HSBA HSBAFOR SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN Issue BriefAvailable in Arabic Small Arms Survey Number 23 July 2014
Protective measures Local security arrangements in Greater Upper Nile
ince erupting in December 2013, ity of official state security forces to conflict in Greater Upper Nile. The the South Sudanese civil conflict respond to the security needs of civil- tradition of LSAs in these areas was a has displaced nearly one million ians. Local security concerns include factor leading to the rapid mobiliza- S 1 people and left more than 10,000 dead. persistent cattle raiding and militia tion of armed youths at the outset of Much of the fighting has been con- group activity, as well as the effects of the recent crisis. centrated in the Greater Upper Nile the long-term proliferation of weapons In particular, this Issue Brief focuses region—including around the strate- and ammunition. on the complex ways in which LSAs gic state capitals of Bentiu (Unity state), This Issue Brief discusses the organi- reflect local security dynamics and Bor (Jonglei state), and Malakal (Upper zation of LSAs in Greater Upper Nile cultural norms surrounding the role Nile state). Rich in oil, Greater Upper and their impact on local security of youths in providing protection for Nile is home to the Nuer supporters of dynamics in the region, drawing on their own communities. It describes the the former vice president, Riek Machar, original research conducted in Mayom security environments in the case study who currently leads the opposition and county in Unity, Uror county in Jonglei, areas, LSA structures and functions, who hails from Unity. and Fashoda county in Upper Nile and the impacts of the LSAs on secu- The involvement of unofficial forces prior to the outbreak of widespread rity levels. In doing so, it considers in the conflict appears significant. Both sides have recruited armed youths to supplement their fighting forces.2 In Map 1. Greater Upper Nile, South Sudan WHITE SENNAR Jonglei, thousands of armed Lou Nuer NILE youths took control of Bor alongside SUDAN rebel forces loyal to Peter Gadet in ed Damazin late December. Meanwhile, President
SOUTH e BLUE l i Salva Kiir authorized the recruitment N
e
t KORDOFAN i NILE
and training of thousands of youths for h W a Juba-based auxiliary force under his Kadugli command, with many of the recruits drawn from the predominantly Dinka 3 Hejlij areas of Greater Bahr el Ghazal. The Abyei UPPER NILE Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Abyei azal has also taken on new recruits from town Kiir Bahr el Gh Malakal the Equatorias and Western Bahr el l Bentiu a n So a b C a
Ghazal to fight on the front lines in i t e l g 4 n Unity and Upper Nile. o Kwajok UNITY J The rapid recruitment of armed youths into the conflict reflects a ETHIOPIA WARRAP Greater Upper Nile demand for fighting power and a AUHIP-proposed recognition of their roles as commu- border JONGLEI nity security providers, often where Ba International hr el boundary Je official state security is absent. Local be l State boundary LAKES (W h security arrangements (LSAs) are a i te Abyei N il long-time feature in rural South Sudan, SOUTH e SUDAN State capital ) Bor and they have a particularly strong 100km presence in Greater Upper Nile due to CENTRAL EQUATORIA EASTERN EQUATORIA the marked security gap—the inabil-
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 1 state security policies and practices— form to close this ‘security gap’. While Since the end of the civil war, the including civilian disarmament cam- some LSAs are officially recognized government’s emphasis on civilian paigns—that influence LSA formation, and sanctioned community forces that disarmament as its primary security as well some of the security dilemmas actively coordinate with state security policy in violence-affected rural areas associated with LSAs. providers, others are less formal arrange- of Greater Upper Nile has deeply influ- Key findings include: ments that exist beyond state control. enced the context for LSA activities. Yet, although they provide security Civilian disarmament is ostensibly While LSAs in Greater Upper Nile services, LSAs around the world have designed to reduce the number of provide protection to civilians, they also been shown to exacerbate inse- weapons available for cattle raiding, have also contributed to cycles of curity by engaging in human rights insurgency, and revenge attacks. But violence and revenge by commit- violations, revenge attacks, and extra- the SPLA has not carried out disarma- ting human rights abuses, armed judicial killings.5 ment in a balanced way, and has failed attacks on other communities, and In South Sudan, the army remains to provide protection in the wake of extrajudicial killings in the process the primary state security provider. disarmament—at times leaving dis- of responding to local threats to But its expected transformation from armed communities at the mercy of the community. a rebel force into a nationally represent- their rivals. Disarmament itself has Local government officials and tra- ative and civilian-controlled security often been repressive and violent, and ditional leaders in Greater Upper provider is far from complete. While inadequate systems for the collection, Nile are not providing the over- the army continues to grapple with registration, and storage of weapons sight and accountability required command and control issues, ethically have reduced its effectiveness. For these to allow LSAs to operate effectively driven attacks on communities have reasons, chiefs and even some local and within the law. been a recurring phenomenon in government officials have claimed that While traditional authorities may Greater Upper Nile, where Murle, civilian disarmament should only be not have direct command and Nuer, and Shilluk communities are carried out on the condition that security control over LSAs, and while their based. The South Sudan National forces are able to provide a basic level authority vis-à-vis local govern- Police Service (SSNPS), envisioned of protection to their communities.10 ment officials has declined over as the local security provider over the In 2014, many communities in time, they still possess a great deal long term, remains a weak and under- Greater Upper Nile and elsewhere of local legitimacy to negotiate resourced presence, especially in rural have continued to rely on LSAs as between rival communities and areas. Nor is the SSNPS equipped to their only source of security against resolve disputes