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Allied Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Last Year of the Battle for the Atlantic." Canadian Military History 7, 3 (1998)

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Allied Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Last Year of the Battle for the Atlantic. Canadian Military History Volume 7 Issue 3 Article 3 1998 Confronting Technological and Tactical Change: Allied Anti- Submarine Warfare in the Last Year of the Battle for the Atlantic Douglas M. McLean Directorate of Maritime Concepts and Doctrine, Department of National Defence Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation McLean, Douglas M. "Confronting Technological and Tactical Change: Allied Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Last Year of the Battle for the Atlantic." Canadian Military History 7, 3 (1998) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. McLean: Confronting Technological and Tactical Change: Allied Anti-Submar Confronting Technological and Tactical Change Allied Anti-Sub111arine Warfare in the Last Year of the Battle of the Atlantic Douglas M. McLean he recall of German U-boat wolfpacks from Improvements in Submarine T the central north Atlantic at the end of May Technology 1943 ended the most costly phase of the shipping war for the Allies. Never again would the German omewhat paradoxically, the new challenges 1 U -boats inflict dangerously high shipping losses. S to Allied ASW forces in 1944-45 were born The naval war remained bitter. nonetheless. for of their very success in the Spring of 1943. In the U-boats refused to give up. turning instead desperation. the Germans adopted new tactics. to new technology and new tactics. Right to the These featured submerged penetration of focal end, they continued to present a plausible threat areas of trade by individual boats, which then that caused concern in high Allied circles. Indeed, waited for targets of opportunity, made sudden in January 1945 the First Sea Lord of the ambushes. and then immediately executed Admiralty was moved to warn that. "The high extreme evasive manoeuvres for prolonged shipping losses which may occur during the first periods. Unlike the massed "wolfpack" attacks half of 1945 may well prejudice the maintenance against convoys which had been the hallmark of 2 of our forces in Europe .... " U -boat operations in 1942-1943, these so-called "static'"1 tactics seldom caused severe losses The ensuing struggle in early 1945 led to a because U-boats spent far more time avoiding confrontation between improvised technological detection than aggressively seeking opportunities improvements and tactical changes by the U­ to attack. Yet their new success in avoiding boats countered by operational and tactical detection in areas where the Allies had previously adaptation produced in reply by Allied anti­ been able to detect and destroy them caused submarine warfare (ASW) forces. This last phase concern in some quarters of the Allied High of the battle of the Atlantic was fought out for Command. 5 As 1944 drew to a close this the most part in the confusing and difficult apprehension grew because it appeared that the shallow waters around the coasts of the United U-boats were not only mastering the art of Kingdom and off the east coast of Canada, evading antisubmarine forces but were once moving to the shores of the United States only more becoming effective in their attacks.G in the last few months of the war. This campaign provides insights into how new and unexpected The new equipment which allowed this initiatives by an enemy could be dealt with even dramatic change in U-boat tactics was the when no te~hnological solutions were readily at schnorkeJ.7 This was a comparatively simple hand. It also illustrates the difficulty that both device which provided enough air to allow U­ submarine and antisubmarine forces encounter boats to operate their diesel engines while when operating in the challenging environment submerged.8 Little more than a tube about as of shallow water. 3 ©Canadian Military History. Volume 7, Number 3, Summer 1998, pp.23-34. 23 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1998 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 3, Art. 3 Sleek type XXI U-boats at Lisahally. Northern Ireland, 1945. U-2582. on the lf(ft. has her sclmorkel mast raised. The submarine in the middle is U-2511. the only type XXI to undertake a wartime cruise. long as the submarin~·s periscope, the schnorkel frustratingly difficult opponent. 12 Although greatly reduced a U-boat's vulnerability to shipping losses remained comparatively light, searching Allied forces because its small head schnorkel-equipped U-boats regularly prowled was far less conspicuous than the submarine's in the vicinity of the shipping routes to the conning tower. Moreover, travelling slowly and beachheads. Even when discovered these carefully, the U-boat needed to use the schnorkel submarines proved elusive targets, and. in view only three to five hours in every twenty-four. 9 of the immense concentration of ASW forces. Most U-boat commanders prudently schnorkeled remarkably few were destroyed. ~~l at night to avoid visual detection of the smoke produced by the submarine's diesel engine. In In addition the Allies (thanks to decryption addition, the head of most schnorkels was fitted of high-level German message traffic, an with a detection device that gave warning ofthe intelligence source known as "Ultra") were approach of Allied radars. 