DOCSLIB.ORG

Protective Measures: Local Security

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

HSBA HSBAFOR SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN Issue BriefAvailable in Arabic Small Arms Survey Number 23 July 2014 Protective measures Local security arrangements in Greater Upper Nile ince erupting in December 2013, ity of official state security forces to conflict in Greater Upper Nile. The the South Sudanese civil conflict respond to the security needs of civil- tradition of LSAs in these areas was a has displaced nearly one million ians. Local security concerns include factor leading to the rapid mobiliza- S 1 people and left more than 10,000 dead. persistent cattle raiding and militia tion of armed youths at the outset of Much of the fighting has been con- group activity, as well as the effects of the recent crisis. centrated in the Greater Upper Nile the long-term proliferation of weapons In particular, this Issue Brief focuses region—including around the strate- and ammunition. on the complex ways in which LSAs gic state capitals of Bentiu (Unity state), This Issue Brief discusses the organi- reflect local security dynamics and Bor (Jonglei state), and Malakal (Upper zation of LSAs in Greater Upper Nile cultural norms surrounding the role Nile state). Rich in oil, Greater Upper and their impact on local security of youths in providing protection for Nile is home to the Nuer supporters of dynamics in the region, drawing on their own communities. It describes the the former vice president, Riek Machar, original research conducted in Mayom security environments in the case study who currently leads the opposition and county in Unity, Uror county in Jonglei, areas, LSA structures and functions, who hails from Unity. and Fashoda county in Upper Nile and the impacts of the LSAs on secu- The involvement of unofficial forces prior to the outbreak of widespread rity levels. In doing so, it considers in the conflict appears significant. Both sides have recruited armed youths to supplement their fighting forces.2 In Map 1. Greater Upper Nile, South Sudan WHITE SENNAR Jonglei, thousands of armed Lou Nuer NILE youths took control of Bor alongside SUDAN rebel forces loyal to Peter Gadet in ed Damazin late December. Meanwhile, President SOUTH e BLUE l i Salva Kiir authorized the recruitment N e t KORDOFAN i NILE and training of thousands of youths for h W a Juba-based auxiliary force under his Kadugli command, with many of the recruits drawn from the predominantly Dinka 3 Hejlij areas of Greater Bahr el Ghazal. The Abyei UPPER NILE Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Abyei azal has also taken on new recruits from town Kiir Bahr el Gh Malakal the Equatorias and Western Bahr el l Bentiu a n So a b C a Ghazal to fight on the front lines in i t e l g 4 n Unity and Upper Nile. o Kwajok UNITY J The rapid recruitment of armed youths into the conflict reflects a ETHIOPIA WARRAP Greater Upper Nile demand for fighting power and a AUHIP-proposed recognition of their roles as commu- border JONGLEI nity security providers, often where Ba International hr el boundary Je official state security is absent. Local be l State boundary LAKES (W h security arrangements (LSAs) are a i te Abyei N il long-time feature in rural South Sudan, SOUTH e SUDAN State capital ) Bor and they have a particularly strong 100km presence in Greater Upper Nile due to CENTRAL EQUATORIA EASTERN EQUATORIA the marked security gap—the inabil- www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 1 state security policies and practices— form to close this ‘security gap’. While Since the end of the civil war, the including civilian disarmament cam- some LSAs are officially recognized government’s emphasis on civilian paigns—that influence LSA formation, and sanctioned community forces that disarmament as its primary security as well some of the security dilemmas actively coordinate with state security policy in violence-affected rural areas associated with LSAs. providers, others are less formal arrange- of Greater Upper Nile has deeply influ- Key findings include: ments that exist beyond state control. enced the context for LSA activities. Yet, although they provide security Civilian disarmament is ostensibly While LSAs in Greater Upper Nile services, LSAs around the world have designed to reduce the number of provide protection to civilians, they also been shown to exacerbate inse- weapons available for cattle raiding, have also contributed to cycles of curity by engaging in human rights insurgency, and revenge attacks. But violence and revenge by commit- violations, revenge attacks, and extra- the SPLA has not carried out disarma- ting human rights abuses, armed judicial killings.5 ment in a balanced way, and has failed attacks on other communities, and In South Sudan, the army remains to provide protection in the wake of extrajudicial killings in the process the