non-violently. respond to large-scale security threats cattle raiding and revenge attacks, In the absence of stable and effective such as insurgent militias. although these groups tend to partici- state security forces, forced disarma- LSAs are not a new phenomenon pate in activities that undermine their ment may exacerbate insecurity in South Sudan. From the colonial own long-term security. These cycles by increasing the vulnerability of period onwards, traditional leaders— of violence and revenge are likely to communities to armed attacks by chiefs, community elders, spiritual lead- intensify, even with the May ceasefire rival communities, and by increas- ers, and youth leaders—were often in place.11 Indeed, a strong urge for ing hostility to the army. engaged in the provision of security, revenge will persist among many Nuer Politically marginalized groups, justice, and local administration.6 They in Greater Upper Nile if serious efforts such as the Shilluk and Murle, often continue to provide these services are not made to address impunity for rely on LSAs to provide security, today, although their authority has been the killings that took place in December especially where state security undermined by the militarization of 2013, including the systematic killing forces have a record of repressive ethnic identities and their political of Nuer in Juba by Dinka forces loyal actions against them. marginalization by local government to Kiir at the outbreak of the conflict. The tradition of LSAs across the officials.7 The 2009 Local Government Greater Upper Nile region and the Act codifies the role of traditional proliferation of small arms have authorities in local administration at Unity state contributed to the rapid mobiliza- the county, payam, and boma levels, tion of armed youths on both sides Oil-rich Unity state shares a border but it also limits their autonomy and with Sudan and the contested region of the current conflict. political influence by placing them of Abyei. The state continues to host under the administrative control of thousands of refugees from the ongoing local government officials (GRSS, 2009).8 conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue LSAs in South Sudan This relegation has negatively influ- Nile; it also received people who were Local security arrangements are a enced their ability to advocate on displaced by the bombing of Bentiu feature of many conflict-prone areas behalf of their communities, especially by the Sudan Armed Forces in April where the state does not or cannot among ethnic minorities such as the 2012, although many have left since provide sufficient security. LSAs can Murle and Shilluk.9 conflict erupted in December 2013.
2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 23 July 2014 As of June 2014, the UN Refugee Agency in Mayom county, Unity state, was where cattle raiding takes place. As a was hosting more than 70,000 refugees suspended in June 2013, after an armed result, they are often unable to respond at Yida refugee camp, close to the bor- attack on the community by Dinka to the security needs of communities. der with Sudan.12 While tensions with youths from Tonj North in Warrap In addition, the security forces are some- Sudan remain high, Unity’s pastoral- state.20 Previously, Nuer youths from times outnumbered and outgunned. ist communities have long perceived Mayom had attacked a Dinka commu- As a result, the SSNPS and the SPLA cattle raiding as the most persistent nity in Gogrial East in Warrap, claiming may join forces with armed youths from source of insecurity.13 Local youths the lives of 33 unarmed civilians, most the raided communities to recapture participate in these cycles of violence of whom were women, children, and and return stolen cattle.22 This approach and revenge, which have intensified older people.21 Such cycles of violence tends to blur the lines between soldier in recent years.14 and revenge highlight the need for— and civilian, army and police. Access to small arms and light and current absence of—high-level weapons has exacerbated inter-tribal coordination of security policy develop- The ‘Sons of Mayom’ conflict in Unity. Legacy weapons ment and implementation at all levels. Mayom town is located less than 50 km from the civil war era, in which both The police are primarily responsible from the border with South Kordofan, armies provided arms and ammunition for responding to cattle raids but are Sudan, and the disputed territory of to communities, remain in circulation. often ill equipped to do so. In prac- Abyei. Exposed to insecurity as a result Evidence shows that Southern security tice, the SPLA tends to take the lead of its proximity to Sudan, the local com- forces also allowed civilians to access in responding to security threats, but munity has also experienced the cattle additional weapons during the more it lacks adequate training in human raiding and revenge attacks described recent siege of Hejlij, in March–April rights and legal standards. The SSNPS above. During the Hejlij crisis in April 2012.15 Moreover, illicit cross-border and the SPLA both suffer from poor 2012, the Sudan Armed Forces dropped flows from Sudan are thought to con- access to vehicles and ammunition, low six bombs in Abiemnom town, just a tribute to civilian stocks in Unity. or delayed wages, and limited access few kilometres from Mayom. Four Despite official claims to the con- to aircraft to patrol the vast landscape exploded, killing seven people.23 trary, the SPLA’s management of weapons collected during civilian disarmament efforts has been problem- Map 2. Mayom county, Unity state, South Sudan atic. Due to the absence of effective systems for weapons collection, regis- SUDAN tration, and destruction, security forces Lake Jaw have not been able to account for the total number of surrendered weapons Abyei Hejlij or to ensure that they are not funnelled Riangnhom back into the communities.16 According Pariang to local SPLA commanders, some 11,000 Abyei town K Abiemnom weapons have been collected in Unity iir ahr el Ghazal state over the last five years; of these, B 17 Rubkona nearly 5,000 were handed over in 2013. Mayom totownwn Yoynyang Bentiu Another 500 were seized in the first Rupkona Turalei Mayom Guit Old Fangak half of 2013, after armed youths killed Mankien Wang-Kay eight police officers who were respond- ing to a cattle raid in Koch.18 A recent Koch review of the army’s surplus stockpile SOUTH SUDSUDANAN Gogrial Koch management policies and procedures B ah 19 r e UNITY found much room for improvement. l G Kwajok WARRAP haz Leer Since long before the recent conflict, al JONGLEI B Mayendit Adok a Nuer youths from Unity and Dinka Warrap h ( r W e h l youths from neighbouring Warrap Leer i J Mayendit te e b N e state have been locked in a deadly il l e) cycle of cattle raiding and revenge Nyal attacks. Meanwhile, uneven civilian Wau AUHIP-proposedThiet border disarmament has exacerbated violence State boundary Panyijar Kuajiena between communities and placed County boundary LAKES GanyGanylGanylellelel community leaders at odds with local State capital government officials. The most recent Selected main roads 50km forced civilian disarmament campaign
