. through increases in spending or The latter, to do their job properly, running on of service lives, with the require (expensive) sensors such as accompanying problems of reliability. infra red detection devices if they are The categories of surface combatants to be sure of picking and keeping watch used in this table are very broad ones on the right target at night or in low - they include large amphibious ships. visibility without risking themselves Thus the figures can be a little askew, being shot down. A good rule of thumb but it does help indicate that there 20 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993

TABLK 2.

SUUMAIUNKS AIRCRAFT SURFACE SURFACE SUPPORT MCM CARRIERS COMBATANTS COMBATANTS CRAFT OVER OVER 1000 UNDER 1000 1000 TONS TONS TONS

1973 4 (5) 1 (28) 21 (25) 22 (10) 6 8 INDIA 1983 8 (12) 1 (38) 19 (23) 41 (19) 9 14 1993 18 (11) 2 (44) 32 (12) 5 5 (13) 6 22

1973 3 (4) 7 (30) 7 (19) 2 1 PAKISTAN 1983 6 (7) 8 (35) 25 (19) 4 6 1993 9 (20) 15 (32) 18 (23) 4 3

1973 4 (11) I1ANGIADESH 1983 3 (28) 14 (22) 1 1993 4 (26) 25 (23) 2

1973 44 (21 ) 17 (15) 282 (12) 9 7 CHINA 1983 121 (16) 64 (19) 615 (20) 32 23 1993 87 (22) 83 (16) 675 (13) 59 iai

1973 21 (29) 44 (26) 3 2 VIKTNAH 1983 5 (40) 34 (23) 1 1993 5 (50) 52 (29) 15

1973 13 (24) 30 (22) 2 6 THAI I AND 1983 9 (33) 32 (19) 10 1993 17 (25) 33 (33) 1 11

1973 10 (22) 12 (28) 74 (22) 13 lo 1N1X)NKSIA 1983 4 (18) 18 (24) 19 (21) 9 4 1993 2 (12) 31 (27) 28 (15) IS 4 1973 2 (18) 22 C>> 1 6 MAI.AVM A 1983 4 (24) 3U (13) 2 1993 a (24) 14 (17) 2 4

1973 10 (30) 22 (25) •1 4 1 Ml I.I I-I'INKI, 1983 33 (40) 22 (25) S 1993 12 (49) 13 (22) 5

1973 1 (31) 11 (6) :. I HI .A 11 ill K 1983 6 (39) 12 (12) 2 1993 6 (46) 18 (17) NOTK: Numbers in ( ) indicate average age of vessels.

TABLE 3.

ANTI-SHIP ANTI-SHIP I.ONG RANCH MEDIUM/SHORT SHORE BASED SHIP BASED SHIP P.ASKD SHIP I1ASEI) BOMBERS FIGHTERS UFA RANGE MPA HELICOPTERS HELICOPTERS ASM F/W A/C FIGHTERS 1981 8 37 30 1988 5 6 44 56 23 1993 1? 18 54 64 23 1983 4 10 1988 3 10 1993 5 10 10

1983 ?30 380 70 80 3 19BB 35 880 13 40 26 199.1 30 820 1 1 40 6?

1983 10 19BB 10 1993 4 18 1983 6 1988 16 8 1993 1 1 B 4

1983 16 5 16 20 INDONRRIA 19B8 If, 8 16 53 1993 16 10 21 49 198.1 1 1 9B8 1 6 1993 7 16 1983 3 I'll I I.IPP1NKS 1 988 3 9 199.1 » 198.1 SINC.APOKK 19B8 58 4 1993 58 4

NOTK: Numbers in ( ) indicate average age of vessels. November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 21 may be fleet-wide problems for various surveillance forces for its vast navies, even if particular sections are archipelago by purchasing no less than in good order. 39 corvettes, landing ships and mine countermeasure vessels from Germany. With India for example, although The purchase price for these East carriers do last longer than smaller German built vessels was tiny. It ships, the two ships are steadily remains to be seen how expensive will getting older. There is no replacement be the processes of adapting them from in sight because India cannot afford the short distances and cold weather of new construction and there are no good the Baltic to the demands of the second hand ones on the market. Yet. Archipelago. There is a possibility India may however, secure an Invincible that the Indonesians are not going to if the Royal Navy has to lose a achieve the improvements in operational carrier, or do a deal with the French capability which they wanted from the to pick up Clemenceau or Foch when the project. On the other hand, as with the latter leave French service at the turn case with India, perhaps good enough is of the century. The Indian point of the enemy of nothing at all. On a tight view - and this is often glossed over budget and otherwise bound to new when dealing with small navies - is construction in the yards of PT-PAL, it that an old and inefficient carrier is must have seemed that the Indonesian vastly better than no carrier at all. Navy had no other realistic means of Despite a reducing average age in the achieving the numbers it wanted. The last two decades, the Indian Navy scale of the perceived force structure continues to have a middle aged fleet. needs can be gathered by the fact that With ships getting more expensive and naval planners spoke openly about the budgets leaner, the prospects are not requirement for 23 new construction ideal. frigates. China has similar problems; looking at Maritime Air Forces. The last area of the age of the submarine fleet and 1 survey in this paper concerns maritime despite a 'cleaning out in recent air forces. The role of shipborne years of the oldest and most helicopters in the surveillance and ineffective units, it is getting very targeting mission has already being old in total. The surface forces are touched upon. It is important to note improving but even they are middle aged that credibility in maritime air - and it should be realised that the operations effectively requires life of a wooden hulled fast attack dedicated squadrons, trained and craft is more like ten years than the prepared for the role. For maritime air 25 of a destroyer. to intervene at distances greater than In fact, some Navies, particularly 50 miles from the coast, the need is those of ASEAN such as Thailand, are in first for capable maritime patrol a much healthier condition than these aircraft which, if not armed figures would indicate, provide they themselves, are capable of providing a can steel themselves to removing aged picture to headquarters ashore for the units from the effective list which assignment of anti-shipping missions seem to be retained there for reasons and of reporting the positions of the as much of personnel employment as any targets to the strike aircraft once the other cause. Singapore needs to spend latter are airborne. If you are wanting some money replacing the old landing to achieve strikes at more than 100 ships which are used for troop miles from the coast on any sort of transport and support duties. This has consistent basis - unless you have started with the purchase of a third ringed your shores with airfields - you hand Sir Lancelot class landing ship, need air to air refuelling. similar to the Tobruk. The Philippines The development of maritime air in the needs to rebuild its entire fleet. region as shown in Table 3, is, with Indonesia has attempted to short some exceptions, still in its infancy. circuit the force structure problems it India presents as a country with faces in providing adequate patrol and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 probably the best fleet air arm/air updated P3s. The Indonesian Air Force force structure. But there are limits operates some very sophisticated radar on earner borne aircraft, particularly surveillance aircraft. Singapore is fighters. A total force of 23 Harriers acquiring the latest Fokker maritime - and there are only 3 two seat patrol aircraft. It already has the E-2 trainers in addition - is not much to airborne early warning aircraft. provide for operational conversion and two air groups. It is probably fair to The strictures mentioned earlier with say that India's most important regard to the complexity of seaborne strategic maritime air assets are its operations apply just as much to Air Bear F and May maritime patrol Forces. aircraft. CONCLUSION China presents a more complex picture. In concluding it would be fair to say The number of air assets is impressive. that in watching the region, it is not Their sophistication and probably their one of arms races. There are dangerous expertise are variable. The Chinese developments and there is certainly Naval Air Forces probably attempt to enough weaponry to serve a host of make up in mass for what they lack in conflicts. But the great majority of individual capability. What is of that weaponry is being acquired within concern to other nations around the the context of reasonable security South China Sea is the efforts of the judgements and relatively limited Chinese to acquire sophisticated long budgets. Furthermore, the increasing range fighters from the Russians, sophistication of the defence outlooks together with air-to-air refuelling. of most nations in the region means The attainment by China of the that most systems are acquired with a capability to maintain air superiority realistic view as to the capability to over the Spratly Islands must have support them and the associated implications for the future strategic requirements to employ such balance in the South China Sea. capabilities to proper effect. Even the That concern must be part of Malaysia's most bargain basement buy in these days rationale for the dual purchase of MIG has some sound thinking behind it. 29 and F-18 aircraft. The packages are small, particularly for the American Commander James Goldrick is a past built machines, but they do confer a Councillor of the ANI and a prolific writer on matters of naval history and quantum increase in capability from strategy. This paper was delivered at a anything ASEAN has possessed before. In recent Navy League of Australia and anti-ship terms, however, it is other Company of Master Mariners sponsored seminar on Developments in Maritime Power nations who have gone or are going in East, Southeast and South Asia. further. Thailand already has F-27 patrol aircraft configured to take the Harpoon missile; it is acquiring November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 23 WOMEN IN SURFACE COMBATANTS Lieutenant Commander Peter Jones BACKGROUND approached the varied tasks and the It is approaching a decade now that high workload sailors must tackle in FFGs with enthusiasm and achieved most women have served on RAN ships and nearly a year since HMAS Sydney became satisfactory results. This positive the first RAN surface combatant to have approach served to dispel any questions about whether they were up to the job a mixed gender ship's company. The and proved a major factor in their usual female complement on board is now smooth integration into the ship. around three officers, three POs and thirty junior sailors. Since the women There were however other important joined the ship Sydney has completed a aspects to this integration. They refit (SARA 3), a work-up (achieving i ncluded: the best result of any ship in 1992) and took part in Fleet Concentration Having accommodation and Period 93-1 and TASMANEX 93. At the heads/shower facilities properly time of writing Sydney was preparing organised from the start. Indeed for another work-up and an operational the only impediment experienced to deployment. full integration was having to initially accommodate female POs in the female junior sailors mess. Knowing the women were here to stay. Having women on board in sufficient numbers so that they did not attract special attention. Having women in all departments. Maintaining the behaviour protocols contained in various DI(N)s and Maritime Command instructions. THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF INTEGRATION In terms of peacetime operations the presence of women on board further contribute to the RAN's positive image abroad by making the ship's company This article aims to give a feel for more representative ambassadors of some of the issues surrounding the Australian society . introduction and integration of women into the ship's company of an FFG. As In operational terms the inclusion of such it contains subjective women in boarding parties gives added observations and is very much an flexibility when boarding merchant Executive Officer's view of things. ships with crew and passengers of both sexes. AN OVERVIEW Less tangible, is the different The introduction of women into the atmosphere that exists on board a mixed Sydney has been successful and given gender ship. I believe such an some unexpected positive spin-offs in environment encourages a more mature the process. Importantly the level of behaviour, particularly among integration has been accepted in a the more junior members of the ship's positive way by the vast majority of company. Sydney's experience is that the ship's company. there are fewer incidents of extreme The women on board have generally (and usually alcohol related) behaviour •ws»**

Wffi

* '^^^^^* This is why Gaeta minehunters will survive time and time again. Palm trees are amazing plants. With just shallow roots and sand for support, they hardly seem capable of surviving the explosive power of tropical cyclones. Yet, once the torrential rains have stopped and the gale force winds died down, there they are. Right where they were. Because rather than stand up to the elements, palms go with the flow. They absorb the force of the wind by bending with it. Gaeta Class minehunters come uniquely equipped to do exactly the same thing. Like most minehunters today, the Gaeta ships have fiberglass hulls, mainly because a lot of mines are activated by steel hulls. But that's where the similarity ends. The Gaeta design features a unique hull. Rather than rely on traditional transverse and longitudinal supports, these revolutionary ships have a single huge, solid piece of fibreglass which can actually flex far enough to absorb the shock waves from an exploding mine. Which means Gaeta is much more likely to keep on surviving. Just like palm trees. Besides shock resistance and a low magnetic signature, there's a third factor of critical importance. The amount of noise the ship makes. That's because many mines use acoustic devices set off by sound waves. Suffice to say, Gaeta has an exceptionally low noise signature. (Exactly how low is classified.) Not all that surprising when you realise that the Gaeta Class minehunters that ADI and Intermarine are proposing to build in Australia for the Royal Australian Navy are the /atermarimf fourth generation of these revolutionary Italian ships designed by Intermarine. And an improved version of the type that helped clear the waters off Kuwait after Operation Desert Storm. ADI Without a single mishap.

THE PROVEN MINEHUNTERS WITH A BUILT-IN SAFETY FACTOR 26 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 ashore. women integrate into ship operations simply because to them "it just isn't PRECONCEPTIONS natural". Provided individuals do not One of the interesting aspects about obstruct integration these views can be the introduction of women into the tolerated. On this issue one has to ship's company is the need to be take the long term view and accept that prepared to cast aside long held these officers and sailors will leave preconceptions. As an example it was the service in the fullness of time. often said that women are not as strong More important is the attitude of as men and this will impact on junior officers and sailors. seamanship evolutions. Certainly while But opposition to women at sea is not the average lift capacity of women is the sole preserve of males. A few women less than men in practice this has not on board either did not think women become an issue. The same numbers for should go to sea at all or that they seamanship evolutions are used as should only serve in auxiliaries. Once before and highlight that these numbers again the rationale for these views was were traditionally based on men with a generally "because it does not seem variety of lifting strengths. Clearly right". It is therefore important to you still need some strong men to do accept that both males and females are certain jobs such as in the Dump Party a product of a society that is - but that is as far as it goes. culturally sexist, albeit it is rapidly changi ng. FRATERNISATION AND HARASSMENT Fraternisation and harassment are the big issues and must be watched unremittingly. The key must be to: adhere to the rules, let people know where they stand from the outset, set the example from the top, and keep your finger on the pulse.