primary state security provider. disarmament—at times leaving dis- of responding to local threats to But its expected transformation from armed communities at the mercy of the community. a rebel force into a nationally represent- their rivals. Disarmament itself has Local government officials and tra- ative and civilian-controlled security often been repressive and violent, and ditional leaders in Greater Upper provider is far from complete. While inadequate systems for the collection, Nile are not providing the over- the army continues to grapple with registration, and storage of weapons sight and accountability required command and control issues, ethically have reduced its effectiveness. For these to allow LSAs to operate effectively driven attacks on communities have reasons, chiefs and even some local and within the law. been a recurring phenomenon in government officials have claimed that While traditional authorities may Greater Upper Nile, where Murle, civilian disarmament should only be not have direct command and Nuer, and Shilluk communities are carried out on the condition that security control over LSAs, and while their based. The South Sudan National forces are able to provide a basic level authority vis-à-vis local govern- Police Service (SSNPS), envisioned of protection to their communities.10 ment officials has declined over as the local security provider over the In 2014, many communities in time, they still possess a great deal long term, remains a weak and under- Greater Upper Nile and elsewhere of local legitimacy to negotiate resourced presence, especially in rural have continued to rely on LSAs as between rival communities and areas. Nor is the SSNPS equipped to their only source of security against resolve disputes non-violently. respond to large-scale security threats cattle raiding and revenge attacks, In the absence of stable and effective such as insurgent militias. although these groups tend to partici- state security forces, forced disarma- LSAs are not a new phenomenon pate in activities that undermine their ment may exacerbate insecurity in South Sudan. From the colonial own long-term security. These cycles by increasing the vulnerability of period onwards, traditional leaders— of violence and revenge are likely to communities to armed attacks by chiefs, community elders, spiritual lead- intensify, even with the May ceasefire rival communities, and by increas- ers, and youth leaders—were often in place.11 Indeed, a strong urge for ing hostility to the army. engaged in the provision of security, revenge will persist among many Nuer Politically marginalized groups, justice, and local administration.6 They in Greater Upper Nile if serious efforts such as the Shilluk and Murle, often continue to provide these services are not made to address impunity for rely on LSAs to provide security, today, although their authority has been the killings that took place in December especially where state security undermined by the militarization of 2013, including the systematic killing forces have a record of repressive ethnic identities and their political of Nuer in Juba by Dinka forces loyal actions against them. marginalization by local government to Kiir at the outbreak of the conflict. The tradition of LSAs across the officials.7 The 2009 Local Government Greater Upper Nile region and the Act codifies the role of traditional proliferation of small arms have authorities in local administration at Unity state contributed to the rapid mobiliza- the county, payam, and boma levels, tion of armed youths on both sides Oil-rich Unity state shares a border but it also limits their autonomy and with Sudan and the contested region of the current conflict. political influence by placing them of Abyei. The state continues to host under the administrative control of thousands of refugees from the ongoing local government officials (GRSS, 2009).8 conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue LSAs in South Sudan This relegation has negatively influ- Nile; it also received people who were Local security arrangements are a enced their ability to advocate on displaced by the bombing of Bentiu feature of many conflict-prone areas behalf of their communities, especially by the Sudan Armed Forces in April where the state does not or cannot among ethnic minorities such as the 2012, although many have left since provide sufficient security. LSAs can Murle and Shilluk.9 conflict erupted in December 2013. 2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 23 July 2014 As of June 2014, the UN Refugee Agency in Mayom county, Unity state, was where cattle raiding takes place. As a was hosting more than 70,000 refugees suspended in June 2013, after an armed result, they are often unable to respond at Yida refugee camp, close to the bor- attack on the community by Dinka to the security
Recommended publications
  • Upper Nile State, South Sudan June 2017

