Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU
Master's Theses Graduate College
7-1964
An Analysis of the Rapacki Plan to Denuclearize Central Europe
James R. Ozinga
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Recommended Citation Ozinga, James R., "An Analysis of the Rapacki Plan to Denuclearize Central Europe" (1964). Master's Theses. 4995. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/4995
This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. AN ANALYSIS OF THE. RAP AOKI. :PLAN TO DENUCLEARIZE.CENTRAL IDROPE
. James R. Ozinga
A thesis presented to the Faculty ot the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the Degree of Master of Arta
Western Michigan University · ICalama.zoo, Michigan July- 1964 ACKNOWLEDGl!l!IENTS
The investigator wishes to acknowledge hia sincere appreciation to the Faculty of the Political Science Department for their in valuable services during the past two yeara; to Dr. Roland Ebel for his initial encouragement of a oareer in Political Soienoe; and to Dr. George Klein for an impetus towa.rda Eastern llm-opean atu<%1,and for the generoua gift of hi& experience and time.in the preparation of thia paper. Special mention is due m:, wife, Suzanne, the domestic .!!a!, 9,ua � of thia report.
Jamea ll. Ozinga
... TADLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • ...... 1 I THE BACKGROUND: SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE •••••••••• ...... 1 II THE BACKGROU1'l""D: DI SARMA.MENT IN A CENTRAL EUROPEAN CONTEXT • • • • • • • • • • • 12 III THE PROPOSAL ITSELF ••••••••••••••• 24 IV THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF WEST GERMANY ••••••••• 33 V WESTERN REJECTION OF THE PLAN...... • • 44 VI THE RAPACKI PLAN REFUSES TO DIE ...... 62 VII CONCLUSION ...... 74 APPENDIX A: TROOP CONCENTRATIONS IN AND NEAR CENTRAL EUROPE • • • • • • 89 APPENDIX : D: TEXT OF POLISH NOTE AND MEMORANDUM • • • • • • • • • • • • • 90 APPENDIX C: TEXT OF POLISH FREEZE PROPOSAL •••9 4 · APPENDIX D: Tli'....XT OF U.S. REPLY TO THE RAPACKI PLAN • • • • • • • • • • • • 96 APPElillIX E: U.S. COMMENTS AT GENEVA • • • • • • 99 DIDLIOGRAPHY . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ...101 IllTRO:OOCTION
,· In 1957, Adam Rapacki, Foreign" Minister of Poland, proposed that a zone be created in Central Europe in which nuclear weapollQ of all kinds would be prohibited. The zone � to inoluda the countries of West Germany, F.ast Germany, Poland, and Czeohoslovald.a.. This paper seeks to s tuey- that proposal in the ligb.t of its background and conse quences. The purpose of such a stuey-, beyond the b9peful accretion of knowledge, is to fo:rm conclusions based on the analysis of the pro posal as the beginning of a solution to the political and military impasse in Central Europe. 'lhe proposal will be studied in seven" chapters which are topi cally arransed. Chapter One considers the background to the proposal in terms of the security of Central Europe. Cha:pter � considers the ba.okground with regard to Central European disarmament. Chapter
!tbree deals with the Ra.pa.old. proposal itself. Chapter Four discusses the pivotal role pl8¥8d by West Germany in regard to the Rapacki PlanJ Chapter Five considers the Western rejection of the Planf Chapter Six reflects the continuing in:f'luenoe of' the Plan; and Chapter Seven sum marizes briefly and fo:rmulates conclusions. These conclusions will attempt to show that the Ra.pacld. proposals did not receive a fair hearing in 1957-1958, a.hd.. that present day circumstances might indi cate a reappraisal of the proposal's 1>ossibilities by the West.
1 T CONT OF EOPE SECUT
lring te yeas iedately followng the Scond World Wa te
United States bg lag scae demobilization of its aed forces ad. bga wthdaw to wt its continent shorea. With a short tie, lsaia �ted presme in te lac Sa aea, te Medterraea aea, ad in.Centa Eope. Gorg F. Kn, witing in July, 1947 . . 11 udr the psedn of ''Mr. X , proposed a positiv couse of action to coteract te agessiveness of the Soviet Union. �is corse ot action, he said, should not mae the Bssiaa lose prestig; bt cer tainly 11.J.it is clea tat the mai element of a United States � . polic mst b that of a long te:, patient bt fir ad vglat oon- 1 tainent of Rssia exasiv tendencies".
W w containent necssa? Te wxsted wrld seeed
read_ to exlode·a. Tis tie the theat w lssia rater t
Gn. Te dmobilization of aed forcs follow the w hd
not redced th. Rssia that; for were te Bd A had pushed ot
te Ge:as, tere te Rd A reed. Stali w t no cces
that a repetitio of te invion b Gr forces to wtin sigt of
the Kei cold ocor againo Wit te B tic States uder contol,
lssia now sougt to control the Centra Eopea States lying btwen
Tssia ad Wester Eope. Te doinated territor includd Polad,
Czechoslova, East G:a, H, .stia, Bmaia, Mgia,
.l, Gorg F. Kn, "Soces of Soviet Condct", Foreig Afairs, Vol. 25, Juy 1947, P• 575•
1 2 Yugoslavia, and Albania. From the Arctio Circle to the semi-tropical Mediterranean, Soviet armed forces helped to install Communist govern ments on the Russian pattern. �key felt pa.rt of her territory threat ened and was pressured to allow at least partial Russian control of the Bosporus Straits. Greece was beseiged by Communist guerillas. Both France and Italy had large, powerful Communist Parties that usually followed Moscow directives. The buffer extended from North to South, /� from 200 to 500 miles wide between Russia. and what she conceived as the aggTessor nations to the West. Facing this monolith of power was a. disorganized Western Europe, exhausted and in rubble. If oontaiDinent was the desired goal, .America. would have to revise her thinking a.bout involving herself in European affairs. There was such a. shift in American th1nk1ng. It began to bear :f:ruit in 1947: the year Kenna.n's article appeared, the year the Marshall Plan was-inaugurated, and the year that the United States took over from Great Britain the underwriting of the anti-Communist efforts in Greece and �key. Conta.iDinent was beginning to develop. Stalin, meanwhile, had become annoyed with Tito. The Yugoslav _ leader did not owe his regime to Soviet armed forces. He had developed his own cha.in of command v.m.ch Stalin could not seem to penetrate. This breach of authority could not be tolerated by the Soviet leader because if' national communism swept into the other satellites his wall of states would be drastically weakened. Gomulka, in Poland, was already speak ing of a Polish pa.th to socialism and the achievement of socialism by evolutionary rather than compulsory means. So from Stalin's view, Titoism had to be stopped. !n 1947 Stalin ordered the to:rmation of 3 the CoIIllllUllist In:f'ormation :Bureau seemingly for the sole purpose of ousting Tito :f'ram the Communist bloc. This formal break came in June of 1948, and was supplemented by the attempted implementation of eco nomio sanctions against Yugoslavia by many of the bloo countries. �us there was substantial pressure on Tito to align himself with Stalin; but there was also pressure applied :f'rom the other Communist countries. The yea:r 1948 in the Soviet bloc seems to be a y-ear in which the reins were tightened, so to speak. This fact, for example, is visible in the Czechoslovak ooul?, r.arnu)ka's replacement by Bierut in Poland, and the East German Conmunist· indifference to a parliamentary facade. �is tightening is also seen in the Soviet pressure at a weak liDk of the West, viz., :Berlin. Located deep within the Soviet sector, the former capital had also been divided among the victors. The Western sectors were cut off :f'rom West Germany, and were, therefore, quite dependent on Soviet desires to hOllor the agreement concerning access routes through the Russian sector. Stalin ordered these routes blockaded in an attempt to force the West out of Berlin altogether. The United States responded to this challenge by instituting the Berlin Airlift, a gigantic and successful effort to maintain both directions of the flow of goods entirely by aircraft transportation. The weak link was stronger than Soviet planners had imagined. However, after the CoIIllllUllist � _gl � in Prague in 1948, the Soviet Union had its wall of stone ·right through the heart of EuropeJ a wall consisting of states governed by men absolutely loyal to Moscow. To a great extent, Russian danination had been extended to the Elbe 4
Ri r, a feat the Czars could not equal. The existence of this power bloc created a desire on the pa.rt of the West to present a defensive front that was as strong and as unified as possible. Therefore, on. March 17, 1948, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Imcembourg signed the Brussels Paot which bound them in a defensive g:L"ouping for 50 yea.rs. The Brussels Pact, also called the Western European Union, was used as an example of legitima� defense grouping by the Vandenberg Resolution which the United States Senate passed in June of 1948. Negotiations ensued between the United States, Canada, and the Brussels Pact powers crulmjnating in the signing of the North Atlantic 'h-eaty on April 4, 1949. Thus by the time the Berlin Blockade was officially lifted in May of 1949, the Western powers had erected an alliance structure which bound the United States to the defense of Western Europe. As ChurchilLsa.id, "Europe began to rest under the 2 precarious protection of .American- nuclear powr." The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was electrified by the outbreak: of hostilities in Korea and the evidence of Soviet nuclear capabilities. Th.a West plunged into an intense program of rearmament and decided that West Germany should be pe:rmitted to join the mili tary effort. Just how the former enemy was to be rearmed was a problem. The initial solution was the European Defense Community, a supranational defense organization that did not include Great Britain or the United States. This solution crumbled with the failure of' the French National .Assembly to accept the agreement, probably because Britain was not a
2 u.s. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, "Disarmament and Security in Europe," Staff Stud;y Number Five, Control and Reduction 2f..Armaments, Report 2501, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 19513°, p.223. 5 member and because of fear and distrust of Germany. This clearly seemed to be a victory for the Communists, who had actively opposed the Comrmmity.
However, in 1954, the United States and Great Britain participated in con ferences with the West Europeans whioh resulted in the revision of the
Brussels Pact to permit West Germany to join NATO as a military contri butor.
The-Russians, even before the NATO treaty was signed, had blanketed
Ea.at Europe with bilateral allia.noes. This network extended from Russia 3 to Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria., Hungary, Rumania, and Poland. As the
1950's began, therefore, the demarcation line resembled a trip-wire with ( ) ma.s_sive concentrations of armed strength on either side See Append.ix A .
Both sides faced eaoh other with nuclear capabilities; each could destroy
the other, but in so doing each faced its own destruction. A necessary
d.etente began.
This detente.was seemingly given a somewhat altered basis by the
death of Stalin in 1953. With the brief emergence of Malenkov swiftly
followed by Khrushchev as the new leader, the hope grew in the West that
the death of the Russian dictator might somehow change the aggressive
ness of Russian foreign policy. This hope was fed by an occasional
liberalization of Soviet policy. East German leaders 'W8Jlt the opposite way. In the uncertainty following Stalin's death, they attempted to
show their control by depriving certain groups of their ration cards, and by increasing work norms by lo%. Because of resultant bitternesa ,
and in the hope of a.fi'eoting West·German elections, the East German
3 Ibi� ,page 234. 6
Government granted concessions to the people, admitted errors, and pro- 4 mised remedial action. But before the concessions could be made the anger of the workers broke into revolt. The strikes became demon strations which turned into riots that the Soviet Army had to pu.t down. Soviet willingness to use force to retain Fast Ge:rmany made reunification an even more important issue in the West German campaign. Russia than let it be known that the unity of Germany would be impossible if West 5 Ge� joined NATO. Nonetheless, there seemed to be a movement of Soviet policy in the direction of a thawing of aggressive tendencies. Even while the Russian forces were crushing riots in East GermaJ:zy, Soviet relations with Turkey brightened. Russia dropped her post-war claims against part of Turkey's territory and dropped the demand for a partial control of the Straits. Relations with the Middle East were improved, and M'alenkov expressed peaceful intentions toward Afghanistan and I.ran. Russia began oontri blting to the United Nations• program for underdeveloped countries and 6 did not interfere with the Korean truce. These evidences of a. thaw led some writers such as Isaao Deutscher to conclude that Stalinism 1 was being :replaced by a more liberal spirit. Others found no such
4 Arnold J. Heidenheimer, �Govermnent Et.Germa.n,y. (New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1961), p. 172. . 5 Philip Mosely, "The Kremlin's Foreign Policy Since Stalin," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, October, 19 , pp 20-33. 6 3 53 Ibid 7- Isaao Deutscher, Russia� Next, (New York: Oxford Universi-ty Press, 1953), P• 125. See also Robert.Tucker, "The Politics of Soviet De-Staliniza.tion," World Politics, Vol. 9, July, 1957, P• 550• 7 comfort. Yet the evidence that some change in policy had taken place was given a strong boost by the Soviet agreement, in 1955, to grant a peace treaty to .Au.stria.. This treaty ended ten years of negotiations 8 and was probably caused by Karl Renner•s 1945 maneuvering, .Austria•• a.ocep,tance of a neutral status, and a thaw in Soviet policy. 'lllia agreement provided an additional basis for hope in the West; as did the easing of relations between Russia and Yugoslavia, and the denun ciation of Stalin at the Twentiet,J:r Party Congress. Moreover, on February 14, 1956, Kru.shchev made a public speech in which he pro claimed three important principles of Soviet foreign policy: the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two opposed systems, re jection of the inevitibility of war, and the approval of various forms 9 of transition to socialism. Krushohev felt e:x:te:rnally secure or he would not have made the statement. The inclusion of a rearmed Ge� into NATO following the Paris Agreements of 1954 had been followed by the 1955 formation of the Warsaw Pact, binding Russia and her satellites in a mutual defensive alliance. Moreover, the ostensible relaxation of pressure in Central Europe had the tendency to weaken the Western cohesivenessH and while hope remained alive, voices wore also heard urging caution. Henry Kissinger, for example, called pe�oef'ul coexistence "the most
-Bruno Kreisey, "Austria Draws the Ba.lance," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, January, 1959, P• 270 9 Philip Mosely, "Soviet Foreign Policy: .New Goal or New Manners?" ForeiQl Affairs, Vol. 34, July, 1956, P• 545• 8 efficient offensive tactic, a more effective means to subvert the exist- 10 ing order." Others sa.w peaceful coexistence e.s the natural result of 11 the lolea s taaa te •
The effects of Khrushohev•s ea.sing of tension were profound in the satellite countries. 'e rapprochement with Tito thew oon:f'u.sion into Party ranks. The newMosoow line necessitated a shift that in many cases was diffioult to make sice it voided past decisions against 'l'i-toists 12 in their ovm ranks. Then, when Kshchev dathroned Stalin, the fater image seemed to era.sh to the goud. Polad and Hungary were parti ola ly afected. The Polish reaction began wit the Ju 28, 1956 worker's revolt in Poz. Kshohev's so-aled Secret Speech had been in Februa.r,n e.nd the Stalinist Polish leader, :Beirut, had ded in March. Te revolt was in te form of a protest mch in Posn; a serious ad yet soe- what ga;y march in which many Communists joined. The marchers were pro testing tight labor controls, ad the movment reflected general u- rest i the country. As a. reslt of the unrest Gomulka. was released from hose arest in August ad took over the Pat again. He gined almost immediate popular support by deman� economic reforms ad national sovereignty. He fought it ot with Kshchev and won severa concessions.
lOJ::renry Kissinger, "Reflections on American Diplomacy," Foreiw Affairs, Vol. 35, October, 1956, P• 44. · 11or� W.W. Kulski•s reply to a Disarmament Subcommittee questionaire recorded in: Control� Reduction ,2! Armaments, Report 2501, P• 400. 12An example of this is Slansky1 s execution in Czechoslo vakia partly because of alleged Titoist ideas. cf. Sir Robert Lockhart, "Report on Czechoslovakia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, April, 1955, P• 484. 9
The Soviet Leader was not satisfied with Gomulka; and yet Khrushchev's hands were somewhat tied in that the crushing of Gomulka would have re versed. the direction of his own policy in regard to Tito and Stalin.
This same reasoning could have also applied to Hungary's subse quent attempt to attain sovereignty. Imre Nagy seemed slated to be Hungary's "Gomulka", but by the time he had been called in,
11 ••• the panicked Connnunist leadership had already called for military aid against the people. In consequence, the revolution, under the pressure of conflict, quickly moved beyond the 'national Communist' position to one that was increasingly anti-Connnunist and anti-Soviet. The Soviet decision to crush the revolution by force seems to fol low directly from this movement11 beyond the confines of Communism and the Warsaw Pact. 13 Hungary was far too important in the buffer wall of states for
Russia to relinquish, especially with Austria non-aligned. Khrushchev could not have explained that breach in the wall at home. Besides, a
Hungarian success would undoubtedly have begun a wave of such revolts; he might have thought that armed intervention would be necessary sooner or later anyway. Fortunately for Khrushchev, Britain and France were involved in the Suez fiasco at this time, and the Eisenhower Adminis tration in Washington seemed to have no intention of carrying out the campaign declarations of Eisenhower with regard to the freeing of the 14 captive nations of East Europe. The risk of a general conflict in
13 Henry Roberts, "The Crisis in the Soviet Empire," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 3.5, January, 19.57, p. 193. 14 "Ike Would Free East Europe," New York Times, June 8, 19.52, Po .52; See also a clarification in regard to whether violence would be used to free East Europe, August 14, 19.52, P• l; and August 26, 19.52, PP• 1, 12. 10 which everyone would lose seemed too great to the United States. The Polish and Hungarian revolts did prove that resistance to to talitarianiem was possible albeit shortlived, and a possible reason for this was the apparent fluctuation in Soviet policy since Stalin's death. The policy seemed to fluctuate between a reluctance to altar the old ordar and a desire to grant concessions. But the net effect of any thaw in Soviet policy on Central l!au-ope was slight. The propensities for change seemed enlarged but within definite limits. Those limits were dictated by the seClU'ity interests of the Soviet Union that were in turn apparently dictated by the confrontation of opposed forces in Central Europe� The Ra.pacld. Plan attempted to break this deadlock by removing part of the reason that the Soviet bloc was coming increasingly con cerned about Central Europe-nuclear weapons. The proposal was a re action of concern not just because of the deadlocked security aspects of the area; but also because of the known American desire to share its nuclear devices with the West Germans.15 The� NATO Confer- ence in 1957 at Bonn had deferred the question of the sharing of these weapons by the NATO allies until the Dsoembe:r meeting in Paris. This deferral was for the purpose of aiding .Adenauer in his election·;,; in Germany, in which ha was under considerable pressure from the Social Democrats to refuse nuclear armaments entirely.16 The SDP main tained that GeJ:man possessions of . such weapons would weaken the
1511Nato," Tims, Vol. 70, December 30, 1957, P• 180 l6110ur Atanio Defense," Newsweek, Vol. 49, � 13, 1957, P•50• ll possibilities for reunification ·by endangering the Soviet Union. There fore the timing of the Rapacki Plan in early October of 1957 sought the beginnings of a solution to the security problems of Central Europe, but , with specific reference to the rearming of Poland's former enemy with :nuclear potential.17 This was most undesirable both to the Poles and to the Soviet Union.
17 "Poland Will Cut Forcea, n, !!?!, �Times, February 17,1960, P• 2., and Arthur Olsen, "Poles Disappointed in u.s. Rejection,"!!!! � Times, April 8, 1962, P• 19. DISARMAMENT IN A CENTRAL EUROPEAN. CONTEXT
Rapacki's proposals are also part of the age-old quest for dis armament. The beating of swords into plowshares was a goal already in ancient Biblical times. But, seemingly, man had.never· been ready for the utopia called for by such a goal; the ideal of disarmament had often been followed by the reality of war, and quite often the war had been followed by the hope for an end to arms. So it was again when the death of Stalin seemed to change the direction of events.
Winston Churchill tied Western hopes for a new era to the reduction of arms in a speech before the House of Commons in May of 1953. He said:
"We all desire that the Russian people should take the highest place in world affairs that is their due, without feeling anxiety about their security. I do not believe that the immense problem of reconciling the se curity of Russia with the freedom and safety of Western Europe is insolvable. Indeed, if the United Nations organization had the authority and character for which its creators hoped, it would be solved already•••• "The Locarno Treaty of 1925 was in my mind. It was the highest point reached between the wars •••it was based upon the simple provision that if Germany attacked France we should stand with the French, and if France attacked Germany we should stand with the Germans. The scene today, its scale, its factors, is widely different and yet I have a feeling that the master thought which animated Locarno might well play its part between Germany and Russia in the minds of those whose prime ambition it is to consolidate the peace of Europe as the key to the peace of mankind." 1
Perhaps Churchill was ahead of his time. But the hope he ex- pressed was widely shared. Even though this beginning of optimism
1 Bryon Dexter, 11 Locarno Again," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32, October 1953, p. 34. 12 13 was expressed, there also existed the strong desire to strengthen both defensive and offensive capabilities. Recent showdowns of force throughout the world, the crushing of the East Garman re volts, and repeated difficulties in Berlin were convincing reminders of the necessity of continuing to arm. Malenkov spoke of the 2 danger for all men in a nuclear war , but these official pronounce ments could not always be taken at face value. The West could not turn from the path of strength--the trust was not there. Vice President Nixon expressed this when he said that the United States had adopted a new principle of foreign policy. " •.. the new principle summed up is this; Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars we should rely in the future primarily on our massive mobile retaliatory power which we would use in our discretion against the major source of aggression at times and places we choose." 3 In this Nixon was echoing Secretary of State Dulles' policy of massive retaliation4, and responding to the threat from the Soviet Union. Bloc stood against bloc in an organized fashion by 1955; like 11two old time gunslingers each with a loaded six-shooter, each with the drop on the other. ,,5 There seems to be no doubt that these were days of extreme tension.
