An Analysis of the Rapacki Plan to Denuclearize Central Europe
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Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Master's Theses Graduate College 7-1964 An Analysis of the Rapacki Plan to Denuclearize Central Europe James R. Ozinga Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Ozinga, James R., "An Analysis of the Rapacki Plan to Denuclearize Central Europe" (1964). Master's Theses. 4995. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/4995 This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. AN ANALYSIS OF THE. RAP AOKI. :PLAN TO DENUCLEARIZE.CENTRAL IDROPE . James R. Ozinga A thesis presented to the Faculty ot the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the Degree of Master of Arta Western Michigan University · ICalama.zoo, Michigan July- 1964 ACKNOWLEDGl!l!IENTS The investigator wishes to acknowledge hia sincere appreciation to the Faculty of the Political Science Department for their in valuable services during the past two yeara; to Dr. Roland Ebel for his initial encouragement of a oareer in Political Soienoe; and to Dr. George Klein for an impetus towa.rda Eastern llm-opean atu<%1,and for the generoua gift of hi& experience and time.in the preparation of thia paper. Special mention is due m:, wife, Suzanne, the domestic .!!a!, 9,ua � of thia report. Jamea ll. Ozinga ... TADLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • . 1 I THE BACKGROUND: SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE •••••••••• . .. 1 II THE BACKGROU1'l""D: DI SARMA.MENT IN A CENTRAL EUROPEAN CONTEXT • • • • • • • • • • • 12 III THE PROPOSAL ITSELF ••••••••••••••• 24 IV THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF WEST GERMANY ••••••••• 33 V WESTERN REJECTION OF THE PLAN. • • 44 VI THE RAPACKI PLAN REFUSES TO DIE . 62 VII CONCLUSION . 74 APPENDIX A: TROOP CONCENTRATIONS IN AND NEAR CENTRAL EUROPE • • • • • • 89 APPENDIX : D: TEXT OF POLISH NOTE AND MEMORANDUM • • • • • • • • • • • • • 90 APPENDIX C: TEXT OF POLISH FREEZE PROPOSAL •••9 4 · APPENDIX D: Tli'....XT OF U.S. REPLY TO THE RAPACKI PLAN • • • • • • • • • • • • 96 APPElillIX E: U.S. COMMENTS AT GENEVA • • • • • • 99 DIDLIOGRAPHY . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ...101 IllTRO:OOCTION ,· In 1957, Adam Rapacki, Foreign" Minister of Poland, proposed that a zone be created in Central Europe in which nuclear weapollQ of all kinds would be prohibited. The zone � to inoluda the countries of West Germany, F.ast Germany, Poland, and Czeohoslovald.a.. This paper seeks to s tuey- that proposal in the ligb.t of its background and conse quences. The purpose of such a stuey-, beyond the b9peful accretion of knowledge, is to fo:rm conclusions based on the analysis of the pro posal as the beginning of a solution to the political and military impasse in Central Europe. 'lhe proposal will be studied in seven" chapters which are topi cally arransed. Chapter One considers the background to the proposal in terms of the security of Central Europe. Cha:pter � considers the ba.okground with regard to Central European disarmament. Chapter !tbree deals with the Ra.pa.old. proposal itself. Chapter Four discusses the pivotal role pl8¥8d by West Germany in regard to the Rapacki PlanJ Chapter Five considers the Western rejection of the Planf Chapter Six reflects the continuing in:f'luenoe of' the Plan; and Chapter Seven sum marizes briefly and fo:rmulates conclusions. These conclusions will attempt to show that the Ra.pacld. proposals did not receive a fair hearing in 1957-1958, a.hd.. that present day circumstances might indi cate a reappraisal of the proposal's 1>ossibilities by the West. 1 T CONT OF EOPE SECUT lring te yeas iedately followng the Scond World Wa te United States bg lag scae demobilization of its aed forces ad. bga wthdaw to wt its continent shorea. With a short tie, lsaia �ted presme in te lac Sa aea, te Medterraea aea, ad in.Centa Eope. Gorg F. Kn, witing in July, 1947 . 