    Upper Nile State, South Sudan June 2017

    Situation Overview: Upper Nile State, South Sudan June 2017 SUDAN Introduction previous REACH assessments of hard-to- presence returned to the averages from April reach areas of Upper Nile State. (22% June, 42% May, 28% April).1 This may Despite a potential respite in fighting in lower MANYO be indicative of the slowing of movement due This Situation Overview outlines displacement counties along the western bank, dispersed to the rainy season. Although fighting that took RENK and access to basic services in Upper Nile fighting and widespread displacements trends place in Panyikang and Fashoda appeared to in June 2017. The first section analyses continued into June and impeded the provision subside, clashes between armed groups armed displacement trends in Upper Nile State. of primary needs and access to basic services groups reportedly commenced in Manyo and The second section outlines the population for assessed settlements. Only 45% of assessed Renk Counties, causing the local population to MELUT dynamics in the assessed settlements, as well settlements reported adequate access to food flee across the border as well as to Renk Town.2 and half reported access to healthcare facilities as access to food and basic services for both FASHODA These clashes may have also contributed to across Upper Nile State, while the malnutrition, MABAN IDP and non-displaced communities. MALAKAL a lack of IDPs, with no assessed settlement malaria and cholera concerns reported in May PANYIKANG BALIET Baliet, Maban, Melut and Renk Counties had in Manyo reporting an IDP presence in June, continued into June. LONGOCHUK less than 5% settlement coverage (Map 1), compared to 50% in May.
  • The Crisis in South Sudan

    The Crisis in South Sudan

    Conflict in South Sudan and the Challenges Ahead Lauren Ploch Blanchard Specialist in African Affairs September 22, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43344 Conflict in South Sudan and the Challenges Ahead Summary South Sudan, which separated from Sudan in 2011 after almost 40 years of civil war, was drawn into a devastating new conflict in late 2013, when a political dispute that overlapped with preexisting ethnic and political fault lines turned violent. Civilians have been routinely targeted in the conflict, often along ethnic lines, and the warring parties have been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The war and resulting humanitarian crisis have displaced more than 2.7 million people, including roughly 200,000 who are sheltering at U.N. peacekeeping bases in the country. Over 1 million South Sudanese have fled as refugees to neighboring countries. No reliable death count exists. U.N. agencies report that the humanitarian situation, already dire with over 40% of the population facing life-threatening hunger, is worsening, as continued conflict spurs a sharp increase in food prices. Famine may be on the horizon. Aid workers, among them hundreds of U.S. citizens, are increasingly under threat—South Sudan overtook Afghanistan as the country with the highest reported number of major attacks on humanitarians in 2015. At least 62 aid workers have been killed during the conflict, and U.N. experts warn that threats are increasing in scope and brutality. In August 2015, the international community welcomed a peace agreement signed by the warring parties, but it did not end the conflict.
  • South Sudan's

    South Sudan's

    Untapped and Unprepared Dirty Deals Threaten South Sudan’s Mining Sector April 2020 Table of Contents Executive Summary 1 Invitation to Exploitation 4 Beneath the Battlefield: Mineral Development During Conflict 12 Indications of Possible Money Laundering 19 Recommendations 20 We are grateful for the support we receive from our donors who have helped make our work possible. To learn more about The Sentry’s funders, please visit The Sentry website at www.thesentry.org/about/. UNTAPPED AND UNPREPARED: DIRTY DEALS THREATEN SOUTH SUDAN’S MINING SECTOR TheSentry.org Executive Summary South Sudan’s mining sector has seen rapid development in recent years, and preliminary reports suggest that the industry could become an engine for major economic growth. However, ineffective accountability mechanisms, an opaque corporate landscape, and inadequate due diligence have exposed the sector to abuse by bad actors within South Sudan’s ruling clique. The Sentry has found that existing laws have proven insufficient bulwarks against abuse, raising concerns that the country’s mineral wealth could do little more than spur the kind of violent competition that has ravaged the oil sector. Although South Sudan took welcome steps to reform the mining sector in 2012, some government officials, their relatives, and their close associates have fostered a weak regulatory environment susceptible to exploitation. In one example of how the privileged few have apparently exploited kleptocratic arrangements, President Salva Kiir’s daughter partly owns a company with three active licenses, while another company with three licenses lists former Vice President James Wani Igga’s son as a shareholder. Ashraf Seed Ahmed Hussein Ali, a businessman commonly known as Al-Cardinal who was placed under Global Magnitsky sanctions in October 2019, reportedly owns the company currently holding the greatest number of licenses.1 In the gold-rich region of Kapoeta, state government officials have begun issuing licenses independently of the central government.
  • Conflict and Crisis in South Sudan's Equatoria