2 u.s. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, Report 2501, p. 378-;- 311Nixon Takes Strong Stand", ��Times, March 14, 1954, p. 1. 4John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace·;" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32 , April 1954, pp. 353-364. 5 11Where We Would Disengage If," Newsweek, Vol. 54, August 24, 1959, p • .37. 14 Disarmament activity was given a great imi;etus by the major Soviet concession concerning Austria. It seemed like a tremendous break-through, a beginning of a new thaw in the Cold War, and the possibilities of German reunification seemed much brighter. It was in this atomosphere both of strength and of hope that the SUmmit Conference of the Heads of State met in Geneva in 1955. The important con£erees were Eisenhower, Anthony Edan, Bulganin,. and Khrushchev. The conference almost immediately ran into a procedural problem that forestalled any real progress. Bulganin. wished to emphasize Russian security in Central Europe: " ••• our eventual objective should be to have no foreign troops remaining on the 6 territories of the States of Europe." He added that German rearmament and inclusion within NATO were obstacles to German reunification because they represented a threat to the security of the Soviet Union.7 Eisenhower remarked that while he under stood the security interests of the Soviet Union, prior considera tion should be given the reunifying of Germany by free elections, and the new nation must be free to choose its own defensive alliances. Besides this, Eisenhower felt that it was time to consider giving the peoples of East Europe the freedom to choose their own form 8 and type of government. Whether Germany or security came first-
6 Anthony Eden, Full Circle, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960) p. 330. 7Ibid. 8 Ibid., pp. 328-329. 15 that was the problem. Anthony Eden sought to remove this deadlock by dealing with both security and reunification simultaneously. "The original Eden Plan was advanced by Sir Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary, at the Berlin Conference in January 1954. Its twin objectives were to unite Germany in freedom and at the same time convince the Soviet Union that it had nothing to fear from such a dev·elopment. In addition to stipulating the conditions under which free elections should be held to establish a government of a united Germany, the plan also suggested that as evidence of good intentions there should be a zone of inspection and control comprising areas of comparable size and depth on both sides of the demarcation li§e between.r�unified Germany and her eastern neighbors." In 1955, Sir Anthony added the concept of a zone of 'withdrawal by both sides. The original zone of inspection was expanded to in clude the withdrawal of forces,.leaving a rather narrow demili� tarized strip between the two blocs on either side of the Iron Curtain. The plan also included inspection of the buffer area, limitations on armaments in areas of Europe, and a security pact 1O between East and West. Both the United States and Russia were willing to consider the proposal, but each favored different elements in the plan, as might be expected. The Eden plan was relegated to the background of the conference, however, after Eisenhower's plans for total, world-wide d�sarmament were pre sented to the conference. "Open-Skies", as it was called, was a grand plan for complete disarmament to be inspected both by
91'Macmillan Refuses to Discuss Eden Plan in Commons','·' � York Times, May 1, 1957, p. 6.
10sir Anthony Eden,� Circle, P• 325. 16 ground control posts and by aerial inspection of each other's territory; including the e:x:.ohange of strategic blueprints. The October Conference of Foreign Ministers was unable to reach a decision on any of the proposals; but the fact that meetings were taking place gave rise to the "Spirit of Geneva", a feeling that men could work their problems out at the conference table rather than by mutual destruction. The hope seemed to have been erected on little more than the desire for such hope. East and
West, after the Geneva meetings, were still far apart. The same procedural problem remained even for Eden's plan which had been altered prior to the October meetings in that German reunification 11 was made the first step of his proposal. Both East and West remained rather inflexible, and the build-up of arms and the testing of nuclear weapons continued. Very little had been ac complished at Geneva; and yet, as Harvard's Dr. Berman pointed 12 out , th e door seeme d open �or � f urth er negot· ia t· ion. On November 17, 1956, Bulganin sent a comprehensive disarmament proposal to Great Britain, France, India, and the United States.
The disarmament door did seem to be still open. Bulganin pro- posed ... a world-wide reduction in armed forces Yd th a corresponding reduction in armaments, a total ban on the use and production of
11 "Eden Plan for Garman Reunification,"� York Times, September 27, 1955, p. 12. 12 Harold Berman's reply to a Subcommittee questionaire, quoted in U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control� Reduction 2.1_ Armaments, Report 2501, p. 375. 17 nuclear weapons, the destruction of existing stockpiles, a re duction of forces stationed in Central Europe and a removal of all forces stationed on foreign soil within two years, reduction in armament expenditures, a ban on nuclear weapons in foreign states, internat'ional inspection and control, and a zone of aerial inspec tion 800 kilometers on either side of the demarcation·line between 13 East and West. The West seemed to be cautiously intrigued at first, but after a short time all of the objections were solidi fied under a "threat to NATO" concept which overshadowed the :parts of the Bulganin proposals that seemed acceptable.14 Evidently the Russian leaders were interested in the dis engagement parts of the Eden plan. This became a strong element in their proposals in 1957, but the Soviet Union was proposing withdrawal of forces from the demarcation line between East and West Germany; whereas Eden had suggested the withdrawal of forces from the border between reunified Germany and its eastern neighbors. This is why Konrad Adenauer could agree to disengagement in 1955, but disagree emphatically in 1957.15 On April 20,- 1957, Bulganin tried again with a simpler plan. First, a temporary ban on testing; second, a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries; third, the conclusion
13 C.L. Sulzberger, "The Bulganin Proposals;'' � .!.2E1sTimes, November 18, 1956, :p. 33. 1 411Adenauer Sees Merit in Russian Proposals," New York Times, January 12, 1957, pp. 1, 9. ".Adenauer Replies to U.S.---: Criticism," ��Times, January 13, 1957, pp. 8, 40. l5 Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle, p. 325. 18 of an all European collective security pact; fourth,. discussion of the Eden plan for demilitarization and partially armed areas; and fifth, serious consideration of other Soviet disarmament ideas.16 The timing of this proposal suggests the probability that the Soviet leaders were concerned about the nuclear rearming of West Germany; a question to be discussed at the May NATO Conference in Bonn. Whatever the motivation, the proposal stirred up a variety of reactions. Harold Stassen, attending the London Disarmament Conference, seemed interested, but when he expressed his interest some Western leaders were dismayed.17 Eisenhower replied to a news conference question that the Bulganin proposal deserved serious study in regard to the Eden ideas, and that " ••• I personally believe that ••. mutual inspection is going to come about through some such evolutionary develo�ment that is envisaged in that kind of proposal."18 Leaders in West Germany saw this answer as hedging over a proposal th�t would tend to perpetuate the division of Germany. When Washington seemed interested in the zone of aerial inspection and arms reduction in Central Europe, West Germany thought that the official sources quoted were referring to demilitarized areas, and they were very critical. Washington denied favorable consideration of areas of demilitarization and
16 11The New :Bulganin Proposal�" New York Times, April 25, 1957, p. 1. 17Jerome Spingarn, "Five Months in London," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 13, September 1957, p. 258.
18 11 � � "Text of Eisenhower News Conference� Times, May 9, 1957, p. 18. 19 blamed the whole misunderstanding on Harold Stassen, chief U.S. disarmament negotiator. 19 Secretary of State )}ulles began, under standably, to feel that Central Europe had too many political complications, and that a more politically barren area should be 20 th e f.irs t s tep for a zone o f.inspec t·ion. A ccor'-W,,;pg�-� '• 1 y ,--- Ifull· es later flew to London, the site of the Conference. on Disarmament, and proposed a possible Arctic inspection zone including parts of the United Sta�es, Norway, and Russia.21 This got nowhere, mainly because Russia refused. The Soviet Union also rejected a twenty-four nation proposal at the United N�tions that would have progressively reduced a;rmaments and armed forces with both air and ground inspection, even though the proposal was passed by the
General Assembly.22
Disarmament talks continued-but nobody disarmed. The hard line on both sides of the Iron Curtain held fast. As one writer put it: "For more than a year now the contending parties have been more concerned with twisting arms than with reducing them.11�3 Each side was afraid to stop testing and developing nuclear weapons for reasons of their own security. If there was to be
19"Eisenhower on Troop Reduction," � �Times , May 12, 1957, p. 1. 1 20 "U.S. Concerned about Troop Cuts·,' ��Times, May 30, 1957, P• l.
21 11 11Arms--Putting the Chips Down, Newsweek, Vol. 50, August 12, 1957, P• 38. 22 11 11Th.e Partial Measures Approach to Disarmament, United Nations Review, Vol. 4, December 1957, p. 4. 2 311Twisting A:rms,u Economist, Vol. 189, February 22, 1958, p. 481. 20
any progress at all in this Spirit of Geneva, a first step was
needed, particularly in Central Europe. As a writer in Nation
put it, there seemed to be no sense in a "foolproof inspection
of polar bears, while Europe, which both sides have packed to overflo�ing with military installations and troops, would be ig 2 nored.11 4 Harold Stassen sought a rather large ·first step when he prop· osed a two year mora,torium on tests and the production of nuclear devices, an eriforci-ble: _system- of, in§Jpectiol;l and an initial reduction in conventional arms and armed forces.25 Premier
Khrushchev suggested on a taped Face �Nation interview that 2 6 both sides withdraw their troops from foreign bases. United States officials did not like this kind of a first step, however. A few days later Senator Knowland (R - California) suggested that
Norway be neutralized in exchange for the neutralization of the... 2 Warsaw Pact country, Hungary. 7 This proposal was rapidly re
jected by Norway, Hungary, Dulles, 1n the�� Times edi- torial staff; 28 even though Knowland was advocating free elections
in Hungary only a year after the bloody revolution was crushed by
the armed might of the Soviet Union, and feeling about Hungary was
24 11The First Little Steps," Nation 1 Vol. 184, June 8, l.957, p. 489. 2 11 5 .Answer--A-Blast," Nevrsweek, Vol. 50, September 12, 1957, p. 38. 2 6 11Te:x:t of Khrushchev's Rem.arks'," New York Times, June 3, 1957, p. 6.
2 11 n 7 Knowland's Plan·� �� Times, J e 10, 1957, :P• 1. 28 11Norway Irked by Neutrality Plan·," New York Times, -, June 11, 1957, pp. 5, 34; "Dulles Against Knowland Plan,"11 � Ibid., June 12, 1957, p. 12; "Hungary Dismisses Knowland: Plan·, June 15, 1957, P• 4. 21
29 still very much in favor of doing something to alter the situation. Hugh Gaitskill, leader of the British Labor Party, sought the first step in a proposal that was specifically Central European. His plan included the removal of all foreign forces from East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; international control over the national forces that would remain; the reunific� tion of Germany; a security pact guaranteeing European borders; and the removal of Germany and the three satellites from their 0 respective alliances in either NATO or the Warsaw Pact.3 Mr. Gaitskill was quoted as saying that he would much rather test the Russians than go on testing bombs.31 His ideas were not championed by the Conservative Government nor by the.West generally; but they did stir up interest and discussion. Another man that created discussion in early 1957 was George F. Kennan, the Mr. X of the containment policy. He testified be fore the Disarmament ·Subcommittee on January 9, 1957, making suggestions similar to those of Gaitskill. "I have never felt that there was any great possibility of arriving at any multilateral agreement for reduction of armaments, so long as you (sic) had Americaj and Soviet 11 2 forces face- to face in the middle of Germany.
2911Knowland's Plan," ��Times, June 10, 1957, p. 1. 0 3 Hugh. Gaitsk.ill� .Adlai,· Stevenson,: Pierre Mendes France,·. "Tee OpJJosition Leaders Discuss Russia a.nd the West," New Republic, Vol. 139, March 24, 1958, p. 12. 3111Gaitskill's Plan," New�Times, June 17, 1957, P• 4. 32u.s. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control� Reduction .2f_Armaments (hearings), Part Two, 85th Congress, 1st Session, January 9, 10, 1957, p. 1003. 22
The next question concerned .NATO ,- in which Germany wa.s by now a
prominent member. Senator Symington (D - Mississippi) asked: " ••• would you be willing to scrap NATO in order to have our troops
out of Western Germany and Russian troops out of Poland or East
Ge:rmany? 1133 Kennan replied: "I an inclined to think.that the dan gers might be less by not ha:y,ing Germany in NATO, if· the Soviet·s 34 would really get out of Eastern Europe.11
Kennan's ideas received world wide attention in late 1957 when
he delivered the Reith Lectures35 over the British Broadcasting
Company facilities. The lectur� on Central Europe was given on
November 24, 1957. The main element in his prescriptive remarks was disengagement, or the pulling back of opposed forces leaving
a buffer area in between. Thia was ot a reversal of his contain
ment article ten years earlier, but rather an adjunct to that
policy. It represented an answer to the question implicit in
containment: Now what? Kennan's answer reflecte many expert 6 op.inions3 that Soviet withdrawal could not be expected without
some sort of negotiated quid pro quo agreement between the two
powers. The rigid policies of the United States and the Western nations, :Mr. Kennan said, generally ask Moscow to abandon
"the military and political bastion in Central Europe which it won by its military effort from 1941-1945,
33 Ibid., p. 1013. ·34Ibid.
35These lectures are now a Harper & Eros.publication, Russia,.��� lliWest, (New York: Harper & Eros, 1957) 36u.s. Senato Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments, Report 2501, p. 11 • . . :·�· , .. -- 23
and to do this without any compensatory withdrawal of 7 American armed power from the heart of the Continent." 3 I 11 I think we are justified in assuming tha it is this question of the indefinate retention of the American and other Western garrisons on a3eman soil which lies at the heart of the difficulty •••• " "It j�signs half of Europe, by implication, to the Russians.
In that other half, he continues, it is the retention of Soviet troops that prevents the evolution of the satellites to insti-. · tutions and social systems most suited to their needs.40 There� fore, what more logical solution than reciprocal withdrawal? In regard to West Germany's part in NATO, Mr. Kennan said:
"I would only say that it seems to me far more desir- able 6n principle to get the Soviet forces out of Central and Eastern Europe than to cultivate a new German army 1 for the purpose of opposing them while they remain there." 4 Kennan's ideas were accepted by a great many people, but on the official level they were rejected by the Western powers. The interesting part of the matter was that increasingly both sides were suggesting the same thing: some sort of zonal area in v,hich a beginning might be made to make Europe more secure by the reduc tion of arms and forces. However, progress was not being made.
Would a more modest proposal be accepted? Evidently reduction in conventional armed forces and in conventional arms faced certain opposition--but what about-a proposal to ban just nuclear weapons, and in just a small area? This was a question Adam Rapacki probably asked.
3 , 7George F. Kennan, Russia. _____the Atom and the West, P• 38. 8 3 Ibid., p. 41. 39Ibid., p. 40. 4oibid., p. 36. 41 Ibid., P• 45 TI:IE PROPOSAL ITSELF
Adam Rapacki has been Foreign Minister of Poland since Gomulka came back to power in 1956, during the Polish October. As Foreign Minister Rapacki is the official head of the Polish delegation to the United Nations. It was here that his proposal was initially made, in a speech before the General Assembly, on October 2, 1957. "The special responsibility of the great powers as stressed by the United Nations Charter, by no means limits the responsibility or the part to be played by the small states. Poland will make its contribution. "Poland.is a socialist country and is therefore able to overcome the consequences of its age-long backwardness and insure its growth in all fields. It can also be a positive factor in the peaceful development of relations among: states. "Strong and stable ties of solidarity, springing from mutual needs and common basic problems, link it with other socialist countries, but it wishes to maintain at the same time the friendliest relations with other states. There cannot be any contradiction in this regard, for this is the esssnce of constructive peaceful coexistence. "Poland has embarked on a great effort to reorganize its forms and methods of government and its economic administration. Favorable :pros:�1ects, however, are linked with �he progress of the international situation. "At this session of the Assembly, attempts should be made to reach mutual understanding on controversial issues, or at least partial solutions. "Disarmament is the key problem. The first obstacle which the Disarmament Subcommittee proved unable· to over come and the main reason for its lack of success was the concept of the so-called "global strategy" of·the Western powers in which so vital a role is played by nuclear weapons. "Another was that the Western powers made concrete steps toward disarmament conditional upon the simultaneous solution of other controversial international problems. And the third obstacle arose from the opposition of the German Federal Republic and from considerations concerning the remilitarization of Western Germany.
24 25 "Time is running short. Every month of the armaments race imposes on humanity an increasing burden. The armed forces of the great powers are being speedily re-equipped with nuclear weapons, and the danger of the armies of an in creasing number of states being equipped with such weapons is growing. The danger of weapons of mass destruction being used even in local conflicts will soon become imminent. "Therefore, if an agreement on a final and complete ban on nticlear weapons is not possible at present, the Soviet proposal for a pledge by great powers not to use such weapons for at least five years is an appropriate initial step. Poland also supports every initiative which will lead,, in the shortest possible time, to the cessation of nuclear tests. "The remilitarization of the German Federal Republic and the concentration of arms and troops there are dangerous to the cause of peace in Europe and in the whole world.- The rightful aspirations of the German people toward nation�l unity are in the good interests of Europe, but the process of reunification can develop favorably only in an atomosphere of relaxation of international tension, dis armament, and a growing sense of security on the part of Germany'e neighbors, only by rapprochment and understanding by the two German states. "The existing tension is 0 eing intensified by revisionist claims concerning Poland*s western frontier, a frontier which is final, inviolable and not subject to any bargaining. "Poland is against the division of Europe into opposing blocs and military pacts, but in view of tne danger which West German rearmament within NATO poses, Poland and its allies had to conclude the Warsaw Pact, which safeguards security until an effective system of collective security is set up to replace the existing division of Europe. Poland supports even partial measures leading toward that ultimate objective. That is why the setting up of a zone of limited and controlled armaments in Europe would serve a useful. purpose. "In the interest of Poland's security and of European detente, and after consultation on this initiative with other members of the Warsaw Pact, the Government of the Polish People's Republic declares that, should the two German states express their consent to putting into effect the prohibition of production and stockpiling of atomic.and thermo-nuclear weapons on their territories, the Polish People's Republic is prepared simultaneously to take the same action on her own territory. "Should this initiative be adopted, it would be at least an initial step forward on a matter of paramount importance not only to the Polish nation and to -the German people, to their good mutual relations, but also useful 26
1 to Europe and to all nations.11
The remainder of his address dealt with related matters such as the reduction of tension in tha Middle East, and the improving of trade relations between East and West. Immediately after Adam Rapacki's speech, Vaclav David, of Czechoslovakia, made the following speech of affirmation. "In the interests of reducing international tension, Czechoslovakia is prepared to associate itself v.rith the proposals of Poland and to assume an obligation to re nounce the producti0n and stationing of atomic weapons on its territory if both German states come to an agreement for the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of atomic weapons on the territory of Germany, as was pro posed by the German Democratic Republic. "The readiness of Poland and Czechoslovakia to assume these obligations can make it easier to reach such an agreement which would, no doubt, constitute a step forward in solving the problems of peace and of European security. At the same time it would help considerably in improving the international atomosphere �d reaching agreement on further disarmament measures."
Tha two speeches were summarized by the --New York Times-as United Nations news. It was a brief summary on page four, and the reporter concluded with the observation that Rapacki had not mentioned any provision for control and inspection if the proposal were accepted by West Germany.3 Rapacki does speak of controlled armaments but not the control of the reduction nor the inspection.
