MASTER’S THESIS M-704

SELTON, Robert Warren. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE DURING THE ANTI-BANDIT WAR (1947-1949).

The American University, M.A., 1964 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan Copyright by

ROBERT WARREN SELTON

1965 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE

TO GREECE DURING THE ANTI-BANDIT WAR

(19^7 - 19^9)

"by

Robert W, Selton

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

MASTER OF ARTS

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman: ^ f 4 ^

Date Dean of the^Bcl|f)Ol UNIVERSITY Dat e : i-luk. l i b r a r y AUG 3 11964 I^ASHINGTON. D. c ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my appreciation to the faculty of the School of International Service, American

University, without whose help this thesis would not he possible. In particular. Professor Harry N. Howard contributed of his vast store of knowledge on the Near

East and Professor Durw^^d V, Sandifer greatly assisted in the area of United States national security policy.

The Office of the Chief of Military History,

United States Army, made a significant contribution by permitting me to have access to yet unpublished documents and reports of the United States military agencies in

Greece pertaining to the period of the Anti-Bandit War.

Mr. Roland Gill of that office was extremely helpful in locating and making available these reports. In addition, two officers currently serving on the Army General Staff,

Colonel Warren K. Bennett and Colonel George L. Eckert, who served as advisers to the Greek Army during the Anti-

Bandit War, provided valuable assistance in the form of first hand accounts of the battle action. Colonel Eckert also read and commented on the manuscript.

I owe a particular debt of gratitude to General

James Van Fleet who took time from his current pursuits to correspond with the author and provide information necessary to approach some of the more cogent problems uncovered in iii the research.

Finally, I thank my wife for the cheerful contri­ bution of her busy time which she spent proofing and typing the draft manuscript as well as for her patience over the loss of a husband for the summer.

In the final analysis, however, the opinions expressed in this thesis are the sole responsibility of the author. TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...... vii

LIST OF FREQUENTLY USED ABBREVIATIONS...... xii

CHAPTER PAGE

I. WORLD WAR II - CONVENTIONAL COMBAT...... 1

General Considerations , , 1

The Greek-Italian War . . . 3 (October 19^0 - April 19^1)

The German Invasion ...... 7 (April - May 19^1)

II, THE OCCUPATION AND AFTERMATH - GUERRILLA COMBAT ...... 17

The Occupation...... 17 (May 19^1 - October 19^%)

The Greek-British Dilemma ...... 30 (October 19^k - Spring 19^7)

III. THE TRUMAN D O C T R I N E ...... k8

Recent Greek-American Relations ...... U8

The Truman Doctrine ...... 52

Military Implications ...... 57

IV. THE EASY WAY - THE ANTI-BANDIT WA R ...... 63 (May 19^7 - December 19^7)

Communist Operations ...... 63

Greek National Situation ...... 69

United States Military Assistance - The Easy W a y ...... 7^

V., TRIAL AND ERROR - THE ANTI-BANDIT W A R ...... 8l (January 19^8 - December 19^8) V

CHAPTER PAGE

United States Military Assistance ...... 82

Operations ...... 8 3

S u p p y ...... 8U

Two Typical Problems , 88

T r a i n i n g ...... 90

Greek National Operations ...... 96

On the Communist S i d e ...... 100

Military Operations . 100

The Macedonian Question and The Fall of M a r k o s ...... 103

VI. VICTORY - THE ANTI-BANDIT W A R ...... 112 (January 19^9 - August 19^9)

Greek National Operations ...... 112

The Communist Dilemma ...... 120

United States Military Influence . 126

Operations and Training ...... 126

Logistics...... 130

VII. TRANSITION...... 135

Security Situation ...... 135

Economic Transition ...... 138

VIII. CONCLUSIONS...... 1^5

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 156

MAP WITH G A Z E T E E R ...... 162 LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE

I. ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND LOCATION OF GREEK BANDIT RESERVES ...... 6?

II. STRENGTH OF GREEK ARMED FORCES MAY 19^7.... 73

III. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES...... 131

IV, STRENGTH OF AMERICAN MISSION FOR AID TO GREECE...... 132

V. REPORTED DESTRUCTION AND DAMAGE ...... 139

VI. APPROPRIATIONS UNDER PL 271 AND 793 BOTH CONGRESS FOR ASSISTANCE TO GREECE . . , lU2 INTRODUCTION

Today the "Cold War" is some fifteen years old.

Perhaps it is drawing to a close, perhaps not. But the fact remains that the United States today is deeply committed to costly military assistance programs which include the maintenance of American military advisers in numerous foreign countries. American officers and enlisted men are being killed in the course of foreign military operations against indigenous guerrillas in what euphemistically are called counterinsurgency operations.

This thesis looks back to the first armed conflict between the "Free World" and the "Communist Camp"; to the place and time where today's military assistance program, the use of U. S. military advisers, and the current con­ cepts of counterinsurgency originated; to United States military assistance to Greece during the Anti-Bandit War,

19^7-^9« a review of the events of that little known war reveals that. Just as the Truman Doctrine served as a turning point in U. S. foreign policy, so military assistance to Greece served as the precursor of United States military

strategy for the cold war era. A study of the actions and

errors of the Communist guerrilla forces, the Greek National

Armed Forces and the United States military missions in

Greece during the period of the Anti-Bandit War holds many lessons that are applicable to today’s politico-military viii

environment. The purpose of this thesis is to examine

United States military assistance to Greece during this period. It is hoped that this examination highlights the

lessons which have applicability to today's international

situation.

The first two chapters provide background on the

Greek military operations of World War II and the political,

economic and military situation of Greece brought about by

World War II and its aftermath. The background information

is oriented primarily to establish the conditions prevail­

ing in Greece in the Spring of 19^7 at the time of United

States involvement. The third chapter shifts perspective

to the United States point of view and briefly discusses

the events leading to the Truman Doctrine. Primary emphasis

is on the military implications of this abrupt reversal of

United States peacetime isolationism. The next four

chapters examine United States military assistance to Greece

during the Anti-Bandit War. As a consequence, of the inter­

action of military, political and economic factors, the

Anti-Bandit War is presented in chronological sequence.

Within each period Communist activities and the correspond­

ing Greek National reactions are discussed. Where United

States influence came to bear an attempt is made to weigh

the impact of this influence and to analyze the subsequent

results. Conclusions are stated in the last chapter. IX

The first two chapters on World War II are essential to the thorough understanding of the Anti-Bandit War, From the point of view of research and source material, however.

World War II and the Anti-Bandit War have little in common.

World War II and its immediate aftermath have become a part of history and are exhaustively documented. One would have to look far to find a British Officer who had parachuted in­ to Greece in World War II who has not written a book on one or another of the Greek resistance movements. Greek writers of all political hues including Communist ELAS leaders have published books in English on World War II Greece. The

Office of the Chief of Military History U.S. Army, and the

Special Operations Research Office of American University have made exhaustive studies of the guerrilla operations of the period.

The Anti-Bandit War, on the other hand, is shrouded

in the uncertainty of contemporary Cold War relationships.

Virtually nothing has been written on it. Primary source material in English is limited to three now unclassified reports of the U. S. military agencies in Greece, several

studies published by the Greek Army, and the President's

reports to Congress on assistance to Greece and Turkey.

Secondary source material is also limited both in scope

and quantity. Four or five articles in Service Journals

written by military officers on specific aspects of the War, one general article by Marshall Papagos In Foreign Affairs. and selected chapters of books directed primarily at the later economic reconstruction of Greece comprise the secon­ dary sources. No. U. S. government agency has published an unclassified history of these military operations.

The name "Anti-Bandit War" probably has no official status in this country. It represents a translation of the Greek terminology with due deference to Greek nationalist pride. The Greeks vehemently object to any terminology vaguely resembling "Civil War", with the connotation that both sides are equally Greek. The term Anti-Guerrilla War would probably be acceptable to some but to the more ardent

Greek nationalist the term guerrilla connotes an organized military grouping fighting for a nationalist cause. Thus the ELAS of World War II could qualify as a guerrilla force but the "Democratic Army" of 19^7 could not. The Greeks who have a word for everything characterize the "guerrillas" of 19^7 as "bandits".

The main emphasis of the thesis, in so far as possible, is on the military aspects of the American Aid

Program to Greece and on the primarily military aspects of the Anti-Bandit War. Such emphasis is dictated by academic selectivity. But it soon becomes apparent that politico- economic factors are so interwoven into the chain of events as to make the segregation of military factors infeasible. One of the principal characteristics of the XI

Cold War era from the United States government's point of view has been the fusion of the so called military sector of national policy with that of the economic and foreign policy sectors so as to produce an integrated national security policy. The Anti-Bandit War as the opening cam­ paign of the Cold War provides an excellent example of the interaction of politico-economic factors and military fac­ tors. It is the belated American appreciation of this interrelationship that marks the Truman Doctrine as a major turning point of American Foreign Policy and marks

United States military assistance to Greece as the genesis of United States military strategy for the Cold War. xii

LIST OF FREQUENTLY USED ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are frequently used in this thesis. There is no lingual consistency in the deri­ vation of the abbreviations. Generally, abbreviations for organizations existing during the British aegis in Greece tend to be derived from the Greek language whereas the Americans tended to attach English language abbreviations to Greek organizations.

AMAG American Mission for Aid to Greece

AMFOGE Allied Mission for Observation of Greek Elections

DA Democratic Army (Post 19^6 Communist Army)

EAM National Liberation Front (A political front for the Greek Communists during World War II)

ECA/G Economic Cooperation Administration/Greece

EDES National Republican Greek League (A World War II anti-Communist resistance group)

EKKA National and Social Liberation (A World War II anti-Communist resistance group)

ELAS National Popular Liberation Army (Military Arm of EAM during World War II, dominated by Greek Communist Party)

GAF Greek Armed Forces

GNA Greek National Army

JUSMAGG Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group Greece

JUSMAPG Joint U. S. Military Advisory andPlanning Group

KKE Communist Party of Greece

NDC National Defense Corps (A post 19^7 auxilliary of the Greek National Army)

RHAF Royal Hellenic Air Force

RHN Royal Hellenic Navy

USAGG U. S. Army Group Greece CHAPTER I

WORLD WAR II — CONVENTIONAL COMBAT

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

One of the hardest problems concerned with discuss-

ing American Military Assistance to Greece is the estab­

lishment of meaningful chronological limits for background.

The situation which the United States faced in the Spring

of I9U7 when the first elements of the U, S. military mission arrived in Athens had its roots in tumultuous

earlier years. How far back to trace these roots without

examining the entire history of Greece is therefore an

arbitrary decision. The period of World War II has been

selected as the minimum requisite background to set the

stage for the arrival of the principal actor -- the mili­

tary elements of the American Mission for Aid to Greece

(AMAG). This chronological selection, albeit arbitrary,

provides a multi-dimensional perspective of how Greece

came to be what it was when the United States chose to

reverse its traditional attitude of peace-time isolationism.

Militarily, World War II and its aftermath was a

series of four somewhat disconnected campaigns, the last

of which was still smoldering when the United States arrived

on the scene. Economically, World War II and its aftermath

saw Greece move from a marginal existence through starvation 2

and desolation back to marginal existence and then start

a precipitous downward turn again. Politically, the

natural propensity of Greeks for politics coupled with the artificial geographical separations imposed by the German

occupation splintered the political center to ineffective­

ness and permitted the previously underground Communist

Party to assume militancy. On the international scene.

World War II presented many facets for Greece. It cemented

Anglo-Greek relations thereby assuring Greece's temporary

salvation apd at the same time established an incongruous

void with the U. S. S. R. which further contributed to this

salvation. In World War II's aftermath Greek national

relations with her Communi zed Balkan neighbors deteriorated

but at the same time permitted close cooperation between

these neighbors and the Greek Communist Party (KKE).

Ironically, Greek - U. S. relations were not an influence

in the main stream of events. Thus, the period of World

War II presents a sufficiently broad background on the

military, economic, and political situation of Greece in

1947 to serve the purposes of the thesis.

World War II and its aftermath, up to the point of

U. S. involvement, can be divided into two phases:

(1 ) The conventional combat phase, which consists

of the brilliant Greek resistance to the Italian

invasion (October 19^0 - April 19^1) and the abortive 3

Anglo-Greek efforts against the German invasion

(April - May 194l).

(2) The guerrilla combat phase, which consists of

the Greek guerrilla operations during the German

occupation of Greece (May 19^1 - October 1944) and

the Communist bandit activities against the British

supported legally constituted Greek government

(October 1944 - Spring 1947).

The first phase is the subject of the remainder of this chapter. The second phase of World War II forms the second chapter of this thesis. Within each of these phases an attempt is made to integrate the military, economic and political aspects of Greece's struggle so as to set the stage for the arrival of the United States on the seene in the Spring of 1947.

II. THE GREEK ITALIAN WAR

(OCTOBER 1940 - APRIL 194l)

On 28 October 1940, the Italians confronted the

Greek Government with a short term ultimatum accusing it of unneutral acts and more particularly of aiding the

British war effort. The ultimatum demanded that the whole of Greece be opened to Italian troops. Metaxas' famous answer "No" brought Greece into World War II along side of

Great Britain which had on 13 April 1939 offered Greece a guarantee of assistance. The Italian army, massed in 4

Albania, attacked before the expiration of the ultimatum.

In retrospect it would appear that Mussolini's decision to invade Greece was based on four factors.

First, Italy wanted to establish hegemony over Greece as a step toward the extention of Facist power in the Eastern

Mediterranean, Secondly, he estimated Greece to be weak and Britain to be neutralized in its home island. Thirdly, the Italian effort, under Graziani, to dominate North

Africa was falling short of II Duce’s expectations and

Italian prestige required bolstering. Finally, Hitler had ignored and hurt Mussolini by the German occupation of

Romania which clearly disturbed Italian concepts of the

Balkan status quo. According to the Ciano Diaries Mussolini stated ;

Hitler always faces me with a fait accompli. This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the papers that I have occupied Greece.^

The Italian attack did not infuriate Hitler as Mussolini presumably had hoped; however, something else did, some­ thing Mussolini could not have suspected at the time.

Langer and Gleason summarize their analysis of the early days of the Greco-Italian conflict by concluding "that the

Duces' transgression did not at the time appall Hitler . . .

Mussolini's crime was not that he attacked Greece, but that 2 he failed to conquer it."

The Italians had underestimated the Greeks and the 5

British, In a two week period the Greek Army completed its mobilization while limiting Italian progress to minor penetrations. On lU November 19^0, eighteen days after the Italian attack, the Greek Army launched a general offensive all along the front which was destined to drive the Italians back more than 30 miles into Albania by the end of the year. The British for their part reacted immedi­ ately, within their limited means, to assist the Greeks.

By 6 November the advance elements of five fighter and bomber squadrons had arrived in Greece and were gtopporting the Greek Army, In accordance with Greek request and

Churchill's intuitive strategic judgment, the British also occupied Crete with its naval and air bases dominating the

Eastern Mediterranean and Lemnos whose air bases threatened the Romanian oil fields. Churchill expresses his thinking succinctly in his discussion of the Italian attack: "One salient strategic fact leaped out upon us -- Crete!"

Three other events are worth noting at this point.

First, Turkey had diplomatically neutralized Bulgaria by warning her not to attack Greece. Secondly, as early as

November 19^0, Hitler had told Molotov that "Germany would at once oppose by military action any attempt by England

to get a foothold in Salonika. He still retained un­ pleasant memories of the World War I Salonika Front. Both

of these events will come into play in the next phase of 6 the war, but for the remainder of 19^0 and early 19^1 operations continued to go well for the Anglo-Greek allies. Finally, King George had appealed to the United

States for moral and material assistance. President

Roosevelt had on impulse replied that steps were being taken to extend assistance, but in fact the "arsenal of democracy" was not producing yet and the Greeks derived no material benefit from the sympathy and generous impulse 5 of the President and the American people. Nevertheless, as Langer and Gleason point out, American interest had been aroused.

While rejoicing in the successes of the Greeks and British, Americans came to appreciate the importance of Middle Eastern and Balkan problems and to under­ stand their bearing on the overall development of the conflict.

The Italians possessed superiority in air power, fire power, armor, motor transport and maintained a ground force superiority of 26 divisions to lU Greek divisions.

Despite this Italian superiority, the Greek Army maintained offensive operations throughout January and February of

19^1 driving the Italians back in six places along the

Albanian Front. As extolled by Churchill, "the Greek Army showed superior skill in mountain warfare, outmaneuvering and outflanking the enemy." These Greek victories were the highwater mark of Greek arms. Coupled with the British destruction of the Italian fleet at Taranto in November of 7

194o , and General Wavell's destruction of Marshall

Graziani *s Army at Sidi Barrani, they also represent the high water mark of Anglo-Greek success in the eastern

Mediterranean, Great Britain was destined to return inter­ mittently to peaks of grandeur in the Mediterranean hut for

Greece the road ahead led downward for eight long years.

But the Greeks were to gain one more victory.

Mussolini made a last effort to pull his own chestnuts out of the fire before Hitler could intervene. The Italian

Army attacked on 9 March 19^1, less than a month before

Hitler's invasion of Greece. The results are summarized by General Papagos as follows;

During this battle, which lasted sixteen days, the Greek Army smashed the full-scale offensive launched after great preparations and with powerful means by the Italian High Command, in the presence of Mussolini himself, in order to restore the prestige of Italian arms by winning a victory over the Greek Army before the impending German intervention materialized. De­ spite his overwhelming superiority and his powerful artillery and air support, the enemy proved unable in the course of this l6-day battle to gain even one inch of the ground occupied by the Greek forces. The result of this supreme Italian effort, which cost the enemy very heavy losses, was that the Italian Dictator left for Italy in secret to await the solution of the dilemma to which he had been reduced by the inter­ vention of his German allies.

III. THE GERMAN INVASION (APRIL - MAY 1944)

As early as January l4, 1941 General Wavell had come to Athens to discuss what then was considered the imminent

German invasion. The British desired at this time to 8 commence deployment of supporting troops to Greece. The

Greek position as stated in a note to the British Ambassa­ dor on 18 January 19U1 was.

The aid which is being offered to us . . . is absolutely inadequate, not to mention the complete absence of infantry forces. In consequence, whereas the transport of this force to Macedonia would consti­ tute a provocation causing the Germans and probably the Bulgare also to march against us, its inadequacy would make the failure of our resistance certain. Moreover, we have been categorically assured that Yugoslavia although at present resolved to defend her­ self against the possible passage of the Germany Army across her territory will withdraw the above mentioned assurance in the event of a German aggression provoked by the dispatch of British forces to Macedonia. On the other hand, the transport of this British force to Macedonia shall not take place unless the German troops, by crossing the Danube or the frontier of the Dobruja, penetrate into Bulgaria,^

To appreciate fully the Greek position it is necessary to understand that the two principal military avenues of approach into Greece from the north pass through Yugo­ slavia. The easternmost (Vardar Valley) isolates all of

Greek Thrace and Eastern Macedonia and leads directly

Greece's second largest city, the major port of Salonika.

The westernmost approach (Monastir Gap) penetrates into

Western Macedonia, bypassing the principal defense line of

Northern Greece (Olympus - Vermion - Kaimaktchalan) and

debouches onto the roads to Athens. After summarizing what he considered to be his courses of action. General

(later Marshall) Papagos states;

These conclusions clearly show how much the choice of a defensive position, as well as the general disposition of the Anglo-Greek forces in the event of a German intervention, depended on the future political attitude of Yugoslavia.^®

The British for their part realized the importance of establishing a Yugoslav-Turkish accord with Greece. In

Churchill’s words,

If at the wave of our wand Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey would all act together it seemed to us that Hitler might either let the Balkans off for the time being or become so heavily engaged with our combined forces as to create a major front in that theater.

It was soon evident, however, that Turkey would have none of it. On the other hand, negotiations and diplomatic discussions between the British or Greeks and the Yugoslavs continued intermittently without definitive agreement until too late to influence the military picture.

On the military side the British had consistently tried to talk the Greeks into withdrawing from Macedonia, falling back from Albania and consolidating a defensive line with the British against the imminent German attack.

During meetings in Athens on 22 February and 5 March

(after the Germans had entered Bulgaria and the British had

started to move into Greece), Mr. Eden tried in vain to talk Papagos into a more defensible posture. In a message to his Prime Minister on 5 March, Mr. Eden reported:

Papagos now proposed to hold the line of fortifi­ cations near the Macedonian frontier with four divisions, although he thought they could not hold out for long, and also simply to remain where he was on the Albanian front. .This seemed an admission of despair, as he himself practically admitted. We were finally offered 10 1 p three Greek divisions.

As British forces began arriving in Greece, Mr. Churchill became increasingly concerned over Greek dispositions and on l4 March cabled to Mr. Eden in Cairo,

Can you tell me why Papagos does not draw three or four divisions from Albania to strengthen his right front . . . Present strategic layout of Greek Army looks to me most dangerous. Papagos must have good reasons, and if you have learned them pray let me k now.^3

Papagos for his part continued to refuse to abandon

Macedonia as long as Yugoslavia showed any willingness to participate in the war on Greece’s side. He supported his stand by emphasizing the logistical importance of Salonika to the Yugoslav Army. On 25 March the government of Regent

Paul of Yugoslavia adhered to the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Tri­ partite Pact and was shortly thereafter overthrown by a coup d'Etat. The new government confirmed its intention to stand by the Anglo-Greek forces. A single military meeting among British, Greek and Yugoslav military repre­ sentatives was held on the r^ght of 3 April but no coordin­ ated plan was developed before the Germans struck on 6

April. It was then too late to extricate the isolated

Greek armies.

The proceeding discussion of Anglo-Greek relations prior to the German invasion points up three factors that will repeat themselves on the 1947-50 scene — the strategic importance of Yugoslavia to Greece and the capability of 11 the Greek government for independent thinking (or from an outside point of view intransigence) in the face of great power pressure. On the other hand, the Papagos who re­ appears in 1949 is a far wiser and more ammenahle commander than the Papagos of 1941.

Hitler's motivation for attacking Greece appears to have been fourfold; to secure lines of communication to the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa, to secure the southern flank of the forthcoming assault on Russia, to remove the air threat to the Romanian oil fields and to restore Axis prestige in the Mediterranean. The German Army attacked

Greece and Yugoslavia before dawn on 6 April 1941. Nine divisions were employed against Greece of which the entire mobile element, 3 Panzer Divisions and 1 Motorized Regi­ ment, was committed through Yugoslavia and entered Greece via the previously mentioned Vardar Valley and Monastir Gap.

The Yugoslav Army defending southern Yugoslavia adjacent to

Greece was not fully mobilized at the time of the German

attack and was unable to halt the Panzer attack which

pivoted into Greece on 8 and 9 April. The entire Yugoslav

Army had capitulated by 17 April, The Greeks for their

part fared little better. Of the twenty Greek divisions,

four were cut off defending the Bulgarian border, fourteen

were cut off still fighting a "victorious" battle against

the Italians in Albania and only two Joined the British 12

Expeditionary Force in the decisive central sector. It is

interesting to note that the Greek Army in Albania

surrendered to the Germans before the Italians had reached

Greek soil. It could be speculated that Greek martial pride played a role in Papagos ' decision not to redeploy these forces.

The British forces consisting of the British 1st

Armored Brigade, the 2nd New Zealand Division and the 6th

Australian Division were almost fully motorized, but their

equipment was suitable for desert warfare, not for the

steep mountain roads in Greece,The weakness of each

successive British position was that it could be outflanked.

