Refugees from Burma in Thailand and Repatriation Preparedness: Issues of Dialogue, Representation and Trust

Sophie Zupper MSc Thesis

15 January 2016 International Development Studies

10898255 [email protected] Supervisor: Dr. Lidewyde H. Berckmoes Second Reader: Dr. Enrique Gómez-Llata Cázares

MSc International Development Studies Graduate School of Social Sciences Sophie Zupper 10898255 [email protected] 15 January 2016

Supervisor Dr. Lidewyde H. Berckmoes Programme group: Anthropology of Health, Care and the Body Graduate School of Social Sciences University of Amsterdam [email protected]

Second Reader Dr. Enrique Gómez-Llata Cázares Programme group: Governance and Inclusive Development Graduate School of Social Sciences University of Amsterdam [email protected]

Local Supervisor Ariana Zarleen Co-founder and Programme Director Burma Link [email protected]

Word Count: 26,894 Cover Photo: Mae La Refugee Camp in Tak Province, Thailand, July 2015, by S. Zupper

Acknowledgements This thesis would not be lying in in front of you as it is right now if it was not for a number of people who supported me throughout the process of preparing for the research, navigating the field in Thailand, and analysing and writing after my return to the Netherlands.

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to the refugees who made this research possible. Despite the terrible events they experienced and the conditions they live in I was met with outstanding hospitality and eagerness to help wherever I went. I thank them for taking the time to participate in sometimes lengthy interviews and answering all questions I had, often beyond expectations, sharing meals and inviting me to their homes. I am especially grateful to my interpreters – without you I would have been lost – and my local assistants who helped me transcribing due to my lack of skills in the diverse local languages. Secondly, this research would have been significantly more difficult without the invaluable help of Ariana Zarleen and Patrick Kearns. Ariana filled the role of my local supervisor and facilitated contacts, interviews, travels and accommodation and always took the time to share her extensive local knowledge and to provide feedback. Thank you for your guidance and the confidence you gave me. Without Patrick it would have been impossible to access the refugee camps in the first place – thank you, for your time and perspective and for the opportunity to visit the camps. Furthermore I would like to extend my gratitude to Lidewyde Berckmoes, who provided the necessary academic guidance, theoretical stimuli and highly appreciated feedback. Thank you very much for your supervision and support throughout the whole research and writing process.

On the less academic, but not any less important side I would like to thank my friends for their genuine interest, (hopefully mutual) motivation and support as well as the necessary distractions. Wendy, Jonathan and Lucy – without you, studying here in Amsterdam and writing the thesis would have been significantly less enjoyable and I am grateful for being able to call you my friends. Thank you to Jack Barber, who probably had to deal more than anyone else with my concerns and several rounds of proof-reading until the final product. Thank you for your support and comfort.

Lastly I would like to acknowledge my grandparents Reinhard and Johanna Zupper – without your unwavering support, selflessness and love I would not be where I am today. Thank you.

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Abstract Scholars in recent years have emphasised the necessity of including disaster-affected communities in decision-making processes regarding their lives and futures, underscoring the agency of refugees and benefits of participation such as increased resilience and empowerment. Especially in protracted refugee situations, refugees face several limitations and uncertainty. The Communication with Disaster Affected Communities Network calls for a prioritisation of communication within such settings. This study explores both enabling and constraining factors regarding refugees’ meaningful participation in decision-making processes, particularly in repatriation planning. Drawing on qualitative field research in 2015 in three refugee camps along the Thai-Burmese border, this study builds upon the accounts of the 20 interviewed refugees. The first refugees arrived in Thailand three decades ago, making it one of the most protracted refugee scenarios worldwide. Due to apparent reforms in Burma, UNHCR and other agencies initiated the ‘repatriation preparedness’ phase, leading to fears of premature and involuntary repatriation among the refugees, accompanied by a critique of a lack of refugee participation. The research shows a prevalent lack of effective dialogue and information. As informed decision-making is at the core of voluntary repatriation, this lack of refugee-informedness is highly concerning, rendering the aspect of voluntariness questionable. Inadequate representation further complicates the issue, as CBOs and the refugees themselves are excluded from the majority of decision-making processes. In addition, the research unearthed a widespread lack of trust between the general refugee population and camp leaders, UNHCR, NGOs and the Thai and Burmese governments. This corresponds to recent research by Hargrave (2014) who suggested a trust-based approach towards such planning. While she focused on how distrust in the country of origin results in refugees’ resistance against repatriation initiatives, this study emphasises the importance of dialogue and trust as pre-requisites for effective communication and participation in the preparedness phase. It is argued that a prioritisation of two-way communication and trust-building among all actors and placing the refugees at the centre of decision-making processes should be a pre-requisite to any further planning activities. Truly participatory and dialogical processes need to be implemented now, reflecting the refugees’ conceptions of their future.

Keywords: Refugees, Participation, Communication with Disaster Affected Communities, Durable Solutions, Protracted Refugee Situations, Burma, Myanmar, Thai-Burmese Border, Repatriation

Table of Contents Acknowledgements ...... iii

Abstract ...... iv

List of Figures ...... vii

List of Abbreviations ...... vii

1. Introduction ...... 1

2. Theoretical Framework ...... 3

2.1 Introduction ...... 3

2.2 The Strategic-Relational Approach and Refugee Agency ...... 3

2.3 Citizenship Participation, Refugees and Communication with Disaster-affected Communities .. 5

2.4 Options for the Future – Repatriation, Local Integration, Resettlement ...... 9

2.5 Conclusion ...... 11

3. Research Context ...... 13

3.1 Introduction ...... 13

3.2 The Conflict in Burma ...... 13

3.3 The Situation along the Thai-Burmese Border ...... 14

3.4 Recent Developments ...... 16

3.5 Research Location ...... 19

3.6 Conclusion ...... 20

4. Research Design ...... 21

4.1 Introduction ...... 21

4.2 Research Questions ...... 21

4.3 Conceptual Scheme ...... 22

4.4 Methodology ...... 23

4.5 Sampling ...... 23

4.6 Methods...... 25

4.7 Method of Data Analysis ...... 26

4.8 Challenges and Limitations ...... 27

4.9 Ethical Considerations ...... 28

4.10 Conclusion ...... 29

5. Refugees’ Perspective on their Future ...... 30

5.1 Introduction ...... 30

5.2 Thinking about the Future ...... 30

5.3 Relating Future Aspirations to Location ...... 31

5.4 Conclusion ...... 36

6. Causes for Refugees’ Fear of Imminent Repatriation ...... 37

6.1 Introduction ...... 37

6.2 Activities by other Actors ...... 37

6.3 Rumours and Lack of Accurate Information ...... 44

6.4 Conclusion ...... 44

7. Mechanisms for Participation in Repatriation Planning and Communication ...... 46

7.1 Introduction ...... 46

7.2 Existing Structures for Participation and Communication ...... 46

7.3 Conclusion ...... 51

8. Synthesis of Main Findings and Exploration of Underlying Processes ...... 53

8.1 Power Differentials ...... 54

8.2 Trust as a Prerequisite for Efficient Joint Repatriation Planning ...... 56

8.3 Discussing Representation and Inclusiveness ...... 59

8.4 Conclusion ...... 61

9. Reflections ...... 63

9.1 Methodological Reflection ...... 64

9.2 Policy Recommendations ...... 65

9.3 Future Research Agenda ...... 67

References ...... 69

Appendix ...... 77

Appendix I – Map of Burma and States of Ethnic Minorities ...... 77

Appendix II – Operationalization Table ...... 78

Appendix III – Interview Guide for Refugees ...... 80

Appendix IV – Interview Guide for Key Informants ...... 82

Appendix V – List of Interviews...... 84

List of Figures Figure 1 - Modes of Participation (Cornwall, 2003:1327) ...... 7 Figure 2 - Map of the Thai-Burmese Border (Burma Link, 2015d) ...... 19 Figure 3 - Conceptual Scheme ...... 22 Figure 4 - Age group of respondents ...... 24 Figure 5 - Cartoon illustrating pressure felt due to ration cuts (Karen News cited in Hargrave, 2014) 39 Figure 6 - UNHCR post box ...... 48 Figure 7 - Amended Conceptual Scheme ...... 63 Figure 8 - Map of Burma with Ethnic States (as used in Bjornstad, 2010) ...... 77

List of Abbreviations CBO Community-Based Organisation CCSDPT Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand CDAC Communicating with Disaster-Affected Communities CMWG Camp Management Working Group IDP Internally Displaced Person INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation ISC Information Sharing Centre KCBOs Karen Community-Based Organisations KnRC Karenni Refugee Committee KRC Karen Refugee Committee KWO Karen Women Organisation MFLF Mae Fah Luang Foundation under Royal Patronage NGO Non-Governmental Organisation RTG Royal Thai Government SRA Strategic Relational Approach TBC The Border Consortium THIGJ The Hague Institute for Global Justice TMFA Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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1. Introduction

1. Introduction Worldwide, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2015c) reports rising numbers of displaced people. At the same time, refugee situations are increasingly protracted. In some cases, refugees1 live in camps for up to 40 years (Gerstner, 2008), resulting in average durations of 17 years (Zeus, 2011). Traditionally, refugees were seen as traumatised victims of conflict and were regarded as in need of help, food and general support. UNHCR, governments and other organisations fulfilled the role of the provider and decision-maker. Accordingly, “powerful narratives of refugees as dependent victims have shaped reality in justifying mechanisms for international protection and incapacitating refugees” (ibid.:256). As a result, refugees “are dictated upon and decided for […]; UNHCR […] [treats] the refugees like children” (Kaiser, 2005:361). In contrast, the narrative of refugees as agents took shape in recent years. Zeus argues that it is “crucial […] to recognise refugees’ agency and potential and for refugees to be able to incorporate this potential into their identity” (2011:270), especially in protracted refugee situations. Research commissioned by the Network for Communicating with Disaster-Affected Communities (CDAC) shows how dialogue and information increase the resilience of refugee communities, empowering them and diminishing the uncertainty inherent to protracted refugee situations. The situation of the refugees from Burma2 in Thailand represents such a protracted case – some of the refugees fled their country of origin already 30 years ago (Burma Link, 2014). Since then, they are confined to a restricted live in refugee camps along the border. When the military government in Burma initiated reforms and ceasefire negotiations with the different groups involved in the conflict in 2011 (Burma Link, 2015b), the Royal Thai Government (RTG), UNHCR and non- governmental organisations (NGOs) initiated the repatriation preparedness phase. The refugee communities do not support this premature focus on repatriation and call for wide participation of refugees in the decision-making and planning processes (KCBOs, 2012). They emphasise that “repatriation should arguably be a refugee-led voluntary operation and not enforced by outside actors” (Burma Link, 2015e). This research aims to explore the current dynamics of refugees’ participation in the Thai- Burmese context and to what extent refugees have the opportunity to be in charge of and meaningfully contribute to decisions regarding their future. Refugees’ agency is a central concept for

1 A refugee is anyone, who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, 2010:14). 2 Throughout the thesis I make use of the traditionally used names in Burma. In 1989, the military government introduced new names for the country (now ‘Myanmar’) and locations within it (Hargrave, 2014). Many of the ethnic groups in conflict with the military government reject these new names (Demusz, 1998). As the focus of this research will be on the perspectives of refugees from such a background, the use of the old name ‘Burma’ only seems appropriate. I only use the new names if the source I cite from employs these terms.

1. Introduction

this approach. The research aims to contribute to the discussion about refugees’ centrality to programming and planning and the supposed benefits of their meaningful participation in decision- making processes. Highlighting the enabling and constraining factors of the context this participation is placed in, the following research question is explored:

How can refugees from Burma along the Thai-Burmese border participate in decision-making and planning processes regarding repatriation and what possibilities and constraints exist?

The theoretical framework underlying this research is detailed in Section 2. It builds firstly on the Strategic Relational Approach (SRA) as a basic framework to underscore refugees’ agency and the relevance of contextual structures. Secondly, the concept of citizenship participation is explored, describing what makes participation meaningful and relating it to the SRA. The idea of Communication with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC) relates to the idea of meaningful participation and is important to understand for the document at hand. The third concept revolves around the durable solutions – repatriation, local integration and resettlement – which are commonly envisioned for the cessation of refugee status. This thesis focuses especially on repatriation as it is the most relevant for the case study of refugees from Burma in Thailand. The following section gives greater insight into the research context, including a brief description of the history of conflict in Burma, the refugees in Thailand and relevant actors along the Thai-Burmese border. Section 4 describes the research design, which also encompasses a discussion of limitations and ethical considerations. The next three chapters concern the analysis of the data from the field research. First, refugees’ conceptions of their future are described. Second, recent activities by other relevant actors and their effects on the refugee population are examined. Thirdly, current mechanisms for participation and communications are assessed. The following chapter then examines the underlying structures in more detail and synthesises the main findings of the preceding three chapters. This is followed by a concluding chapter, reflecting on theory and formulating recommendations for policy and future research.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction This chapter describes the theoretical concepts this thesis is based upon. First, it introduces the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) and discusses refugee agency as this constitutes the basis for the following concepts. Second, it explores the idea of citizenship participation. It relates it to the SRA and defines characteristics of meaningful participation, emphasising dialogue and information. The third part is concerned with the durable solutions designed for refugee, particularly repatriation as this is the most relevant of the three for the chosen research context. It addresses the question of the voluntariness of repatriation and the importance of refugee participation in repatriation planning.

2.2 The Strategic-Relational Approach and Refugee Agency Understanding the concept of agency and its relation to context-specific structures is crucial for discussing refugee agency and refugees’ participation in decision-making processes. Therefore, this section starts with a definition of agency and a description of the SRA. This is then applied to refugee situations to provide a foundation for the following sections.

Sewell describes agency as being “capable of exerting some degrees of control over the social relations in which one is enmeshed, which in turn implies the ability to transform those social relations to some degree” (1992:20). Bakewell (2010) also emphasises that agency is relational and Lopes Cardozo describes agency as the individuals’ “space of manoeuvre […], in which they develop intended or unintended strategies of action” (2015:6) in order to engage with their environment. Agency is therefore inherently connected to the specific context, but also has the potential to transform social relations. Thus, one cannot look at agency without considering social structure (Jessop, 2005; Bakewell, 2010). Structures constrain and enable individual and collective actors and are subject to transformation and reproduction depending on the actions taken by the agents (Jessop, 2005; Bakewell, 2010; Coffey & Farrugia, 2014). Thus, structures “are never reproduced through self- identical repetition but […] the future remains pregnant with a surplus of possibilities” (Jessop, 2005:53). The SRA is based on this conception of agency and structure and examines “structure in relation to action, action in relation to structure, rather than bracketing one of them” (ibid.:48). It introduces the idea of structural selectivity, meaning that structures are strategically-selective, thus privileging “specific forms of action, tactics, or strategies and [discouraging] others” (ibid.:49). This rewards actions which are ‘structurally coherent’, i.e. reproducing existing structures, while at the same time the “scope for actions to overflow or circumvent structural constraints” (ibid.:51) always exists.

2. Theoretical Framework

Actions are conceived as “structurally-oriented strategic calculation[s]” (ibid.:48) as actors are capable of reflection and structuring. Actors respond to selectively privileging structures by means of strategic-context analyses informing their actions, whilst they “face possible opposition from actors pursuing other strategies or tactics” (ibid.:51). This potential for “reflexive reorganisation of structural configurations” (ibid.:49) means that there can be both path-dependent and path-shaping strategies, depending on the actors’ capacities and experiences. The SRA also takes time into account, as it emphasises that “a short-term constraint for a given agent or set of agents could become a conjunctural opportunity over a longer time horizon if there is a shift in strategy” (ibid.:51).

Actors can therefore be regarded as acting strategically to shape or reproduce existing structures. Refugees are often not considered as agents in the prevalent discourse as forced migration can be seen as a ‘non-decision’ (Bakewell, 2010) and refugees often experience highly constraining environments. As such, they are seen as incapable of actively contributing to their own present and future (Zeus, 2011). It is the role of international and local organisations and governments to protect them and provide for them (ibid.). This research follows the contrary narrative of refugee agency. According to Bakewell, refugees can “retain some degrees of freedom (agency) and can be seen as following some strategy” (2010:1699), “even under the most extreme forms of coercion” (N. Long, 2001:16). As such, a clear line between forced and voluntary migration cannot be drawn (Richmond, 1998) as flight is “an attempt to use whatever power, control, and mobility the person still possesses to escape from danger to safety” (Stein & Cuny, 1994:178), constituting therefore an agentic act. For refugees in situations of encampment, it is difficult “to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance and from this powerful narrative” (Zeus, 2011:268). Especially in protracted refugee situations which are still being managed from a ‘top-down’ relief perspective instead of a development perspective this leads to incapacitation of refugees over time. As a result, they might end up internalising the ‘victim narrative’, which can prevent them from taking any initiative (Pouw & McGregor, 2014). In contrast, where host governments’ policies have been less restrictive, refugees have been able to gain self-reliance and even become economic assets for their hosts (Harrell-Bond, 1998). The refugees from Burma in Thailand are an example of how the refugee community has been able to develop a complex educational system, despite a restrictive policy by the Thai host government (Oh & Stouwe, 2008). It becomes clear that it is the structural limitations in terms of discursive and material constraints (Jessop, 2005; Bakewell, 2010) which impede refugees’ agency, but “they are not completely powerless” (Zeus, 2011:269). Currently, there is a clear lack of “participatory approaches for refugees to become actively involved and shape policy and planning processes concerning their own situation” (ibid.:268) and the existing power structures “do not allow them to become self-reliant, contribute to and have a positive impact upon their own and their host communities’ development”

2. Theoretical Framework

(ibid.). Seeing them as agents will enable refugees to act on their own behalf and participate actively in decisions regarding their current and future situation, plus it “would facilitate dismantling the power structures from within, as they are sustained in great part by the narrative of refugees as victims” (Zeus, 2011:270).

The application of the SRA allows to analyse refugees as strategic actors, “who are located in and might (or not) constantly respond to a strategically selective context” (Lopes Cardozo, 2015:6). This requires the analysis of the “unevenly distributed configuration of opportunity and constraint“ (Hay, 2002:381) in their environment. It allows to understand why they choose or do not choose specific strategies and tactics to transform or reproduce the societal structures within which they are operating in, including an exploration of “their levels of access to particular strategic resources” (Lopes Cardozo, 2015:6) and potential opposition by other actors (Jessop, 2005).

2.3 Citizenship Participation, Refugees and Communication with Disaster- affected Communities The concept of the SRA can also be applied to refugee participation. Participatory approaches have been part of development for decades now, but how they are conceptualised changed over time. A relatively recent idea is the one of “people’s participation in development as ‘makers and shapers’” (Cornwall, 2003:1326), turning “towards political participation and increasing poor and marginalised people's influence over the wider decision-making processes which affect their lives” (Gaventa, 2002:3). This approach towards people-centred or citizenship participation is concerned with “issues of power, voice, agency and rights” (Cornwall, 2003:1326), making participation a “right that can be claimed by excluded or marginal peoples, and thus provides a stronger political, legal and moral imperative for focusing on people’s agency” (Hickey & Mohan, 2005:258).

Accordingly, Arnstein defines citizenship participation as:

The redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared [and] goals and policies are set […]. In short it is the means by which they can induce significant social reform. (1969:216)

Using this quote one can draw connections between the concept of citizenship participation and the SRA. The ‘have-not citizens’ (the agents) use it deliberatively as a means and strategy (their structurally-oriented actions) to reform their respective society and existing power structures (the

2. Theoretical Framework

strategically-selective context) in order to be included in the future. Gaventa describes it as the “ways in which […] people exercise voice through new forms of deliberation, consultation and/or mobilisation designed to inform and to influence larger institutions and policies” (2002:1).

