Introduction

Volumes 11 and 12 featured papers that considered the themesofconsciousness and logic, themes bearing on the fundamental question of the possibility of knowledge.Volume 13 was dedicated to the topic of desire and its role as apre- supposition of action and morality.The papers we have collected together in the present volume focus on the interaction of philosophical traditions. They exam- ine ways in which Kant and the German idealists came to terms with and were influenced by representativesofearlymodern philosophy. By comparatively evaluatingkey features of the different philosophical traditions, the papers help us better appreciatethe unique contributions of Kant,Fichte, Hegel, Schel- ling and Novalis. In most cases, our authors comparethe ideas of asingle classical German philosopher with thoseofasingle rationalist philosopher.These comparisons help us assess the ways in which specific metaphysical themesofthe earlymod- ern period became either transformed or preserved in later philosophical move- ments. Somepapers consider Kant’srelationship to Wolff and Leibniz.Others discuss Fichte’srelationship to Spinoza and Leibniz, or Hegel’srelationship to Descartesand Spinoza. We includethree papers,inaddition,onthe influence of Spinoza on Schelling and Novalis. As is evidentfrom this list of topics,Spinoza’sinfluenceonpost-Kantian phi- losophyisgiven special attention in this volume. Perhaps areason for this is that it is with reference to Spinoza that the question of the influenceofearlymodern philosophyonclassicalGerman philosophytakes on special urgency.Aconsid- eration of the relationships of the post-Kantians to Spinoza helps us appreciate their metaphysical developments and innovations.Itperhaps also suggests an- swers to questions that,inrecent years, have been posed with renewed interest, such as whether Hegel’sidealism should be regarded as “metaphysical” or “non- metaphysical”. The theme of our volume invites reflection not justonthe relation of Kant and the German idealists to the earlymoderns, but also on the means by which these figures in the history of philosophyare typicallyclassified. The vol- ume neither provides nor implies aunified conception of rationalism. Most of our authors consider the relationship between twophilosophers (such as Kant and Leibniz)and thereforepresuppose no single conception of rationalism. Oth- ers call into question features oftenassociated with rationalism. They challenge us to reconsider and perhaps modify our common classifications.We see this, for example, in the contributions of Zicheand Heidemann, as well as in the paper by de Boer which raises critical questions about the wayinwhich the line be- https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110651546-004 XX Introduction tween empiricism and rationalism is typicallydrawn. It is our expectation that this volume of the Yearbook will stimulate the productive reconsideration of what we mean by rationalism. Rather than begin the volume with the essays thatare most preoccupied with philosophersofthe earlymodern period, we first include papers on Kant and lastinclude apaper on Novalis.Ofcourse, all of the papers discuss at least one earlymodern figure. Four of our authors have contributed papers on Kant.The first paper is adis- cussion by de Boer of the lessons we should draw from Kant’s Dreams of aSpirit- Seer about his relationship to Wolff. The Dreams essaygives us aparadigmatic example of the earlyKant’srelianceonthe earlymoderns. Alreadyinthat essay, Kant’spreoccupation is the question of the relation of sensibility to the understanding,aquestion to which he repeatedlyreturns in assessing his rela- tionship to the rationalists. The next two essays consider Kant’sviews on the dis- tinctionbetween sensibility and the understanding as well, this time highlight- ing Kant’streatment of Leibniz in the Critique of Pure Reason. Look’spaper evaluates Kant’scritique of Leibniz,while Jauernig provides acomprehensive portrayal of similarities and differences in how the two philosophers treat the distinction between sensibility and understanding.Inthe fourth paper on Kant,Ziche offers anew interpretation of how we should understand Kant’sef- fort to combine elements of the empiricist and rationalist traditions.Atthe center of Ziche’sattention in the essayisKant’saccount of the regulative function of ideas in natural scientific inquiry.Amore detailed sketch of the topics of these four essays follows: In “Staking Out the Terrain of Pure Reason: Kant’sCritique of Wolffian Metaphysics in Dreams of aSpirit-Seer”,Karin de Boer argues thatinhis 1766 Dreams essay, Kant is more of arationalist than is commonlysupposed. De Boer takes acareful look at Kant’scritique of Christian Wolff in that text,and she challenges thosewho suggest that Dreams is an expression of Kant’stempo- rary flirtation with empiricism. She argues thatKant should not be understood as rejectingWolff’srationalism, but rather as attacking Wolff’sview that the sensi- ble and the intellectual constituteacontinuum. De Boer’spaper first defends a “continuist” account of Wolff on metaphysical cognition, then goes on to argue that Kant’sobjection to Wolff in Dreams is by no means evidence of his whole- sale rejection of Wolffian rationalism. In addition, de Boer asks us to reconsider the meaning of the labels “empiricism” and “rationalism” in Kant’spre-critical writings. In his paper “Sensibility