By 13 April the two ill-equipped Greek divisions with the

British had disintegrated and the British Expeditionary

Force stood alone. From this point, the British conducted

a series of stubborn and skillful rear-guard actions lead­

ing to their evacuation of Greece. The Greek Army held off

its formal surrender until 2k April at which time the

British commenced their evacuation. During the five day

period thereafter the Royal Navy evacuated some U0,000 or

do per cent of the British Expeditionary Force, and some

10,000 Greeks and others. This evacuation was conducted

under conditions more adverse than Dunkirk in as much as

the Germans had complete air superiority and the German Army

was pressing harder at the embarkation areas. Some of the 13 evacuated Greeks went on to Crete where another battle was still to be fought — a battle that will go down in history but which is not germane to this paper. Some of the Greeks were evacuated to Egypt where they were to play a role in the next phase of the war. The situation had now reached a precipitous decline from the high water mark of Anglo-

Greek success only sixty days ago. The Anglo-Greek team

had been defeated. Furthermore, Rommel had seized Benghazi and Bardia and was threatening Egypt. The British were

fearful for the safety of Crete, Gibralter and Syria.

Before turning to the next phase, the occupation of

Greece, it is interesting to ask why the British Expedi­ tionary Force came to Greece in face of the certainty

that Papagos was not deploying his forces to adequately

counter the German threat, Eden himself in the 5 March

cable to Mr. Churchill which already has been quoted in

part acknowledges the unsoundness of the adopted solution

but added that "At the worst, it should always be possible

to make a fighting withdrawal from this line through

country eminently suitable for rearguard action,

Perhaps the best answer comes from non-British

sources. Sherwood answers the question this way.

The British had to face the grim decision either of leaving the Greeks to their unavoidable fate, or of sending in reinforcements which could not possibly be strong enough to render more than token aid. Churchill chose the latter and more honorable but Il*

hopeless alternative, and took the consequences.^^

And in the words of an American military man, written for the President during the course of the battle.

It was essential, in my opinion, for the British to send an army to support Greece. There was a chance that Yugoslavia could offer effective re­ sistance; Turkish backs needed stiffening; Russia has been influenced by this move, and finally abandoning Greece to its fate, after the great help they have already given to Britain, would have been an action so base and immoral that reenforcing them was necessary, regardless of its influence on the future of Britain. It is doubtful if the Greeks and the British can withstand the Germans and hold on to any part of Greece. CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

^Ciano Diaries, cited by William L. Langer and 8 . Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War (New York; Harper, 1953), p. 10?. 2 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War. p, 107.

^Winston S, Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 19^9), p. 534.

^Raymond J. Sontag (ed.), Nazi-Soviet Relations (Washington; U. S. Department of State, 1948), p. 232.

^Langer and Gleason, op_. cit.. p. Il8 .

^Ibid.

^Churchill, 0£^. cit.. p. 549.

^Alexander Papagos , The Battle of Greece 1940-41, trans. Eliascos (Athens; The J. M, Scazikis Alpha Editions, 1949) 9 Written note handed by the Greek Government to the British Ambassador in Athens on January l8 , 1944 cited in Papagos, ££. cit., p. 399.

^Opapagos, Ojg_. cit.. p. 320.

^^Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 95.

^^Ibid.. p. 99.

l^Ibid.. p. 109.

^^United States Army, The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Washington; Office of Chief of Military History, 1952), p. 118.

^^Churchill, The Grand Alliance. p. 100.

^^Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York; Harper, 1948), p. 275. 16

^^Memo of Admiral R, K, Turner to Admiral Stark, dated April 12, 19^1 approved by him and forwarded to President Roosevelt, cited in Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 415, CHAPTER II

THE OCCUPATION AND AFTERMATH - GUERRILLA COMBAT

I. THE OCCUPATION (MAY 19^1 - OCTOBER 1944)

The evacuation of the last British units from the mainland of Greece on 30 April 1944 left the nation under the heel of the Axis. The period that followed had many ramifications which bore directly on the situation at the time of American intervention in 194?, The period of the occupation takes on different appearances, depending upon the perspective from which it is viewed. In great, over­ simplification these perspectives can be summarized as follows. The British Middle Eastern Command at Cairo attempted to amalgamate evacuated Greek elements and re­ sistance elements inside occupied Greece into the war effort against the Axis, The Greek government in exile

(primarily in London or Cairo) attempted to maintain a political and military contribution to the British war effort while at the same time influencing occupied Greece and planning for the future administration of that nation,

British officers parachuted into Greece, attempted to carry out instructions on the war effort but became more and more involved in the crux of the Greek dilemma - the political dissentions that destroyed the unity of the Greek people. In Greece itself, the splintered political center 18 found refuge in the major urban areas and plotted and planned for the political future with but ineffective con­ cern for resistance, the political right headstrongly con­ cerned itself with only resistance, and the political left tenaciously devoted itself to the efficient build up of a well integrated political and resistance organization.

Finally, the British Government and its Prime Minister developed an overlook of the Greek situation which trans­ cended the war effort and with clairvoyance unusual for the

"Grand Alliance" pursued a course which anticipated the

"Cold War" of later years.

"The Greeks rival the Jews in being the most politi­ cally minded race in the world.These words of Churchill sum up part of the dilemma in which the Greeks soon found themselves. This Judgment should probably be tempered by

Woodhouse's caution that Greece like other nations has a horizontal line crossing all political parties which divides the politically conscious and politically unconscious.

Specifically in the Greek mountains, peasants were fighting for one resistance group or another with no deep political conviction and "nothing to decide them except the first glib tongue that rached their ears from above (the hori- 2 zontal line)." Further, to complicate matters McNeill contends :

Many a man liked to have a foot in both camps, so that no matter who might win the war, he would be able to put a bold front forward and claim to have been a 19

loyal supporter of the victor from the beginning. An amazing and incredibly complicated maze of espionage and counterespionage developed from this situation.^

It is necessary to an understanding of the political tur­ moil of the occupation to remember that the Greek Consti­ tution had been suspended in 1936 by General Metaxas who had also driven the Greek Communist Party and other politi­ cal leaders underground. Metaxas for all the good he had done for Greece was still a dictator. The Monarchy had sanctioned this dictatorship and thus was associated in the minds of the people with the loss of civil liberties and, even worse, the loss of the war. The German occupation denied cohesion to the diverse factions within and between urban, rural and emmigre elements of the Greek nation at the time they were striving most for political expression.

The immediate result was a splintering into myriad political groupings. The ultimate result was a bipolarization into extreme left and extreme right.

Upon the unstable political arena the spectre of starvation, inflation and black market was soon superimposed.

One researcher describes the economic situation prevalent during the period in these words, "The condition of the masses in the cities was particularly pitiable and the sight of people dying of starvation in the streets became common­ place."^ These desperate political and economic conditions were propitious to the rise of all types of extremist

causes particularly Communism, 20

■ The Communist Party of Greece (KKE), long accustomed to underground operation, had responded to the occupation by forming in September of ip4l the National Liberation

Front (EAM), a political coalition dominated by them. By

April of 1942, EAM was ready to announce the formation of

the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS). This Army was

controlled by the hard core of KKE but by no means did

Communists form a majority or even a significant number of

the rank and file. It is interesting to note that ELAS was

commanded by a "troika" consisting of Atanasios Klaras

(Aris), a die hard Communist, General Sarafis, a respected

anti-monarchist and a communist political advisor. To many

ELAS offered the only opportunity to fight the invader, to

others it gave vent to anti-monarchist or anti-Metaxas

feelings; still others fell for the Communist line. What­

ever the motivation of the ranks, the leadership organized

a disciplined and effective guerrilla force which soon be­

came the largest (20,000) force in Greece, Colonel Wood-

house, a British officer with the British (later Allied)

Military Mission in Greece during the occupation, in dis­

cussing ELAS concludes that fighting the Germans was a

secondary though not negligible consideration for the

leaders.^

There were numerous other resistance organizations

but the alphabet soup of Greek resistance is not germane 21 to the post war situation other than to identify the two closest competitors of EAM/ELAS, The National Republican

Greek League (EDES) was formed in the summer of 19^2 in

Epirus (the north eastern section of Greece along the

Albanian border), EDES had little political cohesion with­ in its ranks and little coordination between the political elements in Athens and the army in the mountains. General

Zervas, the militarily competent leader, proved to be a political opportunist and moved politically from an initial position of left of center to the royalist right in corre­ sponding degree with the depredations of EAM/ELAS, EDES probably never reached a strength in excess of 5,000 but was better at fighting Germans and obeying British orders than ELAS. One other organization, the National and Social

Liberation (EKKA) under a Colonel Psaros,should be mentioned.

It numbered only a thousand or so fighters and was initially politically center (which in those days meant anti-communist and anti-monarchist) until hatred of Communism drove it toward the right. As ELAS became more brutal, numerous other organizations sprang up and the ranks of the German sponsored security battalions swelled with Greeks primarily motivated by anti-Communist sympathies. However, anti­ communists had no integrated organization, no common leader and no political cohesion.

The British established liaison with both ELAS and 22

EDES in the autumn of 1942 and through the British Military

Mission to Greece, maintained contact with or supplied them both throughout the war. In November 19^2, the British succeeded in getting General Zervas (EDES) and Aris (ELAS) to cooperate with British demolition teams in the destruc­ tion of the Gorgopotamos Viaduct (a vital railroad bridge located 70 miles south of Lamia on the German supply line from Salonika to Pireaus harbor and onward to Rommel in

Africa) in what turned out to be the only successful cooperation of the rivals EDES and ELAS.^ In Spring of

19^3 separate sabotage efforts of both EDES and ELAS con­ tributed to Allied preparations for the Sicilian campaign.

This sabotage resulted in the movement to Greece of two additional German divisions which might have been used in

Sicily, but as Churchill sadly relates.

This, however, was the last direct military contribution which the Greek guerrillas made to the war, and henceforward the scene was dominated by the struggle to gain political power at the end of hostilities.'

During the same spring, ELAS had started to assassin­ ate rival guerrilla leaders and in May of 19^3 launched military operations against EKKA. The principal British effort was transferred from getting the Greeks to kill Ger­ mans to keeping the Greeks from killing each other. The first of many of these efforts was the "National Bands" agreement of July 19^3 in which ELAS, EDES and EKKA all 23 recognized each other and their subordination to GHQ Middle

East, However, the surrender of the Italian forces in

Greece in September 19^3 provided ELAS, which obtained the

Italian equipment, a marked material superiority over their rivals. Subsequently, ELAS acting on political intelligence that the Italian capitulation would cause immediate German withdrawal, tipped their hand and attacked EDES in October

1943. This fratricidal struggle lasted until February 1944 when the British by ceasing arms shipments to ELAS again established an uneasy armistice, the so-called Plaka Armis­ tice.

To further the nations distress, the period during and after the Italian surrender proved to be the most brutal of the occupation period. In August 1943 the Germans officially announced that for every German soldier killed g in Greece no less than fifty Greeks would be executed. In the villages reprisals extended beyond mass executions to burning and leveling the entire village and it is estimated that as high as a fourth of all the buildings in Greece were damaged to some degree.^

To digress briefly, the strained ties between the

Greek mountains and the Greek Government in Exile should be mentioned. As early as March 1943 a manifesto had been sent from Athens to Cairo asking the King not to return until after a plebiscite had been held. In August 1943 a 2U delegation representing both EAM and EDES had gone to Cairo to plead the same cause, and in addition to demand several cabinet seats in the Exile Government. The Exile Govern­ ment's position in both cases had been clear. The King promised elections and a plebiscite after his return.

Meanwhile, EAM propaganda plus natural anti-royalist senti­ ment had been taking effect in the Greek armed forces in the Middle East, When after the Plaka Armistice, EAM set up a Greek Government in the mountains it served as a signal for the Greek armed forces in the Middle East to serve political demands on the Exile Government and subsequently to mutiny in April. The mutiny was put down by British and Royal Greek arms. In Greek periodization of the Commun­ ist attempts to seize power the suppression of the Middle

East Mutiny is considered the end of "round one" which had commenced in the mountains in 1942, The mutiny, however abortive, did cause the Government in Exile to become more concerned about a representative government. Subsequently, the new Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou, agreed in the Lebanon conference of May 17 , 1944 to accept representation from all parties both inside and outside Greece.

Back in the Greek mountains, the communist strategy of alternating attack with negotiation, which later was to become so well known, was playing out an early rehearsal.

The Plaka Armistice of February was broken in April of 19^4 25 when ELAS, again anticipating German withdrawal, attacked for the second time EKKA, which had rebuilt its strength after the previous May's similar attack. This time there would be no return, EKKA's forces were slaughtered or scattered and its commander. Colonel Psaros, murdered.

The next British attempt at reconcilliation occurred in the

Caserta agreement of September 1944 when military plans were developed for the harrassment of the anticipated Ger­ man withdrawal from Greece. In General Wilson's words.

It was agreed that all guerrilla forces should come under orders of Sccbie who was now nominated G . 0, C, Forces in Greece by the Greek Government. The two guerrilla leaders (Serafis, ELAS, and Zervas, EDES) also agreed between themselves to end past rivalries, to form a national union and prevent their followers from taking the law in their own hands ; with regard to their relations with Scobie they undertook that they would take no action in Athens without his direct orders.

The final proof of ELAS' intentions with regard to the

Caserta agreement occurred after the German withdrawal of

October 1944. General Saraphis, whose position was then

Commander of GHQ, ELAS is cynically direct in his recording

of the events.

On the same day (1 December 1944) we received the ELAS Central Committees Order No. 2, which informed us that in the Central Committee's opinion, Zervas would transfer forces to Athens and asked us to take the necessary measures .... GHQ's tasks were to be the disbanding of Zervas' and Tsaous Andons guerrilla forces , . . .Speedy action against Zervas had special priority so as to prevent the transfer of his forces to Athens.

EDES (Zervas) which was in the process of demobilizing in 26 accordance with the Caserta Agreement was attacked and annihilated by ELAS in December 1944.

To summarize the period of the occupation, McNeill uses these words which serve to place the period in per­ spective as it affects the aftermath of the war.

Three and a half years of occupation then brought unmitigated disaster to Greece. The quisling Govern­ ment decayed steadily, losing power and efficiency until it became entirely helpless by 1944. Economically, a sort of false prosperity followed the famine of 1941, but after mid-1943 unchecked inflation began, prices rose astronomically, and in the end the currency became worthless so that economic exchange reverted to a barter basis. Losses from retaliatory destruction were heavy and grew ever more serious. But perhaps the most irreparable damage of all was the hurt done to the Greek spirit. The country became hopelessly divided against itself.

Before turning to the aftermath of the war, one major question remains to be answered. Where did the Soviet

Union fit into the picture of Greek Communism at this time?

It" sé'ëms rather incongruous that the pro Soviet anti—British

Communist Party of Greece should not have received some modicum of support from the Soviet Union. It is known that EAM/ELAS congresses as early as the summer of 1943 were attended by representatives of Bulgaria, Albania and

Yugoslavia and that ELAS troops operated in Albania and

Yugoslavia when attacking Zervas in 1944, Indeed, Stephan

Xydis in his recently published penetrating analysis,

"Greece and the Great Powers," makes the point that as the

Soviet armies prepared to descend into the Balkans in 27 early 1944, the Soviets started to challenge the British position in Greece, Xydis admits that his case is based on a "logic of the situation" approach and an analysis of the "subtle and intricate interplay" between the KKE and l4 Soviet tactics ae revealed through the Communist press.

Nevertheless, operational ties between the Soviet

Union and ELAS never became visibly operative. McNeill states "there is no evidence of Russian advice affecting the day to day policy of the Greek resistance movement.

It is true that a Soviet Military Mission of eight officers headed by a Colonel Popov parachuted into the ELAS area in

July of 1944. But Colonel Popov apparently was not im­ pressed with what the Greeks showed him and according to

Colonel Woodhouse,

Neither on the military nor the political level does it seem likely that a favorable report on EAM/ ELAS went to Moscow, The Soviet Government was at that time more concerned over the successful prosecution of the war against Germany than over Balkan ideologies,

On the highest levels of government. Prime Minister

Churchill for some time had been interested in establishing agreement with Stalin on "spheres of influence" which would provide for British hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean.

President Roosevelt who heretofore "had given Churchill a free hand in dealing with the Greek quarrels"^^ concurred with this Churchillian return to great power diplomacy despite the fact that United States foreign policy opposed 28

on principle such an undertaking, (Roosevelts' concurrence had been sent in the absence of and without informing his

Secretary of State). When the U. S. and British ambassa­

dors went to inform Stalin on September 23, 19^4 of the plan for the forthcoming British occupation of Greece,

Stalin remarked that he thought the plan all right and that l8 it was high time that it be executed. During Mr.

Churchill's visit to Moscow in October of 1944, he broached

the subject directly with Stalin. Churchill recounts his

words and Stalin's response as follows:

Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria, We have interests, missions and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?

While this was being translated I wrote (it) out on a half-sheet of paper . , . , I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the trans­ lation, There was a slight pause. Then, he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to sit down.

Stalin confirmed this arrangement to General de Gaulle on

the letter's visit to Moscow in December of 1944 saying in

response to a question on Greece,

The Russians have not penetrated there, leaving it to the British troops and ships. To know what is happening in Greece, you should therefore address yourself to the British,

Faced with the evidence that Stalin agreed to stay

out of Greece and the lack of evidence that he violated 29 this agreement, it is interesting to surmise why. Perhaps he was honest, perhaps he was too busy elsewhere or perhaps he was never caught, Mr, George Kennan puts forth another

answer -- that Stalin had an inferiority complex that lead

him to fear repudiation by foreign Communist leaders better

educated and more cosmopolitan than himself and.

That he was generally hesitant to encourage foreign communist parties to attempt to seize power , . . , His hopes for the advancement of Soviet power rested primarily on two factors over which he felt himself in a position to exert greater personal control than over revolutionary activities of foreign communist parties. The first of these was the expansion of Russia's own industrial and military power. The second was the exploitation of differences between the great powers of the capitalist w o r l d , 21

Mr. Kennan elaborates on Stalin's fear of successful rival

foreign Communist leaders uniting against him in a later

book as follows:

From this, there came his aversion to really spon­ taneous and successful revolutions by any of the for­ eign communist parties. He recognized clearly that so long as these parties remained struggling opposi­ tion groups, caught in the network of their own semi­ criminal defiance of established authority within their respective countries, they would have a dependence on Soviet support -- a dependence which he as head of the Soviet state could exploit in order to keep them under control, , . . If, on the other hand, they we?e actually to come into power and to achieve the ability to dispose, as he was now able to dispose, over the resources of a great country, this dependence would be lost.22

As Robert V. Daniels points out in support of Kennan's

thesis :

When the power vacuum created by the military defeat of Germany at the end of World War II offered an 30

opportunity for expansion of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, it was the Red Army and Moscow trained East European exiles who formed the instruments of ex­ pansion not revolution by local communist parties.23

This point of view seems to have some validity for it would appear that a small amount of Soviet assistance might have tipped the scales in December of 1944, so close was

ELAS to control over the entire Greek homeland.

The next few years, the period between the German evacuation of October 1944 and the United States interven­ tion of Spring 1947, hear our Feis' succinct summary,

Despite Stalin's aloofness, the Greek Communists were going to make the title which Churchill gained in Moscow -- a free hand in the direction of Greek affairs — a shaky one.

II. THE GREEK-BRITISII DILEMMA

(OCTOBER 1944 - SPRING 1947)

It is perhaps an academic question when or whether

World War II ended for Greece. The one certainty is that fighting did not end in Greece.

The German army initiated its long awaited evacua­ tion of Greece in early October 1944, British units landed in Greece on 4 October 1944. By 12 October the

Germans had evacuated Athens with the British hard on their heels and by early November the last Germans had left Greece. In Churchill's words. 31

Greece was in ruins. The Germans destroyed roads and railroads as they withdrew northward .... Everywhere was want and dissention. Finances were disordered and food exhausted. Our own military re­ sources were stretched to the limit.^5

Xydis provides a dramatically confirmatory and vivid description of the ruins of Greece which faced the new government,

Tremendous difficulties caused hy the three and a half years of enemy occupation and by the new, last- minute devastation wrecked by the departing Germans, confronted the Government of National Unity of George Papandreau when it returned to Athens on October l8. Greece was entire Europe in miniature, its sea-carved land deeply etched with the corrosives of war, its seven-and- a-half million people, bodies starved, minds split, senses dazed, emerging from the horror of a nightmare turned true into a new reality of harsh light and dark shadows. Its body politic­ lacerated by still gaping, suppurating wounds in­ flicted by the enemy occupation as well as by that civil division would soon culminate in new fratrec idal strife — was like the world in microcosm moving spasmodically toward a new era. The years of occupation had left the country in a state little short of disasterous. Villages had been burned down or razed to the ground; about a quarter of the buildings were damaged or destroyed. The cultivated acreage had fallen by twenty-five per cent. Because of the lack of raw materials, industry had come to a standstill. Communications were in a state of complete chaos. A large percentage of Greek shipping had been sunk. Established patterns of production had been dislocated, and the entire basis of the Greek balance of payments had toppled. The Axis powers and puppet governments had liberally resorted to the printing press for money. Inflation had reached heights surpassed only by Germany during the decade between 1913 and 1923.

The principal and most urgent problem after the

German withdrawal was internal security. The crucial issue of how to implement the provisions of the Caserta Agreement 32 concerning the disbanding of guerrilla forces had boiled down to two opposing and irreconcilable positions. The proposed solutions were fought with danger of an open re­ volt by EAM. Churchill believed that:

The only chance of averting civil war was to disarm the guerrillas and other forces by mutual agreement and establish a new National Army and police force under the direct control of the government in Athens. '

The Greek Right in consonance with the British view insisted that all "guerrilla units" be demobilized and that the two major combat units of the Greek Army in exile, the 3d Moun­ tain (Rimini) Brigade (which had been fighting in Italy and had captured Rimini) and the Sacred Squadron (composed of some 800 officers who had fought in the Middle East) be utilized as the cadre for the new Greek Army. EAM, on the other hand, insisted that all units be demobilized and a new National Army be formed from scratch, or as a compromise, equal numbers of units from ELAS and the Right be main­ tained to form the cadre of the new Army. Needless to say,

ELAS was dominated by the KKE and the Rimini Brigade and

Sacred Squadron were both, since the Mutiny of April 1?44, violently anti-Communist and pro—monarchist. The wobbly

coalition government of Papandreou which had arrived in

Athens on I8 October could not resolve this issue. Indeed

it is probable that no government could have solved it for the decisive issue of control of ultimate power was at

stake. 33

General Scobie, the British commander in Athens, tiring of the endless bickering and indecision of the Greek cabinet, on 1 December ordered General Sarafis (ELAS) and

General Zervas (EDES) to disband their guerrilla forces by 10 December, The next day the six EAM Ministers in

Papandreou's cabinet resigned in protest of General

Scobies' order, McNeill objectively analyzes the situation when he says, "The disarmament question was only the stimu­ lus for an open collision of what had long been irrecon- o A cilable wills," On 3 December an EAM demonstration in

Athens got out of control of the police and in the ensuing 2 9 melee at least seven were killed. (Sarafis (ELAS) con­ tends that there were 28 dead and more than 100 wounded. )^*^

A new era of violence was upon Greece within a month of the long awaited "liberation". On 6 December ELAS attacked the government building in Athens and coincidental­ ly any British troops that may have been guarding them.

