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Thesis title cR.: o+er..s;, 61 Heroes I Vi<.:+1M>,J

Date >'"/I 0 J r ' ).oI� RIOTERS, VICTIMS, OR HEROES: TRANSFORMING NARRATIVES ABOUT THE GWANGJU UPRISING

SUNGIKYANG

Professor Eiko Maruko Siniawer, Advisor

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors in History

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

Williamstown, Massachusetts

April 15, 2013 I I Table of Contents

Acknowledgements i

Introduction 1

I. Calling Murder by Some Other Name: Official Narratives of Gwangju Pre-Democratization 19

II. Victims and Resistance: Unofficial Narratives About the Gwangju Uprising Before 1987 55

III. Vanguishing the Past: Official Narratives About the Gwangju Uprising After 1987 89

IV. The Gwangju Spirit: Unofficial Narratives After 1987 122

Conclusion 169

Bibliography 175 I I I

I I Acknowledgements

I have aspired since childhood to write papers on topics few people really care about. With this thesis, I am one step closer to achieving that dream. Without the following people, however, I would never have made it even this far.

First, I cannot thank my advisor ProfessorEiko Maruko Siniawer enough for her guidance throughout this entire process. Her endless patience in dealing with my procrastination, my perplexing word choice, and my repetitive and redundant and unnecessarily wordy writing style has been awe-inspiring. Her incisive comments have always kept me on my toes and forced me to dig deeper in my analyses. She has taught me more about history and the writing of it than anyone else fromthe day I timidly walked into her class on U.S.-Japanese relations during my freshman fall, and I will always be indebted to her.

I would like to thank other professors for their input and overall guidance.Professor Tom Kohut used his droll wit and optimism to provide a very relaxing atmospherefor the thesis seminar and was instrumental in easing the pressure on us. Professor Alexandra Garbarini cheerfully answered whatever questions I had about the topic of collective memory, and her tutorial on Holocaust memory was incredibly helpful in preparing me for this thesis. I would also like to thank Professor Jim Mahon, Professor Sam Crane, and the other members of the incredible faculty of Williams for indelibly shaping my intellectual growth.

I would also like to thank my friends for their kindness, humor, and sympathy, which never wavered throughout this ordeal. I have been burdensome with my complaints, terrible jokes, and conversation tangents, yet they have always been there for me. But I also have bad news for them: I will never stop rambling on about Korean history and how they should all read up on it. (It's a fascinating subject!)

Finally, I thank my family for their love and support my entire life. My sister and mother have always found a way to overcome challenges and enjoy life to the fullest, and I hope that I can follow their example someday. I would like to give a special thanks to my father. Although he disapproved of my thesis topic at first, since then, he has constantly supported me and helped me as I wrote the thesis. Without the many sources he found and sent to me, I would have been at a loss to continue the project. Thank you for believing in me and encouraging me to pursue my dreams, Dad. ii Introduction

I would like to start with a personal story of mine regarding this project. I had been keenly interested in Korean history for most of my life, an interest my father fully supported. It was a given that my thesis project would thus be about some aspect of

Korean history. It took me a long time for me to decide upon Gwangju, but when I did, I dutifully emailed my father, in English, about wanting to research and write about the

1 "Gwangju Massacre." The next day, he called me and told me he had reservations about my project. I asked him why, and he said just by looking at the email title - "Gwangju

Massacre" - he could tell that I had been influenced by biased sources and that perhaps I should not tackle such a controversial topic until I had read more Korean history. Why not write about a more benign topic which might actually benefit Korea in the future say, German reunification? Being the stubborn mule that I am, his disapproval only made me want to write about Gwangju even more (a decision I do not regret). Nevertheless, this episode brought home to me just how the topic of the Gwangju Uprising is, over thirty years later, still enormously contentious and emotionally charged, and how even one word can make all the difference in letting people know what you think of it. Words, and especially narratives, will be the central focus of this thesis.

The Gwangju Upri sing is generally considered one of the most momentous events in South Korean history. It took place in the ten days between May 18 and May 27, 1980 in the southwestern city of Gwangju. During this period of time, after the Korean military brutally suppressed pro-democracy protests and began to beat and shoot indiscriminately, massacring hundreds of citizens, much of the Gwangju citizenry rose up in revolt, seizing weapons, and temporarily pushed the soldiers out of the city on the 21st. For five days,

1 I will primarily call this event the "Gwangju Uprising," for reasons given below.

1 the citizens coexisted peacefully, although the leadership became increasingly divided

over whether to surrender the weapons or continue to resist. The military fi nally returned

and recaptured Gwangju in the waking hours of the 27th. While the efforts of the citizens

to end military brutality and promote democracy seemingly ended in failure, after 1987,

when South Korea successfully transitioned to democratic government, Gwangju

emerged as a lionized symbol of the triumphant popular struggle for democracy and

human rights.

The above description does not say much except the essential details, yet a

member of a particular group could easily take issue with it. For instance, I did not call it

a riot and made no mention of possible radical tendencies and influences of the

demonstrators , which the military government actively did throughout the early 1980s. I

did not mention the democratic motivations of the citizens, which civic groups

emphasized in the 1990s and 2000s. I failed to address the plight of the surviving victims,

who continue to put up with physical and mental pain as a direct result of the Uprising.

Thus, the question of what the Gwangju Uprising really was yields no easy answers, for it

was a complex, multilayered event. There are many directions in which one can analyze

Gwangju, but my curiosity was directed mostly toward how people described it. Why did

the military government deem it a riot when most eyewitness accounts contradicted such

a designation and argued that it was just instinctual resistance against the wholesale

brutality on the part of the soldiers sent to the city in order to enforce martial law? Why

did Gwangju become such a key symbol of resistance for the Korean left? Why did later

representations claim that the Uprising was wholly in the spirit of democracy? Each of

the answers to these questions contains a specific narrative, and it is the development and

2 competition of these narratives and their supporters which will be the central topic of this thesis.

Even the names conferredonto the Uprising are contentious. Whether one calls the Uprising the "Gwangju Incident" ( Gwangju satae) as the military did, or the

"Gwangju People's Uprising" ( Gwangju minjung hangjaeng), which activists and locals in the 1980s preferred, or the "Gwangju Democratization Movement" (Gwangju minjuhwa undong), which is currently the standard term both officially and unofficially, each name tells differing narratives of how the Uprising happened and what its legacies were. Examining who prefers which name also reveals much about a person's or group's stances regarding the events and significance of the Uprising. I will continue to use the phrase "Gwangju Uprising" throughout this thesis. Calling it an "Upri sing" connotes some sympathy with the activist narrative of resistance on my part, but it is considered the most neutral term to describe what happened.

Before the Uprising

The events in Gwangju were the culmination of the turmoil that began late in the

2 dictator Park Chung Hee's reign in 1979. Although Park had overseen South Korea's transformation as one of the four "Asian Tigers" starting in the 1960s, economic growth

was slowing down in the late 1970s. In addition, relations with the United States

deteriorated at a rapid pace with the ascension of Jimmy Carter to the American

presidency. Carter had pledged to remove American troops from South Korea, despite

opposition from not only Park but his own cabinet. Park was also irritated by Carter's

z For this sectionI have relied on Jolm Kie-chang Oh, Korean Politics: TheQuest forDemocratization and Economic Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1999), 58-60, 71-83; Gi-Wook Shin, "Introduction," in Contentious Kwangju: TheMay 18 Up rising in Korea's Past and Present, ed. Gi-Wook

Shin and Kyung Moon Hwang (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc .. 2003),xii-xvii.

3 pressure on the issue of human rights. The chilly relationship sparked speculation that

American support of the regime was not as firmas before and signaled a loss of

legitimacy for Park both within the regime and among the opposition. Finally, domestic

politics reached a boiling point by 1979. In order to tighten his grip over Korean politics,

Park installed the Yushin constitution in 1972 which removed term limits, allowed the

president to appoint one-third of the National Assembly members, and gave him power to

pass laws through emergency decree. However, this assertion of near-absolute power

caused greater friction between the state and opposition groups.

A series of events in 1979 rocked the regime. In what became known as the "Y.H.

Incident," after the owner of the garment producing Y.H. Trading Company took the

company's assets and fled to the U.S., the female employees began a hunger strike at the

headquarters of the opposition National Democratic Party (NDP) in August to protest the

owner's actions. The government sent in riot policemen to brutally beat and arrest the

workers; one woman died in the fracas. The leader of the NDP, Kim Young Sam,

publicly condenmed the Park regime for this action and in retaliation, Park ordered the

National Assembly to expel Kim from his seat on October 4, all while police physically

blocked NDP members from entering the building. NDP lawmakers resigned en masse in

response, while Kim's expulsion triggered massive protests in Busan, the city he

represented. After the government declared martial law in Busan, the protests spread to

the nearby city of Masan. In what came to be known as the Bu-Ma Incident, thousands of

demonstrators protested and fought against police, calling for Park's resignation as

president. What became truly alarming for the regime was the presence of ordinary

citizens, including members of the middle class, alongside the student protestors. The

4 protests spread throughout the country.

Within Park's inner circle, fierce debates broke out over how to handle the Bu-Ma demonstrations. Kim Jae Gyu, the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency

(KCIA) and former classmate of Park at the military academy, favored a more cautious and lenient approach. Cha Ji Cheol, Park's chief bodyguard who came to wield increasing control over the president, advocated for harsher crackdowns on the demonstrators. To add to the tension, Kim and Cha were fierce rivals who vied for Park's favor. There were rumors that Cha was becoming closer to convincing Park that Kim was not fit for the job of KCIA chief. Whether he was motivated by the policy dispute, personal animosity, fears for his job, or all of the above, after inviting Park to the KCIA compound for dinner, Kim shot and killed both Cha and Park on October 26, 1979.

With Park's death, Prime Minister Choi Gyu Ha became president. Martial law

3 was imposed, but the public felt optimistic about the prospects for democratic reform.

Nevertheless, although change was in the air, it was not the kind activists expected or desired. Choi abolished the emergency decree which banned criticism against the governmentand released political prisoners, including former presidential candidate Kim

Dae Jung, but progress on nationwide elections and constitutional reformwas slow.

Indeed, political progress could not keep pace with the rapid and unsettling changes that were concurrently taking place within the military.

Soon after Park's death, a new, younger group of generals headed by Major

General Chun Doo Hwan launched a coup to take control of the military. Chun, who headed the military's intelligence apparatus, the Defense Security Command, was in charge of the investigation of Park's assassination. It happened that the Martial Law

3 This was considered "limited" martial law becauseit did not extend tothe island of Jeju.

5 Conunander, General Jeong Seong Hwa, was also dining at the KCIA compound during the time of the assassination at Kim Jae Gyu' s invitation. Chun used this coincidence as a pretext to arrestJeong on December 12 for conspiring to kill Park. Army units loyal to

Chun were mobilized to attack Jeong's residence and take over the military conunand in

4 Seoul. Chun's coup, called the 12/12 Incident, was successful, and. he consolidated his power over the coming months. Chun became the KCIA chief in April 1980, which allowed him to control the most important levers of power in the government.

In the meantime, students and other activists were becoming restless at the slow pace of political transition. They were also afraid of what was happening in the military, especially with Chun's increased status and power. The omens of a full takeover by Chun were growing stronger, and so the activists decided to act. Once the school semester began in the spring, students launched scores of demonstrations calling for Chun to resign his ill-gotten positions and the establishment of inunediate democratic elections. One protest on May 15 was attended by approximately 150,000 demonstrators. Student leaders then decided to wait for the government's reaction to this protest in the coming days.

What they got was another military coup. Complete martial law was declared on

5 May 17, which extended to Jejudo. The National Assembly was closed, colleges and

4 These units were supposed to only move once they received approval from the UnitedStates as per the rules of the Combined Forces Command (CFC). However, they violated the agreement by moving without notifyingGeneral John Wickham, the CFC Commander at the time. The failure of the Americans to prevent the coup, and then their refusal or inability to reverse it, contributed to the heightened criticism of the U.S. by Koreans in the 1980s. 5 Because Jejudo was excluded from martial law in the partial declaration in October and was thus not full martial law, the Martial Law Commander had been subordinated to the Minister of Defense and civilian rule before May 17. With the declarationof full martial law extending to Jejudo, the top military staff including the Martial Law Commander and Army Chief of Staffreported directly to the president. Thus, the military assumed real power while the civilians were relegated to the background. See Jacqueline Reditt,"Arrests and a Curfew Follow the MilitaryTakeover inS Korea," The Times (London),May 19,

6 universities were shut down, criticism of the government was again forbidden, and the press was censored even more heavily. Military units were sent across the country to enforce martial law and put down protests, including in Gwangju.

The Gwangju Massacre and Uprising

Before I describe the general timeline of events during the Uprising itself, as this thesis deals with the competing narratives of "what happened" in Gwangju, I must acknowledge that what follows is a subjective narrative in itself. When discussing the construction of other narratives, I am passing judgment on them and am not doing so from an objective place. In a similar fashion, presenting the below account of the

Uprising as the basic, "true"template would be dishonest because it is my own

interpretation of how events occurred based on the materials I have read. However, in order to provide a chronological and historical reference point for the reader before delving into the nuances of the diverse narratives which were constructed afterwards, I am attempting to provide as bare-bones of an account as possible.

On May 18, a group of students gathered to protest martial law in front of

Chonnam University. The soldiers in Gwangju, paratroopers who were members of the

Special Forces 7th Brigade, and thus trained for "unconventional warfare," began to beat

the students with their batons. They then began to beat indiscriminately, including

bystanders. The soldiers demonstrated such brutality that the citizens could not help but

join in the demonstrations against the military. In the next couple of days, the violence of

the soldiers spread and the crowds only grew larger. Furious that the domestic media first

ignored the violence and then falsified the reports about Gwangju, the citizens burned

1980; Linda Lewis, Laying Claim to th e Memory of May: A wok Back at the 1980 Kwangju Up rising (Honolulu: University of Hawai 'i Press: Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawai 'i, 2002), 163 n. 3.

7 down the local television stations. On the 20th, taxis, buses, and other vehicles led a charge toward Provincial Hall. This vehicle protest was mercilessly broken up by the soldiers. The number of people in the streets by that time reached the tens of thousands.

On May 21, an estimated 100,000 demonstrators converged on Geurnnamro (Geurnnam

A venue) in front of Provincial Hall, where the soldiers had set up barricades. At around 1

PM, the soldiers began firing at the crowds, killing at least 50 people and injuring hundreds more. In response, the citizens raided the armories and seized weapons and vehicles to defend themselves. The citizens were able to drive the military out of the city limits that night.

From May 22 to May 27 was the period called "liberated Gwangju" ( Gwangju haebang). Despite the military's claims that Gwangju was filled with riots and a mood of fear, during this time, the Gwangju citizens were remarkably cooperative and peaceful, sharing food, donating blood, cleaning the streets, and refraining from committing hardly any crimes. There were several mass protests at Provincial Hall that numbered in the tens of thousands. The people were angry at the government's refusal to acknowledge the brutality of the soldiers and the huge number of civilian casualties. Despite the show of solidarity, there were internal divisions among the leadership as moderates and hardliners discussed whether to hand in the weapons or fight. Negotiations with the military, which had begun almost immediately after the military retreated, were stalled. The radicals eventually took over the committees which had nominal leadership over the city. Amidst reports that the army was moving in to recapture Gwangju before dawn on the 27th, a group of volunteers decided to defend Provincial Hall and other key buildings in the city.

8 But they were no match for the military units which methodically retook the city with relatively few casualties; most of the defenders surrendered.

Aftermath

Chun was elected president in August of 1980 and officially sworn in the next year. His was one of the most authoritarian regimes in South Korean history. The media remained heavily censored. Thousands of political activists were arrested and sent to

6 purification or "reeducation" camps. Despite the resumption of economic growth, Chun was generally disliked. His leadership of the military during the Uprising was one of the key reasons why, creating a legitimacy problem for his rule throughout his term in office.

Questions about why the U.S. failed to intervene in the Uprising on the side of the demonstrators caused an unprecedented spike in anti-American sentiment. Resentment against the foreign influence and the authoritarian state, coupled with the seeming failure of the Uprising, radicalized activists, including students, and caused a swell in support for the resistance-based ideology of minjung, which denotes "mass" or "people." Gwangju was a banned topic of public discussion, but it was really an open secret among Koreans as rumors and stories about it spread. It quickly became a symbol of government oppression and heroic resistance by the oppressed.

Eventually, democratization finally occurred in 1987 after weeks of mass street demonstrations in June. The elections produced disappointing results, as Chun was succeeded as president by his close friend and army colleague Roh Tae Woo after the opposition candidates Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung split the vote. Nonetheless, the

6 Hagen Koo, Korean Workers (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 2001), 102; Chong-SikLee, "South Korea in 1980: The Emergence of aNew Authoritarian Order,'' AsianSurvey Vol. 21,No. I, A Survey of Asia in 1980: Part I (Jan., 1981): 136; Tim Shorrock, "The Strugglefor Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and the Rise of Anti-Americanism," Third World Quanerly Vol. 8,No. 4 (Oct., 1986): 1204.

9 new government was much more open than the previous one. The National Assembly almost immediately launched a series of investigations into the Gwangju Uprising, providing the public with previously withheld information about the brutality of the soldiers during the massacre. The Uprising, which had been called the "Gwangju

Incident" by the government to remove all political connotations from it, was renamed the "Gwangju Democratization Movement," linkingGwangju with the successful democratic transition post-1987. In 1995, a special law was enacted to allow the government to bypass the 10-year long statute of limitations and prosecute Chun and Roh for their actions during the 12/12 Incident and the Gwangju Uprising. They were convicted, although pardoned after only a short term in prison. Currently, the government sponsors many monuments, memorials, and ceremonies related to the Gwangju Uprising.

The Argument of the Thesis and the Literature on Gwangjuand Collective Memory

This thesis attempts to answer the following questions regarding the narratives about the Gwangju Uprising. How have the memories and representations of Gwangju changed over time? What were the key events and trends which facilitated the transformation of the narratives? Who was creating the narratives, and how did the "who" affect the content and themes of the narratives? I will also examine what was at stake in the creation and maintenance of these narratives, and on a related note, how and why the memory of Gwangju has been so contested. My argument has two main parts. First, knowing the groups which disseminated the narratives is essential to understand the narratives themselves; in other words, the "who" determined the "what" and "why." I divide the main creators of the narratives into "official" (i.e., state-sponsored) and

"unofficial" (i.e., groups outside the government) categories. Because the second

10 category is so broad, there are divisions among unofficial narratives and groups as well, which I will explore in the fourth chapter. Second, the contemporary circumstances of the groups and of society at large greatly affected the content of the narratives. I consider the

1987 democratic reforms to have been the key turningpoint in how official and unofficial narratives were constructed. I have organized this thesis to reflect this argument, examining the narratives before and after 1987.

My arguments have been shaped by the existing literature on the collective memory of the Gwangju Uprising. Sociologist Gi-Wook Shin contends that the narratives on the Uprising underwent a shift in content and tone due to changing social and political contexts in South Korea, with the 1987 democratic reforms being the decisive event

7 which triggered the changes. Sociologist Sallie Yea argues that there was a division between official and unofficial narratives of the Uprising until democratization, after

8 which there was a convergence to the democratic and human rights narrative. Yea also discusses the commodification of May 18 from the 1990s onward, locating the trend within the reinvention of the Jeolla region as a universal symbol of democracy and

9 human rights and a center for dissent in Korean politics. Anthropologist Linda Lewis, who has written the most extensively about memory and representations of the uprising,

10 is critical of the development of the collective memory of the Uprising. She asserts that

7 Gi-Wook Shin, "Introduction," xxvii. 8 Sallie Yea, "Rewriting Rebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea: The(Re )presentation of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising Through Mangwol-dong Cemetery," Urban Studies, Vol. 39, No.9 (2002): 1557-1558. 9 Sallie Yea, "Reinventing the Region: The Cultural Politics of Place in Kwangju City andSouth ChOlla Province," in Contentious Kw angju: The May 18 Uprising in Korea's Past and Present, eds. Gi-Wook Shin and Kyung Moon Hwang (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003}, 123-127. 10 See Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May; Lewis, "'The Kwangju Incident' Observed: An Anthropological Perspective on Civil Uprisings," in The Kwangju Up rising: Shadows over the Regime in South Korea, ed. Donald N. Clark (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988): 15-27; Lewis, 'The Revictimization of the Direct Victims," in The1980 Kwangju Uprising After20 Years: The Unhealed Wo unds of th e Victims, ed. Juna Byun and Linda S. Lewis (Seoul, South Korea: Dahae Publishers, 2000),

11 narratives about Gwangju, both officially and unofficially, have shifted decisively in favor of the democratic narrative, which inadvertently revictimizes the original direct victims of the massacre by pushing their pleas for greater recognition and compensation out of the public discussion on the topic. Both the official and unofficial narratives after

1987 were altered to connect the Uprising to the new democratic political environment and also to aggrandize the role of the groups constructing the accounts in both Gwangju and the democratization movement.

Informed by these academics' works, I argue that the memories of Gwangju, which the narratives articulate, were reconstructions of the event from the present-day viewpoints of the individuals or groups doing the remembering. Scholars who have examined collective memory have reached a tentative consensus on the assertion that memory is a construction of the past heavily influenced by the present. French sociologist and the founder of collective memory studies Maurice Halbwachs contends that "the past is not preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the present" and that "collective frameworks are ... precisely the instruments used by the collective memory to reconstruct an image of the past which is in accord, in each epoch, with the predominant

11 thoughts of the society." Anthropologist James Wertsch adds that "one of the few

12 genuinely durable attributes of collective memory is that it undergoes change." These changes arise "in response to the need to create a usable past," a need which "varies over time" because "what constitutes a usable past in one sociocultural setting is often quite

183-198; Lewis. "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," in Ko rean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State, 2nd ed. , ed. Charles K. Armstrong (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 145-165. 11 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 40. 12 James V. Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering (Cambridge, U.K. ;New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2002), 173.

12 r3 different from what is needed in another.'. He defines a "usable past" to be "an account

of events and actors that can be harnessed for some purpose in the present," usually

14 having to do with "individual or collective identity claims." The transformations of the

narratives about Gwangju can be largely explained by this understanding of the nature of collective memory.

Not only has the discourse on the Gwangju Uprising been influenced by political

and social change, the reconstructed pasts have been used to legitimize the government

and unofficial groups propagating their respective narratives at the time of their creation.

It is normal, according to sociologist Paul Connerton, for these usable pasts to be used to

15 "legitimate a present social order." Especially relevant to the topic of Gwangju,

sociologist Iwona Irwin-Zarecka adds that memory projects take on special significance

in countries which experience political transformations, such as a switch from

dictatorship to democratic government, because of the importance of refrarning the past

16 to reflect the new political changes. However, one of the risks of these politically

motivated memory projects is "that of sanitizing the records of the past for the sake of

17 greater inspirational value." The group which leads the present political and social order

has great incentive to reconstruct a past which best illustrates the group's significance in

causing positive change and its legitimacy, even if it means filtering out negative aspects

of the political upheavals.

13 Wertsch, Vo ices of Collective Remembering, 4345. 14 Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering, 31. 15 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 3. 16 Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance: TheDynamics of Collective Memory (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 110. 17 Irwin-Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance, 134.

13 I thus also argue that identifying the individuals and groups who created the narratives is fundamental in understanding the purpose of these narratives, since the creation and maintenance of specific reconstructions of the past depend on the social groups who decide what to remember. Halbwachs argues that "every collective memory

18 requires the support of a group delimited in space and time." As a result, because collective memory is defined and constrained by the group, with a variety of groups there can exist many different collective memories of the same event; as PierreNora states,

"memory is blind to all but the group it blinds .. . there are as many memories as there

19 are groups."

The presence of the diverse groups with different and often conflicting needs, mentalities, and opinions caused the contestation of the memory of Gwangju. Wertsch identifies three forms of distributed memory, the concept that there is no "collective mind" but that memory is "distributed" among a group's members: homogeneous, complementary, and contested. It is this latter form, the "contested distribution," which is relevant to the discussion of the collective memory of the Gwangju Uprising. The contested distribution of collective memory is a system characterized by "competition

0 and conflict" between narratives which are in "opposition and contestation."2 Wertsch argues that narratives "are embedded in concrete discourse characterized by dialogic and

1 rhetorical opposition" among groups.2 Using this framework of contested distribution, we can examine Gwangju as a "site of contestation" among the numerous groups involved- the state, media, victims, and democracy activists, just to name a few.

18 Maurice HaJbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York: Halper & Row, 1980), 84. 19 PierreNora, "Between Memory andHistory: Les Lieux deMemoire," Representations 26(Spring 1989): 9. 20 Wertsch, Voices of CollectiveRemembering, 24. 21 Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering, 59.

14 I choose to examine narratives because they play a huge role in determining collective memory because they are the essential intermediary between the event being remembered and the people who are remembering. Collective memory can arise out of direct experience, but Wertsch argues that memory of historical events, which is often not

22 the result of direct experience, should be considered "textually mediated" memory. The kinds of textual resources available for the formation of collective memory are diverse.

Wertsch provides broad definitions of what constitutes a "text," classifying "textual

resources" as being "narratives that stand in, or mediate, between the events and our

23 understanding of them." He adds that "the narrative texts used in collectivememory are

best viewed as tools, or raw materials to be employed in organizing or reconstructing an

24 account of the past." Narratives are not confined to written texts, but can be expressed

through ceremonies, buildings, artifacts, and other objects. While the type of text matters,

it is the story which the different types of texts tell which is the main point of concern.

Irwin-Zarecka argues that it is "the 'infrastructure' of collective memory, all the different

25 spaces, objects, 'texts' that make an engagement with the past possible." Memorials,

museums, and commemorative ceremonies can exhibit and propagate narratives as well

as written texts. In this thesis, I have used a variety of texts, ranging from newspaper

articles, eyewitness accounts, memorials, ceremonies, and cultural representations of the

Uprising such as literature and film. 26

22 Wertsch, Vo ices of Collective Remembering, 5. 23 Wertsch, Vo ices of Collective Remembering, 5. 24 Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering, 8. 25 Irwin-Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance, 13. 26 One of the main weaknesses of this thesis is its virtual lack of Korean language sources. Most of the texts I have cited are written in English.However, I believethat, although it is not preferable, the sources provide enough information such that I would reach similar conclusions had I incorporated more Korean language materials.

15 Despite the growing literature on the actual uprising, its political and social effects, and its collective memory, there still has been no comprehensive analysis of the variety of narratives that were created and advanced from the beginning of the Uprising to the present, which I will attempt to provide. This thesis will examine the collection of competing narratives about the uprising put forth by various groups and organizations before and after democratization. This analysis will also inevitably look at the political and social contexts surrounding the formation of these narratives and the effect of democratization on the narratives. The liberalization of Korean politics in 1987 proved to be the decisive factor in the shift in both official and unofficial narratives regarding the

Gwangju Uprising.

In Chapter One, I examine the official narratives fromthe time of the Uprising up to 1987. The military regime consistently labeled the participants, who consisted of a minority of the total population of Gwangju, as "rioters" whose passions were inflamed by radical, possibly Communist, activists and spies. In Chapter Two, I analyze the countemarratives of unofficial groups such as the foreign media and eyewitnesses. The victimization of the citizens at the hands of the harsh state contributed to a flowering of more radical political movements, especially the counterhegemonic minjung ideology, which was an amalgam of anti -capitalist and nationalist platforms. Victirnhood and resistance were the key themes in these unofficial narratives. The successful 1987 democracy movement dramatically altered both official and unofficial accounts of

Gwangju. Chapter Three deals with how political liberalization after 1987 reversed how the state portrayed the Uprising, froma "riot" to a "democratization movement." This transformationlinked Gwangju to the 1987 reforms and thus also made the implicit claim

16 that the subsequent governments were the defining legacy of the Uprising. Finally, in

Chapter Four, I show how the prevailing post-1987 unofficial narrative parroted the new official narrative in accepting Gwangju as a democratization movement, although the unofficial narrative placed a heavier emphasis on the universal aspects of the Uprising, especially in the concern for human rights. Although the new interpretation of the event is widely accepted, it ignores the continued suffering of the direct victims of the Uprising and the underlying importance of social class. I show how literary and film depictions of

Gwangju have largely been sympathetic to the victims and the older minjung narratives.

Yet, it is clear that the democratic and universal narrative continues to be ubiquitous.

Therefore, I find that despite the democratic transition, the contemporary discourse about the Gwangju Uprising is characterized by the presence of a dominant, almost hegemonic narrative.

The Gwangju Uprising has endured as one of the most important events in modem Korean history, a site of contestation over its meaning and use, and an object of shifting claims over its legacy.

Note on Romanization: Although I will be using the Revised Romanization of the

Korean script Hangeul throughout this paper, much of the English language literature still uses the McCune-Reischauer Romanization system. Thus, there will be many instances in which the same word or term will have slightly different spellings. For example,

Gwangju will often be written as "Kwangju" in quoted sources and Jeolla as "ChOIIa."

Note on names: There are a variety of ways to write Korean names. The (usually) two syllable given name can either be hyphenated or not hyphenated. In the case of the

17 former, the second syllable is usually not capitalized, but sometimes is. In the case of the latter, both syllables are usually capitalized. In many instances, the name of the figure or author whom I am either quoting or citing uses both systems. For instance, Kim Dae Jung can also be written as Kim Dae-Jung or Kim Dae-jung. I have tried to make the spellings as consistent as possible.

18 I. Calling Murder by Some Other Name: Official Narratives of Gwangju Pre Democratization

When discussing the narratives of the Gwangju Uprising put forth by the South

Korean government from 1980 until 1987, it might be helpful to recall PrimoLevi's words regarding how Nazi soldiers and officials verbally sanitized their actions: "call

1 'murder' by some other name, and it is not murder anymore." For instance, when

German officials discussed the systematic murder of the European Jews, '"finalsolution' meant 'extermination'; 'special treatment' meant 'death by gas'; 'transfer' .. . meant

'mass deportation."' 2 In the case of Gwangju, the Korean government manipulated language in a similar fashion. The demonstrators became "rioters" (pokdo) and

"criminals" (kkangpae or bulryangbae) influenced by Communist infiltrators or pro-

Communist South Koreans, who were in tum deemed "impure elements" (bulsun bunja); the military crackdown on the uprising was a "national security"initiative. Sometimes, the crimes were omitted from the official narratives completely, such as the soldiers' initial brutality that sparked the mass protests in the first place. In the end, the bloody massacre became a mere "incident," a term that denotes none of the violence and

controversy that has continuously surrounded the event. The larger goal was to build up

an official narrative that would establish state legitimacy in the wake of the crisis. By

framing the event as a lawless riot produced by nefarious and fringe radicals, the government could demonstrate its capacity to protect its citizens from both domestic and external enemies and also restore much-needed peace and order with a compassionate touch.

1 PrimoLevi, "The Memory of Offense,"in Bitburg in Moral and Politi cal Perspectiv e, ed. GeoffreyH. Hartman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 135. 2 Levi, "The Memory of Offense," 135.

19 According to the state, the uprising was essentially mob violence sparked by a small group of cunning Communist spies, pro-Communist radicals, and supporters of the opposition who infiltrated the demonstrators for the end goal of destabilizing the entire country. Historian Donald Clark neatly summarizes the position of the government as being that "the events of Kwangju were the work of a planning group which kept close touch with the political opposition in Seoul, namely Kim Dae Jung, and drew financing

3 from various suspicious sources." The majority of the rioters, who were innocent citizens, joined the fight not because they reacted to soldiers randomly beating and murdering other civilians, but because they were hoodwinked and their emotions riled up by the infiltrators' vicious rumors and lies about the government's motivations. As emotions heated up, demonstrations spiraled out of control into bloody riots. The rioters

acquired weapons in the midst of their frenzy, and the military, which exercised great

self-restraint in trying to protect the lives of the citizens, was forced to move out for a

short time. The massacre of civilians by rampaging soldiers was all but ignored by the

state, which deigned to discuss it only as another example of the vicious lies and rumors

disseminatedby the rioters. Once the army cleared out of the city on May 22, the city fell

into a period of absolute anarchy and chaos. Citizens feared for their lives as widespread

looting and random violence continued. The radicals seized control of the citizens'

committee that was bargaining with the military, derailing what were once promising

negotiations. The military had no choice but to use force to take back the city, but the

soldiers again did their best to minimize casualties. Afterwards, the government

immediately sought to aid the citizens in healing both the physical and emotional scars

3 Donald N. Clark, "Commentary: Interpreting the Kwangju Uprising," in The Kwangju Up rising: Shadows over the Regime in South Ko rea, ed. Donald N. Clark (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 68.

20 left by the tragic incident.

The main conduits of the offi cial narratives were the official statements issued by the government and the military andthe reporting by the heavily censored domestic

4 medi a. At this point, complete martial law had been declared, and so the military was essentially controlling the government. Civilians such as the president, prime minister,

and members of the Cabinet were fi gureheads. Thus, statements from the Martial Law

Command had more authority than those from civilian officials. In addition, because the

state had extensive control over the media at the time, examining both what was written

and what was omitted in newspaper articles can reveal much about the government's

opinion on the events in Gwangju. 5 The construction of this narrative began immediately

as the demonstrators gained the upper hand on May 21. From this point on, a barrage of

official statements and newspaper articles was released. The official narrative of impure

elements, rioting, anarchy, the virtue of the soldiers, and the necessity of military

intervention remained largely unchanged until democratization.

Official Statements at the Time of the Uprising

Offi cial statements during the Uprising were designed to convince the Gwangju

citizens to return home and to minimize the impact of the Uprising on the rest of the

country by characterizing the demonstrations and resistance as radical acts. These

statements were disseminated through several media channels, such as newspapers, radi o,

and television. Various government officials, such as the Martial Law Commander, the

Minister of Defense, the Prime Minister, and President Choi Gyu Ha issued statements

4 I will extensively utilize the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's (henceforth FBIS) English translations of the official documents and newspaper ar ticles. 5 I will primarily examine bothEnglish-lang uage newspapers such as the Korea Times and Korea Herald and the Korean language coverage by the Dong-A llbo inthis section.

21 about the uprising that sought to both infonn the entire nation about the events (in a way favorable to the government and military, of course) and reach out to the demonstrators in order to settle the crisis. The military authorities' statements were quick to point the finger at subversive elements in the country as the puppet masters pulling the strings behind the scenes. The civilian authorities' responses were more measured but they also did not place any of the blame on the military. As we will see in the next chapter, these official statements did little except to aggravate the demonstrators. But placating the demonstrators was not the main aim of these statements. As mentioned above, the objective .was to establish state and military legitimacy in a time of crisis and political uncertainty. The official statements focused on highlighting the military's role in securing public order, asserting the innocence of the majority of citizens in order to not alienate the public, fi ghting back against more radical ideologies, and discrediting opposition political forces.

On May 21, the Martial Law Command released the first official statements about the uprising: a general announcement, and a statement by the Martial Law Commander,

General Lee Hui Seong. According to the general announcement, the "incident" began as peaceful demonstrations by students from Chonnam National University. However, on

May 20, "all kinds of wild, groundless rumors were spread to exacerbate local sentiments," and Gwangju citizens joined the demonstrations and became increasingly violent and began burning buildings and cars. The rumors consisted of reports of soldiers' random violence, such as indiscriminately beating people and dragging them around, and the regional identity of the soldiers, claiming they were mostly from the rival

Gyeongsang Province. Moreover, according to the announcement, only one citizen was

22 dead while five police officers and soldiers were killed, whereas the rumors claimed that

6 over 40 people died on May 18 alone. In his statement, General Lee added that the

"riots" were planned by "a considerable number of impure elements ...in an attempt to lead the situation to extremes." "Hoodlums and gangsters" blindly followed the impure elements as they "stimulated regionalism in a premeditated manner and instigated acts of rioting" for the ultimate goal of bringing down the country. He implored the Gwangju citizens to "regain [their] reason" and maintain peace and order. Lee also warned the demonstrators that the soldiers would "take the necessary measures for their self-defense against the violent acts disturbing social order." Finally, he stated that most of the demonstrators were "patriotic and honest citizens" whose prejudices andpassions the

' minority impure elements had inflamed.