    Conflict and Crisis in South Sudan's Equatoria

    SPECIAL REPORT NO. 493 | APRIL 2021 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org Conflict and Crisis in South Sudan’s Equatoria By Alan Boswell Contents Introduction ...................................3 Descent into War ..........................4 Key Actors and Interests ............ 9 Conclusion and Recommendations ...................... 16 Thomas Cirillo, leader of the Equatoria-based National Salvation Front militia, addresses the media in Rome on November 2, 2019. (Photo by Andrew Medichini/AP) Summary • In 2016, South Sudan’s war expand- Equatorians—a collection of diverse South Sudan’s transitional period. ed explosively into the country’s minority ethnic groups—are fighting • On a national level, conflict resolu- southern region, Equatoria, trig- for more autonomy, local or regional, tion should pursue shared sover- gering a major refugee crisis. Even and a remedy to what is perceived eignty among South Sudan’s con- after the 2018 peace deal, parts of as (primarily) Dinka hegemony. stituencies and regions, beyond Equatoria continue to be active hot • Equatorian elites lack the external power sharing among elites. To spots for national conflict. support to viably pursue their ob- resolve underlying grievances, the • The war in Equatoria does not fit jectives through violence. The gov- political process should be expand- neatly into the simplified narratives ernment in Juba, meanwhile, lacks ed to include consultations with of South Sudan’s war as a power the capacity and local legitimacy to local community leaders. The con- struggle for the center; nor will it be definitively stamp out the rebellion. stitutional reform process of South addressed by peacebuilding strate- Both sides should pursue a nego- Sudan’s current transitional period gies built off those precepts.
  • Southern Sudan News Bulletin ______

    Southern Sudan News Bulletin ______

    Southern Sudan News Bulletin ___________________________________________________________________________ An Overview of UN Activities in Southern Sudan Published by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) _____________________________________________________________________ Vol. 4 Issue No.1 January 2009 Highlights: ¾ Thousands flee LRA attacks ¾ Sudan marks fourth CPA anniversary ¾ Former SPLA combatants turned into Prison Services Wardens ¾ Misseriya still in Southern Kordofan ¾ Planning underway for Tri-State Peace Conference ¾ Data compilation for essential services in Lakes State completed . Sector I – Juba Sudan Marks fourth CPA anniversary Thousands flee LRA attacks On January 9, Sudan marked the fourth Thousands of internally displaced persons anniversary of the Comprehensive Peace (IDPs) and refugees fleeing attacks by Agreement (CPA) that ended 21 years of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels have conflict between northern and southern poured into Western Equatoria State, Sudan in the Upper Nile State capital of prompting Governor Jemma Nunu Kumba to Malakal. The ceremony, which was attended launch a humanitarian appeal for by both the President of the Government of assistance. The displacement follows a joint National Unity (GONU), Omar Al Bashir, and military offensive by Ugandan and the First Vice-President of the GONU, Salva Congolese forces against the LRA that was Kiir, drew thousands of Sudanese to the launched on 14 December. The IDPs and city’s stadium. refugees, most of whom come from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), During the celebrations, President Bashir moved into Sudan after LRA attacks on and Vice-President Kiir, who is also their villages killed hundreds and led to the president of the Government of Southern abduction of women, children and even Sudan (GoSS), inaugurated the Malakal men.
  • The Greater Pibor Administrative Area