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 3 Cattle raiding is particularly acute were provided to them by the secu- officials, and the security forces (formal in the tri-state area formed by Lakes, rity forces. Local chiefs often refer and informal) is required in negotia- Unity, and Warrap. The Bul Nuer of to the armed youths as the ‘Sons of tions. Chiefs have a particularly impor- Mayom share an interstate border Mayom’ and acknowledge that they tant role to play in liaising with the with the Dinka of Gogrial East, Twic, both protect the community and par- SPLA in preparation for, and during, and Tonj North in Warrap state. The ticipate in cattle raiding. The cattle civilian disarmament campaigns; Bul Nuer are also affected by tensions camp youths usually respond to their active involvement may also with the nomadic Missiriya from Sudan, attacks by rival communities, led by help increase the number of weapons who cross the border each year, graze youth leaders rather than local chiefs collected.29 their cattle on Nuer land, and trade (see Box 1).25 While the leaders sup- The UN Development Programme goods from Sudan. port disarmament in principle, they and other development and humani- In the absence of state security are hesitant to enforce it in light of tarian agencies have recognized the forces, the armed youths of Mayom persistent security concerns and the importance of engaging with traditional function as an unsanctioned LSA, inability of state security forces to leaders. But leaders’ cooperation—as using weapons that they have hidden protect civilians, particularly against well as that of the youths—hinges on from disarmament campaigns or that cattle raiding. the provision of adequate security and the reciprocal disarmament of rival The waning of traditional power communities, as well as on assur- Box 1 Lou Nuer cattle camps and leaders ances that collected weapons will not A number of factors have led tradi- In Lou Nuer society, the responsibility for the recirculate—which is fundamentally tional leaders to lose their grip on the protection of the community and cattle— impossible without adequate registra- dynamics of violence associated with the community’s most valuable collective tion and storage systems. resource—traditionally falls to the youths. cattle raiding. For one, local govern- In order for the cattle to survive, the Lou ment officials have undermined their Nuer and other pastoralist communities power and authority. Interviews reveal Jonglei state have adopted a semi-nomadic lifestyle. The that the state government has occasion- youths leave the village behind and set up ally removed locally elected chiefs Jonglei has experienced the most intense temporary cattle camps, where they rest inter-communal violence in a decade and sleep with the cows before taking off and replaced them with chiefs chosen due to cattle raiding and the insur- for new grazing lands the next day. Boys go by the state governor. State govern- to the cattle camp between the ages of 12 ment officials in Bentiu claimed that gency of rebel leader David Yau Yau, and 14 and may remain there until they are they removed illiterate local chiefs in who accepted a peace deal with the ready to get married. Even married men will the past, but that they no longer inter- government of South Sudan in May sometimes return to the cattle camp. While 30 fered in the selection of traditional 2014. While unrelated at the outset, village chiefs are vested with general powers, 26 these two sources of insecurity have they serve primarily a judicial function in leaders. The Local Government Act, the villages and their authority does not which remains to be fully implemented, overlapped and intertwined in com- extend into the cattle camps. clearly codifies the right of communities plex ways. So, too, have the policies In the cattle camp, decisions are made to select their traditional authorities, in for addressing the violence—civilian by youth leaders who are chosen based on keeping with custom and tradition.27 disarmament and counterinsurgency. bravery, fighting skill, and leadership ability.24 The legislators recognized that the During forced disarmament campaigns, Youth leaders are responsible for making the SPLA engaged in abuses—includ- decisions concerning the health and well- appointment of chiefs by the local being of the cattle, as well as for leading government tends to undermine their ing torture and rape—of members of cattle raids and responding to raids from credibility, as well as their ability to the Murle ethnic minority, who live rival groups. A youth leader may be replaced negotiate effectively between rival almost exclusively in Pibor county, at any time if he proves to be a poor decision- communities.28 and other civilians, contributing to maker, but a respected youth leader with Another factor that has weakened feelings of ethnic and political mar- a great deal of experience may hold on to ginalization on which David Yau Yau the position for many years, some into traditional leaders is the militarization 31 their forties. of armed youths. This trend has been had capitalized. The spiritual leader, or prophet, is another accompanied by an escalation in the On 15 July 2013, clashes between influential figure in Lou Nuer society. There levels of violence, as cattle raiding has Murle and Lou Nuer youths in Pibor may be several prophets at one time, all given way to revenge killings in which ended with more than 200 Lou Nuer claiming lineage to the nineteenth-century youths target entire villages rather being treated at the hospital in Bor. prophet Ngundeng Bong. One of the current prophets, Dak Keuth, played a prominent role than the cattle camps. In this violent Injured Murle, estimated to be in the 32 in mobilizing the Lou Nuer youths during climate, local chiefs no longer feel safe hundreds, fled into the bush. It was attacks on Pibor in 2011; he also supported enough to travel alone and must be one of the deadliest attacks between the SPLA 8th Division in Bor at the onset of escorted by the SPLA or SSNPS. these two parties in more than two the December 2013 conflict. The prophet To bring these cycles of violence years. Video taken by peacekeepers will usually lead the youths alongside a and revenge to an end, the combined of the UN Mission in the Republic of youth leader. commitment of local chiefs, government South Sudan (UNMISS) in Manyabol,