The next ten days saw ELAS constrict the Anglo-Greek forces into an ever tightening perimeter. By the l6th of December the area controlled by British forces had been reduced to a mile long and six block wide section in the center of

Athens, and a few strong points at the nearby airport and harbor. The 3d Greek Mountain Brigade was surrounded in its barracks area. At this their high water mark, ELAS con­ trolled all of Greece except as noted.

By now, two complete British divisions and an Indian 34

Brigade were being rushed from Italy and the tide of battle began to turn. On Christmas Day, Prime Minister Churchill himself arrived to "reinforce" the beleagered troops.

Field Marshall Alexander had cabled the Prime Minister on 21 December,

It is my opinion that the Greek problem cannot be solved by military measures. The answer must be found in the political field, , , , I am convinced that further military action after we have cleared the Athens-Piraeus area is beyond our present strength.

During his Christmas visit, Churchill made two far-reaching decisions: one political, the other military. Politically, he was able to mastermind an agreement between the Greek politicians including ELAS representatives to accept the

Archbishop of Greece, Damaskinos, as Regent effective

1 January 1945. Militarily he ordered the British Military

Command to launch offensive operations to clear the Athens area of ELAS. Anglo-Greek attacks were successful in driving ELAS from the area and on 11 January ELAS sued for an armistice.

In the resultant Varkiza Agreement ELAS agreed to give up all arms to the British. It was further stipulated that the new Army would be recruited by age groups with professional soldiers trained in modern weapons (i.e., the

Third Brigade and Sacred Squadron) serving as the cadre.

Both sides also agreed to a plebiscite followed by an elec­ tion under Allied supervision. The Varkiza Agreement marked 35 the end of "round two". It is probable at this time that

EAM/ELAS thought they could win a majority at the polls.

They did not reckon with the public reaction against the terrorist tactics employed by ELAS since the liberation.

During this period numerous atrocities and brutal reprisals had been committed by ELAS, For example, documented reports were printed of 200 deaths within one column of 800 hostages taken by ELAS, Another report that 500 of 800 prisoners who surrendered to ELAS had been murdered was circulated.

One of the more gorey episodes related that "batches of

15 to 20 hostages were brought to the north-east corner of the (Peristeri) cemetary every day by ELAS and murdered — in all, 1,200 to 1,500 people were executed, mostly with 3 2 knives and axes." Although atrocities were not limited to the Communists alone they greatly undermined the EAM/

ELAS cause and caused a violent anti-Communist reaction among the population. Woodhouse concludes that, "At the

end of 1945, the right was as dominant in Greece as the

left had been at the end of 1943."^^

Only the most cursory and admittedly oversimplified

coverage of the ensuing Greek political dilemma will be

attempted. The center (still defined as neither monarchist

nor Communist) had been largely dissipated by the war. The

victory of the right (monarchist) over the left (now

Communist dominated) subsequently had been accomplished by 36

force of arms. This directly settled two major problems,

public order and national defense and indirectly partially

settled a third, the form and composition of the govern­ ment. But political cohesion of the right and uneasy

cooperation with the surviving center was limited to an

ant i-Communist motivation. Where this stimulus was not

present Greek politics reverted to their former bitter

animosities. Thus, the nations critical problems of re­

lief from starvation, economic recovery and financial

stability eluded the grasp of one government after another.

During. 19^5 four Prime Ministers (Plastiras, Voulgaris,

Kanellopoulos and Sophoulis) under the Regent wrestled

with the political problems of elections and plebiscites

to the practical exclusion of the pressing economic prob­

lems. That Greece was not starving was due largely to

foreign assistance. Initially a special organization known

as Military Liaison Greece had assumed responsibility for

relief. Then, in April of 19^5 UNRRA took over. By April

of 1946 UNRRA was delivering one pound per person per day

of foods, certainly enough to sustain the population. But

in the reconstruction and rehabilitation area no foreign

initiative was yet forthcoming and no Greek government was

able to overcome political bickering sufficiently to make

progress. In the fiscal area inflation was running rampant.

Despite these critical conditions, the main political 37 issue became the order between plebiscite and election and the timing thereof. Largely as a result of Allied pressure Greek elections were held on 31 March 19^6 under the supervision of the Allied Mission for Observation of

Greek Elections (AMFOGE) consisting of U. S., U. K, and

French delegations. It will be remembered that Stalin had refused at Potsdam to participate in the supervision of the

Greek elections stating that it would "show a want of con­

fidence in the honesty of the Greek people.It was soon

apparent that Stalin would not desire such a precedent for his sphere of influence. As a result of these Greek elec­ tions a government was formed by Tsaldaris pledged to re­

store the monarchy, restore law and order, support Greece's

territorial claims and foster economic recovery. As an

indication of the problems connected with economic recovery

it should be pointed out that over 50 % of the first

Tsaldaris budget went for national defense and internal

security -- in other words, it was preordained that there

could be no significant economic recovery. It was also

preordained that the 1 September plebiscite would recall

the King who returned to Athens for the first time on 27

September 19^6. McNeill describes the Greek political scene

at this time in succinct summary.

By concentrating public attention first upon an election that settled nothing, then upon a plebiscite that was a foregone conclusion, little was contributed towards the survival of the Greek State.35 38

Although Athens is the center and hub of all Greek seen life, it has been /that when Athens is paralyzed, as it was during the occupation, the mountains take matters in their own hands. It is most pertinent to the background of

American intervention to follow the developments in the countryside of Greece during the post occupation paralysis of the capital. The Greek Army General Staff contends that ,

The decision to continue to fight to overthrow the Government by force was taken before Varkiza and the necessary orders were issued: To hide arms To maintain Armed Communist Cells on the mountains To send Communists to neighboring Communist countries to train new cadres To reorganize the party and non-party communist members and organizations on a military basis.36

General Papagos cites the Varkiza Agreement as "an example of the Communist tactic of a provisional withdrawal in order to renew the attack later under more propitious o Y circumstances." ' Hard core Communists or criminals who could not expect to benefit by the partial amnesty pro­ visions of Varkiza remained in the mountains where they eventually would join the "third round.

After Varkiza, the KKE sent potential Greek Communist leaders into Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia for training.

The Greek estimates of the numbers involved during 19^5 run as high as 8,000,^^ although an independent estimate 39 of 4,000^^ would appear more plausible. The Moscow-trained prewar leader of the KKE, Nicholas Zakhariadhis, who had spent the war in a German concentration camp, returned to

Greece in May 19^5 and displaced George Siantos, the war­ time leader of the Party, McNeill places great emphasis on this change, stating:

This shift represented the assertion of control by leaders trained and directed by Moscow as against the more independent "home grown" leadership which Siantos had embodied

Woodhouse emphasizes the same point:

The restored Secretary-General, being less aware than his predecessor of domestic Greek feeling, was correspondingly more sympathetic to Soviet policy. The coordination of policy with other Balkan Communists was no longer in doubt, nor was the intimacy of the KKE's affiliation to Moscow.

At this time the coordination between Greek and

Yugoslav Communist Parties became very close. Certain

elements of both parties splintered into a "Macedonian

Communist Party" and advocated the oft proposed "Autonomous

Macedonia" to the embarrassment of both the KKE and Tito.

Bands of Slav autonomous Macedonians conducted raids in

Greece in the summers of 19^5 and 19^6,^^ The "Macedonian

question" will subsequently reappear and prove to be a

significant factor in the ultimate downfall of the KKE.

As a result of his research, Xydis chronologically

places the decision of the KKE to launch the "third round"

of its campaign to take control of Greece in February 19^6. 4o

Specifically at the February 12 Plenum, the Central

Committee of the KKE approved the Greek Politburo plans for the military and technical preparations required for the take over. Xydis further reveals that Zachariadis later stated that this decision was taken "with the explicit assurance of Tito that he would provide substantial aid," and that "without this promise, there would have been no hh resort to the armed struggle."

Bandit activity in the mountains broke out on an increased scale in the Spring of 19^6 partly as a result U 5 of the March elections. Utilizing the returning officers from the northern training camps and exploiting continuing economic distress and political instability, the KKE launched a planned program of terrorism to secure recruits and supplies as well as to disrupt the economy. The initial attacks were on isolated officials and right wing citizens.

Then, as the gendarmerie (a police force responsible for all areas not covered by metropolitan police forces) dispensed to protect citizens the isolated gendarmerie detachments were attacked. In September, after the return of King George there was a marked upturn of bandit activity.

McNeill writes that.

The Communist leaders in Athens openly acknowledged their connection with these bands and claimed that ten thousand men had again taken to the hills of Greece, forming a new ELAS which would combat the monarchO- Facist government of Greece. ° Ui

The gendarmerie was soon forced to consolidate its personnel thus exposing small villages to bandit plunder and forced recruitment techniques. In December 19^6,

"General" Markos Vafiades, a former political commissar of

ELAS was made commander in chief of the postwar communist guerrilla forces. These forces took the name of The

Democratic Army" (DA), It is interesting to observe that attacks on villages were not limited to Northern Greece.

It has been speculated that the Democratic Army was attempt­ ing to create the public impression in support of the U. N. offensives being conducted by the Soviet bloc that the raids represented a nationwide "civil war" . By the end of 19^6 the bandits were attacking gendarmerie posts of

30 or 4o men and by the time the United States became involved in the Spring of 19^7, the bandits had grown bold enough to attack Greek Army frontier posts along the northern borders. It is estimated that by the spring the strength of DA had grown to between l4,000 and 17,000.^^

Fortunately for the scholar, the entire Greek security problem and more particularly the border incidents of the "bandit" attacks on frontier outposts had been put in the hands of the United Nations. If it were not for this, it would probably be impossible today to unravel the mass of conflicting evidence and claims and counterclaims.

United Nations records provide much factual data on the k2

"Greek Problem" and will be referred to again after the United

States intervention. It is pertinent at this point to review briefly the U. N. activities prior to March of 19I+T.

The first Greek case. . . . had come before the Security Council as a result of a letter of the Representative of the U.S.S.R. on January 21, 19^6 . . i charging that the presence of British troops in Greece was a threat to international peace and security. . . . the charge was not substantiated. The second case was brought to the attention of the Security Council by a cable from the Ukranian Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 2U, 19U6 .... charging that the policy of the Greek Government had produced a situation in the Balkans endangering international peace and security .... once more the Security Council declined to accept the thesis presented by the Soviet representative. The problem of Greece came before the Security Council for the third time on December 3, 19^6 when the Delegate of Greece . . . requested that the Security Council give early consideration to a situation which it charged was leading to friction between Greece and itsIts northernnor neighbors, Albania,ind Bulgaria and Yug<;oslavia.5®

As a result of the Greek request a Commission of Investi­ gation was established to ascertain the facts relating to the alleged border violations along the jiorthern frontiers of Greece. The Commission arrived in Greece in January

19^7 , held 91 meetings, made some 33 field investigations and heard a total of 270 witnesses. The Commission left the Balkans in early April 19^7 and although it's report was not finished until May, most of the facts pertained to a period ending in March 19^7 and are extremely pertinent to the last phase of the background to American interven­ tion. The Commission's final report stated ; 43

On the basis of the facts ascertained by the Commission, it is it's conclusion that Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent, Albania and Bulgaria have supported the guerrilla warfare in Greece.51

It is of interest to note that "the Delegations of Poland 5 2 and the U.S.S.R. did not approve these conclusions."

Before leaving Europe, the Commission established a

Subsidiary Group in Salonika to investigate potential frontier incidents occurring after the Commission's de­ parture. The reports of this group lend factual detail to some of the later activities along the Greek northern border s.

Professor Xydis in his work, "Greece and the Great

Powers, 1944-1947," builds up a chain of circumstantial historical evidence which tends to implicate the Soviet

Union in the KKE decision for armed struggle. The chain involves the Soviet position on Greece at Potsdam, the similarity between Greece and acknowledged Soviet probing in Iran and Turkey, acute Soviet - British di s sent ion in the Balkans, analogies between the KKE and CPSU press and radio, and particularly the monolithic unity evidenced by the Balkan and Soviet spokesmen before the U.N. Xydis contends that prior to the Truman Doctrine, there was no disagreement between the Soviet and Yugoslav governments about the aid the latter was furnishing to the Greek guerrillas. Only after the U.S. committment did the

U.S.S.R. perceive any risk in establishing hegemony over U4 5 3 Greece. The author will return to this contention later in the thesis.

The United States was formally drawn onto the Greek scene when Great Britain announced on 21 February 19^7 that British Aid to Greece would terminate on 31 March

1947. Spring of 1947 brings the Greek-British dilemma to an end. On 3 March Prime Minister Maximos and Foreign

Minister Tsaldaris appealed to the United States for assistance. On 12 March President Truman in his famous speech to Congress announced the Truman Doctrine which pro­ vided military and economic assistance for Greece and

Turkey. Thereafter, the problem of Greece became a Greek-

American dilemma.

It is necessary to leave the main stream of events

in Greece and turn now to view Greece from the perspective

of the United States. The next chapter describes some of

the events leading to the Truman Doctrine and its military

implications. CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

^Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1951), p . 532. p Chr.is.topher Woodhouse, Apple of Discord (London; Hutchinson, .1948), p. 56.

^William H. McNeill, The Greek Dilemma (Philadelphia ; Lippincott, 1947 ) , p. 54.

^United States Army, Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Warfare In Greece 1944-45 (Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, 19^2), p. 10.

^Woodhouse, ££. cit. . p. 6l,

^Ibid., p . 136. 7 Churchill, Closing the Ring. p. 535.

8McNeill, 0£. cit.. p. 5 6 .

^Ibid. , p. 58.

^^Greek Army, The Nat ions Battle (Athens; Hellenio, 1952) , p. 11. 11 Field Marshal Wilson, Eight Years Overseas (London: Hutchinson, 1948), p. 233.

^^Stefanos Sarafis, Greek Resistance Army, trans. Prascoe (London : Farleigh, 1951), pp. 301-304.

^^McNeill, o_£, cit. . p. 6 0 .

^^Stephen G . Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers. I9U4-I947 (Salonika: Institute for Balkan Studies, I963), pp. 31, 3 4 , 6 2 , 88, 93 and 506.

^^McNeill, £2_. cit. . p. 6 0 .

^^Woodhouse, 0£_. cit., p. 199.

^^Herbert Feis, Churchill « Roosevelt, Stalin (Prince­ ton; Princeton University Press, 1957 ) , 335 . 46 l8 Ibid., pp. 424-446.

^^Winston S, Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 227.

^^Charles de Gaulle, Salvation (Vol. Ill of War Mémoires, 3 vols.; New York; Simon and Schuster, 19^0).

^^George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941 (Princeton; Van Nostrand, 19&0), p . 54. 22 George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (New York; Mentor, 1962) p. 237. 2 3 Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism (New York ; Random House, 1962), p. 75. 2 4 Feis, 22.' cit. . p. 446.

^^churchill. Triumph and Tragedy. p. 286.

^^Xydis, op . cit., p. 6 0 .

^^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 287.

^^McNeill, 2 2 . cit., p. 16O.

Z^Ibid., p. 169.

3^Sarafis, 0£_. cit., p. 303.

3^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 310.

■3 2 British Foreign Office Documents Regarding the Situation in Greece (London ; EM Stationery Office, 19^5) , pp. ^ 7 and 8. 33 Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 229.

^^Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press, 196oTi pT 2 8 9 .

35^^McNeill, op. cit., p. 267.

^^Greek Army, The Nat ions Battle.

Alexander Papagos, "The Guerrilla War," Foreign Affairs, (January 1952), p. 220. 47

C. Murray, "The Anti Bandit War," Marine Corps Gazette. Vol. 3 8 , No. 1 (January 1954), p. 1 6 , First of a series of five articles. Vol. 38, Numbers 1-5 (January - May 1954) hereafter referred to by date of article. 3 9 Greek Army, Study of Guerrilla Warfare, trans. USAGG (Washington; Hq. Dept, of Army, undated) , p. 45. 40 Murray, ojg_, loc . 41 William H. McNeill, Greece American Aid in Action 1947-56 (New York; Twentieth Century Fund, 1957 ), pi 28. 42 , Woodhouse, o^. cit.. p. 2U3.

^^McNeill, Greek Dilemma. pp. 26I-269.

^^Xydis, ££. cit., pp. I81, 6o4. It should be noted that Xydis does not accept Zachariadis' statement about Tito, believing it to be a cover up for Soviet involvement. 45^ Murray, op_. loc .

^^McNeill, Greek Dilemma. p. 24l. 4t Edward Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War In Greece," Military Review. June 1957 , p. 17 and Murray, cit . U A Murray, Marine Corps Gazette. (April 1954), p. 54.

^^United States Army, Histroy of JUSMAGG 25 March 1949 to 30 June 1950 (unpublished) , pp. 193-197.

5ÛHarry N. Howard, The United Nations and the Prob­ lem of Greece, Department of State Publication 2909 (Washington ; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 1.

^^U. N. document S^360, Vol. I, pp. I67-I82 cited by Howard, o^. cit.. p. 24.

^^Howard, og. cit., p. 24.

^^Xydis, £g. cit.. p. 468. CHAPTER III

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Mr, Walt Rostov has used the following words to

describe the Truman Doctrine.

It was evident at the time and it has become increasingly evident since that Truman's words marked a major turning point in American and world history . . . The Truman Doctrine thus opened a new and authentically revolutionary phase in the nation's experience .^

It is not the purpose of this chapter to substantiate the commonly accepted view that the Truman Doctrine marked

a significant change in United States foreign policy — the reversal of traditional U. S. peacetime isolationism.

Rather the author desires to emphasize the significance of

one aspect of the Truman Doctrine to this thesis — the

establishment of a framework for United States military

strategy for the Cold War era. The chapter briefly comments

on the embryonic state of Greek-American relations before

discussing the events leading to the Truman Doctrine and

commenting on its military implications.

I. RECENT GREEK-AMERICAN RELATIONS

As an introduction to the Truman Doctrine, it is

appropriate to review the more significant aspects of

American involvement in Greek affairs between World War II 49 and March of 1947. The United States had traditionally evidenced sympathy for Greece, At the time of the Italian attack this sympathy was again expressed. However, after the fall of Greece except for a few U. S. military who parachuted into Greece as part of the Allied Mission, the

United States remained distinctly aloof from Balkan prob­ lems leaving them to England,

U. S. public opinion during the occupation of Greece had come to regard ELAS as a valiant underdog struggling against the brutal Nazi oppressor. Consequently, when the

British Army forcibly suppressed the ELAS uprising of

December 1944, the U, S, press bitterly attacked Churchill and the British, Robert Sherwood states,

American public opinion was not too well informed as to the merits of this complicated situation or the extent to which the resistance groups might be under communist domination; all that was apparent on the surface was that British troops, engaged in the task of "liberation" were killing Greek patriots who had been fighting the Germans, and it was even possible that the British were using American Lend-Lease weapons for this purpose,

Mr. Churchill complains.

The vast majority of the American Press violently condemned our action, which they declared falsified the cause for which they had gone to war, . . The State Department, in the charge of Mr, Stettinius, issued a markedly critical pronouncement, which they in turn were to regret, or at least reverse in after­ years . . . Stalin however adhered strictly and faithfully to our agreement of October, and during all the long weeks of fighting the Communists in the streets of Athens, not one word of reproach came from Pravda or Isvestia,^ 50

President Roosevelt writing to Churchill on 13 December

1944 throws further light on the U, S. attitude.

As anxious as I am to be of the greatest help to you in this trying situation, there are limitations, imposed in part by the traditional policies of the United States and in part by the mounting adverse reaction of public opinion in this country , , , It is for these reasons that it has not been possible for this government to take a stand along with you in the present course of events in Greece,

However, as the war in Europe ended, U, S, citizens began to play an important role in Greece and through their observations and reports the factual situation was soon to be clarified to the U, S, government and the American public. The initial relief to Greece was administered by a special organization known as Military Liaison Greece headed by U, S, Brigadier General Percy L, Sadler,^ A U, S. citizen, Buell Maben, headed the UNRRA Mission which re­ lieved Military Liaison Greece,^ As has already been men­ tioned, the United States participated in AMFOGE during the

election of March, 1946 and again during the plebiscite of

September 1946, President Truman in December of 1946 appointed Mark F, Ethridge, whom he had sent to study in the Balkans in 1945, to be the U, S, Delegate on the U, N,

Commission of Investigation, In the latter part of December

Greek Premier Tsaldaris, who had been receiving intimations

of British inability to continue economic support of Greece,

visited Washington, On this visit the Premier briefed

President Truman, Secretary of State Byrnes and other U. S, 51 officials on the economic and military plight of Greece and sought short-term credit to alleviate Greece's immediate 7 problems. The next month the spiritual forces of the

Greek Orthodox Church and the political force of the Greek-

American community were brought into play for Greece as

Athenogoras, Archbishop of North and South America, (later

Patriarch of Constantinople) and Greek-American leaders called on President Truman to appeal for assistance.®

On January 13, 1947, an Economic Mission headed by Mr. Paul

A, Porter and including seven other economics, financial and engineering experts went to Greece to examine economic 9 conditions and recommend measures for reconstruction.

Thus America was unknowingly preparing for the political and economic role she was about to play.

Despite its headlong demobilization and perhaps also unwittingly the United States was preparing to play a military role. In accordance with Forrestal's vision of American warships ever roaming the world's oceans and seas showing the flag as symbols of America's worldwide political influence and power, U, S, naval power was ex­ panding into the Mediterranean, The battleship, Missouri, had paid a courtesy call to Greece in April 1946, A naval task force with the carrier, Franklin D, Roosevelt, visited

Greece in September, By the end of 1946 a permanent naval task force headed by the aircraft carrier, Randolph, had 52 been assigned to the Mediterranean, the nucleus of the soon to be formed Sixth Fleet, This expansion of U, S, naval power greatly facilitated the capacity to implement the Truman Doctrine,

II, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

British economic difficulties which led to the

British decision not to continue military or economic support for Greece had been long in the making. As early as l4 October 1946 the British Treasury had opposed before the House of Commons any further aid to the Greek Armed

Forces,The British note of 21 February 1947 which re­ quested the United States to assume as of 1 April the burden of economic and military aid to Greece, previously borne by Great Britain, brought home the full impact of the changing world situation to United States officials,

Joseph M, Jones describes the situation as "the most com­ pelling world situation ever to confront the nation in 12 time of peace,"

In retrospect, the l8 months between V-J Day and the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine gave many indications that America was again headed toward a traditional post war pattern of withdrawal from international affairs. Despite

ominous rumblings on the Soviet frontiers and notwithstand­

ing ardent U, S. interest in the United Nations, a retreat

to isolationism appeared to be in process. 53

Jones cites four significant indicators as of

February 194T -- military strength, the State Department, the Congress and public opinion to substantiate this contention that the national trend was toward isolation­ ism and military nihilism. The demobilization of the armed forces from the 19^5 strength of 12,1 million men had proceeded at such a rate that by mid-year it would reach 1.5 million men. As a result of the attendant confusion virtually no units - land, sea or air - were combat ready. Even more grievous was the a.bsence of strategic planning as military brain power was diverted from the international arena to the interservice struggles over unification. The State Department, bypassed in major policy decisions during the war by Roosevelt, was just beginning to emerge as an effective foreign policy mechanism under the month long tutelage of General

Marshall, The 80th Congress convened in January was

Republican dominated - a repudiation of the President which would classically lead to frustration and inaction.