But is the concept of citizenship participation applicable to the case of refugees, who are displaced from their country of origin and thus their ‘country of citizenship’? Several authors (Samuel, 2002; Gaventa, 2002; Zeus, 2011) see this nation-oriented approach to citizenship critical. We live in a world which is ordered along state lines, thus refugees are often seen as outsiders to the international community (Zeus, 2011). In terms of citizenship they ‘belong’ to their countries of origin, but are seeking refuge in a country where they are not citizens in legal terms. Gaventa argues, that ‘citizenship’ as a term can also be employed for “the act of any person taking part in public affairs” (2002:4), going beyond the notion of ‘state-citizen’ and including “both citizens as well as disenfranchised people not recognised by the state as citizens” (Samuel, 2002:9) as possible actors in citizenship participation. This way, citizenship becomes “an ‘ensemble of different forms of belonging’” (Gaventa, 2002:6). Depending on how the people at the centre of citizenship participation conceptualise and act upon their right to participation, citizenship is framed by the agency of “non- state participants in claiming, monitoring and enforcing rights themselves” (ibid.:2). In the case of refugees, one can argue then that if they are exercising their agency and claiming their right to participation towards state and other powerful actors, it is possible to transfer the idea of citizenship participation onto the refugee context. Following this more flexible approach to citizenship, refugees can be “recognised as political agents capable of […] voicing legitimate and meaningful concerns” (Ilcan et al., 2015:8).As such, mobilisation for participation can give refugees “a voice that is often omitted from top-down processes; it serves as a space of information-sharing, networking, and capacity-building” (García-López & Arizpe, 2010:199). This can eventually lead to the alteration of unequal power “relations and [opening] new spaces of participation through the pressures put on governments or other powerful actors” (ibid.).

2. Theoretical Framework

2.3.1 Meaningful Participation But not every form of participation is meaningful and its transformative potential can be severely constrained by contextual factors, the strategically-selective structures. Cornwall (2003), building on Arnstein’s (1969) ‘ladder of citizenship participation’ sees different forms of participation on a continuum reaching from tokenistic enlistment to genuinely transformative modes of participation:

Figure 1 - Modes of Participation (Cornwall, 2003:1327)

It is crucial to emphasise that not all forms of participation will result in actual influence, as the ones in power “may have no intention of changing their agendas” (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2002:34). Powerful actors might just employ tokenistic forms of participation to diffuse criticism and let the decision-making processes appear to be inclusive and consultative (ibid.). Adding refugee representatives to committees and meetings thus will not result in transformation and influence if they are actually not capable of raising their voices or no one is listening to their concerns (Cornwall, 2003). For this reason it becomes necessary to analyse the underlying power structures as “participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless. It allows the powerholders to claim that all sides were considered, but […] maintains the status quo” (Arnstein, 1969:216). Further, aspects of inclusiveness and representation, i.e. “structured opportunities for broad participation” (THIGJ, 2013) need to be considered to establish whether participation is meaningful. Giving all citizens the same rights does not necessarily result in inclusiveness (Gaventa, 2002). Again, differences in resources and power need to be considered as they impact the opportunities for citizens to claim their rights differently, perhaps encouraging some while discouraging others. Here, the strategically-selective context comes into play, which might be strongly influenced by power holders, who could have a stronger interest in the reproduction of existing structures than their transformation into a more equitable society (ibid.). One has to closely examine “who participates, decides and benefits from ‘participatory’ interventions” (Cornwall, 2003:1327) to assess their claims to inclusiveness. Often, specific efforts are needed to “enable marginal voices to be raised and heard” (ibid.:1337) in order to achieve truly inclusive participation.

2. Theoretical Framework

The transformative potential of citizenship participation also depends on whether the spaces in which participation takes place have been ‘created’ from below by the citizens themselves or if they constitute ‘invited spaces’ which have been established in a more top-down process (Gaventa, 2002; VeneKlasen & Miller, 2002). Created spaces often result in citizens having “a stronger position to influence policy choices” (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2002:34) as they themselves exerted the pressure which led to their creation. Arnstein states “in most cases where power has come to be shared it was taken by the citizens, not given” (1969:222). Invited spaces might require stronger efforts and demonstrations of power or perhaps even resistance on behalf of citizens as they are more strongly shaped by the interests of the already powerful (Gaventa, 2002). Thus, even if no space for participation is ever neutral, attention needs to be paid to who creates them and with what underlying objectives in order to understand the dynamics which shape the processes.

2.3.2 Dialogue is key: Communication with Disaster-Affected Communities At the heart of meaningful participation lies dialogic flow of information (Ardon, 2002). Arnstein argues that “informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities, and options can be the most important first step toward legitimate citizen participation” (1969:219), combining it with the possibility for feedback and the option for negotiation. It is necessary to involve people from the beginning of a planning process, so that they will not only be presented the final product at a stage where they have little opportunity to influence the decisions concerning their own situation. In recent years, actors in the humanitarian sector started paying closer attention to the role of communication and the often prevalent lack of information (Wall & Robinson, 2008). This led to the establishment of the Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC) Network in 2009 (CDAC, 2015). It places a “priority on communicating with people affected by disaster” (IFRC, 2005:9) so that “they can take greater control of their own lives” (ibid.). Further, the affected populations are the ones with “the deepest and most immediate knowledge about their greatest needs” (CDAC, 2014). Effectively informing and communicating with them improves “their ability to make decisions” (Abud et al., 2011:6) and increases their chance at engaging in their own rehabilitation and other planning processes – especially in times of uncertainty, information is crucial (IFRC, 2005). Refugee situations represent such uncertain contexts where information is critical. Often, information flows are very poor and refugees frequently have to rely on rumours. Kaiser describes a case of refugees in Uganda where “far from being invited to participate in planning and implementation processes, the refugees were left in ignorance and confusion about issues that directly affected them” (2005:359). In another study conducted in Dadaab, Kenya, Abud et al. describe that the majority of their respondents indicated that “they have never been able to voice their concerns or ask questions of aid providers or the government” (2011:4). Besides severe implications for the possibility of these refugees to participate in decision-making, it also decreases the effectiveness of

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programmes, accountability and trust in other actors, be it NGOs, UN agencies or government bodies (ibid.; IFRC, 2005). Therefore, dialogue forms a critical part of participation, especially in contexts of high uncertainty and the dependence of the respective population on humanitarian actors. It empowers these communities “to start [making] decisions about their own lives” (Abud et al., 2011:38) and “to create knowledge about and give meaning to their own situation” (Horst, 2006:144).

2.4 Options for the Future – Repatriation, Local Integration, Resettlement This thesis discusses the possibilities and constraints for meaningful participation by refugees in the context of repatriation planning. In order to do so, this last section of the theoretical framework briefly examines the solutions designed for refugee situations, including the principle of non- refoulement and voluntariness of repatriation.

The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the amending 1967 Protocol are at the centre of today’s refugee protection (UNHCR, 2010:2). They codify the rights of refugees at the international level and are both status and rights-based. UNHCR is responsible for promoting the protection of these rights and their application. Central principles of the 1951 Convention are the ideas of non-discrimination, non- penalization and non-refoulement. The principle of non-refoulement is described in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention:

Prohibition of expulsion or return (‘refoulement’) 1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. (UNHCR, 2010:30)

It is one of the most important mechanisms for protecting refugees, ensuring that refugees cannot be sent back if they would be persecuted there (Holdorp, 2011). Even where states are neither signatories of the convention nor the protocol, the principle of non-refoulement is widely regarded as “embedded in customary international law” (UNHCR, 2010:4).

UNHCR is further responsible for finding solutions for refugee situations, “by way of voluntary repatriation or assimilation in new national communities” (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2007:426). This results in three durable solutions for refugee situations: voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement to third countries (Holdorp, 2011). Ultimately, they should allow refugees to rebuild their lives in dignity and peace.

2. Theoretical Framework

Repatriation links directly to the principle of non-refoulement, thus the emphasis on voluntary repatriation. Local integration means the “assimilation and naturalization of refugees” (Scott, 2006:351) in their host countries, eventually leading to them obtaining citizenship. The third solution – resettlement – means integration into a third country and “is advocated when it is impossible for a refugee to stay in the host country or return to his or her country of origin” (Holdorp, 2011:38). Especially when large amounts of refugees are concerned, repatriation is often regarded as the preferred option by the host governments and UNHCR (UNHCR, 2006). Thus, refugees are often “not encouraged to explore alternative options for reintegration and economic sustainability” (Weiss Fagen, 2011:12). Weiss Fagen criticises this prioritisation of repatriation as the conditions for a sustainable return are often not met and “people who have been displaced may not necessarily want to return to their homes, and international and national efforts need not be devoted overwhelmingly to making this possible” (ibid.). She argues that they “do not necessarily surrender the right or desire to return, but they often prefer to postpone returning because they recognize that the institutional conditions needed to facilitate genuinely sustainable returns will probably be lacking for many years” (ibid.:3).

2.4.1 The Voluntariness of Repatriation In theory, as long as the conditions in his/her country of origin which rendered the respective person a refugee did not fundamentally change, a refugee only cedes to be one by returning voluntarily. Voluntariness in this respect is related to the “conditions in the country of origin (calling for an informed decision); and the situation in the country of asylum (permitting a free choice)” (UNHCR, 1996:10). ‘Free choice’ entails freedom from any pressure to repatriate, be it physical, psychological or material, thus if “their rights are not recognized, if they are subjected to pressures and restrictions and confined to closed camps, they may choose to return, but this is not an act of free will” (ibid.). ‘Informed decisions’ form the other part of voluntariness, “[ensuring] that refugees’ decisions are taken in full knowledge of the conditions of the country of origin” (Willems, 2009:15). This approach is intended to give “refugees a chance to break away from being victims of persecution and become a genuine part of the solution” (UNHCR, 1996:2), thus placing refugees as agents at the centre of any repatriation decision. In practice, “voluntariness for all is difficult to ascertain or verify” (Stein & Cuny, 1994:175) as repatriation often takes place in situations where there is at least some degree of coercion (ibid.; Gerver, 2015). As a result, some authors recognise a shift in focus from voluntariness to the preconditions of ‘safety’ and ‘dignity’ of return, as these are supposedly more objectively assessable. Accordingly, if UNHCR determines that “objectively, it is safe for most refugees to return and that such returns have good prospects of being durable” (UNHCR, 1996:14), the agency initiates activities to advocate for repatriation.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.4.2 Refugees’ Participation in Planning Processes for Durable Solutions The shift towards more ‘objective’ criteria like ‘safety’ and ‘dignity’ of return also leads to a shift away from refugees at the centre of repatriation decision making to UNHCR and other actors as “the decision to promote repatriation is based not only on the refugees’ preference but more fundamentally on UNHCR’s objective assessment of whether life is better at home relative to life in the camps” (Barnett, 2001:34). As such, “policy responses are made without listening to [the refugees]” (Zimmermann, 2012:55) and planning processes are rather top-down, disqualifying refugees’ voices (Malkki, 1996). Katy Long (2012) argues that exactly the opposite should be the case as repatriation also has the goal of remaking the social contract and trust between refugee-citizen and their state of origin. Thus, it is an inherently political process, which requires that refugee-citizens have governance power to participate. Planning and decision-making processes which undermine refugees’ agency and disregard their point of view undermine the durability of the solution (South & Jolliffe, 2014). Building upon the value of dignity in repatriation, Katy Long (2008) suggest that participatory decision-making should be part of repatriation planning, “[reflecting] the priorities and desires of the returnees” (Stein & Cuny, 1994:186). Ensuring ‘dignity’ thus commences before the actual return, “through the process of deciding upon the content and timing of return” (K. Long, 2008:35). Including refugees’ point of view in the planning process increases the legitimacy of such processes as well as increases accountability and transparency, which can ultimately help establish trust between the refugee-citizens and other actors (THIGJ, 2013). Shah and Cardozo write that “how stakeholders’ participation is facilitated […] can foster constructive interactions and relationship building or promote distrust and entrench intolerance” (2015:194f), thus it is important to set up participatory planning processes for repatriation in congruence with the characteristics of meaningful participation described earlier.

2.5 Conclusion For this research, the SRA has been integrated with the concept of citizenship participation in order to apply it to refugee repatriation scenarios. The SRA provides the basis for the understanding of refugee agency and the analysis of the structures influencing their actions. Refugees’ participation in decision-making processes is a potentially transformative action, but in order to be meaningful a variety of enabling and/or constraining factors has to be taken into consideration. These include context-specific power relations, questions of representation and inclusivity, and whether the spaces for participation have been created by the refugees or other actors. Most importantly, participation becomes meaningful when it encompasses the dialogical flow of information. The importance of two- way communication gains increasing importance in the discussion of humanitarian programmes, as in situations of uncertainty – such as refugee situations – information is highly critical and the inclusion of the refugees’ voices becomes crucial in order for them to regain power and control over their lives.

2. Theoretical Framework

Projecting this onto the more specific case of refugee repatriation and the difficulty of ensuring true voluntariness of return, it becomes clear that the meaningful participation of refugees in repatriation planning is critical for ensuring their dignity, making their voices heard and ultimately ensuring the durability of repatriation.

3. Research Context

3.1 Introduction The following chapter describes the context of the field research. It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to give a detailed account of the long history of conflict in Burma. Nevertheless I give an overview at the beginning of this chapter to foster understanding of the reasons for the refugees’ flight and obstacles to their return. Then the focus shifts to the Thai side of the border, describing the refugees’ situation in their host country, introducing the main actors relevant for this thesis. The following section concerns recent developments in Burma and Thailand which impact the refugees’ situation and perspectives. Finally, I briefly specify the geographic location of the research.

3.2 The Conflict in Burma Burma gained independence from colonial rule in 1948, with the central government in the hands of Burma’s ethnic majority3. As the central government did not implement a 1947 agreement, which would have granted ethnic groups ‘full autonomy in internal administration’, but “increased efforts to ‘Burmanize’ ethnic groups by suppressing local languages and cultures” (Randolph, 2013), fighting broke out. Nevertheless the country moved towards democracy and development (Kurlantzick, 2002). In 1962 though, the military seized power in a coup, pushing the country in the following years into socialist totalitarianism (ibid.) and leading to a severe deterioration of its economic and developmental situation, while fighting against the different ethnic ‘insurgents’. In 1987, Burma belonged to the least-developed countries worldwide. In the same year, protests erupted against the government’s policies, calling for liberalisation and democratisation. In 1988, a newly formed military government declared martial law and promised reforms and elections in 1990. These took place, but the military government ignored the results, which were unfavourable for them. In the following decade, the Burmese society was under strong military control with frequent and arbitrary offensives against ethnic armed groups (Kurlantzick, 2002) and imprisonment of thousands of activists. In 1996, the Burmese government initiated the ‘four cuts’ strategy against insurgent groups to limit their access to food, intelligence, funding and recruits (Green & Mitchell, 2007). Cease-fire deals were sealed and broken again; human rights abuses were wide-spread, “including massacres, torture, forced labour and forced relocation” (Hargrave, 2014:18). Already in the middle of 2001, “several international aid agencies cautioned that Myanmar was on the brink of a humanitarian crisis” (Kurlantzick, 2002) as a result of decades of mismanagement of the country and conflict, which led to “widespread poverty and barely functioning health and

3 Ethnic groups according to the CIA (2015): Burman 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, Indian 2%, Mon 2%, other 5%

3. Research Context

education systems” (IRC, 2007), accompanied by the exclusion of ethnic minorities from political participation.

3.3 The Situation along the Thai-Burmese Border

3.3.1 The Research Population: Refugees from Burma Over the course of the conflict in Burma, thousands of villages were destroyed and millions of people ended up displaced (Green & Mitchell, 2007). The first Burmese refugees arrived in Thailand in 1984 after an offensive by the Burmese military against ethnic groups (Yeni, 2009). The majority of the refugees are from the Karen ethnic group, but other ethnicities from Burma are represented as well, for example Kachin, Karenni, Mon and Shan (Oh & Stouwe, 2008) as well as pro-democracy Burmans (Hargrave, 2014)4. Refugees from Burma arrive in Thailand for several reasons. Whilst the majority is fleeing from the conflict, human rights violations and repression (Burma Partnership & Burma Link, 2015b), the dismal economic situation in Burma also has driven many outside the country (Yeong Cheah et al., 2010). Besides this, frequent relocations of ethnic groups inside Burma destroyed the livelihood bases of many, forcing them to seek refuge along the border. A few also “left Burma to the camps to gain better access to education” (Burma Partnership & Burma Link, 2015b:8). By now, the situation presents “one of the most protracted refugee situations in the world” (CCSDPT & UNHCR, 2013:5). Over the course of the three decades since the arrival of the first refugees, hundred thousands of Burmese fled to Thailand (Burma Link, 2014; Yeong Cheah et al., 2010), resulting in currently 110,439 refugees5 in the ten refugee camps on the Thai side of the border (TBC, 2015a). According to human rights organisations a large number, perhaps up to 80% of migrant workers from Burma in Thailand are de facto refugees as well (Burma Link, 2015c). Yeong Cheah et al. thus describe the border region as “a place of convergence of refugees, migrant workers, displaced people and day migrants” (2010:123).

From early on, the refugees coming to Thailand set up administrative structures and relied on extensive self-governance through camp committees, health and education departments (Thompson, 2008)., while NGOs provided only limited support. Despite a shift towards greater dependence on external support and less autonomy, these structures are still in place. As such, the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) and the Karenni Refugee Committee (KnRC) represent the camp residents, supervising the camp management and coordinating with NGOs, UNHCR and Thai authorities. The everyday camp management and administration is under the

4 A map of Burma with the States of the respective ethnic minorities can be found in Appendix I. 5 This number represents the verified caseload of refugees, published monthly by The Border Consortium (TBC). It includes all persons living in the camps, no matter whether registered or not. They usually differ slightly from the verified population numbers provided by UNHCR.

3. Research Context

authority of Camp Committees, which are elected every three years in each camp. The camp leaders are the main connection between the general population of refugees in the camps and the external organisations providing services to them. Each camp is comprised of different sections as administrative units, which themselves are headed by section leaders. This is complemented by a wide range of community based organisations (CBOs). The most well-known are the Karen Women’s Organisation (KWO) and the Karen Youth Organisation, which are represented in all nine camps next to their Karenni counterparts. Besides these, a plenitude of CBOs exists, which cover matters of health, relief, environment, human rights and community development.