4 Sudan Issue Brief Number 23 July 2014 Ghaza Tonga Map 3. Uror county, Jonglei state, South Sudan el l Malakal hr New Fangak Ba Juaibor UPPER NILE Bentiu Atar International Old Fangak Canal boundary Fangak (Khorfulus) State boundary County boundary Nyirol State capital UNITY Nyirol Main roads Mogok
Waat Adok Ayod Mwot Tot Walgak Wanding S Pieri h
w
a
l Akobo
Akobo
ETHIOPIA
Duk Fadiat J
o A Uror n ta g r Duk l P e
i i b C o a r n a m B l a a Kongor ana Pochala ( hr N Ajwara W e hi l JOJONGLEINGLEI te Je N be Likuangole ile l Twic East ) Pochalla Rumbek Pibor LAKES Bor South Gumuruk Bilait Churi K e Padak/Baidit n Manyabol g e n a ll Bor ti Pibor SOUTSOUTHH SUDANLo Boma
WESTERN EQUATORIA 50km CENTRAL EQUATORIA EASTERN EQUATORIA
Pibor county, in July 2013 shows thou- commanders reportedly collected the food and alcohol in local markets.39 sands of youths, presumably returning weapons once the fighting had ended.36 Local demand for weapons remains from fighting in Pibor.33 In 2011, at After the Comprehensive Peace high, partly due to the uneven disarma- least 1,000 lives were lost in clashes Agreement was signed in 2005, the ment of warring communities and between Lou Nuer youths and small disarmament of the Lou Nuer youths SPLA abuses. bands of Murle fighters using guerrilla- became a top priority for the Sudan The July 2013 mobilization of Lou like tactics against their much more People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Nuer youths in Jonglei took place in numerous opponents.34 Nearly 3,000 weapons were collected response to a number of serious The Lou Nuer cattle camp youths, in northern Jonglei in 1996. Local Nuer attacks over the past year, including sometimes called ‘white army’ (jiech considered the disarmament ethnically a large cattle raid in Akobo West on mabor), comprise several Nuer youth motivated, since the mainstream SPLA 8 February 2013 that resulted in more brigades (bunaam) from each of the was mostly Dinka, the enemy of the than 100 Lou Nuer fatalities. While Lou Nuer counties that make up the Nuer since the 1991 split. Confrontations the perpetrators have not been inde- Greater Akobo region, including Akobo, between the Lou Nuer and the SPLA pendently verified, Lou Nuer youths Nyirol, and Uror. These bunaam come resulted in 1,600 deaths, nearly one interviewed for this Issue Brief insisted together for community protection person killed for every two weapons that the attackers were Murle, a group but also to retaliate against perceived collected.37 they often equate with Yau Yau’s forces. threats to the community.35 Nearly all There have been at least five suc- These attacks left the Lou Nuer feeling Lou Nuer interviewed during this cessive waves of civilian disarmament deeply vulnerable and abandoned by research rejected the name ‘white in Jonglei, yet the inability of state state security forces.40 As one youth army’ in reference to the recent mobi- security forces to control the illicit remarked, ‘The Lou Nuer are like a lizations of Lou Nuer youths. The term flow of weapons and ammunition has people in prison—we have been initially referred to the mobilization undermined the success of these efforts.38 disarmed and left with no way to of bunaam during the civil war, after Sources of weapons and ammunition protect ourselves.’41 the 1991 split between John Garang and include illicit flows from Sudan, local Riek Machar. Machar’s faction armed traders across the border with Ethiopia, Community police units the Nuer youths with AK-pattern and SPLA soldiers who provide weap- In response to Lou Nuer demands for rifles as an auxiliary fighting force. His ons and ammunition in exchange for increased protection, former state gov-
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 5 ernor Kuol Manyang Juuk signed a ernment official said he felt intense to respect any ceasefire in place and, provisional order in January 2013 to competing pressures to carry out as already noted, to close the security create community police units (CPUs) forced disarmament on the one hand, gap while the SSNPS builds its capac- at the boma level across the state. and to respond to the security needs of ity to provide protection to civilians. While the CPUs are not new to South his community on the other, knowing By March 2013, the CPUs had been Sudan, or to Jonglei for that matter, this full well the limitations of the SPLA selected by the boma chiefs, although is a significant step towards formalizing and SSNPS.45 A group of youths con- they had not received training, uni- an LSA that may have implications for veyed their anger with Murle attacks forms, or the code of conduct outlined future peace and security in Jonglei. over the past year, pointing out that in the provisional order.49 According The mandate of the community police they felt increasingly marginalized to follow-up interviews conducted in is to ‘assist SSPS [SSNPS] by providing by the state government, which has November 2013, the programme was protection to unarmed civil population responded poorly to insecurity in Lou suspended, although no additional dis- and their properties in Bomas and Nuer areas.46 The women said that they armament had been conducted. In the villages while the Regular Police shall trusted their sons, rather than security worst-case scenario, the community continue to support this unit logistically forces, to protect them.47 police programme could rearm youths and operationally’.42 It has already led It is not uncommon to see dozens without providing training, oversight, to the partial establishment of CPUs of armed youths along the main road or accountability.50 Nevertheless, some in all counties of Jonglei except Pibor, in Uror. In fact, for the young men state-level officials maintained their where counterinsurgency operations protecting the cattle camp, it would support for the programme as the against Yau Yau stopped at the end be extremely risky to move without most effective way to provide civilian of 2013. arms. Yet the state government has protection and introduce