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CHS-16 May 1985 CERN LIBRARIES, GENEY A -'°I Cf.l ::i:: u 11111111111111111~111~11111111111'1 ~II I~ I~ ml 11111111 CM-P00043005 STUDIES IN CERN HISTORY From the provisional organization to the permanent CERN May 1952 - September 1954 II. Case studies of some important decisions. John Krige *> GENEVA 1985 The Study of CERN History is a project financed by Institutions in several CERN Member Countries. This report presents preliminary findings, and is intended for incorporation into a more comprehensive study of CERN's history. It is distributed primarily to historians and scientists to provoke discussion, and no part of it should be cited or reproduced without written permission from the Team Leader. Comments are welcome and should be sent to: Study Team for CERN History c/oCERN CH-1211GENEVE23 Switzerland © Copyright Study Team for CERN History, Geneva 1985 CHS-16 May 1985 STUDIES IN CERN HISTORY From the provisional organization to the permanent CERN May 1952 - September 1954 II. Case studies of some important decisions. John Krige*) GENEVA 1985 *) Supported by a grant from the JOINT ESRC/SERC COMMITTEE, United Kingdom. The Study of CERN History is a project financed by Institutions in several CERN Member Countries. This report presents preliminary findings, and is intended for incorporation into a more comprehensive study of CERN's history. It is distributed primarily to historians and scientists to provoke discussion, and no part of it should be cited or reproduced without written permission from the Team Leader. Comments are welcome and should be sent to: Study Team for CERN History c/oCERN CH-1211 GENEVE 23 Switzerland © Copyright Study Team for CERN History, Geneva 1985 CERN - Service d'information scientifique - 300 - juillet 1985 From the provisional organization to the permanent CERN May 1952 - September 1954 II. Case studies of some important decisions. Introduction I. The choice of a site (a) The decision to locate CERN in Geneva (b) The local opposition to the site in Geneva (c) Winning something for Copenhagen II. The convention. Two key clauses (a) The basic and supplementary programmes (b) The admission of new states III.Financing the interim organization (a) The first request for funds (b) Raising further funds 'to continue reasonable progress with the planning work' (c) From 'reasonable progress with the planning' to avoiding 'serious delays in the orderly and economical progress of the work' (d) Concluding remarks IV. The nomination of the first director and its aftermath (a) The first initiatives (b) A second main candidate emerges (c) Political realignments (d) A decision is taken (e) The director is appointed (f) Concluding remarks V. The strong-focusing principle: the decision and its early consequences (a) The proton synchrotron (b) The synchro-cyclotron (c) Some problems surrounding the building of an alternating-gradient synchrotron VI. Planning the future laboratory (a) Budget and total staff (b) Laboratory organization (c) Preparing the experimental programme VII.Notes and references In a previous report in this series (CHS-14) we presented an overview of the historical development of the provisional CERN. We described the activities of the various study qroups, of the Council, and of the Interim Finance Committee (IFC). We also depicted the first steps taken to establish the laboratory in Geneva, and to prepare for the birth of the permanent organization. In this report we complement that discussion with more comprehensive, in-depth analyses of some of the important policy decisions taken during the period in question. The methodological grounds for this division were spelt out in the preface to CHS-14. As we noted there, the study of the 'transitional CERN' has posed a number of problems for us for it bridges two very different periods in the organization's life. The steady increase in the size and complexity of the organization alone, not to speak of the growing diversity of its activities, make a 'comprehensive history' of it impossible. At the same time one would like to preserve the richness of understanding which an in-depth analysis can provide. To satisfy these potentially conflicting demands, we have decided to complement general overviews of well-defined periods with more intensive studies of particular topics or key events. This report is the first of such studies. The topics we have selected for closer analysis highlight dif ferent aspects of CERN itself, and their arrangement is roughly chrono logical. In the first three sections the bias is towards political and admi nistrative matters - we discuss the debate surrounding the choice of Geneva as the site for CERN, two clauses in the convention (one specifying the research activities of the laboratory, the other the conditions for admitting new states) and, in section III, the steps taken to finance the interim organization. Thereafter we analyse three issues intimately associated with the scientific life of CERN, namely, the nomination of the first Director-General, the decision to adopt the strong-focusinq principle and its early consequences, and the preliminary steps taken to plan the laboratory in which the two accelerators would be embedded. 