The next day, the Martial Law Commandissued a report focused mainly on detailing the role of opposition leader Kim Dae Jung in instigating the upri sing and discrediting his motives and actions. The report stated that ever since Park's

assassination, Kim had been lusting after power and was prepared to take both legal and illegal measures to attain it. The report alleged that because he realized he had a low

likelihood of attaining the presidency through legal avenues, Kim "devised a political strategy aimed at providing an opportunity for seizing power at one sweep by deepening the people's distrust of the government and creating an abnormal revolutionary situation

by agitating the people." One tactic was to strengthen his support from university

students and professors, even offering funds to students running for student government.

The report accused Kim of "attempting to overthrow the government by violence" by

6 "Martial Law Command Announcement on Kwangju Situation," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 21, 1980. 7 "Martial Law Commander's Statement," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Ko rean, May 21, 1980.

23 manipulating innocent students into initiating the wave of student protests in May 1980, anticipating enough social unrest to sweep into power. The report concluded by examining Kim's ideological background. It claimed that Kim was an early member of the Workers' Party during the American occupation after World War II, that his supporters included many supporters of North Korea, and that many of Kim's statements often supported and echoed those of North Koreans. 8

These early statements set the tone for the rest of the official accounts of the upri sing, bringing up several terms and themes that would be consistently repeated in

later statements. The demonstrations were called "riots" by the military leadership, indicating that violence was being committed predominantly by out-of-control civilians.

The statements notably failed to mention any military violence unless it was a dismissal

of reports of soldiers' brutality as merely another groundless rumor. Indeed, it was the soldiers who had to exercise the right to self-defense instead of the citizens; the military's

role was otherwise subdued and restrained. In a later statement, Martial Law Commander

Lee continued to downplay any reports of soldiers' violence, asserting that army leaders

"ordered the martial law troops not [to] fire, and thus made them refrain from even

9 exercising the right of self-defense." Civilian deaths were low, whereas the security

personnel suffered the brunt of casualties.

The disturbances were also said to be premeditated, the work of "impure

elements" who were influenced by North Koreans and opposition figures such as Kim

Dae Jung. The term "impure elements" denoted primarily the pro-North Korean radicals

8 "Martial Law Command Cites KimTae-Chu ng's Partin Riots," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 22, 1980. 9 "Martial Law Commander's Announcement on Kwangju Incident," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 31, 1980.

24 in South Korea. They were "impure" in the sense that while they were South Koreans, their radical ideas and politics made them unreliable and likely disloyal citizens, as opposed to the "pure" citizens who swore loyalty to the South Korean state. Kim in tum was branded a craven politician with pro-North Korean sympathies who was the major instigator of the uprising.Because of the influence of these larger political forces who were thought to be seeking the overthrow of the South Koreanstate, the uprising was deemed a national security issue.

Finally, the authorities separated the minority of instigators from the majority of innocent citizens. This was done primarily to reassure the citizenry that there would be no repercussions to their participation in the protests, thus encouraging them to halt the uprising. Furthertnore, this separation served to minimize any perceived opposition to the state. The demonstrators were mostly motivated by regional hatred or provocative lies, not by anything wrong done by the government.If there were any direct complaints, they were mostly made by radicals who comprised only a tiny minority of the people - nothing that indicated any real threat to the government's legitimacy. It should be noted that this separation serves as a direct contrast to the emphasis on the unification of the

citizenry in post-democratization narratives by both the state and nongovernmental

groups.

After the soldiers retreated, the statements reflected early optimism on the part of the military that the situation could be soon resolved. The Martial Law Command declared that "thanks to the active reconciliatory activities of the government authorities

and the martial law army and the self-restraint of the citizens," it seemed that an early

25 10 settlement could be reached. On May 22, citizen representatives quickly presented a list of demands that they wanted the authorities to accept before surrendering to the military and collecting and banding in weapons. While most reports acknowledged the existence

of at least seven demands, one report by the Martial Law Command announced that the

citizen representatives who talked with the military brought up only two demands: first, that "the authorities should not treat citizens as rioters and should only take appropriate

measures after ferreting out the radical elements so as to prevent the victimization of

innocent citizens," and second, that "the authorities should actively persuade the citizens

11 to returnto their homes." If it sounds a bit too convenient that these citizens had the

exact same aims as the military, it is because this report was lying. Although this was

only one contradictory report out of many others which confirmed the seven demands, its

existence does testify to the motivation on the part of the military to portray reasonable

citizens as having been largely in harmony with official statements and actions. None of

the seven demands were about eliminating impure elements or that the government

should push further in telling the demonstrators to go home. In fact, the list of demands

included, among others: official recognition of the military's excessive use of force and

its role in provoking the uprising; releasing those arrested during the uprising;

compensating the families of the dead; an assurance that there would be no retaliation on

the part of the government once the martial law troops returned, which would only

12 happen once a settlement was reached. The military authorities at first accepted these

10 "Martial Law Command's Announcement," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Ko rean, May 25, 1980. 11 "Settlement Prospects 'Bright,"' FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean; May 23, 1980. 12 See LeeJae-eui, Kw angju Diary: BeyondDeath, Beyond the Darkness of the Age, trans. Kap Su Seol and Nick Mamatas (Los Angeles: UCLA AsianPacific Monograph Series, 1999), 104; Chang Jae Yo!, "Maybe I was Too Young," in The Kwangju Uprising: Ey ewitness Press Accounts of Korea's Tiananmen, ed. Henry Scott-Stokes and Lee Jai Eui (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 181.

26 demands on principle. Despite this early optimism, there was conflict between moderates and hardliners within the committees the Gwangju citizens had set up to deal with the negotiations and the running of the city, and the early agreement fell through.

As the impasse continued, the military's tone and rhetoric remained unchanged.

Counterespionage officialsreportedly discussed the likelihood that North Koreans had infiltrated and incited the masses and were now readying the city as a base for other

13 North Korean guerrillas. A government spokesman warned that the South Korean government would not "tolerate any schemes of the North Korean communists to miscalculate or take advantage of the recent domestic situation," pointing to extensive

North Korean media reporting of the event as evidence that the North Koreans were

14 attempting to foment popular uprising in the South. The Martial Law Command issued another announcement which again reaffirmed that the demonstrators became more violent due to, in part, the rumors circulating in the city, and that while the soldiers

"inevitably arrested the violent demonstrators," they "concentrated their efforts on trying to maintain public order," withdrawing to the outskirts when the demonstrators began

15 arming themsel ves. The military command even deemed the rioters' acti ons, such as

16 stabbing soldiers, as "atrocities." The military indicated that it was the demonstrators- turned-rioters who were committing the real violence and abuses; the rioters threatened the peace by seizing weapons and brutalized the soldiers who sought only to fu lfill their duty of protecting the innocent civilians.

In direct contrast to eyewitness accounts which revealed the peaceful and

13 "Counterespionage Officials Analyze Situation," Seoul Radio Munhwa, FBIS, May 23, 1980. 14 "Spokesman Warns North,'' FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Ko rean, May 26, 1980. 15 "Events Leading Up to Military's Occupation of Kwangju: 23 May Martial Law Announcement," Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 23, 1980. 16 "Martial Law Command's Announcement," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Ko rean, May 25, 1980.

27 cooperative atmosphere in the days of autonamy in Gwangju, the offi cial line was that this period of time was one of fear, chaos, and anarchy. For instance, the announcement from May 25 used a variety of imagery to describe the fear most citizens felt, claiming

17 citizens were "trembling with fear" and "shiver[ing] in horror." This fear was due to the actions of the lawless actions of the reckless rioters. These rioters, mainly"students from all places, hoodlums, beggars and loafers," roved the streets and allegedly robbed and

18 looted stores, taking food, money, and valuables. Due to the youth of most of the rioters, they often mishandled weapons, and citizens consequently were "in a state of

19 terror as a result of indiscriminate firing." Furthermore, the "radical rioters" were becoming so divided that there reportedly was a firefight at the Provincial Hall which left

20 two students dead. In this "state of lawlessness," what the tired and frightened citizens

21 wanted most of all was for the authorities to come into the city and "restore order."

The civilian officials in the government backed most of what the military authorities said with regards to the uprising and the interlude of autonomy, but their announcements featured a subtle shift to a softer andmore conciliatory stance than the one put forth by the military. Park Choong Hoon, who immediately took over as Prime

Minister after the previous one resigned on May 22, quickly flew to Gwangju by

22 helicopter to inspect the situation there. However, as he was unable to enter the city, he could only look down at Gwangju from a distance. This did not prevent him from declaring that at that moment, "there [was] no public peace and order'' in the city. He

17 "Martial Law Conunand's Announcement," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 25, 1980. 18 "Martial Law Conunand's Announcement," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 25, 1980. 19 "Martial Law Command's Announcement," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 25, 1980. 20 "Kwangju Situation 25 May," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 25, 1980. 21 "Martial Law Command's Announcement," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 25, 1980. 22 Although never officially explained, one can assume that former Prime Minister Shin Hyun Hwak resigned, or was forced out, due to the eruption of the Gwangju Uprising.

28 repeatedthat "some impure elements" perpetrated the attacks and arson on public buildings and captured weapons, and that their end goal was to overthrow the government. According to Park, it was these impure elements who caused the most casualties by firing on the soldiers, as "the soldiers could not fi re at them nor counterattack them because of the strict orders of the government." This "limited number of impure elements, rioters with weapons" also intimidated andforced the other civilians to stage demonstrations against the government - again, exonerating the majority of the citizens. Finally, Park implored the citizens to think about the impact of the uprising on the Korean economy, as it was not only disruptive to national stability, but in addition foreigners would be frightened away from doing business in Korea. The Prime Minister' s statement differed fromprevious official proclamations only in Park's cautious contradiction of earlier reports of complete lawlessness. He stated, "They say that the city

is a lawless city, but that is too exaggerated" and that he did not think that "the city has been reduced to lawlessness." Perhaps Park did see some measure of order in the

helicopter. Perhaps, as a civilian, this was his attempt to differentiate himself from the

Martial Law Command and assert the independence of the interim government from the

increasingly encroaching military. In any case, this small caveat did not change the

overall tone of Park's statement, which repeated the same characterization of the

protesters as rioters and impure elements, the same claim that these rebels constituted

only a minority of the citizens, and similar rhetoric with regard to national security as

previous government accounts. 23 Order, stabi lity, and security were the key themes he

emphasized.

23 "Late Report:Premie r's Statement on Kwangju Visit," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 22, 1980; "Prime Minister Visits Kwangju, Appeals for Order," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 22, !980.

29 President Choi Kyu Ha finally stepped in on May 25, going on television to read a statement which, like the Prime Minister's, also included more conciliatory gestures toward the citizens of Gwangju. Choi expressed his sympathy for the citizens, stating he could "understand the uneasiness and fear of the majority of the K wangju citizens in a

state of non-existent law enforcement and unspeakable inconveniences to [their] daily

lives." He did not explicitly blame anyone for triggering the crisis but alluded to the

national security threat that accompanied the destabilization of the country, declaring that

no one should forget "that a situation which puts us against each other will surely lure the

communist group in the North into taking advantage of it." Throughout the speech, Choi repeated his call for the protesters to "regain [their] calm and reason," blaming

"temporary emotion and ephemeral fury" for their actions. He made no mention of

impure elements or spies. He announced that the government would do its utmost to

"render maximum rehabilitation and relief for the unexpected damages that have

occurred" and "show maximum generosity and ignore those mistakes" made by the

citizens. Choi placed himself firmly on the side of a peaceful solution to the crisis and

urged the citizens to seriously enter into talks, asserting that "there is nothing that cannot

be solved through dialogue; nothing can be solved through confrontation." This sentence

may very well have been an attempt to urge the military not to abandon talks as well. If it

had been, it did not seem to make much impact, since soldiers moved in less than two

days later. Ultimately, with his declaration that "we are all fellow countrymen," Choi

clearly sought to deliver a message of national unity and solidarity, not pointing out

internal enemies. His strategy seemed to be that with a more measured and softer

response to the uprising, the demonstrators would cooperate, restore the status quo, and

30 24 initiate the process of "rehabilitation, forgetting everything of the past."

But how could the citizens of Gwangju really believe in the president and his message of moving on if he did not even addresstheir central concern: the horrific brutality exhibited by the soldiers enforcing martial law? The citizens could not move on if the people whose actions triggered the crisis were let off so easily. They could not forget the past as if nothing happened when so many people died and the perpetrators were not even acknowledged, let alone prosecuted. Choi did not blame anyone or label the demonstrators as hooligans, but neither did he castigate the military for excessive force. Choi tried to be balanced, but that was the main problem. There was no way anyone could be balanced in such a situation and expect to be able to connect to an

audience on either side of the conflict.In this respect, Choi failed to display the

leadership necessary to take control of the situation. The president at this point was a

figurehead and Chun and his military allies were the real powers in the government, but

Choi still could have taken the initiative to inject a stronger plea for a peaceful solution.

As the military authorities grew impatient with the impasse and decided to take matters

into their own hands, the president continued to be a mere bystander despite his

ostensible role as head of state. As a result, the outcome he wished for in his speech, a

peaceful settlement reached through dialogue and subsequent healing of national wounds,

was never feasible. Moreover, Choi's continued emphasis on stability, national security,

and the threat of North Korea in his address demonstrated how much his core interests

still aligned with those of the military.

In the waking hours of May 27, the army entered and recaptured the city,

encountering only small pockets of resistance from the remnants of the Citizens' Army.

24 "President onKwangju Situation," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service, May 25, !980.

31 The Martial Law Command announced 17 rioters were killed and 295 arrested in the final

25 confrontation, with 12 of the deaths coming at the battle at Provincial Ha11. The military framed the action as one executed to preserve the country, declaring that "by subduing

the rioters, [the Command] was making efforts to restore public security and

26 administration." The soldiers were cast as selfless heroes leading the way to the rehabilitation of the city, with the statement claiming that "they have decided to supply a total of 6,000 straw bags of rice to citizens of Kwangju saved from the rations allotted to

27 themselves" to relieve the food shortage. In a seeming effort to combat the Citizens'

Army's claim to legitimacy as the army of the citizens, the Martial Law Command

declared it would restore law and order "as members of the people's army protecting the

28 people's property and lives." Rather than being an external organization, the military

was one with the people, whom it tried to protect. The Command continued to separate

the majority of the citizens from the minority of extremists, stating that the soldiers

29 would "treat the citizens generously, except for the radical rioters." The process of

rehabilitation could not be begun unless the majority of the citizens were exonerated from

persecution.

The death toll reported by the governmentwas constructed as to show minimum

military culpability. According to Martial Law Commander Lee, the death toll reached

30 170 people: 144civilians, 22 soldiers and four policemen. Lee stated that 28 civilians

died "during a cross-fire between the martial law troops defending the Kwangju prison

15 "Martial Law Command's Announcement," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Ko rean, May 27, 1980. 26 "Martial Law Command's Announcement," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 27, 1980. 27 "Martial Law Command's Announcement," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 27, 1980. 28 "Martial Law Command's Announcement," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Ko rean, May 27, 1980, emphasis added. 29 "Martial Law Command's Announcement," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 27, 1980. 30 "Martial Law Commander's Announcement on KwangjuIncident," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Ko rean, May 31, 1980.

32 and rioters," which again directly contradicted his claim (made in the very same announcement) that soldiers did not "fire even a shot" during the ordeal, not even for self-defense. 32 died due to traffic accidents, 15 died due to mishandling of weapons, 29 died because of the internal conflict between radicals and moderates, 17 died during the military's recapture of the city on May 27. These numbers added up to 121 civilian deaths, not including an unspecified number ("some" according to the statement) who were murdered to "even old scores." The rest of the deaths were unaccounted for, but the official narrative left little room for any deliberate military involvement in those deaths?1

In explaining the causes of the crisis, General Lee stated that "the situation was brought to its worst stage with the eruption of uncontrollable mob-hysteria by exasperating and igniting the sentiments of the Kwangju area citizens through an elaborately masterminded manipulation and by subtle instigations." The uprising was not a spontaneous revolt but a premeditated act of disruption against the state. The forces behind the whole affair were North Koreans and Kim Dae Jung. General Lee cited the fact that a North Korean spy, Lee Chang Yong, was captured on May 23 in Seoul as proof of North Korean influence on protests.32 Kim was the primary antagonist in this tale, as he "masterminded the student disturbances in order to realize his impure political objectives" and controlled the students from behind the scenes. The use of "impure" clearly connotes that Kim's goals had a Communist flavor to them, as alluded to in

31 "Martial Law Commander's Announcement on Kwangju Incident," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Ko rean, May 31, 1980. 32 Almost two decades later, it was revealed thatwhile the man, whose real name was Hong Chon Sui, was indeed a North Korean spy, the North Koreans did not send anyone south until after months or a year of planning, and that no one had any idea about what was going to happen in Gwangju. Hong's mission was completely unrelated to the uprising. Henry Scott-Stokes and Lee JaeEui, "Epilogue," in The Kwangju Uprising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Ko rea 's Tiananmen, 228-229.

33 previous statements and all throughout his political career.33

Kim's trial gave legal backing to the official narrative of Gwangju being a planned event. Already arrested immediately after the extension of martial law on May

17, Kim was soon charged with sedition and anti-state activities, including mastenninding the entire Gwangju Uprising. Foreign officials and journalists derided the tri al, which began in August, for its clear lack of objectivity and questionable evidence

behind the claim that Kim had been trying to overthrow the government. The government

moved forward with the case despite these criticisms and within a month, the court found

Kimguilty of the conspiracy charges and sentenced him to death. American and Japanese

officials strongly expressed their dismay, to which the South Korean Foreign Minister

Noh Shin Yong responded by warning any foreign countries from meddling in Korea's

domestic affairs?4 However, as detailed in then-American Ambassador William

Gleysteen' s memoir, the Koreans did engage in negotiations with the Americans on the

topic of saving Kim's life.35 The Koreans eventually extracted a promise that Chun would

visit the White House early in Ronald Reagan's term, and in return, Chun commuted

Kim's sentence to life imprisonment in January 1981, eventually releasing him into exile

in December 1982. Although Kim was ultimately released, the death sentence gave legal

weight to the official stance that Gwangju was not a spontaneous uprising but a carefully

planned anti-state revolt by the crafty opposition leader; the official statements were not

mere rhetoric. The rhetoric in turn reinforced the legal decision, resulting in a legitimacy

feedback loop of sorts. Another effect was that public approval of Kim Dae Jung declined

33 "Martial Law Commander's Announcement on Kwangju Incident," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 31, 1980. 34 "Further Details," Haptong (FBIS), September 19, 1980. 35 William H. Gleysteen, Jr ., Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 171-190.

34 as more people began to believe he was indeed Communist or was a Communist sympathizer. 36 The denunciation of lefti st South Korean leaders, including Kim, even in contemporary times speaks to the durability of such charges.

As reports about Gwangju and the government's unsavory role in suppressing the protests circulated in the foreign press, Korean officials sought to. clarify details of the upri sing overseas. One case was a Korean ambassador's letter to .the Times of London in response to a story on South Korea's political situation. The writer, Simon Scott

Plummer, was quite critical of the Koreans' governing style, suggesting that "Korean politics were ruled by the gun, Wild West style" and that Chun was a "strongman" in charge of "a military dictatorship thinly disguised by the trappings of democracy."37

Plummer only briefly described the Gwangju Upri sing in one sentence. The imposition of martial law and the arrest of Kim Dae Jung "provoked a rebellion, which was brutally suppressed by the army, in Cholla."38 But even this one sentence had the elements to provoke the South Korean ambassador to Great Britain, Kang Young Hoon, to write a response letter to The Tim es in order to give, in his eyes, a more correct account of

Korean politics to British readers. To Kang, the problems with Plummer's description were threefold. First, "rebellion" did not possess the same unlawful andchaotic connotations as "riot." Second, Plummer noted the military's excessive fo rce. Third, he contradicted the military's claim that the uprising was premeditated and instead argued that it was spontaneous, triggered by Kim's arrest.

36 Sam Jameson, "World Outrage May Not Be Enoughto Spare Kim Dae Jung," Los Angeles Times, December I, 1980. 37 Simon Scott Plummer, "Jammed Lid is Back on the Saucepan," The Times (London, England), August 3, 1981. 38 Plummer, "Jammed Lid is Back on the Saucepan," The Times, August 3, !981.

35 Kang took the opportunity to repeat the official position on the Gwangju Uprising

in almost as brief a description as Plummer' s. He declared that Plummer's buried

sentence about Gwangju was inaccurate in stating that "the Kwangju riots a year ago last

May were a reacti on to the arrest of Kim Dae-Jung and other opposition leaders." Instead,

Kang claimed, ''The fuse for that rebellion already had been long and carefully laid out

9 by Mr Kim and his associates before their arrest."3 Kang labeled the uprising as "riots,"

following the standard government account, and also repeated the official charges against

Kim Dae Jung as planning and inciting rebellion in Gwangju. Kang did not elaborate in

his letter just what Kim and the opposition's planswere, or whether they picked the exact

date of the uprising, or if they somehow foresaw the imposition of martial law in mid-

May the previous year. Nor did Kang discuss the harsh military reaction to the uprising

that Plummer brought up, seemingly content to let the label of "riots" justify any military

brutality in their successful attempt to quash the rebellion.

In the years between 1981 (the year of Chun's inauguration as president) and

1985, the government kept silent on the issue of the "Gwangju Incident," or Gwangju

satae, despite pressure from civilians, and made its mention in public taboo. The

government finally broke its official silence in 1985. In early February, the exiled Kim

Dae Jung returned to Korea from the U.S., and his supporters performed surprisingly well

40 in the National Assembly elections that same month. The opposition lawmakers,

energized by their success, became more outspoken in voicing their hostility to

government policies, including the taboo on Gwangju. This legislative pressure caused

the Chun regime to respond with an official report fromthe Ministry of Defense. Inthis

39 Young Hoon Kang, "Perspectives on Korea," The Times (London, England), August 27, 1981. 40 Linda Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May: A Look Back at the 1980 Kwangju Up rising (Honolulu: University of Hawai 'i Press: Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawai 'i, 2002}, 77.

36 lengthy report, one can find most of the elements of the standard official narrative on the uprising.

On June 7, 1985, Minister of Defense Yoon Sung Min presented his "Report on the Kwangju Incident" to the National Assembly National Defense Committee. Yoon started with the aftermath of Park Chung Hee' s assassination, claiming that although the government attempted to peacefully implement democratic reforms, strikes and disturbances by students and workers in late 1979 and early 1980 hampered national

41 security and damaged economic recovery. Furthermore, North Korea began to move soldiers to the border in light of this instability south of the DMZ, and South Korean

42 intelligence indicated that an attack was imminent. With the country's survival at stake, the government "was forced to take the emergency measures" of complete martial law on

May 17.43 If anyone was to be blamed for the crisis, it was a minority of radical activists influenced by North Korea and opposition politicians who tried to disturb the economic and political recovery of the country from the shock of Park's death.

In the description of the actual events in Gwangju, Yoon's report emphasized

both the role of a small group of Communist sympathizers or spies in creating a violent

mob mentality and the reticence of the military in using violence. In their frenzy, the

"rioters" seized weapons, armored vehicles, and explosives from armories and mines in

the area. Again, Yoon did not mention the shocking brutality on the part of the soldiers as

they beat students and other citizens. What was made clear was that the protesters turned

irrational due to manipulation by impure elements and the soldiers possessed the cooler

41 "Document: Report on the KwangjuIncident to the National Assembly National Defense Conunittee, June 7, 1985," in The Kwangju Up rising: Slu:utows over the Regime in South Korea, ed. Donald N. Clatk (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 83. 42 "Document: Report on the Kwangju Incident," 84. 43 "Document: Report on the Kwangju Incident," 84.

37 heads. When the demonstrators drove the army out of the city, the report declared that

Gwangju was in "a state of lawlessness and anarchy as the city's administrative functions were paralyzed. "44 Thus, the military was forced to enter the city in order to "save the

45 citizens from anarchy." Finally, the report referenced the trial of Kim Dae Jung when it

stated that "the Supreme Court made it clear that some political forces pulled a string for

46 the flare-up ofthe Kwangju incident." Yoon used the trial to add legal authority to

Kim's culpability.

The key lessons Yoon declared that the country should take away from Gwangju

47 were that "the military played a decisive role in protecting the nation from this crisis.''

The military fu lfilled its duty in protecting the citizens of Gwangju, and by extension, the

entire populace from further harm. The military was blameless in this whole affair, as the

soldiers tried to do and successfully did what was expected of them.

Korean Media Coverage

In the case of the Gwangju Upri sing, strict censorship by the South Korean

military and government prevented the domestic media from fu lfilling its role as a

provider of accurate news and unofficial views to the public. Furthermore, government

controls co-opted the media and transformed it into essentially another vessel for

disseminating the official narrative of the uprising. Although much of the public did not

believe what the media was reporting about Gwangju, as evidenced by later calls for the

"truth" of what happened, the fact that Gwangju is still such a divisive issue testifies to

the power of the expansive reach of the media, which undoubtedly pushed some portions

44"Document: Report on the Kwangju Incident," 84. 45 "Document: Report on the Kwangju Incident," 90. 46 "Document: Report on the Kwangju Incident," 84. 47 "Document: Report on the K wangju Incident," 92.

38 of the public and their opinions on the uprising toward the government line.

Censorship of the media, which had always existed to some extent since South

Korea was established in 1948, became much harsher under Park after the 1972 imposition of the draconian Yushin Constitution. The government not only meddled in the production of news stories, but often worked to firejournalists that it found objectionable.48 Although restrictions on civil liberties were relaxed after Park' s assassination, advance censorship of the press was restored in the proclamation of full martial law on May 17, 1980.49 Journalists would report to soldiers who were members of the "Press Censor Corps" and present a ready-to-print newspaper for review. The soldiers would then mark all the articles and photographs they disapproved, which then required ° immediate replacement. 5

Because Korean newspapers in 1980 were censored, coverage of the Gwangju

Uprising was usually heavily slanted toward the government narrati ve. In reportingabout the Gwangju Uprising, domestic newspapers adopted the government line that the uprising was a violent riot instigated by "impure elements" and criminals, failing to disclose the cruel acts committed by the rampaging soldiers sent to enforce martial law.

Television news reports were also one-sided. One reporter, Chang Jae Yo! of the

Joongang Ilbo, drily noted in a later account of the incident that if one were to believe the hyperbolic tone of the domestic reporting, Gwangju "was hit by disturbances much like those in Los Angeles in the early 1990s."51 Anger directed against the Korean media and

48 "The Media," in South Korea: A Country Study, ed. Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1990). http://countrystudies.us/south-korea!73.htm. 49 "Proclamation of Extraordinary Martial Law, May 17, 1980," in Harold C. Hinton, Korea Under New Leadership: the Fifth Republic (New York, NY:Praeger, 1983), 130. 50 Kim Heung-sook, "Memories of Gwangju," TheKorea Times, May 20, 2011. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2013/03/169_87360.html. 51 Chang Jae Yo!, "Maybe I Was Too Young ...," 180.

39 its biased reporting about the situation in Gwangjucaused demonstrators to attack and burn the local KBS (Korean Broadcasting Service) and MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting

Corporation) stations, and while foreign journalists were readily welcomedby the demonstrators, Korean newspaper reporters were viewed with suspicion, even to the

52 point where many came to regard the domestic media as "the enemies (of the people)."

As the media continued to omit the soldiers' role in provoking the conflict and even declared that there was only one civilian death as of May 21, it is not hard to understand

53 the demonstrators' anger. At least compared to the official statements, the tone of the reporting on the upri sing was a tad more impartial and conciliatory, especially in the newspapers' editorials. But telling the truth in this case meant revealing the soldiers' outrageous behavior, which was information the government obviously wanted to prevent from leaking to the already agitated public. Thus, the media in its coverage of Gwangju were muzzled dogs restrained by a leash which was held by the military authorities.

The accounts by the Korean newspapers were distinguished by their extensive reliance on and uncritical parroting of official sources for informati on. The fi rst articles about the disturbances in Gwangju were not published until May 21, when the situation began to turn against the military. Even then, the Dong-A llbo could only publish the short and vague government statement which revealed the "outbreak of unrest" in

Gwangju and the determination by the Martial Law Command to take the necessary steps

54 to restore order. Indeed, most of the articles from the Dong-A llbo and Kyunghyang

Shinmun on Gwangju either simply reproduced official statements or offered accounts

52 Cho Sung Ho, "How the Provincial Hall Was Taken," in The Kwangju Uprising: Ey ewitness Press Accounts of Korea's Tiananmen, 150. 53 Cho Sung Ho, "How the Provincial Hall Was Taken," 150. 54 "Gwangju Demonstration Incident," Dong-A Ilbo, May 21, 1980.

40 that highlighted only acts of violence on the parts of the citizens. For example, the Dong

A llbo published on May 22 a long report on the events of the uprising covering the days from May 18 to May 22. The article was rather vague on what sparked the violence, stating that what started out as a protest by Chonnam University students turned into a violent clash between the students and the police and soldiers sent to suppress them, leading to casualties on both sides. These clashes erupted into full-scale demonstrations as more citizens joined in beginning on the 19th. "Vicious rumors" further inflamed the citizens' passions, and the demonstrators seized weapons, threw Molotov cocktails, and drove buses, trucks, and taxis at the soldiers and police, making it extremely difficult for the military to contain their violent actions. Public administration was soon paralyzed and stores were evacuated. The article regularly mentioned incidences of arson and the use of weapons by the demonstrators. For instance, the article blamed the citizens for setting public buildings and institutions on fire, such as the Gwangju KBS station. The article also declared that citizens across the country desired that "in order for there to be no further bloodshed, soldiers subdue the demonstrations softly and [the Gwangju] citizens regain their composure." Again, the role of the soldiers in provoking violence was minimized by the article. Although the article did not utilize terms such as "impure elements," and "riot" (either nandong or pokdong) was included only sparingly, it is clear that the citizens were the principal actors in this entire ordeal, according to the Dong-A

Ilbo.55

The English-language Korean newspapers did not diverge much in tone from the other domestic newspapers. The Korea Heraldpublished an hourly account of the

"Kwangju Riots" on May 23, which reflected much of the content of the Dong-A Ilbo

55 "Fifth Day of Gwangju Demonstrations," Dong-A llbo, May 22, 1980.

41 6 report and the official statements. 5 According to this article, the uprising developed as

the military said: growing numbers of citizens joined the initial group of student protesters and increasingly grew violent to the point of being riotous- during which time the soldiers did not do anything except try to keep the peace. No beatings, no random violence on the part of the military. Unprovoked by the security forces, the citizens went on a rampage- the article uses the term "angry mob" or "angry demonstrators" quite often in its portrayal of the protesters- and committed random violence against other

people, buildings, and cars. As there was no mention of the soldiers firing on the masses of protesters, the article made it seem as if the protesters went straight from mob violence and arson to capturing weapons and explosives in the latter stages of the insurrection. The reported death toll up to that point was nine people; it was not specified how many of

them were civilians. The report did confirm that citizens laid out a seven-point proposal,

and that one was for the authorities to "admit that soldiers acted too harshly in dispersing the demonstrators." Yet, the wording of this phrase still did not get at the root of what the

citizens wanted, since they wanted the military to admit that excessive brutality was the

trigger for the mass uprising. The article mentioned that there was one report that

suggested that the actions of the paratroopers were indeed something that intensified the

protests, but this was the furthest extent the article strayed from the official position on

the development of the incident.57

After the military withdrew, according to the newspapers, the city was chaotic and

crime-filled. In addition, the Korea Times added that during the five-day period of self- rule in Gwangju, the prevailing mood of selfishness exhibited by food dealers, who "were

56 "HourlyAccount of KwangjuRiots," The Korea Herald (FBIS), May 23, 1980. 57 "Hourly Account of Kwangju Riots," The Korea Herald (FBIS), May 23, 1980.

42 very reluctant to sell grain to citizens who were nottheir old customers even for the high prices," exacerbated the shortage of food, medicine, and other necessities.58 After the military retookthe city, the Korea Times reported, "As well as government officials, employees of private business firms also began attending their offi ces in the morning and chatting with each other about their experiences during the 10-day turbulence. "59

However, the article stopped there, and readers did not find out exactly what these employees were saying about the uprising and whether their stories differed fromoff icial accounts.

The newspapers were also quick to warn against the ever-looming North Korean threat. The Korea Herald declared in its May 28 editorial that "North Korea has been desperate to make use of the commotion in Kwangju to advance its scheme for 'a South

Korean revolution. "'60 The Korea Times's editorial on May 29 opened with:

The nationhas suffered a historic upheaval in the Kwangju incident, which has given us all a dramatic lesson in connection with the necessity of solidifying our anti-communist posture more than in any previous days. The entire people in the south have been given the impression that the Kwangju turmoil reached the 'brink of a war.' In other words, the communist masterminds may well have provoked an all-out war against the republic in the south, taking advantage of the Kwangju upheaval .61

The editorial went on to claim a high probability that "Pyongyang-dispatched agents were

6 behind the column of these radical rioters." 2 The threat did not recede with the conclusion of the Gwangju Uprising. Instead, the South Korean people had to remain vigilant against the constant and "ever-ominous North Korean plot to eventually

58 "Shortages of Food, Supplies," The Korea Times (FBIS), May 27, 1980. 59 Yang Dong-bee, 'Takeover of Kwangju by Government Troops Reported," The Korea Times (FB/S), May 28, 1980. 60 "Return of Order inKwangju," The Korea Herald (FBIS) , May 28, 1980. 61 "Communist Threat," The Korea Times (FBIS), May 29, 1980. 62 "Communist Threat," The Korea Times (FBIS) , May 29, 1980.

43 63 communize the whole peninsula by force."

Despite these warnings, in the aftermath of the reestablishment of government control, the Korean newspapers' commentaries followed President Choi' s lead and embraced the necessity of national unity: unity with one another, unity with the state.

After all, most of the citizens of Gwangju who participated were manipulated or coerced into joining with the rioters. Because ordinary citizens of Gwangju failed to respond sympathetically to the calls from the "radical elements" to revolt in full force, or so the newspapers claimed, that fact "eloquently" proved that "the majority of Kwangju citizens were eager to see the restoration of peace and order more than anything else, far from

64 being sympathizers with radical elements or Pyongyang-dispatched agents." Most

Gwangju residents were still good, loyal citizens, just like the rest of the South Korean citizens.

The editorials all stressed that the Gwangju citizens' pain was borne by the rest of the country as well; the Korean people shared everything together. The Ko rea Herald urged:

While doing our utmost to return the life in K wangju to normal as soon as possible, we should also do our best to achieve national conciliation and harmony which are essential to tide us over the present difficulties facing the country. President [Choi] certainly had this in mind when he promised utmost leniency for wrongdoings committed in momentary excitement in a special message addressed 65 to the citizens of Kwangju.

The editorial argued fur ther that the main lesson from Gwangju was that everyone must

"respect the virtues of tolerance and compromise to strengthen the basis of national

63 "Communist Threat," The Korea Times (FBTS), May 29, 1980. 6' "Communist Tlueat," The Korea Times (FBTS), May 29, 1980. 65 "Return of Order in Kwangju," The Korea Herald (FBTS), May 28, 1980.