registration Each unit is made up of 40 young led several waves of civilian disarma- and operation standards to youths in men aged 18–30, who are selected by ment to reduce armed violence linked rural and remote areas. local chiefs at the boma level. The com- to cattle raiding and revenge killings. The CPU programme presents other munities are responsible for providing While youths may have been cautious risks, however. First, the community the CPUs with food and shelter, while about openly carrying their weapons police would rely on a SSP 100 (USD 18) the county chief inspector for police until the community police order was annual tax to be paid by each adult.51 is tasked with providing training and signed in January 2013, they have since Previous efforts to support commu- oversight. The officer in charge at the come to understand that they may carry nity security in Akobo at the payam payam level and the executive chief a weapon for self-defence. In interviews, and boma levels suffered from insuf- at the boma level also have oversight some youths mentioned that they had ficient resources available for salaries, responsibilities. been allowed to rearm sometime in training, and uniforms to distinguish The provisional order highlights early February, although it was not the community police from other the terms under which the CPUs are to clear in what way—if at all—such armed youths in the community, not have access to arms and ammunition: permission might be related to the unlike more recent attempts to formal- ‘Each Boma administration shall be CPUs.48 Local officials said they had ize community police.52 While inter- tasked with the provision of guns, not received any order to permit local viewed community members said uniform, shoes and minimum salary of youths to carry weapons and under- they would be willing to pay a small 300 SSP (three hundred South Sudanese scored the need for civilian disarma- tax if it meant improved security, they Pounds only) [USD 53] for each com- ment as the only sustainable solution suggested that a 50 SSP (USD 9) tax munity police member’.43 to inter-communal violence. The CPUs, would be more reasonable. One advan- The order charges the SSNPS with they noted, would be used to close tage of this model is that the police the provision of ammunition and the the security gap in the short term— would be based in their own commu- registration of weapons, many of which and ultimately to support civilian nities, reducing logistical problems had not been surrendered.44 disarmament. that adversely affect response rates. Other potential benefits of the The second hurdle is also budget- CPUs in Uror county community police programme are the ary. It is unclear where the resources planned registration of CPU weapons for training would come from, since Uror county is at the heart of Jonglei and CPU personnels’ involvement in the SSNPS formerly relied on support state and is a gathering place for the addressing—and perhaps controlling— from the UN Police and other interna- Lou Nuer late in the dry season, when wider community access to weapons. tional donors that are unlikely to sup- water becomes increasingly scarce. Much would depend on transparency port the CPUs. To carry out the initial During interviews conducted for this and accountability, which could be training, the state government would study, youths, women, chiefs, and addressed by improved coordination need enough resources to cover trans- local government officials in Uror and cooperation between community portation costs, accommodation, and expressed considerable frustration leaders, the youths, the police, and food for the duration of the training regarding the security gap. One gov- outside observers. The aim would be course, at the very least. Additional
6 Sudan Issue Brief Number 23 July 2014 support is required to draw up the of Nuer mobilized in support of the targeting young Shilluk men (HRW, code of conduct and provide copies to nearly 9,000 soldiers who had defected 2011). Underlying Shilluk support for local officials at the county, payam, and with Gen. Peter Gadet from the SPLA the SPLM–DC has been an ongoing boma levels—including local chiefs.53 8th Division. While the Lou Nuer youths land dispute between the Shilluk and Finally, without robust coordination have since returned to their homes, the Dinka over what the Shilluk refer and cooperation between local govern- they continue to control large parts of to as the three ‘occupied areas’, one ment officials, traditional authorities, Jonglei and remain ready to fight in on the Eastern bank of the Nile across youth leaders, and civil society organi- response to attacks on the community.54 from Kodok, the county capital of zations, there appears to be limited As the political and military crisis Fashoda, and the other two areas south scope to implement effective oversight unfolds, the issue of civilian disarma- of Malakal.57 over the community police force, which ment is likely to resurface, particu- In April 2013, Johnson Olony, a operates without a clear command larly with reference to Nuer militias. key commander in the rebel South and control mandate. While the Local Meanwhile, the community police pro- Sudan Democratic Movement/Army Government Act provides a frame- gramme is unlikely to move forward (SSDM/A) and prominent Shilluk, was work for this kind of power-sharing in any formal capacity, but the security offered an amnesty deal by President arrangement, it has not been fully gap remains. Thus, alternative security Salva Kiir, along with five other rebel implemented. In the absence of local measures should be carefully consid- commanders, to end all existing insur- oversight and effective command and ered, drawing on the experience of gencies in South Sudan. Having initially control, there is no way to prevent the previous disarmament campaigns. rejected the deal, Olony accepted it in community police from participating One option is to encourage the CPUs September after having been granted in cycles of violence and revenge. to report security incidents and human a pardon by the Shilluk king for the While Lou Nuer youths and commu- rights violations to auxiliary units and murder of a Shilluk chief. Olony and nity police represent distinct arrange- to authorities via satellite phone. his men demobilized in Fashoda and, ments, they both draw on and reflect following the outbreak of fighting in the social and cultural norms for Lou Unity in December 2013, they helped Nuer youths in the community, as well Upper Nile the SPLA secure