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AClT·llon GUllDte SOUTH AF ICA NONVIOLENT ACTION TRAINING PROGRAM For eddltlonal copl_, wrtt. PED-Reeowcee, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE. 1501 Cherry Str.... PhIl8delphla. Pao 19102 Price: $ 1.00 1 Why act on southern African issues? We in the West are not going to liberate trade, diplomatic acceptance, cooperation anybody in southern Africa. That is for in public relatiols campaigns, and low the people of southern Africa themselves profile alliances through military and to do. Besides, we face massive tasks intelligence establishments. Corporations in eliminating perverse human relation have been principal conduits for this ships right here at home; we must over support. come racism and concentrated power, to name two characteristics our 'society Despite the continued domination by minor shares with much of southern Africa. ities, however, change is coming in south ern Africa. Nonviolent direct action of We can, however, support those people the kinds described in this booklet can struggling for justice and peace in lend support to the dominated majorities southern Africa by our actions at home. and can help make the systems they exist And we can let them down by our under more vulnerable to change. Western inaction. governments and businesses will continue to deal with South Africa and Southern The minority rulers of southern Africa Rhodesia only so long as the costs in have never stepped aside, or changed dollars and prestige are low. The actions their policies, unless pressured from suggested here can raise the costs tre within their own countries. Reinforc mendously, cut into profits, and mobilize ing those internal pressures, however, shame. They also provide effective means have been the actions of others: Inde to sensitize and educate people. Nonviolent pendent African countries, units of direct action has worked before in chipping the United Nations, some Western govern away at apartheid, and it can have formid ments, and local and international able impact in the months to come as the groups of ordinary persons. working United States faces new demands for a through their churches, black commu changed policy toward southern Africa. nity groups, sports associations, activist coalitions, legislatures, * and so forth. Gandhi began a form of nonviolent direct In post-Soweto southern Africa, the action, which he termed "satyagraha" , minority governments of South Africa long ago in South Africa. The end of and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) are outside support for South Africa's system retrenching and actively seeking sup may well begin once more with Gandhi. port from the West. Western support, while never loudly proclaimed, has been forthcoming by way of investment, * This third edition of the Action Guide on Southern Africa is the result of cooperative effort by staff of, and a consultant to, the AFSe's Nonviolent Action Training Program (NVAT) of the Peace Education Division, and staff of the Southern Africa Program of the International Division. It is the outgrowth of work originally done by NVAT staff, here incorporated into Section 2. Thanks must go to a number of individuals whose suggestions and criticisms have, we hope, made this edition better than the last. Philadelphia, December 1976. Graphics credits: Cover: si Ihouette of Namibian demonstrators from Namibia News, top photo from Southern Africa, lower left The New International ist, lower right NVAT-AFSC; p. 6, Sechaba; p. 7, The Africa Fund; p. 8 the companies' adverts; p. 9 NY Times; p. 11 the Star (Johannesburg); p. 12, The Guardian (New York); p. 14 unknown; p. 15 ad in Soldier of Fortune; p. 18, FCNL; p. 21, Sechaba; p. 23 lOAF; p. 24 Pro Veritate; p. 27, Pro Veritate; p. 28 lOAF; p. 30 unknown; p 37, UN Assn of USA; p. 52 The Colorado Dai Iy; p. 55, Newsweek; p. 63 lOAF. Our thanks to al I.' 2 *** Contents *** Why Act on Southern African Issues? 1 Section 1. Action Campaigns: What Has Been, and Could Be, Done Economic Leverage: Some Considerations .• •••. 3 Bank Loans to South Africa: The Buck Starts Here • . 4 Stopping South African and Rhodesian Imports . • . 6 Stockholder Action and Public Hearings • • • . 7 Boycotting Consumer Goods ..••..•. 8 Gold and Diamonds -- The Krugerrand •.. 9 Action on Technical Cooperation. -- Giving South Africa the Bomb? 11 Minority Regime Presence in the United States .•.•..• 12 Action on Military and Intelligence Cooperation •••• 14 Mercenaries •• .••• 15 Sports •• •• 15 Entertainers .• •• 16 Tourism. ••• 17 Legislative Action 17 Operation Namibia -- Focus for Namibia Support •• •• 20 Encouragement to Others •••• •• •. 21 Political Movements •.••• 21 Political Prisoners • •••• 22 Labor Groups •• .• 23 Women's Organizations. • 23 Section 2. Some Techniques in Organizing a Campaign 1. Get in touch with others • ' ••• 24 2. Investigate •••• 24 3. Set Goals / Develop Strategy 25 Further Reading •• •.