The Republicans were committed to reduction in government

spending and higher tariffs; the former inferring political

isolation, the latter being equivalent to economic

isolation. Public opinion in the United States had come 54 to accept the notion that the United Nations would assure world peace and prosperity and look after the national interest of the United States. According to

Jones' analysis, there was little on the scene in

February of 194T that would presage an abrupt reversal of traditional United States foreign policy.

Contrary to the implications of this analysis of the American scene, the United States Government reacted with boldness, imagination and speed. Within one week from the receipt of Britain's note of 21 February

1947 announcing the discontinuance of aid to Greece,

United States leadership completely abnegated isolationism.

The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and Congressional leaders had agreed to a program of providing aid to Greece and Turkey,

This aid was to be both economic and military. It was generally realized by the American leaders that Britain's

note on Greece was tantamount to formal abdication from world leadership and that United States provision of aid

to Greece and Turkey was tantamount to formal acceptance

of Britain's role of world leadership.

It is interesting to note the high degree of coopera­

tion that was already developing between the Greek and 55

United States governments. The latter, sensitive to the congressional and public opinion aspects of acting directly on a request to replace Great Britain, sought to base its forthcoming action on a "free" invitation on the part of the Greek people. Such an invitation was drafted. Jointly by Greek and American diplomatic officials in the State

Department on 28 February. The invitation was couched within a framework which acknowledged that implementation of a full scale aid program could not but involve some degree of U. S, interference in Greek internal affairs.

The Greek note signed by Prime Minister Maximos (who had replaced Tsaldaris as Premier) and Tsaldaris (who retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs) was delivered on 3 March.

President Truman’s address to a Joint session of

Congress on 12 March 19^7 requesting assistance to Greece and Turkey initiated a far-reaching and soul-searching de­ bate on foreign policy that lasted over two months.The final passage of the aid to Greece and Turkey Bill by a vote of 67 to 23 in the Senate, and 287 to 107 in the House gives little indication of the depth and passion of the debate. The opposition to PL 75 in Congress and from the public deeply exploited myriad aspects of traditional U. S. isolationism. Accusations against the administration in­ cluded militarism, interventionism, imperialism, power politics, undeclared war, violation of the Monroe Doctrine, 56

violation of Washington's Farewell Address, violation of

the UN Charter, by-passing the U.N,, war mongering, hiring mercenary foreign armies, support of reactionary and

corrupt governments, perpetuation of monarchy, violation

of neutrality, hiding Turkey under the rug of Greek dilemma,

undue provocation of the U.S.S.R., irresponsible fiscal

waste, aspirations to world empire and a host of others.

The two most frequently voiced and significant objections

centered around the failure to utilize the United Nations

as a means of peace restoration and, secondly, on the

aspects of military assistance. The debate may well go

down in United States history as one of the most significant

foreign policy actions of Congress in the first half of

this century. It served to form foreign policy guidance

for the Cold War decades ahead and provided public con­

sensus for a definitive peacetime foreign policy objective.

Public Law 75 (the so-called Truman Doctrine) con­

tained provisions which were designed to integrate foreign

policy and military strategy and provide a framework with­

in which military strategy would operate. The Law provided

for the provision of economic assistance and military

equipment to Greece, It gave the War Department the author­

ity to detail military personnel as advisers and required

that Greece grant free access for the purpose of observing

military assistance. PL 75 not only permitted the U. S. 57 military to become involved in the training of the Greek

armed forces in Greece but provided for the instruction

and training of Greek military personnel in the United

States. All functions of aid to Greece both economic and military were to be under the control of the Chief of

Mission in Greece (a State Department position), and

coordinated at the Washington level through the State-War-

Navy Coordination Committee.

III. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

The concept of the Truman Doctrine was a radical

departure from past American tradition. It ushered in a

new era of United States foreign policy. By the same token

the military implementation of the Truman Doctrine during

the Anti-Bandit War in Greece presaged many departures from

past United States military policy and was the precursor

of a new era of United States military strategy. The Anti-

Bandit War was the first armed conflict between what since

has come to be known as the "Free World" or the West and

the forces of Communism. The Anti-Bandit War can well be

considered the formal proclamation of the "Cold War". From

the military point of view the Anti—Bandit War would prove

to be the genesis of four significant trends in United

States strategy; (l) the provision of large scale military

assistance to a foreign government in "peacetime", (2) the 58 aggressive use of U. S. military personnel as advisers to indigenous forces in the conduct of active military opera­ tions, (3) the development of counter-guerrilla tactics as a paramount requisite of the Cold War era, and (4) the acceptance of U. S, involvement in military hostilities without the committment of maximum resources.

But these inchoate trends were not discernible in the Spring of 194?. The War Department proceeded slowly and cautiously; perhaps even hesitantly. In accordance with PL 75 the U. S.Army Group Greece (USAGG) was estab­ lished as part of the American Mission for Aid to Greece on l4 April 1947 in Washington. The mission of USAGG was to determine what supplies and equipment were required by the GNA, the Gendarmerie and the RHAF and to initiate the procurement of these items from British and American sources.USAGG also was responsible for rations for the

RHN but a Navy Group was formed to control other items for the RHN.

A Memorandum of Understanding between the Department

of State and the War Department regarding the Greek aid

program established that USAGG would communicate on matters

of policy through the Chief of Mission and the State Depart­

ment and would communicate directly with the War Department

on technical matters. Coordination at the national level

was to be within the framework of State-War-Navy Coordination 59

Committee. An Interdepartmental Interim Greece-Turkey

Assistance Committee was established to permit coordination with other governmental departments. The Memorandum also stipulated that the War Department would provide for in­ struction of Greek military personnel in the U. S, when determined to be necessary.

During the initial planning stages there was a reluctance on the part of the War Department to send a military mission as such to Greece unless it proved abso­ lutely necessary. Other alternatives such as attaching a few officers to the British Military Mission or to the

U. S. Military Attache in the Embassy or to the U. S.

Economic Mission were thoroughly examined. It was estimated that between 10 and Uo officers would be adequate for the task of determining the military requirements of Greece and of assuring that financial assistance was effectively utilized. It was also estimated that approximately

$150,000,000 would be required to provide military supplies and equipment for the ground and airforces of Greece. It was believed at that time that U. S. military assistance could be made effective simply by furnishing the Greek ,. armed forces with what supplies and equipment they needed for the conduct of successful operations against the guerrillas. No observers were to be stationed with combat units in the field, in as much as it was believed their 6o presence there would give critics and opponents of the aid program an opportunity for accusing the United States of conducting military operations.

It should be reemphasized that Public Law T5 as enacted by Congress, in addition to its fiscal and material assistance provisions, provided the War Department with the authority to detail military personnel as advisors and required that Greece grant free access for the purpose of observing military assistance. It further provided for the instruction and training of Greek military personnel.

Despite the broad provisions of PL 75, the War Department chose to restrict the authority of USAGG to the basic mission of assisting the Greek military by furnishing supplies and equipment. It is probable that the War Depart­ ment accepted Greek estimates that the war would not last out the year. Under this assumption it was logical not to disrupt the then functioning British Military Mission in

Greece. But in retrospect, it is ironical to realize that the War Department planned to allow the British military to guide Greek military organization, training and opera­ tions and interject the United States military in logistical matters only. The irony is compounded when it is realized that the British and American military organizational and logistical structures were at that time virtually incom­ patible . 61

The name of the next chapter, "The Easy Way," de­ rives from the author's contention that the initial United

States approach to the Greek problem was to seek the easy way out — by expending dollars only. Despite this slow, hesitant start of 19^7, the reader will discern in subse­ quent chapters pertaining to 19^8 and 19^9, the genesis and development of military operational techniques which have become the hallmark of United States strategy for the Cold

War era. CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

^Walt W. Rostov, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Harpers, I960), p. 2 08. 2 Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper, 19^8), p, 8Uo,

Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 293. li Ibid.. p. 300.

^McNeill, Greek Dilemma, p. 20U,

^Ibid .. p. 257.

^Xydis, ££_. cit.. pp. 443-453.

^Ibid.. p. 469.

^United States Department of State, Greece - A Summary of Background Information. Office of Public Affairs, March 1947 , unpublished, p. ïTI

^^Xydis, ££_, cit., particularly p. 537 . Throughout this work emphasis is placed on the role of U, S, naval power in world politics.

^^Ibid.. p. 476.

^^Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: Viking, 1955)» p. 9. 13 Jones, op_. e it.

l4Xydis, op. cit., pp. 480-48l,

^^The debate is contained in United States Congress, Congressional Record. Both Congress. Vol. 93, Parts 3 and )+ ( Washi ngt on : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947).

^^The following discussion of early planning for military assistance to Greece is derived from U, S. Depart­ ment of the Army, Brief History of USAGG Procurement 24 May 1947 to 31 August 19^7. (Unpublished) on file in the Office of Chief of Military History, U. S. Army. CHAPTER IV

THE EASY VJAY

THE ANTI BANDIT WAR (MAY 19^7 - DECEMBER 194?)

To return now to military operations in Greece and United States military assistance to Greece during the Anti-Bandit War which are the main focus of this thesis. Since it is manifestly impossible in the Cold War era to separate military considerations from political or economic ones, political and economic factors are woven

into the framework of the narrative whenever their impact

is significant to the outcome of military operations.

I. COMMUNIST OPERATIONS

The "Democratic Army" (D A ) enjoyed a tactical ad­ vantage over the Greek National Army (GNA) which few

guerrilla forces have enjoyed so early in a campaign. The

Greek Communists recently had had three years of modern

guerrilla experience with ELAS. In addition, many of

their officers had received valuable supplementary training

at the hands of Yugoslav partisan instructors. Centuries

of Turkish occupation of Greece had fostered a tradition

of "hillsraen" plundering the more prosperous "plainsmen"

in the antecedent of guerrilla operations. Mountains

cover more than two thirds of the mainland and are the 6h normal home of 40% of the population. Topographically the country provides almost optimum conditions for waging guerrilla warfare.^ The bandits enjoyed logistical support from a privileged sanctuary out of reach of their opponents. Added to these organizational, operational and logistical advantages was the seething unrest of the popu­ lation caused by economic privation and political uncer­ tainty.

There is some opinion to the effect that the KKE was not fully committed to a "war" policy until mid 194?, Till then there was still hope that the government could be sub­ verted from within. According to Colonel Murray's articles

in the Marine Corps Gazette, which are by far the most

comprehensive study of the war printed in English, the

Democratic Army was to use primarily economic, political

and terroristic measures and only in the last analysis 2 military. He supports this thesis by pointing out that

the guerrilla offensive of 1946-4? was not directed against

the Army but against public services, lines of communica­

tion, civilians, industry, agriculture and transportation.

The effort was to destroy and sabotage the life of the

nation so that KKE leaders could demand a role in the govern­

ment. Papagos recounts that the Communist explanation of

raids as solely retaliation for excesses of the "Right" 3 found widespread credence both inside Greece and abroad.

McNeill points out that the KKE remained an integral part 65 of an opposition coalition under the aegis of the liberal politican Sofoulis until they were read out of the coali­ tion in July 1947. McNeill asserts that only in July of

1947 did the Communists give up hope of coming to power legally through appointment to a coalition government and h become an instrument of all out war.

However tempting it may appear to accept this July date as a major turning point, the evidence of the Sub­

sidiary Group of the Commission of Investigation Concerning

Greek Frontier Incidents does not support it. The Com­ mission reported on 15 incidents along the Greek northern borders with Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania which occurred during the period April through July 194?. The conclusions presented primarily are intended to establish the flow of aid to the bandits from the Satellite countries

and the provision of sanctuary from GNA pursuit. Addition­

ally, however, the testimony reveals that the bandits in

seven of the incidents fired on or attacked Greek Army

units,^ hardly a measure short of war. Considering the

previously discussed evidence concerning the Plenum of

12 February 1946, which was probably not available to

Colonel Murray or Professor McNeill, it appears more ob­

jective to accept a gradual and constant increase in

Communist violence from the Spring of 1946 through the end

of 1947 in direct proportion to the expanding capabilities 66 of the Democratic Army (DA) rather than to accept a July

1947 turning point in KKE intentions.

There were three categories of personnel associated with the Democratic Army — fighters in the bandit bands, collaborators and reserves. The fighters who numbered only a few thousand in March of 1946 had probably risen to about 20,000^ by the end of 1947. Although this figure may have risen to as high as 25,700? at one point in early 1949 it tended to stabilize in the lower range of 8 between 20 - 25,000 men throughout the period of the war.

Murray speculates that these limits were planned personnel ceilings based on the Communist requirement for politically Q reliable cadres and on logistical support requirements.-^

It appears certain that the DA could have expanded far beyond the 25,000 mark had it so desired. The second category of personnel, collaborators, are much harder to fix in numbers. Papagos refers to this category as the underground — an organized network of spies, informers, suppliers and recruiting agents.These people are some­ times referred to as the "self defense organization".

Murray would tend to estimate their number at approximate­ ly 1/2 the number of fighters, based on Greek arrests in areas of confirmed bandit strength and exposed undergound nets.^^ Wainhouse on the other hand estimates the number of Communist self defense personnel at the end of 1947 as 12 50,000, or more than twice the number of fighters. Since 67 primary sources make no attempt to estimate the number of collaborators it is most difficult to reach a judgment.

Separate estimates on the number of active Communists 13 would tend to support the higher estimate. The third category of personnel were the reserves training and re­ cuperating in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, These personnel probably moved back and forth across the borders to reinforce bands in the Greek mountains in some type of rotation system. The best available estimate lists this category as follows:

TABLE I

ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND LOCATION OF GREEK BANDIT RESERVES!^

Combat effectives Non-effectives

Albania 4,500 6,500 Bulgaria 2,500 2,500 Yugoslavia 4,000 10,000 Total 11,00 0 19,000

Thus, the Communist cause enlisted at any given time between late 1947 and early 1949 between 20-25,000 active fighters,

10-50,000 active collaborators and an able bodied reserve across the iron curtain of approximately 11,000. There are no confirmed reports of foreign troops serving with the DA other than sporadic sightings of individual Satellite

soldiers so close to the border as to lead to the deduction

that Satellite troops may have served as guides across the

borders. In one instance, two Bulgarian soldiers were 68 killed inside Greek territory, but again within a mile or

so of the border.

The DA maintained a terrorism campaign throughout all of Greece during 1947, attacking isolated villages to obtain supplies and recruits and fleeing before government

forces could arrive. It sought to avoid open combat with the Greek National Army although it would raid small iso­

lated detachments of the gendarmerie and the army particu­

larly to secure passage across the northern borders.

Through terrorism and propaganda the Communists extracted

subservience, concurrence or at least non resistance from the inhabitants of a considerable number of villages.

During 1947 base areas in the rugged Grammes and Vitsi mountain areas adjacent to the Albanian and Yugoslavian

borders were established and a crude but effective supply

system running down the Pindus mountain chain was estab­

lished to support the bands operating in the barren

mountains of central Greece, Although these base areas

were initially vast areas of hidden supplies they were

gradually built up into a crude logistical complex which

served as an intermediate station between the Satellite

sources and the bands operating further south. Eventually

they could not be concealed and the DA's tactics were

directed toward diverting the GNA away from these areas

and finally to defending them. 69

On 2k December 1947 the formation of a "Provisional

Democratic Government" in the Grammes area was announced.

The U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans adopted a resolu­ tion to the effect that recognition, even de facto, of this movement followed by aid would constitute a grave threat to 15 the maintenance of international peace and security. The

United States State Department issued notice that recogni­ tion of this group by other governments would have serious implications.^^ In December, the DA launched its first large scale attack of the war on Konitsa near the Albanian border. There is speculation among Greek sources that had this attack succeeded the "Democratic Government" would have established its capital in Konitsa and recognition by the Soviet bloc would have been consumated. However, as reported in the Presidents Report;

The valorous action of the Greek Army in late December 1947 at Konitsa against initially superior guerrilla forces justified previous confidence in the Greek Army and displayed again the traditional fighting qualities of the Greek soldier.

In the ten-day battle at Konitsa, the DA received its first major setback.

II, GREEK NATIONAL SITUATION

In the late winter of 1946-47 it had been estimated by the Greek High Command that by the end of the year the 3. Q Communist bands would have been liquidated. Many factors contributed to the inaccuracy of this estimate and the TO prolongation of the war till August 1949. Weakness of the

Greek military structure was probably the most significant single factor involved. The study of 194? from the nationalist point of view is an analysis of military weak­ ness and political futility.

An Army dissolved for four years can not be rebuilt in a day. The Greek officer corps had been long deprived of command and on the whole was not professionally competent.

The GNA had expanded from one brigade of 2000 men to seven divisions and 120,000 men in two years. In such a rapid expansion many personnel are bound to achieve positions of responsibility for which they are not qualified. Further­ more, the Greek proclivity for politics adversely influ­ enced the efficacy of the Army. Mutually remunerative relationships between officers and political leaders were not uncommon. Attempts to remove incompetent officers from responsible positions were invariably projected into the political arena. In turn, politicians were constantly exerting pressure to have their constituency protected by the Army, Politicians would sometimes force the cancella­ tion of military operations if the operation involved re­ moving protecting troops from the home area. McNeill succinctly summarizes the political philosophy of Greece at the time when he states that government administration was traditionally conceived in terms of "doing favors for 71 ones friends and withholding them from ones opponents

There was a tendency in the Army to deprecate train­ ing, in fact training seemed to entail a loss of face for combat units. Ironically, the British Military Mission had done little to encourage training.

The early operations of the GNA showed a lack of the will to fight. This can be attributed to several factors.

A prolonged lack of success against the bandits fostered a frustration at their constant disappearance and reappearance.

Discipline in the chain of command often broke down. Offi­ cers were more often than not inclined to do nothing rather than attack and run the risk of making an error. Many of the soldiers came from families that were on the verge of starvation and endangered by bandit attack. Many soldiers failed to see anti-Communism as a cause worth dying for.

Finally, rank and file alike realized that even if the Army did gain control of an area the Greek Government was not 20 capable of consolidating such gains. As a result, there was very little desire on the part of the GNA to close with and destroy the enemy. McNeill comments that for the first year of the war it seems safe to say that the advantage in 21 morale lay with the guerrillas.

One might speculate, that if things were this bad, why the Communists had not taken over Greece already as they had so many other European nations. The answer lies 72

in the fact that in Greece the police, the army and the

civil bureaucracy were all in the hands of Anti-Communists.

The Greek ruling elite had yet to resolve what they were

for, but Varkiza and the March 1946 election cemented one

salient common denominator -- they were against Communism,

The situation in the Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) was little better than in the Army. No sound base for

expansion existed. Aircraft and communications equipment

were in short supply. Leadership lacked aggressiveness

or initiative. There was some Communist infiltration of

the RHAF, Finally, the lines of responsibility drawn

between the British and American missions fostered inde­

cision and half measures on the part of the Greeks,

The Royal Hellenic Navy (RHN) was by far the most

efficient service. The Navy had largely escaped destruc­

tion at the hands of the Germans and operated during the

war with distinction under British aegis in the Mediter­

ranean. But it was small and its influence on the conduct

of the landbound Anti-Guerrilla War was perforce limited.

The authorized strength of Greek National Forces

at the time of the arrival of the U, S. military in May

1947 was as follows; 73

TABLE II

STRENGTH OF GREEK ARMED FORCES MAY I9U722 (in thousands of men)

Greek National A r m y ...... 120,000 Gendarmerie . . . 30,000 Royal Hellenic Air Force . . . 5,500 Royal Hellenic N a v y ...... 13,000 Civil P o l i c e ...... 8,000 176,500

In October 19^7 the Greek High Command with the assistance of the U, S, Army Group formed the National

Defense Corps, This action proved to be the first step in a long chain of events which would eventually wrest the initiative from the DA. The National Defense Corps (NDC), originally established at 20 battalions of 500 men each, was designed to free the regular army of all static duties it was performing and to permit it to concentrate wholly 23 on offensive operations.

A significant and unanticipated result of the bandit activity was the ever increasing stream of refugees fleeing from attacks in areas where the gendarmerie could no longer protect them. The refugee problem was further aggravated by the GNA efforts to clear certain areas in order to de- 24 prive the bahdits of potential support. By the end of

1947 over 420,000 refugees had fled to the large cities,

The feeding and care of these refugees greatly exacerbated the already precarious Greek economy. Eventually the TU refugee problem was destined to consume the bulk of U, S. non-military aid resulting in continual deferral of re­ construction projects.

The close of 19^7 saw the Greek Army dispersed in static dispositions dictated by primarily political con­

siderations. Military operations against the bandits had generally failed through bad timing, poor coordination, and lack of aggressiveness.^^ As Papagos summarized the year's operations,

The operations did not go according to plan. The Communists were generally informed in advance and had left or leaked through the arms of the pincers. When areas were cleared, large numbers of Greek troops were, required to hold it.^?

The best that could be said for the situation was said in the President's Report;

It is significant to note that for the most part the guerrillas have been forced to operate in the mountains and that they have failed to take and hold any center of population suitable for the seat of their government.

III. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE -

THE EASY WAY

The advanced elements of USAGG arrived in Athens on

2h May 19^7 and a complement of 40 military personnel and 20 20 civilians had been reached by 31 July. USAGG set out

to accomplish three initial tasks. First, to submit an

accurate list of the most significant equipment shortages 75 of the Greek Armed Forces (GAF), Second, to integrate its organization with that of the British and Greek military supply personnel. Finally, to survey the military logisti­ cal facilities of the GAF to plan ample storage, space and transportation facilities and to assure the efficient flow of U. S. military supplies when they arrived. It also be­ came necessary to undertake the instruction of Greek per­ sonnel in the operation and maintenance of U, S, equipment with which they were not familiar. American technical instructors were attached to the staffs of the Greek Sig­ nal, Engineer and Ordnance Schools, The first United States vessel carrying military assistance supplies consisting of vehicles, rations, and general military cargo arrived on

2 August 1947. World War II U. S. military equipment was available in depots in Europe and the Mediterranean and was furnished expeditiously and at a fraction of original cost. By the end of the year procurement initiated for ground and air programs amounted to $74,000,000 of which

174,000 long tons with an estimated transfer value of

$40,000,000 had been delivered.

Immediately prior to October 1947 the question of the formation of the National Defense Corps which has al­ ready been discussed, was being weighed by the Greek High

Command and the British Military Mission. It was believed that United States aid would be required to support this new corps. USAGG was brought into the planning process. 76

It developed that additional U, S. funds would have to he made available if the project was to be consummated. This

episode along with other similar experiences clearly

demonstrated the erroneous concept upon which the USAGG

mission had been predicated. In the words of the USAGG

report,

It soon became evident that the problems of supply and training were too closely integrated with those of the strategic, tactical and political aspects of the GNA for them to be maintained altogether as separate and self-contained undertakings .

In October a small plans and policies group Joined USAGG.

Referring to this group's studies the USAGG report relates.

Its studies reveal an urgent necessity for extending the authority of the U. S . Army, Navy and Air Force in Greece to include the full advisory functions pro­ vided for in PL 75. The earlier belief that military aid could be limited to matters relating strictly to supply was no longer valid.

By the end of 19^7 the authorized strength of USAGG had

been increased by 90 officers and 80 EM (a 4 00^ increase of

military personnel) for the purpose of extending military

advice to the Greek Army.