and Understanding in Leibniz and Kant”,Brandon Look reviews Kant’sdiscussion of Leibnizinthe Amphibolychapter of the Cri- tique of Pure Reason. He focuses, in particular, on Kant’scharge that Leibniz Introduction XXI fails to acknowledge thatunderstanding and sensibility are distinct sources of cognition. AccordingtoLook, Kant’streatment of Leibniz is inaccurate. Look presents textual evidence to demonstrate that Leibniz held that concepts or thoughts are entirelydistinct from sensations or perceptions, and that thereis in Leibniz more of adistinctionbetween sensibility and understanding than Kant acknowledges. In addition, Look suggests that Kant’sclaim to improve upon Leibniz’stheory of knowledge is persuasive onlyifwetake on board meta- physical assumptions that Leibnizclearlyrejects:the assumption that there real- ly is causal interaction among substances,and an assumption about the ultimate givenness of experience. In “Finite Minds and their Representations in Leibniz and Kant”,Anja Jauer- nig dedicates her discussion to the meaningand role of representations in the works of the twophilosophers. She carves out an interpretation of what each philosopher has in mind by sensible and conceptual representations. Particular- ly of interest to Jauernig are their respective accounts of the difference between finite and infinite minds, and between human and divine modes of sensible and intellectual representation. In addition to illuminating keypointsonwhich the two philosophersagree, Jauernig argues thatLeibnizand Kant fundamentally disagree on how they understand the passivity of receivedsensiblerepresenta- tions. Thisdifferenceinher view explains further points of disagreement, for ex- ample,regardingthe question of the clarity of representations. Paul Ziche explores the interaction of empiricist and rationalist elements in Kant’sCritical philosophyinhis paper, “Epistemic Confidence – Kant’sRation- alism of the PrinciplesofSeeking and Finding”.AccordingtoZiche, Kant argues that empiricist approaches cannot provide solid ground for our knowledge of na- ture. Nonetheless, Kant is convincedthatempiricist methodsare essential if our knowledge is to expand and be open to novelty.Our knowledge of nature thus requires more,for Kant,thanthe employment of rationalist methods of concep- tual clarification; what we need, in addition, are rules that guide our openness to new discoveries. Ziche’sfocus in this essayisonthe role Kant assigns principles of reason in regulatingour efforts to secure and expand our knowledge.The prin- ciples are apriori and therefore necessary,and they servetoguide our effortsto expand our scientific knowledge and refine and multiplyour concepts. Accord- ing to Ziche, Kant’ssystem of regulativeprinciples functions as amultifaceted and rich heuristic. Our threecontributions on Fichteexplore different aspectsofhis relation- ship to Spinoza and Leibniz. As is the case with Kant,wecan better understand Fichteifweconsider how his system was influenced by and responsive to early modernphilosophy. Thepapers of both Haagand Ivaldo emphasize the role of the practical in Fichte’sresponses to Spinoza and Leibniz. The first two papers XXII Introduction of this section focus on Fichte’srelation to Spinoza. In different ways,Breazeale and Haag set out to clarify Fichte’sambivalent attitude towards Spinoza. Fichte’sinterest in and treatment of Spinoza is the topic of Daniel Brea- zeale’sessay, “Fichte’sSpinoza”.Drawing from Fichte’sunpublished and pub- lished writings, Breazeale makes the casethat Fichte’sfascination with Spinoza was evident alreadyinhis very first sketches of what would become the Wissen- schaftslehre,and survivedinto his final version of thatwork in 1812.Breazeale’s main thesis is that Fichtebelieved it was with reference to the “dogmatic” and “fatalistic” nature of Spinoza’ssystem that he could best demonstrate the virtues of his own “critical” philosophicalalternative,asystem farcloser in nature to the transcendental idealismofKant.Ingiving us acareful exploration of Fichte’sad- miration of and departure from the Spinozist point of view,Breazeale helps us understand Fichte’sassertion that his own system is capable, in away that Spinoza’sisnot,both of accounting for the relationship between the unchange- able absoluteand its changeable manifestations, and of giving human autonomy its due. In his paper “Fichte’sCritique of Spinoza in the Grundlage”,Johannes Haag examines Fichte’srelationship to Spinoza in the 1794 Grundlageder gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. Haagsuggests that we misunderstand Fichteifwetreat him, as manyhaveand still do, as a “subjective Spinozist”.For Haag,this label is too weak to capturethe radical natureofFichte’sdeparture from Spinoza, adepar- ture that is especiallyapparent in the critique of Spinoza that appears at the end of the third section of the Grundlage. Haagreconstructs Fichte’scriticisms step- by-step, and points out that one of Fichte’simportant objectionstoSpinoza is revealed in the fact thatthe first principle of his Grundlage is apractical princi- ple. Haag’scareful textual analysis of the relationship of FichtetoSpinoza helps him make the case that it is principallybymeans of Fichte’srelation to the prac- tical thatheisable to distinguish himself most essentiallyfrom Spinoza. Fichte’sconcept of striving is the central focus of MarcoIvaldo’spaper, “Die praktische Konstitution des ‚Setzens‘ nach der Wissenschaftslehre Fichtes”. Ivaldo seeks to persuade us that an analysis of the concept of striving can dem- onstrate that Fichteiscommitted to the thesis that our relationship to the world is practicallygrounded. In addition, Ivaldo argues that this insight regardingthe role of the practical was anticipated in Leibniz’sconception of appetite. Acentral focus of Ivaldo’sdiscussion is paragraph 5ofthe Grundlage der gesammten Wis- senschaftslehre,whereFichteintroduces his concept of striving.Inthis context, Fichteexplains the meaning of the concept and thereby helps us understand and seriously consider his thesis that the concept as well as the foundation of philos- ophyisfundamentallypractical. Introduction XXIII