44 66 harmony, an indispensable force to overcome tbe present difficulties." The Korea Times contended, "Healing tbe scars in the minds of Kwangju citizens is perhaps more

67 important tban material rehabilitation." Referencing tbe proverb that "warm breezes from the soutb should melt tbe ice in the people's hearts," tbe newspaper advocated for a

"maximum display of reason and brotberly love" and "broad tolerance" toward the

6 innocent civilians. 8 The newspaper maintained tbat "the best way to establish order in society is in 'benevolence, faitb and justice.' It is time for all of us to reexamine this

69 truthful clause." Finally, rapidly building up national unity was "required in view of national security, the most important national cause to be shared by all people of tbe

0 country in tbis difficult time."7

The Dong-A Ilbo pushed tbe boundaries of censorship, even publishing an editorial which criticized tbe government for failing to realize tbe root causes of the rebellion: popular distrust of tbe authoritarian state. The editorial went on to urge tbe military not to partake in any retaliatory measures and also placed tbe responsibility squarely on the governmentto regain the confidence of tbe whole nation, not just of the citizens of Gwangju. The editorial identified tbe root cause of the crisis as being popular distrust of tbe government, to which tbe government could respond only through "a self- examination from a fortbright viewpoint."71 Why tbis editorial was not censored by the autborities is perplexing. Perhaps, since Chun and his allies had not yet taken formal control of tbe government at tbat point, criticism of tbe present government was less

66 "Return of Order in Kwangju," The Korea Herald (FBIS), May 28, 1980. 67 "Kwangju Aftermalh," The Korea Times (FBIS), May 28, 1980. 68 "Kwangju Aftermath," The Korea Times (FBIS), May 28, 1980. 69 "Kwangju Aftermath," The Korea Times (FBIS), May 28, 1980. 70 "Kwangju Aftennath," The Ko rea Times (FBIS), May 28, 1980. 71 "Tong-A llbo Editorial: Tasks After Putting Martial Law Troops IntoKwangju," Dong-A Ilbo (FB!S), May 28, 1980.

45 disagreeable to the censors. Perhaps popular discontent with the governmentwas so evident and well-knownthat censoring any commentary on it was not worth the trouble.

Nevertheless, the domestic media was still much harsher toward Kim Dae Jung, whom they viciously censured during his trial. The Korea Herald accused Kim of

"demagogism" as he attempted to capitalize on Park Chung Hee' s assassination for his

72 own political ambitions through illegal and treasonous activities. An editorial by the newspaper implied that the charges of Communist allegiance brought against Kim were true and further argued that "Kim' s shady record of leftist activity and pro-communist orientation, his destructive verbal attacks abroad to topple the home government and his readiness to resort to any illegitimate means to advance his personal political gains

73 deserve to be condemned before the tribunal of public opinion." After Kim 's death sentence was commuted in January 1981, the Chosun Ilbo applauded Chun's

74 "generosity" and "catholicity'' in this move toward "national reconciliation." The

newspaper quoted a government official, who declared that because Kim was "a dissident

of the old political circle ...he has nothing to do with the political affairs of the new

75 era." In essence, Chun was ushering in a new era of politics to which Kim would be foreign. The Korean media condemned Kim as a traitor and gushed over Chun's action despite the fact that most international observers and journalists ridiculed the charges and

criticized the whole trial as "farcical" and a charade for Chun to eliminate his most

76 powerful political rival. The Korean newspapers' slavish response to the Kim Dae Jung

72 "SternWarning in Kim Tae-chung Case," The Korea Herald (FBIS), July 6, 1980. 73 "A Case Against Kim Tae-chung," The Korea Herald (FBIS), August 16, 1980. 74 "World Concern Acknowledged," The Chosun /lbo (FB/S), January 24, 1981. 75 "World Concern Acknowledged," The Chosun llbo (FBIS), January 24, 1981. 76 See Sam Jameson, "World Outrage May Not Be Enough to Spare Kim Dae Jung," Los Angeles Times, December I, 1980; "Samurai Justice in Korea," The New York Times, September 18, 1980; Asia Watch, Human Rights in Korea (January 1986), 47.

46 trial, despite the fact that many of the journalists seemedto have been ambivalent at best about the government, clearly demonstrates the control the government had over the domestic media.77

The Korean journalists' production of the official narrative and omission of military violence caused Gwangju citizens to view the domestic media so negatively, almost to the point of it being the "enemy of the people." But due to censorship these reporters had little to no choice in what they wrote. Korean journalists later wrote about this extensive censorship, translations of which were published in the book The Kwangju

Up rising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea's Tiananmen, which was a collection of accounts from both foreign and domestic journalists detailing their eyewitness accounts of what they saw in the city and their travails in the aftermath of the massacre.7 8 Army officers were stationed in newspaper offices and broadcasting stations, making sure that

9 media reports on the incident were to the military's liking? With this oppressive censorship in place, it is no surprise that the Korean reporters adapted through the practice of self-censorship, omitting in their writings any pieces of information that would be thrown out anyway. Newspapers could only publish pieces which toed the government line, condemning the demonstrators and characterizing the military as restrained guardians of the peace:

Kim Dae Jung (not to be confused with the politician Kim Dae Jung), a senior

editor at the Chosun llbo, has expressed his guilt at his "failure to keep [his] promise to

77 The question, which I cannot answer, is why journalists chose their profession despite their knowledge of the extensive censorship. Was censorship less strict when they entered? Was censorship of the reporting about Gwangjumore excessive than with other events, and thus reporters were more tolerant of censorship in the years before 1980? 78 Henry Scott-Stokes and Lee Jai Eui, ed., The Kw angju Uprising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea's Tiananmen (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000). 79 Henry Scott-Stokes and LeeJai Eui, The Kwangju Uprising, 129.

47 write a factual, objective account based on reporting of what happened in Kwangju in

80 1980." Although the journalists who reported back to him informed him that there was no "riot" and urged him to write the truth of the uprising, because of both the military censors and his own self-censorship, Kim could only write a vague report which still

81 included the term "rioters" in place of "citizens." He and the other reporters had little leeway in how they could cover Gwangju. Indeed, despite being one of the same Chosun llbo journalists that reported back to Kim and urged him to report the facts, Suh Chung

Won admitted that he wrote an article "in terms intended to get it published even under

82 martial law censorship." Kim faced more diffi culties with the censors five years later, when he decided to publish a revised account of the events in Gwangju for the newspaper's magazine, the Chosun Monthly. The censors predictably eliminated any mention of the military brutality which triggered the mass insurrection. Moreover, the censors waited until the articles were about to go to press to act; Kim did not have time to write a replacement article and had to print the heavily edited and slanted article, because the magazine itself could not be published with "a huge hole in it" and publication could

83 not be delayed without incurring huge losses in revenue. Especially as a rival newspaper was able to run the type of expose that Kim had so desired at around the same time of the Ch osun Monthly's failure, the public backlash against the Chosun Ilbo was

84 harsh.

80 Kim Dae Jung, "An Editor's Woes," in The Kw angju Uprising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea 's Tiananmen, 141. Interestingly enough, both Kims are fromthe JeoJla region of South Korea. Kim the editor was also weJI known as a conservative columnist for the Chosun Ilbo, while Kimthe politician was a left leaning populist dissident before ascending to the presidency in 1998. 81 KimDae Jung, "An Editor's Woes," 137. 82 Suh Chung Won, "Bang! Bang! Bang!," in The Kwangju Uprising: Eyewitness Press Accoullls of Korea's Tiananmen, 155. 83 KimDae Jung, "AnEditor's Woes," 138. 84 Kim Dae Jung, "An Editor's Woes," 139.

48 Other journalists also hit the brick wall of censorship regarding coverage of

Gwangju. Ryu Jong Hwan of the Pusan llbo also recounts how "not a single line" of

85 what he and his team had written was published in the article's original forrn. Kim

Chung Keun was sent by the Dong-A llbo to cover Gwangju starting on May 17, and he

86 wrote in vivid detail the cruel actions of the rampaging soldiers. Yet, none of this report

87 made it through the censors. A photographer, Hwang Jong Gon, was ecstatic that one of his photos of Gwangju, which showed a massive crowd of people on the street of

Geumnamro with cars strewn all around, spewing large amounts of smoke, was published

88 on May 23. However, the caption below the photo was vague in its description and seemed to blame the civilians for the trouble. It read, "Demonstrations being held at the city's main street of Geumnam-ro. [The demonstrators are] rolling burning cars toward

89 the military and police holding the perimeter." The soldiers and police were merely setting up and guarding a perimeter; they were not doing anything. Again, it was the demonstrators who were committing violence, as they were the ones burning cars and sending them toward the security forces. Oh Hyo Jin, who was a reporter for MBC, described how the horror of theevents and the greetings by the "friendly people" in the crowds caused him to immediately "[lose] all pretense to objectivity" once artiving on

90 the scene on May 21, even joining with the protesters. He found a live telephone line that day and, in his emotional state, "blurted out everything, omitting no detail" to

85 Ryu Jong Hwan, "Not One Line ...," in TheKwangju Uprising: Ey ewitness Press Accounts of Ko rea's Tz ananmen, 197. 86 To read the account, see Kim Chung Keun, "Days and Nights on the Street," in The Kwangju Uprising: Elewitness Press Accounts of Korea's Tiana:nmen, 3-17. 8 Henry Scott-Stokes and Jai Eui Lee, TheKwangju Uprising, 1. 88 Hwang Jong Gon, "A Photographer's Credo," in The Kwangju Uprising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea's Tiananmen, 190. 89 Dong-A llbo, May 23, 1980. 90 Oh Hyo Jin, "Kwangju, That Changed My Destiny,'' in TheKwangju Up rising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea's Tiananmen, 202-203.

49 someone at the reporters' room at the Ministry of Transportation in Seoul. He continued to send reports by phone. The KCIA soon carne to know of Oh's actions, and his career

91 as a broadcaster was effectively ruined.

Furthermore, journalists sympathetic to the demonstrations were persecuted. In early June, the government arrested eight journalists for allegedly spreading rumors

("vicious" and "groundless," as usual) that "the North Korean Government was better than that in the South, that student demonstrations were 'a people's liberation movement,' that the uprising in Kwangju was 'a righteous uprising by masses oppressed by power,' and that troops had mutilated a girl in Kwangjuand used bayonets against its

92 citizens." In late July, two months after the conclusion of the Gwangju Uprising,

Korean media associations pledged to eliminate "detrimental elements," defined as

"j ournalists considered not to be working in the nation's interest," in order to comply

93 with the military-sponsored "social purification" carnpaign. Some of these journalists included those who went on strike to protest censorship during the uprising. This purge and stricter censorship resulted in about 400 reporters losing their jobs, hundreds of publishing houses and periodicals being shut down, and several journalists, including

Kim Tae Hong, the former president of the Journalists' Association of Korea, being

94 arrested. In total, almost 700 journalists were released in 1980 alone, not to mention the hundreds of periodicals and publishing companies which were shut down in the early

95 1980s. The state' s leash on the media continued to tighten, culminating in press laws

91 Oh Hyo Jin, "Kwangju, That Changed My Destiny," 203-204. 92 "Seoul Detains Reporters Over 'Vicious' Rumors," The New York Times, June 10, 1980. 93 "Purge Aimed at Journalists in South Korea," The Times (London, England), July 31, 1980. 94 Chong-Sik Lee,"South Korea in 1980: The Emergence of a New Authoritarian Order," Asian Survey Vol. 21, No. I, A Survey of Asia in 1980: Part I (Jan., 1981): 135-136; Jacqueline Reclitt, "Korean Journalist Faces Martial Law Charge," The Times (London, England), October 10, 1980. 95 Asia Watch, Human Rights in Korea, 289.

50 which forbade publication of materi als without a license and forced media companies to send copies of publications and broadcasts to the Ministry of Culture andInformati on, essentially giving the Ministry supreme power to censor anything deemed inappropriate.96

How can one characterize the Korean journalists at this time? One could say the reporters were effectively helpless bystanders in the formation of the narratives about

Gwangju, as they had little control over what to write. But many of them still wrote and spread misinformation. They were not innocent in characterizing the demonstrators as dangerous criminals who threatened the existence of the country, but neither were they guilty. The journalists were a mix of both perpetrator and bystander in the production of official narratives. To the demonstrators, however, although the censorship of the Korean media was widely known, the journalists firmly sided with the government by not doing anything further. Oh recounts how he could only watch while the soldiers took away the final resisters on May 27. One of the students told him fi ve years later, '"I had thought you reporters were on our side ...But when we were taken away by the soldiers, why, you stood with the soldiers. "'97 This comment reflected the traditional belief that the media was supposed to provide another voice for the people or another channel for them to express their opinions. The fact that the domestic journalists not only were aligned with the government in print but also seemingly in person only hurt their standing in the public eye. The reporters in The Kwangju Up rising all expressed regret that they could not do more, that all their efforts were in vain, that they failed in their duties to bring the truth to the public. But they also expressed their sense of utter helplessness in the face of

96 Asia Watch, Human Rights inKorea , 290. 97 Oh Hyo Jin, "Kwangju, That Changed My Destiny," 204.

51 media suppression. Journalists were bystanders in the killing of civilians as well. Kim

Yang Woo of the Kukje Shinmun describes watching students get murdered before his very eyes in the aftermath of the recapture of the city on May 27. He writes, "I was

98 total ly helpless. I was unable to mount a protest, to save that dying young man." The journalists' dilemma with regard to how much effort they should exert in fighting to publish true accounts was a classic case of "damned if you do, damned if you don 't." At best, if they defied the authorities, they lost the battle anyway; at worst, the journalists' careers ended there and then. The journalists were intrinsically complicit in the pushing of the official narrative. Yet, the media had little control over what it could publish or

broadcast, since military censorship was in full effect.

Conclusion

Throughout the early and mid 1980s, the government carefully chose terms which

defended its actions in Gwangju and delegitimized the protesters during the Uprising.

"Murder'' by the paratroopers became a "riot" led by radicals. Later it became an

"incident," if it was mentioned at all. If the terminology varied, the story behind the

words remained resolutely consistent. The common themes in the official narrative as

exemplified in the official statements and media reports and commentaries all validated

the actions of the government. There was no mention of the brutal actions on the part of

the soldiers that provoked such a dramatic reaction from the citizens. Instead, students

were the ones who initiated the violence. Moreover, "impure elements" spread false

rumors to incite the crowds, turning them into "rioters." The use of words such as

"incite," "riot," "mob," and "anarchy" all pointed to subversive actions which created

98 KimYang Woo, "Kwangju Is Not Over Yet," in The Kwangju Up rising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of

Korea's Tiananmen , 214.

52 chaos and anarchy in the city, a narrative that stands in stark opposition to unofficial narratives, as will be shown later. The soldiers did not do anything wrong or provocative and instead showed great restraint as they sought to protect both the innocent citizens and ultimately the nation from the threats posed by the rioters and their "impure" backers.

Therefore, the government was completely justified in all of its actions and. committed no wrongdoing in its response to the uprising.

Despite its simplistic nature, the official narrative was not without its inconsistencies. First, depending on the statement, there were different levels of emphasis on whether it was Kim Dae Jung or North Korea who was the biggest culprit behind the upri sing. The authorities ultimately tried to have it both ways by implying that Kim was a communist at heart. It is also unclear where the exact line separating "innocent citizens" and "rioters" was. The official statements consistently discussed how the citizens lost their minds and became violent because they were manipulated, but they also limited those who committed the more heinous crimes such as arson, firing weapons indiscriminately, and looting to just the "rioters," of whom the majority were "hooligans

and impure elements [pursuing] their particular political aims as the number of students

99 decreased to about 30 percent." Yet, the statements also mentioned crowds in the

thousands or even tens of thousands burning the TV stati ons, for example. Ifthese people were all criminals and impure elements, and other violent acts were being committed throughout the city at the same time, the number of rioters must have reached at least the tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands. In a city of less than a million, such crowds were not insignificant; clearly, more than just a "minority" of determined radicals

99 "MartialLaw Conunand er's Announcement on Kwangju Incident," FBIS Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, May 31, 1980.

53 and criminals must have participated in the uprising. These inconsistencies belied the general contradictions within the official narrative. As more was revealed in other, unofficial accounts, it became clear that these contradictions appeared because of factual inaccuracies in the official narrative, the most glaring one being the absence of military brutality and the citizens' reaction to it.

54 II. Victims and Resistance: Unofficial Narratives About the Gwangju Uprising Before 1987

Whereas the state propagated a tale in which the military acted as heroic defenders of the nation in the face of a small but determined group of extreme leftists, spies, and mobsters who sought to destabilize the country, other groups told a far different story, one in which the military was the actual threat to public security and harmony. The unofficial narratives countered official ones by filling in the crucial characteristics of military brutality and the peacefulness of the period of "liberated

Gwangju." Due to this narrative, Gwangju became a symbol for the leftist political opposition of the Korean people's resistance against the oppression of both the state and foreign powers.

Despite a general sense that the Gwangju Uprising did not happen as the

1 government said, Koreans still could not openly talk about the event during the 1980s.

One woman stated:

I was so scared, so afraid. The newspapers warned everybody not to talk about it: don't spread rumours, they wrote. Everybody said, keep silent, don't speak about it, they may hear you. Maybe the taxi driver, maybe the waiter, anybody can be one of them. Even now I feel the fe ar. During that period, the husband of one of my colleagues worked for the secret police, and she heard from him that all the rumours from Kwangju were true. But the mass media said that everything was fabricated, falsified rumours. What was I to believe? The only thing for me was to keep silent, not to ruin my career, my life?

There were rumors that people were arrested just for telling alternative viewpoints about

Gwangju to taxi dri vers , and people such as journalists and students continued to be

1 Most of my sources are thus foreign (mostly American) in nature; I rely on foreign media reports, eyewitness accounts from foreigners who resided in Korea at the time, and foreign academic works. There are now many accounts by Koreans that have been published since 1987, but due to time constraints, I decided to focus on the foreign narratives, which were the most readily accessible. 2 Quoted in Geir J;Ielgesen,Democracy and Authorityin Korea: The Cultural Dimension in Ko rean Politics (New York: St. Martin 's Press, 1998), 91.

55 questioned and arrested for similar "crimes."3 Thousands of students, workers, intellectuals, journalists, and government officials thought to be against the state were sent to "reeducation camps" to be politically "purified."4 The fear that people felt in discussing the uprising in public caused them to convey the stories within small groups in order to seek "mutual comfort within the community itself," according to anthropologist

Linda Lewis, who was also a witness to the massacre and subsequent uprising. This

inward-looking creation of narratives meant that ultimately, and rather ironically, there

was a lack of diversity in the unofficial narratives, as competing narratives only took hold after democratization.5 In this climate of repression and resentment against the

government, in addition to the fact that the state had already extensively propagated its

own narrative about the uprising, it is understandable that the primary narrative about

Gwangju that would gain prominence was a defensive one in which the government was

the real antagonist and the people rose up to exact justice.

The majority of the narrati ves from unofficial sources at this time, such as the

foreign press, eyewitnesses in Gwangju at the time of the massacre and subsequent

revolt, academics, and nongovernmental organizations, largely agreed that the excessive

viciousness of the soldiers in suppressing the protests, rather than any underlying political

motives such as Communist provocation or democratic advocacy, was what tri ggered the

mass revolt. Most of these groups, such as the foreign media and foreign eyewitnesses,

did not have any visible agenda regarding Korean politics other than to note the state 's

3 Linda S. Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May: A Look Back at the 1980 Kwangju Up rising �Honolulu: University of Hawai 'i Press: Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawai 'i, 2002), 60. Asia Watch, Human Rights in Korea (January 1986), 194, 199; Hagen Koo, Korean Workers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 102; Chong-Sik Lee, "South Korea in 1980: The Emergence of a New Authoritarian Order," Asian Survey Vol. 21, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1980: PartI (Jan., 1981): 136; Namhae Lee, The Making of Minjung: Democracy andthe Politics of Representation in South Korea \Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 46-47; "South Korea: Harsh Politics," Time, August 25, 1980. Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 61.

56 harshness and seeming lack of remorse for the soldiers' actions. Based on individual journalists' and eyewitnesses' accounts, they merely wanted to get the story publicized.

Some groups, such as the students and other members of the political opposition, had

6 other goals, such as achieving democracy. Their struggle against the authoritarian state shaped how these groups depicted Gwangju. Thus, causality went both ways: the story of the Uprising dramatically affected many people's political perspectives, but these

7 perspectives also shaped how Gwangju was portrayed within non-govermnent circles.

One such development was that narratives about Gwangju aided the development of a broader, more mass-based opposition movement in the 1980s by radicalizing opposition groups and offering them potential solutions to rectify what they saw as a failed opportunity to liberalize Korean politics. Opposition groups such as students and labor did try to connect Gwangju with larger political and historical themes. For instance,

Gwangju was acknowledged as a significant event forthe larger opposition movement in

South Korea. But instead of considering Gwangju to have been a key moment in successful democratization as was emphasized after 1987, students, labor, and intellectuals found Gwangju to have been a terribly disappointinglesson in the limits of the strategies they were using in order to implement democratic reforms. Furthermore,

Gwangju was a major turning point in Korean perceptions of the United States. Whereas

6 Here, I am referring to the students and opposition groups which created these narratives afterthe uprising. 7 A few words on the reliability of these unofficial accounts: I find these accounts to be generally more accurate than those from the government. The reasons why I give more credence to these unofficial and eyewitness accounts over official statements are twofold. First, many of these accounts came from people who were in Gwangju at the time of the beatings, shootings, revolt, and independence. In contrast, most official statements came frommilitary commanders and public officials who were not at the scene, and soldiers obviously could not issue their own accounts during this time. Second, a large number of diverse sources confirmed the same basic infonnation, giving these sources' narratives much more credibility than the official sources which tightly controlled the information issued by the military and government and clearly had an agenda in attempting to show a less violent side of the soldiers' actions. It is true thatmany of these unofficial sources also had agendas that biasedmuch of the narratives' content. Yet, the core information, such as the brutality of the soldiers, was corroborated many times over.

57 prior to 1980 the majority of Koreans viewed the Americans favorably and saw them as upholders of the values of democracy and human rights, after 1980, there was a large

swing in public opinion toward the view that the U.S., due to its imperialistic foreign policies, was one of the main reasons holding back the tides of democratic reform in

Korea. Anti-American sentiment, in addition to the reevaluation of opposition strategies

in the wake of the perceived failure of the Gwangju Uprising, was a key catalyst in the

growth of mass-based political movements in the 1980s, the most prominent of them

being the ideology of minjung, which roughly translates to "people" or "masses."

The political consequences I am exploring are fundamentally about shifting

narratives as well. The narrative about the American role in Korea changed from one of

benevolent protectors to neoimperialists who were holding back the Koreans' prospects

for democratization and unification. The recognition of the need for a broader, mass

based political opposition was a transformed narrative as well: in contrast to the state's

elevation of economic development andant i-Communism as the key ideas of the day, the

opposition absorbed Marxist thought and threw its support behind the minjung movement,

which advocated a narrative which emphasized economic andpolitical independence for

the weak and oppressed. Democracy could not be achieved if the opposition only relied

on intellectuals and politicians; labor and the masses needed to be included.

In the end, while the demonstrators themselves may have had apolitical intentions,

the narrative of Gwangju still took on political overtones by its very anti-state content and

tone. The legitimacy of a state which would perpetrate such atrocities was severely in

question, if not irrevocably destroyed. Furthermore, even if the citizens were defeated in

the end, their heroic struggle was an inspiration and a call to arms for minJung advocates

58 and other groups in the opposition movement. Thus, in addition to the theme of victimhood, unofficial narratives in the 1980s were characterized by the theme of resistance.

Gwangju as a Reaction to Soldiers' Violence

Most groups outside the South Korean government agreed that the soldiers' violence in putting down the student protests was the main reason the citizens revolted. In contrastto the domestic media's toeing of the government line, the foreign media were much more willing to cast blame on the military, although there was some initial ambivalence in the earlier articles. The foreign media did not face the problems of censorship that the domestic media in Korea did. Foreign journalists also had better access to the leaders of the uprising as well, who trusted the foreign media more than the domestic media because of the censorship issue. Thus, foreign journalists could present a fuller picture of what happened which stood in sharp contrast to the offi cial accounts.

With its greater freedom of access and reporting coupled with the suppression of discussion about Gwangju within South Korea, the foreign press provided one of the few windows into what Koreans were saying about the Uprising outside of the state.

Realizing the consequences of the greater freedom allowed foreign journalists, the military was reluctant to let them into the city. The reporters often had to bribe their way in, and one German cameraman, JUrgen Hinzpeter, who would shoot rare film footage of the massacre, invented a story about locating his boss who was trapped in Gwangju.8

Indeed, Hinzpeter' s coverage of the uprising was the probable reason behind his assault by South Korean policemen while fi lming a rally by the opposition party in Seoul in

8 Jilrgen Hinzpeter, "I Bow My Head," inThe Kwangju Up rising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea's Tiananmen, ed. Henry Scott-Stokes and Lee Jai Eui (Annonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 67-68.

59 9 1986, an attack which caused injuries severe enough to end his career.

Initial reports by the foreign media revealed little about the military brutality that sparked the revolt. When brutality was mentioned, the journalists were generally cautious in deeming whether the reports were credible. For instance, in an article published on

May 22, New York Times reporter Shim Jae Hoon mentioned the fact that soldiers fired

into crowds "apparently at random" and there was a "mounting total of dead," while at time same was quick to maintain that "the reports [of soldiers' brutality] could not be confirmed." In another report published on May 23, Shim continued to use ambivalent language . He wrote, "Whether the discipline of the armed forces broke down also could not be determined," that an account of bodies piled up in a shopping area "could not be

substantiated," and that eyewitness accounts from neighboring towns of soldiers beating

10 students "could have been exaggerated."

Despite the hesitancy of the foreign reports at confirming brutality, they did at

least cite many eyewitness accounts of excessive force on the part of the soldiers,

something that official sources certainly did not do. Shim did note that the various

11 eyewitness accounts were "generally identical" in their mention of military brutality.

Some instances included eyewitnesses who saw soldiers kicking and hitting students

whom they first dragged out of a library and stripped to the undergarments and the

soldiers' beating of the taxi drivers as they drovetoward Provincial Hall was

9 JUrgen Hinzpeter, "I Bow My Head," 75-76. 10 Shim Jae Hoon, "Unsuccessful Truce Talks Held in South Korean City," The New York Times, May 23, 1980. 11 Shim Jae Hoon, "Protesters Control South Korean City; at least 32 Killed," The New York Times, May 22, 1980.

60 13 mentioned.12 The death count was reported to be "substantially more than 100." Still, almost two decades after the event, Henry Scott-Stokes of the New York Times admitted

4 that he was "struck by how the grey prose of the New York Times diluted the drama." 1

The chief reason for this hesitancy to confirm the brutality was probably the fact that

Shim and the French reporter Phillippe Pons of Le Monde did not enter Gwangju until

May 21 -early enough to catch the chaos and violence that erupted that day but too late to directly witness the beatings and other cruelties administered by the soldiers.15 Scott-

16 Stokes himself did not arrive in Gwangju until May 26.

It was only at the end of the ten-day ordeal that the foreign media, rather than merely reporting on brutality, more concretely assigned blame to the military for antagonizing the Gwangju residents. In a report from May 28, Scott-Stokes wrote that residents pointed to "the brutality of the paratroopers in dealing with student demonstrations on May 18 and thereafter" as what triggered the citizens to rise up. He extensively quoted an American resident who said that the "random beating" was "what struck [him] most": "'They were hitting anyone, splitting skulls, I'm not surprised the people just rose up."' The American resident himself was part of a group that was surrounded and beaten by soldiers in a back alley. When he yelled at the soldiers to stop the violence to no avail, the latter responded, '"This is Korea. This is not Americ a. This is where we do what we want."' In any case, "in talking about the uprising, stndent leaders, citizens and foreign residents all said that the brutality led to public outrage and then to

12 Jacqueline Reditt, "Paratroops Quell Riot in S Korean Town," The Times (London), May 20, 1980; Henry Scott-Stokes, "Cabinet Resigns In South Korea As Riots Grow," TheNt!W York Times, May 21, 1980. 13 Henry Kamm, "Seoul Seems to Plan a Move on Kwangju," The Nt!WYork Times, May 26, 1980. 14 Henry Scott-Stokes with Shim Jae Hoon and Phillippe Pons, "A Scream for Freedom," in TheKwangju Uprising: Ey ewitness Press Accounts of Korea's Tiananmen, 109. 15 Scott-Stokes, "A Scream for Freedom," 110-1 11. 16 Scott-Stokes, "A Scream for Freedom," 112.

61 riots." As the official stance was that "the revolt was the work of a few Communists and

'impure elements,"' Scott-Stokes concluded that "it is hard to reconcile the two views," implying only one side could be rightY His mostly uncritical inclusion of eyewitness reports indicated that he sided with the demonstrators' version of events. An article in

Time less ambivalently pinned the blame on the state, noting that "most accounts" stated

that "the armed forces themselves encouraged the rioting by overreacting," and that most

18 of the hundreds killed were civilians.

These foreign journalists were much more candid about their experiences in

Gwangju in the pieces they wrote for the volume The Kwangju Up rising: Ey ewitness

19 Press Accounts of Ko rea's Tial'!anmen, published in 2000. Not restricted by their

professional obligations, the journalists in these articles were clearly on the side of the

demonstrators. Whereas they maintained a more neutral tone in their reporting in 1980,

these reporters infused in their eyewitness accounts a much more subjective tone. At the

end of his piece, Terry Anderson, who infamously would be taken hostage in Lebanon in

1985, made it clear that to him, journalistic objectivity could not get in the way of

judging that orte side was clearly the oppressor:

As journalists we are rightly required to be neutral, to do our best to be objective. But that requirement does not mean we do not know right from wrong and cannot tell the difference between dictators and freely elected leaders, between victims and oppressors. Often that difference is unclear and muddled, and the best we can do is report what we see, what we know to be true, and hope our readers can understand. K wangju was the first major story I covered where the difference was

17 Henry Scott-Stokes, "When the Troops Finally Came, Kwangju Revolt Became a Rout," The New York Times, May 28, 1980. " "South Korea: Ten Days that Shook Kwangju," Time, June 9, 1980. 19 The version published in 2000 included Korean perspectives. Anearlier edition, titled Kwangju in the Ey es of the World: The Personal Recollection.1 of the Foreign Correspondents Covering the Kwangju Up rising, contained only accounts by the fo reign journalists, and was published by the P'ulpit Publishing Company in 1997.

62 absolutely clear to me, and I triedto make it clear to my readers, not with opinion, 20 but with fact.

Scott-Stokes was also much more decisive in his judgments on Gwangju than in his articles in 1980. He declared, ''The wrong side had won. The students who had asked for our help were now, however many of them, dead. We had not lifted a finger to protect them .• m Because they were not constrained by their home publications, these journalists were much freerto express their true emotions. It is also probable that the lack of information in 1980 affected what and how they reported the events of Gwangju.

Furthermore, the passage of time, with more eyewitness accounts laying bare the vari ous atrocities committed and greater public agreement regarding "what happened" probably sharpened these journalists' opinions on the event.

Eyewitness accounts, including those written by the few Americans in Gwangju at the time, were much more unequivocal in their descriptions of government violence, as they were not hampered by considerations of journalistic objectivity. Although many of these accounts were published years after the Uprising, they capture the immediacy of the event rather than imposing the temporal distance which accompanies the more retrospective memoirs. Moreover, many of the published accounts were based on extensive and unpublished notes and journals written at the time of the Uprising. Thus, I consider these testimonials to be eyewitness accounts rather than memoirs. The eyewitnesses included missionaries and Peace Corps volunteers (PCV s) such as Tim

Wamberg, who published one of the most comprehensive eyewitness accounts in English

20 Terry Anderson, "Remembering Kwangju," in TheKwangju Uprising: Ey ewitness Press Accounts of Korea's Tiananmen, 52. 21 Scott-Stokes, "A Screamfor Freedom," 114.

63 22 in 1987. The eyewitness accounts all concurred that the paratroopers initiated violence.

Warnberg described the unprovoked violence perpetrated by the soldiers:

At around 3 P.M. [on May 18] I looked behind me and saw that the airborne paratroopers had arri ved and were blocking passage down Kumnam Street. At precisely that moment the soldiers charged and began swinging their clubs. We ran with the panicked crowd and I ended up in a small store along with about fifteen other people, including one other PCV. A soldier came into the store and proceeded to club everyone over the head with his truncheon until he came to the other volunteer and me. He stopped, startled, hesitated a moment, and then ran out. We went out into the side street and found that the troops had retreated to the main street, leaving behind wounded people everywhere. Most of the injured had 23 suffered serious blows on the head, arms, or legs.

It was not just students and the youth that were targeted. Martha Huntley, a missionary

and longtime resident of Gwangju saw others being randomly attacked:

One man we knew, a businessman about thirty, was pulled off the bus he was riding (along with other youngish-looking people), and was kicked about the head so bad he lost an eye. Another young mother about the same age, thirty or early thirties, who was taking her two children to Sunday school, was beaten and left unconscious on the sidewalk - she had to have stitches in her scalp and was incoherent for four months - her husband joined the students Sunday afternoon 24 when they fought with the soldiers. No one knew what was happening or why.

Her account showed that citizens often joined in demonstrations because of the collateral

damage dealt by soldiers. Jean Underwood, another missionary, added that while the riot

police were restrained in their actions, many residents did witness the paratroopers

"kicking, beating with night sticks, and other unprovoked attacks. "25 Arnold Peterson, a

Baptist missionary in Gwangju, related seeing a young man being met and beaten by

paratroopers on May 19, despite his insistence that he was not involved in the protests

22 The content ofWarnberg's article was probablywritten before the conversion to a democratic �overrunent in 1987. Warnberg, "The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View," Korean Studies Vol. 11 (1987): 39. 24 MarthaHuntley, quoted in Warnberg, "TheKwangju Uprising: Anfuside View," 40. 25 Jean W. Underwood, "An American Missionary's View," in Contentious KwaJ111.iu: The May 18 Up rising in Korea 's Past and Present, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Kyung Moon Hwang (Lanbam, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 25.

64 26 and that he was just trying to get backhome. Many taxi drivers were attacked when

they attempted to help the wounded and take them to the overflowing hospitals. It seemed

as if the general citizenry of Gwangj u was being targeted.

According to these eyewitness accounts, it was inevitable that the citizens would rise up in the face of the indiscriminate and unjust violence, which continued until May

21. Warnberg quoted a military offi cer he confronted as having said, '"It doesn't matter

27 how many get killed."' Warnberg wrote that it was on May 19 that he "began to hear

murmurs from the crowd -Let's rise up ! Let's fight! - not from students, but from

28 ordinary people in the streets." Indeed, Lee Jae-eui, who was a student during the

demonstrations, later wrote in a famous eyewitness account, which I will analyze further

below, that "May 19 was the day the torch of the upri sing was passed from the students to

29 the ordinary working people." With all of this random violence that, from the citizens' point of view, was unprovoked, even those not involved in the protests saw no other

option but to fi ght back. As the army began shooting the crowds as they approached

Provincial Hall on May 21, the citizens finally armed themselves with guns and seized

military vehicles in response. As Warnberg arrived in city at around 2 P.M., he saw that

the streets were crowded and citizens were patrolling them in commandeered buses and trucks. Most of the passengers were armed with M-ls. We learned that early Wednesday morning the people had engaged the army in a widespread revolt, commandeering buses, military jeeps, and Armored Personnel Carriers, and raiding ammunition dumps to secure carbines, M-1 rifles, pistols, and thousands of rounds of ammunition. The missionaries and other PCVs agreed that around 1 or 2 P.M. the military had begun firing on the demonstrators. By the time I arrived on foot from the outskirts of town at 4 P.M., there was a serious gunbattle on Kllmnam Street. Kwangju Christian Hospital reported that in the

26 Arnold Peterson, quotedin Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 10. 27 Wamberg, "The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View," 41. 28 Warnberg, "The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View," 40-41. 29 Lee Jae-eui, Kwangju Diary: BeyondDeath, Beyond the Darkness of the Age, trans. Kap Su Seal and Nick Mamatas (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series, 1999), 56.