United States military personnel had begun to work

more closely with the Greek High Command. By year's end,

it had been agreed to effect substantial augmentation of

the Greek Armed Forces. The National Defense Corps was to

be increased from 20 battalions and 10,000 men to 100

battalions and 50,000 men in order to free the entire regu­

lar army for offensive operations. The RHAF which had 77 proven during the summer and autumn months to be an ex­ tremely effective weapon against the guerrillas was to be expanded by 1000 men in order to accept new aircraft. The

GNA itself was to be given an additional 12,000 men to man programmed modern weapons,

This increase in the Greek Armed Forces required a diversion of aid funds from the economic to the military program. Originally, $149,000,000 or 50% of the aid funds had been apportioned to the military. As a result of the

increase in the Greek Armed Forces, $172,000,000 or 57.5% 33 of the funds were proportioned for military programs.

The designation military program refers to what might be

called strictly military items — rations, ammunition,

equipment and material for the armed forces. The desig­

nation economic program does not connote strictly non- military expenditures. As has already been pointed out,

the care of refugees displaced by military operations con­

sumed a significant portion of these economic funds. As

will be developed later, projects such as road, railroad

and harbor repair and construction, normally considered

military support, consumed most of the remainder. The

flexibility to shift funds between economic and military

programs and vice-versa, depending on the course of the

war, proved to be a tremendously significant factor in the

effective administration of American assistance. 78

Avoidance of complete collapse of the nation had been made possible by American financial assistance but in the words of the President's report, it was "clear that until the military threat to Greece has been removed, there is no possibility of Greek economic recovery. CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

^Wainhouse, o^. cit., p. l8.

2Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (January 1954) , p. IT. 3, *Papagos, Foreign Affairs. p. 222.

^McNeill, American Aid in Action. p. 37.

^United States Department of State, The General Assembly and the Problem of Greece. Bulletin Supplement (Publication 2986) (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 1129-1149.

^United States Department of State, Reports to Congress on Assi stance t o Greece and Turkey. Second Quarterly Report, pT Second of eight quarterly reports hereafter referred to as - Quarterly Report, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office).

^History of JUSMAGG. pp. 193-197 .

^Ibid.

^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (January 1954 ), p. I8 .

^^Papagos, Foreign Affairs, p. 221.

?^^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (January 1954) , p. 20. 7 P Wainhouse, ojg_. cit., p. 22.

^^Lt . Colonel Curtin, the Public Relation Officer for JUSMAGG estimates the number of active Communists in Greece in 1948 as 150,000. This probably includes a large number of sympathizers who played no role other than vocal. "American Advisory Group Aids Greece in War on Guerrillas," Armored Cavalry Journal (January-February 1949), p. 8.

^^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette ( January 1954 ), p. 21.

^^Ibid.. p. 17.

l^Second Quarterly Report » p. IV, 80

^?Ibld ., p. 4.

^■^Papagos, Foreign Affairs. p. 223.

^^McNeill, American Aid in Action, p. 24. 20 The foregoing analysis of the weaknesses of the GNA is derived in large part from Colonel Murray's articles. The U, S, military mission had not yet assumed responsi­ bility for operations.

2^1^McNeill, American Aid in Action, p. 4l.

22'Brief, Hi story USAGG Procurement, p. 12.

^^Ibid.. p. 13.

^^McNeill, American Aid in Action, p. 4o.

^^Second Quarterly Report. p. 5.

2^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (April 1954), p. 57.

^?Papagos, Foreign Affairs. p. 224, ?8 Second Quarterly Report. p. 10,

^^The following discussion of United States Military assistance during 1947 is derived, except as otherwise cited, from the Unpublished after action report. Brief History USAGG Procurement. 3 0 Second Quarterly Report,» pp. 7 and

^^Brief History USAGG, p. 14 .

^^Ibid.. p . 15 .

^^Second Quarterly Report,, PP • 8-9 .

3^Ibid.. p. 12. CHAPTER V

TRIAL AND ERROR

THE ANTI-BANDIT WAR (JANUARY 1948 - DECEMBER 1948)

The beginning of 1948 found the Greek National Army

(GNA) and National Defense Corps (NDC) deployed in static defense positions with the mission of protecting the centers of population against the attacks of a numerically inferior Democratic Army (DA), about 22,000 strong, which was continuously successful in concentrating a force, attacking a mountain village, looting, abducting civilians and escaping before the GNA could act. As a result, re­ fugees by the hundreds of thousands had fled to the larger cities where they lived under miserable conditions.

The DA had exploited the lack of aggressiveness of the GNA and had abducted large numbers of unwilling re­ cruits to organized training camps in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The Communists were engaged in an active program of murder and destruction in order to force the

Greek people to submit to the KKE. With the assistance of

Communist countries on the northern border of Greece, the guerrillas had established strongholds along the border at Mourgana, Grammos, Vitsi, Kaimaktchalan, Beles , Boz Dag,

Khaidou and Evros ; had taken control of large areas in mainland Greece at Pieria-Olympus, Agrafa, Roumeli, Othris, 82

Kallidhromon and Parnassos, and had established defense areas in all the mountain ranges of the Peloponnese.^

I. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE

USAGG had been unsuccessful in favorably influencing the course of the Anti-Bandit War during 19^7 through the approach of furnishing solely logistical support. A far reaching change was in order. On the last day of 19^7 the

Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group

(JUSMAPG) was established by JCS directive. The Director of JUSMAPG was authorized to maintain direct communication with the JCS on military matters. The Mission of JUSMAPG,

was to assist the Greek Armed Forces in achieving internal security in Greece at the earliest possible date by providing to the Greek National Army (GNA) including the National Defense Corps (NDC), the Royal Hellenic Navy (RHN) and the Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) stimulating and aggressive assistance in the form of operational and logistical advice.^

To assist the Greek General Staff JUSMAPG had Personnel,

Intelligence, Plans and Operations, and Logistics Advisors

in the Athens JUSMAPG Headquarters.

In the areas of active conflict advisory teams were

attached to Field Army, the three Corps Headquarters and

the seven divisions that comprised the GNA combat forces.

The duties of the field teams were to maintain a continuing

study of the military situation, to furnish operational and

logistical advice to the commander and staff of the unit to 83 which they were assigned and to make recommendations to the

Director concerning changes in the organization and train­ ing of the GAF. The Corps teams typically consisted of

8 officers and 8 HCO's while the division teams had 3 offi­ cers and 4 NCO's. It should be noted that the United States military was now prepared to assume responsibility for military operations as well as to retain responsibility for logistical support of the Greek forces. JUSMAPG was not, however, prepared to enter the training and organiza­ tional aspects of the GAF at this time. The British

Military Mission continued to furnish advice on organization and training. On 24 February, Lt. General James A. Van Fleet assumed the positions of Director of JUSMAPG and Commanding

General of USAGG.

Operations

Prior to the activation of JUSMAPG the GNA had con­

ducted no major operations, "Tactical unity of major units

had been ignored and they had been parcelled out piecemeal

to protect certain areas. Few had any reserves and virtually

none were mobile."^ The first major task of JUSMAPG was to

convince the Greek High Command that the initiative had to

be wrested from the enemy by large scale coordinated opera­

tions designed to clear systematically the guerrillas from

the infested areas of Greece. JUSMAPG estimates of the

requisite military operations and recommended priorities of 84 areas to be cleared were soon provided to the Greek Army

General Staff, The actual scope of military operations during 1948 will be discussed later in this chapter under the heading, Greek National Operations, but it is pertinent to accept the judgment of the JUSMAPG report that.

The results of operations carried out by the GAF are indicative of the progress made by JUSMAPG in carrying out its mission and functions.

Progress of the GAF hereafter was due in large measure to the buildup of military supplies and equipment and to the advice of JUSMAPG. Conversely, however, continuing short­

falls of the GAF were to lie in areas which JUSMAPG was probably somewhat slow to uncover. These shortfalls would take longer to rectify than was realized in early 1948.

On 1 November an U. S, Air Force Group relieved

USAGG of responsibility for RHAF procurement. By year^

end, the total strength of the four U. S. military missions

in Greece (U. S. Army, Navy and Air Force Groups and

JUSMAPG) amounted to 210 officers, 221 enlisted men and

30 civilians,5 a far cry from the original War Department

estimates.

Supply

Despite the arrival of significant United States

military assistance inadequacies in certain categories of

equipment existed as late as June 1948, The GNA had short­

ages in automatic weapons, mountain artillery,vehicles and 85 mortars. The organizational structure of the GNA was unbalanced; the number of signal, engineer and mountain artillery units being inadequate to support operations.

The situation in the GNA was further aggravated by the fact that British equipment in the hands of troops was starting to deteriorate. The NDC battalions had little equipment other than rifles. The RHAF was deficient in reconnaissance and combat aircraft and lacked airfields which were equipped to permit an all weather capability. ^

During 1948 plans were made and steps initiated to correct the remaining supply inadequacies of the GAF. The

RHAF was provided additional aircraft and plans were made for the 1949 delivery of a U. S. ground support aircraft more effective thru the British Spitfire then in use. In

March, fifty Air Force cadets were sent to the United

States for flight training, A program to rec,-onstruct and improve air fields was expedited in order to provide for all weather operation and increase the striking power of the RHAF.?

In April, Public Law 472 provided for continuance of military assistance until 30 June 1949 in as much as the original authorization was to terminate in June 1948.

To have completely reequipped the GNA with U, S. material would have required considerably more expenditure than was visualized under current authorizations and in 86

any case would have been illogical under the existing com­ bat situations. It will be remembered that the GNA con­

sisted of four Mountain Divisions, largely animal trans­

ported; three Field Divisions, with a modicum of motor

transport, and separate units. Among the separate units were the independent commando battalions which comprised

the "Raiding Forces", In early 1948, probably February,

the final decisions were made on the material distribution

to the GNA. United States equipment was to be used to equip

three Greek divisions. To a large extent British equipment

would remain in the other units and the Raiding Forces.

British equipment freed by the supply of U. S, material

would be utilized to equip an eighth Greek Division to be

activated on 3 March 1948.

In addition to the complete equipping of these three

divisions, JUSMAPG planned to supply certain categories of

U. S. equipment to all Greek combat units. Mountain

artillery (75mm pack howitzers) would be provided on the

basis of one battery per division. U. S, light machine

guns would be placed in all infantry battalions on a basis

of a 4 gun platoon per battalion, thus increasing the fire

power of a division from l6 to 36 machine guns. U. S.

mortars were to replace British mortars in all units on a

one for one basis thereby providing increased range and

lethality. Nine U. S, 2.36" rocket launchers were to be 87 provided for each division and finally special units of

T5mm recoilless rifles were to he organized. The fire­ power provided to the GNA was austere by theh modern

standards but it was more than adequate for the enemy it was then facing. It is to the credit of USAGG that no

effort was made at this time to sophisticate the GNA and bring it up to World War II standards. In fact, USAGG placed orders for UOOO mules in the summer of I9L8 because

it was felt that too much reliance was being placed on Q motore vehicles.

Colonel Murray somewhat depreciates the U. S. effort to reequip the GNA and RHAF, stating that, "In all proba­ bility, the war would have ended where it ended and when

it ended had no changes in armament occurred."^ His be­

lief is predicated on the fact that the total U. 8. reequip­ ment program was completed in July 19^9 in time for only

the last two battles and that these battles could have been

won without the equipment. This argument disregards the

fact that the reequipment program was accomplished on a

gradual basis and that by mid 19^8 GNA units with U, S.

artillery, mortars, machine guns and vehicles were in com­

bat against the Democratic Army. Colonel Murray later ad­

mits that "Supply shortages probably never seriously

affected the combat efficiency of the army."^^ Colonel

Murray's thesis also disregards the overriding necessityte 88 be prepared for the least desirable contingency. The Greek

Anti-Bandit War ended with a GNA victory because of a

combination of GNA actions, Democratic Army errors and

outside circumstances. Had the enemy's errors been less

grievious or the outside circumstance less conclusive, the

GNA's combat capability would have proven the decisive

factor rather than one of the several decisive factors. In

referring to mid-19^8 the USAGG report states that "planned

operations against the principal guerrilla strongholds were

being conducted on a scale that would not have been possible

without American military aid."^^

By the end of the year transportation of military

assistance to Greece had totaled 393,903 tons on 284 ships

from the U, S, and 45,330 tons on 95 ships from the U. K.

and Middle East — a total of 439,313 weight tons on 379 12 ships.

Two Typical Problems

It is not feasible to discuss in detail the extent

to which JUSMAPG became involved in the day to day problems,

of the GAF. In order to indicate the degree of this in­

volvement two examples have been selected -- the revitali­

zation of the GNA and the arming of civilians.

When the Greek government returned to the mainland

in 1944 it reinstituted conscription at the identical point

where it had left off in 194o, As a result, early in 1948 89 the hulk of the soldiers in the GNA were old and the NDC was made up of even older reservists. The GNA appeared content to hold these older soldiers of the pre-World War

II classes to fight the guerrillas and either not induct younger classes or else release them after minimal train­ ing, JUSMAPG "insisted" that releases of younger classes he suspended until the class of 39 had been discharged and that battle weary men of the GNA be transferred to the NDC 13 while younger men from the training centers enter the GNA.

As a result of the JUSMAPG "advice" the GNA gradually be­ came revitalized with young conscripts who were physically more capable of chasing up and down the mountains. The pre-World War II reservists of the NDC were in turn replaced by a younger group who had seen active combat against the guerrillas. All but eight of the NDC battalions were re­ vitalized by the war's end. It seems almost incomprehensi­ ble that the American military should have been forced to intervene in such a basic decision of the Greek government.

The second selected problem is that of the arming of civilian refugees. It will be remembered that by the end of 1947 some 420,000 refugees had fled from the villages of northern Greece. This number was to increase to a total of almost 700,000 by the end of 1948. A great number of the earlier refugees who had fled from the isolated villages requested weapons for self protection in order to enable l4 them to return to their former homes. JUSMAPG was 90 instrumental in working out a plan with the Greek govern­ ment whereby selected village families would be armed and permitted to return to their villages and prepare to plant the next crop or resume some other productive function.

These personnel were to be organized into a kind of "Home

Guard" (distinct from the NDC) in army approved and super­ vised units. The "Home Guard" in each village would be under the command of the local tactical unit commander.

During 1948, l4,000 older British rifles were issued to this category of personnel. By August of 1949 some 50,000 such rifles had been released. It is estimated that some 250,000 refugees of the peak figure of 700,000 had voluntarily re­ turned to their villages prior to the war’s end. It is difficult to conjecture how much of this trend was due to this specific arms program and how much to the general restoration of confidence in the GNA but it would be unwise to underate the influence of this program on the morale of a traditionally self-reliant people such as the Greek mountaineer,

Training

Of all the surprises awaiting the members of the

U. S, military missions in Greece perhaps the most unex­ pected was the status of training of the GNA. Long accustomed to hearing of the valorous World War II exploits of the GNA in Albania, the American officers were initially 91 inclined to look everywhere else but to tactical training to find explanations for the failure of Greek Arms. The fact that the British Military Mission apparently had the training situation in hand tended to further extenuate the oversight. The Greek weaknesses in unit training have al­ ready been mentioned but it was only after JUSMAPG adviser teams had been operating with GNA divisions in the field that these weaknesses became apparent to the Americans. In

July 1948 training officially became a joint U. S.-British responsibility with the II. S. taking responsibility for infantry training and the British retaining responsibility for other training. This was tantamount to the United

States military assuming full responsibility for GNA train­ ing since the Infantry forms the basis upon which all com­ bined arms training must be predicated. Anti-guerrilla operations provided little room for armor or artillery.

Thus, more than a year after the arrival of the advanced elements of USAGG, the U. S. for the first time was in the position of advising the GNA on the full spectrum of military activity -- plans and operations; organization and training,

and logistics. There is not much point in speculating why

such a dichotomy had been allowed to persist so long. The

answer probably lies in an overly optimistic estimate of

the gravity of the Anti-Bandit VJar and the delicate nuances

of post war U. S.-British relations. 92

The JUSMAPG analysis of the GNA training situation made after receipt of initial observer reports is curt. It states that as of June 1948 unit training and field exer­ cises had not been conducted in the GNA, Only individual training had been conducted. The analysis adds the miti­ gating circumstance that the British were short handed and the Greeks had few qualified instructors,^^

Accounts of individual American officers with the

GNA are more to the point. Colonel George L. Eckert, USA, who was advisor to the 42nd Brigade of the Greek IX Infantry

Division during the spring and summer of 1948, reflects that the GNA was not familiar with infantry unit tactics.

In the initial attacks of the Grammes battle in June

1948, according to Colonel Eckert, King Paul (who had succeeded King George upon the letter's death in March

1947) and General Van Fleet were present to witness an attack against a bandit strong point. In accordance with a well-conceived division plan, the attack was initiated with an aerial napalm attack and artillery preparation on the objective. When the artillery lifted its fire the infantry waited a good while and then jumped off only to become stalled by the first guerrilla machine gun that opened fire. Even though the King was present the infantry could not get moving muchless take the objective. General Van Fleet questioned the American 93 officers and found that this performance was typical of the status of infantry unit training. Within a week, JUSMAPG had assumed responsibility for infantry training.

Colonel Warren K, Bennett, USA, who was advisor to the IX Infantry Division from early 1948 to July 1949, con­ curs with the estimate of the extremely poor status of GNA unit training at the time of the 1948 Grammos operation.

Colonel Bennett points out that this weakness was not apparent in the Spring Roumeli operation because there was no real fighting in Roumeli, The magnificent physical condition of the troops and their high state of discipline causedmost units to look well in Roumeli, In Grammos, however, when the enemy stood and fought, the officer corps was not up to the task of leading the soldiers. According to Colonel Bennett, the more senior officers were not only tactically untrained but lacked the fundamental precepts

of combat leadership. It was customary to issue an opera­

tions order and then assume compliance. Senior commanders

seldom went forward to the battle area to observe and en­

courage their troops. Colonel Bennett relates instances

of how it was necessary for U, S. observers to "shame"

commanders into going forward by the device of asking the

commander to accompany the observer who was going forward.

There were some instances of intermediate commanders not

complying with orders of higher commanders. All in all. 94 the early days of the Grammos campaign demonstrated the lack of infantry unit training and the lack of discipline and tactical training in the officer corps. On the other hand, it was readily apparent that the Greek soldier as an individual was unexcelled in bravery, physical stamina IT and discipline.

General Van Fleet relates that he took over the responsibility for training the GNA from the British on his own initiative. His action was predicated on his con­ viction that "whoever was responsible for fighting an army 18 must be responsible for training that army." Presumably, the training reports of advisers such as Colonels Eckert and Bennett were instrumental in General Van Fleet's decision.

The situation confronting JUSMAPG in July of 1948 was that military operations against the bandits could not be

successfully concluded with the then existing status of

GNA unit training, but at the same time the guerrilla situ­

ation would not permit discontinuance of military operations

for the purpose of initiating a major training program. The

solution worked out was to select a rifle platoon from each

GNA division, bring it back to a training site and thor­

oughly indoctrinate this platoon with the proper tactical

training and weapons technique according to U, S. doctrine.

This platoon would then return to its parent division and

in conjunction with qualified instructors demonstrate the 95 proper infantry tactics to every unit in the division.

It is estimated by Colonel Murray that all units had completed these demonstration exercises by the opening 20 of the final campaign.

In addition to these demonstrations, JUSMAPG accom­ plished the following seven training projects;

1. Revised school programs.

2. Organized advanced individual training for infantry weapons and tactics.

3. Supervised retraining of all elements of divisions.

4. Conducted schools for unit instructors and supervised training of units in winter warfare, aerial adjustment of artillery fire, and air support.

5. Instructed and supervised instruction of pack animal transport units in the "Bell Mare System".

6. Placed U. S. military officers in a supervision capacity in the Infantry School, Raiding Forces Training

Center, Recruit Training Center, Infantry Heavy Weapons

Training Center and the Animal Transport Training Center.

T. Sent 43 officers, 85 cadets and 25 EM to the

United States for specialized training.

The major U, S. military assistance efforts in the

organization and training area as well as in the operational advisory role and logistical support function were initiated 96 during 1948. Although they gradually began to bear fruit later in the year it was not until 1949 that they reached full fruition. Battle is the payoff and during 1948 the

GNA was not yet prepared to give a full account of itself.

II. GREEK NATIONAL OPERATIONS

The GNA was organized into a Field Army of three

Array Corps and 7 Divisions. Three of the divisions were classified as Field Divisions (having sufficient motor transport to operate on the plains ) and four as Mountain

Divisions equipped primarily with animal transport. On

3 March 1948 the I Division was activated bringing the total to eight divisions with an authorized strength of

132,800 men. The NDC had organized 97 of its 100 author i zed battalions by May 1948 and was prepared to execute its mission of defending towns, villages, communications and vital points with the object of releasing as much of the field array as possible from these static duties.

In April 1948 the Greek armed forces began a series of major offensives against the Democratic Army for which the GNA had long prepared. This offensive commenced on

15 April 1948 with operation DAWN in the Roumeli area north­ west of Athens. Three Greek Army divisions, plus support­ ing artillery and commando troops were given the task of surrounding and destroying an estimated 2500 Communist P 1 bandits. The President's Report states that the operation 97 was completed with "excellent results.The JUSMAPG

Report refers to Roumeli as "a crippling defeat" for the

guerrilla elements in the area.^^ The casualty figures

provided by the Greek Staff tend to indicate that almost

2000 of the estimated 2500 bandits were killed or cap­

tured .

However optimistic a picture these reports and

figures portray, it is probable that Roumeli was somewhat

less than a serious blow to the DA. Colonel Eckert who

was with one of the two brigades of the IX Division of the

GNA making the main attack states that the Greek troops

stuck to the mountain trails leaving very wide gaps between

the columns. Guerrillas escaped each night through these

gaps. The GNA found village after village to have been

abandoned, the bandits having hidden in the nearby hills

only to return when the army had passed. Colonel Bennett

who was with the other brigade of the IX Division a great

deal of the time corroborates Colonel Eckert's observation

and is inclined to doubt that any serious casualties were

suffered by the guerrillas. Colonel Bennett characterizes 2 ^ the Roumeli Operation as a "shake down cruise."

On 20 June 1948 an offensive was launched against

the Grammos. mountain stronghold of the Democratic Army by

a Greek Corps of six divisions (Operation CROWN). The

Grammos area adjacent to the Albanian border is characterized 98 by rugged mountainous terrain which precludes motorized movement. Following a well executed night attack, GNA progress was very slow due to the already described train­ ing weaknesses of the GNA and due to the tenacious defense put up by the bandits in their well defended mountain positions. The GNA practice of committing troops piecemeal instead of utilizing coordinated brigade or division maneuvers stalled the offensive. To further complicate the situation, in early July, the Communists reinforced

Grammos from an initial 7,000 men to approximately 12,000 men. Nevertheless, after severe fighting the tide of the operation turned in favor of the GNA during early August.

Some 3,000-5,000 guerrillas escaped across the Albanian border between 20 and 22 August, On August 21 alone, observers from the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans witnessed the crossing of more than 1000 guerrillas into

Albania.Greek National casualties were reported at 801 killed and 5000 wounded while the guerrillas lost more than

2,500 killed and 1000 captured or surrendered. Guerrilla wounded were seldom recovered by the GNA. Presumably those who could make it were evacuated to Albania. Large quantities of guerrilla supplies were captured or destroyed and Communist plans to hole up for the winter in Grammos were decidedly interrupted.