I have also found female members of the ship's company to be more socially robust than expected. They are able to mix and converse well with the male sailors. Having said this, like their male counterparts, there are a wide variety of attitudes and approaches to life. As with any change, the introduction of women into warships has led to a range of reactions from people. Certainly there has been the stereotype male chauvinist attitude among some of the more older members of the ship's In addition to these actions the ship company. This is to be expected and it also instituted an education program on should be accepted that many will not board and this has been backed up by change their views no matter how well recent presentations to supervisors by November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 27 the Chief of Staff to the Maritime sounds. For example, there was at one Command. In the future the level of time a disproportionate number of mixed gender awareness will improve female junior officers at sea acting as further once the initiatives such as the XO' s Assistant. They may well have the Good Working Relationships Project been good staff officers but they could bear fruit. Such education programs are have also been good Assistant Gunnery considered vital to assist ships making Officers. Similarly it is essential to mixed gender manning work. ensure that female junior sailors have equal opportunity to do high profile While the No Touch rule is strictly enforced on board it is recognised that jobs (provided they have the necessary training). It quite often takes time to relationships will be formed by members discover such subtle and often of the ship's company. Everyone on unintentional discrimination is at board is made very much aware that work. It is important of course not to these relationships cannot affect the go too far the other way any give women Sydney and once they reach such a state high profile jobs just because they are then clearly they have no place in the female. ship. Fortuitously the advantages of de facto relationships and marriage THE NUMBERS GAME between naval personnel are such as to encourage these relationships to be One problem Sydney did experience in declared. 1992 was the inability of the Navy to provide sufficient trained women to Part of attempting to keep a finger on fill billets. Even more critical was the pulse is being able to recognise the inability to provide replacements potentially disruptive actions or at short notice. Clearly the tempo of behaviour. This is not always obvious. mixed gender manning has to be tempered As an example, this behaviour may be by the ability of the organisation to interaction between two of the ship's maintain numbers'on existing mixed company that is similar to gender ships. Quality should not be sister/brother clowning around. The sacrificed for quantity or to achieve question of "would this person be doing perceptions of progressiveness. this if the other person was a male?" usually bowls out inappropriate Another point arising from this aspect behaviour. In such circumstances a word is the close numbers management required in FFGs with mixed gender early on can stop problems later. manning. For example in preparing for a While the benefits of the Divisional possible DAMASK deployment the ship had system are long recognised it is only three spare bunks once billeted important to be also alert to its personnel (including Seahawk flight, shortcomings. Chief among them is its CDs etc) were posted. It was therefore unsuitabi1ity for managing sexual critical to get at least twenty seven harassment if the players in any such billeted female sailors posted to the incident are also members of the same ship (which had not been achieved until division. It is vital that victims of April 93) otherwise there would not be sexual harassment are encouraged where accommodation for everyone. they think it appropriate to come It is also essential that there is good straight to the Executive Officer (XO) co-ordination between the ship and the or Commanding Officer. More effort is Directorate of Sailors Career needed within the Navy to encourage a Management (DSCM) to ensure that the culture where all ranks know their female mess is topped up. For example human rights in addition to their if a replacement female cook is not privileges as service men and women. available then another category must EQUAL EMPLOYMENT take up the female bunk. The new DSCM organisation has proved well suited to Having integrated women into the ship be able to keep a cross-category finger it is important to ensure that they are on the accommodation pulse. employed on an equal basis. This is not always as clear and obvious as it The final point on the numbers game is .'rt Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 that the Navy will over time get a initiative does benefit the Navy and better feel for actually how many women the defence interests of Australia. The want to join the Navy knowing they will integration process has been successful be liable for sea service. I believe to date because the organisation was in there will never be a 50/50 male/female place to facilitate it and the ship's split at sea. This is due to cultural, company approached it in a positive social and physiological reasons. manner. Research over recent years has shown there are differences between sexes in As with any endeavour involving people their thought processes and there will be hiccups along the way, adaptability for certain tasks. but it is important to approach them in Whatever progress is made in reducing a rational and considered manner. sexual discrimination, these Whatever the eventual numbers of women differences will no doubt still be at sea becomes it is important that the reflected in numbers joining the Navy RAN gives women the opportunity to and applying for particular categories. serve their country at sea should they This aspect of mixed gender manning is desire. The Navy certainly benefits both controversial and sensitive. from their contribution. Clearly much has yet to be learned in this area and it is important the Navy keeps abreast of the associated Lieutenant Commander Peter Jones is the Executive Officer of HMAS Sydney. A past research. Councillor of the ANI he has contributed previously, especially in the areas of CONCLUSION naval hi story. Mixed gender manning in the RAN's combatants workings. Importantly this

Ansett Australia recognises the important contribution made by Australia's servicemen and service You look women. Not just in Australia, but all round the world. As the official carrier for all Aust- ralian Defence Force personnel, we go out of our way to help you. For private after Australia travel as well as official travel. Ansett's Defence Force Travel Club can organise your trip, provide holiday advice and offer the best possible prices. And not just for you, so Ansett but also for your family. For bookings and holiday inform- ation, call our special Defence Force Liaison consultant on 13 12 31. looks You know we're on your side. Ansett Australia. after you. One of the world's great airlines. November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 29 STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA AND THE REGION OF DEVELOPMENTS IN MARITIME POWER IN EAST, SOUTHEAST AND SOUTH ASIA Captain Jack McCaffrie, RAN INTRODUCTION states to acquire conventional arms... To satisfy budding military With the end of the Cold War, the complexes... Whose support is vital consequent emergence of a buyer's to the survival of political market for conventional arms and the regimes. reassessment by the United States of her military posture throughout the Specifically, some of the Southeast world the attention of many defence and Asian states are either relatively security analysts has turned to the newly independent, like Singapore, apparently increasing potential for Malaysia and Brunei or have until regional conflict. This is certainly recently enjoyed major power protection the case in the Asia-Pacific region such that they could afford to neglect where internal security concerns are their own maritime forces-the giving way to a growing desire to Philippines for example. As new states, influence external issues, many of many had internal security problems to which have maritime connotations. solve before they could comfortably Inevitably, this is leading to shift their gaze outwards. So, early quantitative and qualitative defence spending concentrated on land developments in maritime power with and air forces. Now, with insurgency implications for many countries, within posing significant problems in very few the region and beyond it. Southeast Asian states maritime forces are receiving more attention-either In drawing out the strategic through modernisation (as in implications for the region and for Thailand's case) or for expansion from Australia of developments in maritime a totally inadequate base as is the power in East, Southeast and South Asia Philippines' dilemma. one must first examine the reasons for the developments. This has coincided with a growing ability to fund more capable maritime WHY MARITIME POWER IS DEVELOPING IN forces, although the trend in rising SOUTHEAST ASIA defence spending is very uneven in the In Southeast Asia, the position is sub-region. Some figures, depending on neatly encapsulated in Jacques which are used, show that Indonesia, Huntzinger's comment: Malaysia and the Philippines have all had fluctuations in defence spending in above all conventional arms are recent years. Likewise, while overall needed particularly by the newer spending by Asean states has been states, for establishing a national rising, spending as a proportion of GDP defence. . .They facilitate, albeit has actually declined: a reflection of at great cost, the satisfaction of rising economic prosperity and a many objectives of new states: greater capacity to fund the defence prestige, independence, power, burden. security, and the maintenance of domestic order. They will be sought Closely linked to the ability of for regional preponderance, Southeast Asian states to attend more influence, and expansion and for to external security demands is their the preservation or restoration of need for more self-reliance following balances of power in potentially the Cold War and consequent declining unstable and conflict prone interest of the former Soviet Union and regions. Finally there are purely the US in subsidising the defence internal factors influencing new efforts of regional states. The Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993

decline in superpower interest is diminished the perceived need for SLOC becoming evident in other ways too as security in Southeast Asia, as is the USN withdrawal from the Philippines evidenced by Indonesia's commitment to leaves it without any permanent patrolling and controlling them in some maritime presence in Southeast Asia. of the busiest routes in the world, and Despite repeated commitments to its admission that the task is beyond regional security by the US the reality its present capabilities. Threats to of reduced forward deployments is the SLOCs which have outlasted the Cold forcing Southeast Asian states to look War include piracy, under control in more to^their own maritime security Southeast Asia at least for the needs. 4 present, and ship sourced environmental damage. Greater emphasis on self-reliance is matched in Southeast Asia by The presence and growing value of uncertainty over security caused partly offshore resources also require by the reduced US presence, and partly improved maritime force capabilities. by a residual fear of Russia, potential The extension of territorial seas to instability in the Korean peninsula, a 12nm and of Exclusive Economic Zones to possible scramble to fill the gap left 200nm have vastly expanded Asean by the US and the existence of sub- maritime security responsibilities, 10 regional maritime issues which could with offshore oil and gas fields very strain relations or even develop into important to developing states crises. D Bilveer Singh of the National otherwise dependent on imported energy, University of Singapore has recently or dependent on export of energy for written that some Asean states still income. This affects the maritime force see each other as threats and that this outlook of Thailand with some 50 rigs attitude has been a factor in the in the Gulf, and that of all other upsurge in arms procurement. littoral Asean states with rigs or claims in the South China Sea. One of the most intractable of maritime issues concerns boundary disputes. All Oil and gas apart, virtually all Southeast Asian littoral states have Southeast Asian states have extensive overlapping claims in their respective fishing interests, many subject to 200nm Exclusive Economic Zones, such allegations of illegal activity or that many of the maritime boundaries in boundary disputes. There are, for the South China Sea are in dispute. example, bilateral fishing disputes There is also oil related contention between Malaysia and the Philippines, between Indonesia and Vietnam over the Malaysia and^Indonesia, and Thailand Natuna Islands' continental shelf and Vietnam.11 boundary, and between Thailand and Vietnam over boundaries in the Gulf of On a more sublime plane, Malaysia and Thailand. Each of the claimants feels Indonesia are in dispute over the obliged to develop naval capabilities Malaysian development of Sipadan and for extended patrol of its zone if it Ligitan Islands (particularly for is credibly to enforce its claims. tourism-skindiving). Malaysia is also using its claimed territory in the There is the perceived need of Spratlys for tourism. Southeast Asian states to protect their sea lines of communication, a need Another explanation for growing generated by their desire to continue maritime power is the prestige their already spectacular economic associated with having high technology development which relies so much on weapons systems, especially where it seaborne trade. For example, involves keeping up with the Lee Kwan Singapore's trade is worth some 323% of Yews. The attraction of financial its GDP annually, Malaysia's is worth reward for those involved in 121%, the Philippines' 41% and procurement is also a factor and Indonesia's 35% .° The end of the Cold without identifying any nation there War and the demise of the Soviet Union are regional examples where prestige as a threat to the SLOCs has not and "commissions" have influenced arms November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 31 procurement. the Japanese Defence Agency sees as strengthening ties between Russia and WHY MARITIME POWER IS DEVELOPING IN China.15 EAST ASIA In East Asia self-reliance is becoming WHY MARITIME POWER IS DEVELOPING IN increasingly important in the face of SOUTH ASIA major power force reductions; although In South Asia the need for greater while tension remains relatively high self-reliance is evident in the on the Korean Peninsula and while activities of the sub-region's maritime full-scale Japanese rearmament remains powers-not so much because of a reduced politically sensitive throughout Asia major power presence (it had been the US presence will remain important reducing prior to the end of the Cold and hopefully significant. War anyway) but in reduced availability of easy financing for arms purchases, Japan's build-up has been motivated by especially in India's case as Russia is the need to keep SLOCs open and by the threat of the hitherto powerful Soviet now desperate for hard currency. fleet. How it continues will depend India has also made no secret of its largely on the US-Japan relationship desire to engage in power projection and the maintenance of the US defence with its maritime forces, and its plans commitment. Japan's maritime power will for carrier based aviation reflect also be determined partly by the this. Ambitions have, however, been availability of funds-a problem only tempered by financial restraint in since the recent recession which sees recent years, such that its new carrier the FY 94 defence budget experiencing will now be capable only of operating the smallest rise in 33 years-1.95% or STOVL aircraft and not conventional $US 896 million.12 take off and landing aircraft as had been planned earlier. Although East Asia is less troubled by boundary issues than Southeast Asia Pakistan, India's chief rival as a other tensions contribute to the growth maritime power in the Indian Ocean, has in maritime power among its states. consistently had modernisation plans They include the relationship between frustrated by both lack of funds and China and Taiwan. With the latter no more recently American embargoes on the longer bent on recovering the mainland sale of military equipment. None of by force it is concentrating on the other South Asian littoral states building up its air and naval forces at are maritime powers in any meaningful the expense of the previously favoured sense, although Bangladesh has land forces. ambitions of attending to its offshore protection responsibilities and being On the other side of the Formosa able to make a meaningful contribution Straits China herself is expanding her to any maritime conflict in which the maritime power in response to earlier country becomes involved. inability to backup her South China Sea claims and to reducing tensions on her IMPLICATIONS OF MARITIME POWER land borders. Clearly, China has DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA recognised the value of maritime power Having briefly considered some of the as a means of supporting foreign policy reasons for maritime power developments and expressing national will and M in the region it is now possible to power. suggest some strategic implications, Not all developments in maritime power for the region and for Australia. in East Asia are positive; witness the Taking Southeast Asia first one must be reduction in readiness and activity aware that it is becoming more complex, levels of the Russian Pacific Fleet. more multipolar and more volatile since Nevertheless, Japan is wary of the the end of the nuclear balance inspired Russian Navy's potential to regenerate stability of the Cold War.1" as and when the country's economy Consequently, the most serious recovers. Japan is wary also of what strategic implication is that maritime Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 disputes could become the next regional Langkawi meeting in July to resolve the flashpoint. This view held by some issue by the end of this year, such an Indonesian officials, is also echoed by outcome is unlikely. other writers who see the regional shift of emphasis towards naval and air The number of these relatively minor forces indicating the salience of disputes does highlight the "high maritime security issues in the post degree of mutual suspicion and fear Cold-War strategic environment.2f among countries in the region"." Nevertheless, the potential for Listing just some of the maritime flashpoint over maritime disputes is issues in dispute lends weight to this not limited to intra-regional issues. vi ew: In particular, China's claim that the entire South China Sea is territorial 12 of the 15 maritime boundaries in waters is disturbing; given her the South China Sea, previous resort to armed force in the Malaysia in dispute with every Spratlys and despite her recent other Asean country. commitment to seek resolution of sovereignty by peaceful means. Michael Pedra Branca (Horsborough Light) Leifer has put China's strategic involving Singapore and Malaysia. position succinctly: Sipadan and Ligitan Islands China has come to enjoy involving Malaysia and Indonesia. unprecedented latitude in regional Boundaries in the Gulf of Thailand affairs...That new-found latitude involving that country, Cambodia has permitted a steely rigidity in and Vietnam. prosecuting regional interests,1 displayed in maritime policy.Z6 The Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and China's claim to that Japan and India also have the potential sea as territorial waters. to be troublesome, with Japan's situation the legacy of World War Two Some of these disputes have already more than the result of any recent seen military action; such as the activity. Still, the memory of her past Philippine mobilisation in response to aggression makes it most unlikely that the arrest in 1988 of 49 Filipino any Japanese maritime foray into fishermen by the Malaysian Navy, the Southeast Asia would be acceptable to occasional alert of Malaysian and the sub-region except as part of a US- Singaporean forces in response to Japanese arrangement. Although India intrusions by Malaysian fishermen into was seen as a potential threat some waters adjacent to Pedra Branca and years ago, the slowdown of her naval most significantly, the March 1988 expansion program has allayed fears-at naval confrontation between China and least temporarily. Vietnam in the Spratlys, which cost Vietnam three vessels and almost 100 The presence of simmering maritime lives.23 disputes in Southeast Asia combined with the improving capabilities of At present there appears to be no maritime forces can only add to the consensus as to just what potential potential for conflict. Although the these disputes have for developing into point may be almost simplistic one can violent conflict, and setting aside the argue that as forces become more optimism of some commentators one capable then they may also become more cannot be too sanguine about the willing to apply force. eventual outcome of disputes, however minor, (like Sipadan and Ligitan) which Perhaps the greatest danger in the sub- continually defy attempts by either region is that of the security dilemma side to reach an agreement. That in which states "by seeking to advance particular matter has been simmering their individual national securities for 24 years and despite a commitment (through policies of arming, on the part of President Suharto and deterrence, and alliance) create and Prime Minister Mahatir at their sustain an international environment of November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 33 decreased relative security for differences peacefully. At the same themselves and for the collective of time, however, virtually all of the states." 97 So, while initial arms claimants are beefing up their military procurements may be made for reasons of presence in the islands or islets national security and to gain some claimed by them and are improving their technological edge, in the long run maritime force capabilities with an eye they might induce some kind of arms to the possibility of conflict there. race in which military and The failure of the four informal technological inferiority could become workshops involving Spratlys claimants, politically and militarily untenable. and hosted by Indonesia, to make any real progress thus far confirms the This could emerge as a substantial difficulties in changing entrenched problem following the likely settlement views. Given the expectation of of the Cambodian crisis which provided resource riches in the South China Sea some common security rationale, for maybe even Asian patience will be ASEAN at least. The absence of such a tested by the continuing inability to unifying threat could see maritime advance peaceful resolution of the force capability improvement construed claims. as being a mutually threatening activity. An example of how events Just as commentators and political could get out of hand is provided by leaders claim consistently that South the recent decision by Thailand to buy China Sea disputes will be peacefully a helicopter carrier (and AV-8Bs with resolved they also claim that the it) a major change of direction for a maritime force developments in the sub- nation which had previously been region are not an arms race. To the focussed on the threat to its land extent that the necessary element of borders. Will this acquisition cause competition has not been evident the the Thai Navy to be more assertive in claim is tenable. But because the arms support of its maritime interests in purchases of one country can impinge on the Gulf and the Andaman Sea? Will it the security of another the competitive cause Malaysia to review its lower element may not be far beneath the priority for submarines? Activities surface. Furthermore, a military like this make the prospect of Asean build-up could fuel interstate wide (not to mention Southeast Asian suspicions if it remains unexplained to wide) defence cooperation doubtful for its neighbours. Again Thailand's the foreseeable future. helicopter carrier provides a good example. External actors also add to the possibility that greater capabilities Clearly, with maritime disputes gaining will lead to a greater willingness to a higher profile in the sub-region and use force in the maritime sphere. This with maritime forces more able to is more so the case in the South China contribute to national security there Sea than anywhere else in the sub- is a greater risk of disputes region, because of the many claimants degenerating into crises, or even to all or part of it. Recent history conflict. There is of course, another suggests that the most likely side to all this. There are also candidates for conflict there are China positive strategic implications to be and Vietnam, Tl as does China's drawn from the developments in maritime power. continuing naval modernisation and The fact is that the developments in expansion. Only Vietnam's relative maritime power could lead to greatly naval weakness suggests otherwise, for improved cooperation among Southeast the moment at least. Asian states, for reasons involving the Interestingly, regional political wider definition of security now leaders consistently suggest that the generally accepted. These states do Spratlys and other South China Sea have significant common strategic concerns are being exaggerated and that interests including: the states concerned will resolve their Maintenance of national Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993