1 "Summary of the Debate, U.N. General Assembly," United Nations Review, Vol. 4, November 1957, pp. 84-85. 2 Ibid., p. 85. 311Rapacki and David Pledge Disarming;" � York Times, October 3, 1957, p. 4. 27 of the control. Rapacki replied to this objection in a speech before the Sejm (Polish Parliment) Foreign Affairs Committee on December 13, 1957. He said that Poland was greatly interested in a most effective control to provide maximum security for all the interested states. But ha would rather work out the control and inspection aspects of his proposal after there was agreement on the principle itself.4 As far as Rapacki was concerned at year's end, matters of control could be worked out. Te timing of the proposal was, as mentioned above in connec tion with ::Bulganin's proposals, connected with the December meeting of NATO to be held in Paris. Already during the May meeting in Bonn the United States had expressed its desire to station nuclear weapons on the territory of its allies. The matter had been postponed until December and the issue was pending. The United States made it quite clear in the· intervening months that as soon as intermediate range missiles and their warheads could be mass produced, it would like to see them distributed among the NATO allies. Te primacy of this issue in terms of the denucleariza tion proposal is clearly visible in the remarks Rapacki Lade before the Sejm,5 and this in turn is based on an apparently real fear of Germany which will be discussed in Chapter Four. However, the Rapacki proposals did not get much attention from October to
4Adam Rapacki, 11Poland's Active, Constructive and Peace ful Foreign Policy," Polish Facts� Figures, No. 584, December 21 1957, p. 3. 5Ibid., pp. 1, 2. 28
December. Therefore, in the week preceding the Paris meetings,
11 M. Rapacki quietly called in the diplomatic representatives of a number of Western countries, including the United States, expressed Poland's grave concern over the possi bility �f West Germany's receiving missiles, a�d urged re consideration of his United Nations proposal." Similar motivation was apparently felt by Soviet Premier Bulganin. On Pecember 10, 1957, he wrote to Eisenhower urging the acceptance of peaceful coexistence. The letter attempted to be a calm, objective approach to the problem. Bulganin urged Eisenhower not to put nuclear weapons in West Germany; to con sider the merits of the Rapacki Plan, and to join him in a declara tion against the use of nuclear weapons and in a non-aggression pact.7 Eisenhower replied that the proposals did not meet the heart of the problem which was the mounting production of new nuclear weapons. Besides, he said, of what value is the Rapacki
? 8 Pl an in. view . of 1 ong-range m1ss1· ·1 es. The Soviet leader also wrote to the Bonn Government on December 11th. In this letter he urged an immediate freeze on armament levels, troop withdrawal or disengagement in Central Europe, the Rapacki Pla , and the 9 signing of a non-aggression pact. Only seventeen days after George F. Kennan's lecture on BBC,
6sidr,ley Gruson, "Rapacki Pushes Plan," � � Times, January 6, 1958, P• 12. 711Bulganin's December 10th Letter- to Eisenhower," l!.:..§..:_ Department 21_ State Bulletin, Vol. 38, January 27, 1958, pp. 127-130. 8Ibid., pp. 124-125. 911Text of Bulganin's Proposal to West Gel'I!lany," � � Times, December 12, 1957, P• 4. 29 the Soviet Premier had ideas of disengagement linked to the pro posals of Adam Rapacki; as well as great power declarations of peaceful intent. The main motiv�tion for this evolution of Soviet 1 policy seems to have been the approaching Paris meeting. The
January 6, 1958 issue of the�Republic stated that there were 10 tw.o unseen guests at the Paris meetings; Kennan and Bulganin. They might well have added Adam Rapacki.
The December meetings did not reach complete accord in regard to nuclear weapons in Europe; but enough agreements had been made that Eisenhower suggested to Congress that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 be amended so that nuclear weapons could be supplied to allies of the United States. The result was Public Law No. 85-479, 11 85th Congress, 2nd Session (July 2, 1958). Eisenhower referred to this authority on May 26, 1959 in a message to Congress in which he specifically asked authority to supply West Germany, Turkey, 12 and the Netherlands with nucle�r weapons. But this was not yet a� accompli in early 1958, and Bulganin sought to maintain the pressure on the West by suggesting a chief of state's meeting with an agenda cleared of controversial matters. His agenda included tests suspension, renunciation of nuclear weapons, the Rapacki Plan,
1 0 "Kennan's Advice," �Republic, Vol. 138, January 6, 1958, p. 3. 11 nAtomic Data Exchange," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 14, 1958, pp. 62-63. 12 �., Vol. 15, 1959, pp. 104-105. 30 non-aggression pacts, conventional force reduction with inspection, and the extension of the nuclear-free zone to Scandanavia and 1 Italy. 3 Dulles replied that the nuclear-free zone would lead to the total neutralization of the area, and he stressed the primacy of German reunification by free elections, and freedom for Eastern 1 Europe. 4 The Rapacki Plan vras also used by .Bulganin in other proposals, leading some observers to conclude that the Plan was in essence a Soviet concept. Since, however, Rapacki states in his United
Nations speech that he made the initiative only afte� consultation with the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, the question of its real authorship serves no real purpose. However this may be, the
Plan was still only a paragraph in a speech. As C. L. Sulzberger 15 editorialized, the Plan needed more elaboration.
Rapacki provided that elaboration on February 14th, 1958, when he handed United States.. Ambassador Beam a Note and Memorandum16 in which the original proposal was e:x:panded to answer questions · •: raised against it. The area involved was the same; viz., West and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The states agreeing to the proposal obligated themselves not to produce nor to import
1 11 311Text of Bulganin's Proposal, ��Times, January 10, 1951::S, p. 4; "Bulganin Would Extend Nuclear Free Zone," Ibid., January 12, 1958, p. 1. 1 411Text of Dulles Speech," � � Times, January 11, 1958, p. 6. 15 c. L. Sulzberger, "Disengagement, What it Means," � York Times, editorial, February 5, 1958, p. 26. 16complete text of the Note and Memorandum in Appendix A. 31
nuclear weapons of any kind, nor allow them on their territory. The four states bind themselves not to maintain nuclear weqpons in the armaments of their forces in the area, nor service in
stallations, nor missile launching equipment; and not to transfer such to another government or persons in the area. Other states
having forces.in the area undertake similar obligations. Those
states possessing nuclear weapons pledge themselves not to use
those weapons against the zone.
Rapacki received Soviet approval for his inspection pro 1 visions on the 28th of Ja.nuary. 7 As a matter of fac�, Khrushchev stated in Die� that the nsoviet Union was ready to give re liable international guarantees for such a zone and believed a· 18 broad form of control was possible.11 Rapacki, therefore, sug gested both ground obssrver posts manned by members or both blocs and aerial inspection of th territory involved.
The means of agreeing to such a proposal could be by inter national convention or by unilateral declaration of the states concerned. This second method would avoid West Ger any's reluc tance to do anything implying recognition of East Germany. The 1 Memorandum 9 concluded with a plea for favorable consideration; since it could be a step towards facilitation of agreements in regard to the reduction in conventional arms and foreign armies
1 n 711Russia .4.pproves Polish Controls, ��Times, January 29, 1958, P• 1. 8 1 "Khrushchev Pushes Zone,"� York Times, February 7, 1958, p. 5. 1 9The Memorandum was also sent to Great Britain, France, Belgium, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Russia, East Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and India. 32 within the zone. The proposal as summarized here was not the final form of the Rapacki Plan. It was, nonetheless, the best expression of the 1957-1958 Rapacki concept of control and the limitation of arms in a specified area. The reduction in conventional armaments and. armed forces was not a part of the proposal, at this :point in time. In regard to these ideas, Rapacki said that he welcomed a revival of discussion concerning those concepts, but they had previously aroused too much opposition. "That wa.s why, among other reasons, we put forward a more modest proposal, but a simpler and more 20 practical one." He did not wish the nuclear free zone agree ments to be conditioned by necessary agreement to any other problem. He sought a simple step, a basis for negotiation that could accom plish something desirable: a step away from the bloc confrontation in Central Europe, the stalemated disarmament talks and the resul- tant arms race; and a step a ay from the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
"In this way we want to take part in the struggle of all countries and forces of socialism and progress for the detente in international relations, for peaceful coexistence, for21 disarmament and collective security for a lasting peace."
20 Adam Rapacki,11 "Poland's Active, Constructive and Peaceful Foreign Policy, Polish Facts and Figures, No. 584, December 21, 1957, p. 3. 21 Ibid. TEE PIVOTAL ROLE OF WEST GERMANY
There is no doubt that the Ra:pa.cld. Plan is intricately bound up in what had come to be knovm as the German question. The task of this chap ter is to trace the development of the German situation; first to attempt to show that a fea.r of Germany was the prime motivation for the Rapacki Plan; and second to attempt to traoe the importance of West Germany in te:rms of the acceptance or rejection of the Plan by the Western po'W8rs. The European phase of the war had ended with the unconditional surrender of the German nation. Allied land forces had simultaneously pushed the Gennan armies from the F.ast and the West. When Russian sol diers neared .American troops in Germany, the wa.r had ended for all prac tical purposes. Germany lay in economic and political ruin. As the dust of the war settled t·e four victors divided Germany into occupa tion zones both to prevent the resurgence of Nazism and to begin a. limited effort to rebuild the desolated country. The conflict of interests be-twee• ll Russia. and the i'i7i3 st developed into the Cold W which had a prof.ound effect o0. Germany-e T'ne ori gional wa.rtime policy of stripping G�,.,,.,,,.--..� of industrial ase · s so as ca i to redu ts productivity was gracb..!· ly reversed by the West" By 1946 the Western occupation authorities felt that zonal economi o pro grams • re futile, and in October of 1946 the British and .American zones were merged economically, and re joined somewhat later by the French. By 1948, the original attitude was so reversed that the United States included West Germany in the Marshall Plan. T'.o.ia re sulted in Soviet reorganization of East Germany's economy and aid in :.3'3 .34
the fo:rm of long term credits on the foreign exohange• .As the West's apprehension of Russia increased, the fea:r of Ger many decreased. The economic uion of West Germany was alowd to evolv into the political union of the three Western sectors. The desire to re habilitate West Ge� was very strong, and accordingly a constitutional convention met i Bon udr te leadership of Konad Adenauer. Te Social Democrats at fist opposed this because they feared political sov ereignty would perpetuate the division of Germany. But the convention dafted the Bic Law wth .lied help, and it was proclaimed on� 23, 1949 evn th0g Germcwy reied under Occupational Statute util 1951. The Basic Law merged the three zones into the German Federal Re:publio. Te Sovet Unon followd this 'Wi. th the establishent of the Ger Democratic Republic on October 7, 1949• Both West ad Eat tied thei respective aeas to themselvea bot politically ad economicl. East a.nd Wist Germ.any became really separ • The victor's garr·sons,1 however, W3re not re moved. The ostensible · re ason for the continuation of the :pr sence of ax1t de forces was pro- tection. Western troops :prote cta d West Germany and P.:tt~. sian forces East Germany. Te Gera Stat b3c ame tl: us not an area of oocu:pa. tion but a potential battle ound for teh victors. lTo't'Jhere else in the vrorld the conontation so int9 ne ad eo filled w.l th tensio. No mtter what else was problematic in regd to , ope, the proble of Ge a:ny ovrshadowd it. Te German problem beoams the · gle great est obstacle to the solution of Central Europe's :problems. As George F. Kennan said, any Central Eopea solut�on that did not correct the Ger situation was not a solution; a solution in Gera was te key 35 1 to the whole Central European dler. Bt therei le the rb. k chg i the situation, seemed to iply either w or retreat; so that te question of were does one go from here remained uaswred. Germany, a a brning issue in Centra European politics hd t main facets i te:s of the Rapack Plan. I the fist place, Ger w the main motivation for the proposal; and secondly, Gra w a major factor i the Wester rejection of the proposal. The abilit of Ger, i paticla West Gra, to so affect both s a idx of
her iportac not only in Cental Europe but throughout the wrld. The Polish people have a deep-seated fea ad distrust of Gr; ad, paticlaly sic the Cold Wa, a fear of West Ger. Weter this fea, wich is appaently a viabl thig, is miplated b the Polish Governent is a speclative qu tio • Te fact is that there
ae at least tw baes for it. Fist, the Gra ooopation of Polad dig the w wold hav n created fea i aost an poople. bestialit of the Gr oc- cupation assued upaaleled proporti ns."2 ''lions died before fi
ig squad ad in concentration cas. Tose left aive re dliber
1 3 ately condem.."led o udrouislent ad staation. 1 \ 11 ovr tee million Polish Jew, ad ovr three million Polish non- w wre e- te ited b the Ger occpationa foroe s.4 It wold s- tht no
cotr sffered so riou a occpation as did Polad. C ncentation
1Georg F. Kna, Rss11, -� Ata ad� West, P• 36. 2 Clifford R. Barnett, Pol _! Its People l Societ1 . Cv.tue. ( ew York: Go Pesa, Ic., 'i958), P• '• 3Iid., p. 23.
11 4 Polad," Ecolo:ed Aerica_ (New York: Aerica Cororation, 1956), Vol. 22, P• 287. 36 camps9 such as .Ausch,ri.tz, forced labor, a massive uprooting of people in an atmosphere of inh.umanity lead one to conclude that the Ge:rmana ware bent on the complete extermination of the Polish nation. In the second place, the fear of West Gera sprang out of con cern over the question of the Western boundaries of Poland. This ques tion is bound up with the war and the eventual defeat of Germany. Winston Churchill, at the Teharan Conference in late 1943, proposed that the 1941 Curzon line on Poland's ea.stern border be a.greed to, and Poland would then be compensated for the loss of this territory to Russia by receiving territory from Ge:rtnalJY• Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin a.greed to this in :principle. At Yalta, however, the Soviets were anx ious to preserve their military gains. This was in February of 1945• Russia wanted the city of Konigsb rg, and wanted the compensation from Germany to Poland to extend all the wa;r west to the Oder and Neisse Rivers. Roosevelt seemed indifferent to this5 but Churohill felt that this was too much territory. So the question went unresolved. Be tween Yalta d Potsdam (July-August 1945) the Sovi t Unio. made uni lateral arrangements with Polan wherein Russia. simply granted the ter ritory to Poland vtlthout consultation with the other Allies. At the Potsdam Conference an attempt \'VB.S made to push the Polish nation ba.ok in an eastward direction but no agreement could be reached. There fore, the final .Agreement stat s:
5 Victor s. Mama.tey, Soviet Russian J°!nperialism, (New York: Van ostrand Co., 1964), P• 67. 37 "Tha three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western :f'rontier of Poland should await the peace settlement. "The three Heads of Gover-.ament agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the for mer German territories east of a. line running from the :Baltic Sea immediately west of s,nnemund.e, and thence a.long the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and a.long the western Neisse to the Czechoslovakian frontier, including that portion of East Prussia. not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this confer ence and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish · State and for such purposes should not be considered gs part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany•••• t, Thus this valuable territory from Pola.11d• s point of view has never been a matter of international agreement up to the present day. 'Ihe Soviet Union, of' course, recognized the Odez--Neisse line. The Ea.st Genna.n Government in the Zgorzelec .Agreement of 1950 did a.lso.7. But very definitely not Wast Germany. The Polish acquisition of this t rritory forced many millions of Germans to leave. The same evacuation occurred in regard to Sudetenland which was returned to Czechoslovakia. Most of these refu es ended up in ' st Ge:rman;r but they -ware not hapl ,y there: " •••mil. l i :os of refu- gees have their eyes fixed towards the east. Many of them ree.d;y' for a new war if tha. is the nly wa;y they can regain their ol homea.118
Ev; ry waek another thousand of these people crossed the borders. By J ary;.�, 1950, there re well over nine million r fu.gees in West•
6 ... Ibi,d9', :PP• 144-145• (His appendix contains e- cerpts of' the official document.)
"Tha I tt 7w. Gomulka., Polish People s Republic, Forei&!! Affairs_, Vol. 38, April, 1960, P• 143• 8Ec1gar Sa1in, "Social Forces in Germany Today," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 28, January, 1950, P• 275. 38
Germany, over a fifth of the total population.9 Thia high'a percentage suggests that the refugees strongly affected national policy in areas of concern to them, and that the Adenauer refusal to recognize the Ode�feisse line w strongly conditioned by the presence of the ref'ugees.10 The arming of Germans with nuclear weapons was a fea.r:f'ul thing to the Poles. They fe8t,red the Germans because of occupation terror and the threatened loss of the valuable industrial territory Poland had received; While these weapons were in West German hands 1n 1959, with u. s. con 11 trol of nuolear warheads; the Rapacki Plan in 1957-1958 is an under standable Polish effort to forestall· this. Arthur Olsen, � � T:i.msa correspond.ant 1n Poland, writing from W8:rsaw in 1962, stated that Polish official sources there made no secret of the faot that the first objec tive of the Rapacki Plan was to forestall t e acquisition of nuclear 12 v, apons b West Gr •
It is interesting, parenthetically, that the East German regime was also vr active in supper"', of the :Pacld. Plan. The motivation was some what similar in that their support of the proposal probably :reflected a. fear for their own government if the West G rmans re to given nuo- lear a.ms. t a rate, the effort as a strong one. Pr :i ·X Grotewobl
9Ma.rion Donhoff, "Garmany Pu.ts Freedom Before Unity," Foreia_ Affair... , Vol. 28, April, 1950, P• 403. 10 office of High Commissioner(' -- --- for Germ.a.ny,"Politica.l. Aspects of the Refge Pobl , 11 Report � ---..1. ...-:m '"-T n� No.4, 1-Sptember -;;;,;. ;.::.:_;;;?il July 30, 1950, PP• 30-34• 11Norman Thanas, "Support For Rapacki Plan," Letter, � � T-l..mee, June 17, 1959, P• 34. 12.Arthur Olsen, "Poles Disappointed in u.s.Rejectio ' " - New � Times, April 8, 1962, P• 19. 39
boadcat a rado speech into West Gera ugin that al te Ger peo
ple be given the riht to vote on te Rapack issue.13 Te East Gr
Coist Pat wnt so fa as to sugst that the West Ger Socialist 1 Pat uite wt the i a caaig for the nucleafee zons.4
Ts, the West C-ra potent.al for agession ws a pri motivtor
of the Rapack· Pla. Bt the West Gra State also plaed a lag role
i regd to the Wester reactio to the proposa. A a matter of fact,
West Ger exercised a powrfl ifluence ovr all dsaent pro
posals. At the .on NT Conerence in M of 1957, Eisenowr h a sd Adenaer:
11 ••• that (1) the ntion wuld ma no disaaent aeement which migt prejudice later Ger reuification ad (2) that a coprehensiv disaent prof sal necessaily prespposed solution of the Ger question." 5 16 Lter i the yea, this sae vewoint -was adopted b Bita. and Face. Ho vr wll tis soudd, the results of such a attitud, as J.P.