In the normal tactical sense Grammos was a Greek 99

National victory. But in guerrilla warfare, terrain has only limited value and the GNA had failed to seal off the escape routes to Albania. Shortly after the Grammos opera­ tion, two days to be exact, the bandits who had entered

Albania from Grammos reentered Greece in the vicinity of

Vitsi, By September 30 the Vitsi force was as strong as the initial Grammos force had been. On 30 August - 1 Septem­ ber, the GNA units occupying Grammos turned against Vitsi.

Initial attacks met with minor successes but the guerrillas stubbornly defended their positions. It was the Democratic

Army's intention, as will be developed later, to hold Vitsi at all costs. The GNA reorganized the attacking units in late September and renewed the offensive which lasted through October without success. After weeks of inconclu­ sive fighting and increasing bandit activity in other areas the GNA efforts in Vitsi slackened. The Vitsi cam­ paign had slowed to a standstill. As the winter of 1948-1+9 approached the initiative passed to the Democratic Army.

The year 1948 had been one of full scale warfare.

The Greek National Army reported casualties of 3,843 killed,

i4,075 wounded and 2,803 missing — a total of 20,721. The

Democratic Army lost an estimated 15,727 killed, 8,917

captured and 8,256 surrendered — a total of 32,898 not in­

cluding the wounded who were evacuated across the b o r d e r s ,

Under normal circumstances the wounded should amount to 100 about three times the number killed. Nobody bothered to

count the civilians who had gotten in the way,

III. ON THE COMMUNIST SIDE

Military Operations

A summary of the Democratic Army (DA) situation at the beginning of I9U8 is found at the beginning of the

chapter. During 1948 the DA expanded its battalions and

grouped them into brigades. By May of 1948 the first DA

division was formed.By the end of 1948 the bandits were

allegedly formed in 8 divisions. Colonel Zacharakis postu­

lates that this trend in consolidation of units and the

corresponding changes in tactics may have been due to the

heavy losses suffered which reduced the number of politically 28 reliable cadremen. It should be remembered that regard­

less of organization the DA strength in the mountains was

maintained at a fairly constant figure in the vicinity of

20,000-2 5,000 personnel. This strength was augmented in­

side of Greece by some 50,000 informers, spys; recruiters

and suppliers known as the self defense organization or

collaborators. Outside of Greece approximately 11,000 able

bodied guerrillas were being offered sanctuary behind the

northern frontiers at any given time.

Logistically the DA continued its buildup of the

base areas of Grammos and Vitsi. Probably 1/3 of the bandit 101 strength was in each of these areas which would leave only some 7,000 men to be supported throughout the rest of

Greece. The supply of these forces was accomplished by pack train down the Pindus range although alternate LOCs were sometimes used. General Papagos refers to the re­ supply of guerrillas in the Peloponnesos by sea from Albania, although these instances were probably rare due to RHN control of the seas. The heaviest items transported down the Pindus were probably mines which were a tremendously effective guerrilla weapon. Heavy weapons such as anti­ aircraft and anti-tank cannon were only to be found in the

Grammos and Vitsi concentrations where they could be readily supported from the sanctuary across the border. The United

Nations Special Committee on the Balkans in referring to this sanctuary concluded, based on eyewitness observations up to 10 September 1948 that ;

The Greek guerrillas have continued to receive aid and assistance on a large scale from Albania, Bul­ garia, and Yugoslavia, with the knowledge of the governments of those countries. The Special Committee is fully convinced that the guerrillas in the frontier zones: (1 ) have been largely dependent on external supply. Great quantities of arms, ammunition and other military stores have come across the border, notably during times of heavy fighting. Strongly held positions of the guerrillas have protected their vital supply lines from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and in particular from Albania. In recent months there has been less evidence of receipt of supplies from Yugoslavia by the guerrillas. (2) have frequently moved at will in territory across the frontier for tactical reasons, and have thus been able to concentrate their forces without interference by the Greek Army, and to return to Greece 102

when they wished. (3 ) have frequently returned safely into the terri­ tory of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia when the Greek Army exerted great p r e s s u r e .

The guerrillas intensified recruiting, foraging, sabotage and terrorism both to lower the morale of the

Greek armed forces and the Greek people and to discredit and discourage United States assistance. Except in the

Grammos and Vitsi base areas the DA sought to avoid combat with the GNA. When Grammos and Vitsi were attacked by the

GNA the Communists first sought to utilize diversionary attacks in other parts of Greece to divert significant ele­ ments of the GNA from these areas. After a desperate struggle Grammos was finally abandoned in August of 1948, but the DA dug in and tenaciously held Vitsi against all

GNA attacks for the remainder of the year.

Following the successful stand on Vitsi the Communists launched what could be called the Winter Counteroffensive of 1948-49. DA mining and demolition tactics took a heavy toll of vehicles, bridges, railroads, technical works and water systems. During December the guerrillas mounted attacks in force against medium sized towns in Central and

Northern Greece. Kardhitsa in Roumeli, Sophadhes in

Thessaly, and Edhessa and Naousa in western Macedonia were all placed under siege. The first two towns were held for some period of time before the GNA could effectively counter­ attack . 103

The events of the latter half of 1948 on the

Communist side proved to have decisive impact in the tacti­ cal, psychological and logistical areas. Yet the genesis of this impact lies largely in the political arena. The

1948 decision to hold Vitsi in fundamental violation of guerrilla tactics was a political decision. The decision to launch the Winter Counteroffensive at a time when guerrilla losses were prohibitive was a political decision.

To understand these two decisions and the factors leading to the subsequent defeat of the DA it is necessary to digress from the mainstream of the Anti-Bandit War and examine the political machinations of the Greek Communist

Party ( KKE ) and its relations with the Cominform and with

Marshall Tito's Yugoslavia. These relationships can best be examined in the context of the "Macedonean Question" which served as a nexus between the KKE, the Cominform and Tito.

The Macedonian Question and The Fall of Markos

The proposal of an autonomous Macedonia within a

Balkan Confederation had been an element of Marxist pro­ grams even before World War I. The idea was reintroduced by the Bulgarians at the first Congress of the Balkan 3 2 Communist Federation in Sofia in June 1923. Ever since then, Bulgarian elements had been advocating an autonomous

Macedonia and were particularly active to this end during loU the Bulgarian World War II occupation of Greece, Elizabeth

Barker states that the minimum post war objective of the

Bulgarian Communist Party was to keep Bulgarian (Pirin)

Macedonia out of Tito’s hands and inside Bulgaria while the maximum objective was to create an independent Greater

Macedonia (including Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia) closely linked to Bulgaria or simply to annex Yugoslav Macedonia, 3 3

On another side of this complex triangle Marshall

Tito of Yugoslavia had announced as early as 29 November

1943 that Macedonia was one of the six Federal Republics of

Yugoslavia, Tito's minimum objective was to hold that part of Macedonia within his then current frontiers while his maximum objective was "to bring about the union of

Bulgaria Macedonia, and possibly also part of Greek Mace­ donia with Yugoslav Macedonia, under his own aegis.

On the third side of the triangle, it will be re­ called that Nicholas Zakhariadhis, the Moscow-trained leader of the KKE, had returned to resume control of the party in

May of 1945 and that an externally oriented perspective had been injected into the party. Relations between the KKE and the Albanian, Yugoslavian and Bulgarian Communist Parties became cordial. In December of 1946 Markos assumed command of the Democratic Army. Markos was also Moscow trained but his natural sympathies proved to be with the Greek patriotic wing of the KKE rather than with any Macedonian autonomous wing. From the start of hostilities Markos relied more 105 heavily on support from Tito than from Albania or Bul­ garia, Tito's price for this support appears to have been permission for certain military and political activities within the DA on the part of representatives of the 37 Yugoslav Macedonian Peoples Republic, It was at this time that the National Liberation Front (NOF) appeared, operating nominally under Markos, but in reality a thinly disguised version of the 19^3 Yugoslav dominated Slav

National Liberation Front (SNOF), At the same time, how­ ever, Tito had concluded a far reaching agreement with

Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Communist Party leader, at

Bled (August 19^7) which resolved much of the Macedonian 3 8 question without consulting Greece,

There the question rested until 28 June 19^8 when

Tito and Yugoslavia were read out of the Cominform for deviation from the correct path to socialism. Tito probably still hoped for some sort of reconcfiliation and did not immediately take any precipitous action on the Greek border.It is not improbable that Tito initially thought he could hold the allegiance of the KKE. The close liaison between Markos and Tito continued well past the June 19^8

Tito-Cominform split. Supplies were only gradually reduced and Greek guerrillas continued to be granted sanctuary as late as 7-8 July 1949.^^ The Greek guerrilla radio "Free

Greece" continued to operate in Yugoslavia until early 1949.

But despite the absence of any official KKE pronouncement lo6 against Tito, the rank, and file of the KKE was being in­ doctrinated to side with the Cominform against Tito.^^

Bulgarian influence in the Balkan councils of the Cominform rose appreciably and with it the Bulgarian position on

Macedonia, By late 19^8 Bulgarian Communists again were proposing an autonomous Macedonia, Within the inner circles of the KKE these proposals were interpreted as the precursor of Cominform policy, which indeed they were. In early 19^9 the Cominform declared for the establishment of an inde- 42 pendent Macedonia. The KKE was trapped — it must choose between the Cominform with an autonomous Macedonia and Tito with a somewhat flexible Macedonia. The KKE stalled through its Fifth Plenum in January (which relieved Markos) with a rather vague statement on Macedonia but on 1 March 1949

Radio Free Greece announced what was tantamount to a KKE 4 3 acceptance of the Cominform position.

While the Mac edonean and Tito issues were boiling to a head another issue was to come to the surface. At the 4th Plenary Session of the KKE on 20 August 1948 (during the Grammos campaign) Zakhariadhis blamed the Grammos defeat on poor military leadership and began purging some of

Markos' subordinates while avoiding confrontation with

Markos, In November Markos published a pamphlet con­ demning political interference in the military execution of 4S the war and criticizing Zakhariadhis' handling of the KKE.

It appears from the JUSMAG Report that Zakhariadhi s and not 107

Markos directed the die hard defense of terrain in Vitsi and the fanatical assaults on towns that characterized the

Communist Winter Counteroffensive of December 1948 and

January 1949. The 5th Plenary Session of the KKE in Janu­ ary 1949 relieved Markos from command of the DA and ex- 46 pelled him from the KKE. This decision was publicly announced in February and Justified as being required by the state of Markos' health.

The JUSMAG report lists three considered reasons for

Markos' dismissal. First Markos was friendly to Tito and favored a policy of maintenance of logistical relations with Yugoslavia regardless of political consequences. Se­ cond, Markos outspokenly objected to Zakhariadhis’ grandiose idea for a Democratic Army organized for all-out warfare

instead of guerrilla warfare. Finally, Markos could not be induced to support the concept of an autonomous Macedonia 4? at the expense of Greece, It is interesting that Elizabeth

Barker lists three similar reasons as the probable causes

of Markos' downfall -- the strategy of resistance, rela- 48 tions with Tito and Macedonian tactics.

Colonel Murray analyzes the Markos-Zakhar iadhi s con­

flict in terms of military tactics. He points out that

Zakhariadhis had surrounded himself with amateur strategists

with an ELAS background who longed for divisions and corps

and areas under the domination of a field army. This 108 advice led Zakhariadhis to become confident that the DA could organize divisions and hold ground like any other army. In addition, his logisticians advised him to hold the border areas and his political commissars pointed to the increased political control inherent in larger forma­ tions, Markos, on the other hand, favored the perpetuation of guerrilla warfare into a battle of attrition,

The removal of Markos had three far reaching conse­ quences: one tactical, one psychological, and one logisti­ cal, Tactically, the Democratic Army was placed under command of loannidis who followed Zakhariadls' directive to hold ground and stand to fight the GNA, Psychologically,

Zakhariadis and loannidis supported the Cominform position on an autonomous Macedonia, No amount of double talk could henceforth convince the Greek guerrilla that the KKE was following a nationalist cause, Logistically , the KKE decision to support the Cominform resulted in President

Tito's final resolution to close the Yugoslav-Greek border to "illegal" traffic. Supplies had slowed to a trickle by

January 19^9, but the border was not officially closed un­ til July,

An objective analysis in retrospect of the DA posi­ tion as a result of the Markos-Zakhariadis feud could only conclude that the war was all but lost if the GNA could muster the spirit for a vigorous Spring-Summer Offensive, CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

^The above description of the situation at the start of 1948 as well as the details of U. S. military assistance during 1948 which follow are taken from United States Army, Brief Hi story JUSMAPG 2^ J anuary 1948 to 31 August 1949 (unpublished) except where otherwise footnoted. This after action report is on file in the Office of the Chief of Military History, U, S, Army, There are two sets of page numbering on this History, one discontinuous mimeographed set and one continuous penciled set. Although some passages have been utilized in near the original form, only those of a controversial nature or establishing essential factual data have been footnoted as to page, in which case the pencilled page number has been cited.

^Brief Hi story JUSMAPG. p , 3.

^Ibld , , p . 11, 11 Ibid , , p , 20.

^Sixth Quarterly Report, p, 12,

^Brief History USAGG, p, 20, Logistical data is more detailed in this report than in the JUSMAPG Report.

^Ibid,. p, 19.

^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (April 1954), p, 60.

^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (February 1954) , p , 6o,

^^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (April 1954) , p. 6o,

^^Brief History USAGG, p. 25. 12 Sixth Quarterly Report, p, 13.

ISsrief History JUSMAPG. pp. 15-17.

^^Ibid,. pp. 17-19.

^^Ibid.. pp. 13-15.

^^Interview with Colonel George Eckert, USA. 110 17 Interview with Colonel Warren Bennett, USA. T A Letter from General Van Fleet to author.

^^Brief History JUSMAPG. p. 13-15.

^^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (March 1954) , p. 54. p *1 Fourth Quarterly Report. p, 3.

^^Ibid.

^^Brief History JUSMAPG. p. 20. p ll Interview with Colonel Eckert and Colonel Bennett.

^^Fifth Quarterly Report, p. 3.

^^Brief History of JUSMAPG. pp. 193-197.

Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (February 1954), p. 53. 28 E . E . Zacharakis, "Lessons Learned from Anti- Guerrilla War in Greece," General Military Review (July I960), p. 179. 2 9 y- ^Papagos, Foreign Affairs. p. 226,

^^UNSCOB Annual Report cited in Fifth Quarterly Report, p , 8 ,

^^McNeill, American Aid in Action, p. 43, O p Greek Army, The Nation* s Battle, p. 9.

^^Elizabeth Barker, Macedonia (London : Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), p, 8 3 .

^^Ibid.. p. 9 4 ,

3^Ibid.. p. 83,

^^Ibid,. p, 1 1 7 ,

^^Ibid,. p, 1 1 8 ,

^^George B, Zotiades, The Macedonian Controversy (Salonika : Institute for Balkan Studies, 1961), pi 5 2. Ill

^^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (March 1954), p. 51.

^^History of JUSMAG. p. 49.

^^Barker, o£_, cit.. p. Il8,

^^McNeill, American Aid in Action, p. 43.

^^Barker, o^. cit.. pp. 119 and 120. 44 Hi story of JUSMAGG. This document, on file in the Office of Chief of Military History U, S, Army, contains an excellent discussion entitled, "The Fall of Markos," pp. 15 0- 156. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. U R Barker, op_, cit.. p. 119.

49Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (February 1954), p . 52 . CHAPTER VI

VICTORY

THE ANTI-BANDIT WAR (JANUARY 19^9 - AUGUST 19^9)

I. GREEK NATIONAL OPERATIONS

The ominous rumblings inside the Communist camp which the scholar in retrospect will say preordained the downfall of the KKE and the DA were not heard by the Greek

Nationalists, In fact, even the rank and file of the DA were intentionally misinformed of the Markos-Zakhariadhis polemics. It appears probable that the Greek High Command did not appreciate the significance of this dichotomy with­ in the enemy camp, A Greek Army estimate of early 19^9 portrays a rather discouraging picture,

The grievous reverses of Kardhltsa and Naoussa, although swiftly countervailed, and the disastrous occupation of Karpenissi, which occurred on the same day the change in the Armys' supreme command had taken place kept public opinion in effervescence and were having harmful repercussions abroad, , , . It should, moreover, be admitted that the morale of the Armed Forces also had been affected. The series of misfortunes added its weight to the natural weariness of the troops which for over two years had been fighting relentlessly against a sly and elusive enemy,1

In January the Democratic Army continued its Winter

Counteroffensive, On 11 January it made a (second) attack

on Naousa, which was occupied by the guerrillas for h days.

On 20 January the Democratic Army attacked Karpenision, 113 2 which was overrun and occupied for over two weeks. The

President's Seventh Quarterly Report describes part of the pillage of Karpenision as follows;

The guerrillas occupied Karpenision for l6 days during which time they burned all public buildings, burned the military hospital (2 of 97 patients escaped) and recruited almost all men in the town between the ages of 15 and 4o years. The total of recruits reached 1,300 and an additional 500 hostages were taken. All reconstruction works, warehouses and equipment were destroyed by fire; the shops were looted and many public officials were killed , , , a large amount of relief supplies , . , were either carried off or destroyed by the guerrillas.^

A detailed account of the ONA XV Division's efforts to relieve Karpenision and to pursue the 3-1*, 000 bandits in­ volved has been published,^ This account reveals that the

GNA still had not mastered the fundamentals of military operations much less the more complicated aspects of the pursuit of guerrillas. The initial division attack was slowed and stopped by the guerrillas primarily because the

GNA Corps Commander had countermanded the Division Commander's orders to a subordinate unit without telling the Division

Commander.

On 21 January a change in leadership of the Greek

Armed Forces occurred which was to have as far reaching consequences as the change in the leadership of the Demo­ cratic Army. General Alexander Papagos, the World War II

Commander-in-Chief of the GNA, accepted appointment as

Commander-In-Chief of the Greek Armed Forces. It has been Ill*

speculated that Papagos' terms of acceptance included the

stipulation that political interference in military matters cease forthwith, Papagos himself infers as much when he

states,

The wide power with which the new command was invested were, one might say, the fundamental reason for the subsequent improvement in the situation,5

He immediately set out to rectify the adverse conditions

affecting combat efficiency of the GAP which have been

discussed in the two proceeding chapters. Discipline was

enforced in the senior ranks of the Army, Incompetent and

insubordinate officers were eliminated. Aggressiveness and mobility were stressed in the tactical units. Each unit

was forced to constitute a reserve for the purpose of

pursuit,^ The will to fight, to close with and destroy the

guerrilla was soon to reappear in the GNA. It is to the

credit of the Greek Armed Forces that the previously exist­

ing situation was openly acknowledged and in fact published.

The New Supreme Command of the Armed Forces was primarily concerned with the following: First, the conduct of investigations by Army generals on the cause of reverses . . . so that disciplinary action might be taken against the eventually responsible officers, either because of incompetence or breach of duty. Secondly . , . the enforcement of discipline particularly in regard to the prompt execution of orders.7

On 11-12 March the Democratic Army spurred by

Zakhariadhis' desire to achieve an impressive victory after

the relief of Markos, launched a large scale attack on 115

Fiorina, a medium size town near Vitsi. The attack was repulsed. The tide was starting to turn. Additional guerrilla attacks on Arta, Amindaios, Lidhorikion and in the Grammes were successfully repulsed. By now informers were beginning to advise the GNA in advance of bandit

attacks. The attacking guerrilla forces were beginning to

consist of an increasingly higher percentage of women. The bandits appeared to be having difficulty recruiting able bodied men.

Plans for a GNA Spring and Summer Offensive were

completed. The offensive was once again to be a clearing

operation moving south to north. The first phase, the

clearing of the Peloponnese, had already been initiated in

December 19^8, and was successfully concluded in March,

The next phase known as Operation ROCKET was launched on

1 May 19^9 designed to clear the bandits out of Central

Greece. It was hoped to complete the encirclement of the

guerrillas by imposing a block to the north while other

forces prevented escape to the south. Despite Papagos’

admonitions, GNA operations during the early portion of

ROCKET were marked by indecisive efforts to conduct the

pursuit of the guerrilla force in Central Greece. Once

more, as in the past, a large number of guerrillas were

able to escape partly because of the failure of the block­

ing force to arrive on time and partly because of failure

to seal off escape routes to Albania,® 116

Although unahle as yet to fix and hold the bandits, the GNA, by June, had seized the initiative in all areas except the northern border areas . Aggressive GNA pursuit kept the guerrilla from establishing himself in any area long enough to reorganize. Guerrilla recruiting was suffering accordingly and more and more females were im­ pressed into service as fighters. The GNA training program and the new leadership was beginning to pay off during the last months of POCKET. Renewed vigor and efficiency was evidenced in the continuous and close pursuit of the guer­ rillas during August and September. ROCKET, which ended

21 September 19^9, cost the GNA 152 killed, 257 wounded and 22 missing whereas 1570 guerrillas were killed, 2U98 captured and 1380 surrendered. These casualty figures testify to the increased effectiveness of the GNA tactics.

This campaign resulted in a marked increase in civilian morale, permitted thousands of refugees to return to their homes and villages and enter into productive labor, removed congestion in already over-populated civilian areas, and thereby aided in the reconstruction and rehabilitation programs. Militarily the operations principal defect had been the failure to seal off the Albanian border when the longer and more easily accessible Yugoslav border had been closed by Tito in July.^

The cumulative effect of the GNA pressure, the HT closing of the Yugoslav border, and Zakhariadhis* tactical concepts led inexorably to a Communist buildup in the Vitsi-

Grammos areas, RHAF aerial reconnaissance revealed 105mm artillery, 120mm mortars, AT guns and AA guns in the mountainous guerrilla stronghold.

The third step in the 19^9 Greek National offensive was to be a coordinated attack directed at the DA's strong­ holds in Vitsi-Grammos. This offensive was designated operation TORCH and was to be executed in three phases, a

feint on Grammos, a major assault on Vitsi followed by a major assault on Grammos, The bandits had approximately

7,000 men organized in 2 divisions on each of Vitsi and

Grammos. The nature of their fire support will be indi­

cated by the figures of captured materiel. The feint in the Grammos area was successfully executed during the

period 2-8 August by a GNA division. As a result of this

attack and the deceptive location of GNA reserves, the

Communists transferred units from Vitsi to Grammos.

On 10 August four GNA divisions attacked the concen­

tration of guerrillas on Vitsi, The concentration of

force, status of training of the GNA and superiority of

equipment soon made itself felt. The battle of Vitsi

demonstrated the futility of guerrillas standing to fight

well trained and equipped regular forces. Within 3 days

the GNA with effective air support from the RHAF had overrun 118

Vitsi. The most encouraging aspect of Vitsi was the im­ pressive quantities of bandit materiel, equipment and supplies which were captured. The bandit retreat was executed on such short notice that effective guerrilla destruction of equipment was not feasible. Among the items captured were;

39 Artillery pieces

33 A T guns

1+36 machine guns and submachine guns

115 mortars

3,392 rifles

15*000 rounds of artillery and mortar ammunition

1,650 mines

The Vitsi battle was hailed generally by the Greek press and the public as a sweeping victory. Nevertheless, from the anti-guerrilla point of view, the battle was incon­ clusive. Fifty to sixty per cent of the bandit force in

Vitsi had escaped into Albania, The GNA mission of exter­ mination of the bandits had not been accomplished. The

GNA losses at Vitsi were 220 killed, l,ll6 wounded and 3 missing. The Communists left behind 117 killed, 509 cap­ tured and 133 surrendered. Again the wounded were evacuated to Albania or it might be speculated killed.