soverei gnty. it should provide food for second Further development of national thought. The Far Eastern Economic solidarity, free from any external Review recently stated that by the end i nterference. of the decade China could need to Economic growth leading to greater import up to one million barrels of oil national and regional prosperity, per day, and was relying on good and relations with Iran to ensure supply."" If maritime conflict is in no one's The progressive improvement of the interest, cooperation to avoid it must social and cultural "quality of be in everyone's interest. 11fe" of the nati on.33 The economic dimension is also apparent Some regional security analysts argue at other levels, not least in the that prospects have never been better reliance of Southeast Asian states on for the emergence of a regional offshore resources-fish, oil and gas security community of all ten Southeast especially. The threats to theno-i 11 egal Asian states, based on the principle of fishing, smuggling and piracy-are non-interference and non-use of force." economically debilitating and create That this could be the case is evident tensions affecting mainly the less in the drive by all Southeast Asian developed states. The Philippines shows states for continuing economic growth why, losing an estimated $US3.1 billion and development, and the realisation per year to poaching, illegal fishing that funds diverted for security and smuggling, because it has no purposes will not necessarily effective maritime force to prevent contribute directly to this. There is these illegal acts."1 Regeneration of also the realisation that more capable her maritime force, despite the high armed forces could lead to a priority assigned to it will take a strengthening of the entire sub-region long time, thereby making a good case and could even lead to an organised for the Philippines to develop workable military network for Asean. cooperative arrangements with her The scope for greater cooperation nei ghbours. arising from the development of The economic effects of piracy--lost maritime power appears widest where the cargoes and expensive re-routing--could question of economic security is also be reduced by cooperation among considered. Southeast Asian economic Southeast Asian maritime forces, as has development depends very heavily on been shown by Singapore, Malaysia and international trade and so on the free Indonesi a. access of merchant shipping to the world's sea lanes. While strategic implications suggest both an increased possibility of Perhaps of greatest concern is the maritime conflict or a greater continued freedom of those sea lanes potential for maritime cooperation, connecting the Persian Gulf with many commentators are very optimistic Southeast and East Asia, involving as to the likely outcome in Southeast passage through the Straits of Malacca Asia. However this optimism maybe and Singapore as well as the South overstated, because little substantive China Sea. Despite the ongoing disputes progress has been made in resolving in the South China Sea and Malaysian many longstanding disputes. (as well as Singaporean and Indonesian) concerns about the management of Yet, there is an undeniable desire for shipping using the Straits it is in no greater cooperation and an end to the regional state's interest to see the disputes. Hopefully, a further free flow of shipping interrupted. implication of the growth in maritime power will be the establishment of a This applies equally to external maritime confidence and security powers; especially China. The growth of building regime determined to engage her own economy and her increasing the real issues. The kind of regime dependence on imported oil to lubricate needed is one that will increase the November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 35 amount of information flowing between building measures in the South regional navies and will foster genuine China Sea.41 attempts to resolve disputes and to promote cooperation in exploitation of Japan shares the interests of her offshore natural resources. southern neighbours in the security of the sea lanes for the import of energy IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN and raw materials as well as the export MARITIME POWER IN EAST ASIA of manufactures. Consequently, her developing maritime power is more With fewer contenders the situation in likely to add to the security of the East Asia is somewhat less complex than region than to complicate it. that of Southeast Asia-but potentially no less volatile. The Korean Peninsula That judgment, of course, is not apart, Japan is almost certainly the universally accepted: the US Ambassador object of most concern in maritime to South Korea suggested in Washington terms. To date Japan's maritime in 1992 that Korea had no difficulty in capability expansion has not been identifying her post cold-war threat as opposed, primarily because of its self- Japan. In fact, South Korea fears imposed geographical limits, lack of a being caught between a Japanese and significant power projection capability Chinese naval (and military) build-up. and close relationship with the US. This fear and the gradual US decline But, any expansion of Japan's maritime will inevitably see a growth in the strength beyond these bounds would South Korean navy, hitherto limited to profoundly affect regional strategic responding to the essentially coastal planning, and arguably could lead to an threats posed by the North Korean Navy. almost immediate arms race based on Even now the South Korean Navy is historical experience. 33 taking a broader view of its responsibilities, and is considering The importance of this issue is in the deterrence, sea control, protecting likelihood that the US military offshore resources and the value of presence will be reduced somewhat and presence. " that by the turn of the century Japan will rely less on the US for its As with Japan, Korea's interests and security than it has in the past.'39 the implications of her maritime power Inevitably, it is emerging as a major development lean very much to ensuring power in an environment in which there continuing freedom of the seas to rising nationalism, but no longer any facilitate economic growth and protect common unifying threat. offshore resources. Undoubtedly though, any significant naval However, Japan is sensitive to the development by South Korea would be concerns of its neighbours and has watched by her neighbours with the same forsworn the development of long range apprehension attending any independent power projection forces, a position Japanese buiId-up. which is unlikely to change. Even so, Japan, with her already considerable, Taiwanese naval expansion has and still growing maritime power can implications for East and Southeast contribute significantly to regional Asia, as it relies hugely on the sea security by: lanes for its livelihood and because it fears a Chinese imposed submarine Securing key strategic choke points blockade designed to strangle its in the Northwest Pacific. economy slowly.4" Its planned naval By working more closely with South development is expected to allow it to Korea towards peaceful challenge seriously China's ability to reunification of the Korean dominate the East China Sea-perhaps by Peninsula, and the turn of the century. Fortunately, however, the gradual nature of the Promoting multinational efforts to expansion means that it is not seen as stabilise the Southeast Asian provocative by China or by the region. security environment, for example via confidence and security The picture is somewhat different 36 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 outside the region as Taiwan is it can claim control over a lot of the planning a bigger presence in the South Indian ocean without infringing on the China Sea, where she has claims on the interests of others. Spratlys, and in support of her fishing and other resource interests. Pakistan is markedly inferior in terms of maritime forces and appears to have Significantly, Taiwanese officials have no ambitions to achieve superiority. indicated that they would help China to According to one recent writer Pakistan defend its claims in the South China is more or less resigned to little more Sea (and in the East China Sea where than denying India control over its there is a dispute with Japan over the territorial waters. At the same time Senkaku Islands). ' The destabilising Pakistan considers its defensive nature of this claim needs no posture very strong because it is truly elaboration; adding quite substantial defensive and because India is unlikely maritime strength to an already to get a political pay-back preponderant Chinese capability, commensurate with its apquisition of especially in the South China Sea. offensive capabilities. China's maritime developments are Even so, India's development plans potentially the least benign in all of could be destabilising, in the absence East and Southeast Asia; a fact of any clearly articulated strategy and underscored by Asean's determination to defence policies in a white paper or engage China in regional security equivalent. The potential for dialogue as soon as possible. instability is further heightened by suggestions of "India's interests in One could conclude that the level of the Malacca Straits" and "creative volatility in East Asia is at least as ambiguity as a driving force for Indian high as in Southeast Asia, but that the strategic policy".^ Indeed, if India likelihood of tensions escalating into treated Southeast Asian and South conflict is less because of the Pacific countries in the same way that presence of US maritime forces. it treated its South Asian neighbours Nevertheless, the nature of the differences and of the contenders regional strategic concern would be suggests that any conflict would heightened greatly. probably be more intense and more India does, however, have some genuine costly. (if inflated) concerns. For example it does fear Pakistan's ability to STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF MARITIME endanger it by restricting access to POWER DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH ASIA Persian Gulf oil-as much by recourse to Realistically, in South Asia the issue Islamic solidarity as by any use of involves only India and Pakistan and maritime force.:" India also fears the their relations with neighbouring possibility of high technology weapons states. Strategically the sub-region is transfers to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia an acknowledged backwater, although and the possible use of Iran to give that part bordering on the Persian Gulf Pakistan strategic depth. Mutual is uniquely important with its suspicion between the two neighbours concentration of much of the world's remains high. oi1 suppli es. Consequently, continuing development of The recent slowdown in India's naval each state's maritime power must be expansion will be temporary if India's linked with some form of maritime stated ambitions are to be believed. It confidence and security building forum, professes that whoever controls the however low key, if their strategic Indian ocean controls the sub- implications are to be positive. continent," and in aiming to be that Nevertheless, Pakistan's maritime power power it has no serious rivals. The is very limited, both in naval and strategic implication of such ambitions commercial terms. Its national merchant could be destabilising if India was to fleet comprises only 26 vessels which strike any opposition to its aims, but lift less than 10% of the nation's November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 37

cargo.54 parties to explain the rationale for their maritime power developments- An opportunity (and an enormous transparency in other words. challenge) for both states to improve their maritime relationships could be If the continuing development of provided by a recent BHP proposal. The maritime power in Southeast Asia is to big Australian wants to link energy remain a positive factor in Australia's hungry India with Iran's gas fields by security there will be a need for a underwater pipeline, the only practical continuing dialogue; to reduce route for which would traverse,, misapprehension, to share strategic Pakistan's territorial waters.00 An perceptions, to assure others and be associated proposal that Pakistan also reassured ourselves, and to build a take some gas from the pipeline may cooperative capacity to tackle mutually soothe Indian concerns; but then again important issues like sea lanes it may not. securi ty.59 That India realises the need for a more Maritime developments can also benefit positive role in the region is Australia's position in this sub-region suggested by the recent increase in through the ability of navies Indian and Indonesian naval contact (everywhere) to establish and maintain including joint exercises and a visit cordial relations even when political to India by the Indonesian CNS, in relations are "based on mutual respect which he expressed concern at India's and shared interests, but without the plans for a naval and air base on Great intimacy of the earlier period" as our Nicobar Island- a plan subsequently relations with Malaysia, Singapore and shelved. Brunei are now described. Naval relations with these countries, In summary, while further improvements especially the first two, are in maritime power in South Asia could excellent; and if not intimate are add to existing tensions, both certainly close and cordial. Pakistan's relative weakness and India's awakening to the need for a As Southeast Asian countries develop more cooperative approach provide some more capable maritime forces, often grounds for optimism. with Australian technical help, our capacity to integrate with them for STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS combined operations, involving say IN REGIONAL MARITIME POWER FOR patrol and surveillance will surely AUSTRALIA increase. This should in turn permit Southeast Asia. Arguably, the most the building of a more integrated, important factor in Australia's mutually understanding and generally relationships with Southeast Asia is secure region. the policy of "comprehensive One could leave the issue without engagement" developed by the present suggesting that there could be any government and relying on mutual potential dangers to Australia in a commitment between countries that are region comprising more capable maritime in every respect equals. In security forces, but some caution is warranted terms the policy amounts to "security if only in relation to Australia's with Asia, not security from Asia" as "technological edge" which for so long articulated by Prime Minister Hawke in has been a reassurance for us against May of 1991. This being the case the the emergence of any military threat in strategic implications of our or from the region. Over time regional neighbours maritime power developments advances could see our edge blunted and should be of little concern to us-nor with it the implication that if ours to them. As Foreign Minister Evans relations ever deteriorated to the has put it "there is no basis for us 0 extent that conflict became a being overawed by them." " Undoubtedly, possibility our position may not be so however, if our present satisfactory sound. Save engaging in some form of relations with Southeast Asia are to arms race, for which there is at continue there is a need for both Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 present no justification, Australia geographically remote to be able to need do little bar monitoring events influence events in any significant and participating fully in regional way. security dialogue. South Asia. In South Asia the most There are, however, opportunities which important strategic implication of regional maritime capability maritime power development for improvements offer to Australian arms Australia is the slow but sure manufacturers-and in particular our realisation by India that her growing born again shipbuilders. The chance of strength must be accompanied by more cooperative ship-builds and purchases dialogue with her neighbours if both is there but the competition will be their security and her own are not to fi erce. suffer.6^ This and a sense in the Vice President's recent Admiral Katari So, as Australia seeks ever closer Memorial Lecture that India is feeling relations with Southeast Asia left out of the growing trend towards developments in maritime power there regional security groupings are very seem to be almost wholly positive for positive signs that her military Australia's interests, with the proviso development will not continue in a that if comprehensive engagement were strategic vacuum. ever to develop a conflict dimension Australia would need to evaluate An additional positive sign is that closely how it might wish to remain Australia, which has not had a engaged. consistently high profile in the Indian Ocean, is now well placed to help india East Asia. The strategic implications integrate more fully into regional for Australia of maritime power security groups. There are already developments in East Asia are mostly indications that India might wish to indirect. This is borne out in take advantage of the RAN's excellent Garnaut's 1989 report which showed that relations with the Indonesian Navy. It a survey of Australians indicated is also in Australia's interest to little fear of an East Asian threat and assist because although only 1.3% of East Asians showed equally little our trade in 1990 was with South Asia knowledge of or interest in Australia. some 30% of our trade flows across the But, while we have no direct security Indian Ocean. The Australian and interests in the sub-region Australia Indian navies exercised briefly off would certainly be affected by disputes Port Blair in September 1991, and or conflict there. Any conflict in the further exercises are planned. Korean Peninsula which had maritime Reciprocal visits by high ranking naval dimensions or any maritime conflict officers are also being scheduled. involving any of Japan, China or Korea could interrupt trade to and from East Despite having concentrated on India in Asia, with implications for a number of this assessment there is a clear economies, including Australia's. connection with the other South Asian Although our interests could be states. If Indian maritime power can be affected Australia would be unlikely to shown to be benign in regional terms become involved directly. the other much smaller forces will not A more direct involvement could be feel the need to develop their forecast for Australia were China, as capabilities beyond those needed for an East Asian state to become over their own self-defence and resource assertive in the South China Sea. It protect!on. could prove to be a nice test for our CONCLUSION policy of comprehensive engagement. For the most part maritime power Essentially, then although a continuing developments in the Asia-Pacific region strengthening of East Asian maritime are in response to legitimate national power could prove threatening to security concerns and the growing Australian (and other) trade we are too capacity of regional nations to support November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 39 maritime forces. As well, with the 12 Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 August 1993: 6. regional concentration on economic 13 You Ji, 'The PLA Navy In The Changing World development and the dependence on Order: The South China Sea Theatre', a paper given at the Maritime Power in the China shipping for almost all of the Seas-Capabilities and Rationale Conference, associated trade there is also a clear Canberra, 7 May 1993: 1-2. need for secure trade routes, and there 14 ibid: 2. is the potential for the region's 15 Peter Polomka, 'Developments in Maritime developing maritime forces to Power-Japan', a paper given at the Maritime Power in the China Seas-Capabilities and contribute to this security. Rationale Conference, Canberra. 7 May 1993: Nevertheless, the developments do have 3. the potential to fuel maritime 16 Hormuz P Mama, 'India's Naval Future-Fewer disputes, some of quite long standing, Ships but Better', International Defence especially in East and Southeast Asia. Review, 26. No.2 , Feb 1993: 161. 17 James Goldrick, Navies in Asia: A Survey of The strategic implications for the Development of Ten Navies in South and South East Asia 1945-1992. Forthcoming: Australia of these developments in 106. maritime power are predominantly 18 Mak Joon Nam, 'The Maritime Priorities of positive, but they will require Malaysia', in Ross Babbage and Sam Bateman continuing effort on our part for them (ed), Maritime Change: Issues for Asia, to remain so. On the one hand, maritime St. Leonards, 1993: 120. 19 Sheldon W Simon, 'The Regionalization of issues could provide the next regional Defense in Southeast Asia': 14. flashpoint, but on the other hand, 20 Amitav Acharya, 'Arms Race and Arms control navies have an enviable record of in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia: An maintaining good relations even in the Overv i ew' : 7. absence of close political relations. 21 ibid: 12. Australia must, therefore, encourage 22 ibid. the kind of regional dialogue which 23 Mark J Valencia, 'The South China Sea: will foster reassurance and will lead Potential Conflict and Cooperation', in Rohanna Mahmoud and Rustam A Sani (ed), to a cooperative approach to mutually Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction important security issues. In this in the Pacific, Kuala Lumpur, 1993: 57. sense, the growth in regional maritime 24 The Straits Times, 18 July 1993: 18. power provides Australia with both 25 B. A. Hamzah, 'Conflicting maritime claims challenge and opportunity. in the South China Sea: the scope for resolut i on' : 105. 26 Mak Joon Nam, 'The Maritime Priorities of Notes. Maiaysia': 120. 27 Bilveer Singh, 'ASEAN's Arms Procurements: 1 Amitav Acharya, 'Arms Race and Arms control Challenge of the Security Dilemma in the in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia: An Post Cold War Era': 220. Overview1, a paper given to the ISEAS Workshop on Arms and Defence Planning in 28 ibid. Southeast Asia in Singapore on 18 June 1993: 29 Sheldon W Simon, 'The Regiona1ization of 5. Defense in Southeast Asia': 7. 2 ibid: 9. 30 The Bangkok Post, 18 September 1993. 3 Sheldon W Simon, 'The Regionalization of 31 Amitav Acharya, 'Arms Race and Arms control Defense in Southeast Asia', Pacific Review, in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia: An Vol.3, No.1, June 1992: 5. Overv i ew' : 12. 4 Bilveer Singh, 'ASEAN's Arms Procurements: 32 ibid: 6. Challenge of the Security Dilemma in the 33 Allan Behm and Seedibyo, 'Strategic Post Cold War Era', Comparative Strategy, Cohesion and the Security of Southeast Asia Vol.12, No.2. Apr-Jun 1993: 202. and the South Pacific', Strategic Review, 5 ibid: 209 & 212. No. 10, Jan-Feb 1991: 45. 6 ibid: 213. 34 Amitav Acharya, 'Arms Race and Arms control 7 Sheldon W Simon, 'The Regiona1ization of in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia: An Defense in Southeast Asia': 13. Overv i ew' : 7 . 8 ibid. 35 Bilveer Singh, 'ASEAN's Arms Procurements: Challenge of the Security Dilemma in the 9 ibid: 11. Post Cold War Era': 215. 10 Bilveer Singh, 'ASEAN's Arms Procurements: 36 Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 August Challenge of the Security Di lemma in the 1993: 26. Post Cold War Era1: 215. 37 The Straits Times, 23 June 1993: 14. 11 Sheldon W Simon, 'The Regiona1ization of Defense in Southeast Asia': 13. 38 Allan Behm and Soedibyo, 'Strategic Cohesion and the Security of Southeast Asia .1,1 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993