Morrc, a spoks for the .erica left, points ot wre that the Ger
ma Ccellor hd bee accorded a vto on a com rehensive disa 1 ment measure. 7 Morra fails to add, howvr, t t this veto.also wnt
the other w. . O pa foo of the Bn Aeements of 1952 as aendd
by th-C Pais Potocol of 1954, o�e find the statement that the thee
13 "Text of Peier. Grot wohl I s Speech, 11 � � Tes, Ja ary 23, 1958, P• 4• 1411East Germany Correspond Wth "'lest Ger," New� Times, Dcember 26, 1957, P• 9. 5eci1 V. Crabb, Jr., A'erica Foreig Poli2 in the Nclea A, (Elmford, New York: Row I terso , 190}, P• 468. --
16Iid. 17J.P. Morre, �Yalta . Disaent: .9.2M �Dbte, (New York: Ier & Bos., 1961), Pe 301. 40 Western powers retained their full rights and responsibilities in West Germa.ny in regard to matters affecting German reunification and a peace settlement.18 Even though this veto want both Wccy"S, it may be suggested that Konrad Adenauer would not be the first to propose greater flexibility in dealing with the Soviet Union and her satellites. Adenauer firmly- be lieved that the future of Germany dep nded to a great extent on her orien tation to the West. A developiDg prosperity and great possibilities in herent in the oonQept of the Common Market would tend to confirm a de cided reluctance to alter the course of events. Another possible cause of Ad na.uer's inflexibility in regard to the Rapacki Plan was the boundary dispute with Poland. Fram the Chancellor's point of view there was no reason to a.gree to the creation of a zone such as Rapacki suggested; certainly a. part of the treaty or declaration pro hibiting nuclear weapons would describe the ex ot territory involved. Such a description would tend to legalize the Oder-Neisse line and Po land's sovereignty over the area Ea.st of the line; just a.sit would tend to confirm the sovereignty of East Gema • Either of these would be op- posed by the estern powars a.�y; but it woul probably also have been politically unhealthy for Adenauer to even apparently recognize these borders, because of the preponderance of refugee voterso _4;rnold Heiden heim r suggested that betv;een elections the Chancellor was largely in sensitive to the desires manifested in public opinion,19 but it must be
18 u. s. Senate, Connnittee on Foreign Relations, Rea.rings on the Potocol .2!!.Trtion � .2! � Occpation R_pe .!!!.�Federal � J?P:_blic g:(!e:rma ;Y:, 84th Congress, 1st Session, Ma.re 29, 1955. ( 7ashing ton: Government Printing Office, 1955), P• 26. 19.Arnold J. Heiclanheimer, The Governments .2!G,e rman,v, (New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1961) P• 220. 41
_remembered th.at Adenauer first got the Chancellorship by only one vote; and the independent parties that formed pa.rt of his several coalitions were often supported by refugee groups• Even a.f'ter the refugees formed their own party, the Ex:pellees party (BHE), many still voted for inde pendent groups. This was a povrorful factor in the 1950-1960 German :political situation. Even though the five per cent·cla.u.se 20 of the :Basic Law kept them from exercising too much power, by 1960 the retu gae population exceeded thirteen million, or one-fourth of the total population of West Germa.ey.21 Some writers have gone so far as to suggest that Adenauer's in flexibility was occasioned by his lack of desire for reunification. One such is Nonnan Thomas, .American Socialist leader, who maintained that Adenauer went along with the West on reunification only a.s an issue, not as reality. In other vmrds, Thomas charged that Adenauer thought first of the political benefits from the division and sec ondly of' Germimy or German wel:fa.ree Mr. Thomas states that Adenauer was opposed to Geman reunification b9oause:
20This cl�se of the Basic Law reduced the number of splin�r parties by maintaining that parties failing to receive 5fo of the total feder�l. second ballot vote, or which fail to elect 3 deputies in direct constituency seats cannot share in the distribution of seats on a pro portional basis. 21Flora Lewis, "The Un.stable States of Germany," Foreiffi M., fairs, Vol. 38, July, 1960, PP• 588-597. For additional information on the refugee's political impact see also James Pollock, "The Electoral. System of the Federal Republic of Germany," APSR, Vol. 46, December, 1952, PP• 1056-1068; Otto Kircheimer and Arnold Price, "Analysis and Effects of the Elections in Western Germany," �pa.rtment of State Bulletinv Vol. 21, October 17, 1949, PP• 563-573; and Peter Merkl, � Rrigin .2!, the� German Republic, (New York: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 19b3). · . 42
"He did not want an accession of Protestant and Socialist strength in his Republio. His refusal to abandon claim to what vras German territory ea.st of the Oder-Neisse lines be fore 1945 is evidence of' his desire for an issue rather than its solution. Poland will not give up that territory with out war; its German inhabitants a.re mostly wall resettled in West Germany, and the Gennan threat forces a som�Ft reluctant Poland into the arms of the Russian bear. Whatever the reason for his lack ot flexibility, Adenauer pos sessed a major role in the formation of' Western polio;r with regard to Central Europe. He used his veto power often, and a.lweys with suocess.23 He seemingly could not agree to any proposal adversely af'feoting the strength of West Ge:rmany or its basic orientation to the West. As late a.s 1963, the role of West Germany was seen by West Germans at least a.s no less pOW8r:f\ll. than it had been. In regard to the test ba.n treaty during the Kenne� Administration, the West Germans were very un happy that they had not been shown the tr a.ty before it was initialed in Moscow. Before West Ge:rma.ny would adhere to the treaty, they asked that the Western Allies pranise that a:ny future proposals that came up for negotiation with the Soviet Union be sul:mitted to West Germany for scrutiny prior to acceptance.24 In terms of disa.:rmament proppsals affecting Central Europe, the West was camnitted to the first step of the reunification of Ge:rma.ny by :tree elections as a prerequisite; and this was very definitely not a part of
22 Norman Thomas, "The Situation in Central Europe,u ..2!:.!2!!E Times, � 8, 1959, P• 15. (Advertisement) 23 ''U.S. Position Explained to Adenauer,"�� Times, June 19, 1957, P• 3. 24 "West German Reservations About Test Ban�" !!! � Times, August 9, 1963, P• 11. 43 th Rapack Pla, wch pported to b bt a smal bgni of a solu tion to Cent� nopea proble. !e West Ger role both 1 tel of motivtion for te Pla ad 1 ter of the Wster rejection of t
Pla appeas to hv ben a mjor, evn a pivot one.
• WESTERN REJECTION OF THE RAPACKI PLAN
The initial Rapacki proposal in the United Nations received very little attention in the Western world. It seemed in the be ginning that the only person actively aware of possibilities 1n the·proposal besides Rapacki and David was Nikolai Bulganin. Twice in the months following the October speech Bulganin included the denuclearization concept as� part of his package proposal. But :Bulganin was not the only one interested. He merely got more publicity. There was reaction throughout the Western world. The Western reaction was somewhat confused in the sense that many persons confused the Rapacki Plan with disengagement in Central Europe. This seems understandable. George F. Kennan had given the widely publicized Reith Lectures only a month after Adam Rapacki had made his speech. Both had called for a small beginning in the reduction of tension, both asked for the creation of a zone between the two opposed blocs that was in different ways to be partially demilitarized; and both granted the primacy of Germany as a source of friction and sought in different ways to neutralize this. Neither disengagement nor denuclearization called for a neutral status for Germany; but rather a neutralizing of what each considered the prime irritant in Germany: foreign armies or nuclear weapons. But beca�se both plans attempted to reduce the defense capacity of_ t�e German States, the Rapacki Plan and disengagement were often confused with the concept of a neutral
44 45 status for Germany. The neutrality of the two Germanies might be an interesting discussion topic, but the neutrality of West Germany was the direct opposite of the United States policy since 1949, and to� lesser degree the opposite of the NATO policy. Part of t�e conf'usion was perhaps due to the initial vague- ' ness of the Rapacki Plan. 1 After all, it was just a paragraph in a speech. The connection with disengagement was unfortunate, however, because Rapacki was trying specifically to keep his proposal free from other entanglements. As time went on this situation began to change; from the original aloofness to the con cept of disengagement in the hope that his modest proposal would be accepted, the variants of the Rapacki Plan began more and more to contain elements of dis.engagement. The concluding paragraph of his February 14, 1958 Memorandum states: "The Government of the Polish People's Republic has reasons to state that acceptance of the proposal concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe will facilitate the reaching of an agreement relating to the adequate reduction of conventional armaments and of foreign armed forces statione� on the territory of the states included in the zone." But in terms of his original proposal he was at pains to state that it must not be con:f'used with other plans.
1For example, Senator Douglas, after interrupting a dis armament speech of Senator Hubert Humphrey, stated that George F. Kennan had proposed the atomic neutralization of Central Europe to be followed by conventional forces withdrawal. See "Speech of the Honorable Hubert Humphrey," Congressional Record, Vol. 104, Part 2, January 31 to February 25, 1958, @ashington: Government Printing Office; 1958) February 4, 1958, p. 1615. 2 see Appendix A this report. 46
"It would �ean losing a simple question in a jungle of more oom licated mat�ers. It would in practice mean the rejection of 3 our proposal'r•••", \ Also the connection between Kenna.n's disengage- ment and neuirality was unfortunate because the latte� represents a conclusion in regara to the consequences of the former. Kennan said: "PeopJ.e will ask: how do you envisage th� future of Germany if'1 not as a full-fledged member of NATO?, Is it neutrality you are recommending, or demilitar�z�tion, or a general '1furop�an security pact? · ,': "These again are problems for the planner,. The com binations are many; and they must be studied minutel{ as alternatives. No outsider can judge which is best." Moreover, as Rapacki began moving toward disengagement, Kennan seemed to be moving in the direction of denuclearization. While discussing the withdrawai of forces, Kennan cannot avoid pointing to an apparent obstacle to that di.sengagement, namely, the placing of nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO allies. "If therefore the Western continental countries are to be armed with them, any Russian withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe may become unthinkable once a.J2d for all. •••"5 The relationship between the views of Rapacki and Kennan is a close one, therefore, and the fact that the West very often re acted to them both at the same time is understandable. However,
3Adam Rapacki, Polish Facts� Figures, p. 3. 4George F. Kennan, Russia, � � and the West, p. 45. 5Ibid., p. 59. · 47
those favoring one did not need to favor the other. Denis Healey, British Labor Member of Parliament, favored disengagement but saw only a small.amount of merit in the Rapacki Plan. 6 The reaction of the West was also conditioned by a view of the Polish proposal as a Soviet proposal. This impression was without doubt greatly strengthened by Bulganin's almost immediate snapping up of the Plan as a part of Soviet disarmament suggestions. The question of the authorship of Rapacki's proposal, as stated in Chapter Three, is a speculative one and is perhaps unnecessary to answer. Denis Healey felt that it was a peculiarly Polish sug- gestion "without Soviet prompting or support.117 At about the same time Gomulka had said: "It was the result of our own deliberations and studies. We wanted to take a first ••• simple and effective step 8 in reducing international tension.11 Certainly the fact that any proposal would originate in a satellite country was itself signifi cant even if it were part of general Communist disarmament policy. However, the evidence available to the West indicated more of a connection with the policies of the Soviet Union than a separation. Vaclav David, in his speech of affirmation following Rapacki's at the United Nations, stated that Czechoslovakia agreed with the de nuclearization concept "as was proposed by the German Democratic
6 Denis Healey, "How to Start Disengagement," � Republic, Vol. 138, March 31, 1958, PP• 14-16. 7lli!., p. 16. 8 Arthur Olsen, "The Polish Memo," ��Times, February 18, 1958, P• 7. Republic.119 This referred to a July 27, 1957 program of the East German Government calling for a prohibition of the stockpiling and manu:f'acturing of atomic weapons in Germany, the withdrawal of the two German states from the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, abolition of conscription, agreement on the strength of the respective armies, and a joint request to the Big Four to withdraw their forces from Germany. 10 Besides this, previous Soviet proposals made prior to Rapacki's speech had advocated the creation of a Central European zone of limited armaments. Those who sought a peculiar Polish authorship had to ignore or explain this evidence if they wished to advocate consideration of the Plan simply because it was not part of general Communist policy. The fact that the Rapacki proposal might not have been Polish need not indict the Plan; the discussion here is merely an attempt to ex plain why the Western leaders did not in fact distinguish it as a Polish proposai.11 The Netherlands' Foreign Minister, Dr. Luns, returned from the Paris NATO meetings "very pleased with what he called the failure of the latest Soviet effort to sabotage the North Atlantic Treaty Conference." 12
The West German reaction was a definite rejection. Adenauer,
911Summary of the Debate," United Nations Review, Vol. 4, November 1957, p. 85. 10 "Khrushchev Repeats his Denuclearization Proposal," �� Times, August 9, 1957, P• 2. 11·"Remove Nuclear Weapons from Central Europe?," New York Times, December 13, 1957, p. 1. 12 11NATO Meeting Adjourns," � � Times, December 21, 1957, p. 3. 49 at the Paris Conference, had not really insisted on nuclear arms for West Germany, but by January he was seemingly most anxious to correct an impression that he had been influenced by George F. Kennan. The Chancellor made it quite clear that he was not so influenced, and rejected the Rapacki Plan because, like Dulles, Adenauer felt that the proposal would lead to the neutralization of Germany. Such a zone, he said, would give the people in it no protection; it "would mean the end of NATO, the end of freedom 1 in Western Europ�, and thereby the end of our own freedom.11 3 Dr. Adenauer was stating this rather strongly, and his remarks were misleading. Certainly the decision to rearm West Germany with nuclear weapons was a step away from neutralization, but the decision not to so arm West Germany is not a step toward neutra lity. Most of the nations of the world did not possess nuclear weapons; they merely possessed their own national forces, bound together with others in alliances. Formosa, for example, could not be called a neutral nation and yet does not possess nuclear weapons. To say, as Adenauer did, that the proposal would afford the people in the zone no protection, is to ignore the faot that the people in that zone had no protection against nuclear war anyway outside of the guarantees of Russia and the United States. The acquisition of nuclear weapons still under the control of the United States would not alter that;· it moreover would probably
1 311west German Bundestag Backs Adenauer," � � Times, January 24, 1958, P• 5. 50
result in West Germany's rise in importance as a primary target in the event of war. In addition, there was a strong feeling among many Germans, especially Social Democrats, that the nuclear rearming would decrease chances for reunification of the entire German State. The country was in a :f'uror over the Rapacki and Kennan concepts with meetings being held, and petitions being 1 circulated; 4 even though Adenauer was firmly against them. He 1 said that he would "never, never agree to the Rapacki Plan.11 5 Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano denounced the Kennan ideas 6 as "sanseless": Wilhelm Grewe, Acting State Secretary in the Foreign Office said that he would not negotiate on the Rapacki 17 Plan even if reunification were also on the agenda. But the Social Democrats and even some members of the Christian Democratic Union were very stirred by the large amount of public support for the Rapacki Plan and for Kennan's ideas, but the :Bundestag none 18 theless gave Adenauer a vote of confidence on January 23, 1958; and on March 25th it approved the nuclear rearming of West Germany 19 by a vote of 275-161 with 26 abstentions.
1411Polish Proposal Popular in West Germany," � � Times, February 9, 1958, p. 3E. l5"Hope vs Illusion," Newsweek, Vol. 51, February 10, 1958, p. 59. 1 6Ibid. 17 �. 18 "West German Bundestag Backs Adenauer," � !2E£. Times, January 24; 1958, p� 5. 1911west German Nuclear Rearming," lli!.!! �Times, March 26, 1958, P• 10. 5l
On the other hand, Field Marshall Harding, retired British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, said during a Bonn conference in March that the dangers of a military pull-back were actually leas than the dangers in the existing situation.20 This concurred with the posi�ion of the Social Democrats in West Germany. Fritz Erler, prominent spokesman for the Social Democrats, supported the Rapacki Plan, he said, because missiles that could overfly the zone made the bases in that zone meaningless; so therefore why 21 not denuclearize in the hope of reducing tension. Eric Ollenhauer, the Social Democratic lead.er, called the Plan a first step toward controlled disarmament; the socialist newspaper Neue Ruhr Zeitung said after Adenauer had rejected the Plan: "The only plan that might have checked the amament race has now been re- 22 buffed most strongly." When the Bundestag approved the issue of nuclear rearming Ollenhauer declared that his party would intro duce a resolution asking that the issue of nuclear weapons be taken 23 to the people in a referendum. This was far more than mere opposition to the paDty in power; the Social Democrat position reflected a consistent view of nuclear arms and of West Germany's place in the power picture. They feared such weapons would
20"Conf'erence on Disengagement," New� Times, March 31, 1958, P• 45. 21Fritz Erler, nThe Reunification of Germany and Security for Europe," World Politics, Vol. 10, April 1958, p. 371. · 22 ''Adenauer Opposed on Nuclear Zone,"�� Times, January 16; 1958, p. 6. 23 11011enhauer to Request Referendum,"� � Times, March 26, 1958, p. 10. 52
2 increase the separation between East and West Germany. 4 For this same reason they had initially opposed the :formation of the Federal Republic. However, the official position prevai1ed. Felix von Eckardt, West German Press Chief, summed up Adenauer's reaction. (1) The plan made no advance to reunification but asked a sacrifice by the West. (2) Western security would be harmed because the mili tary parity would be destroyed. (3) The United States withdrawal from Central Europe would harm NATO. (4) Controls and inspection in the zone would be impossible to organize. (5) The pledge of the nuclear powers not to attack the zone was not a strong enough guurantee.25 The rejection was made official by means of a note delivered to Warsaw on the 25th of February, 1958.26 In Great Britain the situation was somewhat similar, in that the Conservatives generally op�osed Rapacki and Kennan, and the Labor Party was generally in favor of both. However, in Britain the Labor Party was much stronger than were the Social Democrats in Ge:rmany: this may account for the more moderate position of ficially taken in London. Back in December of 1957, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd had stated in response to questions in the Commons that: "In military reality the buf'fer zone concept is as outdated
24Fritz Erler, "The Reunification.of Germany and Security for Europa," World Politics, Vol. 10, April 1958, p. 372. 25 "Pros and Cons of Polish Proposal," --New York Times, .February 20, 1958, p. 4. 26"Bonn Rejects Polish Plan," ��Times, March 1, 1958, P• 3° 53 as the medieval moat. With long27ange aircraft, and missiles with ranges of 150 miles or more it is impossible to dis engage in the sense that may have been possible in the age of conventional weapons. The choice is between a clearly defined line .•• and a no-man's land, into which it may be tempting to infiltrate, to try some kind of coup in the be lief that undefended territory can be taken without risk of war. In present circumstances and on the present de marcation lines, to dissngage might we2e lead to a greater insecurity and a greater risk of war."
1.i'his position did not satisfy the Labor Party in the least. :Ba.ck in April of 1957, a similar response of Macmillan to Bulganin's invitation to discuss the Eden Plan had not satisfied the Liberal
1 Party either.
"Jo Grimond, leader of the Liberal party, pressed the Prime Minister to take up Mr. Bulganin's proposal for reopening discussion of the Eden Plan through ordinary diplomatic channels. The object. Mr. Grimond suggested, should be to ease tension in Eastern Europe and obtain w thdrawal of Soviet troops from the satellite nations.029 A public opinion poll taken in early 1958 had registered 75% of the 0 people questioned as being in favor of some sort of disenga.gement.3
This did not imply that this high a percentage of people would vote against the Conservative Party; but the electorate was certainly
27 Mr. Lloyd is being quite conservative here. Just a few weeks after his Commons' remarks the New York Times (January 26, 1958, p. 3) carried a news article concerning the successful firing of the Snark missile which hit its target 5,000 miles,, away. These were already in service in the Strategic Air Command. 28 11 11Neutral Zone, Time, Vol. 70, December 30, 1957, p. 22. 29 11:Macmillan Refuses to Discuss Eden Plan in Commons. "' ��Times, May 1, 1957, P• 6. 30 11Hope vs Illusion," Newsweek, Vol. 51, February 10, 1958, p. 59. 54
being influenced by the advocates of disengagement. A very in fluencial advocate was the British mathematician and pacifist, Lord Bertrand Russell. He wrote open letters to the� Statesman 1 and the Nation3 much like the letter he was asked to write for the liberal American journal, the New Republic, in which he attempted to make his view clear. "A Neutralized Zone to be established in Central Europe com prising, as a minimum -- Germany, East and West - Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. No alien armed forces, whether Russian or Western, to be allowed in the Zone. Each country in the Zone to be free to chooss its own political and eco nomic system and in particular, East and West Germany to be allowed to unite with whatever form of constitution they prefer. No State in the Neutralized Zone to conclude an alliance vlith a:ny State outside the Zone. Germany to accept the Oder-Neisse frontier.11 32 Hugh Gaitskill, leader of the Labor Party, was very emphatic on this point, as was noted in Chapter Two.33 The Labor position favored such a step as the Rapacki Plan as it favored the concept of disengagement suggested by George F. Kennan - as bases for .negotiation.34
3111Soviet Stake in a Divided Germany,''� Republic, Vol. 139, March 17, 1958, P• 9. 32Bertrand Russell, "Bertrand Russell on Negotiations," New Renublic, Vol. 138, January 27, 1958, p. 9. 33see page 21 this report. 3�en though Harold Wilson continues to support the Rapacki Plan and phased-disengagement, a Labor victory at the polls does not mean that the British would adopt the Rapacki Plan as such. Wayland Yound, a member of the Labor Party's disarmament committee and of the defense committee of the Assembly of the Western European Union, stated recently that the Polish proposals could form 11 part of an orderly p:rocess to minimum deterrent balance." (Wayland Young, "British Labour's Arms Plan," New Republic, Vol. 150, May 23 , 1964, p. 14) 55
These factors of opposition might help to explain why the Conservative reaction seemed to leave room for negotiations. The reply to Bulg-dllin's 1957 proposal which contained the R�packi con cept differed from the replies of the other allies in that it cautiously asked for more information on the Rapacki proposal, and on non-aggression pacts.35 They evidently felt ·that the Rapacki Plan in its 1957 form was unacceptable, but saw it as a basis for 6 discussion, as a means of reducing the tension in Central Europe.3
But by February, 1958, the official reaction was a tentative rejection.37 Italy saw the denuclearizing idea as a threat to European security, even a,i>ter Khrushchev promised Italian neutrality and other concessions if they would join the nuclear free belt. Foreign Minister Pella said: "The partial or total neutrality of the great part or Europe as proposed by Khrushchev would not faci litate but rather make more difficult and impossible the solution 8 of Europe• s s-ecurity. 113 Premier Hansen of Denmark, hov,ever, rec commended the Rapacki proDosals for the attention and consideration of the West.39. Albert Schweitzer called the Rapacki.Plan a ray of
35"British Reply to Bulganin," New York Times, January 16, 1958, p. 12. 6 3 11Gaitskill :Backs Polish Plan," New York Times, January 13, 1958, p. 10. 37 ":British Reaction to Rapacki," !2!!,_ � Times, February 12, 1958, p. 13. 38 11Italy Rejects Russ Bid," � � Times, March 31, 1958, p. 4 • . 9 3 "Denm T ark Favors Polish Plan," � York i�. es, January 16, 1958, P• 12. 40 light, However, the few voices ap proving the Plan could scarce ly be heard. The French reaction was quite definitely against the Plan. They were not hostile to the idea; but they pointed out that the original buffer zone concept of Anthony Eden had put the zone be t-\veen a reunified Ge:rmany and the East, whereas the Rapacki zone ignored the division of Germany and would therefore tend to con firm the unhealthy situation in Central Europe.41 Some, like Mendes France, former French Premier, favored the denuclearization concept as a useful experiment,42 but the official reaction pre vailed. The status quo in Germany and East Europe was not to be recognized in such a formal fashion,43 nor was the potential removal of West Germany from NATO to be admitted.44 The reaction of the United States45 was a definite rejection of the Polish Memorandum, February 14, 1958; even though, as in other countries, voices could be heard in opposition to the official position. The United States Department of State felt that the
40 1 11schwei tzer Backs Nuclear Zone, 1 � York �1.1imes, April 29, 1958, p. 14. 4111Premier Gaillard Revives Polish Plan,".� York Times, January 15, 1958, p. 3. 42Rugh Gaitskill, Adlai Stevenson, Pierre Mendes France, "Three Opposition Leaders Discuss Russia and the West,11 New Republic, Vol. 139, March 24, 1958, p. 13. 4311France, NATO Reply to Rapacki Plan," ��Times, January 11, 1958, p. 7. 4411 Text of Couve de Murville's Speech to French Assembly," New York Times, October 30, 1963, p. 14.