2 I. The choice of a site One of the most pressing tasks facing the new Council was to choose a site for the European laboratory. As early as December 1950 a set of criteria for selecting such a site, drawn up very much with Geneva in mind, had been formulated at a meeting at the Centre Europeen de la Culture held in that city. Subsequently Bohr and Kramers argued forcibly that the laboratory should be associated with the Institute of Theoretical Physics in Copenhagen. To deflect them, Auger successfully insisted that the matter of location be settled after the new Council had been set up. By the time the Council first met in May 1952 further procrastination of this delicate and contentious issue was no longer possible or desirable. In what follows we shall first discuss the circumstances surrounding the decision to locate CERN in Geneva, and then describe the subsequent reactions to it, both in Geneva itself and in some Scandinavian circles. (a) The decision to locate CERN in Geneva When the Council met in May only one official offer of a site had been made - that of Geneva. Other governments wishing to propose a location were given until 31 July 1952 to do so, by which time three more offers had been made - Copenhagen by Denmark, Arnhem by the Netherlands and Longjumeau, just outside Paris, by France. Each proposal was accompanied by a reply to a detailed technical questionnaire drawn up by the Laboratory group.1 The decision on the site was taken at the third Council session in Amsterdam held from 4-7 October 1952. The debate was opened on the first morning by Lew Kowarski, who presented the results of his questionnaire. That afternoon the representatives from each of the four countries involved were invited to put their cases, and on the following day all of the delegates visited the site at Arnhem. On the morning of 6 October the debate began in earnest. Though we do not have detailed information on the course of the proceedings, one participant has described the choice of location as 3 2 involving an 'amazing fight'. Patrick Blackett and Donald Fry, who attended as observers of the Royal Society, reported that the delegates from the four countries offering a site 'had clearly been officially briefed to make a stiff fight for locating the laboratory in their country. The scientific prestige attached to it was clearly rated very high; also perhaps the expectation of an appreciable net financial gain' through industrial contracts and technological spin-off .3 In the event, according to the minutes of the third Council session, 'the French, Danish and Dutch delegations successively withdrew their offers in order to permit the Council to take a unanimous decision' in favour of Geneva. There is little doubt that this 'decision' was primarily the outcome of hard bargaining, and that 'objective' criteria of suitability played little or no role in it. Kowarski himself concluded his report on the survey of the various candidates with the observation that 'every one of the four proposed locations is acceptable on narrowly technical grounds' . 4 This left almost unlimited scope for the interplay of political forces. In what follows,it is these that we shall first explore, discussing the reasons behind the successive withdrawal of Copenhagen, Paris and Arnhem. For this study, our written sources have been supplemented by observations made by some of the participants at a meeting of pioneers held at CERN in September 1984. 5 It appears that Copenhagen was rather quickly eliminated from consideration as a site for the new laboratory. For one thing it was deemed too far north, too remote from the centre of gravity of western Europe as it was put. For another the younger members of the Executive group were strongly opposed to having a close association with Bohr, fearing that he would play a dominant role if the laboratory were in Copenhagen. They were also unhappy about having to move with their families to Denmark. On the other hand, they were willing to use Bohr's institute as a temporary centre for European theoretical work. Herein lay the basis for a compromise. Though the main laboratory was not to be in Copenhagen, one of CERN's important activities would be located there for the time being. This effectively defused the debate around Copenhagen and removed it from serious consideration as a possible site. 4 Although Britain took no official part in the debate, her attitude may also have played a role in discouraging the Scandinavians from pressing their case. An official brief prepared for Blackett after discussion with Lord Cherwell stated that, if he were asked about the site, he 'should say that he is not informed of any views which H.M.