and the South Pacific': 41 54 Rear Admiral S. Iqtidar Husain, 'The Patrick M Cronin and Lt. Col. Noboru Maritime Priorities of Pakistan', in Babbage Yamagushi, JGSOF, 'Japan's Future Regional and Bateman (ed) , Maritime Change; Issues Security Role', Strategic Review, XX, No.3, for Asia: 165. Summer 1992: 16. 55 Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 August 41) ibid: 17. 1993: 42. 41 ibid: 19. 56 Sandy Gordon, 'India and Australia's Perspective on Indian Ocean Security': 19- .1.' ibid: 18. 20. 43 Sang-Boon Bae, 'Maritime Development in 57 Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's South Korea', a paper given at the Maritime Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, Power in the China Seas Capabilities and Carlton, Vic, 1991: 182. Rationale, Canberra, 7 May 1993: 4. ',8 ibid: 103. 44 ibid: 5. 59 ibid: 110. .1', Gary Klintworth, ' Developments in Maritime Security-Taiwan', a paper given at the 60 ibid: 191. Maritime Power in the China Seas 61 Ross Garnaut, Australia and the Northeast Capabilities and Rationale, Canberra, 7 May Asian Ascendancy, Canberra, 1989: 323-332. 1993: 10. w Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's ibid: 14. Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s: 47 ibid: 10. 249. •1M Shri K.R. Narayanam, Vice President of 63 Sandy Gordon, 'India and Australia's India's 1993 Admiral Katari Memorial Perspective on Indian Ocean Security': 20.. Lecture, 18 September 1993: 11. 64 Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s: .VI M.B. Naqvi, 'Indian Ocean Yesterday Today and Tomorrow', Ababeel, 1990: 17. 242 50 ibid. M Allan Behm and Soedibyo, 'Strategic Captain Jack McCaffrie assumed the position Cohesion and the Security of Southeast Asia as Director General, Maritime Studies and the South Pacific': 45. Program in September 1993 after six months ibid. as a visiting associate at ISEAS Singapore. This paper was delivered at a Navy League 53 Sandy Gordon, 'India and Australia's of Australia and Company of Master Mariners Perspective on Indian Ocean Security', a sponsored seminar on Developments in paper given at the India-Australia Maritime Maritime Power in East, Southeast and South Security Workshop, New Delhi, 19-21 Nov 92: As i a. 9. November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 41 HMAS RUSTBUCKET Lieutenant Jon Sparks, RAN

Imagine your ship, the latest of a new COATING SYSTEMS class of frigate designed to replace the ageing FFGs, sitting proudly in the Having understood this, it is obvious middle of Sydney harbour. As you look then that rust in our steel ships must with some pride towards her you note be controlled: in the usual course of her elegant low radar reflective lines Navy life this means by the application and advanced weapon systems each of an appropriate paint scheme to a covered with its own combination of properly prepared surface. Given its grey paint and varieties of rusts and time tested use, painting thus seems to verdigris. Rusts and verdigris! be the best solution to the problem of Economic times must be hard to permit corrosion control. However, a more such ships' husbandry practices to detailed look reveals that the side persist. Not necessarily so, say some, effects of preparation and painting can for while economic considerations are in themselves be very expensive. For at the heart of corrosion control, such example, when chipping back around a considerations cannot necessarily be rusting bolt, in a plate, in the side applied in a straight forward manner, of a Fremantle Class Patrol Boat's for corrosion control requirements must superstructure, the incidental marks properly be considered in relation to left in the ships' aluminium plate can other factors such as design not only be unsightly (even when characteristics, strength of structure covered with several layers of paint) to meet its intended purpose, the but also these dents can be in the length of time and the materials order of 0.5mm thick. When this depth available for construction and capital of surface penetration is compared to as well as through life costs. In this that of the thickness of the oxide film formed on aluminium in air, it can be article some of these competing factors will be considered with the aim of recognised that a single blow by a showing that all that shines (or at chipping hammer causes about 500,000 least does not "rust") is not always times the amount of deterioration to cost effective nor appropriate for the plate surface in question. Even today's Navy. where the surface to be prepared is mild steel, chipping and other forms of CORROSION PRODUCTS manual preparations cause metal fatigue as well as pounding salts or oil While from a contemporary perspective, residues in to the metal thereby corrosion may be nothing but a Bosuns increasing the rate of future paint Party's nightmare, corrosion itself can scheme fai1ures. in fact be an important factor in controlling the rate of metallic Beyond this there is also the question deterioration. For example, titanium is of the cost of the sailor wielding the a very reactive metal which forms an chipping hammer, grinder, metal sprayer extremely tenacious compact oxide film or paint brush. In simple terms an Able when exposed to air making it one of Seaman costs our nation around $265 per the most corrosion resistant commercial day." Beyond this, the real cost per alloys available for marine preparation or painting day, will be structures. Closer to home, aluminium much higher, for this figure does not and zinc both form protective coverings take into account the cost to the RAN of metal oxides. Unfortunately for our of sourcing, transporting, storing, purposes though, iron in water results accounting and issuing the necessary in the formation of a layer of stores, nor the cost of the man hours non-protective rust that can both taken to schedule and oversee the impair operability and be most required work. While some may rightly unsi ghtly. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 respond to this by saying that the cast irons have a corrosion rate costs involved in many large surface similar to that of ordinary steels, it preparation tasks have already been has been found that the scale produced addressed through the use of (cheaper) on these irons during casting reduces contract labour (during such periods as corrosion by about 25% over a year.' dockings), or reduced via the use of Such "scaled" irons may thus be modern paint removal and application suitable for brackets, upper deck technologies, the fact remains that lockers and equipment protective each day hundreds of sailors undertake housings. Again, as the corrosion numerous small surface preservation protection property is provided by a tasks that in total are very expensive. scale coating, this advantage would Further, that the Navy employs these soon be lost if items made of these same sailors for the expertise they materials where regularly chipped in hold in other fields, by using them to preparation for re-painting. chip and paint, it not only risks reducing their morale but more Aluminium also has a part to play in importantly, in reducing their ability the RAN's ships as evidenced by to pursue excellence within their increasing amounts of aluminium used as specialisations, the Navy is foregoing a means of weight reduction in ships' the greater efficiencies that can be superstructures. What is not always achieved via the optimum use of their recognised is that while the corrosion most expensive skills. rate of aluminium alloys in a marine environment varies, at no stage is it OTHER MATERIALS FOR RAN USE more than about 1000th of that of the rate of corrosion of mild steel. This Variations in the metallic composition then produces a good case for not only of mild carbon steels produces little more aluminium in selected areas of our effect in terms of their corrosion ships but more importantly, the use of resistance: the exception to this is more unpainted aluminium to save both when about 0.2% of copper is added, the weight and the large costs associated result is a two to three times with paint surface maintenance. reduction in the corrosion rate. This Further, where a particular colour of is not to say copper alloy (and other finish is desired, the anodising of types of low alloy) steels do not rust aluminium can not only provide a but rather that they corrodp at a lower 0 durable pre-coloured surface, but also rate than unalloyed steels. can extend the life of an aluminium Additionally the rust formed on low article four fold. alloy steels is less permeable and more protective than on ordinary steels. As DESIGN AND CORROSION PREVENTION a result, rust on these steels proves less damaging to the final painted So far the discussion has centred on finish. These types of materials then controlling corrosion by optimising the are ideally suited for use on surfaces choice of materials used in that (because of their position in the construction. Equally important though ship or their shape) are best left is the initial prevention of corrosion untouched between refits. Of course to through good design practices. do so would also require the acceptance Attention to features such as water of some "rust" marks forming that were catchment areas, the sighting and shape not over-painted but rather left to of drainage holes and ability to access form their naturally protective films a structure for proper maintenance will improve the performance of any metal or of oxides. coating system. Along with this is also Cast iron alloys (those containing the need for sound fabrication silicon, chromium or nickel additions) procedures that help eliminate crevices are also generally highly corrosion (such as via welding quality control) resistant. Never-the-1ess, they are which can lead to a concentration of expensive, thus their use is normally salts, dirt or differential aeration in limited to pumps, valves and water a particular spot and thus a highly boxes. Conversely, while unalloyed corrosive localised environment around November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 43

that position. theoretically produce net present cost Paralleling this emphasis on corrosion savings to the RAN, it will only do so elimination in the design of individual in practice if the sight of an unevenly items, effective corrosion control can oxidising patrol boat is acceptable in also be progressed by a holistic the fleet. Taken to its logical approach at the design stage. Under conclusion, should cost savings be this philosophy the combined effects of pursued via technologies where a layer of "rust" provides a protective barrier the physical design, materials and coating systems are considered with a against serious deterioration, HMAS view of optimising the corrosion Rustbucket may indeed become an example of the state of the art efficacy in resistant properties of an entire ships' husbandry. system (be it a shock absorbing mount of an entire aerial array) on not just CONCLUSION a capital cost basis but also on a through life basis, including at least The above discussion shows that a realistic cost for of the manpower corrosion control is a combination of that will be required to maintain any coating systems (the RAN's traditional corrodi ng system). approach) the selection of materials to suit the environment and the control of TRADITION the environment via proper design. While in an ideal world all of these From the above brief description of the factors would be considered when advantages that the right selection of ordering new or replacement equipment, metal and thoughtful design can play in constraints of tradition (and to lesser the minimisation of rust, flows the extent) time and capital, currently real possibility of minimising the obviate such an approach. Navy's overall capital and maintenance costs. Never-the-1ess, if there were a Never-the-1ess, the magnitude of the few obviously superior alloys or potential savings available to the RAN superior design methodologies that through the introduction of a new would produce real savings, it is hard holistic approach to ships' husbandry to envisage why such technologies are makes such an approach worthy of not already in service with the RAN. further investigation. The answer to this lies in the dictates As an aside, in starting on this of naval tradition for our abhorrence proposed transition to a more balance of "rust" is at least equally an approach to through life ship abhorrence of the visual appearance of rust as it is a concern for the maintenance, in the spirit of NQM, the time (and the economic constraints operability of the object rusting. faced by the RAN) may be right to ask a Similarly in terms of design, what sailor with a chipping hammer in hand, constitutes the traditional visually just which parts of the system they are appealing lines of warship may not be maintaining take the most effort, and the most effective design for corrosion then go on to ask the operator of that prevention or strength. system to help work out whether the To overcome this traditional inertia, a part in question could, for example, be review of what constitutes and simply modified so as to help alleviate acceptable through life appearance of a build up of corrosive agents. an item in a warship (or a warship as a Alternatively the maintainer/operator whole) will be needed. For example, may be able to identify parts that while it is demonstratively cheaper to could be replaced with alloy (or even anodise aluminium in ship side grey and plastic) components that not only do then use these plates to build a the same job but save the RAN money by largely maintenance free superstructure requiring less maintenance. for FCPBs, to achieve savings in this manner minor damage to this anodised Notes layer must be left un-repaired between K.A. Chandler, Marine and Offshore dockings. While such an approach will Corrosion, London, 1985, p.136. 44 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993

G. Butler and H.C. Ison, Corrosion and its the "addition of 0.5%-1.0% copper can effect a Prevention in Waters, New York, 1966 (rpt considerable improvement in cast iron's 1978) p.79. resistance to...sea water". J.G. Pearce and K. 3 Chandler, Corrosion, p.192. Bromage, Copper in Cast Iron, London, 1964, p.20. 4 This is the variable cost (which is 7 Over time this difference reduces "but after "immediately realisable when reductions in 12 years there still was a marked difference personnel numbers occur"). To put this [between scaled and de-scaled cast irons] in figure in to perspective, this equates to the corrosion rates. Chandler, Corrosion, approximately $45,500 pa for each sailor p. 107. saved by obviating the need to prepare and 8 With ships now being actively prohibited preserve a ship, Commercial Support Program from pretty coating their decks, such an Manual, 3rd edn., 1992, Chapter 3, table 1. approach has, in a small way, already 5 Indeed there is little difference in the occur red. corrosion rates of alloyed and unalloyed steels over the first year of exposure but thereafter low alloyed steels show an Lieutenant Jon Sparks joined the RAM in increasingly marked drop in corrosion rates. 1978. He holds a BA and has served in a For example, see Butler and Ison, Corrosion, number of RAN ships. This article was pp.73-75. written during his tenure as Executive Officer, HMAS Geraldton. 6 A much cheaper cast iron alloy can be achieved by using copper additives. Indeed,

NOTICE OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

Notice is herby given that the Annual General Meeting of the ANI will be convened in Canberra on Thursday 24 February 1994 at 1930 for 2000.

