New Evidence on the Berlin Crisis 1958-1962

200 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 11 New Evidence on the Berlin Crisis 1958-1962 Khrushchev’s November 1958 Berlin Ultimatum: New Evidence from the Polish Archives Introduction, translation, and annotation by Douglas Selvage1 t was on 10 November 1958, at a Soviet-Polish domestic and foreign policies, especially with regard to friendship rally to cap off the visit of Polish leader trade and cultural relations with the West.5 In contrast, IW»adys»aw Gomu»ka to Moscow, that Soviet leader Khrushchev’s Berlin gambit presaged an increase in Nikita Khrushchev first publicly announced his intention tensions between East and West. Although it might have to turn over the Soviet Union’s control functions in Berlin been aimed indirectly at preventing West German access to the German Democratic Republic (GDR). to nuclear weapons, the central goal was to gain Western Khrushchev’s speech was the prelude to his letter of recognition of the GDR.6 Khrushchev’s Berlin ultimatum November 27 to the Western powers, in which he meant, in effect, that the struggle within the Eastern bloc demanded that they enter into negotiations for a German between Poland and the GDR over what was to come first peace treaty and on the issue of transforming West Berlin in Soviet-bloc foreign policy—regional disarmament or into a demilitarized, “free” city. If sufficient progress recognition of the GDR—had been decided in the East were not made within six months, Khrushchev threatened Germans’ favor.7 to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR and to grant it In the session on November 10, Gomu»ka let control over the transit routes to Berlin.2 Khrushchev do the talking. When the Soviet leader asked Recently-declassified minutes of a meeting between Gomu»ka if he had read Moscow’s latest “suggestions” Gomu»ka and Khrushchev on November 10, the day of the regarding Berlin, he said that he had. “We understand,” Soviet leader’s speech, shed light on the immediate Gomu»ka said, “that they are aimed towards liquidating the prelude to the ultimatum of November 27. They tend to western part of Berlin.” Khrushchev quickly countered, confirm Hope Harrison and Vladislav Zubok’s main “It is not that simple.” The announcement on Berlin was assertions in their recent studies about Khrushchev’s goals only the “beginning of the struggle.” Moscow intended to in provoking the crisis: to differentiate himself from his hand over its control functions in Berlin to the East ousted opponents, to counter the Federal Republic of Germans, and this would force the West to speak directly Germany’s (FRG) expanding role in NATO, and—above with the GDR—leading, in effect, to its recognition. The all else—to gain international recognition of the GDR.3 Soviet leader also suggested other possible reasons for his The minutes highlight in particular the key role of the gambit. He tried to differentiate himself from his former shifting nuclear balance in Khrushchev’s thinking and opponents in the struggle to succeed Stalin by citing their provide insight into the evolving relationship between policy towards the German question. Both KGB Chief Khrushchev and Gomu»ka. Lavrentii Beria and the Soviet’s Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Georgi Malenkov, Khrushchev Khrushchev’s Goals declared, had favored a Soviet withdrawal from Berlin and On the weekend of 8 November 1958, Gomu»ka the GDR in 1953.8 In the same year, Khrushchev had received a draft of Khrushchev’s proposed speech for the justified Beria’s removal and execution by pointing to his friendship rally on Monday. He was reportedly shocked. German policy. Similarly, in June 1957, he had vindicated Although the GDR and the Soviet Union had sent notes to his purge of the “anti-party group” of Malenkov, the Federal Republic and the Western powers in Vyacheslav Molotov, and Lazar Kaganovich from the September calling for a German peace treaty and inter- Soviet leadership by citing their opposition to credits for German talks on reunification, there had been no mention the GDR.9 To help assure Gomu»ka’s support, of Berlin. Only days before had the Polish foreign Khrushchev now alleged that his former opponents had minister, Adam Rapacki, renewed his proposal for a even wanted to alter Poland’s western border, the Oder- nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Europe to embrace Neisse Line. Having differentiated himself from his both German states, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.4 The opponents, he also brought up the issue of the FRG’s underlying goals of the initiative, the “Rapacki Plan,” membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were to prevent West German access to nuclear weapons (NATO), an alliance “clearly directed against us.” Bonn’s and to provide the basis for détente