10 Since the U-boat was acutely aware of the possibilities of the new U­ already submerged when using its schnorkel, an boat designs. 14 The Type XXI and Type XXIII alert crew could usually dive deep and escape boats were the first conventional submarines before an attack could be launched even if an capable of rapid underwater manoeuvring. 15 Allied radar operator could distinguish the small Although they could sustain high-speed echo of the tube from the random returns manoeuvres for perhaps only an hour or an hour provided by ocean swells or flotsam and jetsam. and a half, these submarine were the most menacing known at that time. 16 German Schnorkel-equipped U -boats were sent into authorities assigned the highest priority to their the English Channel during the summer of 1944 production in July 1943, but the first few only to attack the heavy flow of shipping that became operational as the war ended. 17 The sustained the Normandy beachhead; their potential impact of these vessels on the trans­ commanders learned that they could operate in Atlantic logistics of the Allied campaign in the most heavily defended waters. 11 The Allies Europe remains one of the most interesting had anticipated an aggressive response to the subjects for speculation. Fortunately for the June 1944 invasion and had prepared a Allies, however, the war was fought with older, comprehensive defence in depth of the ChanneL Type VII and Type IX. U-boats re-equipped with Massed ASW forces devastated U-boats not yet schnorkels and radar detectors. equipped with schnorkels (at the time a majority) but found schnorkel-equipped submarines a 24 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss3/3 2 McLean: Confronting Technological and Tactical Change: Allied Anti-Submar The only area where schnorkel-fitted boats of the bottom is another factor which can be could achieve any success was in the coastal largely ignored in deep water, but not along the areas near ports and focal points of shipping. 18 coast. Rocks and shoals, as well as shipwrecks Although both Allied and German naval officers and schools of fish, produce convincingly considered in late summer 1944 that a return submarine-like echoes. Finally, the effect of fresh to open-ocean wolfpack operations would be the water from rivers and streams is frequently only way in which Allied shipping could be pronounced, and, in combination with interdicted effectively, and though such tactics temperature variations, cause especially dense might arguably have been practical using the new layers to form in the water that so affect the submarines, 19 the Germans realized that such propagation of sound as to effectively "blind" the tactics were impossible with the older U-boats. sonar of a searching warship. The Germans were encouraged by the ability of schnorkel-equipped submarines to operate in Consequently warships acting as close escort such heavily defended waters as the English to convoys rarely detected aU-boat in shallow 0 ChanneF , but were acutely aware that simply water before the submarine attacked. During this surviving was not enough. Shipping had to be stage of the war U-boats often rested on the destroyed if the apparently inexorable Allied bottom in the vicinity of shipping traffic, rising advance was to be slowed. and too few ships up to fire a torpedo only when alerted by the were being sunk. Still. the schnorkel-equipped sound of an approaching convoy. Waiting to boats had just garnered the greatest success that detect convoys passively by their noise did not German submarines had enjoyed since the fall prove adequate, however. and in mid-December of 1943. As the summer of 1944 waned, 1944 BdU ordered all U-boats to remain at Befehlshaber der U-boote (U-Boat periscope depth during daylight hours so as to Headquarters. or BdU) decided that until increase their chance of finding targets visually. 24 improved types ofU-boats became operational, This helped the U-boats somewhat. and the U­ an offensive in coastal areas offered the best boat's chance of being detected by the escort chance of inflicting losses on the Allies. 21 before it attacked remained slight. After firing. the submarines usually either made off at slow speed just above the bottom. sometimes simply Shallow Water Submarine Warfare drifting with the tide, or rested on the bottom until searching forces had moved on.2 s Close ith their decision to move into coastal escort vessels had little chance to destroy a W waters using older schnorkel-equipped U­ submarine employing such snap attacks and, boats, the Germans created a difficult problem since they had to remain with their convoy.
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