On the night of 2k August the GNA launched the

Grammos assault with a night attack designed to envelop the 119 north flank of the guerrilla position and seal the Albanian border. The assault forces moved forward with determination and completed the envelopment. Four GNA Divisions and five

Raiding Forces groups overran the Grammos position and collapsed the guerrilla defense by 27 August, Severe casualties and the loss of large quantities of supplies and equipment were inflicted on the guerrillas. During the battle of Grammos, United States supplied "Helldiver" air­ craft delivering napalm were used for the first time. The

RHAF air support was extremely effective and was all the more commendable in that these aircraft were unloaded from ships only a week before the offensive started. The GNA c aptured;

lU Artillery pieces

7 AT guns and 17 A/A guns

538 Light machine guns

99 Heavy machine guns

203 Mortars

220U Rifles

GNA casualties amounted to 2^*3 killed, 1,1*52 wounded and

11 missing. The bandits left 922 killed, 765 captured and

179 surrendered behind them on Grammos as the survivors fled individually into Albania, The GNA had succeeded in envel­ oping the position and is credited by the U, S. observers with brilliant and aggressive action.Yet the casualty 120 figures seem to indicate that at Grammos as at Vitsi a large number of guerrillas also had succeeded in escaping.

By 31 August there were no effective bandits in the

Vitsi-Grammos area. The total strength of the guerrillas remaining in Greece in isolated pockets was estimated at about 3,500. Mopping up operations were to continue for the rest of the year and into 1950. By year's end, the number of guerrillas remaining in Greece was estimated to have been reduced to 811. The 19^*9 casualties had amounted to some iU,6U3 killed, wounded and missing for the GNA and 12 32,1*78 killed, captured and surrendered guerrillas. The

Democratic Army had been crushed and the military threat to the security of Greece had been removed. Henceforth, the economic and political aspects of reconstruction were to play an ever more important role.

II. THE COMMUNIST DILEMMA

It would be a mistake to underestimate the serious effect that the 191*8 battle casualties (nearly 33 ,000) had had on the Democratic Army. These casualties represent al­ most a 150% turnover. Nevertheless, as has been mentioned,

Zakhariadhis drove the Democratic Army into the Winter

Counteroffensive spurred on by the motivation of his per­ sonal feud with Markos. The temporary gains in the attacks on Kardhitsa and Soufhades in December and Naousa and 121

Karpenision in January were more than offset by the punish­ ment taken when the bandits attempted to hold these gains against the GNA counterattacks. The desperate attack on

Fiorina in February was Zakhariadhis' last major offensive action and was repulsed with heavy guerrilla losses.

As the initiative passed to the GNA in the Spring, the Democratic Army tried to defeat the GNA offensive by the previously successful tactic of diversionary raids designed to force the GNA to withdraw singificant forces from the main effort. But by now the NDC was strong enough to contain the raids and in any event Papagos was not amenable to diverting regular troops from offensive opera- 11 tions. As the GNA wrested control of Central Greece from the bands of guerrillas they withdrew north to the refuge of the Vitsi-Grammos redoubts. The buildup of these base areas became the main concern of the bandits. In the words of the President’s Eighth Quarterly Report,

Feverish efforts were undertaken by the guerrillas to increase the defensive strength of this area. Earth and concrete emplacements were prepared, barbed- wire entanglements were erected, and various types of artillery ranging in caliber up to 120mm mortars were brought in from Albania to strengthen the position against the inevitable attack by the GNA,^^

The closing of the Yugoslav border in July 19^9 was a severe blow to the Communist cause. To appreciate its full significance one need only recall the distribution of the guerrilla forces. The reserves behind the iron curtain 122 were distributed 2,500 in Bulgaria, U,000 in Yugoslavia and ^,500 in Albania. Tito's act effectively neutralized the U,000 in Yugoslavia and cut off the 2,500 in Bulgaria from the main concentrations in Vitsi-Grammos. The 20,000 odd bandits in Greece were distributed roughly 1/3 in

Vitsi, 1/3 in Grammos and 1/3 in the remainder of Greece.

Of this remainder 2500 to 3000 were located in Thrace and

Western Macedonia. The GNA controlled the open Vardar

Valley separating Thrace from Vitsi-Grammos necessitating movement through Yugoslavia. Thus, Tito's act not only sealed off some 6,500 reserves but effectively isolated some 2500 to 3000 bandits in Greece — a personnel loss of some 30-35^.^^ Additionally, it should be remembered that

Yugoslavia had initiated a significant portion of the supplies sent to the guerrillas even though they may have crossed the border at points along the more covered Albanian border. Colonel Murray hypothesizes that:

The low levels in certain classes of supplies found in the Vitsi and Grammos positions after the collapse of the guerrilla defense suggests that the Tito- Cominform rift so affected the supply situation of the Democratic Army that it was by 19^9 no longer capable of carrying on operations on the scale of 19^7 and 19^8 . Indeed, this may have been the proxi­ mate cause of the guerrilla collapse.

On the other hand. General Van Fleet cautions against placing too much importance on the "closing" of the Yugo­

slavian border. The General points out that the Yugoslavs were just as incapable of physically closing the border as 123 the Greeks had been and that Tito did not move the

Yugoslav Army into the areas of Yugoslavia in which the guerrillas, were training or interfere with their hospitali­ zation in Yugoslavia. General Van Fleet considers that

Tito "withdrew support (statement but not fact) only when he saw the handwriting on the wall that the Communist IT guerrilla effort in Greece was failing."

The KKE support of the Slavo-Macedcnian National

Liberation Front in its announced objective of establishing an "independent" Macedonia had a dèletérious effect on the morale of the guerrillas. Surrenders started to show a gradual increase and an increasing percentage of the guerrilla forces were women. As of March 19^9 it was estimated that 1 A as high as 20-25% of the Democratic Army was female.

Clearly the Communist cause was in decline.

Nevertheless the DA gave a good account of itself to the end. In an appendix to the JUSMAGGreport General

Jenkins very favorably reports on the tactical proficiency of the guerrillas in bringing counterbattery fire to bear on GNA weapons in the Vitsi and Grammos battles.The

GNA casualties in these battles speak adequately for the determination and valor of the guerrillas. The JUSMAGG report points out that despite GNA superiority at Vitsi and Grammos "no large scale surrenders or easy capture of sizeable guerrilla groups occurred. The guerrillas were 124 20 "beaten — they did not give up."

Before leaving the Communist side for the last time, it is necessary once again to touch on the extent of

Soviet involvement in the disastrous affairs in Greece,

It will be remembered that in the second chapter, it was concluded that there was little evidence of Soviet support of ELAS during the early stages of British hegemony in Greece.

At that time, Stalin was living up to a wartime agreement with Churchill to leave Greece to the British sphere of influence. Additionally, it can be surmised that Soviet resources were stretched thin in the effort to consolidate their extensive gains in Eastern Europe,

But what of the "Third Round"? The general tenor of

American thinking at the time was to attribute the Anti-

Bandit War to Soviet militancy and the grand design of world Communism to dominate the world. Analysis of the

Greek Press, at the time, indicates that it was generally agreed that the northern neighbors of Greece took their cues from Stalin and that only Stalin could call off the p 1 conflict. One erudite study. Professor Xydis', has de­ duced by circumstantial evidence that Stalin started to challenge British hegemony in Greece early in 1944, acquiesed in the December 1944 uprising and initiated a Soviet War by proxy through Tito and secondhand through the KKE in p p the form of the "Third Round" in 1946. This evidence. 125 however, rejects the autonomy which the Yugoslav govern­ ment and the KKE, in the opinion of the author of this thesis, possessed at that time. In any event. Professor

Xydis concurs that as of the time of United States involve­ ment, the U.S.S.R, backed out.

On the other hand, examination of the primary source material used in this thesis has failed to reveal specific evidence of direct Soviet involvement in the instigation of the conflict. There are indications of later influence on the KKE by the Soviet dominated Cominform but such influence appears to be more directed at the isolation of Tito than at the defeat of the Greek Government, Mar­ shall Shulman in a recently published reappraisal of

Stalin’s foreign policy states.

In fact, as it appeared later from Yugoslav sources the Soviet Union had been opposed to the Greek civil war from the outset and had been urging the Yugoslavs to bring the operation to a close in January 1948, on the eve of the break with Tito. After the split, the Soviets purged the "nationalists" among the Greek Communist s. ^

Shulman's contention that the Anti-Bandit War owed its

support mainly to the Yugoslavs in spite of Stalin's opposition is based largely on the works of Djilas. Djilas

quotes Stalin as saying in February of 1948 :

What do you think, that Great Britain and the United States --the United States, the most powerful state in the world — will permit you to break their lines of communication in the Mediterranean Sea! Nonsense. And we have no Navy, The uprising ig^Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible. 126

There are undoubtedly classified records available that will throw further light on this subject at some future date. From the available evidence, it appears that

Stalin, on the one hand, expediently exploited an existing situation not of his own doing to enhance his Cold War bargaining position with the West, at the time of the

Berlin blockade, while at the same time ruthlessly inter­ vening in the situation by means of the Cominform to assure his more vital objective of hegemony within the then Soviet bloc. Specifically, Stalin used the Greek situation as a means of isolating Tito.

III. UNITED STATES MILITARY INFLUENCE

Operation and Training

Some of the far reaching consequences of the 21

January appointment of Papagos already have been discussed.

From the U. S. point of view, one of the most significant attributes of the new commander was his admittance that a problem did exist, and his open minded approach to the solution of that problem. The efforts of the American missions up to this time to persuade the Government to give the Army a free rein in the conduct of operations, and to encourage the Army to take more aggressive action were not too productive. When Papagos was appointed Commander- in-Chief, JUSMAPG became an effective instrumentality for 127

increasing the combat efficiency of the GNA, United States military observers in the field were considered to be pro­

fessionally competent and impartial reporters, Papagos

was willing to hear their reports and, where Justified, act

on their advice. As a result of JUSMAPG advice, an investi­

gation was directed by Papagos as to new command failures 2 5 occurring during the Grammos battle of 1948, Papagos

initiated accomplishment of many of the aims which JUSMAPG

had long advocated and wholeheartedly accepted the U. S,

proposed training programs,Colonel Murray states that ;

Papagos' success was due in no small part to the manner in which he accepted the advice and recommenda­ tions of the U, S. and British Missions and made full use of them,

The comments in the proceeding chapters on the

unfavorable aspects of Greek Military operations were largely

derived from the JUSMAPG teams with the divisions. For

example, these observers were critical of the GNA's inde­

cisive efforts to pursue the bandits in May and June 1949

during operation ROCKET. At the same time, the Corps teams

were reporting that planning and operations staff work at

the command level was hindering the effective execution ? fi of ROCKET. Papagos' reaction to these reports was rapid

and vigorous. By the later phases of ROCKET many of the

JUSMAPG recommendations were beginning to pay off. GNA

units had learned the lesson of exploiting successes, large

or small, and that a guerrilla rout did not necessarily 128 mean a victory. The concept was permeating all ranks of the GNA that a decisive guerrilla defeat could only be achieved when every fleeing guerrilla was pursued and annihilated.^^

Colonel Bennett, whose first hard comments have been referred to in previous portions of this thesis, was with the GNA from early 1948 until the end of the war. He states that the change of attitude of GNA commanders toward their American advisers distinctly changed shortly after

Papagos' assumption of command. Whereas previously the

Greek field commanders were reluctant to accept advice, they soon came to actively seek it. According to Colonel

Bennett, it was rumored in the field that Papagos had put out instructions that "what the U. S. advisers said was the word,"30

In view of the immediate rapport established between

General (later Marshall) Papagos and the U, S. military advisers it is interesting to speculate on the degree of

United States influence brought to bear to secure the

eventual appointment of the General as Commander-in-Chief.

Spencer in his analysis of the Greek Press of the period

states that the Rightist and Royalist officers had long

concluded that Papagos was the only high-ranking officer with the prestige and ability to unify the politically

divided Greek officer corps. His analysis goes on to 129 conclude that the "demands" of these officers for the re­ call of Papagos "came to he supported hy American ad­ visers . "

In referring to the general status of training in the GNA at this time, the President's Report states,

Greek officers and personnel of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group continue their activities in supervising and training Greek Army units. . . . Response to the recommendations made by members of the United States military mission with regard to various training projects has been excellent and reflects increased appreciation among Greek Army commanders of the value of the training in improving the efficiency of their troops.32

Operation TORCH, the final offensive of the war, was launched in August. It was the culmination of over three years fighting for the GNA. During these three years, the

United States had supplied military equipment and logistical

support for the last two years, military operational ad­ vice for a year and a half, and military training advice

and supervision for one year. The "report card" submitted by JUSMAPG on the Vitsi stage of the operation still re­

flected shortcomings on the divisional level.

The operations of the GNA infantry divisions during the Vitsi campaign were on the whole below the standards expected of infantry troops. Except for aggressiveness of the III Raiding Force and the XI Infantry Division and the rapid exploitation of their successes, too much dependence on air and artillery was displayed by infantry units.33

However, the comments on the final Grammos stage are sig­

nificantly more enthusiastic. The reports refer to the 130

"efficiency of the quick transfer of forces" from Vitsi to Grammos, the "brilliant envelopment" which sealed the

Albanian border, the "determination" with which the direct assault forces fought and the "aggressiveness and speed" of the GNA attack,®^ Some sources tend to attribute the outcome of the Anti-Bandit War exclusively to outside factors such as Tito's defection from the Cominform or to

United States assistance. It should be remembered that by

August 1949 the Greeks had built an Army that could give a favorable account of itself by any Balkan standards. It is undeniable that United States assistance had had a signifi­ cant impact on this army but in the final analysis it was the Greek soldier who did the fighting.

Logistics

By the end of the Vitsi-Grammos campaign (30 August

1949) the United States had initiated procurement in the amount of $344,000,000 for the Greek Armed Forces. 5T8 ships had delivered some 612,170 tons of military supplies 3 5 to Greece. The total appropriation under PL 271 and

PL 793 for Greece amounted to some $472,000,000 for the two year period June 1947 to June 1949.®^ Thus, military procurement had accounted for some 73% of available aid funds. Table III (on Page 131) shows an illustrative example of the deliveries of military equipment. 131

TABLE III

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1949®”^

Motor Vehicles 9,953

Small Arms 154 ,132

Mortars & Artillery 4 ,080

Mules 11,907

Tires 46,744

Radio Sets 7,063

Ammunit ion Bombs & Rockets 89,438 Arty & Mortar 7 ,376,329 Small Arms 445 ,042,694

Rations 224,624 ,284

Gasoline 52,861,890 gallons CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES

^Greek Army, Four Months Work by the Army (Athens: 1949), p. 1.

^Brief. History JUSMAPG. pp. 24-25.

^Seventh Quarterly Report. pp. 5-6.

^Frederick Loomis, "Report from Greece," Military Review (April 1950), p. T.

^Papagos, Foreign Affairs, p. 227.

®Brief History JUSMAPG. p. 25.

^Greek Army, Four Months Work by the Army, p. 10.

^History of JUSMAGG 25 March 1949 to 30 June 1950 contains the most detailed accounts of operations ROCKET and TORCH and is the source of most of the details of these final GNA operations that follow.

9-^Ibid . , pp. 18-36.

10"'Ibid.

l^Ibid.

^®Papagos, Foreign Affairs, p. 229.

^^Eighth Quarterly Report. p. 5.

^^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (January 1954 ), p. 19

^^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette. (April 1954), p. 6 0 .

^^Letter from General Van Fleet to author.

^®Seventh Quarterly Report, p. 11.

^^History of JUSMAG. p. 131. 132

The American Mission for Aid to Greece had grown during the course of the war until it had reached the size shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV

STRENGTH OF AMERICAN MISSION FOR AID TO GREECE (AS OF 30 JUNE 1949)38

State Army N avy Air Fore e Total

Officers 0 ITO 17 25 212

Enlisted Men 0 207 24 20 251

Civilians 26 35 0 3 64

Total 26 412 4i 48 527 CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES

^Greek Army, Four Months Work by the Army (Athens: 1949), p. 1.

^Brief History JUSMAPG. pp. 24-25.

^Seventh Quarterly Report. pp. 5-6.

^Frederick Loomis, "Report from Greece," Military Review (April 1950), p. T.

^Papagos, Foreign Affair s, p. 227 .

^Brief History JUSMAPG. p. 25.

^Greek Army, Four Months Work by the Army, p. 10.

^History of JUSMAGG 25 March 1949 to 30 June 1950 contains the most detailed accounts of operations ROCKET and TORCH and is the source of most of the details of these final GNA operations that follow.

^Ibid.. pp. 18-36.

l°Ibid.

^^Ibid.

^®Papagos, Foreign Affairs, p. 229.

^^Eighth Quarterly Report, p. 5.

i^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (January 1954), p. 19.

^^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette, (April 1954) , p. 60. 17 Letter from General Van Fleet to author.

1 A Seventh Quarterly Report, p. 11.

^^History of JUSMAG. p. 131. 134

Floyd A, Spencer, War and Postwar Greece (Washing­ ton; Library of Congress, p . 105.

^^Xydis, 0£_. cit.. pp. 509, 529.

^^Marshall Shulman, Stalin * s Foreign Policy Re- apprai sed (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 19^3), p. 72. 24 / Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York : Harcourt Brace and World, 19^2 ) , p. 182.

^^History of JUSMAGG. p. 48.

Z^Brief History of JUSMAPG. p. 25.

^"^Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (March 1954 ), p.. 57.

^®History of JUSMAGG. p . l8.

^^Ibid. . p. 36.

®^Interview with Colonel Bennett.

®^Spencer, op. cit., p. Il4.

^^Eighth Quarterly Report, p. 8.

®®History of JUSMAGG. p. 8 5 . 3 4 Ibid. . p. 101.

3^Brief History of USAGG. p. 35.

®^Eighth Quarterly Report . p. 8.

®'^History of JUSMAGG. p. 58.

®®Eighth Quarterly Report . CHAPTER VII

TRANSITION

I. SECURITY SITUATION

To all intents and purposes the Vitsi-Grammos victory of August 19^9 marked the end of hostilities in

Greece. On U November the guerrilla radio announced a decision of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central

Committee of the KKE to end the armed struggle. This broadcast urged its followers to continue their efforts on the political, economic and social fronts until more favorable conditions existed. The KKE classified the action as a temporary retrenchment necessiated by the treason of Tito and the increased U, 5. aid to the mon- archo-fascist government. The press and the public generally considered this announcement to be the end of hostilities and the basis of hope for a brighter future.

On lé November additional instructions were issued to the party faithful to engage only in political and propaganda activities throughout Greece and to avoid contact with

Nationalist forces. Due to reduction in bandit strength, dispersion into widely scattered and uncoordinated small groups, losses in leaders and lack of communications with supply bases in the Satellite countries, the combat effective­ ness of the guerrillas in Greece was virtually eliminated 136 by the close of 19^9.^

The main apprehension of the GNA now became the bandits outside of Greece in Albania and Bulgaria, Accord­ ingly, the Army was disposed along the nothern borders with four divisions facing Albania and two along the

Bulgarian frontier. A transition in internal security responsibility was initiated whereby the Gendarmerie would once again assume the responsibility for maintenance of law and order in all areas except along the northern frontiers

By November the Gendarmerie was given the responsibility of eliminating the pocketed guerrillas remaining in certain locales. It is interesting to note in light of subsequent emphasis on "Civic Action", that GNA engineer units and

selected tactical units were withdrawn from tactical duties and assigned the mission of road building in Northern

Greece. This program had made "fair" progress by November

19^9 when the winter snows seriously hampered it.

JUSMAPG withdrew the Division advisory teams in

September and concentrated on advising higher level staffs

on operational, training and logistical matters. The U.S.

advisers became involved in the demobilization plans of

the GAF, The U. S. Mission was urgently interested in

reducing the size and cost of the GAF so as to concentrate

the maximum effort on Greek economic recovery which was by

now long overdue. Partially because of a somewhat obscure 137 security situation and partially because of a strong Greek military dedication to general conscription the GAF was not reduced to the size desired by the American Mission.

Marshall Papagos replied to General Van Fleet on the sub­ ject of conscription as follows:

General conscription constitutes for Greece a practical way of national and cultural education of the population particularly of the peasantry, who learn in the Army their duty and obligations toward their fatherland on the one hand and their rights as citizens on the o t h e r . 3

The maintenance of divisions on the border and a training establishment adequate for general conscription entailed large expenditures and initially proportionately reduced the availability of U. S. aid funds for Greek rehabilita­ tion which in late 19^9 was in need of an overriding priority.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) aug­ mented and in a sense replaced the PL 75 funds in continuing military assistance to the GAF commencing in FY 1950, The

Communist assault on Korea in June 1950, however, changed the prospect of a significant reduction in the GAF, The crash programs for reconstruction were forced to give way to a long term economic reconstruction program coordinated with the maintenance of an adequate military posture vis-a- vis the northern Satellites, But from 1950 on the emphasis was gradually changed to reconstruction and economic stability. As the JUSMAGG Report states, "The shifting of 138

American aid from a military to an economic field had al­ ways been the aim of the original program,"**

II. ECONOMIC TRANSITION

The condition of Greece at the time of U. S, involve­ ment has already been described in rather black terms.

The condition at the end of 19^9 was even blacker as far as physical damage and economic capability are concerned.

McNeill summarized the situation.

Losses more than equalled the reconstruction which had been accomplished between 19^^ and 19^7 « The country as a whole was worse off in 19^9 than it had been in 19^4 and 1945. . . . Except for main roads and ports which had been rebuilt and improved during the course -of the fighting, almost everything planned in 1947 still remained to be done in 1949.^

The following list (Table V) derived from GNA and

U, S . sources gives as idea of the magnitude of the destruction, (Page 139)

JUSMAPG planned to divest itself of all responsi­ bilities not strictly military. The Economic Cooperation

Administration/Greece (ECA/G) which had been forced to take

second priority to the military missions during the period

of guerrilla warfare was the responsible body for inte­

grating the general program of peacetime aid to Greece.

The plans which were developed envisioned the gradual trans­

fer of USAGG non-military procurement responsibilities to

ECA/G. Responsibility for common use item procurement 139

TABLE V

REPORTED DESTRUCTION AND DAMAGE . ANTI BANDIT WAR JUNE 1946 - DECEMBER 1949

Attacks on Towns or Villages 2,030 Pillages of Towns and Villages 7,690 Houses Burned or Destroyed 24,626 Schoolhouses Destroyed 54 Pillage or Destruction of Wheat, Barley, or Rye 180,000 Oxen and Horses Stolen 114,754 Sheep and Goats Stolen 1 ,365,315 Road and Highway Bridges Destroyed 476 Roads and Highways Destroyed 13,700 Railroad Bridges Demolished 439 Railroad Tunnels Destroyed 5 Trains Derailed 81 Railroad Stations Burned 80

(food, clothing, petroleum products, and general maintenance

material) and supervision was transferred by early 1950,

By July 1950, ECA was administering the distribution of

such MDAP funded items as uniforms and field rations which

could serve a dual military-civil purpose. By year's end,

the U. S, military disengaged from all supply and procure­

ment operations except those pertaining to military hard­

ware .