3.3.2 Thai Authorities – Restrictive Policies Another important actor to consider is the Thai government as it represents the host nation. Thailand is neither a signatory of the 1951 UNHCR Convention nor the 1967 Protocol concerning refugee protection. The Thai policy towards refugees over the past three decades resulted in strict confinement of “the ‘persons of concern’ to their ‘temporary shelters’ until the situation in Burma would improve and the displaced could go home” (Burma Link, 2015c). None of the durable solutions described above have been made available to the Burmese refugees until 2004 (Burma Link, 2015d), when a temporary campaign for resettlement has been permitted by the Thai authorities. In 2012, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported the resettlement of the 100,000th refugee to a third country (IOM, 2012), resulting from this temporary opportunity for registration. Local integration is officially prohibited by the RTG and their rights are severely limited, to prevent refugees from “[getting] too comfortable and [wanting] to stay” (Demusz, 1998:237). Refugees in the camps live very restricted lives. They are not entitled to any employment, education in the camps is sanctioned and they cannot move freely. Organisations working with refugees are limited to providing “assistance in the areas of basic relief goods, health and sanitation” (ibid.:237). The protracted situation of the Burmese refugees in Thailand and the isolation in the camps “prevents refugees from making a positive contribution to regional development and peacebuilding” (Zeus, 2011:257) and has “created a deadlock situation in which it is extremely difficult for the refugees to control the development of their own society” (Oh & Stouwe, 2008:590). They are “almost entirely dependent on international assistance” (IRC, 2007). Every refugee outside the camps without any legal visa is regarded as an illegal alien and faces detention and deportation. Nevertheless, a significant number of refugees choose this option as it allows them to follow at least some kind of employment and contribute to their livelihoods. This highly uncertain situation leaves them vulnerable to exploitation and maltreatment (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

3. Research Context

3.3.3 UNHCR and NGOs working in the border region UNHCR entered the context of the Thai-Burmese border region in 1998 (Thompson, 2008) after attacks on camps led to a tightening of Thai policy and a shift towards containment in the camps, putting the refugees’ self-governance system under pressure. The UN agency is responsible for protection and monitoring activities and the development of durable solutions strategies – as such it currently leads preparedness programming (UNHCR, 2015a) – while the NGOs continue to be responsible for more operational issues (Hargrave, 2014). A total number of 18 NGOs jointly form the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT), covering diverse sectors ranging from camp management and education to livelihoods and shelter, to name a few (CCSDPT, n.d.). They collaborate and coordinate with UNHCR and formulate joint frameworks and strategic plans (CCSDPT & UNHCR, 2013). Further, the CCSDPT represents its members in front of the RTG and thus serves as a link between the two. Its current chair is Patrick Kearns, who also holds the position of Country Director for World Education, providing support for education for refugees and migrants in the border region. One of the members of the CCSDPT is The Border Consortium (TBC), which “is the main provider of food, shelter and other forms of support” (TBC, n.d.) to the camp populations since 1984. As TBC is in charge of the rations provided to the refugees, the organisation came up repeatedly during the research as rations are decreasing in recent years. TBC focuses in its Strategic Directions 2013-2017 on readiness for return, economic and social development, humanitarian support, participation in governance and organisational development (ibid.).

3.4 Recent Developments In 2010, a nominally civilian government was established in Burma under the leadership of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party and its President Thein Sein (South & Jolliffe, 2014), which has been accompanied by ceasefire talks and reforms. Shortly after these changes in the neighbouring country, Thai authorities initiated talks about repatriation of the Burmese refugees back to their home country (Burma Link, 2015d). The military junta in Thailand, which took power in May 2014, announced plans to repatriate all refugees by 2015 (Saw Yan Naing, 2014c). Simultaneously, restrictions on the movement of refugees have been increased, cutting off access to opportunities to sustain their livelihood and increasing dependence on outside aid (Burma Partnership & Burma Link, 2015b).

Reflecting these developments, UNHCR and the CCSDPT started planning for repatriation scenarios. In 2012, UNHCR released the Framework for Voluntary Repatriation: Refugees from Myanmar in Thailand, which has been updated in May 2014 (UNHCR, 2014). The CCSDPT and UNHCR jointly declared “that programmes in Thailand need to be reoriented” (Hargrave, 2014:43) in order to prepare for repatriation and realign their strategies (CCSDPT & UNHCR, 2013). In a Letter

3. Research Context

of Understanding, the Burmese government and UNHCR defined each other’s responsibilities in creating conditions for the return of displaced people (UNHCR, 2013b). In the same year, UNHCR initiated a Return Assessment project to understand spontaneous returns and collect information (UNHCR, 2013a). In 2014, UNHCR published a document answering Refugees’ Frequently Asked Questions underscoring the voluntariness of return and that there is no set time frame (UNHCR, 2014); the CCSDPT reiterated this statement in several publications as well, for example in their Standards and Principles in Voluntary Repatriation form Thailand to Myanmar (CCSDPT, 2012). The latest version of UNHCR’s Strategic Roadmap for Voluntary Repatriation has been published in March 2015, describing the five strategic pillars or phases of repatriation from preparedness till cessation of operations (UNHCR, 2015d). This was followed by the presentation of an Operations Plan draft in July 2015, which details the strategies defined in the former. They recognise the need for information on the refugees’ side, thus “assistance prior to departure will focus on counseling and provision of information [and] verification of voluntariness” (UNHCR, 2015d:7). “Information-dissemination is a priority to help refugees make informed decisions about their futures and also to recognize the contribution and role they play in the preparedness processes” is a statement made by the CCSDPT and UNHCR in their Strategic Framework (2013:3), “recognis[ing] the contribution of refugees, and need for further self- empowerment” (ibid.).

Organisations like Burma Link6 or Burma Partnership regard these talks about repatriation as premature (Burma Link, 2015d) as the ethnic areas in Burma are still far from any form of positive peace and refugees returning to Burma have several reasons to fear for their life. Despite ceasefire agreements and peace talks, conflict and fighting are still ongoing in some ethnic areas. Just at the beginning of 2015, around 100,000 people have been displaced in the Shan State because of torture, rape, air strikes and killings (Burma Partnership & Burma Link, 2015b). Where ‘peace’ exists, the presence of the Burmese military is increasing (ibid.). Zoya Phan, a former refugee and now activist, thinks that “the changes in Burma so far are superficial, which were designed by the military to ease domestic and international pressure” (Nyein Nyein, 2015b) and that the “government is not interested in solving the conflicts in ethnic areas” (ibid.). Soe Aung from Burma Partnership states that “if the concerns of the refugees are unaddressed and the preconditions for safe and dignified return are not ensured, the refugees will again be caught in a cycle of conflict and displacement after their return” (Burma Partnership & Burma Link, 2015a).

6 During the field research from June to August 2015, Burma Link’s cofounder and programme director Ariana Zarleen acted as my local supervisor. More information about Burma Link can be found on their website: http://www.burmalink.org/

3. Research Context

For these reasons, CBOs, NGOs and civil society emphasise more than ever the necessity to include refugees in the planning and preparation processes for a possible return:

Meaningful consultations and diverse participation of refugees and CBOs working with the refugee community in the planning and preparedness of their return is key to their sustainable return. […] Genuine and timely consultation with the refugees as primary stakeholders is fundamental in deepening the trust and improving communication with the refugee community, paving the way for the provision of clear information as regards to their future. There must be genuine and regular consultations in identifying possible relocation sites as refugees can provide expert local knowledge on this matter. (KWO, 2015)

This is directly related to upholding the “humanitarian principle […] that refugees return voluntarily and with dignity” (Syrota, 2015; Brees, 2008). Brees further suggests that “the alternative of local integration should not be taboo and needs to be assessed as a realistic option” (2008:393), as not all refugees will be able to resettle or repatriate. This and the inclusion of refugees in participatory processes require the “commitment [...] on the part of agencies, refugees and the RTG” (Demusz, 1998:243).

3. Research Context

3.5 Research Location The research was based in Mae Sot, a town on the border between Thailand and Myanmar. The biggest camp for Burmese refugees, Mae La, is in close proximity and was one of the three visited camps. Mae Rama Luang and Umpiem Mai are the other two camps. In total, ten refugee camps exist along the Thai side of the Thai-Burmese border, one of them being a camp for ethnic Shan close to Chiang Mai further North (TBC, 2015a). Many organisations working with refugees are based in Mae Sot or have offices there.

Figure 2 - Map of the Thai-Burmese Border (Burma Link, 2015d)

3. Research Context

3.6 Conclusion The protracted situation of refugees from Burma along the Thai-Burmese border, combined with the complicated and still ongoing history of conflict in Burma and the restrictive policies by the RTG, presents a complex scenario for ensuring liveable futures and developing durable solutions for the refugees. Nevertheless, the long established community structures on the refugees’ side provide a viable option for the inclusion of refugees in decision-making and planning processes. Given the current narrative of reforms in Burma (Hargrave, 2014) and the accompanying shift towards preparedness planning by UNHCR and the CCSDPT, the urgency of establishing participatory mechanisms is highly relevant to the described context. Whether the reality currently experienced by refugees on the ground in Thailand reflects this is analysed in the empirical chapters 5, 6 and 7. First, the next chapter details the design used for this research.

4. Research Design

4.1 Introduction This chapter first presents the research and sub-questions, followed by a discussion of the conceptual scheme, which aims to illustrate the above discussed theoretical concepts against the background of the Thai-Burmese context and the relevant research questions. After a brief description of the methodological foundation for this research, the applied research and sampling methods are specified to demonstrate how data collection and analysis were conducted. A methodological reflection and ethical considerations conclude the chapter.

4.2 Research Questions Based on the purpose of the research and the theoretical concepts discussed above, the following research questions have been derived:

How can refugees from Burma along the Thai-Burmese border participate in decision-making and planning processes regarding repatriation and what possibilities and constraints exist?

Sub-question 1a: How do refugees envision their future? Sub-question 1b: How are these aspirations connected to durable solutions? These questions aim to explore the refugees’ aspirations regarding their future and how these relate to questions such as whether they want to stay in Thailand, resettle or return to Burma and under what conditions. They will provide the background for the following questions.

Sub-question 2: What role do other actors play? This question revolves around other actors, such as the RTG, UNHCR and the CCSDPT. It aims to demonstrate how these actors’ and their activities are perceived by the refugees.

Sub-question 3a: What structures exist for participation of refugees in the preparation for repatriation? Sub-question 3b: What are enabling and constraining factors related to these? These two questions examine existing mechanisms for participation and related issues, reflecting upon the characteristics established for meaningful participation in Section 2.3.

4. Research Design

4.3 Conceptual Scheme The following conceptual scheme illustrates the interrelation between the discussed theoretical concepts against the research context:

Strategically- Transformed selective context Structurally-oriented strategies structures

 Exclusionary,  Inclusive, ‘bottom- ‘top-down’ Enabling Factors up’ decision- Supportive actors planning, leading Powerful actors concede power making processes to involuntary Rights  Voluntary, return sustainable return  Fear of premature Refugees exercising agency through or the repatriation participation development of  Disempowerment other solutions Restrictive policies of refugees Opposing actors  Empowerment of  Distrust Opportunity Costs refugees

 Lack of informa- Constraining Factors  Trust tion, no dialogue  Dialogue

tokenistic Modes of Participation transformative

Figure 3 - Conceptual Scheme

The conceptual scheme is based on the SRA. On the left side, the current contextual structures are described. Accordingly, the left side describes the current contextual structures, based upon which the refugees and other actors inform their strategies. These strategic choices and actions reflect the enabling and constraining factors prevalent in their environment. As the refugees are not the only relevant actors, other actors’ actions and positions are influential too, which is reflected in ‘opposing’ and ‘supportive’ actors. Refugees’ rights could form another enabling factor as they provide a legal basis for refugees’ participation. Further, the willingness of more powerful actors to concede power to refugees can be regarded as another condition which would provide opportunity for increased participation. Restrictive policies and opportunity costs on the contrary restrain the refugees in participating in decision-making processes. Eventually – and this is where the ‘actions-arrows’ pass from the blue-lined box of the strategically-selective context on the left to the red-lined box on the right – these actions result in a transformed (or reproduced) future structure. Relating to the specific context of the research, these two structures (the current and future one) are also placed on a continuum reaching from tokenistic modes of participation to transformative ones. How these concepts have been operationalised for the data collection in the field can be seen in Appendix II.

4. Research Design

4.4 Methodology This research followed a qualitative research approach. It reflects the combination of a critical realist perspective inherent to the SRA with social constructivist ideas and seemed appropriate given the sensitive research context along the Thai-Burmese border. This sensitivity results from the uncertain environment the refugees live in and safety concerns for the respondents. Due to this sensitivity and other limitations such as time constraints, the sample is relatively small in size, which I expected beforehand and deemed unsuitable for quantitative methods. Further, a strong emphasis was placed on gaining in-depth understanding of the informants’ perspective, which also justified a more qualitative approach in order to accommodate different individual conceptions. The research followed a case study design as it aims to understand the “complexity and particular nature of the case in question” (Bryman, 2012:66), here the situation of the Burmese refugees along the Thai-Burmese border.

4.5 Sampling When designing this research, I expected that access to the refugees living in the refugee camps would be impossible. Fortunately, once in the field it was rather unproblematic to gain access as Patrick Kearns from the CCSDPT facilitated the issuance of a camp pass. In total, five visits to three refugee camps took place, one of them including two over-night stays in the Mae Rama Luang camp due to the remote location of the camp. Thus, refugees living inside the camps form the majority of the sample whereas a two refugees currently living in Mae Sot are included in it as well. They lived previously in the camp, so that they were able to add insights based on these experiences. In addition, interviews with experts working for the refugees from Burma in Thailand were conducted. The respective informants were identified using a purposive or non-probability convenience sampling approach (Bryman, 2012), which is common in qualitative research in order to gain access to “participants who have experienced the central phenomenon or the key concept being explored in the study” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011:173). Both my local supervisor and contact persons in local organisations acted as gatekeepers into the refugee communities and helped identify informants. Inside the camps, the first contact person – often the respective interpreter – would refer further useful contacts and informants, thus snowball sampling was another method which I employed. Despite the possibility to gain access to the refugee camps the sample is relatively small, which is due to the sensitivity of the context and logistical as well as time constraints. Creswell and Plano Clark argue that a small sample is unproblematic in the context of qualitative research, as even a small sample can give “in-depth information about the central phenomenon or concept” (2011:174). Using saturation as an indicator for sufficient sample size and after having achieved “a reliable sense of thematic exhaustion and variability within [the] dataset” (Guest et al., 2006:65), I feel confident to argue that even though it is a small sample, the number of informants and methods used produced a reliable dataset for this research.

4. Research Design

The 20 respondents were aged Age group of respondents between 19 and 69, with the majority 2 1 belonging to the age bracket 18-29 years. 18-29 Both genders were equally represented. 75% 30-39 4 belonged to the Karen ethnic group; the other 40-49 11 quarter is made up of Burman, Karenni and 50-59 2 60-69 Kachin refugees. Seven of the interviews took place in Mae La, which is the biggest refugee camp Figure 4 - Age group of respondents with a population of 40,283 refugees (TBC, 2015a7), just within a one hour distance by public transport from the border town Mae Sot. It exists since 1984 and is mainly comprised of Karen refugees as Karen State borders Tak Province. 16.1% of its population belong to other ethnic groups. In Mae La, refugees have access to mobile phone coverage and internet, with 24 hours of electricity per day as well as a wide range of educational, health and social facilities (TBC, 2014a). Four interviews were collected in Umpiem Mai, a smaller refugee camp within one and a half hours driving distance from Mae Sot, also still in Tak Province. In August 2015, Umpiem Mai’s population figure stood at 11,953 people. 25% of its population is comprised of ethnicities different from Karen. Here as well, refugees have access to internet and mobile phone coverage and electricity all day (TBC, 2014c). Both Mae La and Umpiem Mai are accessible all-year-round by car and public transport on a sealed road. Besides the two interviews with former camp residents in Mae Sot, the remaining six interviews were conducted in Mae Rama Luang in Mae Hong Son Province. Its population of 11,911 refugees is almost entirely Karen. The camp was established in 1995 after the fall of Manerplaw8 on the Burmese side of the border. Mae Rama Luang is in a very isolated location – it took me six hours by public transport to Mae Sariang, which is the closest town near the camp, and another four hours by 4x4 cars to reach the camp. As it is not accessible for larger trucks during the rainy season, food rations are delivered in the months leading up to the rainy seasons and stored in the camp. There is no access by public transport and the refugees living there do not have access to mobile phone coverage or the internet. Only the camp office and a few other facilities have electricity provided by generators (TBC, 2014b).

7 The same source applies to the population numbers mentioned in the following for the camps Umpiem Mai and Mae Rama Luang. 8 Manerplaw was the head-quarters of the Karen resistance and home to pro-democracy groups.

4. Research Design

4.6 Methods For this research, a combination of different methods has been used, to facilitate the triangulation of data (Bryman, 2012), enriching and explaining insights gained from different perspectives and through different methods (Sumner & Tribe, 2008). Once in the field, the approach allowed for patterns and themes to emerge from the refugees’ perspectives. The methods were chosen in consultation with the local supervisor and were adapted when necessary throughout the research.

4.6.1 In-depth Interviews In order to gain insights from the refugees on all three sets of sub-questions, 19 in-depth, semi-structured and open ended interviews9 were conducted with refugees inside and outside of the refugee camps. This allowed capturing their points of view and did not restrict their options in answering the questions. According to issues and themes the informants raised during the process, following interviews were adapted (Bryman, 2012). The interviews lasted 18 minutes up to one and a half hours, with variations due to the presence of interpreters (often these interviews did not achieve the same flow as interviews conducted without an interpreter) or the ease of the informant (some never gave interviews before and were younger, while more senior interviewees were more used to sharing their experiences). The average duration is 42 minutes. An interview guide has been developed in close cooperation with a local supervisor, to ensure the appropriateness of the questions and wording in the local context. For example, the question about how refugees envision their future has been operationalised in a very direct manner, but due to the rumours and fears related to repatriation in the camps, it has been advised to research this in a more indirect way, asking the informants where they want to live in the future. The interview guide can be found in Appendix III. The interviews were collected with the support of interpreters in cases where the respective informants did not speak sufficient English, to ensure that less information is lost. In total, seven interviews were conducted using interpreters for refugees speaking Karen and four with the help of Burmese-speaking interpreters. The respective interpreters were informants themselves, thus it was possible to first conduct an interview with them, which also ensured that they would be familiar with the questions they translated in the following interviews. As no meetings with the interpreters could be arranged before the visit to the camps, this was the only available possibility of training. Besides the interviews with refugees, interviews with key informants were conducted in order to gain insight into their perspective on refugees’ participation and contextual aspects. In total, three interviews could be collected, respectively from a representative from UNHCR, the CCSDPT and Burma Link as a CBO. These interviews were as well open-ended and semi-structured, even though

9 One interview has been conducted with two respondents, resulting in a total number of 20 respondents for 19 interviews.

4. Research Design

the developed interview guide for organisations (see Appendix IV) has been followed not very closely as the questions were strongly adapted to the work and position of the respective organisation. After gaining permissions and the informed consent of the respective participants, the interviews were recorded digitally, which facilitated the flow of the conversation and ensured undivided attention could be given to the respective interview partner. An exception is the interview with the representative from UNHCR as I conducted this on the phone and only took notes manually. A list of the conducted interviews can be found in Appendix V. This list includes the age bracket and gender of the respective interviewee, the location of the interview and in case of the key informants, the organisation they work for. All names of refugees have been anonymised to protect the respondents. As the use of Western names seemed inappropriate, I asked one of the interpreters to suggest names. The representative from UNHCR preferred using I20 instead of a pseudonym. Only Patrick Kearns from the CCSDPT and Ariana Zarleen from Burma Link are not anonymised as they would have been nevertheless very identifiable due to the uniqueness of their positions; both of course agreed to this.

4.6.2 Document Analysis The analysis of policy documents, newspaper articles and briefing papers (Bryman, 2012) has been used to complement the interviews with refugees and key informants. This was helpful to get insights on organisations and how they are portrayed in local and international media, particularly regarding organisations with which no interview could be conducted. Further, it provided greater context and ensured that information provided in this study reflects the current situation in a very dynamic environment.