and disarmament in membership in NATO, he declared, violated the Potsdam Europe. A relaxation of tensions between the two blocs Agreement. It thus provided Moscow with a justification would have allowed Poland more room for maneuver in its to renounce the existing arrangements for Berlin, agreed NEW EVIDENCE ON THE BERLIN CRISIS 1958-1962 201 upon at Potsdam, especially since the West was using settlement on Berlin and a peace treaty, so as long as West Berlin as an “attack base” against the Soviet Union. sufficient progress was made within six months.12 He rescinded and renewed the deadline two more times before Nuclear Brinkmanship and the West’s Reaction he finally abandoned it in October 1961, two months after Khrushchev sought to calm the Polish delegation’s the construction of the Berlin Wall. fears about the possibility of war over Berlin by underlining the altered strategic balance since 1953. The The Polish-Soviet Relationship West would not risk a war over Berlin, he suggested, The minutes also provide insight into the evolving because the Soviet Union had the hydrogen bomb and the relationship between Khrushchev and Gomu»ka. Only two means to hit the U.S. As Vladislav Zubok and Constantine years before, in October 1956, Khrushchev had flown to Pleshakov point out, Khrushchev believed that the Soviet Warsaw on the eve of the Polish United Workers’ Party threat to use nuclear weapons during the Suez Crisis [PUWP]’s 8th Plenum to confront the Polish leadership exactly two years earlier had played a crucial role in about Gomu»ka’s return to power.13 In contrast, in forcing Great Britain and France to back down. His November 1958, he talked openly with Gomu»ka about the “nuclear-missile romanticism”10 also led him to believe ostensible differences within the Soviet leadership over that in order to avoid nuclear confrontation, the Western Poland’s western border, the Oder-Neisse Line. Not powers would have to acquiesce in East German control surprisingly, he suggested that he, Khrushchev, had always over the transit routes to Berlin. (In his meeting with supported the Oder-Neisse Line and it was others—Beria Gomu»ka, Khrushchev did not mention the possibility of a and the “feeble” Malenkov—who had committed the negotiated settlement with the West over Berlin or a peace “stupidity” of refusing to recognize it. Khrushchev’s treaty.) “If a conflict results,” Khrushchev told Gomu»ka, statement was particularly ironic because it was he who “they [the West] know full well that we are in a position to made veiled threats against the Oder-Neisse Line in two raze West Germany to the ground. The first minutes of meetings with Gomu»ka in 1957. At the first meeting, in war will decide.... Their territory is small—West May 1957 in Moscow, Khrushchev had used the border Germany, England, France—literally several bombs will issue to force Gomu»ka to renounce his demands for suffice...” Although a war “might drag on for years,” the compensation for Moscow’s economic exploitation of Soviet Union could also launch a nuclear strike against the Poland during the Stalin era.14 At the second meeting, in U.S. “Today, America has moved closer to us,” August 1957, he had pressured Gomu»ka to curb the Khrushchev told Gomu»ka, “our missiles can hit them reforms in Poland and combat “anti-Sovietism.”15 directly.” Gomu»ka had responded in October 1957 with a crackdown Since war was no longer a possibility for the West, in Poland. He had ordered the closure of the Warsaw Khrushchev predicted, they would resort to some form of student newspaper, Po prostu, the leading organ of the economic blockade against the GDR and Berlin. This Polish reform movement.16 When students protested the time, however, unlike 1948-49, it would be the Soviet decision, they were brutally rebuffed by Poland’s internal Union that would provide the residents of West Berlin security forces. Then, in November 1957, Gomu»ka had with food. Since France and Great Britain—Khrushchev ordered a purge (“review”) of the PUWP’s membership, and Gomu»ka agreed—did not really favor German which led to the dismissal of leading “revisionists.”17 By unification, they would not necessarily put up much the time of his meeting with Khrushchev in November resistance. Indeed, Khrushchev predicted—falsely—that 1958, Gomu»ka publicly supported Khrushchev’s Berlin French President Charles de Gaulle would not actively gambit, despite his private reservations. In return, the support West Germany during a crisis over Berlin.11 De Soviet leader sanctioned—both in his speech on November Gaulle, he said, feared the Germans; if they attacked any 10 and more importantly, during a visit to Poland in July country in the future, it would be France, not the Soviet 1959—Poland’s right to follow its own path to socialism.18 Union.

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