The venue is Legacy House, 37 Geils Court, DEAKIN, ACT.

Items for inclusion in the agenda should be forwarded to reach the Secretary no later than 14 February 1994. November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 45 THE RATIONALE FOR THE NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING IN NEW ZEALAND

Commander S.M. Duff VRD* RNZNVR

I consider the protection of our the accounts of the transfer of bullion trade to be the most essential from the Americas across the Atlantic naval service that can be Ocean to Spain. The trade routes performed. utilised by these bullion ships became Lord Nelson 1804 well known to pirates, or adventurers INTRODUCTION operating under Letters of Marque issued by unscrupulous governments. The term Naval Control of Shipping Single ship sailings were easy targets (NCS), describes the reporting, for these seagoing plunderers. To routing, voyage organisation and minimise losses, ships were grouped tactical diversion of merchant together in convoys for their mutual shipping, in times of tension or protection and were escorted by armed hostilities. It is conducted using a ships designed for the purpose, such as set of world wide procedures agreed by corvettes and frigates. Throughout Allied nations. The goal of NCS is to history, convoys continued to be used ensure the safe and timely arrival of whenever the movement of troops or merchant convoys, or independent trade was threatened during periods of vessels, at their assigned conflict. Probably the best known desti nations. examples in recent maritime history In wartime, naval authorities provide have been during the two World Wars. the organisation for the control and Given the early losses of shipping in protection of merchant shipping. The World War One, it is hard to understand management, operation and crewing of why measures to convoy merchant ships merchant fleets, remains the trading to and from the United Kingdom, responsibility of individual shipping were not introduced until early 1917. companies, while specific cargoes and The impetus for the introduction of the voyages are allocated to each ship by a convoy system, seems to have been the government appointed committee. After policy of Unrestricted Submarine evaluating the tactical situation, Warfare announced by Germany in maritime commanders select the safest February 1917. In the first six months practicable route for merchant ships of that year, 3.5 million tons of and if necessary assign military assets Allied shipping, representing over to protect their passage. The practice 1,000 vessels, was lost to enemy of coordinating the naval control of action. After the introduction of merchant vessels, with the forces convoys, this was reduced by more than assigned to their protection, is known a million tons in the subsequent six as the Naval Control and Protection of month period. It was to control the Shipping (NCAPS). sailing and coordination of thousands of Allied merchant vessels, that the A BRIEF HISTORY OF NCS British Admiralty Convoy Section began The importance of Naval Control and to develop the concepts of what we know Protection of merchant ships in times today as the Naval Control of Shipping. of tension, conflict or harassment on The Convoy Section operated in close the sea, has been commented on liaison with the British Ministry of extensively by eminent naval Shipping who prioritised cargoes, strategists, great war leaders, allocated merchant ships to tasks and politicians and historians from formed the vital link between the Navy earliest times. Many references to the and the shipowners. Naval Control of Shipping, appear in In the Second World War, the Admiralty 4, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 assumed control of all British merchant maintained in peacetime, by civilian shipping two weeks before the outbreak recruited reserves. This concept of of war and the Trade Division and vesting responsibility for NCS in Naval Ministry of Shipping began the Reserves, was widely adopted throughout introduction of measures for the world. prioritising ship employment and controlling voyages. At the outbreak of THE CURRENT RATIONALES FOR NCS war, the well proven convoy system was There is no doubt that the historical immediately implemented, but because of case for NCS is well made, but why do a shortage of naval escorts, ships we need a Naval Control of Shipping faster than 15 knots were sailed capability in New Zealand today? There independently. It is significant that are three very compelling reasons. losses of independent ships, were twice Firstly, and most obviously, New those of the convoyed vessels. Zealand is totally reliant on maritime It is an interesting point that no trade for her economic well-being. effective alternative to convoying has Despite the improvement in air yet been found for the protection of transport since the Second World War, merchant ships in wartime. This is over 90% of imports and exports by borne out by the fact that the British, value, and 99% by volume are still Americans and Canadians, still charter carried by sea. Twenty two million ships or use their prepositioned tons of New Zealand trade, worth around merchant fleets to exercise live convoy 30 Billion Dollars, moved to and from operations at sea on a regular basis. our overseas markets last year. This trade was transported by over 4,000 The structures and methods put in place individual merchant ship voyages. by the Royal Navy during the two World Coastal vessels made almost 16,000 Wars, formed the foundation of Naval voyages around New Zealand, shifting Control of Shipping Organisations of some 13 million tons of cargo. Over 35% today. Although NCS procedures evolved of New Zealand's GDP is derived from in Britain have now been widely its imports and exports. disseminated throughout the world, the Royal Navy still takes a lead in the New Zealand is heavily reliant on development of new NCS policy. imported goods. Eighty five percent of crude oil, almost all motor transport, NCS doctrines developed over many electronic equipment, fertilisers, years, were tested in a modern context rubber and heavy electrical equipment during the Iran/Iraq war when merchant are imported. Not only would the ships were threatened, damaged and even interruption of maritime trade deprive sunk. When convoy and controlled New Zealand of vital goods, but its protection tactics were used, with the effect would be felt in the instigation of the Armilla Patrol, manufacturing, banking, insurance and losses were eliminated. More recently, retailing sectors, resulting in high a form of NCS was introduced during the levels of unemployment and social Gulf War, when merchant ships were disruption. A recent independent boarded and briefed from Coalition survey conducted by the Ports of Otago, naval vessels on entry into Gulf showed that 18,600 people in that waters. province alone depended on the ports for their livelihood. A similar study Postwar, it was clear to Naval planners conducted in the Ports of Auckland, that a core capability for Naval Control of Shipping needed to be found that 13% of New Zealand's GDP, depended on maritime trade through the maintained. It was recognised that the ports. That report also claimed that Naval Reserve with its special 87,000 people were employed in the affiliation to the Merchant Navy, was Auckland region, as a direct result of ideally placed to undertake this port throughput. important role. Also, the necessary link between the shipowners and the The second important rationale for NCS Navy, could be more effectively in New Zealand, has to do with its November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 47 position on the globe. New Zealand's than a direct threat to ships and geographic location deep in the cargoes at this time, they nevertheless southern oceans, means that its Sea could be easily escalated into a very Lines of Communications (SLOC) are some effective form of economic warfare. of the longest of any maritime trading nation in the world. Apart from The third and arguably the most Australia and the South Pacific important NCS rationale of all, is the nations, the majority of New Zealand's fact that New Zealand is almost totally trading destinations are in the reliant on the ships of other nations Northern hemisphere. This entails to transport her trade. Less than 1% of voyages of 10,000 miles to the European ships serving New Zealand trades are Community, 5,000 miles to Japan and registered in that country. Although 6,000 to the USA. Even taking into there are over 2,000 vessels on the account the higher speed of modern register of New Zealand Shipping, only merchant ships, voyages of 2 to 4 weeks 19 are trading vessels exceeding 500 are not uncommon. Over 75% of New tons. Of these, only 6 regularly trade Zealand's trade, utilises voyages overseas the remainder are employed on averaging 6,500 miles and 18 days coastal services. In terms of total duration. By contrast, the voyage from overseas trade, New Zealand's merchant New York across the Atlantic to fleet is insignificant. Liverpool, takes an average of only 8 New Zealand is not alone in this. By days, and much Northern Hemisphere 1985 the national fleet of that great trade is carried on voyages which are maritime nation Britain, had reduced to shorter than that. such an extent that it would have been Not only do the merchant ships carrying virtually impossible for the Government to find enough ships to mount a New Zealand trade travel vast ocean campaign similar to the Falklands. In distances, but most of them pass through restricted waterways at some that conflict, 53 British registered point during their passage. The Suez merchant ships of various types, were taken up from trade (STUFT). And and Panama Canals, Cape Horn, the although it would seem the requirement confined waters and straits to the north of Australia and the Gulf region, has now disappeared, it is doubtful if the US could have found enough US form natural choke points where the geography makes the potential registered merchant vessels, if the resupply of Europe had become a reality interdiction of merchant trade easily at any time during the past decade. achievable. More than 50% of New Because the majority of New Zealand's Zealand's trade passes through the trade is carried in foreign flag choke points to the north and east of vessels, the owners and operators of Australia, European trade comprising these ships are represented by either a 20%, goes via Suez, Panama or Cape New Zealand office of an overseas Horn, while 85% of crude oil imports, company, or a separate New Zealand are sourced from ports in the confined shipping agency. At present there are waters of the Persian Gulf. In recent seventeen major shipping agencies of years acts of piracy and terrorism whom only seven represent New Zealand against merchant ships have grown at an owned companies. Takeovers, mergers and alarming rate particularly in South management contracts have resulted in East Asian and West African waters. one company, the P&O Group, being now Today's smaller merchant crews, which involved in the carrying almost 80% of can mean there is only one person on all non bulk cargoes to and from New watch, have left merchant ships vulnerable to this sort of attack when Zeal and. sailing in confined waters. In 1991 Bulk cargoes, such as oil, logs and there were 150 such acts reported and fertiliser are carried in vessels it is well known that many other chartered from a wide variety of attacks do not come to official notice. overseas companies. Many of these are While many of these incidents, and the registered in countries whose political threat of them, are more of a nuisance systems and ideologies, are vastly .It' Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 different from New Zealand. A nations and the necessity for them to considerable proportion of trade is pass through most of the major maritime carried in ships registered under flags choke points of the world, it is of convenience to avoid taxes in their possible to envisage a number of own countries. Many of these have scenarios where New Zealand's trade may complex ownership and their crews can still come under threat. be comprised of the nationals of many countries. New Zealand's trade is The possibility of a minewarfare threat therefore maintained almost exclusively in waters where New Zealand trade by foreign shipowners, whose capital originates or terminates. The ever investment in the New Zealand trade is increasing acts of piracy and terrorism very high. against merchant shipping. Political upheavals in states lying across or A typical container vessel on the New adjacent to New Zealand's trading Zealand run would cost up to NZ $200M routes, are just some of the potential to replace. The daily costs of threats to its maritime trade. Clearly, servicing such a vessel and its cargo, any such threats would occur many could be as high as NZ $150,000. Its thousands of miles from its shores and cargo capacity is five times that of a one may well ask what the New Zealand WW II merchant ship and it is capable NCSORG could do about that? Actually, of twice as many voyages in a given it can do quite a lot! period. So in comparative terms, one modern container ship has replaced ten HOW NCS WORKS conventional merchant vessels. Today A merchant ship voyage can only be New Zealand's trade is therefore effectively controlled, if the concentrated in fewer but larger hulls, directions for its voyage can be owned by fewer companies. This coordinated between the countries of concentration of high value cargo in arrival and departure, as well as the foreign owned hulls, constitutes an areas through which it will pass unavoidable but significant risk to the enroute. This is achieved by means of nation's economy. an agreed set of international So it is these three factors; New procedures, common to all Allied Zealand's total reliance on maritime nations. NCS procedures are designed to trade, the sheer length of its SLOC and be implemented in stages, according to its total dependence on the merchant the severity of the perceived threat. hulls of other nations which form the NCS publications delineate the very powerful reasons why we should boundaries of NCS control areas and maintain the ability to take speedy and establish a command and control effective control of merchant shipping structure, designed to operate in should the need ever arise. parallel with Allied military command structures. The key to the POSSIBLE THREATS TO MERCHANT SHIPPING effectiveness of international NCS procedures, lies in an agreed worldwide But what of the need? What could system of signals, utilising possibly threaten merchant shipping in New Zealand waters. The answer is universally agreed procedures. probably nothing more sinister than bad In an emergency where national weather, or the bogey of a mechanical interests are affected, NCS doctrine breakdown. The policy paper The Defence expects governments to consign their of A/eiv Zealand 1991 makes it quite national fleets to naval control. clear there is no perceived threat to Although this allows for broad New Zealand or her sovereign waters. coordination of strategic shipping However, this assessment, while it is assets and for the transfer of control undoubtedly correct, does not in itself from one NCS area to adjacent areas, remove the potential threats to New this worldwide form of naval control is Zealand's maritime trade. Because of becoming less and less relevant. New the length of its trading routes, its NCS procedures are being developed, in total reliance on the ships of other response to the changing world November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 49 political environment. It is effectiveness of NCS is based on anticipated these will allow regional standardised international control commanders to implement NCS in quite procedures, put into practice by means limited geographic areas. Such of secure military communications regional policies would have been systems. Most nations practice these valuable in the Gulf War for instance, procedures by participating in where the worldwide NCS policies international NCS exercises each year. current at the time, were not suited to These exercises are controlled by NATO the limited geographic nature of that in European, Mediterranean and Atlantic conf1i ct. waters and by CINCPACFLT in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. New Zealand The coordinated utilisation of Allied last took part in a CINCPACFLT merchant ships, during periods of sponsored NCS exercise in 1984. tension or hostilities, is the Although it is not difficult to train responsibility of a National Shipping personnel in the core NCS disciplines Authority (NSA) in each country. The of navigation, communications and NSA is charged with the most efficient merchant shipping knowledge, use of available merchant shipping, to international NCS procedures can only meet the economic and military be adequately tested, by exercising objectives of their government. In New them in a multinational exercise Zealand, there is no legislation for environments. In recent years, the the formation of an NSA committee. Australian NCS organisation have However, a committee comprising senior provided New Zealand with limited NCS managers from all shipping companies procedural training, by manning some of serving New Zealand trades, meets their eastern and southern ports during voluntarily once or twice a year, at the TASMANEX maritime exercise. However the invitation of the Chief of Naval useful this is, it does not supply the Staff. This informal NSA committee, multinational procedural exposure which contributes significantly to the is essential for the effective training training of NCS personnel, by ensuring of any NCS organisation. maximum cooperation from their ships during NCS exercises. Members of the However, New Zealand's exclusion from committee also provide valuable advice international NCS exercises has not to the Naval Staff, on a wide range of been all bad. After an initial period maritime issues. of readjustment in 1985, the NCS organisation began to refocus its It is clear from this, that provided priorities on the sharp end of NCS, New Zealand maintains the capability to that is on merchant ships and the operate international NCS procedures shipping industry itself. This has and has appropriate structures in resulted in an improved understanding place, then it is maintaining the of the whole shipping industry and in a ability to contribute materially to the very high level of cooperation from the safety of its merchant shipping. The merchant shipping community. Also, the fact that nearly all merchant ships on lack of international exercises has New Zealand trades are owned by other encouraged the integration of the NCS nations, also means it has a function into regular force maritime responsibility to provide them with exercises such as the TASMANEX series. Shipping Control services, when they In truth however, the effectiveness of are in New Zealand ports and waters. If the Shipping Control organisation in it does not have that capability, many New Zealand today, will not be foreign owners may not be prepared to absolutely confirmed until it can once risk their valuable vessels on its again participate in multinational trades. international NCS exercises. CAPABILITY OF THE NZ NCS ORGANISATION FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR NCS What of the capability of the shipping What are the future directions for the control organisation? From the Naval Control of Shipping in New foregoing it is clear that the Zealand? Looking first of all at the .-•.I Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993