4.6.3 Field Notes Besides the in-depth interviews and the document analysis, other methods were employed. Throughout the field research, I kept field notes and a diary. This was particularly relevant for keeping track of conversations which have been conducted besides the interviews, be it with key informants in meetings prior to the actual interview, occasional conversations with others involved in the same thematic area or conversations conducted with the refugees in the camps. Often, these conversations provided valuable additional insights to corroborate the data collected through the other methods.

4.7 Method of Data Analysis I transcribed the first interviews during the time in the field. Together with the ongoing document analysis and information gained through other observations, this first analysis also served as a reflection on and revision of the research process. The analysis of the data obtained followed a content analysis approach (Sumner & Tribe, 2008), coding the data with the programme atlas.ti and partially in an analogue manner. Both open and selective coding has been employed. Firstly, the data

4. Research Design

has been screened for pre-assumed codes and themes which have been deducted from the research questions. This includes themes and codes such as participation, agency, and decision-making. Not always did these pre-conceived codes find correspondence in the data. Therefore, themes and codes which have not been considered beforehand and emerged during the analysis have been included in the analysis and interpretation as well, which comprises the inductive part of this research. As for example trust and issues related to it were mentioned across the majority of the interviews repeatedly, I decided to include it in the analysis; representation would be another example which emerged stronger than expected during the analysis.

4.8 Challenges and Limitations In eleven out of the 19 interviews conducted with refugees, I used an interpreter. In most cases, these interpreters were recommended by the local supervisor or other contacts, so that their skills were known and tested before. Nevertheless I aimed to always conduct an interview with them first before letting them interpret, so that they could become familiar with the content of the interview. This worked relatively well, even though some concepts, such as ‘decision-making’ proved to be difficult to translate, both into Burmese and Karen language. In such cases, I gave descriptions and examples, even though sometimes the impression arose that exactly these examples would be given later in answering the question. It is possible that this affected the quality of the research, but in such a setting it is difficult to avoid and I tried to overcome such issues by conducting the interviews in the above described manner. The interviews which I conducted with the help of an interpreter were transcribed later by local assistants who spoke either Burmese or Karen. This also aimed at ensuring that a lesser extent of information gets lost in the process of translating back and forth. Thus, the transcripts of these interviews are the transcripts of the informants’ answer in Burmese or Karen. This helped verify the quality of the respective interpreter; on the other hand it is still possible that the assistant did not translate every word correctly. Here again I used assistants recommended by my local supervisor as she worked with them before and was satisfied with the quality of their work, to reduce this particular problem. Key informant interviews and document research complemented the interviews with refugees. Reflecting on the three key informant interviews, these provided important additional insights and different perspectives. As the interviews with the refugees revolved a lot on the relationship with UNHCR, the interview with a representative from UNHCR provided a great opportunity to also hear the other side of the relationship. Unfortunately it proved to be difficult to reach representatives from other organisations, even though both my local supervisor and Patrick Kearns, the chair of the CCSDPT, are very well connected. I contacted a variety of organisations and together with Patrick Kearns I drafted and sent out an overview about the research to partner organisations of the CCSDPT, but unfortunately without success.

4. Research Design

In hindsight it might have been better to rely less on such gatekeepers, but given also the time constraints to get familiar with the local specificities it seemed like the best way of proceeding. In terms of gaining access to the refugees, the gatekeepers proved to be invaluable; even though Bryman (2012) cautions that they might influence the selection of informants according to objectives beyond the researcher’s control. Relying on not one but several gatekeepers hopefully helped diminishing this risk. Even though only a limited number of representatives from organisations could be directly interviewed, I collected a wide range of documents, briefing papers and newspaper reports in order to validate and support the data. Few inconsistencies have been found and could often be explained by using this additional data.

4.9 Ethical Considerations In terms of ethical decisions Brooten and Metro argue for context-specific and “case-by-case negotiations unique to each setting” (2014:3; Matelski, 2014). This is also supported by Sumner and Tribe’s description of “flexibility in ethical decisions with local meanings attached to the conceptualization of ethics” (2008:38). As the local research context has been highly sensitive, both in terms of the environment and the research topic, I deemed a more flexible approach as appropriate, also in respect to considerations of safety (Brooten & Metro, 2014). The input from my local supervisor and other local informants was crucial to guide research activities and to determine what is ‘harmful’ in the local context (Matelski, 2014), for example asking directly about repatriation and thus perhaps fostering anxieties. The sensitivity of the context also impacted the way of obtaining informed consent from informants. It goes without question that I informed my research informants in detail about the purpose of the research, that their contribution was voluntary and that they are free to withdraw from the research at any time (Bryman, 2012). Brooten and Metro described from their research experience in the context of political repression in Burma “that consent forms induce anxiety or are meaningless to informants because they commodify the research process” (2014:12) and that verbal and contextually appropriate consent thus constitutes the more adequate option for such an environment. I have done my best to protect any informant from harm and to uphold confidentiality and anonymity (Bryman, 2012). Brooten and Metro (2014) argue though that such a promise “implies the researcher’s omnipotence, which is especially misleading in a context such as Burma, where power structures are shifting and tenuous”, which does not imply a decrease in ethical responsibility, but rather emphasises again the necessity of context-specific ethical decision-making. I also considered aspects of reciprocity for this research, even though it presented itself always as a relatively complicated issue. Due to the restricted possibility of frequent and extended visits to the refugee camps, it was difficult to contribute locally. Often though, being from outside of the camp and supposedly from the sphere of NGO workers, informants expected information or

4. Research Design

assistance which I could unfortunately not deliver. In line with Zavisca I paid attention to delivering an honest account to everyone involved “about how much the research can realistically be expected to achieve” (2007:142). Nevertheless, I tried to incorporate reciprocity wherever possible. During the visit to the Mae Rama Luang refugee camp the opportunity arose to visit the school of the interpreter and attend two classes, which was hopefully an enriching experience not only for me, but also for the students. Further, the interpreter there asked for help with understanding the Strategic Roadmap to Voluntary Repatriation distributed by UNHCR, so I spent an entire morning with him going through the document. This also supported the research, but that was a secondary benefit. Besides this, I met each informant with genuine interest in their view and story, whilst they always had the opportunity to ask me any questions at any time in return. When possible, I exchanged contact details with them to keep in contact beyond the time in the field, which has been possible thus far with only a few. At the end of each interview, I also offered the informants the possibility that their interviews could be shared with Burma Link, so that the data and information provided by them would not only support this thesis, but could also contribute to the organisation’s work for the refugees.

4.10 Conclusion I followed a qualitative research design for exploring participation in decision-making and the relationship between different actors in the context of the refugees from Burma along the Thai- Burmese border. Epistemological considerations and the specificities of the local context prescribed such an approach. It proved to be appropriate to capture the issues from the informants’ perspective and account for the dynamics and underlying processes of their environment. Even though the sample size is small, the triangulation of the data obtained through different methods and thorough reflection during the entire process of the research validate the quality of the data. The following three chapters detail the empirical findings, which will then be tied together in chapter 8.

5. Setting the Scene: Refugees’ Perspective on their Future

5. Refugees’ Perspective on their Future

5.1 Introduction This first analytical chapter revolves around the first sub-question of how refugees envision their future. This has been operationalised by asking questions such as, “How do you imagine your future?”. This was followed by questions about where they would like to live to gain insights into how these aspirations for their future relate to the question of returning to Burma, staying in Thailand or moving to a third country. Another question I asked was whether they are worried about their future. The chapter adapts the same sequence, describing first how refugees imagine their future and what they would like to see fulfilled. Second, it explores how this relates to the different locations, translating it into durable solutions10. The section concludes with a description of refugees’ current concerns, detailing why repatriation can be considered premature under the current situation from their perspective.

5.2 Thinking about the Future Asked about what they want for their future, the interviewed refugees mainly mentioned opportunities to further their education, being in a place with better education opportunities for their children, having more and better employment opportunities, contributing to their home society and living in safety. As the majority of the informants belonged to the age bracket between 18 and 29 years and often had completed their education in the camp fairly recently, many of them replied to my question with ‘studying at university level’ (Htee-Saw-Htoo; Bu-Htaw; Ta-Kae-Ler; My-Paw-Htoo; Mu-Htaw; Blo-Saw-Too). Interviewees who already had children rather focused on their children’s education and expressed the wish to live in a place with good education (Eh-Klain; Eh-Klu) and expect their “children to study and be educated” (Poe-Mu-Dah). This reflects research by Oh and Stouwe, who point out that “education is highly valued by the Karen in general, and the refugees in particular, because it is a means to higher social status, better-paying jobs, and increased service to the community” (2008:603). This quote already shows the connection to other aspects voiced by the refugees. Many wanted to eventually help their society (Htee-Saw-Htoo), for example work as a human rights activist (Mu-Too) or work in other ways for their community (My-Paw-Htoo; Eh-Klu; Mu-Htaw). Others wanted better job opportunities (My-Paw-Htoo) and the possibility to attend vocational training (Eh- Gay-Moo). Employment-related aspects also include the wish “to be able to work in Thailand without any arrests rather than putting us in this cage” (Poe-Mu-Dah) and thus gain independence from external support and “supply everything my family needs” (Blo-Saw-Too).

10 I did not form my questions using the ‘UNHCR vocabulary’ resettlement, local integration or repatriation, but the refugees used these terms themselves, so that I felt like an employment of these terms here is justified.

5. Setting the Scene: Refugees’ Perspective on their Future

Two respondents replied that they would like to live in safety (Eh-Klain) and “in a country with justice” (Kler-Po), whilst the wish of one respondent was predominantly to reunite with her family, which had been resettled to the United States and Norway (Htee-Ku-Paw).

5.3 Relating Future Aspirations to Location

5.3.1 Prospects in the Camps Living in the camp was often described as a life with very limited opportunities, thus providing little chance of fulfilling the wishes stated above. After completing their education in the camp schools, students have only very few possibilities to further their studies. Opportunities in migrant schools outside of the camps or scholarships for universities in Thailand or other countries are very limited, so that many ambitious students are left behind in the camps each year (Htee-Saw-Htoo; Mu-Too11). Often, they apply year after year before they either get accepted or give up. Other factors keeping young refugees from furthering their education are the importance of family ties in their culture and the often related obligation to contribute an income. “Especially when you're an only child, then there is basically no chance” was a comment Mu-Too made, while Blo-Saw-Too described how he cannot go to study outside of the camp as he has his family, especially his old grandmother in the camp. Work opportunities in the camp are also limited. The majority of jobs are available in the camp education system or in camp-based organisations and camp committees, but these positions are limited in number. International organisations, even though their offices are very visible in the camps, barely work with refugees as permanent staff members, so they do not provide additional employment opportunities. Some of the interviewed refugees found ways to contribute to their society within the camps. For example, Bar-Mee stated that:

I was eager to work for my community. That’s why, after I finished my high school, I joined KYWLS12 school which internship is to work for KWO13 at least for two years. Then, I worked for KWO as a clerk. Later on, I was elected as a chairperson.

Or Htee-Ku-Paw, who was an accountant in Burma and now “devote[s] [her] job as a teacher to support education for children here, as much as [she] can”. Besides these employment opportunities, few options exist to pursue a meaningful job and many end up in jobs they only do half- heartedly (Mu-Too).

11 In informal interview on the 10th of August 12 Karen Young Women’s Leadership School 13 Karen Women Organisation

5. Setting the Scene: Refugees’ Perspective on their Future

What has been striking was how normal it seemed for the refugees to employ prison vocabulary when describing life in the camp. They talked about ‘releasing people from the camp’ (Bu-Htaw), living in a prison or jail (My-Paw-Htoo; Ariana Zarleen) or like “under house arrest” (Kler-Po). Several mentioned that living in the camp is very bleak as “you’re not treated as a human, not as the same kind of human being” (Mu-Too) and that they feel like not being “recognised as a person” (My-Paw-Htoo). To illustrate it with Htee-Saw-Htoo’s words, “even the stray dogs in Mae Sot have a better life and are freer than the refugees – they have freedom of movement, and the refugees have not”. Especially interviewees in the age bracket 18 to 29 years often described camp life in such terms, accompanied by the description of the option of staying in the camp also in the future as ‘wasting their time’ (Htee-Saw-Htoo; Blo-Saw-Too) or ‘being trapped’ (Mu-Too14). This also applies to the multiple restrictions on movement, employment and education, which create a dependency on the support provided by external organisations (Blo-Saw-Too).

5.3.2 A Future beyond the Camps Given the description of life in the camp and how this limits the refugees’ prospects regarding education, self-sustained livelihoods and independence from support, only a very small number considered staying in Thailand, albeit outside of the camps. Obtaining migrant status is difficult, thus their main option is to continue living in the refugee camps, in which some of the interviewees have already lived for 20 years. One of the respondents would “like to live in Thailand but they do not allow us to” (Kler-Po). Two of the interviewees were currently working in Mae Sot, so they mentioned that they could imagine staying there for the near future. Life as a Burmese migrant in Thailand is not easy either, but they saw more opportunities for progressing with their lives and income generation than within the camps. And still it would be a better option than living on the other side of the border. Further, they considered it easier to contribute to their home societies from the close proximity of Mae Sot to the border than a third country, where they would also have to adapt to a completely new environment: “I would just not be contributing so much to the world. But here it's like, I could do a lot. And I already know how to really live here” (Mu-Too). Only a third of the interviewed refugees are ‘old arrivals’15 and could be eligible for resettlement, but nevertheless many interviewees mentioned it as an option they consider for their or their families’ future. At the time of the interview, two interviewees were sure that they could resettle

14 In informal interview on the 10th of August 15 Old arrivals are all refugees who arrived in the refugee camps before the Royal Thai Government stopped the refugee registration by UNHCR in 2005, with the intention of not providing a pull factor for displaced persons in Burma to come to Thailand in order to have a chance at resettlement to a this country (which is only possible for registered refugees). New arrivals are in consequence those refugees who arrived after 2005, accounting for approximately 40,000 people (Jolliffe & South, 2014:17).

5. Setting the Scene: Refugees’ Perspective on their Future soon (Ta-Kae-Ler; Mu-Htaw) while another one was waiting for last confirmations and checks (Bar- Mee). At the time of writing, one of these three already resettled to Australia. The motives for resettlement are similar across all interview partners: they either seek resettlement because they do not see any possibility to return to Burma due to fear of persecution, a complete loss of land or the general prospect of having to start life anew at nothing. Or they connect resettlement to better education prospects for themselves (Htee-Saw-Htoo; Bu-Htaw; Blo-Saw-Too), their children (Eh-Klain) or even their grandchildren (Eh-Klu), thus seeing it as an opportunity to fulfil the aspects they deem important for the future. Young refugees hope to get accepted for scholarships abroad in order to leave the camp whilst others simply wait for the possibility to register one day and then resettle, like Bu-Htaw describes it: “Normally we just wait. Wait for the right time and maybe they will have some interviews in the future, about our biographies, and if we pass this, then possibility is there.”

5.3.3 Returning to Burma vs. Repatriation Having the wish to study in or resettle to a third country did not always imply a permanent life choice:

I'd like to further my studies [in Thailand or third country], if possible. And then after that I will come back to my community and help my people. Because, in Karen State, there are a lot of people still stay in the jungle, who are not educated there. So they need our help. (My-Paw-Htoo)

Out of the 20 interviewed refugees, eight clearly stated they would like to return16 to Burma one day. Others did not mention it that straightforward but rather gave reasons why a return at the current moment is not possible. Three (Bu-Htaw; Eh-Klain; Bar-Mee) said they could not go back as they either lost everything in Burma or, in case of Eh-Klain, fear persecution. Even though some of the interview partners were already for about 20 years in the camps and lived through many atrocities in Burma, they have a strong sense of ‘home’ when it comes to their country of origin. So even though Eh-Kaw stated that “it's a little dark for our future” he would like “to go back to our own land and then to set up our family life, if possible”. Others would like to bring education to the people who remained inside Burma (My-Paw-Htoo; Eh-Klu), which relates to contributing to their society in the future.

16 Often, a distinction was made between ‘return’ and ‘repatriation’. Return relates to refugees going back to their country of origin based on their own decision and willingness. Repatriation is closely linked to activities conducted by UNHCR and other agencies in line with international guidelines and standards and does not necessarily reflect refugees’ participation in planning and decision-making. CBOs representing the refugee community in Thailand expressed preference for the term ‘return’ as it indicates an active involvement of the refugees themselves (KCBOs, 2012).

5. Setting the Scene: Refugees’ Perspective on their Future

None of the interviewees though said that they would like to return soon. They fled to Thailand because of the ongoing conflict and fighting, the prospect of receiving better education in the camps and the impossibility of further sustaining their livelihoods in Burma. Until today, the root causes of their flight remain largely unaddressed (Ariana Zarleen). So while about half of the interviewed refugees said they would return to Burma one day, they all commented that the time for return has not come yet, as they “know that inside Burma we still need many things to return” (Ta- Kae-Ler). Consensus was that once the situation in Burma significantly and lastingly improves, refugees would go back by themselves:

You don't really need to send them back. If they really wanted it, they would go back, like if the situation is good, you don't really need to send them back, they would go back for sure. (Mu-Too)

They detailed why a return at the current time would be premature, mirroring exactly the aspects they consider as important for their future: education, safety, and sustainable livelihoods. Given the importance refugees place upon education, the lack of recognition of the camp education by the Burmese government is one of the major concerns for refugees related to return. For many, getting a better education was a reason to leave Burma, as the camp education is considered superior to the available education in Burma. Mu-Too commented that he learnt in two years of camp education more than in ten years schooling in Burma and that he did not learn anything about the conflict and Karen history until he arrived in Thailand. Further, education in Burma is comparatively expensive. No camp-issued certificates for education, professional qualifications or health are recognised across the border – concerns which were raised by many refugees, no matter what camp. Ta-Kae-Ler described it like this:

If I go back right now I will have to start my life at zero, because I don't have land, my education they don't recognise, my career they don't recognise, I cannot speak Burmese very well. Neither skill I have can be useful for myself. Like, if I stay here, my quality and my education, I can still use, but if I go back, they do not recognise. So that will be very difficult for me, to go back and start my life, to live like that.

Besides such issues, the achievement of “genuine peace and freedom” (Eh-Klu) is another important condition for large-scale return to Burma, as refugees would like to live their lives in safety. So far, despite the reform processes initiated by the Burmese government, peace has not been achieved or where peace has been declared, the refugees do not have faith in its sustainability. Thus, they consider the situation as too unreliable (Kler-Po) for return. During the data collection in the field, fighting broke out directly across the border from Mae Sot between one of the ethnic armed

5. Setting the Scene: Refugees’ Perspective on their Future groups and the Burmese military (Naw Noreen, 2015). This has not been the only occurrence of renewed fighting, despite ceasefire agreements and negotiations for a nation-wide ceasefire agreement. New accounts of armed conflict and human rights abuses across the country have been published frequently (Burma Link, 2015a; Radio Free Asia, 2015; Nyein Nyein, 2015a; KLN, 2015). Due to information from personal networks across the border, the refugees are well aware that fighting continues (Eh-Kaw; Goh-Gway), so even if government officials state the contrary they do not believe it:

Last year, the general from Burma visited Thailand and then he asked, he requested refugees back, he wants all people, all of his people back to Burma, because there is peace in Burma. But I don't believe there is peace, you know, they're all fighting. (Blo-Saw-Too)

Even in areas in Karen State (a ceasefire there has been signed in 201217) where currently no fighting takes place, the Burmese military sends in more troops and fortifies its camps (My-Paw- Htoo; Ariana Zarleen), leading the refugees to believe that the peace process exists only on paper or TV. Ariana Zarleen also described that this reflects how the Burmese military acted during all the years of the conflict; making peace temporarily on one front while fighting on another and eventually shifting back. Therefore, “as long as they’re fighting anywhere in the country, no one is safe anywhere”. The refugees voiced cautious optimism regarding the election in November 2015 (Saw Yan Naing, 2015), even though they also mention that history taught them to not expect too much as the question remains whether the Burmese military will accept for them unfavourable election results. Mu-Too worries that the situation will only improve “when all the resources are gone and nothing is left in the country and the military has nothing to sell and then they give up”.

