Historically Speaking

Historically Speaking Abraham Lincoln, Commander in Chief, at 200 ebruary 12th marks the 200th birth- By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown most of his generals, he recognized that Fday of Abraham Lincoln. Our revered U.S. Army retired this effort required total war. Southern 16th President assumed office amid cata- leaders, with considerable justification, strophic civil strife, preserved the Union and died a martyr believed further participation in the Union imperiled a so- to this cause. In four years, Lincoln—more so than any sin- cial and economic order they cherished. Their decision to gle historical figure—defined Americans’ conception of secede was irreversible. Lincoln wisely let them strike the their Commander in Chief. first obvious blow—at Fort Sumter, S.C., in April 1861—be- Today we expect our presidents to establish the political fore mobilizing the outraged nation that remained. Mean- and moral legitimacy of force when we choose to use it, to while, he had been urgently negotiating within the border- communicate a grand strategic vision and to assert them- line slave states of Delaware, Maryland, Missouri and selves in significant military decisions without displacing Kentucky to keep them in the Union. the professionals who must work out the details and carry When war broke out, Lincoln suspended habeas corpus them out. Military inexperience provides reason to seek and summarily swept 18,000 secessionists within those wise counsel but does not diminish the Commander in states into captivity, tipping a political balance that kept Chief’s responsibility to fulfill these functions. Lincoln’s them in the Union. This extraordinary act was later repudi- sole military experience, in the Black Hawk War of 1832, ated in the court case ex parte Merryman, after the intended was fleeting and superficial, yet he rose to the tasks re- effect had already been achieved. In a speech before Con- quired in far more dangerous circumstances 30 years later. gress, Lincoln justified his actions, asking, “Are all the Lincoln called upon his countrymen to fight to preserve laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself the Union. All else was subordinate to this single and sin- go to pieces?” Congress subsequently empowered the sus- gularly defined purpose. Earlier and more thoroughly than pension of habeas corpus, as ex parte Merryman required. ess Library of Congr ess Library of Congr Above left, Currier and Ives immortalized the bombardment of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor that began the Civil War. Left, President Abraham Lincoln nominated Ulysses S. Grant lieu- chives tenant general in the Army of the United States. Above, Lincoln Ar meets with Allan Pinkerton (left), head of Union Intelligence Services, and Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand after the Battle of National Antietam in October 1862. February 2009 I ARMY 69 Napoleonic battle. Unfortunately for them, Confederate generals such as Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jack- son proved considerably more capable in grand Napoleonic maneuver. Lincoln recognized early on that the Confederacy was a major power of continental scope, that it was unlikely to succumb in a single battle, and that the full manpower and industrial might of the Union would have to be brought to bear to defeat it. Even prior to the embarrassing July 1861 debacle at Bull Run, Va., when many Northerners banked on the quick success of 75,000 militiamen called up for three months, Lincoln sought congressional authorization for 400,000 three-year volunteers. Congress approved 500,000, and in the days after Bull Run authorized 500,000 more. Lin- coln’s determination that the government should “avoid re- ceiving troops faster than it can provide for them” was as prescient as his appreciation of the manpower required. Economic and industrial mobilizations were key fea- tures of his war plans and his personal efforts. He estab- lished a major arsenal at Rock Island, Ill., to bring logistical wherewithal to the western theater comparable to that provided by Springfield, Mass., in the East. The nation’s first income tax and elevated tariffs dramatically increased gov- ess ernment revenues. The Legal Tender Act of 1862 intro- duced paper currency and greater liquidity. National Banking Acts reinforced federal control of the financial sys- tem. Railway Acts subsidized a transportation network Library of Congr A copy of Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation combines upon which the economy depended. The Treasury Depart- his portrait at the top with a border of historical vignettes. ment assumed direct control of the cotton trade in the oc- cupied South, profiting from lands lost to the Confederacy. lavery was important to Lincoln personally, but subordi- Having mobilized such massive resources, Lincoln was Snate as a war aim. His Emancipation Proclamation of determined to attack the Confederacy on a broad front September 1862 freed slaves in states in rebellion, not in along multiple axes. His thinking transcended the tactical those that remained loyal. In effect this was economic war- battlefield, anticipating what we now call the operational fare, encouraging slaves to flee and to cooperate with in- level of war. It took some time to find military leadership vading Union armies, undermining the Confederate econ- capable of this grander vision. Interestingly enough, when omy. Lincoln did not shrink from more drastic forms of he elevated Ulysses S. Grant to be general in chief, he re- economic warfare. The devastation inflicted during Sher- tained George G. Meade in command of the Army of the man’s March to the Sea through Georgia in 1864 was in ac- Potomac, a narrower task to which this more traditional cord with Lincoln’s authorization to his generals to target professional was well suited. Lincoln proved capable of Confederate infrastructure. As costs and battlefield losses sacking and shuffling generals until he assembled a com- mounted, Lincoln affirmed the national purpose and mand team capable of the grand strategy he envisioned. steeled his countrymen for losses yet to come. His iconic Lincoln was hands-on in military deliberations, keeping 1863 “Gettysburg Address” provides a classic example of in touch with developments via layers of advisers and the establishing political and moral legitimacy. The stakes were innovation of the telegraph. He characteristically deferred no less than ensuring that “government of the people, by to his generals in matters of detail, but nagged some into the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.” compliance and removed others when circumstances or In addition to defining the reason to fight, Lincoln devel- the spirit moved him. His recurrent interest in military af- oped and communicated a grand strategic vision. Too many fairs moved George B. McClellan to lament the “browsing of his generals sought to strike a decisive blow in a grand President,” but the talented amateur occasionally picked up on insights professionals had slighted. A case in point BRIG. GEN. JOHN S. BROWN, USA Ret., was chief of mili- was Lincoln’s imposition of a corps level of command tary history at the U.S. Army Center of Military History from upon the Army of the Potomac over McClellan’s objections December 1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Bat- that the division was a better capstone. In imposing the talion, 66th Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War corps, Lincoln reinforced the nascent operational level of and returned to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st war he envisioned. Cavalry Division, in 1995. He has a doctorate in history from In 1863, General Order Number 100—promulgated over Indiana University. the objection of many professionals after exhaustive legal 70 ARMY I February 2009 chives Ar National President Lincoln meets with his generals after the Battle of Antietam. deliberations—foresaw the holistic nature of modern war. Lincoln’s instincts were not flawless in all things military. It provided guidance for military government, occupation For political reasons—patronage—he continued to support responsibilities, partisan warfare, civil unrest and a host of state habits of raising new regiments rather than providing other contingencies that traditional military thinking re- replacements to existing ones. The result was a recurrent garded as messy and peripheral. Lincoln also recognized bloodying of green regiments while seasoned regiments the contributions black soldiers could make to the Union withered. Provisions for conscription, substitution and cause and overrode the prejudices of the era to support commutation also proved more politically feasible than fair, raising and deploying the United States Colored Troops. popular or effective. On balance, however, Lincoln’s in- Ultimately these numbered more than 186,000 men, an in- volvement in military deliberations was a decided plus for valuable augmentation to the Union Army. the war effort. He galvanized innovative thinking, imple- mented valuable initiatives, constructed a war machine of unprecedented potential and provided presidential leadership to winning teams of military and political leaders. e are generations removed from Abraham Lincoln’s Wstruggle to reunite his country “with malice towards none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right.” His model as Commander in Chief remains remarkably current, however. The range and scope of American power has multiplied many times over, but our military expectations of the President remain much

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