    The Greater Pibor Administrative Area

    35 Real but Fragile: The Greater Pibor Administrative Area By Claudio Todisco Copyright Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey © Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva 2015 First published in March 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organi- zation. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Publications Manager, Small Arms Survey, at the address below. Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Series editor: Emile LeBrun Copy-edited by Alex Potter ([email protected]) Proofread by Donald Strachan ([email protected]) Cartography by Jillian Luff (www.mapgrafix.com) Typeset in Optima and Palatino by Rick Jones ([email protected]) Printed by nbmedia in Geneva, Switzerland ISBN 978-2-940548-09-5 2 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 35 Contents List of abbreviations and acronyms .................................................................................................................................... 4 I. Introduction and key findings ..............................................................................................................................................
  • 1 AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan Addis Ababa, Ethiopia P. O

    1 AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan Addis Ababa, Ethiopia P. O

    AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan Addis Ababa, Ethiopia P. O. Box 3243 Telephone: +251 11 551 7700 / +251 11 518 25 58/ Ext 2558 Website: http://www.au.int/en/auciss Original: English FINAL REPORT OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON SOUTH SUDAN ADDIS ABABA 15 OCTOBER 2014 1 Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... 3 ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................... 5 CHAPTER I ..................................................................................................................... 7 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 8 CHAPTER II .................................................................................................................. 34 INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH SUDAN .............................................................................. 34 CHAPTER III ............................................................................................................... 110 EXAMINATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND OTHER ABUSES DURING THE CONFLICT: ACCOUNTABILITY ......................................................................... 111 CHAPTER IV ............................................................................................................... 233 ISSUES ON HEALING AND RECONCILIATION .......................................................
  • The Republic of South Sudan Request for an Extension of the Deadline For

    The Republic of South Sudan Request for an Extension of the Deadline For

    The Republic of South Sudan Request for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of Anti-personnel Mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1 of the convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction Submitted at the 18th Meeting of the State Parties Submitted to the Chair of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation Date 31 March 2020 Prepared for State Party: South Sudan Contact Person : Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch Position: Chairperson, NMAA Phone : (211)921651088 Email : [email protected] 1 | Page Contents Abbreviations 3 I. Executive Summary 4 II. Detailed Narrative 8 1 Introduction 8 2 Origin of the Article 5 implementation challenge 8 3 Nature and extent of progress made: Decisions and Recommendations of States Parties 9 4 Nature and extent of progress made: quantitative aspects 9 5 Complications and challenges 16 6 Nature and extent of progress made: qualitative aspects 18 7 Efforts undertaken to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from mined areas 21 # Anti-Tank mines removed and destroyed 24 # Items of UXO removed and destroyed 24 8 Mine Accidents 25 9 Nature and extent of the remaining Article 5 challenge: quantitative aspects 27 10 The Disaggregation of Current Contamination 30 11 Nature and extent of the remaining Article 5 challenge: qualitative aspects 41 12 Circumstances that impeded compliance during previous extension period 43 12.1 Humanitarian, economic, social and environmental implications of the
  • National Education Statistics

    National Education Statistics

    2016 NATIONAL EDUCATION STATISTICS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN FEBRUARY 2017 www.goss.org © Ministry of General Education & Instruction 2017 Photo Courtesy of UNICEF This publication may be used as a part or as a whole, provided that the MoGEI is acknowledged as the source of information. The map used in this document is not the official maps of the Republic of South Sudan and are for illustrative purposes only. This publication has been produced with financial assistance from the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) and technical assistance from Altai Consulting. Soft copies of the complete National and State Education Statistic Booklets, along with the EMIS baseline list of schools and related documents, can be accessed and downloaded at: www.southsudanemis.org. For inquiries or requests, please use the following contact information: George Mogga / Director of Planning and Budgeting / MoGEI [email protected] Giir Mabior Cyerdit / EMIS Manager / MoGEI [email protected] Data & Statistics Unit / MoGEI [email protected] Nor Shirin Md. Mokhtar / Chief of Education / UNICEF [email protected] Akshay Sinha / Education Officer / UNICEF [email protected] Daniel Skillings / Project Director / Altai Consulting [email protected] Philibert de Mercey / Senior Methodologist / Altai Consulting [email protected] FOREWORD On behalf of the Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MoGEI), I am delighted to present The National Education Statistics Booklet, 2016, of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS). It is the 9th in a series of publications initiated in 2006, with only one interruption in 2014, a significant achievement for a new nation like South Sudan. The purpose of the booklet is to provide a detailed compilation of statistical information covering key indicators of South Sudan’s education sector, from ECDE to Higher Education.
  • South Sudan: Jonglei – “We Have Always Been at War”