Several interviewees commented that they have no land they can go back to as they lost it during the conflict (Bar-Mee; Blo-Saw-Too) or due to still occurring land grabbing (Eh-Kaw). Little available opportunities for income generating activities exacerbate the situation, resulting in refugees having to start from nothing. Mu-Too commented that if land would be provided upon return, the chances might be better, but without it return is unlikely in the near future. As such, under current circumstances, refugees do not see the opportunity to independently sustain their livelihoods in Burma. Another issue which came up repeatedly is that the Burmese curriculum teaches that refugees are rebels and against the government (Ta-Kae-Ler; Field Notes), thus biasing the population early on

17 see Hargrave, 2014:19

5. Setting the Scene: Refugees’ Perspective on their Future against potential returnees. This is also related to the idea that the armed organisations operate from inside the camps and “all refugees have some connections to the armed groups, which is completely untrue” (Ariana Zarleen18). Another prejudice refugees face is that they only went to the camps in search of better opportunities for themselves, again resulting in a rather adverse attitude towards them and possible discrimination upon return (Saw Thein Myint, 2015).

5.4 Conclusion This chapter revolved around refugees’ aspirations for their future and how this is framed in regard to staying in Thailand, resettling to a third country or returning to Burma. As refugees’ perspective is central to this study, an understanding of how they envision their future is crucial for the further analysis. The interviewed refugees place great value on education, which links to the ability to provide for their own livelihoods in the future and to contribute to their society. Further they expressed the wish to be independent from external support and to live in safety. They see the biggest chance for fulfilling these aspirations for better education and (economic) independence in resettlement, as current conditions in the camps and in Burma do not provide an environment for making their aspirations become reality. Besides this, they expressed no faith in the reforms conducted thus far and the peace process in Burma. Despite these reasons against return, talk about repatriation is omnipresent in the refugee camps, resulting in refugees worrying about being repatriated prematurely. The following chapter details how activities by other actors influence the refugees’ perception of an imminent repatriation and contribute to these concerns.

18 In informal interview on the 10th of August

6. Fuelling Fear of Imminent Repatriation

6. Causes for Refugees’ Fear of Imminent Repatriation

6.1 Introduction In the following, factors which - in the majority of cases unintendedly – substantiate refugees’ fear of premature repatriation are explored. These include concrete activities and statements by some of the actors along the Thai-Burmese border, the information environment in the refugee camps and partially also factually unrelated circumstances. The focus is more on UNHCR and the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) as these are for the refugees more tangibly involved in the preparations for repatriation than for example the Royal Thai Government (RTG) and thus more relevant for the analysis beyond this chapter. As such, this chapter aims to analyse how other actors’ actions are perceived by and affect the refugees, which relates to sub-question 2 of the research questions regarding the role of other actors in influencing the refugees’ perception on repatriation. First, statements by the RTG are highlighted, followed by general dynamics in the NGO environment along the border. Afterwards, planning activities by UNHCR and the CCSDPT are described, with a more detailed analysis of the effects of two concrete UNHCR activities. Ultimately, the chapter discusses the influence of rumours and the lack of information on refugees’ fears of premature repatriation.

6.2 Activities by other Actors

6.2.1 Statements by the Royal Thai G overnment Shortly after the initiation of reform processes in Burma, several statements by the RTG raised serious concerns among the refugee population. In June 2011, Karen News reported that the RTG is “considering a plan to repatriate the refugees” (Karen News, 2011a). Further, the governor of Tak Province stated that “it is time to consider starting a program to get people to return to Myanmar” (ibid.), that there is no intention to grant them refugee status and that “Thai authorities would target Burmese pro-democracy opposition groups living on the Thai side of the border” (Karen News, 2011b). In 2012, after a visit by RTG officials to Burma, a statement has been released concerning the repatriation of “thousands of Burmese refugees within the next year” (Saw Yan Naing, 2012). In January 2013 then, the Thai Interior Minister visited Mae La to assure refugees that there would not be any repatriation unless there is genuine peace in Burma (Poe Kwa Lay, 2013). In July 2014 though, after the military coup in May and another meeting between Thai and Burmese high-ranking generals, repatriation fears were sparked anew. Reportedly, the generals discussed a timetable for refugee repatriation, which “is expected to take one year” (Saw Yan Naing, 2014a) and would commence with head counts in the camps – the first one of those took place only a week after in Mae La (Thin Lei Win, 2014), making refugees worry that “the headcount is part of a plan to close the camps” (ibid.). These rumours and concerns led to a statement by the Thai Ministry

6. Fuelling Fear of Imminent Repatriation of Foreign Affairs (TMFA) emphasising that even though repatriation has been discussed with Burmese officials, no specific timeframe has been set (TMFA, 2014). Repeated meetings between Thai and Burmese officials as well as NGOs and UNHCR (Saw-Yan-Naing, 2014b), but without refugee representatives, contributed to uncertainty on the refugees’ side about the Thai authorities’ plans for them. Htee-Saw-Htoo for example said he “read in the media that [the RTG] is going to send them [the refugees] back”, but was also unsure about it:

I read some news that Burma, you know, the military leader and the Thai authority, now agree to send back the refugees. And the next time, again: 'no, they are not going to send those refugees back' and 'this is optional', something like that. And sometimes, they are now going to send those refugees back and there are already shelters, there in Burma. Sometimes, you know, it's very complicated.

As the interviewed refugees were well aware that their fate in Thailand is contingent on the Thai authorities’ decisions, it is understandable that the uncertainty about the assurances given by the RTG and repeated contradictory statements raise fears of impending repatriation.

6.2.2 Ration Reductions and Organisations shifting their Focus to Burma In 2013, The Border Consortium (TBC, 2013) announced that rations provided to the refugees will be reduced due to a decrease in funding. In 2015, TBC reiterated this in order to save costs as it expected “a shortfall of THB 75 million baht (US $2.2 million) in 2015 which is just under 10% of expected costs” (TBC, 2015b). Consequently, the rice ration for adults is since September 2015 at 9kg/month, for vulnerable adults and children between 5-17 years at 11kg/month; the charcoal rations were reduced to 5kg per household. In addition, programmes for nutrition, livelihoods, camp management and preparedness are cut to save costs (ibid.). This has grave implications for the livelihoods of the camp residents. Across all interviewed refugees, the overall conclusion was that the new level of rations is not enough. This is aggravated by the restrictions on movement introduced by the new RTG since 2014 as it limits refugees’ opportunities to contribute to their livelihoods by paid labour outside of the camps – “so they were just forced to be stuck in the camp with rations that are not enough to survive on and with absolutely no way of earning any additional income” (Ariana Zarleen). Further, Goh-Gway mentioned that in addition, “prices for everything are getting higher” while incomes are stagnating, if they have any. And not only TBC’s funding decreased, other organisations experience funding cuts as well, which leads to a decrease in programme support or the complete cessation of some programmes (Htee-Saw- Htoo; Ta-Kae-Ler; Ariana Zarleen; Saw Thein Myint, 2015).

6. Fuelling Fear of Imminent Repatriation

Figure 5 - Cartoon illustrating pressure felt due to ration cuts (Karen News cited in Hargrave, 2014)

Only a few interviewees related the funding cuts to the shift of donors’ focus into Burma. This shift relates to the opening of the country, the international community’s hope for transition to peace and the necessity to support and (re-)build livelihoods in South-East Burma and greater geopolitical and economic issues, for example the Syrian refugee crisis. If respondents commented on it, they rather saw it as “the organisations and the authorities trying to send back the refugees cleverly” (Htee-Saw-Htoo), putting the livelihoods in the camp under so much pressure that refugees themselves see at some point no other option but to return to Burma in order to sustain themselves and their families. Blo-Saw-Too put it in the following words:

UNHCR and the donor, they're not trying to fight with the refugee people. They decrease many support, many help, for the refugees to go back. When they take out their help and the refugee feel like we do not have anything here, it's time, it's not the right time to go back, but if we stay here we don't have anything to do. We cannot survive or we cannot support our family, because even though we stay here we do not have the chance to go outside or to go and work. We do not have freedom like that. That's why we have to go back. Go back and then as you know, we will face the same problems again.

Given the concerns the refugees have about premature repatriation and all the unresolved problems which would currently await them upon return, this decrease in aid and support increases the uncertainty of their situation.

6. Fuelling Fear of Imminent Repatriation

6.2.3 Planning by UNHCR and the CCSDPT Simultaneously to the decrease in donor support, UNHCR and the CCSDPT started planning for repatriation scenarios as described in Section 3.4, which fostered fears among the refugees. None of the interviewed refugees said that he/she knows exactly what these organisations are planning, just that they are planning something. Despite clauses in their documents regarding information sharing and consultation with all refugees (e.g. UNHCR, 2015d), refugees seem to lack critical information and access to key documents. In March 2015 UNHCR distributed its latest version of the ‘Strategic Roadmap for Voluntary Repatriation’ (UNHCR, 2015d). What is problematic is that they seem to share it only very selectively – a camp committee representative interviewed for this research stated that:

In the beginning, they didn’t share the Roadmap with us, but later on in February, not UNHCR but TBC showed that to us, but it was written in advanced English and TBC might know that none of us can understand, so they share us the shorten or light version. In March, we asked about the road-map to UNHCR, and finally share it with us, in state quarter meeting, only because organizations were asking about it. (anonymous) 19

This lack of access to key documents in the repatriation planning raises concerns and uncertainties among the refugee population. The planning figures cited in the document – “10,000 spontaneous returns; and 10,000 to 20,000 returns facilitated by UNHCR” (UNHCR, 2015d:4) – also raised many questions, as other organisations working along the border were not able to verify these figures (Ariana Zarleen). One interviewee criticised that “if someone is interested in going back and ask them about information, they cannot provide anything” (Mu-Too). The Operations Plan following the Roadmap was presented “during a closed-door meeting to roughly 70 camp leadership members […] along with relevant NGOs” (Dene-Hern Chen, 2015). Feedback to this presentation was mixed, with the joint general-secretary of the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) stating that “the KRC does not intend to help UNHCR with the operations plan” (ibid.) as “the KRC is not involved or participating in it, and it is not ours” (ibid.). This was reflected during the interviews, too as “everything is, they [UNHCR] do that, we follow – everything is in their hands” (Eh-Kaw). Another secretary of the KRC commented that they “have a little bit of worry because first we talked about the strategic roadmap and now we are moving towards an operations plan” (DVB, 2015), indicating that such planning is perceived as premature and perhaps even rushed. This reflects other incidents of criticism, repeatedly highlighting that “the discussion of repatriation has continued without diverse participation of the refugees and the […] CBOs working

19 No further identification markers will be disclosed here in order to protect the anonymity of the respondent.

6. Fuelling Fear of Imminent Repatriation with the refugee community” (KWO, 2015). Even assurances that no one would send anyone back prematurely and that all returns have to be voluntary do little to allay these concerns, because “everything that UNHCR does now they just think it's because they're planning something about repatriation” (Ariana Zarleen) as they see “on the ground […] that many preparations are being made” (Nan Thoo Lei, 2012).

6.2.4 UNHCR Profiling Survey and Verification Two particular examples for such activities by UNHCR will be highlighted in the following: the Profiling Survey conducted jointly with the Thai Mae Fah Luang Foundation under Royal Patronage (MFLF) in 2013-2014 and the verification undertaken together with the RTG in early 2015 (Tan, 2015). UNHCR and the MFLF conducted the Profiling Survey in all nine camps, reaching approximately 92% of all households in the camps (UNHCR & MFLF, 2014). The survey results were compiled in a report titled Displaced Persons in the temporary Shelters along the Thai- Myanmar Border: Future Hopes and Aspirations, which confirms the findings described in Chapter 5. In the report, the MFLF describes how they first conducted a pilot study in Mae La in 2013, during which “important lessons were generated and applied in adapting and improving the survey process in the other temporary shelters” (2014:10) and as a result “certain adjustments [were] made to the questionnaire” (ibid.:38) to accommodate “concerns of the displaced people that this survey is not about returning to Myanmar” (ibid.). Reading the document, one gets the impression that it was a fairly smooth process, leading to the survey being “largely welcomed by shelter residents” (ibid.). Mae La residents interviewed for this study give a different description of the piloting process, as illustrated by this quote from the interview with Eh-Klain:

There are three options that we can choose, but at least need to choose two answers, whether to live in Thailand, go back to Myanmar or go to third country. When we discussed about the questions, we said that if people really would like to go to third country, can they choose only one answer? And then they said, 'no, they need to choose at least two answers', so I asked them, if they choose to answer that they want to live in Thailand, or the first priority is to go to third country and the second one is to live in Thailand, what can you do for that? And they answered, 'as you are refugees from Myanmar and you have no Thai registration card and no UN identity card, how will you go to third country? How will you live in Thailand? So the last one is you need to choose, you want to go back to Myanmar by yourself, by your desire? And I'm so afraid and I told people, 'you shouldn't participate in that survey' but most of the people in the camp they only have little education, so they didn't know, should they participate or not.

This passage indicates several issues. First, refugees needed to rank the durable solutions, no matter whether they are available to them and whether they consider them or not. Initially, they were

6. Fuelling Fear of Imminent Repatriation required to rank all three options, which “looked like they were trying to get the refugees to agree that they will voluntary return, but they actually gave them no choice but to say that” (Ariana Zarleen). After protest from the camp residents and a widely covered collection of signatures (Ariana Zarleen; see also Hargrave, 2014), the MFLF and UNHCR adapted the questionnaires. Second, the quotation above indicates that even then it did not actually feel like the refugees could express their wish in a meaningful way. Blo-Saw-Too also commented that he is not sure “whether they take serious our wants”. This concern is not completely unsubstantiated:

Rather than focusing on their indication of preferences on where they wish to live beyond the temporary shelter, the MFLF sees the importance looking closely at the desires and concerns voiced by the displaced people which are fundamental to their well-being across all contexts. Sharing of this information with all concerned stakeholders will help to prepare for the future of the displaced people according to their needs and wishes. (UNHCR & MFLF, 2014:7)

Surely, “looking closely at the desires and concerns” of the refugees is laudable, but not “focusing on their indication of preferences on where they wish to live beyond the temporary shelter” and preparing “for the future of the displaced people according to their needs and wishes” seems slightly contradictory. Third, Mu-Too thinks that “many people did not understand it” as “you need some level of education to understand it, at least some level”, so people ended up scared as they did not fully understand what the survey is about. This is connected to a fourth point mentioned by Eh-Klain – “if they didn't participate in the survey, they would not get registration”. The survey was never connected to obtaining registration and in their report, the MFLF and UNHCR emphasise that they made clear that “participants were not obligated to any of the answers given and, in the same way, there was no guarantee that the preference expressed would be attained” (UNHCR & MFLF, 2014:10). Eh-Klain’s comment suggests though that refugees were not fully aware of the purpose of the survey and the consequences of their responses. Mu-Too also voiced the critique that “with the survey, what they have done, that was too fast, too quick”. Further, they conducted the survey partially on tablets, which raised concerns that recorded answers might be changed later and also might not be the best means of conducting a survey among a population which just recently moved towards the partial use of smartphones. Finally, none of the interviewed refugees could give an answer as to whether they know the results of the Profiling

6. Fuelling Fear of Imminent Repatriation

Survey, even members of the camp committee didn’t “know about the result as they didn’t share with me, but I heard that they share with the camp leader” (anonymous)20.

At the beginning of 2015, the verification of all refugees in the nine camps followed, conducted by UNHCR and the RTG. They “verified and updated the records of nearly 110,000 registered and unregistered refugees from Myanmar with the help of UNHCR's new biometrics identity management system” (Tan, 2015). The verification was linked to the issuance of smart cards containing the biometric and other data of the respective cardholder. Its purpose is to facilitate and better target assistance upon return to Burma as well as easier monitoring. To the refugees, this purpose is less clear, which can be illustrated with the following conversation between me (S) and Blo-Saw-Too (B):

B: Once there was a verification, in April or March. Before that, UNHCR told to the camp residents that that card is SO important, you can't miss to participate in the verification, this is so important for everyone in the camp. So, they said that this card is like gold, like gold for everyone. Have you ever heard of it? S: I did. B: So, like a piece of hope, a small piece of hope for us. But so far, we can't do anything with that. S: Did they tell you what you can do with this card or did they just tell you that it's important? B: That it is important, just that it's important. S: But, for what? B: No idea, haha. Just like that. So not enough information, so...and that's the point, I mean.

Refugees are not sure about the use of the card and often connect it to repatriation – to “send everyone to go home” (Bu-Htaw). Whereas they heard from UNHCR that they should safeguard the card, camp leaders apparently sometimes said “it’s just a card” (Bu-Htaw). In regard to the verification many hoped it would be for registration, although UNHCR told them that it is not (Ariana Zarleen). This is linked to the registration which took place years ago – as refugees lacked information about the procedure, especially in regard to the limited time registration would be possible – and in consequence failed to register, which still affects their prospects today – they lost trust in UNHCR. So “a lot of people really hoped that it's to register and to be able to resettle” (Ariana Zarleen), but finding out afterwards that its purpose was actually the opposite disappointed these hopes severely.

20 No further identification markers will be disclosed here in order to protect the anonymity of the respondent.

6. Fuelling Fear of Imminent Repatriation

6.3 Rumours and Lack of Accurate Information If refugees were under the impression that the information they are getting is reliable, much of the fears created since the changes in Burma might have been dispersed or never existed in the first place. Unfortunately, the contrary is the case, with the camps being an environment where “rumours are everywhere” (Bu-Htaw). Refugees rely on information given to them by friends or families and like this, rumours spread fast as “every time the information goes to someone else, it will be slightly different…the rumour is just so easy and there are a lot” (Mu-Too). “Among those rumours we have to get, I mean, we have to get the right information” (Bu- Htaw). So as they “do not get accurate access to information” (Htee-Ku-Paw), “whether it is true or not depends on our environment, neighbours and society” (Htee-Ku-Paw). Even members of the camp leadership are “not totally sure about repatriation plans, which come from unreliable sources and everyone talking about it – but no one knows when exactly it’s going to happen yet” (Bar-Mee). Ariana Zarleen reported that out of 20 people her organisation interviewed, “only one felt like she gets information”. Not knowing which information and source they can trust and whether they have all necessary information leaves refugees feeling disempowered. Similar situations are reported from other refugee crises, for example did Syrian refugees state in a study undertaken by Janine di Giovanni for Internews that they feel “‘lost’ in a world of rumour and disinformation” (2013:1). Besides the rumours going around about repatriation, also UNHCR is targeted by them, as a few years ago rumours were circulating that UNHCR had a secret plot with the government (I20, UNHCR). Given the current talks about repatriation and the important role UNHCR plays in it as the major planning agency and negotiator with the two governments, this further complicates the situation. In relation to this, the refugees also feel like UNHCR does not share everything they know, “information that we shouldn’t know, they do not share” (Goh-Gway), for example they share information about the ceasefire and the economic development in Burma, but neglect the ‘bad’ news (Ta-Kae-Ler).

