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Czechoslovakia-Cuba Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1959-1962: Evidence from the Prague Archives

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Czechoslovakia-Cuba Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1959-1962: Evidence from the Prague Archives SECTION 4: Communist Europe Czechoslovakia-Cuba Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1959-1962: Evidence from the Prague Archives d. note: Of all the Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact allies in at Havana’s behest, paralleled a comparable deal contemplated Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia appears to have forged by Poland at the same time—and both required a green-light the fastest and closest political, economic, and military from Moscow, which Nikita Khrushchev—briefly in the capital Erelationship with Fidel Castro’s revolutionary leadership after in between visits to the United States and China at the end it seized power in Havana at the beginning of 1959. (In fact, of September—secretly gave, overruling Kremlin associates Russian documents have disclosed, Castro’s guerrilla army first who considered tying the Soviet Union to revolutionary Cuba sought to purchase arms from Czechoslovakia—in apparently its a hopeless cause since it was so firmly within the US sphere of first such foray beyond the Iron Curtain—as early as December influence. According to Fursenko and Naftali, who first revealed 1958, on the eve of its final victory over the Batista dictatorship; the episode (without the piquant details provided by the Czech the Kremlin approved the limited transaction, conducted through documentation here), the step was a significant indication of the a Costa Rican firm.1) With some in Havana considering relations Soviet leader’s emotional commitment to the new regime on the with Prague an “ice-breaker”2 for further ties to the communist distant island, foreshadowing more fateful actions in the years to camp (Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations were not restored until come. “If one were to choose the point at which the United States 19603), Czechoslovak and Cuban leaders frequently exchanged and the Soviet Union started inclining toward their first direct visits and openly signed agreements to increase trade, cultural, military clash, it was this day in late September 1959,” they scientific, educational exchanges, and the like—and secretly wrote. “By approving the weapons sale”—Fursenko and Naftali negotiated extensive arms transfers of Soviet-bloc arms to the were referring to the Polish sale, but Khrushchev apparently also rulers in Havana as they sought to defeat an ongoing challenge approved the simultaneous Czech deal—“Khrushchev signaled to from anti-Castro Cuban insurgents (both on the island and in the top levels of the Soviet government that he would take risks to exile) and faced the looming threat of assault from Washington as pursue Soviet aims in Latin America.”6 US-Cuban relations rapidly deteriorated. Notably, the Czech documents reveal, in July 1959 the The collection of translated Czechoslovak documents presented Cubans had told a visiting Czech trade delegation in Cuba that here document this emerging relationship from 1959 to 1962 Fidel Castro desired to obtain arms from Czechoslovakia, but (at least from Prague’s perspective and through the lens of Czech “that given the current tense situation the purchase of these goods documents—unfortunately, Cuban archives containing records could only be made by way of a third country, otherwise direct of foreign diplomatic and inter-party contacts remain closed, supplies from Czechoslovakia could be politically manipulated preventing a better understanding of Havana’s side of the story).4 by the United States, as in the case of Guatemala.” To mask They are divided into two sections. the sale’s actual partners, the documents show, the sale was to be The first section presents evidence on the early development made via a complicated conduit involving neutral Switzerland of Czechoslovak-Cuban relations from 1959 to 1961, which using financing from the charity C.A.R.E. Evidently, the Cubans includes the somewhat sensitive issue of Prague’s attempting to succeeded in organizing such arrangements under the noses of grasp the relationship and balance of power within Havana’s Americans and of the Central Intelligence Agency in particular. In rulers between Fidel Castro’s “July 26th” movement and the a late November 1959 conversation with the British ambassador traditional, pro-Moscow communist party, the People’s Socialist in Washington, CIA director Allen W. Dulles explained the US Party (PSP). The reports here include contacts of the ruling objections to a proposed UK sale of planes to Cuba because he Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz) leadership with both wanted the Cuban government to turn behind the Iron Curtain camps, including such figures as Raul Castro and Che Guevara, for arms, just like