45see Appendix D for U.S. Reply to Polish Memorandum. 57
neutralization of Germany was a long-range goal of the Soviet 6 Union.4 This was opposed not simply because Dulles seemed against anything suggested by the Soviet Union, but also because Dulles, along with Eisenhower and Nixon, felt quite strongly that axJ.Y attempt to isolate or neutralize a'people as numerous, vital and vigorous as the Germans could only create another climate for a Hitler.47 The Rapacki Plan was viewed as leadi�g to that neutra lization. At a news conference on January 10, 1958, Dulles was asked about the Rapacki proposal. He replied: " ••• such a step would in practice be indistinguishable from an almost total neutralization of the area because, if it is not possible to have in the area modern weapons then it might be imprudent to maintain any forces in the area at all, be cause they would be in a very exposed condition. 1148 A second element in the U.S. position was that the Plan did not address itself to the political problems in the area; and in not so doing tended to perpetuate the existing division of Germany.49 The same day that this position was announced by Lincoln White, State Department Press Officer, the New� �imes carried an editorial on the subject in which there was complete agreement with the State Department reaction. The editorial maintained that one
6 11 � � 4 11Text of Dulles News Conference, Times, December 12, 1957, p. 4. 4711Rapacki Plan," ed.tiorial, �� Times, January 28, 1959, P•. 30. 8 · 4 11Te:x:t of Dulles Speech, 11 � York Times, January 11, 195�, P• 6.
9 4 11u. s. Reply to Polish Plan," � � Times� February 19, 1958,. p. 5. of the first results of the Plan would be the "formal recognition of the East German State as an equal partner in an international · 0 undertaking involving the West." 5 A third element in the U.S. reaction was that the Plan's adoption would seriously alter the existing balance of forces. In terms of conventional forces the Soviet Union had always been granted a preponderance; and the great equali_zer was nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical. It must be recalled at this point that the original Rapacki Plan was being considered here; not the disengagement of forces that was later to be incorporated into the Plan. The conventional armies of both aides were to remain as they were; the only dif ference being that there would be a prohibition of.nuclear weapons in the area. Thus, the Plan was viewed by the State Department as extremely dangerous, because the conventional forces 1 would be imbalanced heavily in favor of the Soviet Union1 As General Norstadt, NATO Commander, pointed out, the removal of nuclear weapons would destroy NATO's shield.52 Thia was an understandable reaction, and one which.Adam Rapacki should have foreseen. This reaction should not be confused with the debate in regard to total dependance on nuclear weapons that seemed a part of the Dulles' policy. Even those advocating the build-up of conventional or non-nuclear forces recognized the necessity
O 5 11The Polish Proposal," editorial, ��Times, February 19, 1958, p. 26. 5111u.s. Objects to Rapacki Plan," New�Times, February 7, 1958, P• 1. 52Ibid. 59
of nuclear weapons in Central Europe as the equalizer of strength.53 With the removal of nuclear weapons it was felt that a·vacuum might be created into which the Soviet forces would be tempted. Lincoln White summed this up when he said: "This crucial element would depend merely upon the good faith of the powers having possession of nuclear weapons and would therefore be unenforceable." "This element would not appear to make ,my adv�nce toward disarmament, but only underscore the need for broader disarmament measures as a guarantee of protection for any area."5 4 Belgium's Foreign Minister Spaak, later to become Secretary General of NATO, agreed. "How can a responsible statesman face his people with the proposition that their soldiers fight with outmoded 11 weapons against an enemy with the most mode� arms? 55 One of the most consistent objectors to this stand of the ·United States has been Hubert Humphrey, Senator from Minnesota, and Chairman (1957-1958) of the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. He did not object in the sense that he actively supported either Rapacki or George F. Kennan; rather, like Rapacki, he sought a way out of the deadlock in dis armament by breaking up the total :package of U.S. demands and negotiating on one item at a time. In his introduction to the
5 �or example see the report of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Quoted in�� Times, October 15, 1959, P• 4. 5411u.s. Reply to Polish Plan,"�� Times, February 19, 1958, P• 5. 55 n0ur Atomic Defense," Newsweek, Vol'. 49, May 13,· 1957, p. 50. 60 Subcommittee's final report he stated: "In its report of September 6, 1957, the subcommittee expressed the view that progress on disarmament 1 can come gradually, a step at a time', and that 'it is a mistake to expect that the problem of disarmament can be solved in one sweeping overall agreement•. The subcommittee also concluded that 'if a first step disa:rmament agreement is to be realized it should be limited both as to armaments
being curtailed11 and as to the amount of inspection to be included•. 5 6 His position at·the beginning therefore was one that merely ad vocated the consideration of these limited proposals as a begin ning. This is visible in his speech to the Senate on February 4, 57 1958. But as time passed, Senator HumDhrey began to publicly advocate an attempt both at disengagement, and the removal of nuclear weapons from Central Euxope.58 He was very definitely not alone in this position; but he did not affect the State Depart ment's total rejection of the Rapacki Plan, both in 1958 and in later years. The reaction of the Western powers was thus against the Plan.
5 6u.s. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcom mittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments, Report 2501, 85th Congress, 2nd Session;-1958, p. ii'f:'" 57"Speech of the Honorable Hubert Hubert Humphrey," Con essional Record, Vol. 104, Part 2, January 31-February 25, 195�(Washington,f Government Printing Office, 1958) February 4, 1958, pp. 1617, 1629.
58For example: "Humphrey· Critical of Ike," � York Times, February 5, 1958, p. 1; "West German ·Nuclear Arms," Ibid., November 23, 195S, p. 42; "Mikoyan ·Pushes Rapacki Plan,"�-, January 17, 1959, p. 3; "Humphrey Says U.S. Studying Rapacki Plan," Ibid., October 17, 1961, p. 33. 61
Besides the reasons given it was felt that inspection would be
almost inpossible since many nuclear weapons could be fired from conventional devices, or could be carried in a brief case. The
Rapacki Plan tended to discriminate against West Germany, some felt, because she really gained nothing by joining the zone. The Rapacki proposal seemed doomed to a limbo of oblivion. Yet this was.not the case. THE RAPACKI PLAN REFUSES TO DIE
On June 13, 1964, Soviet Premier Khrushchev left from Moscow on a trip through Scandinavia with a first sto:p at Copenhagen. While travel ing, he was e:x:peoted by the Assooia.ted Press "to plug for a ban on nuc lear weapons in the countries he is visiting as well as central Europe." "As he tours Denmark, No�, and Sweden, Khrushohev probably will try again to crack the North Atlantic Treaty Organization northern defense ring by asking the Scandj.navian countries to join in turning the Baltio l into a sea of peaoe." Obviously the Rapacki Plan did not fade away as a result either of Western :rejections or the passing of time. The Plan remained influential in two respects. First, the proposal was a stimulus to other :plans simi lar to Rapacki's and yet varying in one respect or another; second, the initial Plan was submitted repeatedly by the Soviet Union, Oomulka of Poland, and by the author himself. The reason basio to this continued activity ley :primarily in the continued impasse in regard to both Cen tral European security and general disarmament; almost the same impasse and situation which had motivated the original :proposal. As time went on, the rela.xation that occurred in both of the opposed blocs which ma.de the possibility of war seem less inevitable did not reduoe the possibility of the redevelopment of tension; the problem remained and would remain until
l Associated Press release, Kalamazoo Gazette, June 13, 1964, p.l. See also "Soviet Proposal For a Nuclear Free Zone in Scandinavia" as :pu� lished in Izvestia., .August 14, 1959, .American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, P• 1404. 63 the German question was solved and the opposed forces no longer faced ea.ch other across the slender line of demarcation. Berlin furnishes an excel lent example of this. Even though an uneasy detente had developed, the situation in Berlin provoked many days of anxiety and still does to�. The chief source of difficulty seems the very wlnerable and easily ex ploited access routes through East Germany. And. as long as the German question remained unsettled, Poland must remain unsure of her borders, garrisoned with Soviet troops, and unable to pley- a. more independent role in either world politics or trade. Again, as long as the problem re mained, Central Europe had a potential. for trouble. Since the large package proposals did not result in axry progress, the emphasis in solu tions increasinly- was in the direction of small proposals like Ra.paoki•s. Several suggestions were now heard in terms of modest proposals; influ enced by the Rapa.cki Plan and by- a desire for some sort of a. bee;inrdng. One of the first to publish such a response was Henry Reuss in June of 1958. (Mr. Reuss was a member of the House o:f' Representatives from Wis consin, and fol'tller deputy co1:.U'.lsel:,fo1t;.the,.,Marsha.ll.'.��a.n)�'.:;/By; .. thisl.time:,..the.; Memorandum had been rejected by- the United States and the direction of
United Sta.tes policy- in regard to :rearming West Germany with nuclear weapons continued unchanged. Eisenhower had proposed legislation that would pel'tllit the Unitad States to sh.a.re its secrets with its allies, as previously noted. Reuss felt th.at this was an ominous developement be- cause it increased the ohanoes that any European war would be a nuclear �, it increased the number of fingers on the trigger;• and it oould not help but result in the Soviet Union feeling compelled to strengthen their 64 forces in Eastern Europe with a subsequent greater degree of control over the satellites. The West, he said, demands that the Russians pull out of East Europe with no �antees. This is silly. Reuss, therefore, re OOOllllends mutual withdrawal of foroes west of the Rhine and behind Rus sian borders, a guarantee of free elections in Germany, self-imposed arms limitations in Central Europe internally policed-with the possible prohibition of nuclear arms; a non-aggression pact against the zone; and a de-emphasis on nationalism in Central Europe in favor of regional poli 2 tical and economic federation. Reuss is not suggesting a totally demilitarized area; the national forces would remain for their own defense. If' either side cheated, the situation would go baok to wbat it Wd.S. In short, Reuss definitely felt that proposals like the Rapacki Plan deserved to be tried.3 Reuss' proposals seemed like an echo of .Anthony Eden with a dash of Rapacki. The proposal of Selwyn Lloyd to the House of Commons merely echoed Eden. IJ.oyd suggested that Germany be united by free elections but that East Ger be left as a. buffer zone; there would be ground and aerial inspection and arms limits for all countries having forces within the zone.4 This plan was attacked by the Labor Party because in their words the proposals did not remove the ca.use of the tension; namely, the foreign forces in the area.5 A few months later United States Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Monta.na.)
2Henry Reuss, "Breaking the Stalemate," Commonweal, Vol.68, June 20, 1958,, PP• 295-298. 3ibid. 411:Br i tish New Plan," � � Times, December 5, 1958, p. 1. 5Ibid. 65 • suggested that the Geman problem be solved by negotiations between the two German states under the United Nations supervision; or a United Nations force in Berlin to replace Ea.st and West military forces, If' the nego tiations :failed the troops could always return. Secondly, he suggested tha.t both Russia and the United States guarantee the existing borders of Central Europe. This would have legalized to a greater extent the West ern territories of Poland. T.b.i.rdly, he urged:. that serious consideration be given to an arms limitation and a nuplear free zone in Europe as well as a. thinning out of opposed forces and a pull-back from contact. He concluded:
11 In short, :Mr. President, it seems to me essential tha.t our policy, NATO's policies, do not exclude a careful consideration of the Rapacki Proposal, the Eden Plan for a demilitarized zone in mid.dl.e Europe or similst' propositions in connection with the reunification of Germany.
As might be expected, Mansfield's suggestions received direct opposi tion from West Germany,7 but they rated warm commendation from Khrush chev. 8 · Senator Fulbright revealed his agreement with Mansfield when he said: nrt seems to me, for example, i:f' both W8re to move back an equal distance-however slight the difference-the :possibility of war, espec 11 ially accidental war, would be reduced. 9 Surprisingly, an editorial in
6 ''Mansfield Supports Zone Study," � � Times, February 13, 1959, I>• 2. 1nwest Germany- Rejects Mansfield,,.s Suggestions," � � Times, February 13, 1959, P• 11. 811Soviet Leader Praises Mansfield," � � Times, March 17, 1959, P• 6.
9"Fulbright Backs Mansfield," New York Times, March 17, 1959, :P• 18. 66 the�� Times a.greed with Fulbright.10 However, like Ifumpbrey•s suggestions these were largely ignored. At about the same time as Mansfield, Macmillan was discussing the Eden Plan with Khrushchev. Both Adenauer and De Gaulle were very upset with Macmillan because he was speaking of a confederation of the two Germanies.11 4 month later Russia proposed disengagement and a limited force zone with, inspection,12 a.nd British diplomats were suggesting that M.a.CJUillan's ideas of armed force limits and a limit on weapons be pro posed at a foreign minister's conference with the Soviet Union.13 Macmillan made it quite clear that he thought both the Rapacld. Plan and Ga.itskill's ideas were extremely dangerous l4 but the other Western leaders thmlght that he was negotiating on these plans. They converged on Macmillan with criticism even to the point of General Norstad appear ing on television to voice criticism of the Prime Minister's position.15 The La.borite Dail.y Mirror responded with the caustic remark: "If
10 uDisenga.gement," editorial,� � Times, March 25, 1959, P• 34. 11 11Bonn and Paris Oppose Macmillan,"�� Times, February 7, 1959, P• 5• 12 11Soviets Push Disengagement,11 � � Times, March 30, 1959, p.l. 1311Bri tish Push Limited Disarmament,·" � .!2E1ETimes, April l, 1959, p.l. .. 14Ibid. l5Ibid. 67
·General Norstadt wants to go into politics, he should resign and become
a private citizen. Making peace is a. task for statesmen, not for sol 16 d.iers. 11 However, by the middle of April, Macmillan was a.gain urging
the nuclear rearming of West Germany,_ and he tied the other ideas to German reunification much as Eden had done years before.17 The errant she ;p was back in• the fold, but he was not publioally forgiven by Bonn 18 until November of 1959. furing April of 1959�another proposal was put forward, this time by Mendes France. Re attempted to avoid Western objections in regard to an imbalance of forces. He suggested the creation of three zones in
Central Europe. The first zone would lie. on either side of the demar cation line, and it would be thirty miles wide. In this zone there would be total dis�ent, policed and enforced by United Nation's forces. In the next zone, flanking the first zone on both sides, there would be only the national foroes of the countries in the zone, armed only with conven tional weapons. The third zome, again on both sides, would contain :f'ully 19 armed NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Jules Moch, a. short time later, proposed a similar solution which had, however, circular zones beginning 20 at Berlin.
16 Ibid. 1711British Arms Plans," editorial, � � Times, April 11, · 1959, P• 20. 18 n Adenauer and Ma.cmill�,11 � � Times, November 19, 1959, P• 1. 19 11Mandes Franoe Proposes Three Zones," � � Times, April 3, 1959, P• 3. 20 11Jules Mook A:rms Proposal,1 1 � � Times, April 10, 1959, P• 4•. 68
The Irish Minister for Ex:ternal .A:ffa.irs, Fra:ik Aiken, proposed in September that a nuclear free zone in Central Europe be guaranteed by a United Nations police force, and that the opposed forces should withdraw from contact. Russian forces would retire behind the Russian border, and Western forces behind French borders.21 Italian Foreign Minister Pella initially supported Aiken, but the support was withdra.wn in December a.f'ter 22 a. visit by Eisenho-wer to Rome. Harold Stassen, chief' u. s. disarmament negotiator, suggested a. Cen tral European disarmament zone including a. reunified Germany and small 2 parts of France and the Soviet Union. 3 President Kek:konen of' Finland 2 proposed a Scandinavian nuclear free zone 4, China's Chen Yi proposed such a zone for Asia.25, and zones were suggested for La.tin .America and .A:frioa. Adam Rapacki was at least partly responsible for about ten other pro posals like the ones mentioned above; differing in some respects and alike in others; but all favor.mg: some sort of control on the armaments ana./or forces in the Central European area.. Perhaps the continuing influence of
21 ''U.N. Foi·ce For Zone," New� Times, September 24, 1959, p.l. 22 "Eisenhower Holds Talks In Rome," New� Times, September 25, 1959, P• 28; December 6, 1959, p.34. 2 311Ha.rold Stassen Suggests Zone In Central Europe," April 12, 1959, P• 10. 2411Kek:konen Asks Scandinavian Nuclear Zone," � � Times, � 29, 1963, p.6.
2 11 5 Chen Yi Proposes Asian Nuclear Free Belt," � � Times, � 12, 1958, P• 4• · · · 69 the Rapacki Plan was due to the situation which stimulated it, but it was also due to the repeated submissions and adaptations of the proposal. After the Memorandum was rejected, and the Geneva. delegates rejected it again in October of 1958, Rapacki may have f'elt that without adapting his proposal there would be no change in the reaction. At a:rJ.Y rate he made an :ilnportant change in Oslo, No�, where he presented his ideas in a. speech on October 31, 1958. He now did what he had said he should not do; that is, to tie the original proposal to something else, in this case--disengagement. "If, as the situation seems to indicate the situation bas undergone a change, we are read,y to consider a.tomio disarmament in Central Europe combined with an approved reduction of conventional forces in this area. Under one conditions that this will not ca.use the deferring of posi tive decisions and extending nuclear armaments to other ar mies in t�g meantime, which should be prevented as soon as possible. Basically his id.ea was to divide the enlarged proposal into two stages. The first phase consisted of a zonal pan on the production of nuclear weapons, on the building of' nuclear installations and the givillg of nuclear weapons to other parties. The second step was to be a. ban on all present nuclear installations in the zone after the conventional forces had been reduced to parity. Tbus he sought to counter the West ern objection that to denuclearize the area would create a serious mili tary imbalance because of the preponderant Soviet conventional force.21
26 "Rapacki Seeks Support," New � Times, November 1, 1958, p.1. 70
:But the new Rapacki Plan was never officially presented to the various governments and was never, therefore, ever officially answered. However, this revised proposal was quite likely a stimulus to Macmillan's wavering in 1959. The ne:x:t major resul:mission of the proposal was by Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party. Speaking· before the General Assembly on September 27, 1960, Gomulka repeated the two-stag-ad, 1958, variation-of the Rapacki Plan with this comment: "Tb.a very reason for the failure of disarmament negotiations which have been conducted hitherto leys in the dangerous and fal lacious theory that peace can be only a.n outcome of the so-called balance of terror between the Fast a.."ld the West, i.e., between socialism and capitalism. This theory determines the policy of the Western Powers. This concept is detrimental to peace- it results not in controlled disarmament but in the control of existillg armaments by both sides." 28 He went on to sa:y- that no matter how good inspection may be, the pos sibility of surprise attack is still present. Even though the United States sey-s she will never attack, the possibility of error exists. If Rapacki's Plan had been adopted in 1958, Central Europe would now be re laxed rather than tense. If it were adopted now it would "reduce the risk of the outbreak of nuclear-missile war in this sensitive area. and conse quently, also, the da.nc,ce:r of the use of such weapons of mass destruction on a global scale.n 29 Back in Warsaw the following month, Gomulka ohal lenged the West to show its sincerity by acceptillg the Rapacki Plan as a
28w. Oamulka., "Peaceful Coexistence," Official Records: General Assembly, 15th Session 874th Plenary Meeting, November,- 1960, -P• 161 •... 29 �-, :P• 161 71 basis for negotiation. He asked Adenauer to permit a :plebiscite in West Germany to let the people vote on the issue; 30 obviously confident that the vote would favor negotiating the Plan. This :proposal, too, was unconditionally rejected by the United States. This was after Rapa.old :presented his f'ull :plan again to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in March of 1962. This rejection by the United States was almost automatic by now. Max Frankel, ��Times Wash ington correspond.ant :paraphrased Dean Rusk's comment: "But all the thinking here appears to be based on the theory that the admittedly undesirable confrontation of Con:mnmist and Western forces in Europe is nonetheless :preferable to the creation of a military or political •vacuum•• n3l The Poles had a difficult time understanding why the proposal was re jected. It seemed to them that Washington did not even study the pro posal but just automatically rejected it.32 The advocates of the Ra:pacld Plan were still not ·discouraged.· Dar ing the year 1963 the proposal was repeatedly subnitted and rejected; and for a time it was tied to the 'i'est Ban Treaty. But to no avail. The United States remained adamant-no troop or weapons withdrawal f'rcm Central Europe.
