Studies in Cern History
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CHS-27 November 1988 CERN LIBRARIES, GENEY A Illllll llllll II lllllll l\1111~ 1111111~\ llm II~\ Iii 111111~ Ill CM-P00043016 STUDIES IN CERN HISTORY The CERN System, its Legislative and Executive Arms and some global statistics on how it functioned Dominique Pestre GENEVA 1988 The Study of CERN History is a project financed by Institutions in several CERN Member Countries. This report presents preliminary findings, and is intended for incorporation into a more comprehensive study of CERN's history. It is distributed primarily to historians and scientists to provoke discussion, and no part of it should be cited or reproduced without written permission from the author. Comments are welcome and should be sent to: Study Team for CERN History c/o CERN CH-1211GENEVE23 Switzerland ·E Copyright Study Team for CERN History, Geneva 1988 CHS-27 November 1988 STUDIES IN CERN HISTORY The CERN System, its Legislative and Executive Arms and some global statistics on how it functioned Dominique Pestre GENEVA 1988 The Study of CERN History is a project financed by Institutions in several CERN Member Countries. This report presents preliminary findings, and is intended for incorporation into a more comprehensive study of CERN's history. It is distributed primarily to historians and scientists to provoke discussion, and no part of it should be cited or reproduced without written permission from the author. Comments are welcome and should be sent to: Study Team for CERN History c/o CERN CH-1211GENEVE23 Switzerland ® Copyright Study Team for CERN History, Geneva 1988 CERN-Service d'information scientifique - 300 - novembre 1988 CHAPTER 9 The CERN System, its Legislative and Executive Arms and some global statistics on how it functioned 1 Dominique PESTRE Contents 9.1 The member states, the Council, and the executive: relationships strongly mediated by a stable group of people in the Council and in the Scientific Policy Committee 9.1.1 The Council and its Committees from 1954 to 1966: Who, Where, When? 9.1.1.1 A flashback to the founding years 9.1.1.2 The control of key posts: who? 9.1.1.3 The Council: A group of men that remained stable for 15 years 9.1.1.4 The Finance Committee: a homogeneous technical team dependent on the Council 9.1.1.5 The Scientific Policy Committee: the voice of Science 9.1.2 Scientists and non-scientists in the Council and its Committees: Differences and points of friction 9.1.2.1 The scientists' attitudes to the Council and to the Finance Committee: between esteem and condescension 9.1.2.2 The non-scientists confronting the organization: the difficult task of control 9.1.2.3 The non-CERN scientists vis-a-vis the organization: from criticism to unavoidable collaboration 9.1.3 The strength of CERN vis-a-vis the member states: the existence of a convinced and powerful lobby 9.1.3. I The defense of the Council's autonomy vis-a-vis the member states: the cornerstone of the CERN system 9.1.3.2 The functioning as lobby 9.1.4 A question in conclusion: Was CERN a political success? 9.2 The CERN Executive: an ensemble strongly influenced by the Scientific Senior Staff 9.2. I The first organigramme, 1955-1957 9.2.2 Cornelis Bakker's two attempts at reorganization, 1957-1960 9.2.2.1 The first proposals for reform in 1957: a forced withdrawal 9.2.2.2 Bakker's second attempt, June 1959-April 1960: A solution that was never put into practice 9.2.3 John Adam's solution, May 1960-July 1961 9.2.3. I The idea of having a Directorate 9.2.3.2 The choice of the twelve divisions and the nomination of their directors 9.2.4 Victor Weisskopf's way of managing CERN, 1961-1965 9.2.4.1 The nomination of Weisskopf and of the members of the Directorate 9.2.4.2 The functioning of the Directorate under Weisskopf's Chairmanship 9.2.4.3 Victor Weisskopf's philosophy of management 9.2.5 Concluding survey: A difficult history 9.3 CERN by numbers: some statistical data on the personnel and its activities 9.3.I The structure by Division 9.3.2 The structure by professional category 9.3.3 Visitors and research staff at CERN 9.3 .4 CERN and its member states Notes Bibliography CERN is an international laboratory financed by a dozen states. Considered as laboratory, it is managed by a scientific executive led by a Director-General; considered as intergovernmental institution, it is under the control of a Council whose members are nominated by the states. The latter is the legislative arm of the organization, the site where power ultimately lies; it defines the overall direction and votes the budget. The former proposes and executes. This at least is the official image defined by the Convention, an image which we are going to look at more closely in this chapter. 