Fashoda county, as the chaotic security environment in Upper Nile state is predominantly Nuer, engaging the same troops that terror- Jonglei. In response to reports of atroc- although it is also home to the Shilluk ized Shilluk communities along the ities committed against Nuer civilians Kingdom, which includes Fashoda, west bank of the Nile following the in Juba in December 2013, thousands Malakal, Manyo, and Panyikang coun- 2010 election.58 ties. The past few years have witnessed While the acceptance of the April intermittent rebel activity along the amnesty by Olony might have pro- border with Sudan. During the civil vided a basis for improved relations war, the Shilluk community was split between the SPLA and the Shilluk between Sudan and South Sudan, with community, tensions have again flared several prominent Shilluk leaders in during the ongoing crisis, this time the SPLA, including Pagam Amun and between the Nuer and the Shilluk. Peter Adwok Nyaba. Lam Akol was also On 24 December 2013, forces loyal to a leading member of the SPLA, but he Machar took control of Malakal. On joined Riek Machar during the 1991 20 January, the SPLA recaptured the split.55 Lam Akol was reintegrated strategic state capital with support from into the SPLM/A in October 2003 and Olony’s forces. Since then, there have served as minister of foreign affairs been widespread allegations of pro- during the interim period between government forces exacting revenge 2005 and 2007. In June 2009, he cre- on Nuer civilians in Malakal, as well ated his own opposition party, SPLM– as Nuer targeting Shilluk in retaliation Democratic Change (DC), and ran for Olony’s support of government against Kiir in the April 2010 general forces in surrounding areas. The con- elections. Lam Akol’s party fared well firmed presence of Uganda People’s in Shilluk areas, but received only 7 per Defence Forces in Upper Nile has cent of the vote in South Sudan.56 added another layer of complexity to The success of the SPLM–DC in the full implementation of the cease- Shilluk areas was followed by a violent fire agreement. civilian disarmament campaign and Ultimately, tensions are unlikely to widespread allegations of human rights be resolved until the underlying land
Armed Lou Nuer youth, Jonglei state, March 2013. abuses committed by predominantly dispute has been successfully negoti- © Justine Fleischner Nuer and Dinka SPLA, specifically ated and communities along both sides
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 7 ment Act, the main function of the Map 4. Fashoda county, Upper Nile state, AUHIP-proposed border king is to adjudicate civil disputes International boundary South Sudan according to customary law. He also State boundary collects taxes from nomadic Sudanese County boundary Gerger tribes that graze their cattle on Shilluk State capital Renk land. The king’s police, similar to Selected main roads Manyo the chief’s police under the colonial
e administration, also protect the king l i N
e and help to enforce his judicial deci- t i
h Renk
W BLUE sions. The resilience of the traditional NILE system, as well as the order and sta- SUDAN bility it provides, suggests that the king and other traditional authorities Melut may continue to play an important SOUTH role in service delivery and local KORDOFAN administration. Melut Athidway Maban Some 30 members of the king’s police reside in the village of Fashoda. Fashoda Maban Additional king’s police reside in Kodok M each village where the king spends a ala Oriny UPPER NILE ka l significant amount of time. During interviews, members of the king’s Baliet Tonga P Malakal any police claimed to have been issued a ika ng Longochuk Dajo rifle by the local government, along Abwong with three magazines of ammunition in order to perform their official 63 So duties. While they do not have a bat Nasir SOUTH SUDANMaiwut mandate to respond to security inci- Nasir dents, they argued that they would MaiwutMaiwut Ulang respond alongside the security forces JONGLEI Jikou in cases of attacks against the commu- ETHIOPIA nity, particularly those that threaten Wanding 50km the life of the king.64 In contrast, the SPLA commanders in Fashoda insisted that there was no cooperation between the king’s police and the security forces. of the Nile—Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk— The seat of the Shilluk Kingdom In fact, a main source of insecurity in have reconciled. is in Fashoda county, on the western the Shilluk Kingdom concerns ten- The Shilluk Kingdom is ruled by bank of the White Nile. Sources of sions between the local community the king (reth). The Local Government insecurity include tensions with the Act grants the king formal authority SPLA and cross-border raids on live- and the SPLA. over local administration and civil stock, food, and locally brewed alcohol.60 The commanders of the SPLA divi- disputes under customary law. He is Food security is a major issue for the sion in Fashoda stressed that they primarily responsible for the internal Shilluk, who are known for their ex- would not tolerate any harassment of affairs of the kingdom, although local pertise in cultivation. Shilluk crops the civilian population by their soldiers administration at the county, payam, are vulnerable to local pests, includ- and that any abuses should be reported and boma levels is similar to that ing great flocks of small birds that to them at once. They also argued that encountered across South Sudan. He decimate crops. Community leaders in the context of the counterinsurgency, is potentially the community’s best have requested state support to be questioning and detaining young advocate but, because he is expected able to address the problem, but there Shilluk men was justified. The army to be neutral, his ability to press the has been no response from the state commanders expressed concern over Shilluk case with other parties is lim- government.61 Shilluk support for the SSDM/A as well ited.59 In order for him to fulfil his For the Shilluk, the king remains as the SPLM–DC’s purported endorse- administrative duties, the king main- a central figure in the daily life of the ment of Olony, which SPLM–DC leader tains his own personal police force— community. Most interviewed women, Lam Akol has denied. These factors the king’s police—which operates youths, and local officials suggested have negatively affected cooperation as an informal LSA under the Local that local traditions had not changed between the SPLA and the Shilluk Government Act. much at all.62 Under the Local Govern- in Fashoda.