The three papers on Hegel take on different projects.Inthe first two essays, Hegel is brought into conversation with Descartesand Spinoza in away that al- lows us to evaluate his representations of the two philosophers, and to clarify his alternative to their respective systems. In the third paper,byHeidemann, the pri- mary objective is to examine whether Hegel’ssystem presupposes rationalist principles. John McCumber’sessay, “ISpeak, ThereforeIam: Hegel on Descartes”,has two main goals: the first is to consider Hegel’sassessment of Descartes’ place in the history of philosophy; the second is to specify key features of Hegel’salter- native to Descartes. McCumber points out that Hegel has much admiration for Descartes’ effort to provide apresuppositionlessfoundation for philosophy. Hegel is convinced that Descartes’ effort fails, however,inlarge part because it presupposes adoctrine of “fixed” essencesand meanings. With the help of an analysis of the beginning of Hegel’s Logic,McCumber argues that the Hege- lian alternative strategyfor groundingphilosophyrequires us to replacethe Car- tesian commitment to “fixity” with the insight that our concepts are fundamen- tallymalleable. Yitzak Melamed’scontribution, “Hegel, Spinoza, and McTaggart on the Re- ality of Time”,offers us adiscussion of an importantissue in the history of in- terpretations of Hegeland Spinoza, namely that of the nature of changeand du- ration. After criticallyassessingHegel’sconclusion thatSpinoza deniedthe reality of duration and change, Melamed develops and defends the thesis that these are real for Spinoza in thatthey trulybelong to substance. Melamed then turnshis attention to Hegel’sviewofthe reality of time as seen through the interpretive lens of McTaggart.McTaggart attributes to Hegel the assumption that the “absolute idea” or “fundamental reality” neither contains nor provides grounds for temporality.Although we can view reality under the aspect of time, this doesn’tmean for Hegel thatthe categories of the Logic are themselvestem- poral. The categoriesofthe Logic layout the blueprint of fundamental reality,but this reality is not in time. DietmarHeidemann’scentral question in “Hegel: Ein Rationalist?” is wheth- er Hegelcan be accuratelyclassified as arationalist.AccordingtoHeidemann, Hegel is arationalist in awide but not anarrow sense. Hegel cannot be under- stood to be arationalist in anarrowsense, Heidemann argues, because he rejects manykey principles of figures such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. In addi- tion, Heidemann dismisses the proposal thatHegel intends the Phenomenology as ameans of testing various rationalist commitments.Heidemann furthermore considers Hegel’s Logic and its claim thatour thought determinations are deter- minations of being.Heidemann considers two strategies for how Hegel might try XXIV Introduction to ground this claim and concludes that there are strong reasons for rejecting the suggestion that the Logic rests on rationalist principles. In the final twoessays of this volume, on Schellingand Novalis,Spinoza is once again of central importance. Like Fichte, Schelling’sstance on the accept- ance and reinterpretation of certain Spinozistic theses is somewhat ambivalent. Schelling’soverall assessment of Spinoza’sphilosophy, however,ismoreposi- tive.The same is true for Novalis,aswediscover in Kneller’sexamination of these relationships. The central thesis of BradyBowman’spaper, “Force, Existence, and the Transcendenceofthe Good in Schelling’s Weltalter (1815)”,isthat Schelling aims to develop aconception of unity in his philosophythat bindstogether el- ementshebelieves are neglected in Spinoza’sphilosophy. Included among these elements are moral freedom and divine creativity.Bowman claims that, in Weltalter,Schellingindeedsucceedsinoffering us such acomprehensive con- ception. Bowman carefullyexamines this conception; he notes Schelling’sfre- quent references to Spinoza and reinterpretationoffundamental Spinozistic the- ses. In her paper, “Novalis,Spinoza and the Realization of Nature”,Jane Kneller challenges those who are inclined to assume that all post-Kantian German phi- losophyisessentiallypost-Kantian idealism. She argues that the earlyromantics Schlegel, Schleiermacher and especiallyNovalis embraced the spirit of Spinoza’s non-reductive naturalism.These figures espoused aphilosophythat was thor- oughlycompatible with the radical enlightenment call for asecular morality. On Kneller’sinterpretation,Novalis held that atheism need not be incompatible with religion. She makes the casethat Novalis drew inspiration from Spinoza’s atheistic naturalism and insistence upon the inseparability of art and nature.