    South Sudan: Jonglei – “We Have Always Been at War”

    South Sudan: Jonglei – “We Have Always Been at War” Africa Report N°221 | 22 December 2014 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Jonglei’s Conflicts Before the Civil War ........................................................................... 3 A. Perpetual Armed Rebellion ....................................................................................... 3 B. The Politics of Inter-Communal Conflict .................................................................. 4 1. The communal is political .................................................................................... 4 2. Mixed messages: Government response to intercommunal violence ................. 7 3. Ethnically-targeted civilian disarmament ........................................................... 8 C. Region over Ethnicity? Shifting Alliances between the Bahr el Ghazal Dinka, Greater Bor Dinka and Nuer ...................................................................................... 9 III. South Sudan’s Civil War in Jonglei .................................................................................. 12 A. Armed Factions in Jonglei ........................................................................................
  • HATE SPEECH MONITORING and CONFLICT ANALYSIS in SOUTH SUDAN Report #6: October 10 – October 23, 2017

    HATE SPEECH MONITORING and CONFLICT ANALYSIS in SOUTH SUDAN Report #6: October 10 – October 23, 2017

    October 25, 2017 HATE SPEECH MONITORING AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS IN SOUTH SUDAN Report #6: October 10 – October 23, 2017 This report is part of a broader initiative by PeaceTech Lab to analyze online hate speech in South Sudan in order to help mitigate the threat of hateful language in fueling violence on-the-ground. Hate speech can be defined as language that can incite others to discriminate or act against individuals or groups based on their ethnic, religious, racial, gender or national identity. The Lab also acknowledges the role of “dangerous speech,” which is a heightened form of hate speech that can catalyze mass violence. Summary of Recent Events uring this reporting period, military clashes continued throughout the Greater Equatoria and Upper Nile regions, both between rebel and government D forces, and among various rebel groups. On October 17, a contingent of National Salvation Front (NAS) fighters under General Thomas Cirillo overran SPLA-IO training bases around Kajo-Keji in Central Equatoria. The assaults occurred shortly after the SPLA-IO captured strategic barracks from government forces. The NAS itself claims that it was attacked by SPLA-IO forces, precipitating a counter-attack. It is unclear whether the NAS attack was coordinated with pro-government forces or conducted separately. The NAS rebel movement, composed mostly of Equatorians, is opposed to perceived Dinka dominance in government institutions, but is also not on good terms with the SPLA-IO. Meanwhile in Jonglei state, the divisions between Dinka Bor South and Dinka Twic East culminated in the passage of a bill in state parliament that seeks to split the state into two parts: Bor (to be based in Bor town) and Jonglei (to be headquartered in Panyagor).
  • South Sudan Early Recovery and Humanitarian

    South Sudan Early Recovery and Humanitarian

    SOUTH SUDAN EARLY RECOVERY AND HUMANITARIAN PROJECT (SSERHP) END EVALUATION REPORT January , 2014 DENNIS OCHIENG & BETTY KWEYU ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Many people among them CARE staff and constituents have contributed to making this evaluation process a successful, smooth-running and rewarding process. Thanks go first of all to the Project Manager Sylvia Kaawe for her unswerving commitment to the evaluation process and tireless effort in ensuring a smooth workflow despite the unrest attributable to the growing tension and anxiety on the ground at the time Secondly, the evaluation team would like to appreciate the input of each and every CARE program staff in Panyagor sub office including but not limited to participation in interviews, coordination and logistics of this evaluation; in most instances beyond working hours and days. We appreciate the effort made by the County commissioner, Payam Administrators and Community members in attending meetings and interview sessions, with very short notices. Last but not least we acknowledge the input and dedication of all other CARE Staff based in Juba who facilitated the evaluation process; without their support the evaluation would not have been successful. i TABLE OF CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................ IV DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS/CONCEPTS ...................................................................................................... V EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................