30 11Gomulka Challenges West With Rapacki Plan,11 .!2!! �Times, October 22, 1960, p.2. 31 Max Frankel, "Rusk Opposes Disengagement," � � Times, October 29, 1961, P• 3.
32 11 "Polish Press Scores u. s. Sta.nd, B2:! �Times, April 6, 1962, P• l. 72
Gomulka tried again on January 19, 1964. He advocated a non•e:ggrsss:ii"an pact, the formation of regional security zones outside Central Europe where in nuclear weapons could be banned, a general disarmament agreement, better trade :relations; and significantly a freeze on nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Thia freeze he regarded as an extension rather than a replace- ment of the Rapa.old. Pla.n.33 The idea of the nuclear freeze was represented by Rapacki as an attempt to get around Western objections in regard to a military disadvantage by permitting forces in Central hu:rope to main- tain present levels of' nuclear weapons. 34 Paul Underwood, Times cor respondent in Warsaw, said that Rapacki avoided the question of' the pos sible ef'feot of the freeze on the proposed multi-national polaris fleet, but that informed sources had stated that the fleet·. :would be banned.35 Nonetheless, the freeze idea. was made a formal proposal and was pub- lished in the United States on March 6, 1964.36 This is the ourrent form of the Rapacki Plan and this, too, has been initially rejected by the West but not as strongly as before. William Foster, Director of U. S. A.."l"DlS Control and Disa.i'ID8IIlent Agency, saw the freeze plan as a most promising area for agreeme ·, 1 jnking it
33 _ ''New Polish Plan," � � Times, January 19, 1964, P• 20.
34 "Freeze Plan,·" ,!!2!! � Times, March l, 1964, P• 2. 35 "Text of' Polish Freeze Proposal,11 � � Times, March 61 1964, P• 2.
36 See Append.ix C for complete text of the proposal. 73 to President Johnson's massage in January of 1964.37 Secretary of State Rusk foresaw sane difficulties and vra.nted to discuss it with the other Western powers. The final reaction is not as yet complete. The Rapacki Plan is, thus, far fra:n dead. The :proposal began as a :paragraph in a speech, was later e:icpa.nded, and then e:icpa.nded again, before it contracted to the mod.est proposal of todazy-. The Rapa.old. Plan has adapted-the West really has not.
37 ''U.S. to Study Freeze,"�!2E1£ Times, March 7, 1964. President Johnson's message was to the Geneva Conference; 11 •••let us agree: (a) That nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of states whioh do not now control them." (New � Times, January 22, 1964, P• 4.) · -· ·. CONCLUSIO!I
The Rapacki proposal made initially in the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1957, was a proposal to remove all nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery from the countries
of West German�, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. It was a proposal that arose out of the post-war division of Europe into
tow opposed groups facing each other in Central Europe; out of
the deadlock betwen the great powers in terms of both European
security and general disarmament; and it flowed out of the context
of specific proposals that had been made before. The Eden Plan in ,. 1955 was a very definite forerunner of fhe Polish proposal. Rapacki was not the only person who authored a simple beginning to a com
plex problem. The failure of package diplomacy in disarmament negotiations had resulted in the voices of several people being raised in defense of a first small step. The voice of George F.
Kennan was one such voice, as was that of Hugh Gaitskill, and
Nikolai Bulganin.
But the initial proposal was not accepted by the West. The reasons for the rejection were that the adoption of the proposal would tend to weaken NATO and/or Western defenses generally, while the Soviet strength would not really be affected. The resulting imbalance would be prejudicial to the West. Rapacki sought to counter these objections by including in his proposal the concept advocated by Kennan, Gaitskill, and others; namely, the reduction
74 75 in conventional arms and armed forces. Rapacki was still seeking the simple first step, but in view of Western obdurance added the disengagementI idea. This, too, was rejected by the Wast for very similar reaso�s. Evan if the conventional forces were reduced to parity, the Soviet Union was very much closer to the area of
Central Eu:rope\than was the United States; and opinion in the U.S. was that a withdrawal of forces from West Garmany w?uld result in a withdrawal from Europe. This, in turn, seemed like a be trayal of trust to Western Europe. The repeated rejections forced a retreat in the Rapacki concept. Beginning with the removal of all atomic weapons from a specific area, then expanding the idea to include conventional arms and forces; Rapacki contracted the proposal in March of 1964 to refer only to a freeze of existing armaments. This was also rejected.
If there is any single thread running through the brief his tory_of the Rapacki Plan that thread is without doubt Germany. In particular it is West Germany that provided.some of the strongest motivation for the Plan, both for the original suggestion and for the repeated submissions and variations. West Garmany also pro vided the single most important cause of the Western rejection of the Plan. As was seen, this primacy of West Germany is not just because West Germany is the locale of the confrontation of forces, but also because West Germany is ·intrinsically bound up with Polish security, and with the foreign policy of the-United States.
The Position of the United St�tes in response to the Soviet threat that developed after the war slowly grew into a policy called 76 containment. Vlhereever any Communist aggression was experienced, the policy implied Western resistance. The concentrated effort was intended, very simply, to hold Communism from further ter ritorial gains. The policy was not always successful on a global scale, but in Central Europe it was successful. It may perhaps be argued that Russia contributed to this success of the contain ment policy because she already controlled as much territory as she could handle; but at any rate the policy of the United States, as exemplified by Secretary of State· Dulles .'from".1952-1959, was a rigid enforcement of the containment concept by means of poised defenses and global alliances with other nations.
This rigid policy was, of course, reflected in the disarmament negotiations. The United States, as well as the Soviet Union, very often proposed mutually unacceptable plans for disarmament in the sense that very little room was ever left for compromise at the conference tables. To compromise was considered a sign of weakness by both sides. Both seemed to be seeking maximum security for themselves vn.thout much consideration for the opposite number.
A very often repeated proposal of the Soviet Union, for example, was that America must remove her foreign bases from around Russia. This sort of withdrawal was understood in the United States as a direct threat to American defense capability. On the other ho.nd,
John Foster Dulles stated in 1957: "We seek collective security so that the smaller and weaker nations cannot be attacked and overrun one by one, and the United States in the end, left isolated and 77
1 encircled by overwhelming hostile forces. 11 :Both sides here seem to be asking the same thing for themselves. This, moreover, is a reflection ot the entire disarmament movement. There seems to have been a complete inability to see any good in the other group's
proposal. Even if a member of the Western Alliance conceived
the plan, if it in any way resembled something ·the Russians had
,suggested it wa,s considered falling into a Soviet trap. This was the substance of the criticism Mr. Macmillan enjoyed from :Bonn
and Washington in 1959 when he flirted with the idea of zonal
troop reduction and arms control.
There is rather an obvious question here - w�s either side
sincere in their efforts to negotiate disarmament? Were the pro nouncements of sincerity by the State Department and/or by the
Russians merely intended for their influence on public opinion?
The answer to this question must� of necessity, be speculation.
:But an affirmative answer to the question has been suggested by reputable people. Hugh Gaitskill charged the West with con tinual prevarication in the handling of Soviet proposals - the
West called them all propaganda and did nothing about t em.2
James Reston of the� York Times suggested insincerity when he wrote: "Problem number one is how to keep our promise to negotiate, made at the recent NATO meeting in Paris, without
1 11Text of Dulles News Conference," New York Times, July 22, 1957, P• 6. 2 11Gaitski11 Scores West on Disarmament," New York Times, January 27, 1958, p. 8. 78 risking the possibility of stopping the arms race at a point high 3 ly favorable to the Soviet Union.11 Robert Wolff, Professor of
Philosophy at Harvard, wrote: "But Marx was no fool, and were he alive today he would no doubt amend his dictum to read: capitalism thrives on the preparation for war, whether that war is fought or not. Can we s9 confidently deny this c1:targe? I wonder.114 Dr.
Inglis, Senior �hysicist at the Argonne National Laboratory, ' ' stated that it is difficult to tell in either the Russian or
American proposals-whether there is sincerity or merely a desire to look purer. He felt the latter intention prevailed more than the former.5 Further substantiation for this position could be sought in the numerous references in reputable newspapers to the fact that the United States is either behind, is gaining, or is dropping back in the propaganda war; or that the U.S. position of leadership in the world is being.challenged by a certain disarma ment proposal.
Henry Kissinger tried to explain this by making the point that this is not a legitimate world order but a revolutionary one. A legitimate world order is one in which all the great powers accept the international order; whereas a revolutionary world order is a system containing a power or powers which refuses·. to accept either
3James Reston, "Conference Preparations," New� Times, January 5, 1958, P• 8.
4 11 11Disarma.ment, letter, ��Times, September 25, 1959, p. 28. 5Dr. Inglis, "Arms Con.trol Effort Buried in State," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 13, May 1957, p. 174. 79
the arrangements of the settlement or the domestic structure of - '. other states. Diplomacy, he said, has a difficult function in a revolutionary world worder. In a legitimate order diplomacy seeks to compromise �isagTeements on the basis of a tacit agreement to agree. But in a revolutionary order'diplomacy has tactical sig nificance -- to_prepare one's position for the next test of strength. In a �egitimate society negotiations seek to bridge differences, to persuade by reason, and to compromise. But in a revolutionary order negotiations are still possible, but the diplomats cannot persuade -- different languages are spoken. Dip lomatic conferences become elaborate stage plays which seek to 6 attach the uncommitted to one of the contender's views. What merit is there is this speculation? The point is that even if Adam Rapacki was as sincere as Sidney Gruson, New York Times correspondent, said he was7, his proposal may not so much have entered an arena of negotiation but a stage on which positions were determined beforehand, by the course of history up to that point. Part of that history was the deadlock in terms of the division of Germany. Both sides seemed unable to do anything other than attempt to incorporate their side of the defeated state into their own respective coalitions. For this reason, Fritz Erler, felt that one should blame the West as well as the East for the
6 Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on American Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 35, October 1956, p. 37. 7 11 lli!!! � · Sidney Gruson, "Rapacki Pushes Plan, Times, January 6, 1958, p. 12. 8o continuing division of Germany. "The c:ruel fact is that both East and West, in basing thair .. policies upon the integration of their respective parts of Germany into their power systems, further con solidate the partition of Germany and destroy any hope for a peaceful reunification. 11 8 And a result of this, he continued, will be that "NATO will become a symbol of the partition of the country instead of a symbol of common de:fense.119 This position was considered Soviet propaganda 10 by John Reshetar; but an objective view of the matter suggests that there is at least the possibility that the Russians were not alone responsible for the wall in Berlin. Each side blames the other: who is correct? Neither? Both? Who is telling the truth?
Perhaps an example will somewhat clarify the confusion. Konrad Adenauer seems to be the pivotal figure throughout this whole controversy. Part of a 1962 article written by him follows. "In the disarmament conference which has been under way in Geneva since Marcht 14th of this year, the United States has submitted extremely far-reaching and well con sidered disarmament plans which we emphatically support. The Soviet proposals, on the other hand, again and again aim at shifting the military equilibrium in favor of the Eastern bloc. This applies in particular to the plans for regional disarmament and so-called aton-free zones in Central Europe, by which it is intended to weaken European defense; as well as to the Soviet refusal to agree to any kind of control, for fear that inspection would remove the secrecy of the closed Soviet system in contrast to the open system of the free world. It seems that the Soviets again wish to use the present disarmament conference only as a vehicle for propaganda. "Despite all disappointments, the efforts of the
8 Fritz Erler, "The Reunification of Germany and 11 Security for Europe, World Politics, Vol. 10, April 1958, p� ,. 366. -9-Ibid. 10u.s. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub Committee on Disarmamenj, Control� Reduction.£!. Armaments, Report 2501, Reply to �uestionaire, p. 436. 81
Western powers to find ways and means leading·to disarmament must be energetically continued. Our hope must be .that con sistency on the part of the West in the disarmament field will convince the Soviets of the necessity to enter into serious negotiations which take into account the interests of both sides.1111 This speech tends to support Kissinger's thesis that the various sides speak different languages. Adenauer is all for_one side, and all against the other. He said that the regional proposals would shift military equilibrium to the Soviet side, but would not the Soviets be pulling out of Eastern Europe? The former
Chancellor goes on to state that the Soviets refuse any kind of control. This is simply not true. There are repeated instances of Soviet initiative in terms of control and inspection; proposals to which the West did not agree. How can Dr. Adenauer expect. the inflexibility of the West to create a climate for Soviet compromise? A compromise that takes into account the interests of both sides is a desirable commodity but it cannot come from only one side. Walter Lippman says, ttEach side knows that its asking price is impossible. The reason why both sides continue to ask an impossible price is that both of them think that a divided
Germany may be better than a:ny united Germany that can be brought 12 into existenca.11 If there is any truth at all to these allegations, then the
Rapaoki Plan did not have a chance from the beginning. The Polish proposal would have altered the existing situation in Central
11 Konrad Adenauer, "The German Problem, A World Problem,", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, October 1962, p. 64. 12 11 11 -val tar Lippmann, The�.:German Question, Newsweek, Vol. 62, September 2, 1963, p. 15. 82
Europe, it would have changed the developing situation in terms of West German nuclear arms; and for these reasons could not have been accepted. Consider the specific objections. First, the proposal would tend to perpetuate the division of Germany. But other attempts at negotiations have not resulted in German unity either. One could suggest that the formation of the West German Government in 1949, or the inclusion of Germany in NATO in 1954, or the desire tQ rearm West Ge·::-many with nuclear arms in 1957 also contributed to the division of the t,,70 German States. Secondly, the area involved is too small. Basic to this ?bjection is the fact thatr missiles could overfly such a zone easily. However, the Rapacki Plan never was meant as a general disarmament measure. but as a beginning for negotiations. If ballistic,Jilissiles can overfly the zone, on the other hand, one could construct an argu ment maintaining the position that in that case the udoption of the zone would not involve any real shift in world power alignments. Thirdly, the proposal is slanted in favor of the East. The sug gestion is coming from Communist Poland - it is not suprising that it might be so slanted. But is the Plan thc.t advantageous to the Soviet Union? Russia would withdraw more than twice the distance the West would. Russia would withdraw from an area of 457,000 square kilometers, whereas the West would withdraw from an area of only 248,OOO square kilometers. ·What seems behind this objection, however, is the assumption that if American troops moved out of West Germany there would be no room for them on the continent; they would have to be moved all the way across the Atlantic. Even 83 if this were true it need not lead again to American isolationism. Modern weapons technology has made much of conventional warfare obsolete anyway. Think orily of the Polaris fleet, air bases in Turkey, Greece, Britain, Portugal, and in the Arctic area. The point that must be made here, however, is that the assumption of complete American withdrawal if not in West Germany is not based in fact. No one, besides Khrushchev, advocated a complete withdrawal; it was merely assumed by men such as Paul Henri Spaak and General Norstadt. Cetrainly the West �hould not desert Europe, or leave West Germany helpless in the face of threats to her survival. But the Rapack Plan did not ask this of America; and it need not lead to that result. It is one of America's goals to get the Soviet troops_ out of Eastern Europe. It was to a great extent America's lack of knowledge that assisted the Soviet forces in attaining these forward positions. V/hat other way to alter the situation than by limited arms reduction coupled with reciprocal troop withdrawal? If one adds conventional armed force reduction with inspection the Western objections become vaporous. Of course this is what the Soviets wanted; it is what Poland wanted, too. :But this fact does not nake the Polish proposal bad for the U.S. There is more than black and white - there is gray in between; and the failure to recognize this is an admission of bankruptcy in foreign policy. Suppose the United States and the other Western nations, in cluding West Germany, had been interested enough in 1958 to have 84
negotiated Rapacki's proposals. What might have been the con sequences in such a hypothetical situation?
1) All nuclear weapons, systems of delivery, stockpiles, and the potential for. production of nuclear weapons would have been removed from West Germany. This, of course, would mean a complete altera tion in the foJ;Ward planning of NATO; for the nuclear shielf concept would no longer be applicable to the situation •. 2) Russia would have been required to remove nuclear weapons and whatever pertained thereto from her forces in the three satel lite states. Thus the change in planning would have been an equal disadvantage to both sides.
3) The Western nations would now be at a serious disadvantage in regard to conventional forces. There would be an imbalance in favor of Russia. Therefore, a major element in the negotiations would have been the withdrawal of conventional forces and equip ment from the nuclear free zone; and an insistance on the part of the West that the remaining national forces be reduced to parity as soon as this could be arranged. The removal of nuclear weapons would not take place until such parity had been realized.
4) Verification of this withdrawal and reduction as well as the complete removal of nuclear devices would be placed in the hands of a United Nations special force reporting directly to the Dis armament Commission of the U.N. This special force would be com posed of an equal number of members of both sides; as well as a number of representatives from uncommitted nations. Both Russia and the United· States would have the right of continuous aerial observation of the zone in addition to the special force control. 85
5) A settlement of the German problem of reunification by means of a confederation of German delegates chosen on the basis of population representation from both East and West Germany's co� bined population. Such an arrangement would benefit West Germany and would thus be a strong test of how much the Russians were willing to compromise in order to get the non-nuclear zone. The reunification would be in three stages. First, a constitutional convention attended by the chosen representatives; secondly, radification by both East and West German electorates in super vised elections; and thirdly, free elections to form a national government of Germany. The resultant State would not be permitted to become a part of any alliance; but rather would be the recipient of guarantees from all of the major powers. 6) Russian forces behind Russian borders, and Western armies west of Germany would be required to reduce in strength so that within one year from the date of the treaty reasonable parity would exist. Since both sides would still possess nuclear weapons, ab�olute parity would not be essential. There is not parity now in conventional forces, but it is the Western view that a balance is achieved by nuclear weapons equality. 7) Efforts to achieve general dis�rmament agreements would con tinue as before. Until such agreements could be worked out both sides would retain their ability to destroy the other. Is this kind of a hypothetical situation too idealistic for consideration? The author submits that it is not.· Much of the above has already been proposed by the Soviet Union; her greatest area of compromise would be in permitting a German confederation 86 in which East Germany would not be of equal status with West Germany. The g:reatest area of compromise for the West would be to accept the idea of the buffer zone safeguards as being suf ficient. The hypothesis to be proven must be attempted. Such an attempt is clearly preferrable to the balance of terror that existed then, and still exists today. The concept of preserving the peace through a balance of terror, Denis Healey said, rests on two assumptions. First, that no one will take the first step toward war knowing the conse quences. However, Hungary and Suez have both demonstrated the futility of this assumption. Neither Russia nor America, Mr. Healey said, has sufficient control over events on its own side of the Iron Curtain to rule out the possibility of such a local conflict. The second assum tion is that America will massively respond to any major Russian attack. This assumption has steadily dwindled ever since Russia developed the potential to completely 1 destroy the United States. 3 One need �ot agree with Mr. Healey's analysis, but little disag:reement can be possible that the world is today quite dif ferent from the bi-polar world that existed immediately after the war. No longer is either Russia or America the free agent.. There. ·is France, and there is China; with many smaller �enters of power that one must consiaer. 'Elle Communist bloc is_ loosening with the
13Denis Healey,· "The Case for Disengagement,'' � Republic, Vol. 139, March 17, 1958, P• 11. 87 with the increased trade relations that have been made with the
Western nations. In the midst of this polycentrism an absolute refusal on the part of the United States to consider limited proposals, as Kennan pointed out, can only result in forcing a •. unity upon the Communist bloc that would not be there otherwise. 14
However, there are signs of the possibilities _of change. The test ban treaty, for example, provides a basis for hope in that it reveals compromise by both sides: The United States in agreeing to a limited ban without inspection, and the Soviet Union in dropping the non-aggression pact that was originally attached. The simultaneous reduction in fissionable material, and the destruction of obsolete bombers are steps that would seem to reduce tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
In West Germany the five per cent clause, time, and prosperity have reduced the bloc effect of the refugee vote. Erhart has replaced Adenauer. Khrushchev, because of his troubles with
China may be more willing to make concessions to the West. Agree ment on the Rapacki Plan does seem to be more possible now -than at any time before. The possibilities inherent in the proposal include not only a reducing of tension; but the potential of the freer development·of the satellite states towards institutions of their own, a practical solution to the German question, and a beginning of a type of solution of world problems that is both peaceful and honorable.