65 hours fromtwo to four they received ninety-nine severely wounded patients, and fourteen dead. 30

Facing the superior numbers and ferocious fighting spirit of the armed citizens, the military was forced to retreat in the late hours of the 21st and the city was in the hands of the demonstrators. The demonstrators only took up arms once they perceived that the military would not cease killing civilians and that drastic measures had to be taken.

These narratives strongly pushed back against official claims that the civilians were at fault for much of the violence and that the core group of instigators was small.

Most analyses blamed the military's excessive use of force as the trigger for protests and

3 then armed revolt. 1 Wamberg maintained that "no amount of 'subtle instigation, rumors,

or wirepulling' could have been as effective in aggravating the situation as the violence

3 by the soldiers which literally thousands of people directly witnessed." 2 The bystanders

could not just stand back and watch, both because they needed to stop the soldiers and

also because they could easily have become the next victims. Furthermore, the reaction

by the citizens was, in the words of Asia Watch, "broad in extent and spontaneous in

action," an assessment with which Lewis agreed in a piece she wrote for one of the first

33 English-language academic works on the Upri sing, published in 1988. She stressed the

popular nature of the uprising, arguing that the majority of the population of Gwangju

30 Warnberg, "The Kwangju Uprising: AnInside View,'' 42. 31 For an example of an academic perspective, see Chong-Sik Lee, "South Korea in 1980,'' 132. Asia Watch, one of the fo rerunners of Human Rights Watch, offered some provocative comparisons to the military brutality, claiming the soldiers "declared open season" on protesters and bystanders alike "with the zeal of Nazi stormtroopers." See Asia Watch Committee, Human Rights in Korea, 36-37. 32 Warnberg, "The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View," 50. 33 For the quotation, see Asia Watch Committee, Human Rights inKorea, 48. Although TheKwangju Up rising was published in 1988, most of the articles were from a conference held before the 1987 democratization movement inApril 1987. See Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 168 n. 7.

66 34 participated in the uprising in some fonn. Most participantsjoined not based on any pre-existing ties to the protest movement but were recruited individually. In other words,

35 the maj ority of the demonstrators joined in as a reaction to what they witnessed. Indeed, it was difficult not to participate because of the rapid spread of fighting. Gwangju was an uprising with broad participation and support because of popular outrage directed against military brutality.

Spirit of Cooperation but Lack of Political Unity During ''Liberated Gwangju"

The foreign media reports after the military was driven out on May 21 displayed none of the hysterical warnings of anarchic violence displayed in official statements and instead revealed that the city was orderly and the citizens were cooperative with one another. There was little of the looting and violence as told by the authorities. Instead, the

New York Times reported that citizens were cleaning the blood and rubble from the streets

36 in front of Provincial Hall. The newspaper also quoted an American missionary, John

Underwood, who said that '"afterGovernment control ended that day there was no rioting, no damage to public property, no looting ...And the streets weresafe and we

37 walked through them. "' A correspondent for Time stated that he "saw no signs of

38 [Communist] provocateurs or organized hooliganism." Jean Underwood observed that

"no one looted" despite the lack of police on the streets, and that "all was quiet and calm," with people cleaning the streets and expressing hope and optimism about the fate

34 Linda S. Lewis, ''The 'Kwangju Incident' Observed: An Anthropological Perspective on Civil Uprisings," in The Kwangju Up rising: Shadows over the Regime in South Korea, ed. DonaldN. Clark (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 17. 35 Lewis, "The 'Kwangju Incident' Observed," 18. 36 "30,000 in South Korea Continuing Kwangju Protests Despite Warning," The New York Times, May 25, 1980. 37 Henry Scott-Stokes, "As Tanks Rumble Off, a Korean CitySprings Back to Life," The New York Times, June 1, 1980. 38 "Season of Spleen," Time, June 2, 1980.

67 of the city?9 Warnberg added that he "never met anyone in the city making such complaints" about looting and shortages.40 There was a keen sense of solidarity displayed by the citizens who gathered in the mass rallies that took place in the days of autonomy

as they collectively sang songs, chanted slogans, and organized events such as funerals

for the victims.41 Overall, eyewitnesses such as Lee and Warnberg found the mood of the citizens who participated in the rallies in the days of "liberation" to be assertive and

hardline, saying that despite some moderates calling for the immediate return of arms,

"the majority of the people at the rally clearly wanted to fight until the military accepted

all the demands."42 Still, according to Warnberg, "no one seemed to have a clear idea of

what direction to take, now that they had succeeded in driving the soldiers out of the

city."43 The only thing that united the crowds according to these earlier accounts seemed

to be the anger directed against the government and military.

As the citizens gathered themselves and discussed what to do, the prevailing

mood was one of anger against the state and the domestic media. Leaflets "which said

that the authorities knew that outside agitators were responsible, not the good citizens of

Kwangju" were dropped by the government, and they only deepened the sense of

isolation among the citizens.44 The people reacted to these flyers with great anger, since

the government was denying the general citizenry's participation; according to Lee, they

"tore the rain of flyers to confetti, stomped on them, and howled, 'Are we all spies and

impure elements?"'45 Furthermore, Warnberg recalled that the protesters were deeply

39 Underwood, "AnAmerican Missionary's View," 36. 40Warnberg, "The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View," 44. 41 Lee, Kwangju Diary, 116. 42 Warnberg, ''TheKwangju Uprising: AnInside View," 43; Lee, Kwangju Diary, 116. 43 Warnberg, ''The Kwangju Uprising: AnInside View," 43. 44 Warnberg, "TheKwangju Uprising: AnInside View," 43. 45 Lee, KwangjuDiary, 116.

68 resentful of the domestic media's biased reporting and were desperate to let the world

46 know about what happened and how much the people suffered. The fact that the military physically isolated Gwangju made it difficult to spread the alternative accounts.

In addition, Warnberg noted the hostility the protesters showed the domestic reporters,

47 which included holding a news conference which was open only to foreignjournalists.

As noted in the previous chapter, censorship made the media reports on Gwangju biased against the demonstrators, which fairly or unfairly earnedKorean journalists the

48 suspicion and ire of the Gwangju residents. In retaliation, the student leaders were much more welcoming of the foreign journalists, whom they saw as more reliable and

49 unconstrained by censorship.

What the demonstrators wanted to tell the world was that the citizens had no choice but to fight back; this was not a riot by any standard measure. A telling quote came from a student leader who talked to a reporter from Time. While looking down on

Gwangju fromthe summit of Mudeung Mountain, the student told the reporter, '"Look.

We all love this city.' "50 The leaders of the uprising demonstrated a love of the city more than any political ideology. In other words, the demonstrators reacted to save their city and their fe llow citizens, rather than fi ghting to uphold any ideological commitments.

Wamberg also related how a student

46 Warnberg, "The Kwangju Uprising: AnInside View," 42. The burnings of the KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) and MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation) buildings on May 20 and 21 were due to public anger at the networks' distortion of events in favor of the state. 47 Warnberg, "The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View," 43. 48 Wamberg mentioned a conversation with a Dong-A 1/bo reporter who complained that he was accurately reporting on the uprising, but his articles were censored when they arrived in Seoul. See Warnberg, "The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View," 43. 49 To read more about the Korean reporters' experiences in Gwangju, see accounts by Kim DaeJung (of the Chosun Ilbo, not the politician), Cho Sung Ho, Snh Chung Won, Chang Jae Yo!, Hwang Jong Gon, Ryu Jong Hwan, Oh Hyo Jin, and KimYang Woo in The Kwangju Uprising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea's Tiananmen, 129-218. 50 "Season of Spleen," Time, June 2, 1980.

69 wanted to make it clear that many of the students felt that they had been forced by the military to defend themselves with arms. As he put it, 'Could we just sit by and do nothing while our neighbors and friends were being beaten and killed before our eyes?' He wanted to make sure that the foreign press realized that this was not a political movement, although there were, he felt, legitimate political demands, but rather an attempt by the people of Kwangju to defend themselves from what they perceived to be the arbitrary use of military force. 51

It is revealing that it was a student denying the political aspects of the revolt. If even

students, who were among the most politicized groups in Korean society, argued that

there were no political motivations for the uprising, it seems likely that, although there

was a vocal minority of radical hardliners, the common view among the demonstrators, even among the students, was that the uprising happened out of outrage and was not part

of a larger movement for democracy.

According to Lee, this lack of political fire and the divisions within the leadership

were the downfall of the Uprising, an argument which best articulates the narrative that

Gwangju was not much more than a natural and spontaneous reaction to injustice. 52 Lee

wrote an account of the events of May in a book called Beyond Death, Beyond the

Darkness of the Age (Jugeum eul neomeo sidae ui eodum eul neomeo) in 1985. This

book, in addition to a second edition published in 1989 which was renamed May 18: The

Record of Life and Death (0 il pal geu salm gwajugeum ui girok), were credited to the

famed South Korean novelist Hwang Sok-yong due to the credibility and visibility he

would bring to the book. 53 Beyond Death was the first published detailed account by a

·" Warnberg, "The Kwangju Uprising:An Inside View," 43-44. 52 Politicalscie ntist and former State Department officialDonald Macdonald also offered a similar argument at the time. He wrote: "But the Kwangju dissidents, while sharing a number of grievances - the traditional feeling that their region was isolated and discrimi nated against, bitterness over the imprisonment of their own native son, KimDae-jung, and above all simple anger at martial law and the excesses of the security forces - sh;rred no real unanimity of philosophy or purpose. Unable to agr ee among themselves, they were eventually overpowered in a quick predawn thrust on May 27." See Donald S. Macdonald, "Recent Political Change in Korea," Asian Affairs Vol. 8, No. 2 (November-December 1980): 67. 53 Lee, preface to Kwangju Diary, 14. I will examine one of Hwang's books in the fourth chapter.

70 Korean on the events in Gwangju which, despite Hwang's arrest and the seizure of thousands of copies of the book, caused it to become an underground bestseller and provided a significant boost to the advancement of the counter-narrative of the uprising.54

The reason why the book was so popular despite it having been banned was due to the

South Korean public' s lingering doubt about the official version of events and overall dislike of the Chun regime in general. The public was curious about what "really" happened; Lee's account was the first major work that depicted the events without the taint of government interference. The English translation, which I will use in this section, was published in 1999 and was renamed as Kwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyond the

Darkness of the Age.

Lee's book serves as both an eyewitness account and a polemic. He not only wrote about his own experiences, as he was a student leader during the uprising, but also drew from dozens of other participants' accounts in writingthe book. Yet, his own perspectives clearly showed through in how he framed the uprising, the terminology he used, and his political style of writing. If one were to put Lee in the Korean political spectrum at the time, he would have been classified as a leftist, even a radical leftist.

After all, he was a student leader who threatened to blow up both himself and a suspected governmentagent if the latter did not leave Provincial Hal!.55 Kwangju Diaryhad a clear political perspective, one which sympathized with the opposition and vehemently opposed the state under Park, Choi, and Chun. Although Lee asserted that his account was "serenely objective and impartial" and contained only the truth, even his translators

54 Lee, prefaceto Kwangju Diary, 14. 55 Lee, Kwangju Diary, 108.

71 56 noted his obvious subjectivity. The book thus was not a merechronicle of events: Lee also inserted his own analysis of why the movement failed. Kwangju Diary ultimately propagated a narrative which detailed not only the cruelty of the soldiers and the state, but argued that the lack of political ambition and will on the part of the protesters and their leaders was the underlying reason for the initial failure of the uprising.

According to Lee, the main reason for the uprising's failure to overturn military rule was its clear lack of political goals. One of the key antagonists in Lee's account was the moderate faction of the leadership, which Lee called the Citizen Settlement

Committee (CSC). He criticized these moderates for supposedly failing to recognize the revolutionary fervor of the protesters. Lee was especially incensed by the moderate faction's suggestion that the seized weapons should have been returned immediately, since the weapons were the only objects keeping the state at bay and guaranteeing the citizens' autonomy at the time; there were serious disputes about the weapons almost as soon as the citizens drove the soldiers out of Gwangju. Lee also documented how the

CSC's decisions and words were in opposition tothe masses' desires. According to Lee, the committees

could not comprehend how the people's desperate and explosive actions brought about this tremendous turn of events, nor could they figure out how the people's implicit aspirations could materi alize as a political solution to the current situation: Most members even of the Student Settlement Committee were motivated only by pure conscience and by a modest sense of justice. They simply wanted to prevent another sacrifice of precious lives. Their resolutions, after an all-night meeting, were modest as well. Their priorities were to control traffic, to form student speech squads to explain the changing situation to people all across the city, and to hand over the weapons to the military aftersuccess ful negotiations. They believed that the unorganized militia's resistance against the regular army was doomed to be crushed violently. To prevent more bloodshed, 57 the best solution was to abandon the weapons to the military as soon as possible.

56 Lee,preface to Kwangju Diary, 13, 15 n. 3. 57 Lee, Kwangju Diary, 107.

72 Lee, agreeing with the student who spoke to Warnberg above, argued that "most people joined the insurgent movement out of a sense of justice; their spontaneous actions were

58 not based on a political orientation." Instead .of seizing the opportunity to advance the political goals of democratic reform, many of the key leaders were focused mainly on

preventing more loss of life and resolving the situation peacefully with the government.

59 In Lee's view, these leaders' ambitions and goals were too limited and even "defeatist."

If there was true unity among the demonstrators and leaders, the upri sing would not have been quelled because the power of the people would have been utilized for the

advancement of democracy, prevailing even over the guns of the military. Lee thus

60 concludes that unity was merely a "facade. "

Related to this disunity was the lack of organization of the demonstrators, which

Lee argued was another reason why the uprising was doomed. He asserted that the

citizens "did not have the capability to retain or spread the liberation they earned at such

cost" without strong leaders to unite the demonstrators and direct them toward political

61 goals. The truth was that the citizens "did not have an organizati on that could transform

the fe elings of the masses into a plan of action ...Their spontaneity brought them this

62 far, but it could not bring victory." The demonstrators were not driven by politics,

contradicting the official accounts, but to Lee, the inability to convert the spontaneous

coming together of citizens into a united political force was what ultimately prevented the

upri sing from succeeding. The lack of leaders was both a strength and a debilitating

58 Lee, Kwangju Diary, 117. 59 Lee, Kwangju Diary, 119. 60 Lee, Kwangju Diary, 107. 61 Lee, Kwangju Diary, 103. 62 Lee,Kwangju Diary, 105.

73 weakness.

Lee's book served as a transition in narratives. First, he reinforced the mainstream unofficial view that Gwangju was apolitical and reflected opposition groups' immense fr ustration with the government's successful suppression of the uprising. Lee's book is notable in that it keenly captured the sense of frustration at the failure to capitalize on an opportunity to end the dictatorship that pervaded the opposition for almost a decade.

Lee's opinion that there was actually no real unity in Gwangju outside anger against the military and the state stood in stark contrast to later narratives of a united, collective drive towarduniversal ideals of democracy and human rights. The movement was depoliticized in the sense that the civilians were not motivated by concerns such as attempting to push for liberalization of national politics; they were mostly angry at the soldiers' exploits and the government's refusal to acknowledgethe Gwangjuresidents' plight. There was no overarching political goal that united the citizenry, such as using the uprising as a way to further political liberalization.

At the same time, Lee previewed the rhetoric about solidarity andvalues of the demonstrators that would become prominent after 1987. Lee recognized, or at least promoted the idea of, the political dimension ofthe GwangjuUpri sing, such as the view that the demonstrators were participating in a larger strugglefor democracy and for the underprivileged, even if they did not know it themselves. One example of this heightened rhetoric is Lee's description of the taxi and vehicle demonstration on May 20: "The emergence of the taxi troop marked another turningpoint in the uprising. The spontaneous unity of action among transport workers showed the potential of the working class: The workers threw their bodies into the arena of history. It was a beautiful moment.

74 63 Their solidarity and commitment were the zenith of the Kwangju upri sing." This passage, among many others, reflected Lee's radicalism artd minjung roots. Moreover, his use of the word "commune" to describe the period of "liberated Gwangju," implicitly referencing the Paris Commune and the idea of spontaneous and democratic self-

64 government, anticipated much of the analyses of the uprising after 1987. Lee differed from the narratives produced by other unofficial sources by advancing a more political argument which foreshadowed the post- 1987 focus on the democratic and universal aspects of the struggle. In both official and unofficial narratives after 1987, the aspect of

Lee's account which underscored the political characteristics of the uprising would gain the upper hand and dominate the discourse on the meaning of Gwangju.

The Chun Regime Ultimately At Fault

In the end, the main antagonists in these narratives were not the soldiers themselves, but the political leaders who sent the soldiers in the first place - namely,

Chun Doo Hwan and his colleagues in the military. The immediate trigger was, as

65 Wamberg argued, the change in strategy to send in the special forces. On a broader scale, since the protests in Gwangju began initially against martial law and Kim's arrest, the larger cause of the uprising was Chun's seizure of power in both December, when he launched an in-house coup within the military, and on May 17, when the military declared full martial law and leaders such as Kim Dae Jung were arrested. These actions demonstrated to the public that Chun was not likely to honor earlier statements that he and the military would stay out of politics, and that hopes for democracy would be

63 Lee, Kwangju Diary, 64. 64 Lee, Kwangju Diary, 72. One scholar, George Katsiaficas, makes the explicit connection in several of his works. 65 Warnberg, "The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View," 51.

75 dashed. The various chants, slogans, and signs against Chun which were on display

66 during the duration of the uprising testify to this sense of disappointment and outrage.

Criticism of the Chun regime in unofficial circles extended to its harsh treatment of Kim Dae Jung. Foreign observers were largely critical of the Kim Dae Jung trial. Time

67 called the trial "more a political charade than an exercise of justice." In an editorial, the

New York Times derided the legal system in South Korea to be one of "samurai justice" and the Chun regime to be a "shogunate"; by referencing the Japanese, the piece was

68 meant to provoke Koreans into reevaluating their political system. Sam Jameson of the

Los Angeles Times wrote that the charges against Kim were "far-fetched" and that the military tribunal "could only be called a kangaroo court" designed to accomplish not

69 justice but "eliminating the 56-year-old Kim as a political entity in South Korea."

Especially in contrast to the Korean articles denouncing Kim as a Communist and justifying the government's persecution of the dissident, the foreign media articles were clearly on the side of Kim, probably due to a combination of Kim's fame as a political dissident, which won him global fame, and the farcical nature of the prosecution.

Lee Hee-ho, wife of Kim Dae Jung, placed all of the blame on the military leaders in her memoir My Love, My Country and even accused them of orchestrating all the events to justify their seizure of power and persecution of her husband. After enduring decades of the government's persecution of her husband, which included a kidnapping from Japan by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in 1973, she was willing to

66 Some examples: "End martial law !"; "Chun Doo Hwan subverted democracy!"; "Free Kim Dae Jung!"; ''Chun Doo Hwan, blow yourself up!"; "Execute Chun Doo Hwan!" See Lee, Kwangju Diary, 42, 105-106. 67 "South Korea: Grim Verdict," Time, September 29, 1980. 68 "Samurai Justice in Korea," TheNew York Times, September 18, 1980. 69 Sam Jameson, "World Outrage May Not Be Enough to Spare Kim Dae Jung," Los Angeles Times, December I, 1980.

76 suspect the government of many insidious things. With regards to Gwangju, it seems she was determined to concretely refute the charges brought against her husband that he masterminded the revolt, turningthe tables by claiming the government might have been the true culprit. She contended that if anything in Gwangju was premeditated, it was the authorities' incitement and manipulation of events to imprison and kill her husband, an outcome whichwas their true objective: "The historical drama was unfolding according to the conspirators' carefully planned scenario. And all the press reports merely mimicked the carefully written script."70 She went on to write:

The martial law authorities massacred untold numbers of innocent and honest students and citizens and called them bandits. And they even implicated my husband and accused him of agitating and manipulating them. Although I was not fully aware how everything was going, I could at least easily sense that the authorities were laying careful� premeditated plots to entrap my husband and eliminate him once and for all. 1

In contrast to the military, which blamed a small group ofrad icals, or "impure elements," for having planned the whole uprising, Lee instead maintained that the military were the real "conspirators" who laid out a "carefullywritten script"for the state and the media to follow. It is rather unclear whether Lee also believed that the entire uprising and subsequent massacre was premeditated, or if only the political manipulation of the event was planned. If one were to rely solely on these passages, it would seem that with the imposition of martial law and the arrest of Kim on May 17, the military went on its infamous rampage in Gwangju the next day to provoke the citizenry to violently react in order to then pin the crisis onto Kim.

70 Lee Hee-ho, My Love, My Country, trans. T.C. Rhee (Los Angeles: Center for Multiethnic and Transnational Studies, University of Southern California, 1997), 148. 71 Lee, My Love, My Country, 148-149. Of course, since IGmwas a popular public figure, he probably had indirect contact with and influence among students. However, accusations of bribery and other similar charges were probably manufactured by the government. The student whose "confession" was used to convict Kim was tortured according to most accounts, and he later committed suicide.

77 As a result of these narratives, many people, both Koreans and foreigners, believed the government acted against the interests of its own people by not only suppressing righteous calls for liberalization but indiscriminately killing its own citizens.

Moreover, the government denied doing such a thing and kept others from offering alternative accounts of the events in Gwangju. As a result, Chun suffered from a widely- held perception of the illegitimacy of his rule throughout his term as president, first for his coup in December 1979 and second for the military's brutal crackdown on Gwangju, which many assume to be one of the reasons why Chun eventually accepted the

72 opposition's demands for democratic reforms in 1987.

The Rise of Anti-Americanism

Assignation of blame to the United States for the massacre in Gwangju was another key aspect of unofficial narratives about the Uprising, which would have long- term consequences in how South Koreans viewed Americans. Indeed, the shift from positive to negative views of the American presence in Korea was one of the maj or consequences of the Gwangju Uprising. Before 1980, South Koreans largely viewed

Americans in a highly favorable light. Not only was the U.S. seen as a land of freedom and wealth, but Koreans did not forget the fact that the Americans saved South Korea during the Korean War and continued to protect the country from North Korean aggression. But this view of Americans changed after 1980; South Koreans began to see the U.S. not as a benign bertefactor, but as a country that was, actively or inadvertently,

72 Young Whan Kihl, Transfonning Korean Politics: Democracy, Refonn, and Culture (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 78; Gi-Wook Shin, "Introduction," in Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Up rising in Korea 's Past and Present, xxii; Jung-kwan Cho, "The KwangjuUprising as a Vehicle of Democratization: A Comparative Perspective," in Contentious Kwangju: The May18 Uprising in Korea 's Past and Present, 68-71; Jang Jip Choi, ''Political Cleavages in South Korea," in State andSociety in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1993), 36-38.

78 holding back democratization and reunification. The rapid rise in anti-American sentiments during the 1980s was largely due to Koreans' negative reactions to the role of the U.S. in the Gwangju Uprising. This trend of anti-Americanism has continued even to the present day.

Because Koreans widely believed that the U.S., with all its great power, was very much capable of affecting change if it so wanted, not only were Koreans disappointed in the lack of American actions, but there was deep suspicion that the U.S. merely chose not to because they were fine with the Korean military's actions. Because of the U.S.'s nominal control of the Korean military, much of the public assumed that the Martial Law

Command could not move troops around without American approval. As a result, many

Koreans believed that the U.S. approved the sending of the wayward paratroopers on

May 18 and then the use of troops to recapture Gwangju on May 27. Despite American assurances that the U.S. did not have control of the special forces used in the suppression of protests from May 18 to May 21 and thus could not have approved their deployment,

3 suspicion among Koreans lingered? Furthermore, there was much disappointment with the lack of an American response to support the protesters, or at least to push for a peaceful settlement of the conflict,especially since President Jimmy Carter was such a forceful proponent of human rights. Most Koreans believed that the U.S., as the major superpower backer and protector of their country since 1945, had the influence to change things if the Americans desired to do so.74 For example, when students led nationwide protests against President Syngman Rhee'sauthoritarian rule during the April 1960

73 Gi-Wook Shin, Etlmic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 169. 74 LeeJ ae-eui detailed how student leaders who organized the protests prior to the Gwangju Uprising believed that the Americans were the few players which couJd decisively change the domestic political situation. See Lee, Kwangju Diary, 39.

79 Revolution, American officials in Korea convinced Rhee to resign. Suspicion that the

Americans might have approved the use of force to quell the uprising and disappointment at the fact that they did not seem to do much of anything outside of feeble protests fed the sense of betrayal on the part of the Korean public and caused many in the opposition

5 movement to rethink their positive views of the U.S.7

Consequently, most Koreans were convinced that the U.S. held a great deal of re sponsibility for the Korean government's actions and that the Americans approved of

Chun's rise to power even at the expense of democracy?6 Comments made by American officials seemingly in favor of Chun's takeover further inflamed anti-American sentiment. A "highly placed U.S. military official," later identified as General John A.

15 The topic of U.S. involvement in the Owangj u Uprising, in addition to the 12/12 Incident, is a fascinating one which would require a separate paper on its own. American media outlets and academics, not to mention the key American officials involved in the U.S. response to Gwangju (namely Ambassador William Gleysteen and Commanderof the Combined Forces Command General John Wickham), maintained that the U.S. could not have done much to stop the quelling of the uprising or keep South Korea on the path to democracy. See "The World: In Summary South Korea's Reality Becoming Official Fact," TheNew York Times, August 17, 1980; "South Korea: Harsh Politics," Time, August 25, 1980; Donald S. MacDonald, "Recent Political Change in Korea," 74; Mark Peterson, "Americans and the Kwangju Incident: Problems in the Writing of History," in The Kwangju Up rising: Shadows over the Regime in South Korea, 56-60; Donald N. Clark, "Commentary: Interpreting the Kwangju Uprising," in The Kwangju Up rising: Shadows over the Regime in South Korea, 74; William H. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, Marginal ll!/luence: Caner and Korea in Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999); John A. Wickham, Jr., Korea on the Brink: A Memoir of Political Intrigue and Military Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brassey 's, 2000). The conservative Heritage Foundation even published a report which largely agreed with the Chun regime's account of what occurred in Gwangju while also reiterating that the U.S. had no role in it. See Daryl M. Plunk (The Heritage Foundation), "South Korea's Kwangju Incident Revisited." Backgrounder, No. 35 (1985): 153-159. Bruce Cumings and Tim Sharrock argue that the U.S. was verymuch at fault for either not doing as much as it could to prevent the Uprising or knowing much more about the massacres and South Korean troop movements than it let on. See Bruce Cumings, Introduction to Kwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyondthe Darkness of the Age, by LeeJai-eui (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series, 1999), 17-35; Tim Sharrock, "Ex-Leaders Go on Trial in Seoul." Journalof Commerce. February 27, 1996. http://timshorrock.com/?page_id=21; Tim Sharrock, "Kwangju Diary: The View From Washington," in Kwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyondthe Darkness of the Age, by Lee Jai-eui (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series, 1999), 151-172. 76 I argue that a belief in the lack of American responsibility or complete ignorance of the Owangju Uprising itself contributes greatly to American confusion as to why U.S.-South Korean relations are so tumultuous despite the tremendous military and economic support the U.S. gave to South Korea for decades. Without understanding the South Koreans' point of view with regards to American involvement in Gwangju, Americans do not understand the role of Gwangju and the sense of betrayal that the event engendered among ordinary South Koreans at the time.

80 Wickham, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea, said in an interview with the

Associated Press and Los Angeles Times, "'Peace and stability are important to the

United States here, and national security and internal stability surely come before political liberalization." He continued, '"I'm not sure democracy the way we understand it is ready for Korea, or the Koreans ready for it."' When asked if the U.S. was fine with

Chun in power as president, Wickham replied, '"Yes - provided that he comes to power legitimately and demonstrates, over time, a broad base of support from the Korean people and does not jeopardize the security situation here - we will support him because that, of course, is what we think the Korean people want."'77 Despite the State Departnient's quick repudiation of Wickham's comments, the news received top billing in all South

Korea newspapers for two days - with Wickham's criticisms of Chun and the State

Department's disavowal censored out.78 The military leadership clearly wanted to show that the U.S. was in favor of Chun's rise to the presidency as long as the motions of democratic procedure were carried out. With this skewing of the news, public perception 9 that the U.S. solidly backed Chun inevitably gained greater credibility and prominence?

Suspicion about the U.S.'s role in the suppression of the uprising, such as the

77 John A. Wickham. Jr., quoted in Sam Jameson, "U.S. Support Claimed for S. Korea's Chon: But State Dept. Disavows Military Official 's Remarks on Presidency," Los Angeles Times, August 8, 1980. 78 Sam Jameson, "Korea Papers Publish Story on Leader," LosAngeles Times, August 11, 1980. Some of the criticisms included Wickham's expectation that if Chun were to take power, he would aneropt to emulate Park Chung Hee by becoming '"president-for-life"' and that Chun was '"terribly unsophisticated about the difficulties of running Korea in the 1980s."' Quoted in Sam Jameson, "U.S. Support Claimed for S. Korea's Chon," Los Angeles Times, August 8, 1980. 79 Atnerican joumalists might have indirectly hastened Chun's ascendance into the presidency. Terry Anderson of the Associated Press and SamJameson of the LosAngeles Times were the interviewers of Wickham. The interview was off-the-record but taped. Henry Scott-Stokes, who stayed in the same room as the other two joumalists, took the tape of the interview as he went to do an interview of his own with Chun. Scott-Stokes played the tape and asked Chun to identify the speaker. Chun said that it was Wickham. Two weeks later, Choi resigned and Chun assumed the presidency. Donald Clark argues that American joumalists thus might have conveyed to Chun the idea that the Americans would accept Chun taking power. An account of the above can be fo und in Mark Peterson, "Americans and the Kwangju Incident," 63. See also Donald N. Clark, "Commentary: Interpreting the Kwangju Uprising," 75.

81 Americans' hesitancy in pressuring the South Korean governmentto stop the killings, the complexities of the operational control structure over the South Korean military, and the

Americans' seeming embrace of Chon Doo Hwan following his inauguration as president, caused popular sentiment to turn againstthe U.S.80 Anti-Americanismspread to the general populace to the point that within a decade, over 37 percent of those polled actively supported anti-American movements (not just had anti-American opinions) and 81 over 72 percent believed that "anti-American sentiments in Korea are serious." Surveys taken in 2002 showed that this growth in anti-American sentiment was still present across broad sectors of Korean society. The younger generation especially, approaching almost 82 75 percent, had unfavorable views of the U.S. The younger generation, workers, and those in the Jeolla region were the. segments of the population who were most likely to hold anti-American beliefs. 83 It is clear then that one of the most pivotal and enduring legacies of the Gwangju Uprising has been the high levels of anti-Americanism which have characterized U.S.-Korean relations for the last couple of decades.

There were several incidences of student takeovers or violence against American buildings in Korea. Students committed arson against the American Information Center in Busan in 1982. The leader of this attack sent a letter to Cardinal Stephen Kim

8 0 Ronald Reagan warmly welcomed Chun to the White House in February 1981; Chun was one of the ftrst foreign heads of state to make a state visit to the new Reagan Administration. It was revealed later that Chun received this honor in return forKim Dae Jung's pardon and release. See also Bruce Cumings, Korea 's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 389- 390; James Fowler, "The United States and South Korean Democratization,'' Political Science Quarterly Vol. 114, No. 2 (Summer, 1999): 285-286; Gi-Wook Shin, "South Korean Anti-Americanism: A Comparative Perspective,''Asian SurveyVol. 36, No. 8 (Aug., 1996): 793-794; Tim Shorrock, "The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and the Rise· of Anti-Americanism," Third World Quarterly Vol. 8, No. 4 (Oct., 1986): 1202-1204, 1208-1210; Jinwung Kim, "Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea: The Causes," Asian Survey Vol. 29, No. 8 (Aug., 1989): 759-760. KimDae Jung articulated similar beliefs in an interview with Richard Falk in 1983. See Kim Dae Jung, Richard Tanter, and Richard Falk, "On Korea," World Policy Journal Vol. I, No. 1 (Fall, 1983): 217-235. 8 1 Shin, Ethnic Nationalism inKorea, 170. 8 · 2 Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea, 176-177. 83 Shin, Ethnic Nationalism inKorea, 170-171.

82 justifying the students' actions, declaring, "We chose the method of setting fireto a building in broad daylight because we felt there was no other way leftto chastise the U.S. for acting as the mother-in-law for this [Chun] dictatorship."84 Students took over the

U.S. Information Center in Seoul in 1985 from May 23 to 25, demanding a formal apology fr om the U.S. government for its alleged role in the Gwangju Uprising.

American officials did not issue any apology but met with the students several times and assured Korean officials that the students were not anti-American or pro-Communist, although the students were later arrested.85 However, this occupation sparked public discussion on who was responsible for the GwangjuUpri sing, which eventually led to the

Defense Minister's report to the National Assembly in 1985, as seen in the previous chapter.86

Students, Labor, and Minjung

Lee's frustration at the perceived failure of Gwangju to overturn the establishment reflected the broader disappointmentin the key opposition groups of students and labor.

Students, workers, and intellectuals reflected on why the Gwangju Uprising was ultimately unsuccessful and what this failure meant in the context of both South Korea's and their own futures. The shock of the massacre andthe seeming failure of the democratizationmovement caused dissident groups such as students and labor to seek more radical solutions. Moderates were discredited in the wake of the wanton massacre of civilians, since it appeared unlikely that the opposition could negotiate with the state.

The aftermath of the uprising was, in sociologist Hagen Koo's words, "a period of much important theorizing about the nature of South Korea's social formation, the historic

84Quoted in Shin, Ethriic Nationalism in Korea, 170. · 85 Asia Watch, Human Rights in Ko rea, 118. 86 Lee, The Making of Minjung, 122-123.

83 mission of the minjung movement, and U.S. involvement in the country's destiny."87

Marxism and dependency theory, which states that wealthy countries seek to keep poor countries dependent on them because poor countries provide cheap labor, natural resources, and markets, became the intellectual fads of the day, dominating di scourse among students and labor as they planned their future courses of action. 88 Indeed, it was only after the Gwangju Uprising that Marxist thought moved fromthe fringes to the mainstream of student discourse.89 Students eventually concluded that revolution was the only way to overthrow the existing authoritarian order.90

In order to achieve revolution, students entered an alliance with labor in the 1980s with the need for mass politics in mind. They viewed "labor mobilization as an important new strategy for the anti-authoritarian, democratic movement."91 The aim of this new strategy, which Koo calls "labor praxis" (hyeonjangron ), was "for students to enter the industrial arena by becoming factory workers, trying to promote class consciousness among workers and help them organize unions. Their ultimate goal was to lead the workers in a joint struggle to end military rule and radically transform Korean society."92

Droves of students dropped out of college to enter the industrial labor force. Koo argues that this effort eventually bore fruit, as labor and its newfound militancy played a critical role in the success of the 1987 democratization movement. 93

87 Koo, Korean Wo rkers, 102-103. 88 Koo, Korean Workers, 103; Namhae Lee, "The South Korean Student Movement: Undongkwt!n as a Counterpublic Sphere," in Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State, 2nd ed., ed. Charles K. Annstrong (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 102. . 89 Mi Park, "Organizing Dissent Against Authoritarianism: The South Korean Student Movement in the 1980s," Korea Journal Vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn 2005): 269, 271-272. 90Park, "Organizing Dissent Against Authoritarianism," 265-266. 91 Hagen Koo, 'Engendering Civil Society: The Role of the Labor Movement," in Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State, 77. 92 Koo, "Engendering Civil Society: The Role of the Labor Movement," 77. 93 Koo, "Engendering Civil Society: The Role of the Labor Movement," 77-83.