ANZUS situation. The ANZUS irritation emergency. would instantly disappear if there was Changes have also been forced on most ever any question of the merchant ships of the major NCS nations, in response of New Zealand's trading partners being to reductions in world Defence budgets seriously threatened. In the event that in recent years. This has encouraged NCS was required, New Zealand's trading the US, and the UK to recognise the partners would insist that New Zealand inherent ability of their NCSORGS to was involved, to ensure the safety of form mobile NCS teams in response to their valuable vessels and cargoes. needs in specific theatres, rather than Commercial reality, and the need for maintain large numbers of shadow posted the Governments of all nations to place personnel against all eventualities. An a high priority on the maintenance of effective NCS operation is after all their trade and economic security, primarily based on its trained would have to prevail. If that argument personnel. Provided they have access to is accepted, as it surely must be, it seems pointless to continue to deny New NCS procedural manuals, navigational charts and a military communications Zealand the means to train to keep the system, NCS personnel can set up and ships of other nations safe! operate anywhere. This concept, aptly The future of NCS is also being named NCS in a Suitcase is currently influenced by the massive changes being seriously studied by the UK. They resulting from the disintegration of envisage rapidly deployable NCS teams, the Warsaw Pact. Existing international perhaps operating under United Nations NCS policies and procedures, have been auspices, being accommodated on board largely developed by NATO to support naval support vessels in areas such as the concept of the resupply of Europe. the Persian Gulf, utilising shipborne With that potential scenario removed, military communications as a method of both NATO and CINCPACFLT are beginning providing a rapid NCS response to to concentrate on the development of future threats. doctrine for regional NCS relationships, as opposed to the world The operating and training philosophies wide policies of the past. Viewing that of the NZ NCSORG, already include the in the New Zealand context, we need to ability to react speedily to any consider the fact that seventy to foreseeable NCS scenario within the New eighty percent of New Zealand's trade Zealand's area of NCS responsibility. is now concentrated within Asia and the It therefore lends itself ideally to Pacific Basin. Many in the New Zealand the flexible and mobile concepts now shipping industry feel that trade with being developed by other nations. the European Community is unlikely to Because of this ability, the NCSORG can grow significantly, because of the high be viewed as an effective part of New cost of shipping and the increasing Zealand's peacekeeping assets, able to trend toward protectionism of European contribute speedily and at very low cost to United Nations initiatives markets. anywhere in the world. Because of these factors, it is reasonable to contend that New The future of NCS is also inextricably Zealand's primary NCS focus, should be tied to Naval Reserves. NCS is a low on areas where our seaborne trade is technology task, which employs much increasingly concentrated. The forging knowledge and skills found widely in of regional NCS links with other the civilian sector. The combined countries within our trading sphere, requirement for civilian skills and the will undoubtedly be governed by mainly part time nature of the peacetime NCS political considerations. However, as task, are ideally matched to the skills trade continues to develop with these and commitment of the naval reservist. It has been estimated that the cost of nations, a defence priority should be maintaining New Zealand's NCS given to regional understandings, which capability in the regular Naval Forces, will facilitate control of the ships would be five times higher than for the carrying our mutual trade in an same capability provided by naval November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 51 reserves. maintenance of a minimum credible CONCLUSION peacetime NCS capability is a very low insurance premium for such a large pay- Naval Control of Shipping will always back should the need ever arise. be required by a maritime nation such as New Zealand. The low cost Commander Stuart Duff joined the RNZNVR in infrastructure, based on naval 1962 and his involvement with Naval Control reserves, and the minimal capital asset of Shipping began in 1978. From 1987 to they employ, belies the value of the 1992 he served on the New Zealand Naval Staff as Director of Shipping Control and NCS contribution, not only to the in 1991 to commenced fulltime service as defence of New Zealand, but to the the Director Naval Manpower Training and economy of this country as a whole. The Reserves .

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ATLAS ELEKTRONIK

Eighty - Five years of Marine Electronics

ATLAS ELEKTRONIK (AUSTRALIA) Pty. Ltd., Unit 6 • 39 Herbert Street • St. Leonhards N.S.W. 2064 P.O.Box 718 • Artarmon • Australia • Phone: (02) 437 45 77 • Telefax: (02) 439 75 76 • Telex: AA 248 15 November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 53 A Fall From Favour: HMAS Australia, 1913 to 1924 Ray Jones