6.4 Conclusion This chapter has shown how recent preparatory activities conducted by UNHCR and the CCSDPT, combined with a reduction in funding and related ration and programme cuts as well as statements by the RTG led to uncertainty and fear among the refugee population that a premature repatriation is imminent. Especially the ration and programme cuts, combined with the manifold and increasing restrictions imposed by the RTG, put the refugees’ already constrained livelihoods severely under pressure, which makes the voluntariness of any returns questionable (see also Hargrave, 2014). As the second condition for voluntariness in repatriation operations focuses on informed decision- making this seems to be the main leverage left to UNHCR and other organisations involved in the preparedness phase.

6. Fuelling Fear of Imminent Repatriation

Given the lack of access to reliable information in the camps, conflicting statements by some of the actors involved and the spread of rumours throughout the camp, this is currently not achieved. Open, transparent and equitable sharing of information seems to be even more necessary than ever. Even though the external agencies underscore this in their official documents and statements, repeated critique of their current planning procedures and the uneasiness and incertitude of refugees regarding such activities indicate a significant communication discrepancy. In order to assess the current degree of participation, communication and related shortcomings, the next chapter examines existing mechanisms for participation and communication.

7. Challenges to Inclusive Participation and Information Flow

7. Mechanisms for Participation in Repatriation Planning and Communication

7.1 Introduction According to Zimmermann (2012), an emphasis on communication and participation should be central to any planning activities. Eh-Klain substantiated this:

It is really good if people in the camp can hear about what happens around the world or what happen to ourselves. Where is the next step to go on or something like that, that is really important for people to know. Because we are refugee and if we didn't know about what will happen next, will be very, very depressed.

The chapter at hand is concerned with the existing mechanisms for refugees’ participation in the decision-making process for repatriation preparedness and processes available for communication between the different actors and refugees. It thus aims to answer sub-question 3a concerning the identification of existing structures.

7.2 Existing Structures for Participation and Communication

7.2.1 Personal Networks Already in the section about rumours it became apparent that refugees rely to a great extent on private networks of friends, relatives and neighbours in the camp to access information, Mu-Too described it as “the way people share information”. Especially people working in and with organisations in the camp are providers of information as they have more contact with external sources: “sometimes, because the people came from outside, they bring some new information the camp leader might not even know” (Mu-Too; Bu-Htaw). Eh-Gay-Moo received information about the possibility to attend vocational training outside the camp via friends of her elder sister. Teachers are trusted sources of information too, as “if the important news happen, then the teachers explain” (My- Paw-Htoo) and sometimes they seemingly know even more than the leaders. These networks also play a role in keeping updated about the situation in Burma independently from the information provided by organisations. The camp residents “communicate with the other people that stay along the border and if they have news then they will come to us and we will know like that” (Ta-Kae-Ler). Sometimes people also “kind of scout, [they] go back and forth [and] share us what they have seen in Burma (Eh-Kaw). This way, refugees for example found out about already established relocation sites in Burma about which they or CBOs have not been consulted about at all (Ariana Zarleen).

7. Challenges to Inclusive Participation and Information Flow

7.2.2 Online Sources In Mae La and Umpiem Mai, the interviewed refugees often mentioned online sources when asked where they get information from. These are the only two camps with internet access. Especially the respondents from the age bracket between 18 and 29 years frequently cited the internet as a source of information (Mu-Too; Eh-Klain; Ta-Kae-Ler), and are able to access it via smart phones or computers provided in learning centres or schools. It also came up during the interview with Lah-Lah- Poe and Paw-Wah as a source of information, as “almost everyone uses smart phones here”, so it is not solely limited to the younger generation. For some, it is the main source (Blo-Saw-Too), especially Facebook and news websites were mentioned as the preferred option for information. Some of the news outlets mentioned included the Irrawaddy and Karen News (Blo-Saw-Too), but also KNU Watch21 and BBC (My-Paw-Htoo). Some of the respondents voiced caution though in regard to the information available online, as “not all the information on the internet is correct” (Mu-Too) and that “the news they put on YouTube or on Facebook are not the real news” (Eh-Klain).

7.2.3 Communication Channels by UNHCR In order to provide refugees with information regarding the situation in Burma, UNHCR established a Facebook page22 in January 2013, the Thailand-Myanmar Cross Border Portal. It is directly linked to a website with the same name, where documents such as reports by organisations working along the border, statistics, meeting minutes and other documents are shared. It is available in English, Karen and Burmese, the latter two reflecting the main ethnic languages23 used in the camps. The aim is to:

[…] help disseminate information that will assist refugees […] in reaching freely informed decisions concerning their future lives, including the possibility of a voluntary return home. The information will be up-to-date and accurate, of a non-political and impartial nature concerning the socio-economic, human development and humanitarian activities taking place in southeast Myanmar. (UNHCR, 2015e)

On the Facebook page, the same documents are shared, complemented by articles from different news agencies. One of the interviewed refugees mentioned that she knows about the

21 The Karen National Union (KNU) is a political organisation representing the Karen people. 22 https://www.facebook.com/commonservice 23 Overall, more than 100 different dialects and languages (Smith, 1994) exist in Burma due to its ethnic diversity. In the mainly Karen refugee camps, Skaw and Pwo Karen – two distinctly different languages from the family of Karen languages – and Burmese are the major languages used (Oh & Stouwe, 2008).

7. Challenges to Inclusive Participation and Information Flow

Facebook page and ‘liked’ it after a visit by UNHCR representatives to her school (My-Paw-Htoo). Other respondents did not specifically mention either the website or the Facebook page. These online channels are only available for a maximum of 47% of the total camp population, which represents the populations of Umpiem Mai and Mae La and includes all age groups, i.e. the percentage of refugees who are active internet users is very likely to be significantly lower.

Besides this, UNHCR publishes Media Monitoring Reports, which can also be found on the Cross Border Portal. These reports are a synthesis of news articles published by different sources, for example the Democratic Voice of Burma, Burma News International, the Irrawaddy and the Bangkok Post (UNHCR, 2015b). A visit to the website reveals that these reports commenced in November 2013, and have been published since then in a fairly regular manner every one to three weeks. There is a break in reports between November 2014 and May 2015 which suggests a lack of capacity during that period. It is worth noting that there is usually an average delay of 9.5 days24 between the date of the news covered in the report and the date this report becomes available online. This could be related to the circumstance that not all news is available in the three languages the reports are published in – Karen, Burmese and English. In a fast changing context like the one along the Thai-Burmese border though, this delay raises the question how relevant the respective news still is on the date of publication by UNHCR. In order to expand the reach of the Media Monitoring Reports, UNHCR also distributes them in the camps by paper to churches, schools, camp leaders and information displays (I20, UNHCR). Blo-Saw-Too mentioned that news are put on the notice boards in the camps, but did not specifically name these reports. He added though that “not many people [are] interested in the news, because the news are just about the repatriation” and that “people usually don’t read the notice board”.

Further, UNHCR installed ‘post boxes’ in some of their offices in the camps, “for refugees to write everything and put it there so they can get it” (Mu-Too), but it “doesn’t work” and is “not really helpful” (Bu- Htaw). The reason is that refugees are not sure whether UNHCR actually collects these letters and reads them. According to Mu-Too, the camp leaders are responsible for the collection and might sort letters out they think should not get to UNHCR. As such, refugees do not trust the effectiveness of the post box and do not make much Figure 6 - UNHCR post box

24 Based on the reports uploaded since May 2015 until the 23th November 2015

7. Challenges to Inclusive Participation and Information Flow

use of it. When asked about this, I20 (UNHCR) said that UNHCR employees are actually the only ones accessing the mailbox, showing again a discrepancy in information.

Besides this, UNHCR sometimes holds meetings in the camps. During the research, it could not be established whether these meetings follow a regular schedule or a certain structure. Nevertheless, some refugees stated that they attended meetings by UNHCR (Eh-Klain; Lah-Lah-Poe). Ariana Zarleen reported from conversations she had with refugees, that sometimes these meetings have the character of a lecture, where UNHCR just tells them recent developments or next steps. Often, there is no time left to answer refugees’ questions, leaving refugees disappointed. Even if they can share their opinions, Eh-Klain feels like “most of the opinions are not accepted”, indicating that UNHCR might listen to what they say, but it will have no consequences.

7.2.4 Information Sharing Centres In 2012, the CCSDPT identified (a lack of) information sharing “as a major concern for refugees” (CCSDPT, n.d), which led to the establishment of Information Sharing Centres (ISCs) jointly by the CCSDPT and UNHCR. Their purpose is not only to share information to the refugees, but also to gather information at camp level and give refugees an opportunity to share information with the organisations. Initially the plan was to establish four ISCs in four camps, but now “there is a new plan where the information centres actually will be at all camps” and “will run through the camp leadership offices” (Patrick Kearns). During the interviews, only two refugees in Mae Rama Luang referred to the ISCs – and in a positive light. Both reported that the ISC was established recently, as a joint initiative between the KRC, CCSDPT and UNHCR (Kpaw-Too; Mu-Htaw). They “don’t know the result in detail” (Kpaw- Too) due to the novelty of this institution, but welcomed the ISC. One reason mentioned is that the ISC “operates in two-way traffic, that the info sharing staff also need to find out information and concern among refugees, and report to KRC and CCSDPT” (Kpaw-Too). It has to be mentioned though that both refugees are members of the camp leadership – whether it filters through to the general population of refugees remains open and depends on how well the information gets passed on. Interviewed refugees not in leadership positions and from other camps did not mention the ISCs.

7.2.5 Meetings outside the Camps Besides the options for communication described above, several different meetings take place regularly and provide a platform for interaction between different stakeholders. There are the Stakeholder Meetings every four months, which are directly concerned with repatriation. The Camp Management Working Group (CMWG) meets to discuss broader issues of camp administration a day before. Similarly, Coordination Meetings with TBC take place twice a year, but they overlap strongly with the CMWG in terms of content. Further, the CCSDPT has bimonthly meetings, alternating between Bangkok and Mae Sot, but these are rather designed to coordinate activities between the

7. Challenges to Inclusive Participation and Information Flow

different NGOs at the sectoral level (Patrick Kearns). In addition, monthly meetings for each camp take place, where also Thai authorities attend. For this research, the Stakeholder Meetings are the most relevant. They take place in Mae Sot or Mae Sariang (Eh-Kaw; I20, UNHCR), a town North of Mae Sot in proximity to the camps Mae Rama Luang and Mae La Oon. Camp committee members take part in these meetings – from each camp, two committee members are invited (Kpaw-Too); the costs for transportation are covered by TBC. Besides these, representatives from UNHCR and the CCSDPT as well as the refugee committees and some CBOs attend. In regard to other organisations in the camp, like the Karen Refugee Committee Education Entity or the Karen Women’s Organisation, the interviewees stated that higher level members outside of the camp participate in the meetings (Goh-Gway; Bar-Mee). The respective chair of the organisation in the camp has the opportunity to provide input via monthly reports about the camp situation, but “they do not ask my specific opinion” (Bar-Mee). One of the refugees25 had the chance to attend some of the stakeholder meetings, which informs the following paragraph. At the meeting, the current progress in regard to repatriation preparedness is reviewed and then the NGOs, CBOs and camp committee members get divided into three groups to discuss and review the last reports. At a later stage, they present their findings in the plenary and discuss. The refugee criticised that there is usually not enough time – the meeting lasts a day – “to debate about the issue or share our opinions” and to define activities to be carried out in their respective communities as a result of the meeting. In March 2015, after the camp committees discovered the existence of the Strategic Roadmap, they requested to discuss it in detail in the stakeholder meeting then. As a result, they have been invited in May to attend the workshop about the roadmap, but it was “rather disappointing for us because the actual time to have discussion with everyone is decreased”. It has been mentioned positively that female camp committee representatives are encouraged to speak at the stakeholder meetings as “women are not normally selected as representative of camp committees to attend those meeting”26. This differs to the customs in the camp, where women are traditionally less respected as leaders.

7.2.6 Camp Leaders In their position as a link between the general refugee population and the refugee committees, UNHCR and NGOs, the camp leaders play an important role for the information flow in both directions. As they meet with representatives from external organisations, CBOs and Thai authorities, they can share the refugees’ opinions, thoughts and concerns with them and advocate for their issues. Both the representative from UNHCR I spoke to as well as Patrick Kearns regarded them as highly important, especially as working with the refugees has to take place via some kind of representatives

25 No further identification markers will be disclosed here in order to protect the anonymity of the respondent. 26 No further identification markers will be disclosed here in order to protect the anonymity of the respondent.

7. Challenges to Inclusive Participation and Information Flow

due to the sheer number of refugees along the border and resource constraints on the organisations’ side: “Not going through the camp leadership structure is probably not appropriate and incredibly expensive”, so Patrick Kearns. As camp leadership structures are long established and the refugees from Burma have a well-developed camp management system, respecting the function of the camp leaders and working with them seems like the easiest way to reach the refugees. Regarding the Operations Plan for example, UNHCR worked so far only with the camp leadership on it and had no information meetings with the general population yet, as it was just a draft at the moment (I20). In the other direction, the camp leaders are supposed to ensure the flow of information to the refugees, as they are often the only ones who can attend meetings with organisations. For this purpose, public meetings are hold; according to Kpaw-Too they take place twice a year in each section of a camp. NGOs also rely on camp leaders to disseminate information into the camps – not only do the camp leaders probably know the refugees and how to reach them better, but it would be unwise to circumvent and consequently undermine the camp leadership (Patrick Kearns).

7.2.7 Other Sources The radio is another source used by the camp populations (Ariana Zarleen). Here again, the BBC was mentioned, both in Mae Rama Luang (Kpaw-Too) and in Mae La (Lah-Lah-Poe & Paw- Wah). Other channels include Radio Free Asia and the Democratic Voice of Burma. Further, there are loudspeaker systems installed in the camps for announcements. The respondents did not further mention it as a source of information, but in a conversation in Mae Rama Luang it surfaced as the loudspeaker system there is currently broken. It was consensus that it would work very well, especially given the circumstance that Mae Rama Luang does not have mobile phone or internet coverage, i.e. communicating across the distances within the camp is difficult without the loudspeakers. As the funding for the repair of the system is lacking, the walkie-talkies used by the camp leadership is the main option for communicating across the camp.

7.3 Conclusion This chapter explored which structures are in place for communication with the refugees and for their participation in repatriation planning, which reveals a varied landscape. It seems that few structures have the potential for efficient two-way communication and meaningful participation. For the ones that do allow information flow in both directions, refugees have to rely mainly on the camp leadership sharing information with external organisations and adequately representing the refugees at meetings. From the perspective of the CCSDPT and UNHCR, the camp leaders provide an important link to the refugee communities and due to resource constraints and other reasons the organisations focus on working through the camp leadership.

7. Challenges to Inclusive Participation and Information Flow

The following chapter analyses in more detail to what extent these structures reflect the characteristics for meaningful participation as established in 2.3, and explores what underlying enabling and constraining factors exist.

8. Synthesis of Main Findings and Exploration of Underlying Processes

So it depends on how you provide the information and how the refugees understand the information. And if they don't understand it right, then something is...and also, they couldn't really provide [the information] very well. They just ask: do you want to go back or not? They don't say anything about how the situation is there, so can you trust it or not? For example, for the refugees, who have never listened to radio or don't know about what is going on inside Burma - how could they make a decision about if they want to go back or not, you know? Mu-Too

The previous three chapters discussed the refugees’ perspective on their own future, their perspective on other actors and their actions and explored the existing structures for communication and participation, thus answering the first two sub-questions and sub-question 3a of this research. Refugees aspire to have better education and livelihoods prospects in their future and live their lives in safety and independent from outside aid. Currently, they regard resettlement as the best option for achieving this. Whilst many would like to return to Burma eventually, they regard a possible repatriation under current circumstances as no viable option. Exactly the above mentioned aspects they consider as important for their future lives cannot currently not be guaranteed in Burma as the reasons for their flight often still persist. The focus of the humanitarian actors along the Thai-Burmese border does not reflect these perspectives of the refugees – instead, they initiated the repatriation preparedness phase, raising concerns among the refugee communities that they would have to return prematurely before an improvement of the situation in Burma. Despite statements by UNHCR and the CCSDPT that any return will be voluntarily, the shift of funds away from the refugee camps and the connected decrease in ration and programme support put the livelihoods of refugees severely under pressure. Some interviewees felt like this is an indirect strategy to repatriate them soon. This is exacerbated by rumours and a lack of access to critical information and key documents. This seems to be not only an issue along the Thai-Burmese border as Jansen (2008) reported similar patterns from the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya. There, “UNHCR and agencies in the camp were very untransparent” (ibid.:578) and “unsuccessful in clearly explaining their policies in a way that refugees (or researchers, for that matter) actually understood” (ibid.:574). Such intransparency results in increasing uncertainty and concerns on the refugees’ side, combined with the feeling of not being included in the planning processes. The IFRC ultimately sees therefore a direct relation between a lack of information and a lack of power, as “information bestows power” (2005:12). Some mechanisms for communication and participation exist. As the number of mechanisms allowing for the inclusion of refugees’ opinions is limited – the UNHCR post boxes, the Stakeholder

8. Synthesis of Main Findings and Exploration of Underlying Processes

Meetings, and the recent ISCs – the camp leaders appear to play a pivotal role in ensuring the information flow in both directions and the representation of the refugees towards other actors.

During this research, camp leaders or those close to the camp leaderships seemed indeed to be well-informed about current developments and less afraid of imminent repatriation. Even if they themselves were not able to attend meetings with UNHCR, they reported that the hierarchical level above them shared the information to a sufficient degree (Goh-Gway; Bar-Mee). Bar-Mee was confident that “whenever the camp representatives get information, they share it with camp authorities such as section leaders, and then the information is passed on to everyone through public meetings”. Blo-Saw-Too – without a direct connection to the camp leadership – described these meetings though as not providing very valuable information, “no special news, no special information, nothing like that…just to not go outside, what is prohibited, things like that”. Ariana Zarleen described that only one out of 20 refugees she once interviewed said that he/she gets sufficient information through the camp committee announcements, but that the majority of refugees has “no idea what the UNHCR is planning or doing” and feels “like they are outsiders, looking at their whole lives, without control over it”. The remainder of this chapter aims to explore underlying enabling and constraining factors in regard to the effective flow of information and the inclusion of refugees in the decision-making processes, trying to find explanations for such discrepancies. First, I try to shed light on the power relations inherent to the communication and participation structures, followed by a discussion of trust as a pre-requisite for communication and participation. Afterwards, issues of representation and inclusiveness are explored, before I conclude this chapter.

8.1 Power Differentials As described in the Strategic Relational Approach, actors and their strategies and tactics are not isolated from their respective environment. Actors define their actions in consideration of other actors’ presence and their potentially opposing or enabling strategies. As such, the power these actors are perceived to have plays an important role in influencing the strategically-selective context and contributing to its reproduction or transformation. The emphasis here is on the perception of power as “our understanding of this world is inevitably a construction from our own perspectives” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011:45), thus reflecting the individuals’ (in this case, the refugees’) “social construction of social reality” (Bryman, 2013:34). During this research, insights were gained into the refugees’ perceptions about the power relations between the actors relevant to this research, which have implications for the inclusion of refugees in repatriation planning.