84 One of the key ideological movements to arise in the 1980s to incorporate the trend toward more radical and mass-based politics was the minjung movement, which sponsored a populist and anti-American nationalist message. Somewhat resembling Latin

American populism, minjung, which denotes "mass" or "people," advocated for those left behind economically and politically during this period of high growth and oppression,

94 such as the workers, peasants, and the poor. The common theme of minjung was

9 struggle by the weak and oppressed for economic and political independence. 5 Despite the seeming mass appeal of minjung, it was only after Gwangju that it gained popularity.

Indeed, historian NarnhaeLee identifies Gwangju as the most critical event in the rise of

% the minjung movement.

Underlying the argument for independence was a strong current of nationalism, which was probably the key aspect of minjung which helped it attract adherents. Minjung was critical of the division of the Korean peninsula and South Korea's dependency and

97 subordination to the United States. As a "counterhegemonic [challenge] to the state- sponsored view of nationalism" in the 1970s, which emphasized anti-Communism and developmentalism or growth-first rhetoric, democracy and reunification became the key 8 goals of minjung.9 Moreover, "nation and national identity were instead defined in terms of national struggles for liberation from foreign dominance and unification of the Korean

94 Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea, 171; Hagen Koo states that the major difference between the Latin American populist movements and minjung is that whereas former were alliances between the "national bourgeoisie and the popular sectors against the oligarchic structure,"minjung had no bourgeois element and was thus a concept "more directly opposed to monopoly capital." Minjung was more homogeneous in class composition and bore "a closer relationship to working-class formation." See Hagen Koo, "The State, Minjung, and the Working Class in South Korea," in State and Society in Contemporary Korea, 143. 95 Koo, "The State, Minjung, and the Working Class in South Korea," 143. See also John Minns, "The Labour Movement in South Korea," Labour History No. 81 (Nov., 2001): 183-186. 96 Lee, The Making of Minjung, 44. 97 Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Ko rea, l71-172. 98 Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Ko rea, 168, 172.

85 nation."99 As mentioned above, dependency theory and neocolonialist thought gained prominence after Gwangju. One of the main reasons was changing perceptions of the U.S. from a benefactor to a neoimperialist superpower which sought to meddle in Korean affairs in order to prop up the dictatorship and economic system from which the

Americans were benefitting. Students believed that as long as Koreans depended on any other foreign power, democratization and unification would never happen and

100 subsequently distanced the opposition movement from the U.S. From the point of view of minjung practitioners, Gwangju was one more instance of the meddlesome nature of

American involvement in the Korean peninsula - division and occupation from 1945 to

1948, the Korean War, and the support of dictators being some other prominent examples. The opposition's attempts to form a cohesive ideology along with their growing discontent with the U.S. produced what American investigativejournalist Tim

Sharrock calls "a nationalist struggle for independence from foreign intervention and

101 eventual reunifications," which is what minjung became in the 1980s.

Ultimately, the initial failure of the Gwangju Uprising prompted student and labor leaders to look to more radical strategies in order to enact political reform, including the need to form a more mass-based movement by incorporating groups such as labor. They vocally criticized Korean capitalism's dependence on the U.S. and the social fallout from the development-oriented policies, which they identified as the root cause of widespread poverty, the Koreans' inability to establish a democratic government, and failure to reunify with the North . The minjung movement thus quickly rose to prominence,

99 Shin, Ethn ic Nationalism in Korea, 173. 100 Park, "Organizing Dissent Against Authoritarianism," 271; Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea, 170. 101 Sharrock,"The Strugglefor Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and theRise of Anti Americanism," 1205.

86 attracting both students and labor because it was the ideology of leftist nationalism, incorporating the working class, the poor, and intellectuals who opposed the authoritarian capitalist state deemed subservient to the imperialistic U.S. Serving as a powerful countemarrative to South Korea's rapid economic development, minjung provided a banner under which opponents of the Chun regime could express their opposition to authoritarianism and support for the quick democratization they were denied in 1980.

The failure of Gwangju stimulated a radicalization of the opposition movement, but Gwangju itself also exemplified the type of revolutionary struggle that minjung was advocating. For instance, a popular protest song in the 1980s called "The Song of Going to the Kwangju Battle" contained these lines:

Ah, ah-Oh Kwangju ofMay! Oh revolutionary Kwangju! Oh city of youth who band firmly together, to fight. In the struggle, flowers bloom; in the struggle, a new day comes. 10 Fight - fight - fight! Oh revolutionary Kwangju! 2

As the repeated mention of the words "struggle" and "revolutionary" indicate, Gwangju was firmly embedded in the revolutionary discourse that dominated the opposition movement. The citizens' resistance against the military despite certain defeat provided a model for the underdog students, workers, and intellectuals to emulate. Furthermore, as

Lee Jae-eui hinted in his account as seen previously, the working class was seen as one of the leaders of the struggle in Gwangju, which added one more revolutionary aspect to the

Uprising. Thus, Gwangju bothcontributed significantly to the rise of minjung and acted as one of its key symbols.

Conclusion

102 Quoted in Linda Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," in Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State, 145.

87 According to the unofficial narratives, the Gwangju Uprising was triggered by the initial brutal actions and massacres committed by the military sent into the city to enforce martial law and put down the student protests. The uprising involved almost the entire city; it was a popular uprising, not something fomented by a small minority group of radicals. The citizens were united in their rage against the state for perpetrating such crimes unprovoked. Yet, beyond this anger, there was little else which united them, although the spirit of unity and cooperation among the demonstrators as a result of the upri sing was remarkably strong and durable. There were no political goals which drove the crowds and the leadership was splintered. In the meantime, the people were severely disappointed by the fact that the U.S. did not intervene to stop the final crackdown on the uprising, helping to tum public sentiment against the Americans, a trend which has not abated even to the present day.

In the 1980s, Gwangju was a symbol of oppression and resistance againstthe dictatorship and American hegemony, but in addition, Gwangju was seen as a failure for the opposition movement. Indeed, Donald Clark wrote in 1988 that Gwangju remained "a

103 potent symbol of the fa iled promise of democracy in Korea." Opposition groups such as students and labor were radicalized as they discussed how to recover from this loss. In addition to Marxism, mass-based ideologies such as minjung became predominant.

Although Gwangju was a defeat in many respects, it served as a symbol of the mil'ljung struggle against an overbearing state and detrimental foreign influences. All this would change with the success of the democratization movement in 1987, after which Gwangju came to be considered not as a loss but as one of the defining and victorious events of the

Koreans' successful struggle for democracy.

103 Donald N. Clark, "Commentary: Interpreting the Kwangju Uprising," 65.

88 III. Vanquishing the Past: Official Narratives About the Gwangju Uprising After 1987

How Gwangju was portrayed and analyzed by the government changed dramatically after the transition to direct presidential elections in 1987. Although South

Korean politics were not fully democratized, the concession by Chun Doo Hwan to allow direct elections signaled a fundamental transformation of the Korean state from a military dictatorship into a democracy, albeit a flawed one. The transformation of South Korean politics created new narratives regarding events in South Korean history, including what happened in Gwangju and why the uprising was important. Rather than condemning the uprising, the government has since celebrated it as a transformational moment in Korean history which presaged the new democratic era.

1987 was the turning point for the fortunes of democracy in South Korea. The years leading up to 1987 offered good omens for liberalization. Opposition to the military regime remained a controlled but still potent force in the 1980s. The opposition New

Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) performed surprisingly well in the 1985 National

Assembly elections, forcing the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) to negotiate in order to pass legislation.1 The economy maintained its rapid pace of growth, swelling the ranks of the middle class, which began to develop a political consciousness beyond simply earning a living.2 Students continued their demonstrations across campuses nationwide. Internationally, the downfall of Ferdinand Marcos's dictatorship in the

1 Young Whan Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Refo rm, and Culture (Armonk,N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 78. 2 John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics: TheQuest fo r Democratization andEconomic Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), 90-91.

89 Philippines boosted the hopes for democratic reform in South Korea.3

To appease the public, Chun promi sed in 1981 to step down after seven years. As

Chun's self-imposed term limit reached its end, the issue of succession heated up. Chun had promised a peaceful transfer of power by 1988, and the DJP began talks with the

NKDP in 1986 to first amend the constitution to reform government and then hold general elections. However, talks quickly reached a stalemate as the two parties found themselves at loggerheads over the type of government to install. The DJP wanted a parliamentary cabinet government, whereas the NKDP sought a presidential government based on direct elections. Historically, the ruling and opposition parties' preferred forms

4 of government had been the reverse. Perhaps the reason for this change in stances was the expectation that the key opposition leaders such as Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young

Sam were in very strong positions to win a presidential election - provided they did not split the opposition vote.

The deadlock broke in 1987 after a series of crises for the ruling regime. In the spring of 1987, it was revealed that the death of a Seoul National University student activist by torture at the hands of the police in January was covered up by the

5 government, sparking nationwide protests. On April 13, amidst the political impasse,

Chun reversed his decision on direct elections, announcing thathe would wait until after the 1988 Olympics, which were taking place in Seoul, to restart talks with the NKDP. In the meantime, on June 2, he chose his close friend and ally Roh Tae Woo to succeed him.

The DJP dutifully nominated Roh on June 10 to be its candidate for the indirect election

3 Gregg Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 246<247. 4 Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics, 79-80. 5 Oh, Korean Politics, 90; Bruce Cumings, Korea 's Place in the Sun: A Modem History (New York: London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005}, 392.

90 via electoral college, virtually guaranteeing him the presidency.6 Citizens launched a massive protest in Seoul beginning on June 10, demanding constitutional amendments and direct popular elections. These demonstrations lasted for days in most cities nationwide. The participants included students, labor, and the burgeoning middle class.

The streets were choked with tear gas, but the human waves of protesters seemed endless.

Chun was on the verge of sending in his Special Forces units to crack down on the demonstrations, virtually repeating what happened in Gwangju. However, Chun's officials, remembering both the consequences of suppression in Gwangj u and the goodwill generated by the nonintervention of the military in the 1960 protests which toppled the Syngman Rhee government, advised him against this action. The American

7 government also warned Chun not to use force against the demonstrators.

The Chun regime gave in, initiating the changes which would mark a fundamental

8 shift in Korean politics into a democratic govemment. On June 29, 1987, Roh announced his acceptance of direct elections along with constitutional amendments which established a democratic government. Although it seemed to be a bold, even heroic, move from the establishment candidate, it is clear that Chun advised him to do so in order to enhance Roh' s legitimacy as a candidate and thus garner him support and votes in the

9 elections. Regardless of Roh and Chun' s motivations, these concessions paved the way

6 Oh, Korean Politics, 91; Kihl, TransformingKorean Politics, 83. Roh and Chun knew each other from high school and also graduated from the Korean Military Academy in the same class. Roh also played a key role in helping Chun complete his coup in December 1979. Without notifying General Wickham, Roh ordered the Ninth Division, which guarded Seoul, to secure army headquarters and arrest Martial Law Commander Chung Seung-hwa. See Cumings, Korea 's Place in the Sun, 380 and Oh, Korean Politics, 108. 7 Oh, Korean Politics, 91-93. 8 Some dates to remember in South Korea's democratization: 1987 was when direct presidential elections were allowed. 1993 was when the first civilian government since 1961 was formed, headed by longtime opposition leader Kim Young Sam. 1998 was the first transfer of power to the opposition party in South Korean history; KimDae Jung finallywon the presidency in the 1997 elections. 9 See Oh, Ko rean Politics, 93-95.

91 for a democratic constitution and direct presidential elections. The constitutional amendments, passed on October 29, 1987, constrained pre sidential powers while expanding those of the National Assembly, limited the role of the military in politics, and stipulated the election of presidents by popular vote, while also strengthening the clauses

0 guaranteeingrights and freedoms.1 In the presidential election in December 1987, neither Kim Dae Jung nor Kim Young Sam could concede the opposition candidacy to the other. As a result, they split the opposition and gave Roh the presidency, despite

Roh's winning less than 37 percent of the vote.

Although Roh won the election, the wave of democratization in Korea forced him to adhere to new rules and norms for governing. He faced many domestic and international issues as president: a wave of strikes by newly·empowered labor unions; changing international politics with the crumbling of the Soviet bloc; preparations for the upcoming 1988 Olympics. Moreover, in addition to demanding a greater role in governance, the public sought a correction of the wrongs committed by the military dictatorship. Foremost on the agenda was the rewriting of the narrative of the Gwangju

Upri sing. Key questions that arose with successful democratization included: How did

Gwangju relate to democratization? Did Gwangju cause the success of the democracy movement in 1987? The answer from the government was that Gwangju and the 1987 reforms were intrinsically linked, and that Gwangju did indeed create the conditions necessary for the 1987 protests to succeed. The democratic government claimed that it was a continuation of the spirit of democracy that prevailed in Gwangju in May 1980.

10 Oh, Korean Politics, 103-104. The extent of democratization in 1987 is still debatable. Bruce Cumings calls it only a "partial democratization" because of the military's still·powerfnl role in government, despite constitutional refonns, and enduring presence of "repressive state structures" such as the intelligence bureau and the National Security Law, which was used to persecute anyone suspected of "anti-state" activity. See Cumings, Korea 's Place in the Sun, 394.

92 The advent of democratization in South Korea thus paved the way for a 180 degree turn in how the government told the story of the Gwangju Uprising. Whereas the government had deemed the uprising a communist-led "riot" or illegal insurrection in the early 1980s, after 1987, the event came to be officially called the May 18 Gwangju

Democratization Movement (5.18 Gwangju minjuhwa undong). With this terminology and the narrative the government put forth, Gwangju was recognized as a broad-based movement which involved most of the city's residents. The political motivations of the participants were also heavily emphasized; although reacting to the military's wanton violence was one aspect of the uprising, the underlying cause was the citizens' deep- seated desire for democratic reform against the military-dominated authoritarian state.

According to Linda Lewis,

with the achievement of a democratic civilian national government, 5.18 has been redefined, from mob riot to heroic struggle. The memory of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising has been written into the newly constructed national narrative of democratization, legitimized and sanctified, its victims extolled as patriot martyrs and Kwangju's citizens, as heroes.11

Indeed, despite some dissent, it is politically unviable to discuss Gwangjuin any other light. As recently as 2012, some candidates for a seat in the National Assembly from the ruling New Frontier Party (Saenuridang) were disqualified by the party for their non- mainstream views on Gwangju and other uprisings in South Korea.12

Yet, the government narrative was still a construction; its transformation in content and tone was due to the changing political and social context of the late 1980s

11 Linda Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," in Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State, 2nd ed., ed. Charles K. Annstrong (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 147. 12 "History Distorters," The Korea Times, March 15, 2012. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2012103/137_106995.htrnl; "'Roh Moo Hyun ITUikmal' Saenuri Park Sang Ilhubo gongcheon chwiso," Hankyoreh, March 14, 2012. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/523449.htrnl.

93 and 1990s onward. One example of the new narrative can be found in the official

Gwangju City government's 1998 publication TheMay 18 Gwangju Democratic

Up rising, which states:

Almost all the citizens voluntarily fought in the face of the cruel violence of the paratroopers. Considering the situation, it was impossible to participate in the uprisingunless one was ready to risk all things, including life. Nevertheless, the K wangju citizens resisted injustice in one body in the name of all Korean citizens, so it was not just one or two individuals' heroic uprising, but a whole J?;ople resisting oppression, and it brought them a glorious victory in the end. 3

This narrative is different from notonly theoff icial accounts prior to 1987, but also from the unofficial accounts as well in several key aspects. First, this account is about heroes, not rioters or even victims. As Lewis notes, this account "makes everyone a hero."14 This narrative mentions the military's violence, but there is no mentionof what actually happened to the victims. The story is about resistance, like the pre-1987 unofficial narratives, but the bitterness of the failure of Gwangju is gone because, according to this account, Gwangju ultimately succeeded with the 1987 protests. As necessary in a heroic tale, the ultimate outcome was victory. This brings up another question: Does this mean that the struggle depicted in Gwangju came to an end with democratization? Although most people, both in and out of the government, would probably admit that South Korean democracy has been far from perfect, the victory narrativeimplies that 1987 was the

culmination of what thepeople struggled for in Gwangju in 1980. In other words, the fightwas largely over. Adherents to the minjung ideology in the 1980s, on the other hand,

would have answered that the struggle was still continuing, for the minjung struggle,

which Gwangjurepre sented, was not limited to political liberalizationbut also helping

13 Quoted in Linda Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May: A Laok Back at the 1980 Kwangju Up rising (Honolulu: University of Hawai 'i Press: Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawai 'i, 2002), 146. 14 Lewis,Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 146.

94 the weak, both politically and economically, gain independence. In additi on, the narrative claims that the demonstrators resisted in the name of "all" Korean citizens, not just those from Gwangju. Finally, this narrative emphasizes unity. The citizens acted "in one body," and it was a "whole people" struggling for freedom. The original official narratives claimed that the radical "rioters" made up only a minority of the citizenry. Lee Jae-eui and others outside the government noted how the leaders of the upri sing were divided and that the unity of the demonstrators was a mirage. Yet, this official account claims that

Gwangju was not a mere spontaneous response by the local residents to outrageous violence committed by the state. Instead, the uprising was ultimately a united effort by the Korean people to achieve democracy - which they eventually did.

The democratization narrative is designed to sever the state 's link to the military regime while also creating continuity between the demonstrators and the current government in order to enhance the latter's legitimacy. Historian Koen De Ceuster asserts that the South Korean government has been propagating a "hegemonic nationalist master narrative" in its descriptions of Korean history, of which the narrative about Gwangju is a

15 part. This master narrative determines how historical events have been depicted, for the nation-state must "suggest national continuity and to restore national cohesion" in order

16 to gain legitimacy. The latest articulation of the official narrative about Gwangju is just that: an account about continuation from a tradition of democracy and cohesion of the

Korean people as a whole (as seen above in the Gwangju City handbook). Other instances include when dissident-turned-president Kim Young Sam declared on May 13,

1993, that "the incumbent regime was an extension of the Kwangju Democratization

15 Koen De Ceuster, "When History is Made: History, Memory and the Politics of Remembrance in Contemporary Korea," Korea.n Histories 2.1 (2010): 22. 16 De Ceuster, "When History is Made," 22-23.

95 17 Movement." 1n addition, Roh Moo Hyun, president from 2003 to 2008, affirmed in

2003, "The passion for democracy, stemmed fromGwangju and inherited to the uprising in June 1987, has molded the foundation of a peaceful turnover of political power and given birth to the current government. This government is a son of the sacred sacrifice of

18 Gwangju on May 18." Since democratization, the government has had a stake in constructing a broader narrative in which the Korean people have been working towards democratic government in order to give itself legitimacy; the government was the culmination of the people's struggle and thus the embodiment of the people's ultimate desire for democracy.

Investigations and Legislation

After the launch of Roh' s Sixth Republic, the government initiated a series of investigations and legislation to sweep away the old official narrative and replace it with a new one emphasizing the illegality of the previous regime's actions and rehabilitate the reputations of the victims. The ruling DJP's loss of a majority in the National Assembly duri ng the April 1988 general elections precipitated the launch of a parliamentary investigation into the Gwangju Upri sing by a coalition of opposition parties in November

19 of that year. The National Assembly held nationally televised hearings in which the bloody details of the massacre were publicly revealed for the first time. Chun publicly apologized for his misdeeds in offi ce and went into self-imposed exile in a Buddhist

17 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 108. 18 Quoted in Hang Kim, "The Commemoration of the Gwangju Uprising: of the Remnants in the Nation States' Historical Memory." Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 12, No. 4 (2011): 617. 19 Kim Yong Cheol, "The Shadow of the Gwangju Uprising in the Democratization of Korean Politics," in South Korean Democracy: Legacyof the Gwangju Up rising, ed. George N. Katsiaficas and Na Kan-chae (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 126.

96 20 temple. However, in addition to the lack of cooperation from the DJP,because the investigation was a "strictly political process without any judicial consequences," the investigation did not yield any forms of punishment against the ringleaders and the

21 rehabilitation of the victims' reputations was delayed as well. At the same time, the hearings signaled the public's keen desire to uncover the truth of the long-suppressed past.

A key issue regarding governmental responsibility for the Gwangju Uprising was related to compensation for the victims and their relatives. The state did distribute funds to victims and their families almost immediately after the conclusion of the uprising in

1980. However, these funds were small and deemed "comfort money" (wimungeum).

Moreover, this "comfort money" was paid not by the governmentbut from either citizens' charitable donations or funds designated for "workforce accident compensation," which, according to legal scholar Han In Sup, "amounted to an evasion

,zz of state responsibility.' The public called this action to be the equivalent of '"a robber playing Robin Hood. "'23

In 1990, the National Assembly passed a compensation law which acknowledged

20 Cumings, Korea 's Place in the Sun, 394; Kim, "The Shadow of the Gwangju Uprising in the Democratization of Korean Politics," 126-127. Chun received mixed reviews for his apology. He did call the Gwangju Uprising one of the most tragic events in Korean history and declared that he was "fully responsible for the tragedy." However, what "full responsibility" meant was still left up in the air, as will be explored in the later section on the trial. Furthermore, many Koreans maintained that a simple apology was not enough, especially since Chun peppered his statement with anecdotes about the personal poverty he faced growing up in a transparent attempt to elicit sympathy. They wanted him to stand trial for the crimes he committed. Itis interesting to note the contrasts between Chun' s apology and his defiant attitude in the 1995 trial. See Karl Schoenberger, "Chun Offers Apology to Koreans, Yields Wealth," Los Angeles Times, November 23, 1988. http://articles.latimes.com/1988-11-23/news/mn-52l_l_chun-regime. 21 De Ceuster, "When History is Made," 19; Kim, "TheCommem oration of the Gwangju Uprising," 615; Kim, "The Shadow of the Gwangj u Uprising in the Democratization of Korean Politics," 126-127. In addition, KimYoung Sam's decision to merge his opposition party with the ruling party in 1990 effectively ended the National Assembly investigation. 22 Han In Sup, "Kwangju and Beyond: Coping with Past State Atrocities in South Korea," Human Rights �uanerly Vol. 27, No. 3 (Aug., 2005): 1032. 2 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1032.

97 governmental responsibility for the suffering of the victims of the massacre and their families. The purpose of the law, henceforth the "Gwangju Compensation Act," was to restore the reputation of the victims and give "substantial payments" to their families.24

The Gwangju Compensation Act also changed the classification of monetary payment to victims to "compensation" (bosang), which conferred legitimacy to the participants of the uprising for having given a "special sacrifice that the individual made for society."25

Although victims' honor was partially restored, the Jaw was ambiguous regarding official responsibility for the consequences of the Uprising. While "compensation" did connote governmental responsibility for the suffering of the victims and their fa milies, the legality of the government's actions in the Uprising itself- i.e., the decision to shoot civilians -

6 was still left up in the air.2

The Special Act on the May 18 DemocratiZation Movement (henceforth "Special

Act") passed on December 21, 1995 more concretely established the criminality of the government's actions in Gwangju. As will be described later, the Special Act was passed in order to tryChun, Roh, and other military leaders for their roles in the December 12 coup and the suppression of the Gwangju Upri sing, but it also contained provi sions about compensation. Article Six of the law stipulated that the compensation in the 1990 law, which was called "bosang" (tffifJ), be changed to "baesang" (M\'!J), which means reparations. 27 According to legal scholar Martha Min ow, "The symbolic dimensions of

24 "Act on Payment, Etc. for Persons Related to the May 18 Democratization Movement," in A Complete Collection of the Korea Laws and Regulations Concerning the May 18 Democratic Up rising (Gwangju, South Korea: The May 18 Memorial Foundation, 2007), 10. 25 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 103!. 26 Han,"Kwangju and Beyond," 1031-1032. 27 The Korean text of the Special Act, or "5. 18 minjuhwa undong deung e gwanhan teukbyeol beopan," is much clearer in showing the change in terminology regardingcompensation. Itcan be found in the following link: http ://likrns.assemb1y.go.kr/billljsp/BillDetail.jsp?bill_id=Ol3532. See also Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1031.

98 reparations express implicitly or explicitly an apology for wrongdoing or for failing to do more to resist atrocities. Apologies implicit in acts of reparation acknowledgethe fact of harms, accept some degree of responsibility, avow sincere regret, and promise not to repeat the offense."28 Reparations cannot recover what was lost, but oftentimes the act of giving reparations is more significant than the material transfer of resources. Inthis respect, the change of terminology to "reparations" was significant in acknowledging the illegality of government actions and the total legitimacy of the citizens' actions in rising 29 up against the state in Gwangju.

Other clauses of the Special Act confirmed the illegitimacy of the government's actions during the uprising and the illegitimacy of the government itself during that time.

Article Four allowed rehearings ofconvictions handed out during the Chun regime for activities related to the May 18 movement, while Article Seven revoked any medals and honors given to soldiers solely for their actions in suppressing the uprising in Gwangju?0

Furthermore, even though most of those convicted for their participation in the uprising were pardoned, the Special Act "stipulated that the 'crime' for which the pardon had been obtained itself be nullified according to official criminal procedure."31 Therefore, under the Special Act, the individual soldiers' actions in Gwangjulacked any merit, and were possibly criminal, and the judicial system's decisions concerning the demonstrators were fraudulent.

28 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History Af ter Genocide andMass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 112. 29 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1031. 30 "Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement, Etc.," in A Complete Collection of the Korea Laws and Regulations Concerning the May 18 Democratic Up rising (Gwangju, South Korea: The May 18 Memorial Foundation, 2007), 7-8. The loophole in this clause was that because "most medals were awarded for more than one achievement," relatively few soldiers were affected. See Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1036. 31 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1035.

99 The Trial of Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo

As mentioned above, the Special Act was passed in 1995 specifically to pave the way for the trial of the former military leaders Chun and Roh for their leadership of the military coup d'etat and the massacre of civilians in Gwangju. The enduring legacy of the

1996 trials was not in delivering justice in the form of punishment and pinpointing anyone specifically for responsibility for the massacre, at least not in a way satisfactory to a large portion of the public, but in reinforcing the narrative about the illegal nature of both the government and its actions in 1980.

Trials of political leaders are a!ways fraught with question of how to find the right balance between their didactic purpose and legal justice. Hannah Arendt was a strong critic of the Eichmann trial in 1961 because she made a clear delineation between the court's legal responsibility and other issues dealing with history. Arendt's ultimate argument was that "the purpose of a trial is to render justice, and nothing else; even the noblest of ulterior purposes ...can only detract from the law's main business: to weigh the charges brought against the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due

32 punishment." According to Arendt, the court has to remove any historicaljudgment and bias and concentrate solely on the legal merits of both the prosecution and defense's arguments.

Yet, Arendt's legalistic framework is too restricti ve, as tri als should be understood as also serving an important didactic function. Legal scholar Lawrence

Douglas supports the use of the trials as didactic tools to educate the world and future generations about history . While acknowledging that trials' main function is to fairl y

32 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann inJerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 253.

100 detennine guilt in a sound legal manner, Douglas finds Arendt's "strict separation between the legal and the extralegal, between the rule of law andthe interests of collective instruction" to be a "crabbed and needlessly restrictive vision of the trial as

33 legal form." Douglas argues that the Holocaust trials, especially the Eichmann tri al, were specifically designed to leave historical judgments on the Nazis' conduct to

34 posterity in additionto adjudicating their criminal conduct during wartime. Thus, to call the Holocaust trials "show trials" as Arendt does, according to Douglas, is "to state the obvious" because the trials were intrinsically crafted for the didactic purpose of demonstrating the full extent of the horrors of the Holocaust as genocide and the evil that

5 had to exist for such an operation to be executed?

Especialiy after instances of mass violence or political transitions, trials have a didactic purpose by demonstrating the efficacy of the legal system in deliveringjustice and releasing information previously withheld from the public. Douglas argues that the

Holocaust trials did just that, although with varying degrees of effectiveness. Legal scholar Martha Minow states that the point of conducting trials is to show that "legal institutions can handle such issues without betrayingthe ideals of law for the exigencies and pressures of politics, personal biases, or yet a new phase in the cycles of revenge and power struggles" - in short, to prove that democratic institutions can objectively deliver

36 justice. There are problems with such trials, of course, including "retroactive application of norms, political influence, and selective prosecution" - all of which were present in the 1996 trials of Chun and Roh -but trialscan also "air issues, create an aura

33 Lawrence Douglas, The Memory of Judgment: Making Lawand History in the Trials of the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale UniversityPres s, 2001), 2. 34 Douglas, The Memory of Judgment, 106. 35 Douglas, TheMemory of Judgment, 3. 36 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 26.

101 of fairness, establish a public record, and produce some sense of accountability."37 The ultimate expectation is that "trials create official records of the scope of violence and the participants in it, and that guilty verdicts afford public acknowledgement of what

8 happened, and its utter wrongfulness."3

The trials of the military leaders had a similar didactic purpose in "rectifying history" by revealing more information about the Upri sing and severing the link between the military leaders and the civilian government, while also proving that the reformed legal and political institutions could deliver some measure of justice. But initially, there was resistance from the government to pursue a trial of the former military leaders. At first, President Kim Young Sam was content to leave the judgment of the military leaders to history, stifling the initial push to try Chun and Roh. The Public Prosecutor's Office, despite launching an investigation into the coup and the massacre in 1994 and 1995, eventually decided that it had "no authority to prosecute" because of the transition of power from the previous military re gimes.39 Moreover, Kim partly owed his presidency to Roh due to their joint decision to merge their parties to form the new ruling party hence one of the reasons the defense accused Kim of "biting the hand that fed him. "40

Public pressure eventually forced the government to proceed with the prosecution.

After an Assemblyman revealed the enormous amounts of money that Chun and Roh had secretly collected during their tenures as presidents, Kim could no longer ignore the furious public reaction and decided to go ahead with the prosecution of the two former

37 Minow, Between Ve ngeance and Forgiveness, 50. 38 Minow, Between Ve ngeance andFor giveness, 123. 39 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1006. 40 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1009. The related argument was that the democratic government owed its existence to the previous governments since 1980, since the transfers of power were peaceful and legal.

102 presidents.41 Roh was arrested on November 16, 1995, and Chun was arrestedon

December 3 for corruption. However, the public was not content, demanding prosecution not just for corruption, but for the military's wrongdoings at Gwangju as well. As a result, Kim reversed course and declaredhe was "rectifying history" (yeoksa barosewugl) by going ahead with the prosecution for the coup and the Gwangju massacre.42 The

National Assembly, on Kim's orders, drafted and passed the Special Act on December

21, 1995, which tolled the statute of limitations and enabled the prosecution of the former military leaders for "the criminal conducts of disrupting constitutional order" on

December 12, 1979 and May 18, 1980.43 Chun, Roh, and other top-ranking leaders were indicted on the charges of treason, corruption, mutiny, and murder.

Despite the passage of the Special Act, one major obstacle to prosecution was the statute of limitations on crimes in South Korea, which lasts fifteen years. The coup took place in December 1979 and the Gwangju massacre in May 1980, meaning that the prosecutions for those events which started in January 18, 1996 violated the time limit.

The Special Act sought to suspend the statute, but the defense argued that the Special Act violated the Constitution by doing so, in addition to the Act's narrow scope in prosecuting just the individual cases against Chun, Roh, and the others and its application of retroactive punishment.44 Five justices out of the nine-justice Constitutional Court did agree with the defense, but because overturning a law due to unconstitutionality required

41 See Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 200 1), 376- 382; Oh, Korean Politics, 170-172. The amount of money the two presidents collected ranged from$500 million to over $1 billion. 42 Oh, Korean Politics, 171; Han, "K wangju and Beyond." 1007. 43 "Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement, Etc.," in A Complete Collection of the Korea Laws andRegulations Concerning the May 18 Democratic Up rising, 6. 44 Han,"Kwangju and Beyond," 1013.

103 4 six votes, the Special Act was upheld and prosecution was allowed to begin. 5

Still, this decision that the law was still constitutional did not completely settle the issue of whether the statute of limitations had indeed been breached by the prosecution.

What counted as "treason" was a key interpretive battle. The Seoul Appellate Court first ruled that the act of treason by the military leaders did not end until June 29, 1987, when the military agreed to direct presidential elections. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, maintained that the military leaders ' treason ended on January 24, 1981, when martial law was formally lifted. This still meant that even without the Special Act, the prosecution was within the fifteen-year statute of limitations - by six days, since the proceedings began on January 18, 1996. Thus, according to Han In Sup, the debate over

4 the Special Act's constitutionality was moot. 6 The legality of the trial was confirmed.

During the trial, dubbed the "Trial of the Century" in South Korea, the arguments by both the defense and prosecution about Gwangjureflected the old and new official narratives, respectively. The defense maintained that the soldiers' actions in Gwangju were acts of self-defense and that the military leaders had no direct role in the massacre.

Chun called himself a political prisoner, claiming he was a victim of politically- motivated attacks rather than for any breaches of the law - ironic given his past

47 persecution of political opponents. The prosecution contended that the operations in

Gwangju were planned and systematically executed; military communications were

stable and thus military leaders knew the situation on the ground; it was the military's

decision to escalate the violence with increased brutality when there was the option to handle the crisis more peacefully. In short, the top military officials were responsible for

45 Han, "Kwangju andBeyond," 1014. 46 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1015-1016. 47 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1030.

104 the massacre "by using soldiers' actions as a human tool" for their own treasonous ends, namely the goal of suppressing opposition to their takeover of power.48 The prosecution thus demanded the death penalty for Chun and life imprisonment for Roh.

As in the Nuremberg and Eichmann tri als, the chain of command posed a problem for the prosecution in designating responsibility for the murders of civilians. Chun and other top-ranking officials denied responsibility because they did not kill anyone directly.

The officers below them predictably pleaded that they were only following orders.

According to Han In Sup, in the cases of organizational crime, the conventional wisdom has been "the more remote and powerful, the more criminal" because lower-ranking members of the hierarchy "have more difficulty thinking independently and acting with discretion"; the leader "controls the engine" despite not having a direct hand in the organization's actions.49 The Appellate and Supreme Courts both agreed with this principle. In the case of the Gwangju Uprising, the accusatory fingers pointed once again to Chun and his associates.

As a consequence, the soldiers directlyparticipating in the massacre were not charged. Legally, the soldiers' crimes in May 1980 fell beyond the statute of limitations and were not within the scope of the Special Act because the soldiers showed no

50 "treasonous intent or purpose." Moreover, by applying the arguments in favor of prosecuting the military leaders, it necessarily followed that the lower-ranking members of the military were less responsible because of their status in the hierarchy; they "could

48 Han, "Kwangj u and Beyond," 1016-1017. According to Han, although a principal commits a crime through his or her own actions, according to the concept of "mittelbare taeterschaft," a principal can use others to fulfill his or her goals. Essentially, Chun and the other defendant• were "indirect principals." 49 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1018. 50 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1018-1019.