8 Sudan Issue Brief Number 23 July 2014 While Amnesty International and Discussion communities have been undermined Human Rights Watch have documented by a lack of coordination and coopera- LSAs are one local response to the human rights abuses, the international tion between local government officials security gap—the inability of official presence in the area has been limited and traditional authorities, as well as state security forces to respond to the since early 2012 due to SPLA security a lack of political will to fully imple- security needs of civilians. Across restrictions. In March 2013, UN peace- ment the Local Government Act at the Greater Upper Nile, official security keepers made some progress towards national level. The prominence of LSAs forces do not have sufficient resources setting up a presence in Fashoda, but in South Sudan speaks to the lack of or manpower to respond to the full with the recent crisis these areas were clarity between security policy and breadth of security needs. LSAs tend cut off once again. As a result of esca- practice, needs and capabilities, offi- to reflect local power dynamics, includ- lating tensions between the Dinka, Nuer, cial and customary roles and respon- ing the militarization of ethnic identi- and Shilluk in Upper Nile, there is an sibilities, not just of the youths, but ties, which, among other factors, has urgent need for independent human also of soldiers, the police, and local undermined the role of traditional rights verification and monitoring. government officials. The government authorities in South Sudan. They The SPLA’s detention policies, and may also be less willing to provide receive weapons and ammunition human rights training for soldiers, are formal security to areas that are under from illicit flows across the Horn of in need of review. International sup- LSA protection. Africa, state and local government port could be leveraged in this regard, For international actors focused on officials, and from the SPLA and particularly through the presence of UN security sector reform in South Sudan, police. Despite efforts to disarm the peacekeepers in the Shilluk Kingdom. LSAs present a unique set of challenges local population, unknown numbers Impunity for human rights viola- and opportunities. The violent and dra- of surrendered weapons have been tions and limited access to information matic turn of events in South Sudan rechannelled to the communities from has revealed the limited success of on the security situation are issues of which they were collected.66 government and donor efforts to build serious concern, particularly in light LSAs can be formal or informal, stable and effective state institutions of the recent crisis. The Shilluk have reflecting the type of support they for governance and security sector been disarmed and the strong pres- receive from local government officials reform. The march towards modernity ence of SPLA in Fashoda has come and security forces. In some instances, with its own security challenges. Yet, as in Unity state, they may even respond and democracy should be understood the climate of political intimidation to insecurity alongside the police and as a gradual process that could benefit is palpable. Interviews with youths SPLA. Prior to the recent violence, there from hybrid forms of power and were conducted in the evenings in had been widespread allegations cir- authority. South Sudan is currently private homes of fear of discussing culating for months of SPLA soldiers faced with a set of complex challenges politics in public. The division com- providing weapons and ammunition to over how to manage decentralization manders were hesitant to meet, even both Nuer and Murle youths in Jonglei alongside local forms of power and with a letter of introduction from SPLA state.67 Cooperation is less likely—or authority. Issues such as impunity for headquarters in Juba. officially denied—between the SPLA and human rights violations, the political Lam Akol recently returned to LSAs such as the Shilluk king’s police. marginalization of ethnic minorities, politics in Juba and the SPLM–DC Tensions between state security and illicit arms flows are not new. remains an active political party. Yet, forces and the communities they aim South Sudan should carefully review over the last four years, there have to protect present a major challenge past experiences and the current state been numerous accounts of intimida- to civilian disarmament efforts and of its security apparatus as it endeav- tion and harassment against SPLM–DC security sector reform in South Sudan. ours to meet the challenges at hand. party members, which does not bode Based on the research conducted for well for the future of a multiparty this report, LSAs are often identified system in South Sudan.65 In Fashoda, by their communities as a source of Conclusions youths feel deeply politically margin- security and protection. Analysts have Viewed against the historical backdrop alized, and the king is often powerless pointed out that ‘since these groups of the civil war, as well as localized compared to government officials. are motivated to protect their families efforts to provide community security, In particular, the settlement of the and communities, they tend to be less the prevalence of LSAs in South Sudan land disputes, access to development predatory and to have higher morale is not surprising. The militarization of funds, support for local agriculture, than state security forces’.68 ethnic identities and the use of armed and accountability for human rights Overall, the effect of LSAs on secu- youths as auxiliary fighting forces violations are beyond the traditional rity is mixed. While armed youths par- have come to characterize how LSAs authority of the king, requiring high- ticipate in cattle raiding and revenge operate in South Sudan. Traditional level government engagement and killings, they also provide protection and military leaders have found it political representation at both the to their communities. Efforts to simul- increasingly difficult to control these state and the national level. taneously disarm and reconcile rival armed youths.69 The violence associated
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 9 with cattle raiding, in particular, has particularly in direct dialogue and 6 The role of traditional leaders in local escalated dramatically since independ- negotiations between rival commu administration, specifically the courts, was formalized under British colonial ence.70 In some cases, the cattle camps nities. Meeting these challenges will rule. See Leonardi et al. (2010, p. 17). have become a proxy for political rival- require high-level political will, stra- 7 Hutchinson and Jok (1999, p. 128). ries in Juba—through the acquisition tegic planning, and strong leadership 8 Executive authority to remove locally of land, cattle, and property by force. at the national level. Such efforts elected chiefs is contested, but routinely LSAs in South Sudan may be under- would not only improve local gov- practised. Chiefs may be appointed or stood as a local response to the secu- ernance, but would go a long way in removed for any number of reasons. At the same time, there are no safeguards rity gap that threatens the very peace addressing the root causes of the recent in place to protect locally elected chiefs’ and stability independence sought to violence as well. political autonomy or their ability to be achieve. Widespread insecurity but, In light of the limited presence of effective advocates for their communities. more specifically, the ability of state state institutions in rural and remote See Deng (2013, p. 12). security forces to provide protection areas, there are good arguments for 9 Local authorities still have considerable accountability. A team of South Sudanese of civilians has surpassed the train- the government to partner with tra- researchers found that 57 per cent of ing, resources, and capabilities of the ditional authorities, youth leaders, respondents in 2009 believed that local SPLA and SSNPS. In some cases, this women’s groups, and civil society chiefs are primarily responsible for com- has resulted in both formal and infor- organizations to improve service deliv- munity security. See Lokuji, Abatneh, and mal security arrangements between ery, security, and rule of law. The Local Wani (2009). 