8. Synthesis of Main Findings and Exploration of Underlying Processes

Joliffe (2014) describes in detail the hierarchical structure of Karen society, which forms the biggest group in the camps and the majority of the respondents to this research. This concerns different aspects, for example age, gender or status in regard to the official position in the refugee community. Ta-Kae-Ler for example describes the opinion of older people might be more valuable: “We are young, so that our opinion is maybe lower than the other opinion. The other opinion will be the best for us.” A female camp committee member describes how she experiences more difficulties in being respected as a leader in her community due to the traditional conception of such a position being a typical male one. Goh-Gway illustrated the third dimension, considering her ideas as “mediocre compared to their ideal plans” when speaking about the higher level leaders from the KRCEE outside of the camp. The camp leaders also seemed to reflect this idea of being in a more powerful position than the general refugee population. Eh-Klu, member of the camp leadership in one of the camps, thinks that “most of [the Karen people] are not knowledgeable”, but if the camp leadership creates “a correct path for them, they follow”. Eh-Kaw stated that the “committee is important to decide something for the people in the camp”. This hierarchical power structure affects the way refugees feel empowered (or not) to partake in repatriation planning. Blo-Saw-Too commented that he feels that just the camp and section leaders make decisions, whereas Ta-Kae-Ler stated that the camp leaders at meetings “explain to you that this is the problem and we will fix it like this”, thus rather informing the other refugees of a solution they designed than consulting them about it. As such, refugees voiced the impression that the opinion that matters is the one of the camp leaders, as “most often, they just listen to the leaders” (Htee-Saw- Htoo).

In regard to repatriation planning, the perceived power differential between refugees and actors such as UNHCR and the CCSDPT, which are often represented by foreigners, is also critical. I personally often experienced that refugees expected me to be in a powerful position and to be more knowledgeable than them, just based on the fact that I am a foreigner and study at a university. Sometimes they concluded interviews with voicing the doubt whether their answers where at all helpful – to me they were invaluable and I always tried making them believe that. Ariana Zarleen confirmed this, stating that “automatically here people look up to foreigners”, making it “always very difficult to try and create an equal situation”. Eh-Kaw commented himself that “everything is in UN or partner hands, not in [the refugees’] hand, [they] cannot decide”, putting the ‘foreigners’ in a more powerful position than the refugees themselves. “Sometimes the locals don't even know how much they know, how much of an expert they are”, thinks Ariana Zarleen, calling for more empowerment of refugees. I20 from UNHCR experienced similar situations and feels like it is difficult to get refugees to say what they really think as she is under the impression that they rather say what they think is

8. Synthesis of Main Findings and Exploration of Underlying Processes

expected of them. Mu Too reflects this concern by stating that “whoever is more powerful, they [the camp leaders] want to be on the same side with the powerful one”. As an example he brought forward the resistance against the profiling survey as described in Section 6.2.4, where camp leaders tried to exert pressure over activists in the camp as they did not “want to make a bad impression towards the UNHCR”. The structure with the highest degree of direct interaction between refugee representatives and organisations are arguably the Stakeholder Meetings. Ariana Zarleen criticised that the set-up of these meeting is not likely to be conducive to refugees’ meaningful participation due to the perceived power differential between foreigners and refugees. The meetings take place in hotels in Mae Sot or Mae Sariang with a plenitude of foreigners, represent a rather intimidating environment for refugee representatives – not only because of the unfamiliarity of the setting, but also because the felt inferiority in comparison to the ‘well-educated’ foreigners. This is fostered due to the use of an advanced level of English language at such meetings – even though especially younger refugees had the opportunity to learn English in the camps, their level often does not compare to that of English native speakers working for the NGOs and UNHCR. Ariana Zarleen argues that this is a highly unbalanced situation, with refugee representatives not daring “to speak and ask questions and do everything that they should be able to do”, while they are supposed to fully participate. As such, there is the danger that refugees’ participation in Stakeholder Meetings is reduced to mere tokenism, making the process appear to be inclusive and consultative, which suggests that these meetings have more characteristics in common with ‘invited spaces’ as discussed in Section 2.3.1. I was not able to identify platforms for participation in repatriation planning which have been created by refugees. This might be connected to the circumstance that repatriation planning in general has been initiated by external actors and that refugees feel less in power in comparison to other actors. The Karen CBOs stated in a position paper, that “meetings must be held in location where people feel comfortable and not intimidated so open discussions are ensured” (KCBOs, 2012). They demand that an independent committee should be formed in order to plan for refugees’ return, which would consist of camp committees, the KRC, other refugees and the KCBOs themselves. It should be “responsible for the return of refugees from the beginning up until the end of the process” (ibid.). Such a committee has not been established to my knowledge.

8.2 Trust as a Prerequisite for Efficient Joint Repatriation Planning An issue which was not considered in the original operationalisation, but emerged strongly during the research and analysis is trust. As the respondents often referred to it and as this research aims to reflect their perspective, I decided to include it in the analysis.

8. Synthesis of Main Findings and Exploration of Underlying Processes

Hargrave describes trust as something which is “part of a biased process of forming belief, rather than a rational evaluation based on belief” (2014:9), while Lewis and Weigert regard it “as a social a priori for all levels of social interaction” (2012:25). It is intrinsically linked to the idea of distrust, which “can be a rational and prudent response to risk, providing a credible means to protect against the disastrous consequences of misplaced trust” (Hargrave, 2014:11). Distrust can be self- reinforcing due to the circumstance that “once people have been primed to suspect someone, they will interpret his or her behaviour to support their suspicions” (Larson, 2004:46), therefore “profoundly [inhibiting] the trustor’s future capacity to trust even in the presence of strong rational reasons to do so” (Lewis & Weigert, 2012:26). As such, trust or distrust directly affects the interactions between the different actors and the refugees. Repatriation can be seen as the (re-)establishment of trust between refugees and their state of origin (K. Long, 2012). Trust not only plays an important role in regard to refugees’ relationship to their state of origin though, but also in regard to other actors involved in the repatriation planning process, reflecting Lewis and Weigert’s (2012) description of trust as a pre-requisite for social interaction. In its Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation the UNHCR for example highlights the importance of becoming “a trusted source of information to the influential refugee representatives” (1996:31) and states that in order to reach informed decisions, a pre-requisite for voluntariness, refugees need to be able “to gather information from sources they can trust” (1996:32). The following analysis shows that trust in actors involved in repatriation planning is often absent among the refugees from Burma.

Section 5.3.3 already described the lack of trust into the peace process of the Burmese government27, demonstrating that the Burmese government has done little so far to gain the trust of the refugees. Patrick Kearns voiced understanding that, if one looks “at what the Burmese government has done, how can you have a lot of faith and confidence in this process? You just really can’t”. Concerning for the refugees is further that there is a seemingly close cooperation between the two military governments of Thailand and Burma and that “the military leader and the Thai authority now agree to send back the refugees” (Htee-Saw-Htoo). Distrust towards the Burmese military is still deeply entrenched and might prevent refugees also in future from returning to Burma, especially if genuine reforms continue to lack. This distrust also transfers to information sources found online, as they “may not be true because some organisations are under the control of the Burma military, they will not write bad things about the Burma military” (Htee-Saw-Htoo). My-Paw-Htoo stated that she trusts information when it

27 In the elections in November 2015 the National League for Democracy won the majority of the seats and thus the military backed USDP under Thein Sein lost its mandate. This research though has been done before the elections, so that the statements made here refer to the ‘old’ regime under Thein Sein. As the military still holds 25% of the seats due to a constitutional clause, sentiments against the government, which is often directly linked to the military, could still persist even under the new government (see Barany, 2015).

8. Synthesis of Main Findings and Exploration of Underlying Processes

is about corruption and abusive politicians or false voter lists in regard to the election in November – basically, as long as it is bad news from Burma, it definitely is true, thus confirming the self- reinforcing nature of distrust. On the contrary, about “news about the future of our refugees, I’m not sure about that, […] very difficult to trust”, she said. Mu-Too added that refugees “don’t really know which one is true, which one isn’t” and that “there is no way of checking whether it is true or not – you cannot just go somewhere and ask someone, ‘is this true or not?’, there is no one like that”. Despite the opportunity for some of the refugees to access online media, they remain wary whether the information they get there is reliable or not. Some respondents also stated that they are not able to say which organisations working in the camp they can definitely trust and which they cannot trust (Htee-Saw-Htoo; Mu-Too), as “some organisations, they’re really taking advantage of the refugees and making money” (Htee-Saw-Htoo). Blo-Saw-Too further thinks that some organisations are ‘fake’ and that no one knows why they are in the camp, requesting that “they should let everyone know what they are doing and why they are here”. Regarding the UNHCR and its information channels, many refugees expressed the perception that it is only ‘half the truth’, that “UNHCR only shares good information with us and not the bad information” (Kpaw-Too). This reflects the assumption that “when the UNHCR says something, they always think there is an ulterior motive to it” (Ariana Zarleen). Blo-Saw-Too can be quoted as follows, regarding the UNHCR information that it is not possible to officially register refugees due to Thai policy: “I don't believe that. In my opinion, I mean, there must be many, many reasons for us not to register, but I don't totally believe that. Maybe they're hiding something”? This is unsubstantiated though as the Thai government indeed “stopped allowing UNHCR to conduct refugee status determination interviews” (Human-Rights-Watch, 2012:1) in January 2014. I20 from UNHCR was well aware of this issue of trust. Since rumours spread that the UNHCR has a secret plot with the governments it has been hard to convince refugees of the contrary. According to her, UNHCR tries to be as open and transparent as possible about everything they do, but also thinks that the agency has to manoeuvre a fine line between providing all information and creating fear among refugees due to falsely understood information. They arguably work in a difficult environment, but Kpaw-Too gets the impression at meetings that they react more like they have to protect themselves. Mu-Too further expressed the opinion that as they “cannot even explain the refugees what they would do for them, if they want to go” it seems like “they themselves haven’t really prepared well enough”, leading to a lack of trust into UNHCR’s capability to effectively protect and assist the returnees. Zimmermann (2012) describes from research with Afghan and Somali refugees, how a gap in perspectives between refugees and UNHCR leads to tension and distrust. As the current focus on repatriation preparedness on the agency’s side does not reflect the refugees’ view that resettlement might be the currently best option to achieve a better future, this might be contributing to the distrust in the case of the refugees from Burma.

8. Synthesis of Main Findings and Exploration of Underlying Processes

Another trust-related issue, which became especially apparent among respondents from Mae La, is distrust towards the camp leadership due to widespread corruption. Htee-Saw-Htoo voiced the opinion that “some leaders are just doing business with the refugees; they just look for their benefits, their richness”. Blo-Saw-Too detailed how section leaders sold rations and took bribes, furthermore so-called ‘photo swaps’ took place, where unregistered refugees bribed section leaders into changing their photos with those of registered families, thus giving the unregistered refugees a chance at resettlement. Mu-Too thinks that “once you’re in the position, you change”, learning the ways of how the camp leadership operates, leaving the general refugee population with no one to turn to when they discover misconduct in the camp. In an informal interview, Ariana Zarleen and Mu-Too discussed the possibility that the notion of corrupt camp leaders could be more linked to the biggest camp, Mae La, due its level of accessibility. Ariana Zarleen reported that in “isolated camps, people are not that unhappy with the leadership”, but Mae La as a richer camp and with more trading and business opportunities might be a more conducive environment. Nevertheless it is an issue to consider regarding the important role camp leaders play in the collaboration with external actors, as Htee-Saw-Htoo put it: “Just because those some, those one or two leaders, or some bad leaders, who are corrupt, thousands of refugees, their life lost hope, so you know, the organisations also have to learn from the grassroots level.” Abud et al. (2011) describe how similarly in Kenya, in the Dadaab refugee camp, a lack of trust towards the camp administration, humanitarian workers and government officials affects the reach of official communication channels and thus their effectiveness. This is crucial given the importance of informed decisions as part of voluntary return and the necessity for refugees of being able to access information from sources they trust, as described at the beginning of this section.

8.3 Discussing Representation and Inclusiveness Related to the issue of distrust towards certain actors and the power differentials discussed in the Section 8.1 is the aspect of representation and inclusiveness, which has been established in Section 2.3 as critical for the meaningfulness of refugee participation. The set-up of the current structures for participation and communication might place the refugees in leadership roles in a better position for influencing decision-making, thus inclusive representation of the general refugee population is critical for achieving meaningful participation of all refugees.

Camp committee members are the main representatives from the camp level which are currently partaking in meetings outside of the camps. CBO representatives join these meetings too, but they are rather from above the camp level (Bar-Mee, Goh-Gway), thus camp leaders are the ones providing a more direct link to the camp population.

8. Synthesis of Main Findings and Exploration of Underlying Processes

In theory, the camp committee members are elected by the camp population. During my research though, it appeared to be highly unclear what the actual process of electing the camp committee is. Some of the respondents stated that “not many people can participate in election because they just choose people that they want” (Bu-Htaw), that “they make alliance with the corrupt people” and “they kind of select the people who live in the camp longer some people who somehow are maybe quite educated…and then they vote for them, but it’s kind of similar to election in Burma” (Mu-Too28). I20 from the UNHCR also stated that she does not fully understand the election system, but added that they vote in blocs, each person representing a certain number of households, but that she also heard complaints about it. Blow-Saw-Too described how the leaders organise section meetings, where they present the candidates, which are usually just the ones who already hold the position anyways – one of the camp committee members I interviewed was member of the camp leadership since 1998. This renders the inclusion of solely the camp leadership level as camp representatives questionable as the elective system apparently suffers from a democratic deficit. It seems that they use their powerful position to strongly influence the elections, therefore concentrating the decision- making power in the camp in the hand of a few over long periods of time. Refugees themselves do not seem to think that camp leaders are the best to represent their interests. Organisations like Burma Partnership and Burma Link highlight that while including the members of camp committees might be a step in the right direction, there is a “need for a wider participation of refugees and diverse CBOs in the decision‐making process” (2015b:22) in order to achieve representation. I20 (UNHCR) said she hopes that the camp leaders represent the refugees, but acknowledged that it is not perfect. She described that it is sometimes hard to reach consensus between different groups of refugees, with great differences in opinion between the KRC and CBOs. Refugee interviewees emphasised that it would be “better if they [the UNHCR] learn from the grassroots level” and “don’t just listen to the leader” (Htee-Saw-Htoo). Mu-Too agrees, saying that “they might think the representative of the people would be just the camp leader, which isn’t true”. Asked for other representatives, CBOs working in the camp were mentioned. One reason is that they are often closely intertwined with the communities, as “a lot of refugees are working there” (Mu-Too) and are thus close to the issues faced by the wider communities. Often, they do not receive a remuneration for their work, but “their life is to do everything they can to help their people” (Ariana Zarleen). Mu-Too29 describes the ideal representative as follows:

People who don't have some kind of hidden motive, who don't have power and who don't have any benefits, who have no reason to...but to speak honestly. Like, if you'd just have normal people from the households, representing their view points, you know, with nothing, with no

28 In informal interview on the 10th of August 29 In informal interview on the 10th of August

8. Synthesis of Main Findings and Exploration of Underlying Processes

power over everything, but they would have a chance to speak. It would be more likely that they would get some kind of real opinion.

As such, questions of representation link back to the idea of trust. Hargrave (2014) suggest a model of deferred trust in repatriation negotiations. According to this idea, “two distrustful parties grow to trust each other because a third party, already trusted by the two parties, proclaims their own trust in both or either party” (2014:16). The stronger inclusion of CBOs might therefore not only lead to greater inclusiveness and better representation, but also help overcoming entrenched distrust.

8.4 Conclusion After a summary of the findings from the previous three chapters, this chapter aimed to analyse in more depth the enabling and constraining factors which exist in regard to participation and communication, thus answering the remaining sub-question 3b. The perceived power differentials within the refugee community and in regard to external actors like UNHCR have implications for the meaningful participation of refugees in repatriation planning. The camp leaders are in a more powerful position than the general camp populations, which renders their ideas and decisions seemingly more valuable than those of other refugees. The internalisation of this power differential could lead to a disqualification of ‘normal’ refugee voices and ascription of importance to the opinion of refugee leaders. In turn, refugees – no matter whether in a leadership position or not – have the idea of ‘foreigners’ as being more educated and thus having greater decision-making power, which could also be related to the long history of dependence on external support in the camps. Therefore, it is questionable whether the refugee representatives present at meetings like the Stakeholder Meetings feel empowered to fully participate. Further, a lack of distrust on the refugees’ part could complicate efficient communication and participation. Respondents expressed distrust towards important actors in the repatriation process, including the Burmese government, UNHCR and camp leaders. Such distrust affects their confidence in provided information, even if it presents truthful facts. Further it leads to potentially unnecessary reservations against collaborating with a certain actor, hindering inclusive participatory processes. Thirdly, the analysis has shown that the distrust some refugees have towards their leaders as well as the democratic deficit in regard to the elections for the camp committee members make the importance placed upon camp leaders as a link between refugees and external actors questionable. Some refugees voiced that they do not feel like their opinions are represented through the camp leadership, which leads both refugees and other actors to the suggestion that other representatives from the refugee community should be included in decision-making processes, too.

This thesis sought to see how refugees from Burma along the Thai-Burmese border can participate in decision-making and planning processes regarding repatriation and what possibilities

8. Synthesis of Main Findings and Exploration of Underlying Processes

and constraints exist? It showed that opportunities for participation exist, but there are limited and strongly subjected to the strategically-selective context. The structural characteristics the refugees are confronted with represent more constraining than enabling factors for refugees’ meaningful participation along the Thai-Burmese border. The combination of perceived powerlessness in comparison to UNHCR or other external actors, the distrust towards various actors, a limited degree of inclusiveness in representation and the lack of processes for dialogic communication lead to the conclusion that refugees in the Thai camps do not have the possibility to meaningfully participate in decisions affecting their lives and future. As such, the participation in this context can be categorised on the lower ranks of Arnstein’s (1969) and Cornwall’s (2003) models for participation, reflecting rather tokenistic inclusion of some refugee representatives than meaningful participation by refugees as agents. Whereas camp leaders might feel more included in decision-making processes the research has shown that they might not be the ideal representative for the general population of refugees, thus rendering the focus on them as the link between external actors and refugees questionable. While Barry and Barham acknowledge “that (traditional) leadership or representation systems should be included in participatory approaches” (2012:40), they emphasise that the same leaders might exclude others systematically, which is applicable to this study. Ultimately, if these structures persist and no sincere effort is made to meaningfully include the refugees in decision-making processes, it could severely jeopardise the voluntariness of the envisioned repatriation to Burma, resulting in the protraction of uncertainty and unsustainability in refugees’ lives.

9. Conclusion and Reflection

9. Reflections To conclude this thesis, this chapter provides a reflection on the theory and methodology employed and offers recommendations for both policy and further research. Throughout the research, the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) provided a helpful guide for examining the interrelations between the different actors and how these relations shape refugees’ participation in repatriation planning. It provided the opportunity to conduct a context-specific analysis to understand the enabling and constraining factors of the case. The structural analysis focused on the characteristics of meaningful participation as suggested by Arnstein (1969) and Cornwall (2003), but also allowed for the emergence of new insights from the refugees’ perspective. As such, trust emerged as a central relational aspect for participation and communication, especially in a very trust-sensitive issue like repatriation (Hargrave, 2014). Therefore, I re-designed the conceptual scheme as shown in Section 4.3, which has been created before the data collection and analysis. Whilst the SRA and participation still constitute the foundation, the adapted scheme reflects the insights gained from the constructivist approach. As the relations between the different actors formed a crucial part of the research, the various actors are listed separately.