14 0 oeorge F. Kennan, ?olycentrism and Western Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, January 1964, p. 182. 88
Perhaps the Rapacki Plan will not work. Perhaps after it is attempted, the situation will revert to what it is today. Perhaps. Would anything be lost? We will never know until we try. APPENDIX A
TROOP CONCENTRATIOlf"
EOROPE -NATO WARSAW � :Benelux countries••• 250, 000 Albania•••••••••••• 35,000 Denmark••••••••••••• 40,000 Bulga.ria•••••••••••l60,000 France Czechoslovald.a••••• 200,000 Fra.nce••••••••••• 470,000 East Ge� United States•••• 50,000 Germa.n•••••••••• 1 50,000 Great Brita.in Soviet••••••••••400,000 Great Brita.in.... 580,000 lfunga.ry United States •••• 50,000 lfunga.ry.-• • • • • • • • 90'000 Greece •••• ••• ••••• •·•l 75,000 Soviet·o·•• •. •. •• •· 60,000 Italy Poland Italy.•• •• ••• •••• 350,000 Poland••••••••�.310,000 United States•••• 10,000 Soviet•••••••••• 30,000 Morocco ••• Ruroa.n:ia United States •••• 10,000 Ruma.nia••••••••• 250,000 Norway•••••••••••••• 30,000 Soviet•••••••••• 30,000 Paldsta.n••••••••••••l60,000 Russ:ia••••••••••• 1,2 �,ooo Portugal•••••••••••• 60,000 2,8 5,000 Spain United States •••• 3,000 Turkey•••••••••••••• 400,000 West Germany German•• ••••••••• 130,000 United States ••••200, 000 Great Britain •••• 48,000 France••••••••••• 30,000 NATO (General)••• 1 ®01000 3,16,000
RAPACKI PLAN AREA
NAT0.•••••••••••••••548,000 Warsaw Pact•••••• 1,08o,OOO
l � � Times, March 22, 1959, page 5E•
89 APPENDIX B
TEXT OF POLISH NOTE .AN.D MEMORANilJr
FEBRUARY 14, 1957
ttI wish to refer to the conversation which Iha.d on December 9, 1957, with the Charge d1 Affaires of the :Flnbassy of the United Sta.tea in War saw. In this conversation I have presented the position of the Polish Government in respect to the tendencies to make the nuclear armaments in Europe universal and particularly towards the acceleration of arma ments in Western Ge:rma.ny. The threat of further complications, primarily in Central Europe, where the opposing military groupings come into a direct contact and the apparent danger of an increase in the international tension have prompted the Polish Government to initiate at that time dll ect discussions through diplomatic channels on• the Polish proposal sub mitted to the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1957, con cerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. "This proposal has evoked a wide interest in government and poli tical circles as -well as in the broad strata of public opinion in many countries. . "Taking into account a number of opinions expressed in declara- tions made in connection with the Polish proposal .and with the view to facilitate negotiations, the Polish Government has resolved to pre sent a more detailed elaboration of its proposal. This finds its ex pression in the attached memorandum which is simultaneously being transmitted by the Polish Government to the governments of France, Great Britain, and the Union of Societ Socialist Republics as well as to the governments of other interested countries. "The Polish Government is conscious of the fact that the solution of the problem of disarmament on a world-wide scale requires, first of all, negotiations among the great powers and other countries concerned. Therefore, the Polish Government supports the proposal of the u.s.s.R. Government concerning a meeting on the highest level of lea.ding states men with the participation of heads of governments. Such a meeting oOtlld also result in reaching an agreement on the question of the establish ment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, should an agreement among the countries concerned not be reached in the meantime. In any event the initiation at present of discussions on the question of a denuclearized zone in Central llu.rope would contribute to a successful course of the above mentioned meeting. "The Polish Government expresses the hope that the Government of the United States will stuc:cy- the attached memorandum and that the pro posals contained in it will meed with the understanding of the
l Department £! State :Bulletin, Vol. 38, Mey- 19, 1958, pp 822-823. 90 91 Government of the United States. The Polish Government on its part would be prepared to continue the exchange of views on this problem with the Government ofll the United States.
"On October 2, 1957, the Government of the Polish People's Repub lic presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations a proposal concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. The governments of Czechoslovakia and of the German Democratic Repub lic declared their readiness to accede to that zone. "The Government of the Polish People's Republic proceeded with the conviction that the establishment of the proposed denuclearized zone could lead to a.n improvement in the international atmosphere a.nd faci litate broader discussions on disarmament as well as the solution of other controversial internal issues, while the continuation of nuc lear armaments a.nd ma.king them universal could only lead to a further soli4ifying of the division of Europe into opposing blocks and to a further complication of this situation, especially in Central Europe. "In December, 1957.the Government of the Polish People's Republic renewed its proposal through diplomatic channels. "Considering the wi.de repercussions which the Polish initiative has evoked and taking into account the propositions emerging f'rom the discussion which has developed on this proposal, the Government of the Polish People's Republic hereby presents a more detailed elabora tion of its proposal, which ma::, facilitate the opening of negotiations and reaching of an agreement on this subject. "I. The proposed zones should include the territory of: Poland, Czeohoclovakia, German Democratic Republic and German Federal Repub lic. In this territory :nuclear weapons would neither be manufactured nor stockpiled., the equipment and installations designed for their · servicing would not be located there; tha use of :nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would be prohibited. "II. The contents of the obligations arising from the estab lishment of the denuclearized zone would be based upon the following
premises:11 1. The states included in this zone would undertake the obli gation not to manufacture, maintain nor import for their own use and not to permit the location on their territories of nuclear weapons of any type, as well as not to install nor to admit to their ter ritories of installations and equil)IIlent designed for servicing nuc- lear11 weapons, including missiles• launching equipnent. 2. 'lhe four powers (France, United States, Great Britain, and u.s.s.R.) would undertake the foliowi.ng obligations: "(A) Not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of their forces stationed· on the territories of states included in this zone; neither to maintain nor" to install.on the territories of• these states 92 any installations or equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment. 11 (:B) Not to transfer in any manner and under any reason whatsoever, nuclear weapons• nor installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons�to governments or other organs in this area. "3. Th.e__. powar which have at their disposal nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to use these weapons against the territory of the zone or against any targets situated:in this zone. Thus the powers would undertake the obligation to respect the status of the zone as an area in which there should be no nuclear weapons and · a.ga.inst11 which nuclear weapons should not be used. 4. Other states, whose forces are stationed on the territory of any state included in the zone, would also undertake the obligation not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of these forces and not to transfer such weapons to governments or to other organs in this area. Neither will they. install equipment or installations designed for the servicing of nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment, on the territories of states in the zone nor will they transfer them to governments or other organs in this area. "The manner and procedure for the implementation of these obliga tions could be the jubject of detailed mutual stipulations. "Ill In order to ensure the effectiveness and implementation of the obligations contained in Part n, paragraphs 1-2 and 4, the states con cerned would undertake to create a system of broad and effective control in the area of the proposed zone and submit themselves to its function:i.ng. "l. This system could comprise ground as well as aerial control. Adequate control posts, with rights and possibilities of action which would ensure the effectiveness of inspection, oould also be established. "The details and forms of the :implementation of control can be agreed upon on the basis of the experience acquired up to the present time in this field, as wall as on the basis of proposals sul:mitted by various states in the course of the disarmament negotiations, in the form and to the extent in which they can be adapted to the area of the zone. "'llie system of control established for the denuclearized zone could provide useful experience for the realization of broader disarmament agreement. 112. For the purpose of supervising the implementation of the pro posed obligations an adequate control machinery should be established. There could participate .in it, for example, representatives appointed/ not excluding additional personal appointments/ by organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Treaty. Nationals or representatives of states, which do not belong to any military grouping in Europe, could also paxticipate in it. "The procedure of the establishment, opera.tion and reporting of the control organs can be the subject of further mutual stipulations. "IV The most simple form of embodying the obligations of states included in the zone would be the conclusion of an appropriate inter national convention. To avoid, however, implications, which some states might find in such a solution, it can be arranged that: 111. These obligations be embodied in the form of four unilateral 93 declarations, bearing the character of an international obligation de · posited11 with a mutually agreed upon depository state. 2. The obligations of great :powers be embodied in the form of a mutual document or unilateral. declaration/ as mentioned above in :para- graph11 l/; ·, 3.· 'lhe obligations of other states, whose armed forces are stationed in the area of the zone, be embodied in the form of unilateral declara- .tions/ as mentioned above in :para.graph 1/. "On the basis of the above :proposals the government of the Polish People's Repubiic suggests to initiate negotiations fo� the purpose of a :further detailed elaboration of the :plan for the establishment of the denuclearized zone, of the documents and guarantees related to it as well as of the �ea.ns of imIJ.ementation of the undertaken obligations. "The government. of the Polish People's Republic has reasons to state that acceptance of the proposal concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe will facilitate the reaching of an agreement relating to the adequate reduction of conventional arma ments and of foreign armed forces stationed on the territory of the states included in the zone." APPENDIX C
TEXT OF RAPACICT FREEZE PROPOSW,
"The Government of the Polish People's Republic has already on num erous occasions manifested its consistent desire in the search for solu tions aimed at bringing about international detente and disarmament and lent its support to all constructive proposals designed to achieve this end. The reduction of international tensions and creation of conditions of security in Central Europe have always been and continue to be matters of particular concern to the Polish Government. This objective can and should be achieved above all by way of arresting the armaments race in this part of the world. , . "With this in mind the Government of the Polish People's Republic presented sane time ago a plan for the creation of a nuclear free zone in Europe which, as is known, aroused the interest of numerous states and of world public opinion. In the view of the Polish Government that plan continues to be fully topical. "The Polish Government believes tha.t there are at the present time suitable conditions for undertaking immediate measures the implementation of which could facilitate further steps leading to a detente, to a strengthening of security and to progress in the field of disarmament. "Basing itself' on these premises, the Government of the Polish People's Republic is submitting a proposal to freeze nuclear and thermo nuclear armaments in Central Europe. The implementation of such a pro posal would be of particular significance to the security both of Po land and all countries of this region as well as of the whole of Eur ope, since, while in no wey affecting the existing relation of forces, it would contribute to the arrest of the nuclear armaments race. "I The Polish Government proposes that the freezing of nuclear and the:rmonuclear armaments include in principle the territory of the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Sooialist Republic, The Garman Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Ge:rmany, with the re spective te��itorial waters and airspace. "ll. The freeze would apply to all kinds of nuclear and thermo nuclear charges, irrespective of the means of their employment and de livery. "III Parties maintaining armed forces in the area of the prpposed freeze of armaments would undertake obligations not to produce, not to introduce or import, not to transfer to other parties in the area or to accept from other parties in the area the aforementioned nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. "IV To insure the implementation of these obligations, an ap propriate system of supervision and safeguards should be established.
l New rnTi.m es, March 6, 1964, page 2. �4 95 "The supervision over the implementation of other oblication not to produce nuclear and thermonuclear weapons covered by the freeze would be exercised in plants which are or could be used·for such production. "To insure the implementation of other obligations control would be established to be exercised in accordance with an agreed procedure in proper frontier rail\vey-, road, waterwey junctions, sea and air ports. "The supervision and control could be exercised by mixed commissions composed of representatives of the Warsaw Pact and of NATQ on a parity basis. Those commissions could be enlarged to include also representa tives from other states. The composition, structure and procedure of the control organs will be the subject of detailed arrangement. "Parties whole armed forces are stationed in the area of the armament freeze, and which have at their disposal nuclear and thermonuclear wea pons would exchange at periodic meetings of their representatives all information and reports indispensable for the implementation of the obli gations with regard to the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments. "V Provisions relating to the implementation of the proposal submitted above should be embodied in appropriate documents. "The Government of the Polish People's Republic is ready to enter into discussions and negotiations with the interested parties to reach an agreement on the implementation of these objectives. "The Polish Government will give due attention to all constructive suggestions which would be in accordance with the objectives of the present proposal and would aim at the freezing of armaments in Central Europe. "The Government of the Polish People's Republic expects a favorable attitude to the proposal submitted hereby." APPENDIX D
TEXT OF U.S. REPLY TO POLISH NOTE ON RAPACKI PLA?il
''United States Ambassador to Poland, Jacob D. Beam delivered on� 3, the U.S. Government's reply to the Rapacki Plan proposals elaborated in the memorandum attached to the Polish Government's note of February 14. Ambassador Beam handed the U.S. note to Polish Duputy Foreign.Minister Josef Winiewicz. The text of the U.S. reply is as follows: "�callenoy: I have the honor to a.oknowledge the receipt of Mr. Ra.packi's note of February 14, 1958, enclosing a memorandum elaborating on the Polish Government's proposals concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. ''Recognizing that the initiative of the Polish Government stems from a desire to contribut to the attainment of a stable and durable peace, my Government has given these proposals serious and careful consideration. On the basis of this study it has concluded that they are too limited in scope to reduce the danger of nuclear war or provide a dependable basis for the security of Europe. They neither deal with the essential ques tion of the continued production of nuclear weapons by the present nuo lear powers nor take into account the fact that present scientific tech niques a.re not ad.equQ.te to detect existing nuclear weapons. The pro posed plan does not affect the central sources of power capable of launching a nuclear attack, and thus its effectiveness would be depen dent on the good intentions of countries outside the area. The pro posals overlook the central problems of European security because they provide no method for balance and equitable limitations of military capabilities and would perpetuate the basic cause of tension in Europe by accepting the continuation of the division of Germany. "An agreement limited to the e:x:clusion of nuclear weapons from the territory indicated by your Government without other, tY]?es of limita tion would, even if it were capable of being inspected, endanger the security of the Western European countries in view of the large and widely deployed military forces of the Soviet Union. Unless equipped with nuclear weapons, Western forces in Germany would_f.ind themselves
1 Department � State Bulletin, Vol .38, � 19, 1958, PP• 821-822.
'· ��-
96 97 under present circumstances at a. great disadvantage to the numerically greater mass of Soviet troops stationed within easy distance of West ern Europe ·which are, as the Soviet leaders made clear, being equip ped with the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all ldnds. "The considerations outlined above have caused the United States in association \vith other Western Powers�to propose that nations stop producing material for nuclear weapons, cease testing with such we a. pons, and begin to reduce present stockpiles. The United States has further proposed broader areas of inspection against surprise attack, including an area. in Europe, roughly from the United Kingdom to the Ural Mountains. We remain willing to do this. You will recall, moroover, that the Western nations offered at the London disarmament negotiations to discuss a more limited zone in Europe. With regard to missiles you will recall that over a year and a half ago the United States proposed that we begin to study the inspection and control needed to assure the exclusive peaceful use of outer space now threatened by the development of such devices as intercontinental and inte:rmediate range ballistic missiles. "The United States, in association with other Western Powers, has also proposed that a comprehensive and effective European security aITangement be established in conjunction with the reunification of Germany. The proposed arrangements would provide for limitations on both forces and armaments, measures for the prevention of surprise attD-ok in the area, and assurances of reaction in the event of ag greasion. "Your note speaks of the existence of opposing military groupings in Central :&u-ope as being responsible for tensions in the area. It should not be necessary for me to recall that the present division of Eu:rope stems primarily from the decision of the Soviet Union not to permit Eastern DJ.ropean nations to participate in the European Recovery Plan. Nor need I repeat the many assurances given as to the defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which is reflected in its entire organizational and command structure. The entire history of its creation and development testify to this, though persistent efforts are ma.de in some quarters to portray it otherwise. "In· the absence of effective arrangements either general or re gional in ch.ara.oter which would pre.mote real security and in view of the present policies and armaments of the Soviet Union, the countries of Western Europe along with Canada and ourselves, joined in alliance �Tith them, have no other recourse than to develop the re4uired pat tern of integrated NATO military strength and to utilize for defensive purposes modern developments in weapons and tecbni4ues. "The views which I have presented above on behalf of my Government point out the basic reasons why the United States considers that the Polish Government's proposals for establishing a denuclearized zone in Central Ew.-ope would not serve to advance their expressed objectives. Nevertheless, the United States appreciates the initiative of the Polish Gove:t'lllllent in seeking a solution to these problems. It hopes that this exchange of correspondence will enable the Polish Government in seeking
r. a solution to these problems. It hopes that this exchang-e of cor respondence will enable the Polish Government better to understand .American proposals in the fields of :European security and disarma ment. I trust that the :improved relations between Poland and the United States will serve as a basis for a better understanding be tween our two countries on these problems, as well as on other matters." APPENDIX E U.S. COMMENTS ON DEVELOFMENTS l AT GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
"Discussions concerning general and complete disarmament are continuing at the plenary meetings of the conference. Preliminary· discussions are focusing on the objectives and principles of gene ral �.nd complete disarmament. What is needed soon is an exploration of essential substantive·problems requiring agreement before the precise language of a comprehensive program on general and com plete disarmament can be developed. The United States believes that such a concentration of effort would quickly take the confe rence to the heart of the issues which must be resolved and hopes that substantive debate may soon begin. "A Committee of the Whole has been established by the conference to consider those partial disarmament measures which the various delegations might wish to submit. The United States attaches great importance to the work of the Committee •. The United States has given clear evidence of its support for those measures which would increase confidence among the nations, faci litate the disarmament process and reduce the risks of war in herent in the present international situation. Agreement on an agenda has not been reached, with priority being given to pro posals on the cessation of war propaganda. Other matters such as a cutoff of fissionable material production for use'in weapons and reduction of the possibility of war by suprise attack, miscal culation, or failure of communication have also been put forward for consideration by this Committee. "In connection with the agenda of this Committee, discussions have developed as to the attitude of the United states toward the proposals of the Polish Government which contemplate the estab lishment of nuclear free zones in Central Europe. While it is recognized that the proposals of the Polish Government, usually identified as the 'Rapacki plan', have been advanced from a desire to contribute to the maintenance of peace, ca.reful study of these suggestions has led the United States to the conclusion that they would not help to resolve present difficulties. "The United States, on the other hand, has proposed equitable measures to this end. These include arrangements for advance noti fication of military movements, such as transfers of ·large military units or the firing of missiles, the establishment of observation
1 "U.S. Comments on Developments at Geneva Disarmament u Conference, De�artment .2!, State Bulletin, Vol. 42, April 23, 1962, pp. 664-6 5.
99 100 posts at important points within a country, the use of aerial and mobile inspection teams to improve protection against suprise attack, and the establishment of a commission to examine the technical problems involved in measures which could reduce the risks of war. Moreover, these measures proposed by the United States could be put into effect immediately without resulting in one-sided political and military advantages. "The principal objections of the United States to the Rapacki plan, which purports to be a confidence-building measure, have been and remain: (1) that the measures envisaged do not address themselves to the nuclear weapons located in the Soviet Union, the use of which against Western Europe has been repeatedly threatened by Soviet spokesmen; (2) that the plan would there fore result in a serious military imbalance; (3) that conse quently, while creating an illusion of progress, it would in reality endanger the peace of the world rather than contribute to maintaining it. The dangers to peace resulting from such an imbalance under present conditions have been clearly and re peatedly demonstrated by events within memory of all. "The United States will continue its efforts to focus the attention of the Committee of the Whole on the proposals it has brought forward -- at the same time, it is prepared to give prompt and serious attention to the proposals and suggestions advanced by other conference members which could offer some hope of early agreement on concrete measures and which would, in turn, facilitate progress toward the overal objectives of the conference. "One initial measure where agreement would do much to set the work of the conference on the road to success is a nuclear test ban treaty. On this subject, unfortunately, there has been no progress at Geneva because the Soviet Union has refused to accept even the concept of international inspection to monitor a test ban. The Soviet Union takes this position in opposition to general scientific opinion and contrary to views held by the Soviet Government itself since 1957. Nevertheless, the United States has not aband0ned the hope that the Soviet Government will recognize that it is acting in defiance of the will of · people everywhere and will return to its earlier position that international verification is necessary for a nuclear test ban agreement." BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS
Barnett, Clifford R., Poland, its Peo-ole,_ � Society, ,lli Culture, New York: Grove Press Inc., 1958.
Crabb, Cecil V., Jr., American Foreign Polio� !a, the Nuclear� Elmsford, New York: Row Peterson Co., 19 O. Deutscher, Isaac, Russia: �Next?, New·.York_: Harper & B:ros, 1957. Eden, Sir Anthony,� Circle, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960. Freidrich & Brzezinski, Totalitarianism, Dictatorship,� ·· · Autocracy, New York: Harvard University Press, 1956.
Heidenheimer, Arnold J., The Governments -of Germany, New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 19fil. Kennan, George F., Russia, lli � and the �, New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Mamatey, Victor S., Soviet Russian Imperialism, New York: Van �-:: · Nostrand Co., 1964. Merkl, Peter,� Origin E!,_ the West German Republic, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. Morray, J.P., From Yalta to Disarmament: �� Debate, New York: Harper & Bros., 1961. Ministry·of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, German Occupation � Poland, New York: Greystone Press, 1944.