10 Author interviews with traditional leaders local government officials and tradi- Government Act provides a framework and youths, Unity and Jonglei, February– tional authorities, while in others it has for cooperation, as well as a legal basis March 2013. For a recent review of the manifested in the resurgence of armed for customary law in the settlement SPLA’s civilian disarmament activities, youth groups that seek not only to of civil disputes. Yet the act has not see Small Arms Survey (2012). protect their communities, but also to received significant support at the 11 As of late June 2014 the ceasefire has been repeatedly violated. participate in cattle raiding and revenge national level, particularly among 12 UNHCR (n.d.). attacks that fuel cycles of violence. members of the educated elite in Juba, 13 Cattle raiding may be motivated by eco- LSAs may possess a great deal of who envision a modern democratic nomic, political, or cultural factors. Youths local legitimacy, but they may also state divorced from the traditional may participate because they lack edu- undermine the state’s monopoly on the ways of the past. Aside from the chal- cational or economic opportunities, are expected to pay a high bride price, or use of force, blurring the line between lenges described in this Issue Brief, wish to demonstrate fighting skills. soldier and civilian, protection and the long-term impact of LSAs on 14 See, for example, Mc Evoy and LeBrun violence. Forced disarmament has peace and security in South Sudan (2010) and Saferworld (2011). exacerbated insecurity and has bur- will depend largely on the political 15 Author interview with an NGO staff mem- dened traditional authorities and local process that unfolds in the wake of ber who served with the military and had more than five years’ work experience in government officials with competing the current crisis. South Sudan, Juba, March 2013. pressures to abide by state directives 16 Author interviews with senior state officials, to disarm their own communities on Bentiu, Unity, March 2013. the one hand, and to respond to their Notes 17 Author interview with an SPLA commander, 2013 security needs on the other. The trust This Issue Brief was written by independent Mayom, Unity, March . 18 Kuich (2013b). deficit between communities and the consultant Justine Fleischner, based on fieldwork 19 King (2014). conducted in February–March 2013, and sub security forces is substantial and must 20 Kuich (2013a). sequent interviews and research undertaken in be addressed in order for meaningful 21 Sudan Tribune (2013). November 2013 and January 2014. The analysis 22 Author interview with an SPLA com- civilian disarmament to take place. draws heavily on interviews with dozens of senior mander, Juba, South Sudan, March 2013. This examination of the formation, government officials, members of the security 23 Author interview with an NGO aid worker, arming, and activities of LSAs sheds forces, local government officials, chiefs and head Mayom, Unity, February 2013. men, youths, women, and civil society leaders, light not only on current security 24 Author interview with a youth group, as well as UN and NGO staff with relevant back dynamics, but also on related chal- Uror, Jonglei, March 2013. ground and expertise. lenges, such as the protection of civil- 25 It is often assumed that chiefs and elders ians, civilian disarmament, impunity have effective command and control over 1 Kulish (2014). for human rights violations, and stand- armed youths, when, in fact, they do not. 2 UNICEF estimates that 9,000 child sol- Chiefs serve primarily a judicial function, ards for the management of weapons diers are involved in the current conflict and thus may help negotiate the return of and ammunition stockpiles. On the (Kushkush, 2014). stolen cattle or retribution for lives lost, political front, major issues include 3 ICG (2014, p. 6); Sudan Tribune (2014). but they cannot call off a raid as a military the full implementation of the Local 4 VOA (2014). commander might call off an attack. 5 The literature is rich, featuring case studies Government Act and the broadening 26 Author interview with Unity state-level on LSAs in Afghanistan, Ghana, Mexico, officials, Bentiu, Unity, March 2013. of the political process to include and Sierra Leone. See Asfura-Heim and 27 GRSS (2009, s. 117). traditional authorities, youth leaders, Espach (2013); BBC (2007); IRIN (1999; 28 Author interview with traditional leaders, women, and civil society organizations, 2008); Jones and Muñoz (2010). Mayom, Unity, February 2013.
10 Sudan Issue Brief Number 23 July 2014 29 Author interview with a senior Unity 61 Author interview with a local government hrw.org/news/2013/07/19/south-sudan- official involved in civilian disarmament, official and Shilluk community members, army-making-ethnic-conflict-worse> Bentiu, Unity, March 2013. Fashoda, Upper Nile, March 2013. Hutchinson, Sharon and Jok Madut Jok. 1999. 30 For more background on the dynamics of 62 Author interview with Shilluk commu- ‘Sudan’s Prolonged Second Civil War armed militias in Greater Upper Nile, see nity members, Fashoda, Upper Nile, and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Small Arms Survey (2012). March 2013. Ethnic Identities.’ African Studies Review, 31 For specific accounts of human rights 63 Author interview with members of the Vol. 42, No. 2. September, pp. 125–45. violations committed by security forces king’s police, Fashoda, Upper Nile, ICG (International Crisis Group). 2014. ‘South during disarmament events, see HRW March 2013. Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name.’ (2013a) and AI (2012). 64 Author interview with members of the Africa Report No. 217. 10 April.
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 11 Leff, Jonah and Emile LeBrun. 2014. Following and Implications. HSBA Issue Brief No. 3, —. 2014. ‘South Sudan President Admits the Thread: Arms and Ammunition Tracing 2nd edn. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Forming Private Army.’ 17 February. in Sudan and South Sudan. HSBA Working February.
HSBA project summary at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the UK Govern- The Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) ment Global Conflict Prevention Pool. Additional support for Sudan/South Sudan is a multi-year project has previously been provided by the Danish Demining HSBA administered by the Small Arms Survey. It was Group and the National Endowment for Democracy. developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, The Small Arms Survey receives additional support from the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the United Switzerland without which the HSBA could not be under- Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and a wide taken effectively. array of international and Sudanese partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely, empirical research, the project supports violence reduction initiatives, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration Credits programmes, incentive schemes for civilian arms collection, Series editor: Emile LeBrun as well as security sector reform and arms control inter- ([email protected]) ventions across Sudan and South Sudan. The HSBA also Cartographer: Jillie Luff, MAPgrafix(jluff @mapgrafix.com) offers policy-relevant advice on redressing insecurity. Design and layout: Rick Jones ([email protected]) Issue Briefs are designed to provide timely periodic snap- shots of baseline information in a reader-friendly format. The HSBA also generates a series of longer and more detailed Working Papers. All publications are available in English and Contact details Arabic at www.smallarmssurveysudan.org. We also produce For more information or to provide feedback, contact monthly ‘Facts and Figures’ reports on key security issues Yodit Lemma, HSBA Project Coordinator, at at
12 Sudan IssueIssue BriefBrief Number Number 6 23 April July 2007 2014