Refugees NGOs Refugee Representatives Repre- UNHCR sentation Dia - Inclusive logue participation in planning for the future Trust Power

Burmese Government

Thai Strategically-selective Government context with enabling and constraining factors regarding transformative participation

Figure 7 - Amended Conceptual Scheme

9. Conclusion and Reflection

The dark blue circular line connects the actors and reflects that they are related in their actions and strategies. The refugees are not directly connected to this line as they are in the majority of cases represented by the refugee and camp committees or CBOs. NGOs and UNHCR are represented here in close proximity as the CCSDPT and UNHCR work closely together and are often regarded as similar in their actions from the refugees’ perspective. The Burmese government is slightly separated from the circle as it has only indirect influence on the refugees’ situation in the camps. The blue- brown line indicates the Burmese government’s involvement in the repatriation negotiations, which are highly important for the current situation and take place between UNHCR and the two governments at the moment. The inner red circle represents the ideally transformed structures. As the research has clearly demonstrated, information sharing and two-way communication – here shown as ‘Dialogue’ – signify a highly critical issue in order to accommodate the refugees’ needs in the planning processes and are pre-conditions for successful participation. Power differentials presented a critical factor for shaping refugees’ participation, as well as matters of representation. This is connected to the fourth critical issue which emanated from the research: trust. Therefore, power, representation, dialogue and trust are based at the centre of the new conceptual scheme to mirror the main issues raised during the research. Their negative opposite – lack of representation and dialogue, distrust and skewed power differentials – can be understood as constraining factors, whereas their positive manifestation represents enabling factors. One cannot easily prioritise one over the other as they are all intertwined, as transparent communications for example are a prerequisite for trust, which in turn is essential for effective communication and participation (IFRC, 2005). This can be applied not only to repatriation planning as in the present case, but to any matters affecting refugees’ lives, focusing on these aspects as critical for meaningful participation and empowering refugees to be in charge of their own situation. Ilcan et al. for example describe how “engaging in meaningful dialogue with refugees about how they wish to conduct their lives” (2015:7) and the emphasis of “equitable participation, distribution and recognition in social, political and cultural relations” (ibid.) would foster refugees’ well-being and self-sufficiency in their host country Uganda.

9.1 Methodological Reflection I entered the field with the idea to research the agency of the refugees from Burma in regard to their participation in decision-making processes. During the research it became apparent that this focus does not necessarily reflect the refugees’ perspective, which was supposed to be central to this research. Therefore I adapted the research according to the issues raised by the interview partners themselves, shifting the focus from agency to the relationship with other actors and the enabling and constraining factors regarding participation, emphasising the criticality of two-way communication. Applying a constructivist approach, this adaptation only seemed appropriate.

9. Conclusion and Reflection

As I was unfamiliar with the situation on the ground, the support of my local supervisor and other local contacts has been invaluable for adapting the research. My local supervisor, who conducted similar interviews with refugees herself (Burma Link, 2015), guided the research process and provided ongoing feedback. The insights gained from the process of the UNHCR Profiling Survey and the refugees’ feedback to it (see Section 6.2.4) also helped adapting the research, ensuring that this research presents the refugees’ perspective. Being able to triangulate my own data with interviews collected by Burma Link, the profiling survey by UNHCR and the MFLF (UNHCR & MFLF, 2014) as well as a PhD project by Victoria Jack (2014) confirms the credibility of the study at hand. Thus, even though the sample for this research has been small, the congruence with similar studies in the same context supports the relevance of the presented findings and conclusions. In order to account for the quality of this research it is further crucial to highlight the influence of my own and my respondents’ positionality on the research process and the interpretation of the obtained data. A subjective aspect is inherent to this type of research. It is possible that the interviewed refugees exaggerated or left out information in order to advance their own agendas or protect themselves. Throughout the research process, I was always open about the intent of my research and that I am in no position of power or related to any of the organisations working for the refugees. It is possible that some refugees still assumed otherwise as I represented a ‘more educated external person’ who seemingly has access to more information, reflecting the power differentials discussed in Section 8.1. Further, the collected data has been subject to the interpretation of the translators used in the camps, the assistants who helped with the transcription and my own. To at least decrease this subjectivity I discussed my findings and conclusions with both my local and academic supervisor as well as research informants, which gave valuable insights. Combining the refugee interviews with the key informant interviews and documents from different organisations also added greater objectivity. It ensured the inclusion of different perspectives and made me continuously aware of the importance of impartiality for this research. As such, this study should not be understood as an accusation of certain actors, but rather as a suggestion on how to improve the current situation jointly and mutually advantageous.

9.2 Policy Recommendations Different policy recommendations can be deduced from this research to overcome the factors impeding meaningful participation. Refugees should be placed at the centre of repatriation planning, making decisions over their own lives as empowered agents and contributing to the potential sustainability of return due to their context-specific expertise. Organisations need to respond to refugees’ need for information and prioritise dialogical communication more, as suggested by the Network for Communicating with Disaster-Affected Communities (CDAC, 2014). Information should not only include news about the situation in Burma or activities planned thus far, but also about the responsibilities, abilities and limitations of the actors

9. Conclusion and Reflection involved, as well as potential negative developments in Burma and Thailand (see also Barry & Braham, 2012). Some refugees voiced the view that UNHCR for example provides them with overly positive news while they know from other sources the contrary, which leads to a reinforcement of distrust. Openness and transparency should be paramount for communicating with refugees. Key documents for the repatriation preparedness phase like UNHCR’s Strategic Roadmap or Operations Plan should be made available for everyone, making them available for discussion to a wider audience and preventing rumours or accusations of secrecy. An assessment of the communication needs and preferences of the refugee population should be conducted in order to identify the most adequate and effective channels for two-way communication. The radio for example was mentioned by some of the respondents as a source they trust and which is used throughout the camps. An example by Abud et al. (2011) from the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya shows how UNHCR cooperated with a local radio station to accommodate refugees’ information needs, which could be a promising idea for the refugees along the Thai- Burmese border, especially for the camps where access to mobile phones or the internet is not possible. Ideally, the communications infrastructure would be improved in order to make such channels accessible for all refugees. Online platforms can be a good way to reach younger generations, but attention has to be paid to the accessibility of contents. For example, downloading and reading PDF documents on a mobile phone can prove difficult, but these are currently the majority of documents to be found on the information portal provided by UNHCR. The Information Sharing Centres were mentioned as a good platform for information exchange in both directions, thus strengthening these and expanding their reach might be conducive. Activities like the profiling survey and the verification conducted by UNHCR and its partners showed that large-scale activities are possible. Nevertheless, large-scale consultations could prove difficult, especially against the backdrop of decreasing funding. Not only, but especially in that case camp-level representatives from the different CBOs should be included in any repatriation planning activities in order to overcome issues of representation and reach a greater degree of inclusiveness, whilst paying attention to not seemingly threaten the traditional authority of the camp leaders. Including CBOs could further improve refugees’ trust into the other actors involved in the repatriation planning. And again refugees should be asked for their opinion on which organisations they feel are the ideal choice for this aim. Meetings like the Stakeholder Meetings could be conducted in environments which are less intimidating for refugees, for example it could be an option to alternate the location between the different camps. Besides this, smaller meetings, focus group discussion and perhaps even consultations at the household level in the camps could provide platforms for dialogue and participation. Employing refugees in the respective organisations could be another way of bridging the gap between external actors and refugees. Persons from outside of the camp are not allowed to stay overnight and organisations have their offices at least in an hour driving distance from the camps

9. Conclusion and Reflection

– building a permanent presence in the camps through refugee colleagues could bring organisations and refugees closer together and perhaps even level the power differentials. Furthermore, attention needs to be paid to the issue of trust. Building trust, especially in uncertain environments, is a challenging task requiring a long-term perspective (Barry & Barham, 2012). As many of the circumstances which led to refugees’ flight from Burma to Thailand remain unresolved, it probably will still take a long time before large-scale returns can take place. Therefore, the time frame for repatriation planning is likely more long-term as well, providing the time needed for trust-building efforts to bear fruit. It is crucial that the Thai government supports such a long-term approach, but at the end it is in their own interest to achieve a sustainable return of the refugees from Burma. Furthermore, solutions need to be developed for refugees who cannot return to Burma at all. The inclusion of CBOs working on the Burmese side of the border, for example the Karen Human Rights Group, could be valuable as well as they have an extensive knowledge of the situation in Burma and are a trusted actor by the refugees. In general it should be considered to include not only the returnees, but also ‘stayee’ populations who remained in Burma (see also Hargrave, 2014) in order to achieve a successful integration of the returning refugees. It should be noted that suggestions for increased communication, representation, trust- building and in general more participation by refugees are focused for the purpose of this paper on repatriation planning, but are applicable to all issues regarding activities and plans concerning the refugees’ situation. Approaching refugees as equals should be paramount for all such activities and any organisation working with them.

9.3 Future Research Agenda Further research is needed to assess the information needs of the refugees in detail and analyse which channels they prefer using as well as which actors they trust. This could be done in a large-scale research with more quantitative elements; examining potential differences between the different camps, age groups and other groups. More detailed insights into the power structures within the camps and in regard to outside actors would further provide valuable information for the better design of participatory mechanisms. In relation to these power structures it could be interesting to explore the election system in the camp to understand these dynamics better. Regarding representation and inclusiveness it might be worthwhile to research differences in perception between the different ethnic groups in the camps – as the majority is Karen and the refugee committees are Karen and Karenni, smaller ethnic groups might feel disadvantaged. The issue of trust – or rather distrust in the present case – deserves more attention and can provide knowledge which is useful not only in the context of this research, but for similar situations of displacement worldwide. Each separate trust relationship deserves more in-depth analysis than this

9. Conclusion and Reflection paper was able to provide. Hargrave sees a “pressing need to supplement this with analysis of how trust is specifically experienced in particular contexts” (2014:23) as it appears to be critical for repatriation. Given the governmental change in Burma, it might be a valuable exercise to analyse a potential shift in attitude towards the Burmese government. Besides this, it was beyond the scope of this research to examine the attitudes and situation of the population which remained inside Burma and might be soon faced with returning refugees, but it can be argued that repatriation planning should include them as well as they will play an important part in the success of a sustainable return and integration.

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Appendix

Appendix I – Map of Burma and States of Ethnic Minorities

Figure 8 - Map of Burma with Ethnic States (as used in Bjornstad, 2010) 77

Appendix

Appendix II – Operationalization Table Concept Dimension Variable Indicator

Meaningful Information flow Are refugees being informed about participation new developments? Do refugees have the possibility to provide feedback? Influence At what stage in the decision- making process do they have the possibility to provide feedback? Is that feedback taken into

selective context - consideration? Inclusion Are refugees included in the decision-making process? Representation Who represents the refugees in the decision-making process? Does it reflect the overall refugee Strategically population? Spaces for Are they created from the ‘bottom- participation up’ or in a ‘top-down’ manner? Constraining/enabling Rights Human and refugees’ rights factors Restrictions Economic factors Opportunity costs Transport costs to meetings/consultations etc. Individual factors Lack of knowledge and information Self-confidence Ability to voice their concerns Awareness of own aspirations Awareness of conducive/impeding structures Other actors Willingness to listen and take refugees’ concerns into account Information sharing Advocacy for refugees’ concerns Capacity building efforts aimed at refugees Short-term project or long-term structural change perspective?

Aspirations regarding Preferred durable What option (repatriation, local their future solution integration, resettlement) do the refugees prefer?

Agency Returning home How do refugees imagine their potential return to Burma?

Appendix

Aspirations regarding Returning home What conditions have to be met to their future make them return voluntarily? When do they think will they be

Agency able to return? What speaks against a return to Burma? Staying in How do refugees imagine their Thailand integration in Thailand? What needs to be done in order to promote local integration from the refugees’ perspective? Resettling to third How do refugees imagine a countries resettlement to third countries? What speaks for/against it from their perspective? Aspirations regarding Information flow How do refugees would like to be their participation informed about new developments? Would they like to provide feedback? How would they like to provide feedback? Influence At what stage in the decision- making process would they like to provide feedback? What would make the participation meaningful for the refugees? Representation From the refugees’ perspective: Who should represent them? What qualifies these people as representatives? Tactics and strategies Responding to the Do they employ strategies to strategically- circumvent existing constraints? selective context Do they feel powerless? Does the (possible) feeling of powerlessness translate into ‘resistant’ or ‘non-resistant’ actions? Networking Do refugees use platforms for jointly raising their voice? Do they ‘use’ the possibilities given to them by NGOs or other organisations ‘in favour’ of refugees’ participation? Do they build alliances across different groups of refugees (e.g. ethnic/women groups)?

Appendix

Appendix III – Interview Guide for Refugees I’m Sophie from Germany. I study at the University of Amsterdam for my Master’s degree in International Development Studies. For the final thesis, we have to do research by ourselves – and that’s why I’m here. My research is about the refugees from Burma here in Thailand. I want to know about how the refugees make decisions and what helps or does not help them with it. For me, it is important that your opinion is heard, which is also why I would like to have this interview with you. All of this will be part of my final master thesis.

Burma Link helps me with my research. (They help me with contacts and have a look at my questions) Do you know Burma Link?

No  they are an organisation working with refugees, making their voices heard. They have a website and also print materials where they tell the stories and opinions of the refugees.

Would it be okay for you if I share this interview with them? Do you have any questions at this point?

I want to make clear that you can of course stop this interview at any time. You do not have to answer questions you do not want to. And you can ask me questions at any time. I will not record your name anywhere, so everything you say here will not come back to you.

I would like to record this conversation, so I can focus completely on talking to you. Afterwards, I will write it down and then I will delete the recording. Is that okay for you? - a hopefully confirmative answer follows, if not, it ends here – Also, I will take some notes while you talk, but please don’t be disturbed by it; I am always listening to you.

Q1: Great, thank you very much. I will turn on the recording now, okay? Q2: Before we start, could you tell me a bit about yourself? Who are you? (Age + ethnicity) Where do you come from? (Place of origin/township in Burma) How long are you in Thailand already? Why did you come here? How? Q3: What do you do now (study/work)? Can you explain what you do now? - Is there anything else you would like to add?-

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Q4: What do you want for your future? (What do you want to do in your future? What do you hope for your future? How do you imagine it? ) Do you want to live here or somewhere else? Q5: How do you think that will happen? How easy do you think will it be to achieve this? Are you worried about your future? Q6: Do you feel like you can make decisions about your life, your future? Why or why not? For example resettlement: Do you know how it works? What information do you have about this? (same for staying/returning/going to school) Where do you get this information from? Do you trust that information ‘provider’? Why or why not? Do you feel like you and other refugees have access to accurate information in the camp? Q7: And how is it in the camp? Can you take part in decisions in the camp? (e.g. meetings/speaking in the meetings/elections for camp reps) What would you change in the camp? Or about life in the camp? Q8: Do you know what organisations work in the camp? Can you name a few? And do you feel like you can talk to them about your ideas and problems? Q9: Do you feel like they listen to it? Q10: How do you think they can make it better or change it? - Is there anything else you would like to add? Anything I did not ask you about? - End: Thank you very much for your time and the interview. Do you have any further comments or questions?

Optional: I would like to ask you whether you would be okay with meeting again and talking in more detail about your life?

Share contact information (Mail, phone, …)

And if you want to, I can also send you my final thesis. I have to write it until the end of the year.

Appendix

Appendix IV – Interview Guide for Key Informants I’m Sophie from Germany. I study at the University of Amsterdam for my Master’s degree in International Development Studies. For the final thesis, we have to do research by ourselves. My research is about the refugees from Burma here in Thailand and how they make decisions about their lives and future and what helps them with it and what does not. For me, the perspectives and opinions of the refugees and organisations like yours who are working with them are the most important part of my research. All of this will be part of my final master thesis.

Burma Link helps me with my research – do you know them?

No  they are an organisation working with refugees and ethnic nationalities, making their voices heard. They have a website and also print materials where they advocate for refugees and Burma’s ethnic nationalities to have their voices heard.

If you are interested, I can share this interview with them, but we can talk about that at the end of the interview, okay? Do you have any questions at this point?

I want to make clear that you can of course stop this interview at any time. You’re obviously free to stop at any point or tell me when you don’t want to answer a question.

It’s up to you whether I include your name in my thesis or not – what would you prefer? And your organisation and your position? And if you would like to, I can send you the quotes I would use from you before I finish my thesis, so you can check it and change it if needed. I want to make sure that I correctly portray your view and organisation.

Q1: Great, thank you very much. I will turn on the recording now, okay? Q2: Before we start, could you tell me a bit about yourself?

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(Age, ethnicity, place of origin, why in Thailand, since when with CBO, position, Why work with this CBO?) Q3: Could you tell me about your work with refugees? How do you think about the current situation in the camps? What do you think are some of the main concerns that the refugees currently have? Q4: In your opinion, what expectations and hopes do the refugees have about their future? Can the refugees make decisions about their lives to achieve their expectations? Or about their future? Q5: Does your CBO support them to achieve this? How? What restraints and challenges do you face in your efforts to achieve this? Does your CBO have access to information about refugees, repatriation plans and developments in the camps? Where does this information come from? How is it shared? Is your organisation invited in stakeholder meetings with INGOs and UNHCR to discuss the refugee situation? Can you take part in planning? Do they listen to you and other local organisation? Do UNHCR and INGOs share information with you? E.g. the UN profiling survey and the roadmap to voluntary repatriation? How does your organisation share information to the refugees (that affects the refugees)? Q5: What do you think are the main problems with this? Do you see possibilities to make it better? Q6: Do you talk about this with the refugees? How do they see it? Q7: And does your organisation work together with other organisations? How does that work? What do you think should be improved? - Is there anything else you would like to add? Anything I did not ask you about? - End: Thank you very much for your time and the interview. Do you have any further comments or questions?

As I mentioned before we started – if you’re interested, I could share this interview with Burma Link, so that they could use it in their materials. If they would use anything, they would contact you before and check with you if everything is correct. Are you interested in that?

Share contact information

I will send you what I write about this interview in my thesis to check it again with you, too. And of course I can also send you my final thesis then! I have to write it until the end of the year.

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Appendix V – List of Interviews # Respondent Date Location Age Gender Remarks/Organisation 1 Htee Saw Htoo 09/07 Mae Sot 18-29 Male 2 Mu Too 13/07 Mae Sot 18-29 Male 3 Bu Htaw 22/07 Mae La 18-29 Male 4 Eh Klain 22/07 Mae La 18-29 Female 5 Eh Gay Moo 23/07 Umpiem 18-29 Female 6 Eh Thu 23/07 Umpiem 18-29 Male 7 Ta Kae Ler 23/07 Umpiem 18-29 Male 8 Htee Ku Paw 23/07 Umpiem 40-49 Female 9 Kler Po 24/07 Mae La 30-39 Male 10 My Paw Htoo 24/07 Mae La 18-29 Female 11 Eh Kaw 27/07 Mae Rama Luang 40-49 Male 12 Eh Klu 27/07 Mae Rama Luang 60-69 Male 13 Goh Gway 27/07 Mae Rama Luang 50-59 Female 14 Bar Mee 27/07 Mae Rama Luang 18-29 Female 15 Mu Htaw 27/07 Mae Rama Luang 18-29 Male 16 Kpaw Too 27/07 Mae Rama Luang 40-49 Female 17 Blo Saw Too 11/08 Mae La 18-29 Male Lah Lah Poe 30-39 Female 1 interview conducted 18 11/08 Mae La Paw Wah 60-69 Female with 2 respondents 19 Poe Mu Dah 11/08 Mae La 40-49 Female 20 I20 06/08 On the phone Female Phone interview; UNHCR 21 Ariana Zarleen 07/08 Mae Sot Female Burma Link 22 Patrick Kearns 10/08 Mae Sot Male CCSDPT Ariana Zarleen Female 23 10/08 Mae Sot Informal interview Mu Too 18-29 Male