105 not be expected to refuse to carry out superiororders under martial law ."51 But the question of whether the lower-ranking officers and the individual soldiers were culpable for their crimes remained. Han In Sup argues that the brutal nature of the suppression makes "problematic" any excuses made by the offi cers and soldiers who participated in the massacre.52 He contends that previous court rulings in South Korea found the argument of "following orders" to be an illegitimate defense. For instance, the KCIA agents who killed Park Chung Hee 's bodyguards during the assassination were still convicted despite their argument that they were merely fo llowing orders from the top of the chain of command.53 Furthermore, the soldiers beat and fired at mostly unarmed demonstrators before May 20. As previous trials such as Nuremberg and the Eichmann

Trials demonstrated, "in cases in which human life is at stake ...the total, blind obedience to superior orders cannot constitute a defense or an excuse. "54

On August 26, 1996, the trial court duly convicted both Chun and Roh of mutiny and treason for the 1979 coup and of corruption for their accumulation of money during their tenures in office. The Court also convicted Chun of treason for the Gwangju massacre, but it did not find him or other lower-ranking generals and officers guilty of actually killing anyone for the specific purpose of treason due to lack of evidence. As a result, in the words of political scientist John Kie-chiang Oh, "the trial found no one who actually ordered shooting in Kwangju. "55 Chun was sentenced to death and Roh to twenty-two and a half years, which were commuted to life imprisonment and seventeen years, respectively, after appeal to the Appellate Court, a ruling confirmed by the

51 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond,'' 1019. 52 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond,'' 1020. 53 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1019, n. 79. 54 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1020. 55 Han, ''Kwangju and Beyond," 1009; Oh, Ko rean Politics, 177.

106 Supreme Court on April 17, 1997. In December 1997, KimYoung Sam doled out presidential pardons to both Chun and Roh. The irony of this action was that these former military strongmen were pardoned on the advice of the dissident they sought to put to

56 death,.the president-elect Kim Dae Jung, in the name of reconciliation and healing.

Although the pardon was generally well-received by the public because of Kim Dae

Jung's reputation and a consensus that healing was necessary, others were still disappointed that Chun and Rob were being released so quickly.

The trial did not give the South Korean public the taste of complete justice, for

Chun was pardoned and questions of responsibility remained even after the proceedings ended. Chun and the other military officers were not specifically convicted of homicide,

57 since the courts made no conclusion about who directly ordered the killings. Linda

Lewis wrote that although the trials and convictions of Chun and Roh "would seem to firmly establish ...the illegality of the government's actions in Kwangju," questions

58 remained about responsibility for the violence. The German journalist Gebhard

Hielse her expressed his disappointment with the results of the tr ials of Chun and Rob:

"No one was sentenced in connection with the events in Kwangju ...For all practical purposes, the Kwangju case has been closed without anyone having been pronounced

59 guilty, as if the massacres never happened." Many were thus greatly dissatisfied with the level of justice achieved by the trial. Leaders were not convicted for ordering the massacre and soldiers were not prosecuted for their excessive force. It is no surpri se that

56 To add tothe irony, both Chun and Roh were presentto watch Kim be inaugurated as president, at long last, on February 25, 1998. It was probably mostly a gesture of reconciliation on Kim's part, but I would like to imagine that Kim had other reasons for wanting them there, such as vindication. 57 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 87. 58 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 87. 59 Gebhard Hielscher, "A Nightmare in Broad Daylight," in The Kwangju Up rising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Ko rea's Tiananmen, ed. Henry Scott-Stokes and Jai Eui Lee (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 59-60.

107 for many victims, citizens of Gwangju, and observers of Korean politics andsociety, the trials produced a less than satisfactory result.

The 1996 trial, while providing some measure of closure for the public on the topic of the military's actions in Gwangju, did not provide any legal answers as to who was ultimately responsible for the deaths during the massacre nor did it punish anyone specifically for the crimes in Gwangju, but it did help establish the illegality of the coup and the subsequent Chun regime. The proceedings did result in criminal convictions of the military leaders, something unforeseeable less than a decade before the ttial.

Moreover, it was clear that while legally Chun was not held responsible for the Gwangju massacre, he was convicted in the court of public opinion. The reputations of those who participated in the uprising were more firmly rehabilitated as well. Lastly, the trial was a showcase for South Korean democracy. It demonstrated the South Koreans' ability to handle justice through legal and democratic institutions. Hence, it further cemented the legacy of Gwangju as the harbinger of successful democratization. The trial thus fulfilled its didactic purpose: it taught the Korean public andglobal observers that Gwangju was a tragedy perpetrated by the power-hungry military leaders, but that the legacy of the

"democratization movement" lived on in the very institutions and proceedings of the trial itself.

Commemoration: Cemeteries, Memorials, and Celebrations

Another key aspect of the government narrative about Gwangju is the importance of democratic motivations in the uprising, which can best be seen in the government' s recent commemoration projects such as cemeteries and memorials. After 1987, the

official andunoff icial narratives regarding the uprising did converge in several major

108 areas, including the emphasis on the citizens' desire for democracy and the universal values exhibited by the united citizens during the period of "liberated Gwangju." As

Lewis observes, there has been "a shift in official response from cover-up to cooptation, and the concomitant transfiguration of 5.18 from mob riot to heroic struggle," which can

60 best be seen in how the government commemorates the Upri sing. Nevertheless, one of the crucial differences between the official and unofficial narratives is the relationship of the state to the uprising and its participants. The state commemoration projects all connote an intimate relationship between the present democratic government and the uprising, which ignores the unofficial narratives of resistance, especially armed resistance, against the state. Moreover, the victims that are honored are implicitly denied their individual identities and turned into sacrifices for the larger political cause of democratic government. These state efforts alienate and supplant groups unaffiliated with the government, who used to be the primary actors in commemorating the upri sing.

Like trials, commemoration can serve a useful didactic purpose for the state by directly shaping how past events are remembered. Like trials, cemeteries fulfill other ostensible purposes; trials deliver legal justice and cemeteries provide a space dedicated to mourning and honoring the dead. But government sponsorship causes both tri als and official cemeteries to intrinsically contain a didactic purpose in legitimizing the state.

Memori als are implicitly subjective and take on the viewpoint of the creators, for, as scholar James E. Young argues, "creators of memorial texts necessarily reconstruct historical events, and so reflect as much their own understanding and experience as the

60 Lewis, lAying Claim to the Memory of May, 108.

109 actual events they would preserve."61 In the case of official memorials, the state's perspective permeate� the memorial texts. The memorials "recall the national myths, religious archetypes, and ideological paradigms along whose contours a history has been constructed - and perhaps acted upon."62 Thus, official memorials tend to whitewash history and elevate the state's actions. For example, Young, in describing visitors' reactions to the Dachau concentration camp in Germany, writes that they "complain that this memorial aestheticizes the past as if to vanquish it, rather than to recall it."63

Similarly, he notes that the goal of Yad Vashem, the official memorial to Jewish victims of the Holocaust in Israel, is to "preserve the memory of the heroes as well as the martyrs of the destruction, thus countering what Israelis view as anexaggerated fascination with the Jews as victims - and victims only."64

The situation is similar in South Korea and the government's commemoration of the Uprising. De Ceuster asserts that in general, the memorial sites in South Korea only

"make reference" to history rather than teaching it, with their main purpose being utilizing public memory, which he defines as "some kind of encyclopaedic repository of historical moments that is commonly shared, but hardly ever the subject of true reflection."65 As a result, the state can appeal to the visitors to the sites with references to the past, but still subtly advance the master narrative of "selfless sacrificefor the greater good of national advancement."66 The new May 18 Cemetery, built in 1997, provides a good example of the South Korean state using memorials to disseminate a master

61 James E. Young, "Memory and Monwnent," in Bitburg inMoral andPolitical Perspective, ed. Geoffrey H. Hartman (Bloomington: Jndiana University Press, !986), 104. 62 Young, "Memory and Monument," 105. 63 Young, "Memory and Monument," !09. 64 Young, "Memory and Monument," 110. Emphasis is Young's. 65 De Ceuster, "When History is Made," 27. 66De Ceuster, "When History is Made," 27.

110 narrati ve, which in the case of Gwangju, is the narrative of democratization and Korean citizens' sacrifice in its name. Although cemeteries at first glance might not seem like ideal candidates for propagating a narrative, official cemeteries honor those in the service of the state. Hence, the victims now interred at the official Gwangju cemetery are implicitly honored for their service to the state, especially their contributions to setting up a democratic government. The victims of the massacres are transformed into heroes, and just as the Israelis desired to differentiate between the victimized "old Jews" and the militant "new Jews," these new protagonists of the uprising in official memorials are characterized as "fighters" for democracy and human rights.

Before 1997, the bodies of the victims were buried in the old Mangweoldong

Cemetery, where bereaved families and activist groups would gather and memorialize the uprising and even stage protests against the dictatorship. The old Mangweoldong

Cemetery was "thus promoted as the central symbolic location for democratic struggle in

67 Korea, articulated in this instance through the May Movement." The old cemetery was, and still is, "much more than a place for memory and mourning; it is also a place for

68 social acti vism/agency and democratic struggle." The old cemetery intrinsically symbolized the currents of anti-authoritarian ideology. However, the Kim Young Sam

Administration desired to heal the wounds caused by the government in Gwangju. Kim sought to do so through symbolic gestures, including the construction of an official cemetery. In 1994, construction of a new cemetery just two kilometers away from the old one began, and in 1997, 137 bodies buried at the old Mangweoldong Cemetery were moved to the new cemetery. This relocation was a largely unilateral action taken by the

67 Sallie Yea, "Rewriting Rebellion and MappingMemory in South Korea: The (Re)presentation of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising Through Mangwol-dong Cemetery," Urban Studies, Vol. 39, No. 9 (2002): 1562. 68 Yea, "RewritingRebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea," 1563.

111 69 government, although a few memorial groups were consulted. Partly due to this, the new official cemetery dedicated to the victims created controversy from the moment of its inception. But there were larger reasons for opposition. Although the state was finally honoring the victims as opposed to condemning them, critics of the new cemetery contended that it saniti zed history and as a result sullied the legacy of the victims.

A description of the cemetery and its various features can provide an insight into what exactly the government has been celebrating and teaching. First, there are many memorials within the cemetery. These include "Democracy Gate ," "Democracy Square,"

"History Gate," "History Place," and "Garden for Democracy." The heavy emphasis on democracy and history in a cemetery dedicated to the Gwangju victims reveals which themes the government thinks is important for visitors to know: the victims and other citizens were concerned chiefly with democracy; there is a historical connection between them and the present government and society. Furthermore, large boards bearing the government-sponsored narrative lay scattered throughout the Photo Exhibition Hall in the new cemetery. The narrative is a sharp reversal from the one propagated in 1980. One board states, "The massacre was a brutal, premeditated military crackdown, the climax of a coup by forces of the so-called new military power." The narrative points to the illegality of the actions taken by the military by calling the event a coup, while also shifting blame for the violence completely onto the soldiers and ranking military officers.

Another board criticizes the official naming of the uprising as an "incident" and claims that "suppression was necessary for political and economic stability" and refers to the

70 soldiers' brutality as an "entire series of murders."

69 Yea, "Rewriting Rebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea," 1560. roYea, "Rewriting Rebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea," 1561.

112 There are also two large statues which represent the Gwangju citizens. The two statues depict the members of the Citizens Army as "conventionally heroic figures" bearing "little resemblance to the ...skinny kids with raised fists, hair too long and clad in suits and fatigues, riding through town on a commandeered truck" as seen on the cover of the June 2, 1980 edition of Newsweek.71 Lewis argues that with the exclusion of

"social class markers" on the people in the statue, it is "(almost) possible to imagine them

...as middle-class company employees being asked to tighten their belts without a fuss, rather than unemployed youths and factory workers in the vanguard of a bloody

72 insurrection." According to sociologist Sallie Yea, "anonymity" is bestowed onto the

7 figures on the statues, adding further to the removal of individuality to the victims. 3

Therefore, the statues reflect not what the citizens really were like, but what the government claims they were in its narrative: middle class everymen united in their fight for democracy but not much else.

Like the statues, the gravesites themselves are colotless, lacking the individuality that characterized the graves in the old cemetery. In the old cemetery, the Gwangju narrative "could be read in the iconography of the individual graves," which were adorned with "accumulated memorabilia" such as photos and keepsakes which

74 "eloquently told each victim's story." Whereas the old cemetery allowed one to

"wander between the graves with a growing sense of each victim's role in the uprising ..

. and see fragments of their personal identity," Yea argues that the new cemetery is a product of the "modern democracy of death," which, through the "monotony of the

71 Lewis, lAying Claim to the Memory of May, 105. 72 Lewis, lAying Claim to the Memory of May, 105-106. 73 Yea, "Rewriting Rebellion andMapping Memory in SouthKorea," 1566. 74 Lewis, lA:ying Claim to the Memory of May, 105.

113 impersonal grave sites," causes the "erasure of the varied identities of the victims buried

75 within them." Thus, in the new cemetery, the state-imposed identity of the demonstrators as democratic fighters sweeps aside their individual identities. This arrangement resembles that of the National Cemetery in Seoul, which honors dead soldiers and patriots. Thus, Han In Sup added that ironically, the monuments and memorials which symbolized the struggle against the state now "resemble those state

a6 representations that the civilians resisted.'

Another key contrast canbe found in the slogans used in the old and new cemeteries. The slogan "Resist" (jeohang) splashes across the banner hanging over the entrance to the old Mangweoldong Cemetery. In addition, for the 30th anniversary celebrations, the Gwangju city authorities used the slogan: "Do you hear, the people's slogans; do you see, the people's torches !!" Both of these slogans recall the minjung calls for resistance. The slogan used for the 30th anniversary commemoration at the ne� May

18 cemetery is much tamer by comparison: "May, the beam that lights the future." The word choice and tone are much lighter and more hopeful, expressing a belief in the

77 positive legacy of Gwangju. Furthermore, the emphasis put on the future and the absence of the past save for the mention of "May" implies that looking back is not important in the long run. The past is only important in that it can be used to illuminate the future.

Beyond the cemeteries are other official spaces devoted to memori alizing the uprising. The government established the May 18 Theme Park and Memorial Park in

75 Yea, "Rewriting Rebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea," 1565, 1566-1567. 76 Han, "Kwangju and Beyond," 1039. 77 De Ceuster, "When History is Made," 29.

114 78 1997, although the parks would not be completed for several years. According to official Gwangju City publications, the purpose of the parks is to "provide people with a place to reflect [upon] the historic meaning of the struggle and to incorporate the May 18 spirit in their daily life.'m The government's intention that visitors reflect upon the

"meaning" of the Uprising and to fulfill the "May 18 spirit" in daily life again points to an emphasis placed on democratic values. The Uprising occurred because of the people's desire for democracy; thus, the state urged citizens in the present to continue this democratic legacy. The mention of "spirit" hints at a more universal reading of the

Upri sing that is highlighted by civic groups, as will be seen in the next chapter. In addition, these parks preserved some buildings from Sangmudae, the old Martial Law

Branch Headquarters for the Jeolla provinces in Gwangju, which include a jail and a courthouse which were used to detain, torture, and try participants in the uprising.80

Keeping these buildings around reminds visitors of the brutal nature of the military regime and highlights the illegitimacy of its rule, including its actions in Gwangju.

The official ceremony further illustrates the enhanced role of the state in commemoration. In addition to the opening of the new cemetery, beginning on May 18,

1997, the national government began holding an annual "5.18 Democratization

Movement Memorial Service" (5. 18 minjuhwa undong kinyeomsik) at the new cemetery.81 A military band would perform, the national anthem would be played, and a top government official, either the president or the prime minister, would deliver a

78 Lewis, Laying Claimto the Memory of May, 131-132. 79 Quoted in Lewis, lAying Claim to the Memory of May, 131. 80 Sallie Yea, "Reinventing the Region: The Cultural Politicsof Place in Kwangju City and South CMlla Province," in Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Up rising in Korea 's Past and Present, ed. Oi-Wook Shin and Kyung Moon Hwang (Lanham, MD:Rowman & LittlefieldPublishers, Inc., 2003), 123. 81 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 120.

115 82 speech; the government had fully appropriated the event. Lewis claims that this move signaled "the transformation of the 5.18 anniversary commemoration from a massive

83 anti-government demonstration to an extended civic festival." This entailed the

84 "commodification" of the Uprising such that it became a "tourist attraction." For instance, there is even an official mascot called "Nuxee" which appears on various

85 souvenir items for sale at the Cemetery's gift shop. She adds that the construction of a new cemetery and the creation of a national holiday meant that the national government

"appropriated the event ...In this way, the government has at the same time assumed the

86 authority to define meaning as regards the Kwangju Uprising." To further exemplify the state's takeover of commemoration, in 1998, while the bereaved families' ceremonies drew a few hundred people, up to ten thousand attended the official ceremony - even though just three years before, thousands attended the unofficial rites at the old

87 cemetery. Moreover, since 1998, only dignitaries could access the plaza where the official ceremony was conducted, while spectators - still numbering in the thousands -

88 had to watch from the edges of the cemetery. This move concretely established the complete appropriation of the celebration by the state. The supremacy of the official ceremony reflects the government's overall dominant position vis-a-vis the unofficial groups in terms of its influence in society at large and its greater capacity to publicize events and narratives. It is apparent that the majority of the public is buying into the official narrative than the minjung-based unofficial narrative. Thus, even in the

2 8 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 103-105. 83 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 147. 84 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 145. 85 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 145. 86 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 121. 87 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 154. 88 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 120.

116 democratic era, the government narrative serves as a dominant, almost hegemonic, one.

The dominance of the official narrative in the commemoration of the Uprising does not preclude the government from criticism from Gwangju citizens or observers such as academics. According to the government's portrayal of the demonstrators in the statues and the boards, it is the citizens' overarching desire for democracy that is the key feature of the event; armed resistance,though depicted, is clearly overshadowed by nonviolent resistance. Thus, according to Han In Sup, "it appears that the governmental involvement domesticates the memorials of 18 May and portrays the civilian reaction as one of purely peaceful resistance."89 This representation inevitably draws the ire of other, more radical groups, who maintain that, in Yea's words, it "distorts the 'real' meaning of the uprising and its place in South Korea's history of populist struggle" and "simply reduces the event to officially sanctioned history."90 Yea also contended that the new cemetery "effectively emasculates activist minjung historiography, promoting instead a reading of the uprising which firmly contains the event in the shackles ofgovernment- sanctioned Koreannational history."91 Historian Martin Jay observed after visiting the cemetery, "the government has created an enormous, theatrical space in which the actual victims are dwarfed by the monument to their memory."92 He recalled many people telling him that visitors "come to pass time at the cemetery, as if in a park, and never actually make it to the graves themselves."93 It truly became, as Lewis noted above, more of a festival than anything else a stage in which the government could flaunt a self- congratulatory narrative.

89 Han,"Kwangju and Beyond," 1039. 90 Yea, "Rewriting Rebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea," 1553. 91 Yea, "Rewriting Rebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea," 1564. 92 Martin Jay, "Kwangju: From Massacre to Biennale," Salmagundi No. 120 (Fall 1998), 16. 93 Jay, "Kwangju: From Massacre to Biennale," 16.

117 Other problems with the state commemoration of Gwangju have been that it contains inherent contradictions, which can be seen by comparing the National Cemetery with the new May 18 Cemetery. The National Cemetery located in Seoul contains the tombstones of soldiers "killed in battle" in Gwangju in May 1980, which remain to the

94 pre sent day. As De Ceuster notes, the terminology of "battle" is highly "inappropriate" and "injudicious" in contemporary times because the perception of Gwangju has changed from that of a riot to a righteous democratic struggle. The demonstrators might have been seen as enemies with whom the soldiers had to battle in 1980, but currently, it seems everyone has a claim to Gwangju' s legacy. Academic Hang Kim notes that as the victims of the massacre in Gwangju have been rehabilitated by the state as fighters for democracy, and by extension, the state in its present form, "the friend and the enemy who killed each other on the same battlefield are concurrently commemorated in the name of the very same nation at different places within the jurisdiction of the state."95 First, this contradiction illustrates the endurance of the old narrative's extolment of the military, embodied in the graves of the fallen soldiers. Second, the contradiction reveals the

shallowness or hollowness of the new narrative and its celebration of the Gwangju citizens, which only sheds more light on the constructed and artificial nature of the official narrative.

While the effect has been to rightfully restore the honor of the victims from

criminals and radicals to citizen activists, the official efforts to glorify the demonstrators contain troubling aspects. As Lewis argues above, the state, by taking control of the memorialization of the upri sing and its victims, is also able to manage their meaning.

94 De Ceuster, "When History is Made," 25. 95 Kim, "The Commemoration of the GwangjuUprising," 617.

118 According to Hang Kim, "the dead citizens of Gwangju have been reduced to the logic of

96 sacrifice dedicated to the nation state." In essence, the criticisms originate in the fact that the state has been co-opting commemoration for its own political ends, and as a result, the memories of the event and its victims are being tarnished.

Conclusion

With the changing of the sociopolitical context, the government had to reconstruct the official narrative about the Gwangju Uprising to adapt to the sociopolitical conditions after the 1987 reforms. As seen in legislation, tri als, and especially commemoration, the narrative has undergone a significant shift. Rather than suppressing the memory of the event, the government began to embrace it after democratization. Rather than it having been a "riot," the event has been called ever since 1987 a "democratization movement."

The "rioters" became "democratic fighters." On the whole, according to the government, the Gwangju Uprising was a democratization movement in which the united citizens of not just Gwangju, but all of South Korea, participated. The army andthe military regime were the enemies of the people.

By promulgating this narrative, the statewas, in James Young's words above, effectively working to vanquish the past by co-opting it and aestheticizing it. The state's actions in the 1980s were oppressive and, according to popular opinion, illegal. The

Gwangju Uprising was a flashpoint event which cemented the illegitimacy of the Chun regime. Thus, the democratic governments sought to trace their origins back to the

Gwangj u Upri sing, which they reinterpreted as a struggle for democracy and renamed a

"democratization movement." The legislation that was passed since 1987 in addition to the 1996 trial of military leaders established the illegitimacy of previous military regimes,

96 Kim, "The Commemoration of the GwangjuUprising," 616.

119 restored victims ' status, and showed that the newly democratic institutions were working.

State commemoration efforts emphasized the democratic nature of the uprising. By doing so, the reformed state reinforced its legitimacy as the heir of the democracy movement's legacy and the embodiment of the people's wishes for democratic government.

This process of transformation has been a welcome change fromthe distortions uttered by the military regime, but at the same time, the new official narrative is itself distorted, although in different aspects. The heavy emphasis on democratic activism took away much of the attention from the citizens' armed resistance to soldier brutality. The claim that the citizens were united as one directly contradi cts many accounts such as Lee

Jae-eui's which argued that despite the demonstrators' surface-level cooperation induced by euphoria at their initial victory and anger against the military, there was no political cohesion during the upri sing. Some unintended consequences were that the direct victims of the soldiers' brutality receded from the spotlight. The state's construction of a conveniently favorable past can be seen in the current unofficial narratives as well.

Indeed, it must be repeated that the official and unofficial narratives have converged in large part today, despite some key differences. It is not like in the 1980s when the two sides diverged so completely. Despite the greater diversity of narratives thanks to political liberalization and subsequent freedom to discuss the once-taboo topic of Gwangju, it is ironic that there seems to be increased homogeneity in the narrative of the uprising that is most used today, whether in government or outside it. One reason is that since the state possessed a far greater reach in the dissemination of narratives that unofficial groups did not due to its traditionallydominant position relative to society, whichever narrative the government adopted would have built-in advantages in terms of

120 recognition and, probably, adherence. The sheer fact that the government was adopting a narrative of democratization meant that the democracy narrative would be ubiquitous upon its creation, overshadowing dissenting ones in the national discussion about the

significance and meaning of the uprising. But it is also because the fundamental transformation of South Korean politics changed narratives in unofficial circles as well, as defeat turned into victory and resistance against oppression turned into working within

a democratic system.

121 IV. The Gwangju Spirit: Unofficial Narratives After 1987

The democratic transformation of South Korean politics after 1987 not only altered the character and outlook of the state, but also paved the way for the burgeoning civil society to take a larger role in thepolitical sphere. The democratization of Korean politics andsociety predictably opened up the discussions which shaped the unofficial narratives about the GwangjuUprising, as there was a greater variety in what people and groups said about the topic. During the 1980s, due to government censorship, the public had not really known many details of the Uprisingbeyond the basics. From rumors and foreign sources, there was general knowledge that there had been a terrible massacre in

Gwangju which the government, effectively led by Chun Doo Hwan, perpetrated. It was a site of state oppression, but also a site of resistance by the people. This narrative was prevalent outside of the government.In the new, freer political environment after 1987, however, information about Gwangju began to appear in droves, leading to the development of what Koreanscalled "a '5-18 industry'" (ginyeom saneop).1 In addition to the government hearings, investigations, and trials, eyewitness accounts and other documents were fi nally published. One example was a 25 volume collection of documents published by the city of Gwangju, which included leaflets, National Assembly hearings, and declassified U.S. documents.2

Furthermore, civic groups emerged to claim a stake in the memory of Gwangju from the traditional victims' groups. In the 1980s, outside of the government, direct victims - the "bereaved family members, the injured, and those arrested" because of the

1 Gi-Wook Shin, "Introduction," in Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Up rising in Korea's Past and Present, ed.Gi-Wook Shin and Kyung Moon Hwang(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), xxvi. Many other scholars also noted this phenomenon, including Sallie Yea and Linda Lewis. 2 Shin, ��Introduction," xxvi.

122 Uprising - were acknowledgedto have had the most legitimate claims to Gwangju's legacy.3 They were symbols of the military dictatorship's oppression, and thus were central to the minjung emphasis on resisting the state and its supporters. The narratives about Gwangju during this time centered on the brutality of the soldiers and the heroism of the citizens in their defiance of the military. From the 1990s onward, the individuals and groups whose presence became more visible and fought for a greatervoice in the

Gwangju movement, a strugglecommonly called the"May Movement," were different from the victims. They were "intellectuals, professionals, and civic leaders - citizens who perhaps through guilt as well as caution had remained passive throughout the 1980s."4

Inevitably, due to the differences among members of the victim and civic groups, there were divisions about what exactly the significance and meaning of Gwangju were.

Association with the Uprising, due to the event's symbolism of the democratic transformation and its resulting legitimizing power, added authority and clout to what anyone said about the Uprising and its effects. The Gwangju-relatedgroups which arose after 1987 could only go about claiming a part of the Uprising's legacy by altering the narrative which gave its members, primarily professionals and the middle-class, a stake in the actual Uprising and its aftermath -just as the state had done after democratization by linking the new democratic government with the wishes of the Gwangjucitize ns. Indeed,

"citizenry" gained additional meanings in these new narrative contexts stressing democracy; it did not just mean the population of a city but also active members of civil

3 Linda Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," in Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State, 2nd ed.,ed. Charles K. Armstrong (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), !53. 4 Linda Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May: A Look Back atthe 1980 Kwangju Uprising (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press: Center for Korean Studies, University ofHawai'i, 2002), 109.

123 society; The post-1987 narrative among unofficial groups thus shifted beyond the narrower confines of direct victims and was broadened to the general populace.

The key difference between the old and new unofficial narratives was in the descriptions of the motivations of the citizens. In the pre-1987 accounts the citizens themselves.were not concernedwith preserving universal ideals of democracy and human rights. They were simply fi ghting together because they were all angry and afraid. The people were oppressed by a cruel and illegitimate government in a shocking,unbearable manner and naturally resisted. As a result, broader movements such as minjung pointed to

Gwangju as an example of both the problem and solution to South Korea's ills, and, harnessingthe potent symbolism of the Uprising, gained tremendous appeal. After 1987, however, as in the new government narrative, the story changed into one in which, according to sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the "participants in the Kwangjuupri sing were no longer considered mere victims but were recast as heroes or fighters for democracy. "5

The actions of the military, both during the coup and its massacre of civilians, and the resistance by citizens were not ignored; in fact, they were necessary to establish the illegitimacyof the military and its leaders during thisperiod of time and the heroism of the ordinary citizens. However, those features set up the context and were at the periphery; they were not at the core. Civic groups and many academics instead reinterpreted the struggle or de-emphasized it in favor of the trait of solidarity and the uni versa! values that it entailed. Indeed, the concept of a "Gwangju Spirit" ( Gwangju jeongsin) gained prominence throughout the 1990s as people tried to derive lessons from the Uprising in order to apply them outside the city. The meaning of the "Gwangju

Spirit" morphed fromone advocating resistance against oppression, both domestic and

5 Shin, "Introduction," xxvi.

124 external, geographically limited to the Korean peninsula, to one representing the universal desire to achieve democratic government, preserve human dignity, and protect human rights. It was important, thus, to spread this spirit of Gwangju to the rest of the globe. In short, the new narrative was both a universal and universalizing one.

It is clear why this stark change occurred when it did. If the ending of a story is altered, it is natural to reinterpret what preceded it. That is essentiallywhat occurredin the case of the GwangjuUpri sing; its initialbitter and gloomy ending which entailed further calls for resistance against oppression was transformed by the events of 1987 into a joyful victory for the Korean people. With the advent of democracy, the people finally had a real stake and voice in the government, despite manyflaws which remained.

Moreover, the very success of the Gwangju-related movements was in the end one of the main reasons for the decline in thepower of victim and opposition groups. After the 1995

Special Act and the trials ofChun and Roh, there was a sense of satisfaction among the general public that "most civic claims in Kwangju had been answered," andas a result,

"oppositional fervor weakened," leading to a decreased general interest in the actions of 6 the victim andopposition groups. No longer did the majority of citizens believe that calls for resistance against governmental oppression were needed. Indeed, ideologies such as minjung seemed anachronistic after 1987. Thus, the new competing narratives about Gwangju reflected this change. According to Lewis,

The changing character of May in Kwang ju, from lamentation to celebration ... is a consequence of an altered national political context, in which Kwangju has been transformed over twenty years from a site of local memory and mourningto a national sacred place and civic leaders can begin to reimage the city as an Asian 'Mecca of Democracy' rather than as the symbolic center of national oppositional political protest and resistance.7

6 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Menwry of May, 109-110. 7 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Menwry of May, 108.

125 The idea that Gwangju was a defeat disappeared because it became universally held that the democratization of South Korean politics became the culmination of Gwangju; the anniversary of May 18 became a "celebration" because it was the victory, at long last, of the Gwangju Upri sing and its spirit. Thus, the Uprising itself was no longer a mere valiant but futile effort by the people but instead foreshadowed the eventual triumph in

1987.

There are still many who push back against the new narrative, including direct

8 victims' groups and some academics. In this counter-narrative, there is an acknowledgement of the social divisions among the participants and the disproportionate suffering of the lower classes during and after the struggle. In the collections of eyewitness testimonials, many related their resentments against students, intellectuals,

and the wealthier residents whose stirring rhetoric did not match up with their actions, which belied a selfishness and callousness regarding the suffering of the victims .

Furthermore, cultural representations of Gwangju such as literary fiction, film, and television shows have retained a view of Gwangju that has focused on the victims and

other more unsettling characteristics of the Upri sing, rather than lauding its victories and

achievements.

In an ironic twist, although the democratization of the political arena resulted in a

diversification of claimants to the legacy of the Gwangju Uprising, it eventually led to a

reassertion of another dominant narrative about Gwangju which closely mirrored that of

the government. Whereas previously, Gwangju was a symbol of oppression and

8 For instance, historian Kyung Moon Hwang cautions against the recent privileging of Gwangju over other democratic struggles in Korean history, maintaining that the reaction to violence was the prime moti valor for the citizens' revolt rather than any aspirations for political change. See Kyung Moon Hwang, "Afterword," in Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Uprising in Ko rea's Past and Present, 136.

126 resistance, the unofficial narratives eventually coalesced around the dominant one featuring democratic activism and universal and humanisticthemes. Although before

1987, the official and unofficial narratives diverged sharply in the former's labeling of the Uprising as Communist-inspired riots and the latter's call for resistance against the oppressive state, by thelate 1990s, save for a few pockets of resistance the dominant official and unofficial lines converged in their emphases on the democratic origins and universal values of the Uprising.

The "Gwangju Spirit": Local to Universal, Resistance to Solidarity

The meaning and significance of the "Gwangju Spirit" have shifted in correspondence with the larger narrative. There was a belief in the "spirit" of Gwangju during the 1980s, but this version was closely linked to the minjung movement. Because the common interpretations of the Uprising before democratization were that it was an example of state oppression and demonstrated the need for resistance against both domestic and foreign powers, the two underlying themes were democratization

(minjuhwa) and autonomy (jajuhwa).9 "Democratization" in this sense not only meant liberalization of the political sphere but also a contradiction of the Chun regime's authoritarianism - in essence, resistance against the state. "Autonomy" connoted both socioeconomic independence from the authoritarian-capitalistic mode of economic development for the working and lower classes and political independence from foreign influence, especially from the United States. It was the citizens' actions - "their heroism and self-sacrifice" -rather than their values which were the key features of the Uprising, and hence, the Uprising's "spirit."10 Thus, the "Gwangju Spirit" during the 1980s was

9 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 148. 10 Lewis, LayingClaim to the Memory of May, 149.

127 heavily localized and dependent on the socioeconomic and political conditions of South

Korea at the time, and the key feature was the resistance of the people despite the odds.

After 1987, the "Gwangju Spirit" morphed into "a generalized concern for global 11 human rights" and democracy as the politicalvalues of the citizens were emphasized. In the new interpretations of the Uprising, the citizens "weredef ending human dignity," rather than merely reacting to the military's violence.12 Of course, joining the fight to avenge a loved one or deciding that such brutality could not continue unhindered were instances of defending human dignity, but the new perspectives were subtly different in that they implied that the citizens were not defending merely their own or their relatives and friends' human dignity, but everyone else's as well. The "Gwangju Spirit" was not reservedjust for Gwangju or even South Korea, but was to inspire movements around the globe.

Civic groups have been using Gwangju to make this link to universal human rights and then to actively advance the cause of human rights elsewhere. The group

KwangjuCitizens Solidarity (KCS) (Gwangju simin yeondae maim) organized a conference with the Asian Human Rights Commission in 1998, the 18th anniversary of the Uprising, which produced documents emphasizing the universal message of

Gwangju. Inthe "Kwangju Resolution on Human Rights," the authors declared that the

Uprising was "a landmark in the development of human rights movement in Asia," not

11 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 150. 12 Lewis, Laying Claimto the Memory of May, 149-150.

128 13 just in South Korea. The "Declaration of Asian Human Rights Charter in Kwang ju,

South Korea" went even further:

the determination of those who faced the massacre and gave their lives and the determination of the people of the Kwangju city to defend the honor of those who died and to keep the flame of solidarity alive and further the continuous influence of the Kwangju Massacre in the political life of [South] Korea as a whole is symbolic of the aspirations of the people to partfrom repression and militarism and to seek an altered world where human life is respected. 14

Ito Narihiko, a Japanese scholar at the conference, asserted that the people of Gwangju

"recovered the human dignity and fundamental freedomby defending 'thecommon refuge which God has provided all men against force and violence.' [They] recovered not

15 only [their] own but also all people's who had been suffered." The general consensus surrounding Gwangju at the time of the writing of the Asian Human Rights Charter was that the Uprising was one of the key turning points in the fight for human rights in South

Korea and the entire world. Another group, the May 18 Memorial Foundation (5.18 ginyeom jaedan), began handing out the "Gwangju Prize for Human Rights" to any

"individual or an organization that has struggled for or contributed to the improvement and advancement of human rights, democracy and peace in their community and

16 1 country." Past winners include Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma in 2004. 7 Examining the campaigns in which the Memorial Foundation is now participating or publicizing, such as the human rights of gay Africans and the China-Tibet issue, confirms the international

13 "Kwangju Resolution on Human Rights," in Kwangju Citizens' Solidarity and the Asian Human Rights Commission, Asian Human Rights Charter and 'Kwangju' (Gwangju: Chonnam National University Press, 1999), 21. 14 "Declaration of Asian Human Rights Charter in Kwangju, South Korea," in Kwangju Citizens' Solidarity and the Asian Human Rights Commission, Asian Human Rights Charter and 'Kwangju', 59. 15 Ito Narihiko, "Lessons from Kwangju," in Kwangju Citizens' Solidarity and the Asian Human Rights

Commission, Asian Human Rights Charter and 'Kwangju ', 151. 16 "Gwangju Prize for Human Rights," The May 18 Memorial Foundation, http://eng.518.org/easelmenu.es?mid=a50301010100. 17 She could not accept the prize until 2013 due to her house arrest by the military junta ruling Burmaat the time.