11 udr the psedn of ''Mr. X , proposed a positiv couse of action to coteract te agessiveness of the Soviet Union. �is corse ot action, he said, should not mae the Bssiaa lose prestig; bt cer tainly 11.J.it is clea tat the mai element of a United States � . polic mst b that of a long te:, patient bt fir ad vglat oon- 1 tainent of Rssia exasiv tendencies". W w containent necssa? Te wxsted wrld seeed read_ to exlode·a. Tis tie the theat w lssia rater t Gn. Te dmobilization of aed forcs follow the w hd not redced th. Rssia that; for were te Bd A had pushed ot te Ge:as, tere te Rd A reed. Stali w t no cces that a repetitio of te invion b Gr forces to wtin sigt of the Kei cold ocor againo Wit te B tic States uder contol, lssia now sougt to control the Centra Eopea States lying btwen Tssia ad Wester Eope. Te doinated territor includd Polad, Czechoslova, East G:a, H, .stia, Bmaia, Mgia, .l, Gorg F. Kn, "Soces of Soviet Condct", Foreig Afairs, Vol. 25, Juy 1947, P• 575• 1 2 Yugoslavia, and Albania. From the Arctio Circle to the semi-tropical Mediterranean, Soviet armed forces helped to install Communist govern ments on the Russian pattern. �key felt pa.rt of her territory threat ened and was pressured to allow at least partial Russian control of the Bosporus Straits. Greece was beseiged by Communist guerillas. Both France and Italy had large, powerful Communist Parties that usually followed Moscow directives. The buffer extended from North to South, /� from 200 to 500 miles wide between Russia. and what she conceived as the aggTessor nations to the West. Facing this monolith of power was a. disorganized Western Europe, exhausted and in rubble. If oontaiDinent was the desired goal, .America. would have to revise her thinking a.bout involving herself in European affairs. There was such a. shift in American th1nk1ng. It began to bear :f:ruit in 1947: the year Kenna.n's article appeared, the year the Marshall Plan was-inaugurated, and the year that the United States took over from Great Britain the underwriting of the anti-Communist efforts in Greece and �key. Conta.iDinent was beginning to develop. Stalin, meanwhile, had become annoyed with Tito. The Yugoslav _ leader did not owe his regime to Soviet armed forces. He had developed his own cha.in of command v.m.ch Stalin could not seem to penetrate. This breach of authority could not be tolerated by the Soviet leader because if' national communism swept into the other satellites his wall of states would be drastically weakened. Gomulka, in Poland, was already speak ing of a Polish pa.th to socialism and the achievement of socialism by evolutionary rather than compulsory means. So from Stalin's view, Titoism had to be stopped. !n 1947 Stalin ordered the to:rmation of 3 the CoIIllllUllist In:f'ormation :Bureau seemingly for the sole purpose of ousting Tito :f'ram the Communist bloc. This formal break came in June of 1948, and was supplemented by the attempted implementation of eco nomio sanctions against Yugoslavia by many of the bloo countries. �us there was substantial pressure on Tito to align himself with Stalin; but there was also pressure applied :f'rom the other Communist countries. The yea:r 1948 in the Soviet bloc seems to be a y-ear in which the reins were tightened, so to speak. This fact, for example, is visible in the Czechoslovak ooul?, r.arnu)ka's replacement by Bierut in Poland, and the East German Conmunist· indifference to a parliamentary facade. �is tightening is also seen in the Soviet pressure at a weak liDk of the West, viz., :Berlin. Located deep within the Soviet sector, the former capital had also been divided among the victors. The Western sectors were cut off :f'rom West Germany, and were, therefore, quite dependent on Soviet desires to hOllor the agreement concerning access routes through the Russian sector. Stalin ordered these routes blockaded in an attempt to force the West out of Berlin altogether. The United States responded to this challenge by instituting the Berlin Airlift, a gigantic and successful effort to maintain both directions of the flow of goods entirely by aircraft transportation. The weak link was stronger than Soviet planners had imagined. However, after the CoIIllllUllist � _gl � in Prague in 1948, the Soviet Union had its wall of stone ·right through the heart of EuropeJ a wall consisting of states governed by men absolutely loyal to Moscow. To a great extent, Russian danination had been extended to the Elbe 4 Ri r, a feat the Czars could not equal. The existence of this power bloc created a desire on the pa.rt of the West to present a defensive front that was as strong and as unified as possible. Therefore, on. March 17, 1948, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Imcembourg signed the Brussels Paot which bound them in a defensive g:L"ouping for 50 yea.rs. The Brussels Pact, also called the Western European Union, was used as an example of legitima� defense grouping by the Vandenberg Resolution which the United States Senate passed in June of 1948. Negotiations ensued between the United States, Canada, and the Brussels Pact powers crulmjnating in the signing of the North Atlantic 'h-eaty on April 4, 1949. Thus by the time the Berlin Blockade was officially lifted in May of 1949, the Western powers had erected an alliance structure which bound the United States to the defense of Western Europe.