Early in October 1913 the battlecruiser (the second HMAS Australia commissioned HMAS Australia led the newly in 1928 and paid-off for scrapping in established Australian Fleet into 1954; the aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney Sydney Harbour. This fleet was the commissioned in 1948 and finally culmination of years of development in paid-off 25 years later in 1973). The Australian naval thought; it gave assertion is often made that the Treaty Australia naval power to dominate the for the Limitation of Naval Armament of region and ensure national security in 1922 (generally known as the Naval an increasingly unsettled world. Limitations Treaty) required that Australia's heavy armament and high Australia be scrapped and there was no speed were a crucial component of choice in the matter, but close Australian 1913 naval strategy and the analysis of events shows many more battlecruiser was hailed as a powerful factors than this Treaty contributed to symbol of naval power. Yet in 1920 that the end of the battlecruiser's service ship was reduced to a limited harbour life. training role and in 1924 was sunk off Sydney Heads after being stripped of Australia had been built during the anything considered useful. transition of Australian naval forces from the coastal defence Commonwealth The transition in such a short time Naval Forces to an ocean-going from publicly acclaimed centre-piece of Australian Navy designed to exercise naval defence into a scuttled derelict sea-control over wide areas and to is unusual for the RAN which tends to protect the British Empire's maritime retain large ships for several decades trade routes. This Imperial role fitted 54 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 well with Australian self-perceptions Indefatigable class ship (the future of growing importance in the Pacific HMAS Australia) some time later. regi on. Before the ship was launched on 25 The new RAN comprised cruisers, October 1911 the term 'armoured destroyers and submarines organised in cruiser' was replaced by a Fleet Unit - a term coined to 'battlecruiser' reflecting the adoption describe a group of ships with of the dreadnought principle of a complementary capabilities expected to single size of main gun. Australia had control oceanic areas remote from eight 12-inch guns in four turrets, one Europe where battle-fleets dominated. forward, one aft and two amidships. Secondary armament of four-inch guns This Fleet Unit concept can be traced and 24-inch searchlights was to an Admiralty planning team sponsored distributed over the fore and aft by Admiral Sir John Fisher (First Sea superstructure for defence against Lord) in 1907. This group stressed torpedo boats and destroyers but the that the British battle-fleet existed 12-inch guns were the main armament. to counter the enemy battle-fleet while the navy's main business was protecting Using the term 'battlecruiser' had the British maritime interests around the unfortunate effect of blurring the world and the cruiser was the means of distinction between this type and the exercising that control. battleship. The battleship carried large-calibre guns and heavy armour The 1907 planning group recommended intended to provide protection against that light cruiser effectiveness be equally heavy guns fired by an enemy enhanced by having support ships battleship. The battlecruiser was carrying supplies to cruisers so they lightly armoured in comparison with its would not have to interrupt patrolling guns; it was not intended to stand up when returning to base for supplies. As to the guns of an equally armed well, the light cruiser's recognised opponent and relied on speed for weakness in guns and armour (compared survival; a battlecruiser unable to use with equivalent German warships) was offset by having a fast, speed and manoeuvrability in action could not rely on its relatively thin heavily-gunned, armoured cruiser nearby armour to protect it against equally guarding the supply ships and serving armed ship. The original HMS as rallying point for light cruisers Dreadnought, first of the modern which chanced upon enemy warships too British battleships, was armed with ten strong to sink unaided. Wireless 12-inch guns and had 11-inches of communications between ships ensured armour protecting her guns with side that several light cruisers working armour up to 11-inches thick; the first with an armoured cruiser could dominate British battlecruisers (Invincible and wide ocean areas. Armoured cruisers Indefatigable classes, including were designed to be fast and heavily Australia) carried the same size of gunned but were not particularly well main armament (eight 12-inch guns) as armoured in the expectation they would Dreadnought but with much less be in action against light cruisers protection; the battlecruisers carried where speed was more important than armour. a maximum of 7-inches of armour protecting parts of the gunnery system The Admiralty's proposal during the with side armour up to 6-inches thick 1909 Imperial Conference that Australia and much thinner armour elsewhere should form a navy based on the Fleet (thinnest was the 2.5 to 1 inch thick Unit was enthusiastically accepted and armoured deck). The battlecruiser was quickly implemented. On 9 December 1909 capable of 25 knots, while the the Australian Government asked the battleship was rated at 21 knots."In Admiralty to order an armoured cruiser theory (and, as events were to confirm, immediately and Prime Minister Alfred often in practice) a battlecruiser had Deakin approved the tender by John less chance than a battleship of Brown and Company to build an surviving action with an equally gunned November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 55 enemy if the battlecruiser could not agreed to despatch expeditions to use speed to escape. capture Rabaul and Samoa respectively; they began assembling invasion forces Distinguishing the two types of ship and planning their movements. was difficult because there was little external visual indication of the Both expeditions could be disrupted, or difference; an Admiralty campaign to even destroyed, by the German East Asia 'talk-up' the battlecruiser by Squadron. This German squadron under encouraging over-estimates of guns and Admiral Count von Spee reflected armour resulted in the Indefatigable similar strategic thought to that class' capabilities being regarded as expressed in the Australian Fleet Unit. much greater than they really were." The German squadron comprised the This propaganda concealed the armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Admiralty's failure to take account of Gneisenau with several light cruisers. events in other navies when designing These older armoured cruisers were well the ship. When Invincible (the first armed and armoured but were recognised British battlecruiser) was designed, as not being a match for Australia the fast, heavily-gunned, lightly although they were a real danger to any armoured ship had a place in the other RAN warships (and especially to British naval order-of-battle because troopshi ps). the German navy did not operate Defence against these German armoured equivalent ships. British cruisers would rely on Australia and battlecruisens would be much more powerful than German cruisers they her movements became crucial to the planned landings. found on distant stations and could be expected to win an action. By the time Admiral Patey, commanding the Indefatigable was designed this Australian Fleet, decided to take the situation had gone, the German Navy had offensive and seek out the German commenced the Von der Tann class squadron at Rabaul. Before moonrise on battlecruiser with similar guns and the night of 11 August 1918, a week thicker armour than the British after the outbreak of war, and while battlecruisers, and an Indefatigable landing forces were still being class battlecruiser could no longer assembled in Australia and New Zealand, expect to be more powerful than any three black-painted Australian German ship on a remote station. destroyers slipped into Rabaul harbour intending to torpedo German warships. In October 1913, when Australia led the The light cruiser Sydney lay at the Australian Fleet into Sydney Harbour, mouth of the harbour ready to assist these were lesser considerations for while Australia waited further out to most people. Australians were not sea ready to engage with her 12-inch interested in (and few understood) guns. The German East Indies Squadron distinctions between battlecruisers and was not at Rabaul but the scene had battleships and were content with been set for Australia's battlecruiser reassurances that they had an effective to provide overwhelming naval power navy built around a powerful flagship. supporting the expulsion of Germany When the First World War broke out in from the south west Pacific. August 1914 the battlecruiser was a After this operation, Australia vital strategic asset. Australia escorted New Zealand troops to occupy co-operated with Britain in Samoa then hurried to join up with the implementing an imperial strategy aimed Australian invasion force bound for at depriving Germany of its colonial Rabaul as it passed through the Coral empire and of the means of making war Sea.0 This Australian invasion force on Britain's maritime trade routes. divided into several sections as it This required the destruction of approached Rabaul. Three destroyers and Germany's radio network and occupation the cruiser Sydney led the way, of German colonial administrative followed some miles astern by Australia centres in the South West Pacific. The with the auxiliary HMAS Berrima Australian and New Zealand governments '• Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 carrying the Australian Naval and influenced his decisions in the first Military Expeditionary Force. months of war. Some miles further astern was a convoy Von Spee's respect for Australia's of storeship, tanker and three colliers speed and 12-inch guns was well escorted by the cruiser HMAS Encounter founded. A few weeks after the German and the submarines AE1 and AE2.' A East Asia Squadron left the South West hospital ship and the cruiser Melbourne Pacific, both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau formed the last group. The advance were engaged at the Battle of the destroyers entered Rabaul harbour and Falkland Islands by two Royal Navy confirmed German warships were not battlecruisers (Invincible and present before the landing force was Inflexible) with 12-inch main armament deployed to take over the similar to that in Australia's administration and find the radio flagship. The British battlecruisers communications stations which were the used superior speed to dictate the naval strategic objective for the fighting range and their heavy guns to operation." sink both German armoured cruisers When the German administration was while the British battlecruisers reluctant to negotiate surrender, sustained little damage. Admiral Patey was able to write from With the departure of the German his battlecruiser flagship to the squadron from the South West Pacific, Governor of German New Guinea, "I will and the take-over of former German point out to Your Excellency that the colonies completed, Australia's power force at my command is so large as to was no longer needed. When Scharnhorst render useless any opposition on your and Gneisenau were sunk the RAN part, and such resistance can only flagship was guarding the Pacific Ocean result in unnecessary bloodshed". end of the Panama Canal. She did not Australia's guns were a significant return to Australian waters but joined part of this force. In the event, only the Royal Navy's Second Battlecruiser Encounter's guns were used in the role Squadron in Britain remaining until the now known as naval gunfire support but end of the war. Her role in Australian Australia was available for that task. waters in the opening months of the Australia's presence was a crucial war, brief as the service was, had been element in Patey's threat to the German cruci al . Governor and her superiority to the Accounts of the decision making German armoured cruisers gave the RAN surrounding the annexation of the and the Australian government freedom German colonies show the dependence on of action in dealing with the German Australia to ensure that the German colonies. Australian and New Zealand squadron would not interfere with the government leaders knew that only Australian/New Zealand operations. Scharnhorst or Gneisenau could Although she did not need to fire a effectively interfere with a convoy or shot, her presence made possible the landing operation but that Australia whole operation from the time of the deterred Von Spee from doing so. This first assault on Rabaul harbour, hoping deterrent was not absolute. Under to sink Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, to favourable conditions Von Spee was the movement of the Samoa and Rabaul prepared to attack Australia and went invasion forces. 1,600 miles out of his way to approach Apia after he heard Australia had There must be doubt whether the arrived there escorting the New Zealand Australian government would have landing force. He hoped to close the sanctioned the despatch of the Rabau", port undetected in the morning invasion force without the confidence half-light and catch the battlecruiser drawn from Australia's presence. We at anchor and off guard. 11 This single need only look at the way troopships incident does not alter the conclusion enroute from Australian capital cities that Von Spee had a great respect for to Albany to form into the First Convoy Australia's guns and her presence carrying Australian and New Zealand November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 57 troops to Europe were ordered by the gunnery duel with the German Australian Cabinet, acting on Naval battlecruiser SMS Von der Tann Board advice, to shelter when reports when a German 11-inch shell penetrated were received that Scharnhorst and Indefatigable's deck aft; flash from Gneisenau may be approaching Australian the explosion reached a magazine which waters while Australia was in New blew up sinking the ship with heavy Guinea waters and unable to protect loss of life - additional 11-inch shell shipping on the Australian coast. hits forward caused more damage but the Convoy assembly resumed only after primary cause of her destruction is, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were attributed to the initial hits aft.1= HM confirmed as being far away from Ships Queen Mary and Invincible (both Australian waters when they were battlecruisers) also blew up. The news si ghted at Tahi ti . was not all bad for battlecruisers (HMS This suspension of activity was New Zealand survived 11-inch hits on entirely an Australia/New Zealand her armour) but there was sufficient evidence that battlecruisers had initiative, the Admiralty remained insufficient horizontal armour and were convinced the operation could proceed vulnerable to heavy guns. without "undue risk" but Australian leaders were concerned at the German After the Battle of Jutland, war at sea threat to ships carrying AIF troops and deteriorated into a stalemate as far as suspended the operation. Australian capital ships were concerned. Some reluctance to mount the Rabaul landing failings at Jutland were studied and an if Australia had not been available to additional inch of horizontal armour provide overwhelming naval power can be was installed around the RAN flagship's confidently deduced. midships turrets. Otherwise, Australia spent the remainder of the war as part Reliance on Australia as a counter to of the remote blockade of Germany the German armoured cruisers was waiting fruitlessly for the High Seas significant and there is no doubt that, Fleet to give battle. during those busy weeks at the end of 1914, the battlecruisen provided the After the Armistice, Australia returned dominant naval power which Australia to Australia where conditions were very sought when the decision was taken to different to those prevailing before establish the RAN. She provided naval the war, especially in the level of power allowing the Australian Government interest in naval defence. Government to co-operate with Admiralty Despite grandiose plans for naval global strategy in the Australian expansion, including one prepared by waters. Viscount Jellicoe, Australia did not have a consistent naval policy and After the German East Asia Squadron was expenditure was difficult to plan. destroyed, and the German colonies in Conditions were so unclear that Admiral the Pacific were occupied, the RAN' s Grant, after two years as Chief of the considerable naval strength became Naval Staff, complained to the Minister superfluous in Australian waters. The for the Navy that '...I have been primary strength, of battlecruiser and unable to obtain any information or any light cruisers, was despatched to decision as to the policy to be European waters and absorbed in Royal pursued..'. Naval policy was extremely Navy squadrons in Britain. unsettled while financial and political In April 1915, Australia collided with factors worked against real expansion HMS New Zealand (a sister ship which in the RAN.20 had been paid for by New Zealand) and The post-war RAN was no longer designed was in dry dock being repaired during around Australia for several reasons, the Battle of Jutland. This battle not least the changed power balance in exposed grave weaknesses in the world. Pre-war competition and battlecruisers working in the battle hostility between Germany and Britain line. HMS Indefatigable (another of had been a significant factor in Australia's sisters) was engaged in a Australia's decision to establish an Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 ocean-going navy to defend Australian battery defending the Depot against and British maritime interests. Ships raids from the sea. The Board explained in the Fleet Unit had been conceived, to the Minister that the ship should designed and built to defeat specific not be considered as being in reserve; German naval capabilities and there was she could not be fully manned and sent no longer such a clearly defined threat to sea at short notice because a full to plan against. crew could not be trained sufficiently rapidly to competently operate and As well, the Australian government fight the ship.25 insisted that Naval expenditure be reduced to the same level as in pre-war Although financial shortages are often years. This required harsh reductions blamed for downgrading the in a navy which had grown considerably battlecruiser there was a more during the war. Australia's complement important loss of interest in the ship of 840 men and heavy coal consumption within the Naval Staff and Naval Board. (192 tons per day at economical speed) An interesting comparison can be drawn imposed a heavy load on a Naval budget between the battlecruiser and the already under pressure as two light submarine arm. The RAN was eventually cruisers could be manned with the same forced by economic conditions to total complement as Australia. abandon the submarine arm in the early 1920s but there were repeated reviews There were more immediate problems including the impending non- and discussions in an attempt to find some way to continue operating RAN availability of main armament o submarines. Nothing similar happened ammunition. The Admiralty had decided, as part of post-war rationalisation, to in Australia's case. In August 1920 the Minister for the Navy advised the Prime phase out 12-inch guns entirely and Minister that as far as Australia was stop manufacturing ammunition of that size. Despite progress during the war concerned, '...I am convinced that it towards producing ammunition in would not be advisable to keep the above-mentioned ship in full Australia this size of naval ammunition commission, as money can be more could not be made locally and cessation effectively used in other of British production meant the service directions...'/ This assessment life of the guns would expire when accurately reflected the Naval opinion ammunition stocks reached the end of of the ship which had undergone a thei r storage 1i fe. complete change since the RAN was In addition to this downgrading of the established. Australian battlecruiser, the In the opening months of the First battlecruiser as a type had dropped out World War the RAN battlecruiser had of Australian naval planning. The given the Australian government Admiralty no longer mentioned strategic freedom to act in support of battlecruisers in advice to Australia (other than to suggest in mid-1920 that national and Imperial objectives; this was the role envisaged when the Australia was expensive to operate and decision had been taken to establish could possibly be placed in reserve ). the RAN^8 and the RAN's valuable service Admiralty advice had begun to follow in the Australian region during those the theme common in the 1920s and 1930s weeks is too often overlooked. But that Australia should build cruisers, subsequent events, especially the submarines and shore facilities. Battle of Jutland, tarnished the In a list of twelve priorities adopted battlecruisers' reputation and exposed by the Naval Board on 9 August 1920 the its unsuitabi1ity for the battle-line. battl ecrui ser was listed eleventh asnjan The Admiralty decision, taken well example of a ship with nucleus crew/" before the Naval Limitations Treaty, to In response to cuts in Naval funding, cease making the 12-inch ammunition the Board allocated Australia to used by many battlecruisers is a clear Flinders Naval Depot for drill and pointer that the Admiralty planned a training. She would also act as a fixed short life for battlecruisers found November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 59 wanting in the battle line at Jutland. disposal. 1 The treaty required Experience at Jutland had led to Australia to be scrapped within different design requirements for eighteen months of ratification (on 17 post-war battlecruisens. August 1923).32 The first post-war battlecruisen class Australia paid off in December 1921, planned for the Royal Navy was vastly before the Naval Limitations Treaty was different to the Indefatigable class signed. There was considerable and even different to HMS Hood which speculation on the best way to dispose was regarded as a particularly powerful of her while complying with the Treaty. battlecruiser. Known as the 1921 Use as a breakwater was quickly ruled Battlecruisen this 31-knot ship was to out because she could theoretically be be armed with nine 16-inch guns (HMS refloated and put back into service. Hood, widely regarded as a powerful The remaining alternatives were to battlecruiser, carried eight 15-inch convert the ship to a gunnery target, guns) and armoured with far thicker to break her up, or to sink her in deep armour than Hood (her side armour water. Conversion to a gunnery target varied from 152 to 307mm while the 1921 was not a legal option because the Battle Cruiser's side armour varied British Empire was limited by treaty to from 305 to 356 mm) and armour in other one target ship and a Royal Navy ship parts of the ship was similarly thicker had been selected for this role. than that in Hood. Four ships of this Breaking her up economically was not new class (to be named Indefatigable, possible in the time available, leaving Inflexible, Indomitable and Invincible) sinking as the only way to dispose of were authorised for construction and the ship.uCl design work began in 1921. There was some interest in re-deploying There is no record of Admiralty Australia's guns to shore defence suggestions that Australia should batteries (as was later done when the acquire one of these ships. Design of light cruisers were scrapped and their the 1921 Battle Cruiser had barely 6-inch guns were distributed around begun when the Naval Limitations Treaty Australian shore defence installations) led to the project being scrapped but but the idea came to nothing. This was preliminary sketches show a ship which partly because 12-inch ammunition would was far bigger, faster, more heavily not be available after Britain ended armed and far more expensive to buy and manufacture but at least as important operate than Australia. Political and was the extent of the engineering work financial conditions in Australia in needed to mount a heavy naval gun, the 1920s were such that it is designed to be served from magazines difficult to conceive the circumstances and powder rooms below and relying on under which Australia would have hydraulic power for routine operation, seriously considered ordering such a in a land installation. The decision shi p. was taken to sink the guns, turrets and In the Naval Limitations Treaty signed spare barrels with the ship at Washington in February 1922 the (photographs of the ship under tow to major naval powers accepted strict be scuttled show the spare barrels on limitations on major warships. The RAN deck). was included in treaty deliberations as On 12 April 1924 the stripped hull of part of the British Empire's naval the battlecruiser was sunk in deep strength and became subject to these water off Sydney Heads. limitations which included agreement not to build capital ships for ten By the time she was sunk in 1924 years and for maximum total tonnages of Australia was obsolete; although only ships larger than 10,000 tons. ten years old, events of the First Signatories agreed to dispose of ships World War had overtaken her. Formal to bring national tonnages down to agreement in the Naval Limitations treaty limits. Australia was among the Treaty that Australia would be made ships of the British Empire listed for unusable was the official reason for Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 getting rid of her but the Admiralty These are not unusual reasons for any had decided, well before that warship reaching the end of its service conference and treaty, that ships with life, the unusual element in 12-inch guns would not be retained. Australia's case is the rapidity of the That decision ensured the Australian process. This was partly because the battlecrui ser had to be scrapped or First World War precipitated new global substantially modified. Not only would power balances but there is also a her guns have to be replaced, but she strong element related to the needed conversion from coal-burning to performance of battlecruisers in oil-burning to be considered as a action. modern warship. This large-scale modification was economically out of In many respects the Australian the question in post-war Australia, battlecruiser's career reflects the especially when the Naval Board had story of British battlecruisers of that lost interest in the ship. period. They were designed to defend imperial lines of communications in More importantly, the pre-war wartime and did that with some success, battlecruiser had not performed well at as demonstrated by Australia in the Jutland where fundamental design South West Pacific or Invincible and weakness had been exposed. Modification Inflexible in the South Atlantic. Once to armour to make her an acceptable Germany's colonial possessions had been capital ship required complete taken and her distant squadrons rebuilding and was not an economic eliminated, battlecruisers were pressed proposition. Australia was not unique into roles for which they were not in this respect. The Battle of Jutland designed and which they did not perform had a tremendous impact on battleship well. The Battle of Jutland thoroughly and battlecruiser design; the terms exposed their defects and ensured that 'pre-Jutland ' and 'post-Jutland' were navies of the world would modify or commonly used after the war to indicate scrap pre-Jutland ships, such as the value of a capital ship in any Australia, as quickly as possible. The navy. The Naval Limitations Treaty Naval Limitations Treaty ensured that includes tables of capital ships to be the RAN had to dispose of the scrapped or retained in which ships are battlecruiser but she had been listed as 'pre-' or 'post-' Jutland to downgraded in Australian naval planning indicate effectiveness. well before that Treaty was negotiated. This down-grading of pre-Jutland battlecruisers must have been an Endnotes important factor in fashioning RAN 1 'War Plans 1907' in The Papers of Admiral attitudes when funds were short after Sir John Fisher, P. Kemp (ed), p.335. the war. The Australian flagship 2 The Admiralty's full plan was for three belonged to a type of ship which was Fleet Units (including the Australian one) in the region. These would combine in time perceived as having grave design of war to form a Far Eastern Fleet. The weaknesses seriously inhibiting its Admiralty's failure to execute this plan did employment and there was little not alter the balance and strength of the Australian Fleet Unit for its intended role justification for continued expenditure of exercising maritime power in the on her. Australian region. 3 Siegfried Breyer, Battleships and Battle By 1922, when means of disposing of Cruisers 1905-1970: Historical Development Australia were being discussed, the of the Capital Ship, London, 1973, p.115. transition in status from the newly 4 Oscar Parkes, British Battleships, London, commissioned main strength of the RAN 1973. in 1914 to a cast off vessel ready for 5 Antony Preston, Battleships of World War 1: An Illustrated Encyclopedia of the scrapping was complete. The underlying Battleships of all Nations 1914-1918, reason for Australia being transformed London, 1972, p.129. so quickly from the centre-piece of the 6 A.W. Jose, Official History of Australia in new Australian Navy to a scuttled hulk the War of 1914-18: Vol IX, The Royal arose from fundamental changes in Australian Navy, Sydney, 1943, p.79. S.S. Mackenzie, Official History of technology and global power balances. Australia in the War of 1914-18: Vol X: The November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 61

Australian at Rabaul, (3ed), pp.34-35. 24 Extract from Naval Board Meeting of 9 Aug 8 Naval operations at this time were 1920, 20/0251, MP1049/1, AAV. influenced by conflicting aims. The Naval 25 Paper entitled 'The Effect on the Royal Board and Admiral Patey were primarily Australian Navy by (sic) the Reduction of concerned with finding and neutralising the Naval Estimates', from Naval Board to German Squadron, while the British Minister, Sept 1920, 20/0251, MP1049/1, AAV. Government and Admiralty appear to have been 26 Michael W.D. White, Australian Submarines: A more concerned with gaining control of History, Canberra, 1992, Chapter 11. German colonies in the South-West Pacific. 27 Minister for Navy to Prime Minister, 26 9 Patey to German Governor, Mackenzie, August 1920, 20/0215, MP1049/1, AAV. Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18: Vol X, p.51 28 M. Briggs, The Too Vast Orb: The Admiralty and Australian Naval Defence 1881-1913, PhD 10 ibid, p.79. thesis, University of Tasmania, 1991. 11 Australia had left Apia before von Spee 29 Erble Bradford, The Great Ship, pp.120-141 reached there. outlines battle-cruiser performance, 12 A.W. Jose, Official History of Australia in strength and weakness. the War of 1914-18: Vol IX, p.153. 30 Breyer, Battleships and Battlecruisers, 13 ibid, pp.100-110. pp.168-174. 14 ibid, p.155. 31 Treaty between the British Empire, France, 15 John Campbell, Jutland: An Analysis of the Italy, Japan and the United States of Fighting, London, 1986, pp.60-61. America for the Limitation of Naval Armament, Washington, February 6, 1922. 16 Erble Bradford, The Great Ship, London, (i.e. Naval Limitations Treaty), Section II 1986, p.141. - Replacement and Scrapping of Capital 17 Conways All The Worlds Battleships: 1906 to Ships. the present. 32 Naval Limitations Treaty, Chapter II, part 18 R.M. Jones, 'Jellicoe and the RAN', Defence 11, art icle IV. Force Journal, Number 18, Sep/Oct 1977, 33 Bowden (Minister for Defence) in reply to pp.44-51. question, 4 April 1924, Commonwealth 19 Grant to W. Laird-Smith (Ass/Minister), 18 Parliamentary Debates, Vol 106, p.401. June 1920, File 20/0215, MP1049/1, 34 Naval Limitations Treaty, Chapter II, Part Australian Archives, Victoria (AAV). II, Article II. 20 The RAN expanded by the addition of 35 Bowen (Minister for Defence), 4 April destroyers, sloops and submarines surplus to 1924, CPD, Vol 106, p.401. British requirements but their addition to the RAN was not the result of any Australian policy decision or long-term plan. Ray Jones served in the RAN, mainly in 21 R.A. Burt, British Battleships of World War aviation postings, until 1983 when he One, London, 1986, p.91. resigned to undertake full-time tertiary study majoring in Australian History. He 22 Colonial Office to Governor-General, now works in administration at the Australia, 13 Aug 20, 20/0215, MP1049/1, University of Tasmania and writes on naval AAV. and defence history as time permits. 23 ibid. 62 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993