129 18 focus.

Closely linked to the change in the content of the "Gwangju Spirit" has been a broadening of the membership of the Uprising itself to include not just the victims and resistance fighters but also most ordinary citizens in both Gwangjuand the rest of South

Korea. This inclusivity is best shown in the shift in focus from the beginning and end of the Uprising, which were the periods of oppression and resistance, to the middle period of

"liberated Gwangju." Initially, Gwangju citizens and the opposition pointed to the citizens' nonviolence and cooperation mainly to counter the government's claims that an atmosphere of terror hung over the city as it was engulfed in riots. After democratization, since "liberated Gwangju" featured mass gatherings of the majority of the citizens who exhibited acts of solidarity and camaraderie across classes and other social divisions, it came to be viewed as a '"model' democratic society," an example of humans spontaneously creating a peaceful democratic order when left to their own devices.19 One

history of the Uprising declared that "through the realization of a community spirit of

selfless assistance ...the spirit of the Gwangju Democratic Uprising can continue to

shine brightly into the future."20 Academics also claimed that there was absolute unity

among the participants. Political scientist Choi Jung-woon argues that an "absolute community" formed in Gwangju during the first few days of the Uprising. The collective overrode the individual, and class divisions dissolved.21 Perhaps sociologist George

Katsiaficas goes the furthest with belief in the citizens' unity. He renames "liberated

18 "Campaigns," The May 18 MeJMrial Fountkltion, http://eng.5 18.org/easelboard.es?mid;a50503000000&bid=e003 1. 19 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 150-151. 20 The May 18 History Compilation Committee of Gwangju, The May 18 Gwangju Democratic Up rising, trans. Park O'bog and Gregory Lanza (Gwangju: The May 18 History Compilation Committee of Gwangju, 2010), 119, emphasis mine. 21 Choi Jung-woon, 'TheFonnation of an 'Absolute Community,'" in Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Up rising in Korea's Past andPresent, 7.

130 22 Gwangju" as the time ofthe "Gwangju Commune" after the Paris Commune of 1871.

To him, the GwangjuCommune exemplified universal values of unity, autonomy, peace, and democracy which inspired democratic movements around the world, helping to unleash the chain reaction of mass democratic movements around the world in the

23 1980s. Thus, in contrast to Lee Jae-eui's earlier criticism about the lack of political will and true unity among the populace other than anger at the state's actions, the new accounts argued that there was a true harmony and deep bonds of community.

Another key trope of the new iteration of the "Gwangju Spirit" has been the claim that the Uprising expressed the universal desire for democracy. It is now generally agreed that Gwangju had a significant role in South Korea's eventual democratization, particularly its effect in creating Chun' s legitimacy shortfall due to his leadership of the

24 military during the massacre. Yet, arguing that Gwangju contributed to democratization is a different contention than asserting that the citizens were politically motivated by the prospect of democracy and that 1987 was the realization of those aspirations, as the new narrative claims. Not only does this offer the same legitimation of the post- 1987 government that the new official narrative does, it opens the door for a universalizing message, with the assumption that democracy is a universal desire among the peoples of the world.

The extolment of the democratic features of the Uprising necessarily transformed

22 George N. Katsiaficas, "Remembering the Gwangju Uprising," in South Korean Democracy: Legacy of the Gwangju Up rising, ed.George N. Katsiaficas and Na Kan-chae (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 3. 23 Katsiaficas, "Remembering the Gwangju Uprising," 16-18. 24 See Cho Jung-kwan, "The Kwangju Uprising as a Vehicle of Democratization: A Comparative Perspective," in Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Up rising in Korea's Past and Present, 68-7 1; Young Whan Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 78; Shin, "Introduction,'' xxii; Choi Jang Jip, "Political Cleavages in South Korea," in State and Society in Contemporary Korea, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca : CornellUniversity Press, 1993), 35-36.

131 the narrative about Gwangjuinto one of victory for democracy. This interpretation canbe seen in a publication by the May 18 History Compilation Committee of Gwangj u, a subgroup of the May 18 Memorial Foundation, called TheMay 18 Gwangju Democratic

Up rising which articulates the history of the Uprising. 25 Although the brutality of the soldiers was one of the most important traits of the massacre and uprising, which was extensively chronicled in the volume, fundamentally, according to the authors, the

Gwangju citizens were not motivated by "a mere love of their own hometown or a simple rebellious spirit, but from a deep desire for democracy that even the oppression of the

2 authoriti es and their distorted propaganda could not erase." 6 Directly contrasting with the pessimism and disappointment of the 1980s, the volume declared that although "it

[initially] looked as if the Gwangju Democratic Uprising had failed," "the ultimate outcome of the Gwangju Democratic Uprising shows it should not be considered a painful, frustrated chapter in modem Korean history, but the beginning of the country's

28 democratization.'m Indeed, Gwangju was "a priceless victory in the end.'' By

articulating that the citizens had political motivations, one could reverse the earlier

disappointment at the initial military suppression and argue that the Uprising was a

victory for the citizens in the end with the democratic transition. Of course, the

endorsement of the idea that the demonstrators revolted because of their idealism ignores

the many opinions among participants and observers alike that self-defense was a major,

if not the key, motivation for the demonstrators as the violence escalated. Furthermore,

25 There were several editions of this book, the newest of which I will analyze. 26 The May 18 History Compilation Committee of Gwangju, The May 18 Gwangju Democratic Uprising, 115. The passages on brutality can be found on pp. 79-99. 27 The May 18 History Compilation Committee of Gwangju, The May 18 Gwangju Democratic Up rising, 48, 50. 28 The May 18 History Compilation Committee of Gwangju, The May 18 Gwangju Democratic Up rising, 116.

132 this account papers over the criticism by people such as Lee Jae-eui that the citizenry lacked any real political unity throughout the Uprising, and that the solidaritydisplayed was merely the product of a general anger against the state for the violence.

Gwangju came to be seen as a global center for democracy due to this argument that the demonstrators possessed an intrinsic democratic nature. For instance, a pamphlet published in 1995 by KCS cast Gwangju as a "Mecca of Democracy" whose people's

'"solemn struggle for democracy has moved the hearts of people across the world who have truly loved peace and freedom."' 29 The conspicuous reference to "Mecca" offers a vision of Gwangju as a place for pilgrimage for democracy activists. Furthermore, the pamphlet explicitly urges not just Korean activists but activists from around the world to make such a pilgrimage, since Gwangju embodied universal humanist values. There is no reference in the above words to the suffering of the Uprising's victims or revolutionary resistance by a people against oppression except a nod to a "solemn struggle," which merely connotes a subdued and nonviolent resistance. Then-president Kim Dae Jung, in a foreword he wrote in 2000 for the KCS publication TheKwangju Up rising: Eyewitness

Press Accounts of Korea's Ti ananmen, added that Gwangju "became a holy spot" as

30 "j ustice was done eventually" with the "victory for democracy." The rhetoric of

Gwangju being a holy site implicitly reiterated the theme of Gwangju as a "Mecca" of democracy.

On a side note, the very mention of "Tiananmen" in the book's title offers some

29 Quotedin Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at theMillennium," 149. 30 Kim Dae Jung, "Foreword," in The Kwangju Up rising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea 's Tiananmen, ed. Henry Scott-Stokes and Jai Eui Lee(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), xv.

133 insight into KCS's portrayal of the Uprising.31 On the surface, Gwangju was very much like the Tiananmen Square Massacre in that the movements failed to realize their goals after brutal government suppression. Thus, Tiananmen, which is much better known to foreigners, could be used to contextualize the GwangjuUpri sing for those who do not know much about it. On the other hand, the fact that Gwangju eventually turnedout to be a success in the eyes of most Koreans reveals the hope that perhaps Tiananmen can become China's Gwangju - namely, that the memory ofTiananmen will allow democratization to eventually be realized in China. Thus, the linkage of Tiananmen and

Gwangju is one more example of the civic groups' universalizing message in relation to

Gwangju.

The new narrative of the Uprising was also used to transform theimage of the city of Gwangjuitself and its surroundingregion of Jeollado into the geographical representation of the "Mecca of Democracy." Historically discriminated against by the

various governments which ruled the peninsula since the seventh century, the residents' frustration boiled over many times in the forms of several uprisings in the region.32 As a

31 Korean historian Bruce Cumings has also labeled Gwangju as "Korea's Tiananmen." 32 Some notable ones include: the Donghak Uprising in 1894, which was the largest peasant revolt in Korean history and precipitated the First Sino-Japanese War; a rebellion in Gwangju againstJapanese rule in 1929; the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion in 1948 by military forces against the Syngman Rhee government; the Gwangju Uprising in 1980. The Donghak Uprising was a revolt by peasants against corrupt government officials which rapidly spread and destabilized the ruling Joseon Dynasty. The government requested Chinese assistance in suppressing the revolt. Under a previous agreement, the Japanese were supposed to be notified of the incoming troop movements. The Japanese claimed the Chinese did not, and thus violated the treaty, and responded by sending their own forces into the peninsula, sparking a confrontation which turued into the First Sino-Japanese War. It was won convincingly by the Japanese in 1895. The 1929 rebellion was begun by Korean students on November 3, 1929 and spread to therest of the peninsula. Itis considered one of the most important Korean independence movements alongside the March 1 Independence Movement. The 1948 revolt was in response to an earlier uprising in the island ofJe ju. Military units ordered to suppress the uprising refused to go to Jejudo. Instead, they took control of the town of Yeosu, located in South Jeolla, and began killing hundreds of residents - ostensibly rightist supporters of the Rhee regime, but also massacring many others as well, After some initial victories, the Yeosu rebellion was crushed within a week. See also Sallie Yea, "Maps of Resistance and Geographies of Dissent in the ChOlla Region of South Korea," Ko rean Studies Volume 24 (2000): 71-80.

134 result of this history, the region of Jeolla gained an identity as a hotbed of not just oppo.sition to whichever government was in charge but also, due to economic and political marginalization, leftist politics stressing populism and socioeconomic equality; the Gwangju Uprising only confirmed this dominant image of Jeollado.33 After the

Uprising, Gwangju in the 1980s was "firmly embedded" in minjung discourse as the center of resistance, and Jeolla became "a counter-hegemonic space in South Korea's political landscape."34

In recent decades, however, the statuses and symbolism of Gwangju and Jeollado have been changing. Closely mirroring the development of the general narrative about

Gwangju, rather than Gwangju and Jeolla being geographic centers of resistance closely tied to the local history of oppression and discrimination, the focus has shifted to promoting the region as global centers of democracy and human rights?5 Sociologist

Sallie Yea argues that "Implicit in all efforts to reinvent South CM!la province and

Kwangju city is the desire to overcome their marginal position within Korea," a problem which "has been a perplexing one that has informed a large number of public discussions in the region over recent years."36 The civic groups thus seek to "reinvent the region" from one representing resistance to the aforementioned "Mecca of Democracy"; they

33 Yea, "Maps of Resistance and Geographies of Dissent in the CMlla Region of South Korea," 82. 34 Yea, "Maps of Resistance and Geographies of Dissent in the CMlla Region of South Korea," 89. Furthermore, Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, both fromGyeo ngsangdo, discriminated against Jeollado politically, by under-representing the number of cabinet members and bureaucrats from the region (while substantially over-representing their home region), and economically, by directing industrial development primarily in Gyeongsangdo and leaving Jeollado an iropoverished and agrarian economic system. The residents of Jeollado were naturally discontent. See David C. Kang, "Regional Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Korea," in Korea 's Democratization, ed. Samuel S. Kiro (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 166; Jeong-Ho Roh, "Crafting and Consolidating Constitutional Democracy in Korea," in Korea 's Democratization, 193-196; Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modem History (New York: London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 343; Sallie Yea, "Reinventing the Region: The Cultural Politics of Place in K wangju City and South ChOlla Province," in Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Uprising in Korea 's Past and Present, 112-1 19. 35 Yea, "Reinventing the Region," 128. 36 Yea, "Reinventing the Region," 120.

135 seek to break Gwangju and Jeollado out of the strictures imposed on them by history,

37 politics, andthe economy and create a broader, more inclusive, more positive identity.

Indeed, one of KCS 's main missions was to reinvent the region and city.38 It is evident then that the local identity politics and the broader narrative of the Gwangju Uprising are closely linked.

The "Gwangju Spirit" also contains a future-oriented approach. The universalizing message of Gwangju is a normative one which contains an implicit prediction of the future: Gwangju and its victorious aftermath exemplified what humanity strives for, and eventually, everyone will achieve these ideals. For example, in the

English translation of Kw angju Diary, published in 1999, Lee Jae-eui wrote in his preface that "the struggle of Kwangju still continues":

It is because our efforts to defend our dignity will continue, as long as the inhumanity of what happened in Kwangju exists anywhere in the world. Now, we will share the bitter experience we had to go through in Kwangju with the world, and with the new generations?9

Much of the minjung rhetoric which influenced Lee was retained in this passage. He mentioned the need for continued struggle in the face of incomplete victory (i.e., incomplete democratization and continued socioeconomic inequalities) and emphasized the "inhumanity" of the "bitter experience" Gwangju citizens faced. To Lee, the fi ght for democracy and human rights will persist indefinitely as long as there are oppressive

authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, even he looked to the future uses of the memory of the Uprising, as he argued that the lessons of Gwangju, both "bitter" and uplifting, could prove invaluable for the struggle in the future, led by the "new generations." It is in

37 Yea, "Reinventing the Region," 121. 38 Yea, "Reinventing the Region," 122. 39 LeeJae-eui, preface to Kwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyondthe Darkness of the Age, trans. Kap Su Seol and Nick Mamatas (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series, 1999), 15.

136 essence an argument that the past can inform the present and future, that it can always be used for a variety of causes.

Statements by prominent leaders in the Gwangjucommunity echoed this focus on the future. Civic groups such as KCS and the Memorial Foundation have spearheaded the push towards a reinterpretation of the Uprising among unofficial groups from a hard- edged resistance-based viewpoint towards a softer universalizing vision. The Chairman of the 17th Anniversary Events Committee stated in 1997 that the commemoration of

.w Gwangju was "not to remember the painful past, but to prepare for a new future." In that same year, even the chairman of the foremost victims' group, the Bereaved Families

Association (BFA), calledfor an end to "the so-calledanti-government struggle style of the past" in commemoration efforts because "an unhappy era has been brought to a close

41 and history is victorious." He reiterated the sentiment that Gwangju was in the end a victory - despite the struggles of the victims his group claims to represent - and also repeated a call to forget the past movements stressing struggle and resistance. The atmosphere of looking at Gwangju in a positive manner affected even the groups which should have been among the wariest about the recent tum of events. As Lewis comments,

"These lofty but non-specific aspirations anti.cipate a 'second phase' of the 5.18 movement in which Kwangju assumes a national, and intemati.onal, leadership role as a model for the development of democracy, and ...serves as an inspiration to people world-wide."42

40 Quoted in Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 148-149. 41 Jeong Su-man, quoted in Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 145. · 42 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 149.

137 In addition, I would argue that there is also an element of not wanting to deal with the past, as one sees in the aftermaths of many such catastrophes. These statements reveal both the forward-looking efforts of the civic groups and the hesitancy to recall a painful and uncomfortable past. While there is indeed a desire to highlight the massacre and military's illegitimacy, there is concurrently a general weariness of describing, or even a passive suppression of, the more awkward aspects of the Uprising, such as issues of social class and the present-day conditions of the direct victims, which I will examine in the next two sections.

In the new iteration of the "GwangjuSpirit," becausethe citizens showed the perseverance and compassion of humanity even during such a dire crisis, the lesson to be learnedfrom the event was that this spontaneous display of true human dignity could happen anywhere. Furthermore, the argument became, it should be encouraged in places where democracy and human rights were ignored.Proponents of the "Gwangju Spirit" have argued that the spirit of democracy and human rights which Gwangjurepre sents will ultimately be victorious, just as the people of Gwangju were victorious.

Civic Groups and Tension with Victims' Groups

Instrumental in the diffusion of the new narrative featuring the tropes of democracy, human rights, and universalism has been the rising influence ofcivic groups who sought to construct a narrative which moved away from the 1980s minjung and victim-centered rhetoric towards a more inclusive and universal message. KCS began in

1993 as a coalition of Gwangju-related groups and then became an independent organization advocating for greater civic participation in Gwangju-related projects, breaking the regional isolationof Gwangju and Jeollado, and spreading the "Gwangju

138 Spirit" to the international community.43 The May 18 Memorial Foundation was founded in 1994 from a variety of funding sources, including donations from victims, in order to

"provide a conduit for the flowof money into commemorative activities."44 The

Memorial Foundation seeks to "develop and maintain the Kwangju spirit through the 45 promotion of social, cultural, and research activities." The topic of victim compensation and assistance are not mentioned much, if at all.

The reason for this omission lay in the composition of the civic groups, which was one of the key factors in their emphases on the universal aspects of the Uprising and added a self-serving dimension to their promotion of the narrative. The membership of groups such as KCS included few survivors of the Uprising. Rather, members were nearly all professionals such as doctors, lawyers, professors, andjournalists.46 Although the common image of protests involves college students, the vast majority of participants in the Upri sing consisted of individuals from lower economic and social classes including laborers and the unemployed. In the older unofficial narratives, there really was no role for the middle class and professionals, although students were still prominent. The new interpretation of the Uprising allowed these non-victims to claim a part of the legacy of

Gwangju, a result which conflicted with the previously elevated position of direct victims' groups, who had more legitimate claims. Lewis thus argues that the "broader, more symbolic" democratic and universal narrative "empowers all Kwangju citizens, and,

43 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 149; Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 137-138; Yea, "Reinventing the Region," 122. 44Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 136. 45 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 137, 138. '6 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 149. Survivors who were part of KCS were college students or professionals during the Uprising. See Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 138.

139 at the same time, dilutes the privileged status of the direct victims' groups and weakens their a priori claims to civic leadership roles."47

In addition, the division between the civic groups and victims manifests itself in the call for objective discussion of the Uprising. Victims and victims' groups were seen to be too "emotional" and even "hysterical" in their retelling of the events of the Uprising and their demands for recognition, since they were directly involved in the massacre and

48 resistance. The overly subjective accounts of the Uprising, civic groups feared, would make the facts of the event unbelievable to other Koreans and to the outside world. Civic groups thus favored "disinterested" and "nonpartisan" accounts of the Uprising and

assumed the outside world placed more credence on objectivity in general because they

saw it as a better source of legitimacy than the unbridled passions of angry, bitter, and

distraught victims and their families. Stories of massacre can be easily exaggerated, and

for maximum believability, using outside objective sources was the best way to prove the

authenticity of the events.

This preference was illustratedin volumes such as Kw angju in the Ey es of the

49 World, which KCS published in 1997. The chairman of a local newspaper which

cosponsored a press conference celebrating the publication admitted that the volume

"excluded Kwangju residents not only to make the events of May 1980 more accessible

to the outside world, but also to make the volume more objective."50 The book's preface

states:

47 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 151. 48 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 151. 49 A later edition of thisvolume became The Kwangju Up rising: Ey ewitness Press Accounts of Korea's Tiananmen, which added testimonies of Korean journalists. 50 Lewis, l.nying Claim to the Memory of May, 140-141.

140 In the searchfor truth, objectivity is always deemed the prerequisite. History, like science, demands an unimpassioned observer to chronicle its events. It hopes that, from his unbiased vantage point, this onlooker will be able to balance the scales, absorb the circumstances, intentions, motivations, and consequences, and come out with a story that tells the whole tale. Thus the modem world has chosen the foreign correspondent as its historian - hoping that his eyes, unmoved by patriotism or ideologic concerns, will not be blinded; praying that his story, unfettered by censorship or national security concerns, will be related in its 51 entirety.

First, "truth" is the main objective, rather than material compensation, a subtle distinction which characterizes one of the key dividing lines between civic and victims' groups.

Second, the implicit argument is that foreign journalistswere uninfluenced either by the state or the victims, both of whom were inherently subjective due to their direct involvement in the uprising. Of course, the idea that foreign journalistscan be wholly objective is very misleading, and the accounts by the reporters in the books show clearly that their sympathies lay with the protesters. Furthermore, equating a journalistto a historian does not bode well to the former's objectivity, since the general consensus at present is that the historian's role is inevitably to be a subjective analyst of the past.

The new democratic and universalizing narrative is an inclusive one, broadening the Uprising's participants and legacies to include non-victims in Gwangju and the supporters of democracy in South Korea as a whole. In short, everyone was included. But the ascendance of the civic groups and their largely middle class membership who disseminated thisnarrati ve meant that the status of the previously prominent victims' groups was unavoidably diminished. As a result, direct victims and their difficulties were marginalized.

51 Quoted in Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millenniwn," 151. The full bibliographical information is as follows: Kwangju Citizens Solidarity, Kwangju in the Eyes of the World (Kwangju: P'ulpit Publishing Co., 1997).

141 Left Behind: The Continued Suffering of Direct Victims and the Issue of Social

Class

Direct victims of the Uprising and victims' groups used to be the most visible leaders of the May Movement. Victims. of the Uprising were examples of the effects of state oppression, and their calls for recognition were largely ignored by the government during the 1980s. Efforts to hold ceremonies for the dead were suppressed and compensation was meager, generating much sympathy from the general public. For instance, the Bereaved Families Association (5. 18 Kwangju Minjung Hangjaeng

Yujokhoe) (BFA), the first group related to the uprising to spring up, once had a prominent position in leading the movement to publicize the massacre and its victims, especially since funeral rites are of great importance in Korean culture. 52 The BFA was at the forefront of the struggle by victims and other unofficial groups to memorialize and publicize the uprising during the oppression of the Chun regime and many members were arrested for their efforts. 53 The government's prevention of mourning by relatives at the

Old Mangweoldong Cemetery until l985 added to the moral legitimacy ofthe victims and victims' groups. 54 Their claim to the legacy of Gwangju was strongest during this time.

Yet, the very success of the victims in having their suffering acknowledged and getting paid compensation led to a decline in status in the 1990s and onward. Due to compensation laws passed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the convictions of Chun and

Rob in 1996, and the citizens' growing desire to know "the truth" being greater than seeing victims materially compensated, "public sympathy for them had run its course"

52 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," !53. 53 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May , 112-116. 54 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement andCivil Society at the Millennium," 154.

142 and "further claims or demands [were] seen as selfish and greedy, ... [and] as narrowly

55 self-serving." Furthermore, whereas leaders of the Uprising continued to play active roles in the democracy movement in the decades afterward, large swaths of the public seemed to believe that "the directly affected 5.18 groups have really been progovernment in the sense that they have not been opposed to the government per se but have worked for compensation, and their leaders have acted more as representatives of interest groups

56 in negotiations with the government." Essentially, the victims' groups were seen to be serving private interests, whereas the civic groups supposedly served public interests.

Despite the prominence of democracy and human rights in the new Gwangju narrative and the political sphere, with the shift from the minjung themes of resistance, dissent, and class and the achievement of many of their goals, the victims were in a sense marginalized and revictimized by South Korean society.

For instance, as recently as 1995, almost 10,000 people showed up tothe BFA's

57 memorial rites at Old Mangweoldong Cemetery on May 18. After the creation of the new Gwangju cemetery and the establishment of an official ceremony in 1997, however, the BFA's ceremony was moved a day earlier to May 17, and the crowds dwindled from

58 thousands to a few hundred people. Lewis asserts that the "shift from the central spot on the commemorative events calendar is symbolic of the group's displacement from

59 power." It has gotten to the point that those "who oppose the memorialization and commodification of the Kwangju uprising make a conscious effort to visit the old cemetery as a form of passive protest," despite the new official cemetery and ceremonies

55 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 152. 56 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memoryof May, 132. 57 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 154. " Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 154. 59 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millenniwn," 154.

143 purportedly celebrating the victims.60 The old conflict between state and public has almost been reproduced, except that the ''public" in this situation constitutes a minority of society.61

With the shift in national focus, victims still suffer decades after the event. In a survey of 67 injured victims of the Uprising and 50 non-victims conducted in 1994 and

1995, medical anthropologist Juna Byun found that the health conditions of the victims were still much worse than those of the non-victims. Victims experienced somatic or physical ailments such as heart problems and dizziness at a rate more than two times that of the non-victims.62 Furthermore, 92 percent of the victims had symptoms of post-

3 traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), or over nine times more than non-victims.6 A separate study conducted in South Korea in 1990 found that 42 percent of Upri sing victims experienced physical health problems as a direct result of the event, 19 percent had mental health problems, and 30 percent dealt with both.64 These injuries and diseases have had serious long-term consequences for the victims, causing not only chronic physical and mental pain but also preventing many from working or continuing to go to

school.65 Worse still, the victims have had inadequate or non-existent support systems or treatment plans to manage their conditions. Furthermore, the victims have suffered in

0 6 Yea, "Reinventing the Region," 124. In 61 fact, the new cemetery has produced a rather complicatedweb of approval and loyalty. Because victims' groups and victims' families sought to represent and celebrate "the heroic deeds of those citizens who gave their lives in the struggle" and desired "that the central role of the victims and comrades should be given precedence" in the commemorations and memorial s, many membersof the victims' groups actually believe that the new cemetery does a betterjob in giving victims recognition than the old cemetery, with its empty graves, worsening condition, and low visibility. See Sallie Yea, "Rewriting Rebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea: The (Re)presentation of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising Through Mangwol dong Cemetery," Urban Studies, Vol. 39, No. 9 (2002): 1569. 62 Juna Byun, 'The 15 Year Aftermath Trauma," in The 1980 Kwangju Uprising After 20 Years: The Unhealed Wounds of the Victims, ed. Juna Byun and Linda Lewis (Seoul, South Korea: Dahae Publishers, 2000), 144. 63 Byun, "The 15 Year Aftermath Trauma," 146. 64 Byun, 'The 15 Year Aftermath Trauma," 147-148. 65 Byun, 'The 15 Year Aftermath Trauma," 151-160.

144 material terms, despite the passage of compensation laws. The unemployment rate among victims was five times higher, and victims generally had fi nancial difficultiesafter the

Uprising.66 The vast majority of the dead victims were members of the working class or unemployed, and this trend has held for survivors.67 In addition, "throughout the 1980s, the direct victims tended to remain poor, with many actually suffering downward mobility."68 One of the consequences has thus been frustration and rage on the part of the victims, who have largely been forgotten by the rest of Korean society in the last couple of decades.69

This picture of the victims provides a jarring contrastto the narrative of Gwangju as a heroic victory for its participants. As academic Hang Kim argues, the victims' lives remain "as a never-ending battle with pain and nightmares. Although the incident has been called a sacred protest to protect democracy, it remains as it really was and will never be erased for actual participants."70 The Gwangju Uprising and its aftermath might have been triumphant for the rest of South Koreans, but theactual victims, both participants and bystanders alike, have continued to suffer immensely. Even worse, the free, democratic society that the struggle supposedly created turned its back on those who were at the front lines. Lewis notes the hypocrisy in the societal atti tudes toward the victims, commenting that "it would seem the promotion of 'human dignity' surely should

6 6 Byun, "The 15 Year Aftermath Trauma," 138, 162-163. 67 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at theMillennium," 155. 68 Lewis, "Commemorating Kwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium," 155. 69 Byun, "The 15 Year Aftermath Trauma," 162. 70 Hang Kim, "The Commemoration of the Gwangju Uprising: of the Remnants in the Nation States' Historical Memory." Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 12, No. 4 (2011): 620. Kimreceived a Ph.D. from the Graduate School of Interdisciplinary Cultural Studies at the University of Tokyo.

145 extend to a renewed civic concern for the quality of the lives of 5.18 victims and for such

m related issues as the treatment of the disabled in Korea.'

The division between the civic groups and victims' groups, briefly mentioned in the previous section, barely conceals the deep socioeconomic rifts which existed even during the time of the Uprising itself. Despite the narrative of "absolute community" and solidarity, divisions festered beneath the surface, especially those of social class. "Petty wage earners," part-timers, and the unemployed made up the vast majority of the

72 resistance fighters - over four-fifths. The core of the Citizens' Army consisted of mostly young laborers who fought for goal of ousting soldiers out of city and defending

73 against brutality, not mainly for immediate democratic transformation. Of course, these facts are almost never touched on in the texts which articulate the mainstream narrative of the Uprising, since a key characteristic was the supposed solidarity of the demonstrators bound tightly together by a burgeoning optimism for the future, especially in the political sphere. Sociologist Kim Doo-Sik, like Lewis, pushes back against the narrati ve of the

Upri sing as a "monolithic or uniform" movement "faithful to the position and interest of a particular group" such as college students, instead urging that it "be understood as

74 having various meanings." One of these meanings is how social class created divisions among the demonstrators.

Many of the Korean witness testimonials released since 1987 reveal citizens' resentment toward the students and professionals' hypocrisy during the fighting and in

71 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 154. 72 KimDoo-Sik, "'Meaning Construction' of the Kwangju Pro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame," Korea Journal (Summer 1999): 210. 73 Ahn Jong-chul, "Simin'gun: The Citizens' Army During the Kwangju Uprising," in Contentious Gwangju: The May 18 Up rising in Korea 's Past arul Present, eds. Gi-Wook Shin and Kyung Moon Hwang (Lanham, MD:Rowman & LittlefieldPublishers, Inc., 2003), 11-21. 74 Kim, "'Meaning Construction' of the Kwangju Pro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame," 220.

146 the prisons?5 One person scoffed that students, professors, and human rights activists

"were busy running away" rather than fighting.76 Anotherpointed out that "it was lower- class citizens that fought with guns.'m Another thought that students "were the very people to be entitled to demonstrate," implying that this was so because the students were removed from socioeconomic realities.78 One prisoner criticized the students for being

"selfish and arrogant rather than exemplary" despite their words, claiming that "they were egotistic enough to disrupt communal life" and that the other prisoners "came to doubt and distrust them."79 Finally, at an interview room before a trial, students and professors obtained a great deal of fruit and vitamin tablets, but they ignored and did not offer any of the food to a man of a lower-class background when he went into the room to do errands.80 If the participants in the Uprising did indeed dream of a world different from the one in which they were living, the key characteristics were, according to Kim, primarily stability and socioeconomic equality and justice.81 The solidarity displayed in

Gwangju, to the working classes, exemplified the ideal of equality in which even the lower classes were treated with dignity.

Furthermore, the membership of the Gwangju-related organizations fo llowed class lines. Kim divides the organizations into two categories: "a lower-class group composed of bereaved family members and wounded people, and a group consisting of

75 Kim, '"Meaning Construction' of the Kwangju Pro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame," 209- 210, 219, 221-223. 6 7 Quoted in Kim, "'Meaning Construction' of the Kwangju Pro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame," 209. 77 Quoted in Kim, '"Meaning Construction' of the Kwangju Pro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame," 209. 78 Quoted in Kim, '"Meaning Construction' of the Kwangju Pro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame,'' 210. 79 Quoted in Kim, '"Meaning Construction' of the Kwangju Pro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame," 221. 80 Kim, '"Meaning Construction' of the Kwangju Pro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame," 221. 81 Kim, '"Meaning Construction' of the Kwangju Pro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame," 212- 213.

147 those arrested and those related with opposition movement organizations. "82 The arrested are distinguished here because many of those detained were activists and leaders of the political opposition, thus granting them a different status than the other victims. 83 The occupations of the members of the first group are similar to those of the dead: most are poor and part of the working-class and over three-fourths of the members have a high school education or lower. 84 Meanwhile, the groups representing the arrested and part of the broader opposition consisted of mostly professionals and activists.85 Thus, Kim argues that the civic groups represent the interests of the organization and democracy movement leaders, rather than advocating for the lower-class, whose interests of

6 socioeconomic equality and justice do not quite match those of the leaders.8

The new narrative's papering over of issues of social class andbroadening of the definition of "participant" in the Upri sing contributedto the decline of the status of direct victims, who were mostly of the lower classes. By emphasizing the role of activists and

students while simultaneously allowing all Korean citizens to lay claim to Gwangju, the end result is that the direct victims and their poverty - which continues today - are once

again ignored by the rest of Korean society. It is true that most sectors of society in

Gwangju did support the resistance in some way and students led the initial protests and

worked in the various committees to stabilize the city and negotiate with the military. But

the new construction of the Gwangju narrative has largely ignored the disproportionate

82 Kim, "'Meaning Construction' of the Kwangju Pro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame," 224. 83 Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 132-133. 84 Kim, "'Meaning Construction' of the Kwangju Pro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame," 224-

225 . 85 Kim, '"Meaning Construction' of theKwangju Pro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame," 225. 86 Kim, '"Meaning Construction' of the Kwangju Pro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame," 227.

148 suffering of the direct victims and the various divisions that were present during the

Upri sing, to the detriment of both the victims and a better understanding of the event.

Cultural Representations of the Uprising: Literature, Film, and Television

Despite the hegemonic nature of the democratic and universalizing narrative of

Gwangju, the older minjung and victim-based narrati ve still thrives in the Uprising's portrayals in literature, film, and television. Historian Don Baker findsthe approach of depi cting the Gwangju citizens "as innocent victims who were mostly apolitical until they were attacked by Chun Doo Hwan's paratroopers" to be especially prominent in the

87 cultural representations of Gwangju. Especially in literature, the focus is on "the innocent victims who suffered from the brutal military assault on Kwangju rather than the

88 leaders who called out for democracy and fought against the martial law forces."

Perhaps the reason for this is that literature and filmboth need drama, tension, and a level of moral ambiguity in order to succeed artistically. In addition, it is important to note that many of the prominent writers of the Uprising were followers of the minjung movement, participants in the Uprising, or were also from Jeollado - sometimes all three. These

89 include the novelists Hwang Sok-yong and lm Cheol-woo and the poet Kim Jun Tae.

According to writer and French literature professor Ch'oe Hyun-mu, who has written under the penname Ch'oe Yun, Korean literature in the 1970s and 1980s was marked by

"a historically critical conscience," reflecting authors ' desires to affect change in

90 society. Thus, the literature on Gwangju has been heavily tilted towards narratives of

8 7 Don Baker, "Victims and Heroes: Competing Visions of May 18," in Contentious Gwangju: The May 18 Up rising in Korea's Past andPresent, eds. Gi-Wook Shin and Kyung Moon Hwang (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 91. 8 8 Baker, "Victims and Heroes: CompetingVisions of May 18," 93. 89 Yea, "Maps of Resistance and Geographies of Dissent in the CMlla Region of South Korea," 82. 90 Ch'oe Yun and Mark Morris, "South Korea's Kwangju Uprising: Fiction andFilm," The Asia-Pacific Journal (February I, 2010). http://www.japanfocus.org/-Ch_oe-Yun/3297.

149 dissent, resistance, and state oppression, which lend themselves easily to the fi rst victim- based approach as articulated by Baker above.