2 The CERN Council, composed of two representatives per government, does not meet very often - generally, twice a year for 48 hours. It is assisted by three committees which, by shouldering many routine burdens, leave the Council that much freer and enable it to consider carefully the more important issues. The Committee of Council (CC) has no specific function, and is a kind of office whose task it is to prepare the Council's work. The Finance Committee (FC) is obviously concerned with money questions, and is officially composed of one representative per member state. The Scientific Policy Committee (SPC) prepares technical decisions for the Council and comprises scientific personalities who are nominated ad personam. On the executive side, the Director-General has the authority to organize the house as he thinks fit. At the start of the period we are dealing with here the laboratory was composed of divisions each led by a director. These directors, together with the Director-General, were collectively known as the leading board of CERN. 3 One of the aims of this chapter is to go more deeply into these ideas, to pass them through the sieve of an historical study, to confront them with the reality of CERN in the years 1954/ 1965. More generally, we want to describe how this vast ensemble functioned, an ensemble which included, at one extreme, very high-level state officials, even Ministers, and at the other locally recruited technical personnel, we want to understand how this organism took shape in the course of developing from a staff of 20 people in 1953 to more than 2000 twelve years later. We cannot of course study all aspects of the system that is CERN, and we have had to overlook things like social policy and the career structure, the functioning of the administration and the workshops, the financial difficulties faced by states like Greece and Yugoslavia, the conditions for the access of new member states (Austria joined in 1959, Spain in 1961), or the relationships with non-member states like the United States and the countries of Eastern Europe. In fact we have restricted ourselves to two main aspects of CERN's functioning, two aspects which have a bearing on the most important relationships of power. We begin by looking at the legislative. Focussing on the Council and its committees the analysis aims to grasp what is original in the way power is distributed between the three classical components, the states who provide the finance, the Council which deliberates, and the direction which executes. During the fifteen years we consider here, the distribution of powers around the Council did not change substantially, so that a chronological approach to this topic did not seem appropriate. Instead we have chosen to tackle it thematically, presenting three of its facets. Firstly, we have identified the people, the men who comprised the Council and its various committees. Then we have studied the nature of the relationships between different groups, notably between administrators appointed by the member states, the scientific members of the SPC or the Council, and the directors of CERN. Finally, we have considered the attitude of the Council to the states, introducing again the notion of the CERN lobby which we used in the first volume of our history. The second main section of this chapter is devoted to the functioning of the executive. Very important changes were made in the organization of CERN -indeed the debates on this issue were very lively and continued for a good three years - and in this case we have adopted an approach by periods. We begin by discussing the reforms presented in 1957, and taken up again in 1959, by Director-General Cornelis Bakker who died accidentaly in April 1960. We then go on to describe the solution advocated by the new Director-General, John Adams, the former director of the division which constructed the 28 GeV proton synchrotron. Finally we look at how the fourth Director-General, Victor Weisskopf, put these reforms into practice. Our attention is concentrated on two points in this section. On the one hand, on the balance between the Director-General, the divisional directors, and a very influential group known administratively as the Senior Staff; on the other, on the particular way in which the direction functioned, on the implicit and explicit rules of management which were adopted. To round off these two studies, we thought it worth presenting statistical data which give a global view of CERN. Based essentially on an analysis of the scientific personnel, they enable one to have a better idea of what CERN was and of the investment which scientists from different European countries made in the laboratory and its facilities.