1.01 102
SIGNED ARTICLES
Adenauer, Konrad, "Germany and ·Europe," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, April 1953, PP• �62-363. Adenauer, Konrad, "The German Problem, A World Problem," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, October 1962, PP• 59-65. Biorkland, E., "Rapacki Plan," Contemporary Review, -Vol 193, May 1958, pp. 238-241. Brannen, Barry, "The Soviet Conquest of Rumania," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30, April 1952, PP• 466-487. Bryant, A., "Two Great Problems, Disarmament and German Unity," Illustrated London�, Vol 227, August 13, 1955, P• 252. Dernburg, H. J., "Rearmament and the German Economy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, July 1955, pp. 648-662. Dexter, Byron, "Locarno Again," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32, October 1953, pp. 34-47. Donhoff, Marion, "Germany Puts Freedom Before Unity," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 28, April 1950,. pp. 398-41f• Dulles, John Foster, "Discussion on German Reunification and Dis armament,"� State Department Bulletin, Vol. 33, November 21, 1955, pp. 828-833. Dulles, John Foster, "Policy for Security and Peace," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32, April 1954, PP• 353-364. Ebenstein, William, "The Study of Totalitarianism," World Politics Vol. 10, January 1958, pp. 286-294. Erler, Fritz, "The Reunification of Germany and Security for Europe," World Politics, Vol. 10, April 1958, pp� 366-377. Erler, Fritz, "The Struggle for Ge man Reunification," F'oreign Affairs, Vol. 34, April 1956, pp. 380-393. Fainsod, Merle, ''The Party in the Post-Stalin Era, Problems of Communism," World Politics, Vol. 7, January-February, 1955, pp. 187-213. Falls, c., "Disarmament and Reunification," Illustrated London �' Vol. 230, June 8, 1957, PP• 229-231. Faure, Edgar, "I Think Germany Should Not Be Neutralized," U.S._� and World ReDort, Vol. 39, July 29, 1955, pp. 101-104� 103
Frye, William, "Disarmament in the UN - A New Chapter," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vo1.:·13, March 1957, PP• 91-94. Frye, William, "New Factors in Disarmament," Foreign Policy Bulletin Vol. 37, March 15, 1958, PP• 97-98. Gaitskill, Hugh, "Disengagement, Why - How," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, July 1958, PP• ·539-556. Gaitskill, Rugh, Stevenson, Adlai, Mendes France, Pierre, "Three Opposition Leaders Discuss Russian and the West," New Republic, Vol. 139, March 24, 1958, pp. 10-13. Gomulka., Wladyslaw, "The Polish People's Republic," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38, April 1960, PP• 402-418, Hartley, A., "Disengagement Now," Spectator, Vol� 204, January 15, 1960-; PP• 67-68. Healey, Denis, "A Blueprint for Mutual Withdrawal,"�Renublic, Vol. 139; March 24, 1958, pp. 14-16. Healey_ Denis, "How to Start Disengagement,"� Republic, Vol. l39, March 31, 1958, PJ.). 13:...15. Healey, Denis, "The Casa for Di seng2.gement," � Republic, Vol. 139, March 17, 1958, pp. 14-16 Hilsman, Roger, "American Military Policy; the Next Phase," Current History, Vol. 33, October 1957, PD• 208-215. Humphrey, Hubert, "First Step Twoard Disarmament," Nation, Vol. 186, May 24, 1958, pp. 468-470. Humphrey, Hubery, "What Hope for Disarmament,"��Times Magazine, January 5, 1958, p.: 11. · Inglis, David, "Arms Control Effort Buried in State," :Bulletin£!_ Atomic Scientists, Vol. 13, May 1957, pp. 174-175. Kardelj, Edvard, "Evolution in Jugoslavia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, July 1956, pp. 580-602. Kennan, George F., "Disengagement Revisited," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, January 1959, PP• 187-210. Kennan, George F., "Polycentrism and Western Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, January 1964, pp. 171-183. Kennan, George F., "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign, Affairs, Vol. 25, July 1947, PP• 566-582. 104
Keplicz, K_., "Poland and the Two Germanies," � Statesman, Vol. 54. August 3, 1957, P• 137. King, James E., "A Neutral Zona in Europe," � Republic, Vol. 138,· April 14, 1958, p. 16. King, James E., "Kennanism and Dis,mgagement," � Republic, Vol. 138, April 7, 1958, pp. 12-16. Kircheimer and Price, "Analysis and Effe(?ts of the Elections in Western Germany,"� Department 2!.State Bulletin:, Vol. ·21, October 17, 1949, pp. 563-573. Kissinger, Henry, "Reflections on American Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 35, October 1956, PP• 37-56. Kissinger, Henry, "The Congress of Vienna - A Reappraisal," World Politics, Vol. 8, January 1956, pp. 264-280. Kreisky, Bruno, ".Austria Draws the Balance," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, January 1959, PP• 269-281. Laohs, M., "Poland's Quest for European Security," International Affairs, Vol. 35, July 1959, pp. 305-309. Laukhuff, P., "Nuclear Disarmed Zone? Rapacki Pl�," �Republic, Vol. 140, January 19, 1959, pp. 10-12. Leghorn, R.S., "Approach to a Rational Security System," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 13, June 1957, pp. 195-200. Lewis, Flora, "The Unstable States of Germany," Foreign .Affairs, Vol. 38, July 1960, pp. 588-597. Lindsay, M.,• "Strategy for Non-Communists,"� Republic, Vol. 139; September 15, 1958, p. 11. Lippmann, Walter, "The German Question," Newsweek, Vol. 62, September 2, 1963, p. 15. Lockhart, Sir Robert, "Report on Czechoslovakia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, April 1955, pp. 484-498. Makins, Sir Roger, "The World Since the War: The Third Phase," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, October 1954, PP• 1-16. · Moch, Jules, "Jules Moch on Disarmament," Reporter, Vol. 13, December 15, 1955, PP• 23-26. Mosely, Philip, "The Kremlin's Foreign Policy SincaStalin," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32, October 1953, pp._20-33. 105
Mosely, Philip, "Soviet Foreign Policy: New Goal or New Manners," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, July 1956, PP• 541-553. Newcomer, M., "Economics of Disarmament," Vital Speeches, Vol. 23, February 1, 1957, pp. 230-234. Northedge, F. s., "British Foreign Policy and tp.e Party System," American Political Science Review, Vol. 54, September 1960, r,p. 635-646. Pollock, James K., "The Electoral System of the Federal Republic of Germany," American Political Science Review, Vol. 46, December 1952, pp. 1056-1068. Price, Charles, "A Look at Disarmament," Bulletin �.Atomic Scientists, Vol. 14, June 1958, l>P• 229-231.
Pritti�, Terence, "Germany, the Missile base Alarm,"�Republic, ·. "Vol. 138, March 31, 1958, p. 9. Rabinowi tch, E., "Frozen Map," Bulletin � Atomic Scientists, Vol. 13, June 1957, pp. 208-211. · Rapacki, Adam, "Poland's Active, Constructive and Peaceful Foreign Policy," Polish Facts� Figures, No. 584, December 21, 1957. Reuss, Henry s., 11Breaking the Stalemate," Commonweal� Vol. 68, June 20, 1958, pp. 295-298. Roberts, Henry, "The Crisis in the Soviet Empire," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 35, January 1957, pp. 191-200. Rovere, R. R., "Letter from Washington - American and Russian Position Today," New Yorker, Vol. 34, March 22, 1958, pp. 134-136. Rovere, R. H., "Letter from Washington - Government New Policy,'' New Yorker, Vol. 34, May 10, 1958, pp. 131-137. Russell, Bertrand, "Bertrand Russell on Negotiations,"� Republic, Vol. 138, January 27, 1958, p. 9. Salin. , Edgar, "Social Forces in Germany Today,'' Foreis:n Affairs, Vol 28, April 1950, PP• 398-411. Sevareid, Eric, "Beginning of a Beginning?," Reporter, Vol. 16, May 16, 1957, p. 13. Sherman, George, "The Polish Disengagement Initiative,"� Republic, Vol. 138, May 19, 1958, p. 11. Shulman, Marshall D., "Changing Appreciation of the Soviet Problem," World ·Politics, Vol. 10, July 1958, pp. 499-511. 106
Skobel'tsyn, D. V., "Chain Reaction of Errors," l3ulletin .2!_ Atomic Scientists, Vol. 14, September 1958, pp. 246-249. Smith, D. o., "Dangers of Disarmament," American Mercury, Vol. 85, September 1957, pp. 91-96. Speier, Hans, "Soviet Atomic Blackmail," World Politics, Vol. 9, April 1957, pp. 307-328. Spingarn, Jerome H., "Disarmament, the Washington Scene," Bulletin .£!. Atomic Scientists, Vol. 14, November 1958, PP• 385-387.
Spingarn, Jerome H., "Five Months in London,", Bulletin -of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 13, September 1957, pp. 257-261. Spingarn, Jerome H., "Humphrey Sub-committee - Was it Worthwhile?," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 13, June 1957, pp. 224-227. Swing, R., "Creating a New Security," Saturday Review, Vol. 41, October 4, 1958, pp. 10-11. Thompson, Carol, "A Proposal for Arms Control," Current History, Vol. 33, October 1957, PP• 233-236. Thompson, Carol, "History of Disarmament Proposals," Currant History, Vol. 36, January 1959, PP• 38-41. Tucker, Robert, "The Politics of Soviet De-Stalinization," World Politics, Vol. 9, July 1957, PP• 550-578. Young, Wayland, t1British Labour's.Arms Plan," New Republic, Vol. 150, May 23, 1964, pp. 12-14. Zinner, P. E., "Politics in East Central Europe," Journal .2!_ International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1957, pp. 9-19. 107
UNSIGNED ARTICLES
"Acheson vs Kennan," lli:.!!, Republic, Vol. 138, J'anuary 20, 1958, · PP• 6-7. "After a Test Ban,"� Republic, Vol 139, September 1, 1958, pp. 3-4. "After the West Surrendered -·a Prophecy," lli:.!!, Republic, Vol. 138, June 20, 1958, pp. 15-17. ".Answer - A-Blast,'' Newsweek, Vol. 50, September 12, 1957, p. 38. "Arms - Putting the.Chips Down," Newsweek, Vol. 50, August 12, 1957, p� 38. "Atomic Ban that Will Stick," Newsweek, Vol. 52, November 17, -.1958, P• 39. ":Beware the Atomic Bootlegger,"�, Vol. 70, December 30, 1957, P• 14. "But Eastward Look ••• Disengagement," Economist, Vol. 186, March 22, 1958, p. 1014.. "Cousins vs Gai tskill," -New Statesman, Vol. 58, July 18, .1959, pp. 65-66. "Disarmament Next,"� Republic, Vol. 137, September 23, 1957, p. 7. "Disarmament Talks - Russian Proposals," Commonweal, Vol. 66, June 14, 1957, pp. 267-268. "Disarmament - We're Betting," Newsweek, Vol. 51, May 12, 1958, p. 38. "Disengagement in Europe, n World Today, Vol. 14, May 1958, pp. 181-182. "Eden Plan Reinterpreted," World-Today, Vol. 13, June 1957, pp. 229-231. "European Insecurity," Economist, Vol. 183, June 1, 1957, PP• 762-764. "Failure in London,." America, Vol. 97, September 14, 1957, p. 6o6. "Fear in West Germany of' an Allied Sellout,"!!!:, Republic, Vol. 141, November 16, 1959, pp. 8-9. 108
"First Little Steps," Nation, Vol. 184, June 8, 1957, pp·• • 489-490. "Gomulka Props Up Ulbricht," Economist, Vol. 183, June 22, 1957, P• 1054 "Heart Of Europe;-West Germany," Time,. Vol. 82, November l, 1963, PP• 30-34 "Hope vs Illusion," Newsweek, Vol. 51, February 10, 1958, PP• 59-61. "Is Russia Beginning To See The Light?," Newsweek, Vol. 49, May 13, 1957, P• 48. "Kennan Has The Razor, u � Republic, Vol. 138, April 14, 1958, P• 5. "Kennan's Advice,"� Republic, Vol. 138, January 6, 1958, PP• 3-5. ''Mr. Stassen Is Ousted, But His Plan Is In," Christian Century. Vol. 75, March 12, 1958, P• 301. "NATO," Time, Vol. 70, December 30, 1957, P• 18. "Neutral Zone," Time, Vol. 70, December 30, 1957, p. 22. "No To The Rapacki Plan," America, Vol. 99, May 17, 1958, P• 217. 11Nuclear Stalemate," Commonweal, Vol. 68, May 16, 1958, P• 173. "Our Atomic Defense," Newsweek, Vol. 49, Mey- 13, 1957, P• 50. "Pa.:rtial Measures Approach To Disarmament," United Nations Review, Vol. 4, December, 1957, pp.1,9 •. "Post NATO Reactions," America., Vol. 98, January ll, 1958, P• 407. "Polish Plan For Nuclear Free Zone Today," International Affairs, Vol. 39, January 1963, PP• 1-12. "Pursuit Of Disengagement; An Analysis Ot Risks," World Today, Vol. 15, April 1959, PP• 156-168. "Question of "Russia's New Proposal," !2!!Republic, Vol. 13·6, June 24, 1957, pp. 3-4. "Soviet Mania - Stop Germany,"·Newsweek, Vol. 55, March 21, 1960, pp. 55-56. r•soviet Stake in a Divided Germany," !2!!Republic, Vol. 139, March 17, 1958, pp. 14-16. "Sta.ssen's Pursuit," !2!!.Republic, Vol. 136, June 3, 1957, pp. 3-4. "Summary of the Debate, UN General Assembly," United Nations Review, Vol. 4, November 1957, pp. 11-14. "Trap the Russians Want To Set," Business�, Vol. 143, May 3, 1958, p. 36 • . "Twisting Arms," Economist, Vol. 189, February 22, 1958, p. 481. "U.S. Comments on Developments at Geneva Disarmament Conference," � Department tlState Bulletin, Vol. 42, April 23, 1962, PP• 664-665. "U.S. Replies to Polish on Rapacki Plan," U.S. Department of State· Bulletin, Vol. 38, May 19, 1958, PP• 821-823. "Weakening of the West," New Republic, Vol. 138, June 2, 1958, p. 4. "What to do a.bout Germany,'' �, Vol. 72, December 15, 1958, ·· pp. 20-21. "Where the Chips are Down,Nobody is Disarming," Saturday Evening �, Vol. 230, August 3, 1957, P• 10. .. "Where We Will Disengage l�, .. Newsweek, Vol 54, August 24, 1.959, pp. 36-38. 110 DOCUMENTS Gomulka, w., "Peaceful Coe:x:istence," Official Records, General Assembly, 15th Session, 874th Plenary Meeting, New York, November 1960. Mansfield, Mike, et. al., Report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Berlin 1.!!.� Changing Eurone, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963. Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, "Political Aspects of the Refugee Problem," Report E,!!_ Germany, No. 4, July 1 - September 30, 1950, pp 30-34, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950. "Speech of the Honorable Hubert Humphrey," Congressional Record, .Vol. 104, Part 2, January 31, 1958 to February 25, 1958, February 4, 1958, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1958. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments, 84th end 85th Congresses, published the follovring list of hearings all under the same title. Number eighteen is a final report of the Subcommittee and is therefore much more substantial than the others. Government Printing Office, locations indicated. 1. January 25, 1956, in Washington. 2. February 29, 1956, in Washington. 3. March 7, 1956, in Washington. 4. March 15, 1956, in Washington. 5. April 9, 1956, in Cambridge, Mass. 6. April 12, 1956, in Washington. 7. June 7, 1956, in Washington. 8. June 8, 1956, in Washington. 9. June 16, 1956, in Minneapolis, Minn. 10. December 12, 1956 in St. Louis, Mo. 11. January 9, 10, 1957 in Washington. 12. January 16, 17, 1957, in Washington. 13. March 7, 13, 1957, in Washington. 14. February 28, 1958, in Washington. 15. March 6, 1958, in Washington. 16. March 12, 25, 1958, in Washington. 17. April 16, 17, 1958, in Washington. 18. Report 2501, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents EE, Germany, 1944-1961, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, Govermnent Printing Office, December 1961. 111 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Protocol .2!!. the Termination£! the Occu ation Regime�� Federal Republic of Germany (Hearings), S4th Congress, lat Session, March 29, 1955, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1955. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Protocol .!£.lli North Atlantic Treat on� Accession .2!.� Federal Republic 21.. Germany (Hearings �,84th Congress, 1st Session, March 30, 1955, Washington, Governn1ent Printing Office, 1955. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Review 21..Operations . .2!.lli� Control� Disarmament Agency. (Hearings), 87th CongTess, 2nd Session, March 8, 1962, Washington,�.Government Printing.Office, 1962. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, To Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (Hearings), 88th Congrm,--rst Session, April 10, 1963,Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963. --NEW YORK TJMES Signed Artioles Frankel, Max, "Rusk Opposes Disengagement," October 29, 1961, p.3. Gruson, Sidney, "Rapacld. Pu.shes Plan,", January 6, 1958, p.12. Olsen, Arthur, "Poles Disappointed in U .s. Rejection," April 8, 1962, p.19. Olsen, Arthur, "The Polish Mamo," February 18, 1958� p.7. Reston, James, "Conference Preparations," January 5, 1958, p.8. Salzberger, O. L., "The Bulganin Proposals," November 18, 1956, p.33. Thomas, Norman, "Support For Rapacki Plan," June 17, 1959, p.34. Thanas, Norman, "The Situation in Central Europe," MEQ- 8, 1959, p.15. (Advertisement) Unsigned .Articles "Adenauer and Macmillan," November 19, 1959, p.l. "Adenauer Opposed on Nuclear Zone," January 16, 1958, p.6. "Adenauer Sees Merit-in Russian Proposals," January 12, 1957, PP• 1,9. "Adenauer Replies to U.S. Criticism," January 13, 1957, PP• 8,40. "Bonn and Paris Oppose Macmillan," February 7, 1959, p.5. "Bonn Rejects Polish Plan," Ma.rch l, 1958, p.3. "British Arms Plans," Editorial, April 11, 1959, p.20. "British New Plan," December 5, 1958, p.l. "British Pu.sh Lmited Disa.:rmamant," April l, 1959, p.l. "British Reaction to Rapaoki," February 12, 1958, p.13. 112 113 "British Reply to Bulganin," January 16, 1958, p.12. "Bulganin Would Extend Nuclear Free Zones," January 12, 19�, _p.l. "Chen Yi Proposes Asian Nuclear Free Belt, 11 May 12, 1958, p.4. "Conference on Disengagement," March 31, 1958, p.45� "Denmark Favors Polish Plan,11 January 16, 1958, p_.12. "Disarmament," Letter, September 25, 1959, p.28. "Disengagement," Editorial, March 25, 1959, p.34. "Dulles Against Knowland Plan," June 12, 1957, p.12. "East Germany Corresponds With West Germa.ny," December 26, 1957, p.9. "Ed.en Plan For German Reunification," September 27, 1955, p.12. "Eisenhower.. Holds Talks in Rane,11 September 25, 1959, p.28. "Eisenhower on Troop Reduction," May 12, 1957, p.l. "France, NATO Reply to Rapacki Plan," January 11, 1958, p.7. "Freeze Plan," March 1, 1964, p.2. "Fulbright Backs Mansfield," March 17, 1959, p.18. "Gaitskill Backs Polish Plan," January 13, 1958, p.10. "Ga.itskill's Plan," June 17, 1957, p.4. "Gaitsk:i.11 Scores West on Disarmament," January 27, 1958, p.8. 11 Gomulka Challenges West With Rapacld. Plan," October 22, 1960, p.2. "Harold Stassen Suggests Zone in Central Europe," April 12, 1959, p.10. "Humphrey Critical of Ike," February 5, 1958, p.l. "Humphrey Seys U. s. Std Rapa.Oki Plan," October 17, 1961, p.33. "Hungary Dismisses Knowland Plan," June 15, 1957, p.4. "Italy Rejects Russ Bid," March 31, 1958, p.4. "Jules Mock Arms Proposal," April 10, 1959, p.4. 114 "Kekkonen Asks Scandinavian Nuclear Zone," May 29, 1963, p.6. "Khrushchev Pushes Zone," February 7, 1958, p.5. "Khrushchev Repeats His Denuclearization Proposal," August 9, 1957, p.2. "Knowland's Plan," June 10, 1957, p.l. "Macmillan Refuses to Disouss Eden Plan in Camnons," May 1, 1957, p.6. ''Mansfield Supports Zone Stu�," February 13, 1959, p.2. ''Mendes France Proposes Three Zones," April 3, 1959, p.3. "Mikoyan Pushes Rapacki Plan," Ja:nu.a:J:7 17, 1959, p.3. "NATO Meeting Adjourns," December 21, 1957, p.3. "New Polish Plan," January 19, 1964, p.20. "Nixon Takes Strong Stand," March 14, 1954, p.l. "Norway Irked By Neutrality Plan," June ll, 1957, pp.5, 34. "Ollenhauer to Request Referendum," March 26, 1958, p.10. 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