Prior to the end of hostilities "economic" assistance

had been limited to two general areas both in direct support

of military operations. The first of these economic

assistance programs was the relief of refugees fleeing from

the areas of military operations. By October of 1947, the lUo number of such refugees had reached 300,000, At the height of the war their numbers had swelled to nearly

700,000 or one-tenth of the nation^ population. McNeill states that "providing even the rudiments of shelter and the necessary minimum of food and clothing to such a large number of people constituted the main burden upon American economic aid between 1947-49,"'^ At the conclusion of the

Vitsi-Grammos campaign, JUSMAPG advised the GNA Corps

Commanders of the necessity and importance of the refugees returning to the then deserted villages at the earliest practical time in order to plant crops and prepare for the g coming winter. The JUSMAG Report emphasizes that the sustained flow of guerrilla-stricken refugees to their homes and removal from the relief rolls was an overriding factor in enhancing the national stability.^

The second major area of "economic" assistance attempted during the hostilities was reconstruction. The reconstruction attempted fell into five major groups of projects : the Corinth Canal, ports, highways, railroads and airfields. It can readily be seen that these pro­ jects all had a short term military payoff as line of communications improvement projects as well as a longer term impact on the economy. The Corinth Canal which had been ingeniously incapacitated by the retreating Germans was officially reopened on 4 July 1948 , The principal ports lUl of Greece, Piraeus, Salonika and Volos, each required ex­ tensive repairs to quay walls, breakwaters and dry docks as well as dredging, removal of numberous wrecked vessels and replacement of dock operating equipment. The highway program called for the actual rehabilitation of 1,120 miles of highways and the engineering supervision of 92 miles of road and 120 bridges which the Greek ministry of Public

Works would rehabilitate. The railroad program included the reconstruction of eight large railroad bridges and two tunnels in addition to the engineering supervision of the

Greek railway system's rehabilitation programs. The air­ field program consisted of runway construction at eight airfields and some improvement of ancilary facilities.

These reconstruction projects were all carried out under the supervision of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. The projects were funded in the amount of approximately $20 million of PL 75 funds by the Corps of Engineers but ECA provided additional funds under both PL 75 and subsequent appropriations ,

Public Law 271, 80th Congress approved July 30, 19^7 appropriated $Uoo million for assistance to Greece and

Turkey, Public Law 793, 80th Congress approved June 28,

1948, supplemented the initial appropriation by $225 million making a total of $625 million for the two year period end­

ing June 30, 1949. (Both PL 271 and PL 793 implemented 142

PL 75, the Truman Doctrine, and hence are often collective­ ly referred to as PL 75 funding.) Of this amount, $472 million was allocated to Greece, This was suballocated as follows ;

TABLE VI

APPROPRIATIONS UNDER PL 271 AND 793 80TH CONGRESS FOR ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AS OF JUNE 30, 1949^^ (in millions of dollars (rounded)

U. s. Government Agency Allocation

Department of Agriculture 31 Economic Cooperation Agency 4 Treasury Department 20 Department of the Army (and Air Force) Military Program 320 Corps of Engineer Projects 20 Department of the Navy Military Program 22 Petroleum Purchases 4 Department of State 53 Total ( Does not total due to rounding) 472

The amount of economic aid included in the above is separately listed in the same Presidential Report as $120 12 million. Taking the total of the Army and Navy Military

Programs as $342 million and allowing the $10 million balance for administrative costs, it will be seen that the military program eventually consumed some 73% of the PL 75 funding. This is in stark contrast to the original esti­ mates of a 50-50 split between the military and economic 143 sectors.The disparity is further exacerbated by the fact that the "economic" funds were to a great extent expended on refugee relief and military support projects.

United States military assistance had contributed significantly to the survival of Greece as a Sovereign

Nation State. That it had done so reflects credit on the officers and men of the United States Military Missions to Greece, The problem facing the Greek government and its American advisers in the fall of 1949 was whether the

Sovereign State of Greece would be a viable State. This presented an economic and political problem beyond the . purvue of this thesis. That this problem also was solved largely due to American assistance, further attests to the wisdom of the concept of the Truman Doctrine. CHAPTER VII

FOOTNOTES

^History of JUSMAG, pp. 139 and lUU.

^Ibid.

^Ibid.. p. 165.

^Ibid., p . 6 2 ,

^McNeill, American Aid in Action, p. 45.

^History of JUSMAG. pp. 193-197.

'^McNeill, American Aid in Action. p. 4 0.

^History of JUSMAGG. p. IO8 .

^Ibid.. p. 139.

^^Fourth Quarterly Report , p. 13.

^^Eighth Quarterly Report f PP '. 26-27.

l^Ibid.. pp. 32-33 and p . 11.

^3gecond Quarterly Report » P* 8. CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

An analysis of the Anti-Bandit War indicates that

Greek National Forces prevailed over the bandits because of a combination of bandit errors, Nationalist persistence and the always present element of external circumstances.

The external circumstances: Tito's defection and United

States assistance can be properly considered within the framework of the two opposing sides, but it should be remembered that the interaction of these two external factors also operated within the global framework of the inchoate Cold War. Additionally, United States military assistance to Greece had far reaching consequences in

U, S. military strategy which transcended the Anti-Bandit

War .

The Democratic Army (DA) operated under optimum guerrilla conditions from the period of mid-1946 until approximately mid-1948. The guerrilla operations of that period reveal maximum exploitation of the advantages which the bandits enjoyed: experienced leadership, a psychologi­ cal environment nutured in guerrilla tradition, favorable terrain, priviledged sanctuary, adequate logistical support, a population torn with economic privation and political un­ certainty and national security forces that were poorly 146 trained, equipped and led. Guerrilla tactics were pri­ marily based on hit and run raids, sabotage, terrorism, and avoiding open combat with government forces except under advantageous circumstances. Initial Communist success, the prospects of ultimate victory and the attri­ tion of prolonged combat led to a split between the leader­ ship of the Communist Party of Greece and the Democratic

Army. The Party leadership under Zakhariadis prevailed toward the end of 1948 and the Army commander Markos was gradually relieved of his responsibilities.

This change in leadership represented a change in basic strategy which resulted in far reaching tactical, political, psychological and logistical implications.

Tactically, the DA overconfidently elected to stand and

fight the GNA, which by now was rapidly improving in combat efficiency. This proved to be the undoing of the DA on the field of battle. Politically, Zakhariadis, a Comin- t'erm —oriented Communist, allowed the KKE to be maneuvered

into the position of supporting the Cominterm position on

the Macedonian issue as opposed to the traditional Greek

National position. This action cost the DA that sector of

popular support which equated Communism with a nationalist

cause. Psychologically, the DA further alienated its popu­

lar support by theblind excesses of terror and destruction

which became the order of the day. A guerrilla movement

can extort minority elements by terrorism but it can not i 4t utilize indefinitely these tactics against a homogeneous majority. Zakhariadis* Cominterm orientation also had logistical implications which contributed to a large degree to the defeat of the DA. Tito closed the Yugoslav supply base to the DA primarily because of Zakhariadis* adherence to the Cominform position in the Tito-Cominform rift.

Tito's relationship to the Greek Anti-Bandit War is indeed a complex one and in the minds of some observers a decisive one. However, the Greek Communists themselves held the key to this relationship. Direct evidence elab­ orated on by recent writings tends to substantiate the belief that Tito and the Yugoslav partisans were primarily responsible for the encouragement and support of the Anti-

Bandit War. Direct Soviet involvement in the instigation of the war has not been yet objectively substantiated.

After the second meeting of the Cominform expelled Tito in June 1948, it is probable that Stalin utilized the

Cominform * s newly established relations with the KKE to assist in the Soviet objective of isolating and destroying

Tito. Tito, however, continued to supply the guerrillas and offer them haven. Markos, the DA Commander, was a staunch advocate of continued cooperation with Tito. It appears that Tito would have continued his support of the war provided that he could influence the KKE and that the

DA had a chance to win. Zakhariadis* ouster of Markos and lU8 adherence to the Stalinist dominated Cominform resolved the first proviso. It is probable that U. S. military assistance to Greece contributed to Tito's appraisal of the second proviso.

In contrast to the Communists, the Greek Armed

Forces were suffering from the pangs of World War II and the growing pains of rapid expansion. Political instability and interference in military affairs, lack of competent officers, inadequate training, inadequate equipment, low morale and lack of confidence in the government, all con­ tributed to the poor combat efficiency and lack of the will to fight in the GAF, The low ebb of late 194 6 is well reflected in Marshall Papagos ' words, "At the end of 1946 the national forces were in danger of losing the war with­ out fighting it,"^ Within three years the Greek nation had extricated itself from this dangerous situation. In the final analysis, it was the valor and effort of the

Greek people that made victory over the bandits possible.

Two factors made a particularly significant contribution to the rising tide of Greek National combat effective­ ness . . . the leadership of Papagos and United States

Military Assistance,

A people cannot fight effectively for a nationalist cause if the national purpose cannot be identified. World

War II and its aftermath had hopelessly emasculated Greek political cohesion and unity of purpose. General Alexander 149

Papagos, the hero of World War II, served his nation once again hy accepting on 21 January 1949 appointment as

Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Armed Forces. In the ab­ sence of a competent higher political authority, he exerted a unifying influence on the diverse factions of the Greek nation and succeeded in defining national purpose in terms that politician and soldier alike could understand. Under

Papagos the Greek Armed Forces were made to do what they were capable of doing. Discipline was enforced, incompe­ tence was eliminated. Political interference in tactical matters was not tolerated. The will to fight was once again instilled in the armed forces. Papagos provided the symbolic revitalization of Greek determination to win, which had been absent for the first two years of the con­ flict. From the United States* point of view, the appoint­ ment of Papagos had even further implications. For the first time United States military advice was wholeheartedly welcome. Under Papagos United States military assistance reached fruition.

The Truman Doctrine established an operational nexus between United States foreign policy objectives and military strategy in peacetime which was without precedent in the history of the Republic. Under the aegis of this national security policy concept, the military departments initiated four operational techniques in Greece which were to become 150 the hallmark of American military strategy for the Cold

War era: (1) the provision of large scale military assistance, ( 2 ) the aggressive use of U. S. military ad­ visers, (3) the development of counter-guerrilla tactics, and (4) the acceptance of limited U. S. involvement in military hostilities.

American military assistance to Greece represented the nation's first peacetime effort at a large scale mili­ tary assistance program. Like many first efforts there

•were mistakes at the beginning. The War Department like the Greek High Command vastly underestimated the guerrilla capabilities and overestimated GAF capabilities. In retrospect, it was a blunder to send a boy to do a man's job, •which in effect is what was done during the first six months after the Truman Doctrine was announced. The War

Department attempted to influence the outcome of military operations by providing equipment only. When this proved ineffective, the next piecemeal step was to add an opera­ tional advisory role. Only after a year of military operations with little or no significant improvement in combat effectiveness did the United States military assume an overall function embracing the logistical, operational and organization and training functions. But the cumula­ tive effect of the arrival of U. S, military equipment

and the increased cogency of U. S. military advice was in the end decisive. 151

Any discussion of United States military assistance to Greece would be remis if it did not point out the out­ standing leadership qualities of General James Van Fleet.

He established a rapport with the Greek military and the

Greek nation as a whole that generated a Greek-American camraderie of arms which significantly contributed to the victory. It is probable that he exercised an "informal command" over foreign troops that is without parallel in

American history. It is, further probable that he will be cannonized in Greek history as a savior of Greece.

The prospect of the arrival of U. S. aid staved off the threatened collapse of the Greek government during the dark days of 19^7. The arrival of U. S. aid sustained the economy and enabled it to mobilize, equip and supply large forces during the precarious days of 1948. Eventually the full impact of U. S, military assistance was felt during the offensive of 1949 when the tide was turned against the

Communists. By the end of 1949» Greece through American military assistance had been able to emerge from the pre­ carious situation in which it had found itself three years earlier. Had this aid not been extended, Greece would probably have fallen under Communist domination with the

subsequent expansion of that domination throughout the

eastern Mediterranean. As 1950 approached, the people of

Greece were free to proceed to rebuild their war torn 152 economy and enjoy in relative peace the way of life for which they had fought against the Facists, the Nazis and the Communists over a period of ten long, hitter years.

The longer range impact of military assistance to

Greece on United States military policy was equally far reaching. Greece was one of the first nations to receive peacetime military assistance. Today some 83 nations re- 2 ceive such aid. The United States Military Advisory

Groups in Greece reached a total strength of some 500 per­ sonnel at the height of the campaign, almost 10 times the original estimate of the requirement. Today some 7,000

United States personnel are serving in military missions in

31 nations worldwide while another 3,000 are serving in similar roles in an undisclosed number of additional nations.3

The $342 million expended on military assistance to

Greece under PL 75 during 1947-1949 has grown into a worldwide military assistance program for which some $32 billion has been expended since 195 0.** The experience gained in administering the military assistance program in Greece has served as a guide to the effective operation of the subsequent programs.

JUSMAPG with its associated Army, Navy, and eventu­ ally Air Force groups as reorganized into JUSMAG (Joint

U. S. Military Advisory Group) in early 1950 served as the pilot model for the organization and operational techniques 153 of U, S, military advisers to America's far flung allies.

The military adviser system first tested under fire in

Greece was subsequently to prove itself in Korea, Quemoy-

Matsu, Laos and today in Viet Nam,

The experience gained by the GNA and its United

States military advisers against the Democratic Array was

to prove to be only the first of the post war episodes of

guerrilla warfare in which the United States has subse­

quently become involved. In many respects the Anti-Bandit

War was the precursor of new frontier counter insurgency

emphas is.

The Anit-Bandit War entailed United States involve­ ment in a shooting war to which American military personnel

were committed (three U. S. military advisers were killed

during the Anti-Bandit War^). Yet there was no ideological

crusade for all out war. The sanctuary of bandit escape

was not threatened by military force. Military operations

in Greece were generally accepted by the American public

as an extention of cold war diplomacy by other means. To

this extent the Anti-Bandit War was a harbinger of the

Limited War concept that was to be Korea and that was to

reappear in the late 50's.

United States military assistance to Greece during / the Anti-Bandit War had a two—fold pay off. In the short

term it materially contributed to the national survival of 154

Greece and its subsequent economic viability as a member of the free community of nations. In the long term it served as the cradle for United States military strategy for the Cold War. CHAPTER VIII

FOOTNOTES

^Papagos, Foreign Affairs, p. 223,

^United States Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts (Washington; 1 May I963), pi 26.

^Ibid.. p. 27.

**Ibid . , p , 2,

^Loomis, o_£, cit. , p. 5. BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY

A. DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Congress. Congressional Record. 80th Congress. Volume 93, Parts 3 and 4, Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947,

Department of the Army, Brief History USAGG Procurement 24 May 1947 to 31 August 1949. Reports and Records Section (USAGG), 15 September 1949. (unpublished)

Department of the Army, Brief History JUSMAPG ^ January 1948 to 31 August 1949, Reports and Records Section (JUSMAPgT7 September 1949, (unpublished)

Department of the Army, The German Campaign in the Balkans. Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, 1952,

Department of the Army. Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Warfare in Greece 1941-451 Hugh H. Gardner, Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, 1962.

Department of the Army, History of JUSMAGG. 25 March 1949 to 30 June 1950. (undatedTT (unpublishedjl

Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts , Washington: 1 May 19^3,

Department of State. Greece - A Summary of Background Information. Office of Public Affairs, March 1947. (unpublished)

Department of State. Bulletin Supplement (Publication 2986) The General Assembly and the Problem of Greece. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947. 157

Department of State. Report s to Congress on Assistance to Greece and Turkey. Eight Reports; First Quarterly Report , 19^7 Second Quarterly Report, 19^8 Third Quarterly Report, 19U8 Fourth Quarterly Report, 1948 Fifth Quarterly Report, 1948 Sixth Quarterly Report, 1949 Seventh Quarterly Report, 1949 Eighth Quarterly Report, 1949 Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office.

B. DOCUMENTS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

British Foreign Office. Documents Regard!ng the Situation in Greece. January 19^5. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1945.

Greek Army General Staff, Four Months Work by the Army. Athens: 1949.

Greek Army General Staff. The Nation's Battle. Athens: Hellenic, 1952.

Greek Army General Staff. Study of Guerrilla Warfare. Alexander Natsinas, translated by USAGG Det. ”"c" Corps, Reproduced by OAC/S G-2, Hq. Department of Army (US), undated,

Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Greek White Book. London: Hutchinson, 1942.

C. OTHER SOURCES

Bennett, Warren K. Personal Interview in Washington on 4 October 1963. Colonel Bennett served as U. S, adviser to the IX Division GNA, from February 1948 until July 1949.

Eckert, George L. Personal Interview in Washington on 25 September 19^3. Colonel Eckert served as U. S. adviser to the 42nd Brigade of the IX Division GNA during the Roumeli and Grammos campaigns in 1948 . 158

Henderson, Loy. Informal Conversât ion in Washington on 23 October 1963. Ambassador Henderson was Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in the Department of State in 194% and 1948.

McNeill, William H. Letter to Author. dated 27 September 1963. Professor McNeill has written extensively on Greece .

Van Fleet, James A, Letter to Author. dated 7 November 1963. General Van Fleet was Chief of USAGG and Director of JUSMAPG and JUSMAGG.

II. SECONDARY

A. BOOKS

Agrafiotis, Chris. Was Churchill Right in Greece. Manchester, N, H.: Granite State, 1945.

Barker, Elisabeth, Macedonia. London; Royal Institute of International Affairs, I95O.

Cas son, Stanley, Greece Against the Axi s. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943.

Chandler, Geoffrey. The Divided Land. London : MacMillan, 1959.

Churchill, Winston S. Their Finest Hour. Boston: Houghton Mifflin^ 1949.

______. The Grand Alliance. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950.

. The Hinge of Fate. Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1950.

Closing the Ring. Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1951.

Triumph and Tragedy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953. 159

Condit, Dorothy M. Case Study in Guerri11a War ; Greece Dur ing World War 11. Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1961,

Christides, Christopher. The Mac edonian Camouflage . Athens: Hellenic, 19^9•

Daniels, Robert V. The N ature of Communi sm. New York : Random House, I962, deGaulle, Charles. Salvation. Vol. Ill of War Mémoires. 3 Vols., New York: Simon & Schuster, I960,

DJilas Milovan. Conversâti ons wi th Stalin . New York: Harcourt Brace and World, I962.

Feis, Herbert. Churchill. Roosevelt . Stalin. Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1957.

______. Between War and Peace . Princeton; Princeton University Press, 19^0.

Hamson, Denys. Fell Among Greeks . London: Jonathan Cape, 1947.

Heckstall-Smith, Anthony. The Greek Tragedy. New York; Norton, I961.

Howard, Harry N. The United Nat ions and the Problem of Greece. Department of State Publication 2909. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947.

Jecchinis, Chris. Beyond Olympus. London: Harrap, i960.

Jones, Joseph M. The Fifteen Weeks. New York; Viking, 1955.

Kennan, George F. Rus sia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin. New York: Mentor , I962 .

Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941. Princeton: Van Nostrand, I960.

Kousoulas , Dimitries G . The Priee of Freedom. Syracuse, N. Y .: Syracuse University Press, 1953.

Langer, William L. and S. Everett Gleason. The Undeclared War 194o-41. New York: Harper, 1953. % l6o

Leeper, Sir Reginald, When Gr eek Me et s Greek. London; Chatto & Windus, 1950.

McNeill, William H. The Greek Dilemma. Philadelphia; Lippincott, 1947.

.* Greece : American Aid in Action 1947-56. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1957.

, Elisabeth McNeill and Frank Smothers. Report on the Greeks. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1 ^ 8 .

Munkman, C, A, American Aid to Greece . New York : Praeger, 1958,

Myers, E. C. W. Greek Entanglement. London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1955.

Papagos, Alexander. The Battle of Greee e 1940-4l. trans. Eliascos. Athens: The J. M, Scazikis Alpha Eiditions, 1949.

Robinson, David M. America in Greece - A Traditional Policy. New York; Anatolia, 194F.

Rostow, Walt W. The United States in the World Arena. New York : Harpers, 19^0 .

Sarafis, Stefanos. Greek Resistance Army. trans. Praseoe. London: Farleigh, 1951.

Sherwood, Robert. Roosevelt and Hopkins . New York: Harper, 1948.

Shulman, Marshall D. Stalin* s Foreign Policy Reappraised. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963.

Sontag, Raymond James and James S. Beddie. (eds.) Nazi- Soviet Relations 1939-1941. Washington; U. S. Department of State, 1948 .

Stavrianos, L. S. Greece; American Dilemma and Opportunity. Chicago: Regnery, 195 2.

Spencer, Floyd A. War and Postwar Greece. Washington: Library of Congress, 1952.

Voigt, Fritz A. The Greek Sedit ion . London : Hollis & Carter, 1949. l6l

Wason, Betty. Mlracle in Hellas. New York: MacMillan, 1943.

Wilson, Field Marshal Lord of Libya. Eight Years Overseas 1 9 3 9 - ^7 . London: Hutchinson, 19^0 ,

Woodhouse, Christopher M. Apple of Discord. London: Hutchinson, 19^8.

Xydis, Stephen 0. Greece and the Great Power5. 19UU-I9UT. Salonika: Institute for Balkan Studies, 19^3.

Zotiades, George B. The Macedonian Controversy. Salonika: Institute for Balkan Studies, l^éïT.

B. PERIODICALS

Curtin, Edwin P. "American Advisory Group Aids in War on Guerrillas," Armored Cavalry Journal, (January - February 19H9 ), Ô-11, 3^+-3 5.

Loomis, Frederick H. "Report From Greece," Military Review, (April 1950), 3-9.

Murray, J. C. "The Anti-Bandit War," Marine Corps Gazette. Series of five articles; Volume 38, No. 1 (January 195^), 1^-23. Volume 38, No. 2 (February 195%), 50-59. Volume 38, No. 3 (March 195^), ^8-57. Volume 38, No. k (April 195**), 52-60. Volume 38, No. 5 (May 195**), 52-58 .

Papagos, Alexander. "Guerrilla Warfare," Foreign Affairs, (January 1952), 215-30.

Wainhouse, Edward R. "Guerrilla War in Greece 19**8-**9: A Case Study," Military Review (June 1957), 17-25.

Zacharakis, E. C. "Lessons Learned From Anti Guerrilla War In Greece ( 19**6-**9 ) , " General Military Review, (July i960), 179-202. GEOGRAPHICAL GAZETEER

To Accompany Map; Greece and the Aegean, 1: 1,6^7,360, National Geographic Society, December 1958,

Mountains (Oros-Ori) Grid

Beles (Belasica) A-6, A-7

Boz Dag (not shown) A-7

Evros A-9, A-IO

Grammos B-U

Kaimaktchalan (not shown) B-5

Kallidhromon (not shown) D-6

Mourgana (not shown) C-U

Olympus B-6

Othris C-6

Par nas so s D-6

Pieria B-6

Pindus B-U to D—6

Vermion B-5, B-6

Regions

Agrafa C-5

Central Greece D-5 to D-7

Crete G-7 to G-10

Epirus C-U

Lemnos C-9

Macedonia B-5 to A-8 163

Regions (Cont'd.) Grid

Peloponnesus E — 5 f E — 6

Thessaly c-5, C-6

Thrac e A-9 •

Roumeli D — 5 , D — 6

Features

Corinth Canal e -6

Vardar (Axios) Valley A — 6 , B — 6

Monastir (Bitola) Gap A-5, B-5

Gorgopotamos River (not shown) d-6

Towns

Amindaios (Araindaion) B-5

Art a C-U

Athens E-T

Edhessa b - 6

Fiorina B-5

Kardhitsa C-5

Karpeni s ion D-5

Konitsa B-U

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