•• 29 Section 3. Organizations A. National Activist Organizations • 31 B. Information and News 33 C. Specialized Groups ••••• 33 D. National - Mainly Academic 34 E. Local Groups •• •••••• 35 F. Canada •••••••••• 37 G. Organizations in Britain and Elsewhere 38 H. African Liberation Movement Representatives in the U.S •• 39 I. Representatives of Newly Independent African Countries + OAU 39 Section 4. Resources Basic Information 40 Southern Africa's Links with the West 40 Periodicals ••••• 41 Films ••••••••• 43" Appendixes A. Local Action on Corporate Complicity with South Africa (SALC) •• 51 B. Speakers.. ••.•••.••••.••.• 52 C. An Example of Action Around a Sports Event: The Fed Cup. 53 D. AFSC Policy Guideline on Southern Africa 56 E. ·501 idar; ty Dates ....... ... .. ···. 59 Note: The last page (no. 64) is a feedback form. Please help us make the next edition of the Action Guide on Southern Africa better. Fill out the form, and send it to us. Thanks! 3 Section 1. Action Campaigns: What Has Been, and Could Be Done Economic Leverage: Some Considerations Some of the most effective points of leverage against the white minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia are economic. South Africa freely describes itself as "a capital-hungry economy" and despite its negative balance of trade considers multi-million dollar propaganda campaigns in the u.S. more than worth its while -- whether aimed at the u.S. consumer ($5 million ad campaign in 25 American cities to sell Krugerrand coins) or the u.S. investor (32 pages of advertising in the Nov. 22, 1976 Business Week). J. J. Kitshoff, head of South Africa's Industrial Develop ment Corporation, puts South Africa's case quite bluntly: Whether one agrees with all its (S.A.'s) polities and practices or not is really beside the point. What counts is that one knows where one stands and that one is not likely to be confronted with sudden and violent changes in policy. The school children of Soweto give the lie to that prediction of calm and stability, but Kitshoff knows where South Africa's salvation rests: Over the years foreign capital and enterprise have made an invaluable contribution to our development and we hope that they will continue to do so in years to come. We realise that apart from supplementing our domestic savings, foreign capita~ normally brings with it know-how and expertise, and often skilled manpower and export markets as well. The u.S. is now South Africa's third largest trading partner, surpassed as a customer only by·the United Kingdom and Japan, and as a supplier by the United Kingdom and West Germany. There are approximately 400 u.S. firms active in South Africa with investments of at least $1.5 billion book value representing 20% of all foreign investment in South Africa. Investment is likely to continue to grow, despite business jitters about the Soweto riots. So is trade. South Africa quotes the u.S. Department of Commerce: "A number of projects deserve attention by u.S. suppliers." Americans therefore have unusual leverage to make a difference in southern Africa. President-elect Jimmy Carter himself points out (Financial Mail November 5, 1976): Our economic presence in S. Africa gives us a greater influence on that government than its government has over Rhodesia. Yet, he goes on to say, with disturbing implications for future u.S. policy: I think our Ameri~an businessmen can be a constructive force achieving racial justice within South Africa. and comes out in favor of relaxed terms for u.S. investment in South Africa and against anti-apartheid economic sanctions as "counter-productive." 4 The presence of u.s. corporations over the years in fact has done nothing to halt the essential progress of apartheid. u.s. corporations, for instance, were not heard to protest the formation of bantustans like the ,Transkei as labor reservations for white industry. Furthermore, U.S. industries will consciously seek to locate in South Africa to take advantage of cheap black labor. Jack Anderson's column revealed that the Lummus Corporations anticipated "substantial savings" in average rands/hr wages paid to trained black labor as opposed to white labor in its secret memos for a projected construction job in South Africa. -Lummus anticipated additional savings by planning black workers' housing that would accommodate seven times more people in half the space than in white quarters, putting nine blacks per room. (Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1976). Although Lummus did not get,its construction job, its reasoning reflects that of a good part of the u.S. business community. Nonetheless, bad publicity in the United States and cancellation of investments and trade can have very damaging effects on the economic under pinnings of white minority governments. There are many stages for action, as the following sections suggest. Bank Loans to South A~rica -- The Buck Starts Here South Africa's massive -- and growing -- debt to private Western banks effectively locks the West into dependence- on South Africa's continued pros perity. Falling international gold prices combined with expanded defense spending have increased South Afric'a' s trade deficit to $2.4 billion, up from $1.7 billion in 1975.