One such story is "Spring Day" (Bomna[), which investigates the immense guilt of a survivor of the Upri sing, which is a source of trauma rather than elati on. The story, written by Im Cheol-woo and published in 1984, follows a group of friends who are trying to visit Sangju, a young man who may or may not have ignored his fr iend's pleas to be let into his home and escape the police; his guilt over this incident drove him mad and caused him to go to the hospital. Sangju' s plight causes the narrator to pose the following questions to the reader: "How do you move on? How do you keep on living

91 after something like Kwangju?" According to the narrator, the answer is to just try to keep living; "perhaps there was no other way for us but to live with those somber

m memories constantly shadowing our daily lives.' In a previous confrontation with

Sangju, the narrator exclaims, "'Some things need to be forgotten. In the end, forgetting is the only remedy we have for things we can do nothing about. ...Living is not at all

93 dishonorable or shameful !ike you say. It is a blessing, isn't it?'" According to Susie Jie

Young Kim, the translator of the story, "In order to survive trauma, the story seems to

94 say, one must somehow understand that its effects are not fleeting, but lasting." To mitigate the durability of the Uprising's trauma, therefore, Im seems to be suggesting that

Gwangju needs to be forgotten to an extent, because otherwise it will steadily consume the lives it has directly impacted.

"There a Petal Silently Falls" (Jeogi sori eopsihanje om kkotnip-i jigo) also

91 Susie Jie Young Kim, "Remembering Trauma: History and Counter-Memories in Korean Fiction," Manoa, Vol. 11, No. 2, The Wounded Season: New Writing from Korea(Winter, 1999), 45. 921mCheol Woo, "Spring Day," translated by Susie Jie Young Kim,Manoa !!, No. 2 (1999): 60. 93 lm, "Spring Day," 55-56. 94 Susie Jie Young Kim, "Remembering Trauma," 45.

150 tackles the question of forgetting a traumatic event. It is a short story first published in

1988 by Ch'oe Yun. The violence in the story is strikingly andinfam ously depicted in the film adaptation A Petal, discussed later in this section, but the .sense of shame, regret, and desire to hide the past is more perceptible in the written story. The protagonist is a teenage girl who is traumatized by the events in Gwangju to the point of mental illness, having seizures from time to time and generally unresponsive to the outside world. She follows a man around, thinking he is her dead brother, much to his chagrin. The man is disturbed by her presence: "The sight of her fi lled him with dread, made his hair stand up, and he felt as if the intoxication that had spread throughout his limbs was suddenly being

95 swept away." In a similar fashion, the memory of the Gwangju Uprising makes South

Korean society uncomfortable in the midst of their celebrated economic development and tum towards democratic government. He beats and rapes her to drive her away, but she remains by his side until near the end of the story. He wonders why she is in her mental condition and only later does he connect her to the rumors of the "nightmare" in

96 Gwangju.

The girl represents not just Gwangju and its residents and their treatment both during and after the Uprising, but also the conflicted nature of its remembrance. There is both a desire to forget and a fear of forgetting. The girl herself attempts to form a "black curtain" to shield herself from her past. She knows that if she ever did "think back," the curtain would dissolve. But the girl admits that the curtain "never existed," indicating that

97 she never successfully repressed her memories. But although she desires such a curtain

95 Ch'oe Yun, There a Petal Silently Fa lls, tran s. Bruce Fulton and Ju-Chan Fulton (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 9. 96 Ch'oe, There a Petal Silently Falls, 55. 97 Ch'oe, There a Petal Silently Falls, 62.

151 for protection, she also does not want to be forgotten. When she speaks to her brother as if he were actually there with her, she urges, "Just make sure you don't put your hands over your ears while I'm talking. If you do, I'll tum to dust. Now that I think about it,

98 I've died and come back to life again and again. " The man is also afraid that "the girl would end up just like those coins, slipping through his fi ngers, trampled by countless feet, covered with earth, and forgotten for all time," just as the residents of Gwangju were

99 concernedthat their struggles would be ignored and forg otten. The memory of Gwangju screams to be heard. The government and people linked to it have tried to bury the past, but Gwangju has always found a way to be remembered time and again. In this story, the

Uprising again acts as a traumatic event that torments a character to the point of insanity.

At the same time , forgetting the event by the larger society is just as harmful in the long run, because then people such as the girl will be abandoned to their fates. Furthermore, the attempt to forget will fail in any case, since the memory of Gwangju will continue to haunt Korean society and become increasingly distorted, just as the girl followed the worker wherever he went and grew more incomprehensible.

"Parched Season" (Mok mareun gyejeol), written by Kong Sonok and published in 1993, is another work which casts Gwangj u in an ambi valent light, exploring the struggles of the surviving residents of Gwangju twelve years afterMay 1980. All of the characters are on the margins of society: an unemployed divorced mother (the narrator); a barowner who has two children from different fathers, with one teenage child being both deaf and mute; a woman with an artificial leg; an unemployed poet. Despite some idle conversation about Kim Dae Jung and his electoral defeat in the 1992 presidential

98 Ch'oe, There a Petal Silently Falls, 65. 99 Ch'oe, There a Petal Silently Falls, 57.

152 election to Kim Young Sam, politics is largely absent fromthe characters' conversations.

In the middle of the story, there is a drought. Just as the water supply dries up, the hopes and life prospects of the characters, which were never great to begin with, also wither away, leading one woman to commit suicide. The drought can also represent the disappointment in the democratic reforms as the characters ' lives are still in terrible shape. This "frightening reality of trying to survive" certainly does not match up with the

100 optimistic and victorious narrative of Gwangju after 1987.

Yet the protagonist, partly at the urging of the neighbor of the dead woman, pledges to endure, since nothing can be done with death. The message of the story is similarto that of "Spring Day": the best solution is to continue living rather than to give

up: Although she is talking about enduring constant noise next to her apartment, this · statement can easily be used to describe what many victims felt: "There was nothing I

101 could do but suppress my emotions and just get on with my life." Hyonsun, the bar owner, laments that

History is a specter. It latches onto the people who are connected to certain events, and it even drags off those who just happen to know those people. When an unconnected person encounters a connected person, she unexpectedly gets eaten up by that voracious specter. There's not one free person in history. That's . . . 102 JUSt hOW It IS. But the narrator rebukes her, declaring, '"History continues because we live. We mustn't die. Nothing can be done through death, and nothing can be connected through

103 it. "' Even if history dealt them an unfair hand, they must persevere; even if people are prisoners of history, they have at least the freedom to live, and they must exercise that fr eedom. Thus, in the case of the Gwangju victims, the message seems to be that even as

100 Kong Sonok, "Parched Season,'' translated by Susie Ji Young Kim,Manoa 11, No. 2 (1999): 165. 101 Kong, "ParchedSeason," 162. 102 Kong, "Parched Season," 177. 103 Kong, "Parched Season," 177.

153 they have been brutalized and then ignored, the only way to possibly fight that miserable fate is to endure.

The Old Garden ( Orae doen jeongwon), a novel by prominent South Korean author Hwang Sok-young published in 2000, is a much more political work which roundly criticizes the direction the nation has gone since the Gwangju Uprising from the perspective of the left and minjung acti vism. The two protagonists, Hyun Woo and Yoon

Hee, are members of the student movement, although at varying levels of enthusiasm.

Hyun Woo and the other student activists who appear in the book are clearly radical leftists, criticizing the evils of capitalism, voicing the need for labor acti vism, and giving

104 one another letters from Che Guevara to Fidel Castro. Even Yoon Hee, who often criticizes the student movement, includes quotes from the Marxist activist Rosa

105 Luxemburg in her letters to Hyun Woo. These activists are clearly members and

106 articulators of the budding minjung movement.

Although Hyun Woo was involved in the Uprising, the book spends little time on describing the event its.elf. What descriptions are given are shown through the pamphlets that Yoon Hee is helping to type up and distribute. The citizens are heroic in these accounts: men and women hold sticks, butcher knives, and steel pipes as weapons as they face the heavily armed soldiers. Taxi drivers lead the charge down Geumnam Street. But although they display great courage, the soldiers are merciless, kicking and beating

104 Hwang Sok-yong, The Old Garden, trans. Jay Oh (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2009), 41. 105 Hwang, The Old Garden, 60-61. 106 The use of ftrst-person narration often makes it seem as if it is not really the characters speaking, but Hwang himself. Hwang is famous not just for his writing, which is already very political, but for his direct activism, such as publishing Kwangju Diary under his name for greater recognition, opposing the military regime in general, visiting North Korea when it was banned, and attempting to organize a "Peace Train" from Europe to Korea Hewas jailed for his activities, and Hyun Woo's experiences in prison obviously mirror Hwang's own.

154 07 anyone they can lay their hands on, firing tear gas and smashing skulls.1 The citizens are valiant in their resistance. But yet again, their political and democratic aspirations are largely absent; the focus is on military violence and the citizens' courage under fire.

Moreover, given their radical politics, when Hyun Woo and his former activist colleagues visit the new cemetery, it is not surprising that they dislike it, which to Hyun Woo resembles "another kind of pri son," and much prefer the Old Mangweoldong Cemetery,

1 8 which feels "real" and "warm and comfortable." 0 The city itself has changed to the point where Hyun Woo is not stirred by the mere mention of the name. Instead, it now

9 sounds "like a famous tourist attraction."10

As the aftermath of the 1987 reforms are central to the new mainstream narrative of Gwangju, the pessimistic description of the changes in South Korea since the 1980s deprives readers of the happy ending that is so integral to the victory narrative. 1987 is not the culmination of democratic activists' efforts, but is instead the beginning of the

"failure" of movements such as labor, since the masses withdrew from the discourse once direct presidential elections were secured.110 1987, in Hyun Woo's-and Hwang's - eyes, is "cursed" for stuntingthe high expectations for true revolution among the activists.111

Democratization was cosmetic. Indeed, Hyun Woo maintains that the 1993 transition to the civilian Kim Young Sam government "was in essence only a controlled transition from military dictatorship at the conclusion of more than thirty years of modemization."112 Furthermore, the hollowness of South Korean society and politics is

107 Hwang, The Old Garden, 354"356. 108 Hwang, The Old Garden, 41. 109 Hwang, The Old Garden, 29-30. 110 Hwang, The Old Garden, 427. 111 Hwang, The Old Garden, 535. 112 Hwang, The Old Garden, 534.

155 highly disappointing to Hyun Woo and Yoon Hee. Money and wealth have become "the most important basis for relationships" and politics is rife with "hypocrisy and

113 opportunism." This is clearly not the world that Hyun Woo and his friends envisioned when they decided to sacrifice everything to transform their country.

The Old Garden is therefore one more example of the victim-based approach to representing Gwangju, although the characters in this story are victimized more by broader historical circumstance rather than any direct participation in the Uprising.

According to Baker, the book "suggests that the people caught up in the events of May 18

114 were victims, or at least caught up in events beyond their contro1." For example,

"[Hyun Woo's] life is more tragic than heroic, and he is more to be pitied than admired," while Yoon Hee is not quite a hero either, acting as a "passive activist ...who drifts through life rather than someone who makes a conscious decision to dedicate her life to

115 struggling against injustice and oppression." The Old Garden is a tragic story which is unlikely to inspire readers in its description of the characters or its criticism of the direction that South Korea has taken in the last several decades. As a result, to Hwang,

Gwangju is not a victory, nor does it provide many lessons to the rest of the world. It is

still a work in progress as long as South Korea remains stuck in its current state of affairs.

Although it does not contain the strong political stances of The Old Garden, the

television drama Sandglass (Morae sigye), which ran in the early part of 1995, also offers

a narrative of Gwangju which clashes considerably with the post- 1987 narrative. One of

the most-watched Korean television shows of all time, it was so popular that "streets

Ill Hwang, TheOld Garden, 527. 114 Baker, "Victims andHeroes: Competing Visions of May 18," 95. 115 Baker, "Victims and Heroes: Competing Visions of May 18," 95.

156 emptied as people rushed home to catch it."116 Although it featured standard tropes such as a love triangle andcriminals with hearts of gold, it was notable in that the social and political issues of the 1960s to the 1980s were prominent in the plot, settings, and characters' backgrounds. In particular, Sandglass was the first television drama to portray the Gwangju Uprising, paving the way for other television shows and films to do the same.

The depiction of the massacre and the uprising featured an apolitical populace motivated by the wanton violence perpetrated against them by the soldiers. The show mixed in actual footage of the protests but also reenacted much of the random beatings and shootings. The city is in chaos as soldiers pull passengers out of taxis, enter a room full of studying students and beat them, and just indiscriminately beat anyone in sight.

They also begin random shootings, for instance killing a pregnant woman who is merely watching prisoners being hauled into a truck. The hospitals are overflowingwith the dead and wounded. The citizens are resilient and cooperative in this time of crisis, however.

They bring food and water for the Citizens Army, and there are long lines at the hospital as people wait to donate blood.

Overall, the depiction of the Uprising in the drama is morally ambiguous, as the demonstrators are not wholly respectable and the soldiers are not evil per se. First, the morally upright character, Woo-suk, who is studying to become a prosecutor, is a soldier during the Uprising, helping to suppressthe demonstrations, albeit unwillingly. His fri end in the unit is from Gwangju and is afraid he will be recognized by the locals when he is beating the protesters. The other protagonist, a gangster called Tae-soo, and his former gangster friend Jin-soo join in the resistance after Jin-soo' s mother is attacked and his

116 Shin, "lntroduction,n xxvi.

157 love interest is shot dead. This twist casts a morally ambiguous shadow on the

7 motivations of both sides.11 Perhaps the demonstrators were not the pure citizens as represented in the new narratives of the Uprising. Perhaps the soldiers were not two dimensional evil and unthinking weapons of oppression.

Moreover, political motivations among the demonstrators are absent. For instance,

Jin-soo initially attacked student demonstrators on May 18 for wasting their educational opportunity and for potentially disrupting his mother's restaurant business. However, he becomes a fe rvent member of the protests, and later the Citizens' Army, after his loved ones are attacked by the soldiers. His example illustrates the main reason the ranks of the protests swelled in pre- 1987 accounts of the Uprising: joining the resistance was a reaction to the violence, especially that against relatives and fri ends. The other demonstrators yell out slogans, but although cries such as "End Martial Law" are present, it is more a reflection of the harshness of the oppression and the people's reaction toward

it, rather than chants for democracy. First and foremost, the citizens call for the

authorities to apologize for their actions. The citizens do not feel like they did anything to

warrant the beatings and shootings. Jin-soo's mother exclaims, "We didn't do anything to

deserve this!" The portrayal of the Uprising in Sandglass is consistent with the

eyewitness accounts from the 1980s which underscore the appalling brutality of the

military and the confusion of the civilians, while deemphasizing political idealism among

the protesters.

The filmA Petal (kkotnip) , based on Ch' oe' s story, is also focused on the latent

violence inherent in human beings, which seriously clashes with the narrative of inborn

dignity and compassion put forth by the new narrative. Released in 1996, it was one of

117 Baker, "Victims and Heroes: Competing Visions of May 18," 99.

158 the first fe ature films to deal with the Uprising. The director, Jang Sun-woo, stated that A

Petal is '"a movie that reveals how human beings disintegrated under violence"' and that he '"chose to make a detour to disclose the brutality of political violence through the

8 ordeals of an innocent girl who falls prey to sexual exploitation. "'11 And indeed, everyone is capable of violence in the film. The soldiers beat and shoot the civilians in front of Provincial Hall in a riveting portrayal of the bloody events of May 21. Struggling workers and regular citizens repeatedly abuse and rape the girl. Even the girl does everything in her power to break her dead mother's iron grip on her arm in order to escape, an act which contributes to her mental instability. According to film scholar Kim

Kyung Hyun, "A Petal holds not only the former presidents of Korea who gave the orders to shoot in Kwangju accountable for the girl's loss of sanity but also ordinary people who passionately championed reactionary politics." Even Jang, who as a construction worker is part of the minjung, "is capable of becoming a fascist, a beastly man who envies power

9 and unleashes violence."11

The girl herself is innocent and completely apolitical. She is a victim of violence by the state and by ordinary people around her who take advantage of her condition, mirroring the violence done to Gwangju and the constant discrimination faced by the region historically. Kim makes the connection between the girl's mental state and the effects of the Uprising on Gwangju, its citizens, and memory of the event: "The nation's attempt to restore order has produced the girl 's mental disorder. Her inability to speak except for occasional mumblings and her failure to regain her memory reflect the

118 Quoted in Lewis, Laying Claim to the Memory of May, 169 n. 15. 119 Kim Kyung Hyun, "Post-Trauma and Historical Remembrance in Recent South Korean Cinema: Reading Park Kwang-su's 'A Single Spark' (1995) and Chang SOn-u's 'A Petal' (1996)," Cinema Journal Vol. 41, No. 4 (Summer, 2002): 110.

159 120 contested historiography of Kwangju." Moreover, the fact that few people actually try to help her illustrates how the nation did not make much effort to truly come to terms with the tragedy and its complexities. The girl's continued madness reflects how

Gwangju "does not - and cannot- simply fade away once the politicians and the soldiers

1 1 who are responsible are punished." 2 Instead, Gwangju's influence will linger, and often for the worse, especially if it is abandoned like the girl was.

In the 1999 film Peppermint Candy (bakha satang), the Uprising, rather than being a triumphant event, acts as the turning point in a man's life which causes him to eventually commit suicide. Peppermint Candy is the story of a cynical and embittered man called Kim Young-ho told in reverse-order, from the moment of his death to his days as an idealistic and artistic-minded factory worker. In between, his troubled life reflects the turbulent history of the nation as he participates as a soldier in the suppression of the

Gwangju Uprising, becomes a police officer who tortures activists, becomes a successful

businessman after leaving the force, and then loses it all during the 1997 Financial Crisis. ·

Before he enters the military, Young-ho meets and falls in love with a young woman,

Yoon Sun-im. However, when they reunite five years later, he treats her with disdain and ends up marrying another woman whom he does not love, a relationship which is doomed

from the start.

Young-ho's behavior towards Sun-im changes so drastically due to the immense

guilt he feels from his recent past. The key turning point can be traced back to Young- ho's participation in the recapture of Gwangju on the last day of the Uprising. He is shot

in the leg as the soldiers move into Gwangju and is forced to stay behind at some railroad

120Kim , "Post-Trauma and Historical Remembrance in Recent South Korean Cinema," 106. 121 Kim, "Post-Trauma and Historical Remembrance in Recent South Korean Cinema," 110.

160 tracks while another soldier leaves to get help. As he waits, he discovers a fr ightened teenage girl hiding behind a pile of lumber who is attemptingto return home. Telling her to get out of there quickly, Young-ho fires his gun when he hears other soldiers nearby in order to provide cover. But his aim is faulty and he accidentally kills the girl. As he holds

122 her, his hands are covered with her blood. From thisincident, his self-loathing steadily consumes him. As this scene is just before the final vignette portraying Young-ho and

Sun-im's fi rst, innocent meeting, it is clear that the events of May 1980 were what launched Young-ho down the path of cynicism and bitterness. Furthermore, according to film scholars Hye Seung Chung and David Diffrient, his killing of the innocent girl

123 "allegorizes the mass murders of innocentpeople in Gwangju." Young-ho weeps uncontrollably after the death, just as Koreans could not cope with the guilt over the massacre.

If Young-ho does indeed represent the trajectory of modem South Korean history, the murder's transformation of his life and personality symbolizes how Koreans as a whole have been unable to live down the Uprising, which has festered and infected all aspects of South Korean society. Gwangjuwas the beginning of a disastrous sequence of events for the protagonist, leading to his suicide in front of an incoming train. In a sense,

Gwangju and the mismanagement of its legacy thus represent an original sin of Korean

122 While talking to Sun-im, she says that his hands are special and that they were how she could tell that he really was the Young-ho she had met years before as his behavior had changed so much. But before that meeting, he had just begun taking part in the torturing of dissidents; a prisoner had defecated on Young ho's hand a short while before the rendezvous. Thus, before his reunion with Sun-im, Young-ho has had blood (of the girl fromGwangju) and feces on his hand, causing him to be derisive. For good measure, he feels up the dress of his future wife (who works as a waitress in the restaurant they are meeting in) just to show Sun-im how dirty his hands have become. 123 Hye Seung Chung and David Scott Diffrient, "Forgetting to Remember, Remembering to Forget: The Politics of Memory and Modernity in the Fractured Films of Lee Chang-dong and Hong Sang-soo," in Seoul Searching: Culture andIdentity in ContemporaryKo rean Cinema, ed. Frances Gateward (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 123.

161 history (one of several), since it is a significant source of many problems which beleaguer the country. It is the cause of the protagonist's, and the nation's, self-torture. It is a pessimistic, negative portrayal of Gwangju which certainly clashes with the standard narrative of eventual victory and hope for the future.

In both A Petal and Peppermint Candy, Gwangju is the sourceof the protagonists' tortured states of mind. The event only brought horror, shame, and guilt to the characters.

Neither of the protagonists felt proud of their actions during the Uprising, and the films do not focus at all on the democratic aspirations of the protesters. Both protagonists embody some aspects of the Korean nation or society, and thus, their character traits and lives symbolize the painful collective memory of the past for Koreans in general .

Gwangju was not the beginning of the end of terror and oppression, but the beginning, or perhaps just the continuation, of a long-standing series of violence.

Hwaryeohan Hyuga, released in 2007, puts forth a different narrative of Gwangju, one which focuses less on shame and more on the apolitical nature of the demonstrators,

124 who only rose up because of the military's actions. It does not dwell on the larger political aspects of the demonstrators ' actions and only explores at the surface the military's motivations to suppress the Uprising - the soldiers believe the citizens are

Communist rebels and spies while the higher-ranking officers want power. The focus of this filmis on how ordinary citizens had their lives utterly devastated by the shocking cruelty of the government. Whether its box-office success demonstrates popular support for this specific narrative is difficult to say, but it does indicate at least that Gwangju is a durable topic three decades later.

124Hwaryeohan Hy uga translates to something along the lines of "Splendid Vacation." Itwas the code name for the paratroopers' operations in Gwangju on May 18.

162 The film spends a great deal of time setting up the characters' backgrounds before

the actual massacre itself. The protagonist, Min-woo, is a taxi driver who supports

5 himself and his younger brother, Jin-woo, who is a high school student.12 He is in love with a nurse, who is the daughter of the protagonist's employer (a fact he does not know

2 until near the end of the film).1 6 The father, Park Heung-su, is a former military officer

(played by the venerable Ahn Sung-ki) who eventually ends up commanding the Citizens

Army. Other peripheral characters include another taxi driver, a Catholic priest, and high

school students and teachers. They were regular people who only wanted to pursue the

ordinary things in life such as material success and love. Politics is absent from the fi lm,

7 almost "to an unnatural degree."12 One of the taxi drivers even asks someone to tum off

the television when there is a broadcast about the government and student protests so that

he and the protagonist can talk about romantic difficulties. When the soldiers start beating

students and bystanders alike, Min-woo asks the priest, "What did we do wrong? We

didn't do anything." The answer, never explicitly stated but heavily implied, is that they

indeed did not do anything wrong.

The inexplicable actions of the military motivate them to rise up and defend

themselves and their loved ones. Min-woo tells Jin-woo explicitly not to join the protests

for fear he will be inj ured or killed. Indeed, it is the death of Jin-woo which dri ves Min-

woo to join the Citizens Army. The film emphasizes how the citizens were not "rioters"

(pokdo). For instance, a mother of one of the slain weeps, "My son is not a rioter !" Min-

125 Although two of the characters are taxi drivers, the film inexplicably does not include the famous taxi demonstration on May 20. 126 Presumably for dramatic purposes, although, in my humble opinion, there really was no point to it. But I di ess. 12.r;: Quoted in Mark Morris, 'The New Korean Cinema, Kwangju and the Artof Political Violence," The Asia-Pacific Jo urnal, (February 1, 2010). http://j apanfocus.org/-Mark-Morris/3298.

163 woo is especially sensitive to this label, exclaiming to Park, "Why are we rioters? Are you saying we're rioters?" Finally, at the end of the final assault on Provincial Hall, Min woo, while trying to escape, is suddenly confronted by a large number of soldiers. An officer orders him to put down his weapon and surrender, addressing him as "pokdo."

Min-woo, enraged, raises his gun and yells out, "We are not rioters !" before dying to a hail of bullets. And that is the main theme of the film: the participants were not rebels but ordinary citizens who took up arms only as a reaction to the government 's actions. The

Upri sing was essentially thrust upon the characters; they did not choose the doomed mission of opposing the all-powerful state. But they faced no other choice if they wanted to protect themselves and their families.

Literature, film, and television depictions of the Gwangju Uprising thus act as one of the last mainstream bastions of the earlier victim- and minjung-based narratives. They center on the ordinary, apolitical, and innocent victims who, as they were merely leading their regular lives, didnot do anything to deserve the brutal treatment they received.

Furthermore, the Upri sing never became the triumphant event for them; they were left with bleak fu tures and physical and mental scars which never healed.

The question remains, if these cultural representations of Gwangju are articulations of a counter-narrative which are being consumed, why does the public still mostly embrace the current dominant narrative? I cannot offer any satisfactory answers to that question. Perhaps the reason lies in the importance of medium. There are different motivations for reading a work of fi ction or watching a fi lm than for reading political or academic works or visiting a cemetery or attending commemorations. In addition, how and why these cultural representations were consumed obviously varied depending on the

164 individual, and any attempts to generalize about how people understood and experienced the stories, shows, and films would only be speculative. I can only suggest that the literary and film representations ' focus on the victims shows the extent to which strains of the old narrative endure. The new narrati ve is not absolutely hegemonic; it was inevitable that the discourse on Gwangju would become more complex given the liberalization of Korean politics. Alternative narratives could not be stamped out. But it is still striking that what people believe about a controversial event such as Gwangju can be so one-sided in a democratic society.

Conclusion

The 1987 democratic reforms necessarily changed how the public looked back on the events of May 1980. The old victim- and minjung-based narratives have been quickly eclipsed by the new democracy- and human rights-centered narratives which contain a universalizing message. The ubiquity of the term "Gwangju (or May 18) Democratization

Movement" in public discourse and the sheer number of published works on the democratic and human rights aspects of the Uprising speak to how the new narrati ve has become conventional wisdom. Several public opinion polls also demonstrate just how dominant the latter narrative is. In a 1997 survey, over 62 percent of respondents believed that the Uprising "was a movement for democracy opposing the new regime," whereas

28 only 16.5 percent viewed it as "a self-defense effort to survive."1 A Memorial

Foundation survey in 2012 produced similar results. Almost two-thirds of respondents believed that the Upri sing aided the democracy movement and over three-fi fths believed

128 Kim,"' Meaning Construction' of the KwangjuPro-democracy Movement and Futuristic Frame," 216.

165 that it "enhanced the country's human rights."129 Therefore, just as in the 1980s, a dominant, almost hegemonic narrative about Gwangju remains, despite the democratization of the sociopolitical sphere. That the government and societal narratives have converged means that while in the 1980s, two narratives about Gwangju were propagated, since the 1990s there has been only one that is really believed. Ofcourse, the official and unofficial narratives do contain subtle differences. The former emphasizes the state's link with democratization, whereas the latter is more universalizing.

Nonetheless, it is ironic that the opening up of the political sphere has still produced only a narrow selection of narratives about the Uprising.

Although the dichotomy between the old and new narratives seems distinct, the rather seamless transition to the universal narrative demonstrates how many Koreans did not see any apparent contradictions between the two. Clearly, there are common links.

One is the theme of democracy. Protesters across the countryin both 1980 and 1987 strongly desired democratic reforms, and at least the initial demonstrators in Gwangju were political activists. In addition, advocacy for human rights was in a way a concern in the original unofficial narratives in that many joined in the resistance because of the outrageous abuses committed by the soldiers; the military was clearly violating the citizens' human rights and dignity by beating and shooting them. The "struggle" aspect of the Uprising was easily adapted to changing circumstances as well. Although in the old narrative, the struggle was at first against the military coup, then the soldiers' brutality, and then afterwards for a socioeconomic and political revolution to topple the repressive state, the new narrative featured struggle as well, although this time a nonviolent one

129 "Gwangj u Uprising Contributed to Korea's Democratization," The Korea Times, May 19, 2012. http://www.koreatimes.eo.kr/www/news/nation/20 12/05/!17_1 11302.html.

166 devoted mostly to advancing democratic reforms. Moreover, the narrative of resistance contained elements of unity and righteousness that are also present in the tropes of democracy and human rights. Finally, both the old and new unofficial narratives shared the very important trait of ostracizing the authoritarian militaryregime of Chun Doo

Hwan. This last similarity may be the key reason why the public has so easily reconciled the two major unofficial narratives.

Nevertheless, there is still a dominant narrative which, despite its agreeable rhetoric about democracy and human rights, has negatively impacted the people who have suffered the most. The civic groups and the public 's use of the narrative to passively ignore the suffering of the victims and the socioeconomic divisions that have continued since the Uprising is an act which seems to violate the very principle of human rights that is so prominent at present. Divisions were rampant in Gwangju beneath the illusion of unity among the participants. Issues of class have largely been ignored by the civic groups and the public, leaving the topic to the victims' groups and academics. Most important, and related to class, has been the trend in the last two decades of ignoring victims and their plight, with the shifting of attention toward more abstract ideals and facets of the Uprising. As the claimants to the legacy of Gwangju have broadened, those directly affected have been marginalized.

This chapter exemplifies perhaps better than any other in this thesis the notion that the "who" defines the specific narratives of an event. The issue of who could claim

Gwangju was, and still is, at the core of the conflict between the old and new unofficial narratives. There are winners and losers whichever way the decision is made. The fairest answer is "everyone" -but that some claimants are more equal than others. It is normal

167 to confer legitimacy upon the claimants most directly affected by an event. Although all

Americans can claim the September 11th attacks as attacks on themselves, the direct victims and their families are elevated above the rest. Similarly, in order for the new version of the "Gwangju Spirit" - a universal concern forhuman rights - to be realized, then even the lower-class victims of the Uprising must be aided and considered in the retelling of the event. To leave them out of any narrative is ignorance and hypocrisy at its worst.

168 Conclusion

From the moment the protestors and soldiers clashed in Gwangju on May 18,

1980, the meaning and significance of the Gwangju Uprising has been consistently

marked by conflict. The participants and the nature of the clash themselves have

undergone considerable change as the social and political contexts of the times have shifted. The content, themes, and tone of the narratives have also clearly depended on the

actors who participated in their creation.

During the 1980s, the main divergence was between the government and its

opponents over what actually happened and what the motivations of the demonstrators

were. Through official statements from the military and the censored newspaper articles

and television and radio broadcasts, the government until l987 consistently characterized

the Uprising as a riot orchestrated by a small group of radicals and Communist spies who

incited the crowds with wild rumors of military brutality and regional antagonism. On the

other hand, the foreign journalists and eyewitnesses who were in Gwangju found these

claims of rioting to be excessive, arguing that it was the soldiers who displayed extreme

behavior in their indiscriminate violence against protesters andbystanders alike. In these

accounts, the citizens of Gwangju demonstrated great courage in their heroic yet futile

acts of resistance against the cruel violence of the soldiers .

This narrative of Gwangju as a heroic act of resistance against oppression boosted

broader sociopolitical movements in South Korea during the 1980s. Although Gwangju

was a forbidden topic of public discussion, basic knowledge of the event spread

throughout South Korea and quickly fed the increasingly radical and militant acti vist

movements opposing the military regime. What underlay all of these movements was the

169 view that Gwangju was a defeat in the struggle against the state. Activists felt they had to

learn from the mistakes made before and during Gwangju in order to succeed in the

future, such as acquiring a much larger base of mass support for the opposition, especially from labor. Furthermore, the perception that the U.S. did not do enough or was even perhaps complicit in the suppression of the demonstrators led to a surge in anti

American sentiment throughout the 1980s. Support for the rhetoric of resisting both the

domestic and foreign oppressors of the Korean people, a need which was evidenced by

what happened in May 1980, coalesced into increased public suppmt for the ideology of

minjung, a broadly counterhegemonic movement against the socioeconomic and political forces seen to be subj ugating the Korean people at large.

Despite the political movements that gained strength as a result of the memory of

the Uprising, many accounts from the 1980s contended that the demonstrators themselves were largely apolitical. Although the initial protests were against the imposition of

martial law, the more famous subsequent demonstrations and armed resistance were

essentially instinctual reactions against the barbarity of the military by a citizenry united

by their anger. Beneath this surface-level solidarity lay an ambivalence in terms of

political goals in addition to grave divisions between moderates who sought immediate

peace and hardliners who wanted to continue the fi ght.

After 1987, politics took center stage in describing the motivations of the

demonstrators in both official and unofficial narratives of the Gwangju Uprising. In that

year, the June Uprising was successful in forcing the government to accept direct

presidential elections, which was a key step in the liberalization of the political process.

As South Korea democratized further, the government sought to make a connection

170 between the changed political environment and. theUpri sing in order to give the state a claim in the latter's legacy. Through investigations, prosecutions of former military leaders, and the establishment of official cemeteries,memo rials, and ceremonies for commemoration of the Upri sing, the government propagated a narrative which made the demonstrators into democratic warriors who were fundamentally motivated by the prospect of launching a democracy after Park Chung Hee's downfall. Their hopes were eventually realized in the 1987 reforms and the subsequent administrations. Gwangju was, in the end, a victory for the demonstrators and the Korean people at large.

Unofficial narratives after 1987 largely followed that of the governmenes, although the civic groups which arose to take leadership of the Gwangju-related movements more heavily emphasized the universal aspects of the Uprising. Pointing to the citizens' protests against the regime, reactions against the dehumanizing military brutality, and extraordinary solidarity during the days of autonomous rule, these groups contended that the lessons of Gwangju were universal: humanity possesses a natural affinity for democracy and human rights even in the worst of crises. This was the true

"spirit" of Gwangju which the whole world could use both as an example for other movements elsewhere and a source of inspiration for the future.

This new universalist narrative had hidden downsides, however, mainly in its enhancement of the status of the civic groups at the expense of the increasingly marginalized victims of the Uprising, who still suffered from physical and mental ailments as a direct result of their often unwilling participation in Gwangju, despite the rhetoric about the appreciation for human rights. Moreover, the narrative of unity and democracy papered over the very real social divisions among the protesters, which

171 manifested themselves in the conflictbetween the middle class members of the civic groups and the mostly lower class direct victims. Despite the fact that most of the literary and filmdepictions of the Uprising have been sympathetic to these victims, public opinion largely accepts the newer interpretations of Gwangju which highlight its universal aspects. Therefore, with the virtual unity in narratives between the government

and civic groups, the main disagreements were voiced by the now-marginalized direct victims of the Uprising and old adherents to the radical minjung movement.

In an ironic twist, despite democratization after 1987, the discourse regarding

Gwangju has been less contested and less diverse. Because of the earlier division between

official and unofficial narratives during the 1980s, this new democratic and universal narrative can be seen as being even more dominant than the previous ones. The labeling

of the Uprising as the Gwangju Democratization Movement is now ubiquitous in South

Korea, and the narrative associated with this term is hegemonic in many ways.

Whether one narrative is correct or wrong can never be truly answered, except

perhaps the military's problematic version in the 1980s. Each of the narratives I have put

forth contains ambiguities and nuances which make absolute judgment on them difficult,

if not impossible. Nonetheless, it is still possible, and I would argue imperative, to

critique the real-life consequences the narratives have caused. These narratives have

proven to have greatly affected the treatment of certain groups andindividuals,

particularly the direct victims of the Uprising. I agree wholeheartedly with Linda Lewis

when she voices her concerns that they are essentially being revictimized as a result of

the shift in narratives. It certainly is a shame that those most directly associated with this

remarkable event are the ones most left out in its remembrance. If the "Gwangju Spirit" is

172 truly about the need to honor the natur.al rights and dignity of human beings, then

attention must be paid to those who still suffer as a result of their sacrifices.

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