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HOSTAGE ON THE YANGTZE: Communist forces were preparing to BRITAIN, CHINA, AND THE AMETHYST CRISIS cross the time, the Kuomintang (KMT) OF 1949 forces of Chiang Kai-shek had retreated By Malcolm Murfett from Manchuria and North China and were suffering heavy losses in the Yangtze Reviewed by Dr Tom Frame Valley as the Chinese civil war was Malcolm H. Murfett, Hostage on the moved steadily towards a Communist Yangtze: Britain, China, and the triumph. Murfett's opening chapter on Amethyst Crisis of 1949, US Naval Anglo-Chinese naval relations from the Institute Press, Annapolis, 1991, pp. seventeenth century is superb and 300, maps, tables, figures and b&w provides a clear description and illustrations, hardcover A5, ISBN assessment of the context in which the 0-87021-289-3, RRP $US34.95. Amethyst crisis was played out. When I was aged fourteen and expressed Although Britain sought to avoid an interest in joining the Royal playing an active military role in Australian Navy, I was given to read an Chinese internal affairs after World account of the dramatic escape of HMS War II when KMT-Communist tensions Amethyst down the Yangtze River in escalated into violence, Communist gun 1949. I was led to believe that this batteries on the northern shore of the sort of incident was indicative of the Yangtze River began to shell both excitement inherent in seagoing naval Amethyst and Consort as the relief of service! Naturally, I was keen to join the latter was in progress on 20 April the Navy as soon as possible. The 1949. Both British ships rapidly Amethyst story is a swashbuckling tale returned fire and more Chinese than resplendent with displays of courage, British were killed in the exchange. gallantry and skill performed in the Consort managed to escape down river context of close-quarters naval combat. but Amethyst ran aground and was But there is much more to the 'Amethyst temporarily stuck fast. When an attempt crises' as Malcolm Murfett explains in to rescue Amethyst the following day his excellent book, Hostage on the was unsuccessful, it became apparent Yangtze: Britain, China, and the after the ship was refloated that she Amethyst Crisis of 1949. would sail only if the Communists allowed her passage. After weeks of This book is an important study which intense negotiation and in the face of breaks new ground in British naval and Communist intransigence, her Captain's East Asian diplomatic history. The options were gradually reduced to one - narrative is woven around the 100-day planning a daring escape. However, the long 'Amethyst' crisis which began on frigate's communications were severely 20 April 1949 when the 1,300 ton restricted and only cryptic plain Modified Black Swan Class frigate, language messages could be sent to her Amethyst, was sent upriver from administrative authority for fear of Shanghai to relieve the embassy the Communists becoming aware of guardship, HMS Consort, at Nanking. It British intentions. With the skill of a was earlier intended that Consort would seasoned novelist in the thriller be relieved by the Australian frigate genre, Murfett very skilfully brings Shoalhaven on 12 April. But as the story to its tense climax. By the Shoalhaven was required for service in end of July 1949, Amethyst was low on Japan at the end of April 1949, her food and fuel. Her men would have one place was taken by Amethyst. chance of escaping although the prospect of success was not great. As Amethyst made her way to the north west through the Yangtze, Chinese - -I Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993

When all of the prevailing conditions emphasises that senior British naval suited her captain, Amethyst sailed officers and the British Government down river under cover of darkness on were able to avoid making the crisis a 30 July and managed to arrive safely in full-blown disaster in every respect. Shanghai after engaging a number of The Chief of Naval Staff, Lord Fraser, shore batteries and completing a stressed the importance of allowing the difficult navigational passage. The man on the scene' to make his own unlikely hero in all of this was appreciation of the situation and to Lieutenant Commander John Kerans, a respond with whatever action he very ordinary seaman officer by all considered appropriate. This gave previous accounts who enjoyed the Kerans and the Commander-in-Chief of pleasures of naval life to the full. the Far East Station, Admiral Sir But virtually overnight, Kerans was Patrick Brind, plenty of scope for transformed from an officer destined to independent action. Similarly, the being passed over' for promotion, to British Government relied properly upon the newest in a long line of celebrated the advice of the British Ambassador, British naval heroes. He was Sir Ralph Stevenson, who tried subsequently decorated, promoted and valiantly to ensure that this later served as a member of parliament. essentially isolated affair was seen more as a local incident than as a Assuming command after Amethyst major stumbling block which might later captain, Lieutenant Commander B.N. inhibit development of long-term Skinner, died of wounds sustained diplomatic and economic relations during the initial 20 April engagement, between Britain and the new China. Kerans had originally been posted to China as Assistant Naval Attache in Hostage on the Yangtze is not the first Nanking. Despite trying conditions, account of the Amethyst crisis. But it enormous hardship, constant frustration has superseded two earlier works: and little prospect of an unopposed Escape of the Amethyst published in escape against a determined adversary, 1958 by C.E. Lucas Phillips; and Kerans' leadership in Amethyst was Yangtze Incident by Lawrence Earl which exemplary. The officers and men under appeared in 1973. These were written his command responded to their plight without the substantial body of with enthusiasm and without complaint. official sources which were available They combined the sailor's seemingly by Murfett who has used them to treat endless capacity for improvisation with effect. But the Amethyst story will a solid reliance on thorough individual only be fully told when the Chinese and group training to achieve what publish their account of the incident. seemed impossible. Using his evidently This will be an important addition to wel1-developed initiative and the historical record. As Murfett has navigational and shiphandling shown, there is insufficient evidence knowledge, Kenans' executed Amethyst's available from the Chinese side to escape down river with great precision. determine with any certainty the According to the Admiralty, the entire intentions of the People's Liberation ship's company upheld the finest Army in attacking Amethyst and Consort, traditions of the Service'. and in prolonging the crisis and risking direct British involvement in Yet, Murfett is not uncritical of the the civil war on the side of the KMT. Royal Navy's performance throughout the crisis. He remarks that the decision to One suspects that we will be waiting deploy Amethyst in such a manner was a some time yet to hear from the Chinese. curiously benighted and...grossly Hostage on the Yangtze is an excellent irresponsible decision . Indeed, Harold book. It will appeal to both the Macmillan in an attack on the Atlee general and specialist reader, and find Labour Government described the crisis an interested audience among students as an absolute gem, a little cameo of of naval and diplomatic history. It incompetence, a miniature masterpiece comes highly recommended. of mismanagement . However, Murfett Finally, a word on the author. Malcolm November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 65

Murfett is presently senior lecturer in concerned. modern history at the National University of Singapore. He obtained British Naval Documents 1204-1960 is his doctorate from Oxford University in certainly an excellent example of this 1980 and was elected a Fellow of the fact. Royal Historical Society in 1990. While The book is published by The Navy studying for his doctorate, Murfett Records Society to mark its one served as principal research assistant hundredth anniversary and complies with to the Earl of Birkenhead, working on the purposes of the Society, including the officially commissioned one-volume "..the editing and publication of biography of Sir Winston Churchill. He manuscripts illustrating the history, has also been a senior associate member administration, organisation and social of St Anthony's College, Oxford, and a 1i fe of the Navy..." visiting associate professor in modern history at York University in Toronto, As such, this 1196 page book is a work Canada. Dr Murfett's earlier published primarily for the serious publications include Foolproof historian. However, that should not Relations: The Search for deter any defence professional from Anglo-American Naval Co-operation reading it. During the Chamberlain Years, To undertake this massive task, the 1937-1940, and The Limitations of Society appointed five superintending Military Power (coedited with John B. editors, each responsible for parts of Hattendorf). His edited volume on the the book and each free to delegate work British First Sea Lords (to which this to contributing editors. The result is reviewer contributed the chapter on a work well up to the high standards Lord Fraser) is due for release in set by the Society. mid-1994. The book is divided into seven periods: For the first half of 1994, Dr Murfett 1204-1485, 1485-1603, 1603-1648, will be a visiting lecturer in the 1648-1714, 1714-1815, 1815-1900 and Department of History at the Defence 1900-1960. For each period, there are Force Academy where he will teach a is a general introduction, with semester-length undergraduate course on sections on policy and strategy, naval history. There is no doubt he tactics and operations, administration, will be in great demand as a speaker materiel and weapons and personnel. during his time in Australia. He will certainly receive a warm welcome from The wide variety of material presented the small but enthusiastic naval offers something for a range of historical community in this country. interests. Thus the 1900-1960 personnel section includes extracts from the diary of a discontented ordinary seaman BRITISH NAVAL DOCUMENTS 1294 - 1960 serving in the elderly battleship Edited by John B. Hattendorf, R.J.B. Canopus in the South Atlantic in Knight A.W.H, Pearsall, N.A.M. Rodger & December 1914, the reflections of a Geoffrey Till Published by Scolar Press chaplain at much the same time, Admiral for The Navy Records Society Sir John Fisher's (remarkably progressive and positive) 1902 views on Reviewed by Commander A.W. Grazebrook, careers for engineer officers, the RANR causes and remedies of the 1931 The title of this book should not deter Invergordon Mutiny (in civilian terms a those who seek to be politically strike against badly handled pay cuts) correct and decry all things British. and manning problems and methods of entry in the 1950s. For there is much for professional defence personnel to learn from the A study of the causes and handling of study of well researched and presented the Invergordon Mutiny has much to naval military history, whatever the offer today's military leaders, for identity of the nations involved in the whom it is all too easy to become period covered the publication absorbed in ever increasing technology Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 at the expense of leadership and agreed total number of aircraft. At relations with personnel. the time, the RAF were querying the need to build the aircraft carrier Ark The personal letters include some Royal. In 1934, the Admiralty forecast remarkably frank statements. Thus that by 1938 Japanese Naval Air Arm Captain W.E. Parry, RN, of the New would have 584 first line Zealand Squadron of the Royal Navy's aircraft,compared with the British cruiser Achilles at the Battle of the Fleet Air Arm's planned 456. River Plate, writes in a letter shortly after the event "At first one felt There is an intriguing series of 1921 awfully frightened at least I did..." Admiralty minutes on the care of an office cat. The docket starts with a There are letters written by a topman binder asking the office keeper for an in an 1805 ship of the line and family increased allowance for the care of the letters written by officers and sailors cat. Ultimately, the matter is in a cruiser at the Normandy landings. considered (sometimes with levity) by A number of Articles of the 1922 the Accountant General, the Permanent Washington Treaty on Naval Armament Secretary and so on. One assumes the Limitations are reproduced verbatim. As whole series was a joke or was it? such, they are of interest to students Then there is a 1914 memorandum from of disarmament needing to determine why First Lord of the Admiralty Winston the Washington Treaty failed. Churchill demolishing by detailed Another subject on which the book analysis a (British) Treasury paper on contains significant material of manpower. If recent British decisions interest is the 1930s debate on naval are anything to go by, their Treasury versus land based air power. Even swill presumes to have a greater today, a popular error is to assign to professional knowledge and judgment narrow minded admirals of the day all than the Ministry of Defence. Of blame for the Royal Navy's lack of course, such a thing would never happen effective air power in 1939. In in Australia. reality, as the book's documents show, The book includes much information of as early as 1934 the official view of interest to the naval and military the Board of Admiralty was that "we professional and historian. It is have with the Fleet too few aircraft certain to whet the appetite of for reconnaissance and spouting, too few fighter aircraft for defence and students of particular periods or too few striking aircraft for attack." aspects of naval history. At the time, the RAF were responsible It can be obtained from Ashgate for providing aircraft for the RN and Publishing Group, Gower House, Croft had failed by 51 aircraft to supply the Rd., Aldershot, Hampshire GU11 3HR, UK. November 1993 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 67 ANI BOOK OF THE QUARTER - SUMMER 1993 Introduced by Jason Sears

AUSTRALIA'S NAVY 1993-94 The Official Annual of the Royal Australian Navy

Australia's Navy 1993-94, the fourth Annual of the RAN, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993, softcover, 124pp., 140 colour photographs, diagrams & illustrations, RRP $16-95 - ANI special discount price $6-00 (plus $4- 00 P & H).

Australia's Navy 1993-94 is the third It has also been an exciting year for edition of the Navy Annual and it is, the operational side of the Navy. The to date, the best in this series of deployments to Somalia by HMAS Jervis impressive books. The standard of the Bay and HMAS Tobruk showed the nation written contributions is very good and the importance of Australia maintaining the photographs contained in the book its amphibious capability. It also are excellent. The production quality demonstrated the Navy's ability to of the book has remained very high. The react quickly to international book has taken on a much more modern situations as they develop. design and should appeal to all Not only have RAN ships been involved interested in the Navy. in UN operations in the Gulf and The major theme of this year's Annual Somalia but they continue to patrol the has been the movement of half the Fleet waters around Australia and participate to the west coast of Australia and the in exercises throughout the region. subsequent development of HMAS Fleet Concentration Period Kakadu One Stirling, Vic Jeffrey has written an proved a great success with interesting piece on the history of the participants including New Zealand, Navy in the west while also providing Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Hong an update on the major developments Kong (UK) while Indonesia and the occurring at HMAS Stirling. Philippines sent observers. This is followed by Sub-Lieutenant Of course, operations do not only occur Wesley's article on HMAS Adelaide's at sea. This year's "Day in the Life of home-porting to the west. HMAS Adelaide ..." feature was particularly is the first guided missile frigate to exciting. It focused on CPOCD John be home-ported at HMAS Stirling and has Voorham of Australian Clearance Diving experienced some unique difficulties Team Four in WA. The article was well but, on the whole, seems to have coped written and Scott Connolly's well with the move. The article on photographs accompanying the article, defence industry in the West certainly and throughout the book, were superb. supports the view that industry can In fact, the overall quality of the cope with the new work. photography this year was excellent. There is clearly a great deal of talent The theme of defence and industry has in the Navy photographic world. also been highlighted in Dr Williams article on the Collins submarine There are many, many more articles in project. Australia now has the most the Annual - indeed, some 33 in all. As advanced conventional submarine in the a book it is great value and would make world. The project is on time and on an excellent Christmas gift and is a budget - a great achievement for all wonderful reminder of the year that has Australians. A very striking picture of been. HMAS Collins is featured on the front Particularly pleasing is the Annual's cover. special price. This year the Navy and 68 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute November 1993 the AGPS came to an arrangement whereby Remaining copies at this price are very pre-ordered copies of the Annual would limited so be early with orders. It is be available to serving personnel and a book that anyone associated with the AMI members at the bargain price of $6- Navy over the past twelve months would 00 which includes a $1-00 donation to be happy to keep as a memento or the Sir David Martin Foundation. recei ve as a gi ft.

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ISBN/TITLE $ Total Price $ The Australian Naval Institute Inc Patron His Excellency the Honourable Bill Hayden AC, Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia. Past Presidents CORE I A Callaway, 1988-92; CORE A H R Brecht, 1985-88; CORE I B James, AM, 1983-85; RADM R C Swan, AO QBE, 1978-83; CORE J A Robertson, 1977-78; CORE V A Parker, 1975-77.

Honorary Li fe Members ADML Sir Victor Smith AC KBE CB DSC; VADM Sir David Stevenson AC KBE; ADML Sir Anthony Synnot KB OBE: CORE J A Robertson; Rt Hon Sir Zelman Cowen AK GCMG GCVO QC; RADM R C Swan AO CBE; CORE I B James AM; Commander G Cutts; CORE A H R Brecht; CORE I A Callaway, Foundation Members Bennett GA Gibbs, BG Martin, DJ Robertson, JA Berlyn, NRB Goddard, FC Martin, PCS Scott, BP Bonnett VWL Grierson KW Mayson, JH Sharp, WR Brecht, AHR Hall, IW McDonald, NE Shearing, JA Broben, IW Herman, FJ Macleod, BD Smyth, DHD Calderwood, GC Histed, G Nattey, RJ Snell, KE Tl Tl Tl C_ IDIDO O Z Z 00 C OD -HO ID m O OOoo "0 CO COP m O m O Tl I O DO m Tl O 5°>S co z OH o? ^ ^>> M r- T) OT I CO "° S > ~D ro -r m ro ^> O CD -, H O CD O o o M O

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