Arbenz had done in Guatemala, for this would both of whom visited Czechoslovakia during this period, and, help mobilize anti-Castro Cubans in exile for a covert operation significantly, extensive information on the Prague government’s to unseat the leadership in Havana. Evidently, Dulles didn’t know decision, in late September 1959, to approve sending what was that the Cubans had already done so, and effectively hidden the euphemistically described as “special technical supplies” or “special transaction for precisely the reason that he wished to coerce and technology” (i.e., weapons, specifically 50,000 submachine guns expose such an act.7 and ammunition) to Havana, using a neutral Swiss firm as a As the Czech documents detail, this military tie intensified cut-out to conceal the transaction, especially from American eyes.5 in 1960 with expanded requests from the PSP head, Blas Roca, The Czechoslovak willingness to covertly aid Cuba militarily, and a visit to Czechoslovakia by Cuba’s defense minister, Raúl 349 Castro, whom Prague had learned was more ideologically attuned East/Central Europe trade with and various forms of assistance to communism than his brother, together with Antonio Nunez (including military) to Cuba, roughly twice as large the next Jimenez, the powerful figure in charge of Cuba’s agricultural highest (Poland and Bulgaria were more or less tied for second).12 reform agency (INRA). Besides furthering Havana’s prospects During the crisis Prague’s ambassador in Havana, Vladimir for buying Soviet-bloc arms, the documents show, the Cuban Pavliček, enjoyed access to such senior figures as Foreign Minister visitors used visits to Prague to widen and intensify their contacts Raúl Roa and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the old PSP stalwart with diplomats from other communist countries, ranging from whom Castro had named to run INRA, and who had become the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of a member of the inner leadership circle, who candidly vented (North) Vietnam to assorted Warsaw Pact nations who had not negative feelings toward’s Khrushchev’s decisions to the Czech yet normalized relations and established embassies in Cuba. As envoy despite the latter’s inevitable loyalty towards Moscow,13 The mutual visits took place at an accelerating tempo, Prague and following summer, a Czechoslovak official in Prague insisted to Havana exchanged embassies in the summer of 1960 and, a fraternal (Hungarian) diplomat that Czech-Cuban relations within a year, they also inaugurated an airline connection via Cuba “did not change during the Caribbean [i.e., Cuban Czechoslovak state airlines (CSA), directly linking the island to Missile] Crisis and the time following it, even amidst the biggest the Soviet bloc by commercial aviation. hardships….”14 Pavliček also, of course, kept in close contact By the end of 1960 and spring of 1961, the documents show, top with his Soviet colleague in Havana, Ambassador Aleksandr level Cuban requests—including from Fidel Castro and President Alekseyev, from whom he gleaned bits of information about the Osvaldo Dorticos through Prague’s embassy in Havana—sought lengthy negotiations between Mikoyan and the Cubans—and his an even broader military relationship to complement weapons Czechoslovak diplomatic colleague in Washington reported on his and equipment being obtained from the Soviet Union, and one meeting (along with other Soviet-bloc envoys) with Mikoyan when that only intensified after the Bay of Pigs.8 Though not formally the Soviet passed through town, meeting with JFK, at the end of acknowledged, this link was an open secret in Havana: “Although November on his way back from Cuba to Moscow.15 More broadly, Czechoslovak sources never officially admitted military aid to the dozens of ciphered cables from Pavliček (who also circulated Cuba,” an outside analysis noted in June 1961, “it is no secret with non-communist diplomats and did not shy away from that a large number of Czechoslovak military advisors are present reporting attitudes critical of the Soviet Union) printed here from in Cuba and that Cuban air force pilots are receiving training in late October-late November 1962 offer numerous fresh glimpses Czechoslovakia.”9 of attitudes, reactions, gossip, and events behind the “Sugarcane By mid-1961, an analysis of Czech-Cuban relations over Curtain” that were difficult to discern or obtain from Washington. the past year concluded that Prague’s “intensive activities” on While Pavliček lacked the insider information on Soviet-Cuban the island had been “evident” since the summer of 1960 but exchanges available to Alekseyev, his reports—usefully compared “particularly vigorous” since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion. with the now-available contemporaneous reports from the Polish Czechoslovakia, it noted, seemed to have been selected by Moscow and Hungarian embassies in Havana16—valuably add the record as its “spearhead” in relations
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