The Gadfly – Spring 2013
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
The Philosophy Program and Philosophy Club of LaGuardia Community College
and
The Student Advisory Council of LaGuardia Community College proudly presents the fourth annual issue of:
THE GADFLY Dying for the truth since 399 BC
Editors in Chief Stefania-Alexandra Dinu and Jonathan Lucas-Sacta
A Note from the Editors The Gadfly is in its fourth year of publication. Since the publishing of our first issue, LaGuardia Philosophy has expanded into a wonderful curriculum of insight and wonder. LaGuardia’s Philosophy Program has grown to welcome all people who seek the answers to their unasked questions embedded within the world of Philosophy. With new students entering LaGuardia majoring in Philosophy, our program is expanding into one of the most prestigious in all of CUNY.
Due to the constant success of previous CUNY Undergraduate Philosophy Conferences, LaGuardia Philosophy sponsored a Third Annual CUNY Undergraduate Philosophy Conference on April 19, 2013 at LaGuardia Community College. This issue of The Gadfly is uniquely notable as it showcases the work of students and commentators who presented at the conference and of other LaGuardia students who captured the attention of our staff.
Therefore, it is a pleasure to showcase the presentations of these undergraduates representing Grand State Valley University, City College, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Sarah Lawrence College, Valdosta State University and LaGuardia Community College
We hope you enjoy the fourth issue of The Gadfly LaGuardia Community College’s Philosophy Journal 1
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Special Thanks to:
LaGuardia Philosophy Program Faculty, For all your hard work and dedication, but more importantly, your nonstop support and guidance.
The Student Advisory Council Of LaGuardia Community College, for funding the printing of this journal.
The LaGuardia Philosophy Program And Philosophy Club for sponsoring this journal.
All the students who submitted their original work.
Professor Emmanuel Nartey and Professor Leslie Aarons for your talents and commitment to mentoring the Philosophy Club
Stefania-Alexandra Dinu and Professor Sarah Midkiff for the design of the front cover.
Mirian Edith Tellez for your constant inspiration and creative innovation.
Nuve Catalina Vera Arteaga for your endless spark, amaranthine elegance, and delightful enthusiasm.
Karl Azizi at Neko Print and Document Imaging, for your consistent high quality service and timely printing of this journal.
LaGuardia Community College Philosophy THE GADFLY Spring 2013 [email protected] 2
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 1
Special Thanks 2
Table of Contents 3 ______
Paper Presentations and Comments
Emptiness in Art: The Deceptively Hidden Nature of Lichtenstein’s “Kitsch” 6 Joshua Liveris – City College
Merits and Pitfalls: A Commentary 17 Ting Yih – LaGuardia Community College
The Determinist Paradox 21 Gregory Smith – Sarah Lawrence College
Musings: A Commentary 31 Rosemary Jill Schaeffer – LaGuardia Community College
Causal Theory of Reference’s Extension to Natural Kind Terms: 33 Rigid Designation, Rigid Application, and Change Adam Shatsky - Grand Valley State University
Free Will Evolves in a Determined World 41 Danny Choi – LaGuardia Community College
______
Abstracts of Posterboard Presentations
On The Nature of The Self 49 Joseph Cutolo – LaGuardia Community College
Understanding Buddhist Social Action in Burma 50 Jason Cole Singletary – Valdosta State University
3
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Existentialism and the Contemporary Moral Self 51 Emiliya Abramova - John Jay College of Criminal Justice
______
Philosophy and Popular Culture
Jedi Reductionism and Paleo-Compatibilism 53 Bryan Parsons – LaGuardia Community College
The Zombie in the Mirror 60 Johnny Cercado – LaGuardia Community College
The Truth Strikes and Bites Back 64 Mira Vuorinen – LaGuardia Community College
______
LaGuardia Community College Philosophy THE GADFLY Spring 2013 [email protected]
4
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Read Previous Issues of The Gadfly here:
http://www.lagcc.cuny.edu/philosophy/gadfly/
If you would like to submit a paper for publication in the next issue of The Gadfly, send it to: [email protected] with your name and “Gadfly Submission” in the subject line. Please include your name and school in the body of the email.
Philosophy at LaGuardia Community College [email protected] Become a fan on Facebook and Google Groups! Find us on the web at: http://www.lagcc.cuny.edu/philosophy Philosophy Program – Humanities Department LaGuardia Community College 3110 Thomson Ave E202 Long Island City, NY 11101
5
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Emptiness in Art: The Deceptively Hidden Nature of Lichtenstein’s “Kitsch” Joshua Liveris City University of New York – City College
Philosophy is a tool that can aid us in our understanding of works of art, and in analyzing these works we can come to understand the merits and pitfalls of a philosophical approach to art. The artwork that this paper will focus on comes from the late artist Roy Lichtenstein. Lichtenstein’s series titled Landscapes in the Chinese Style challenges the notion of avant-garde art put forth by Clement Greenberg, falling somewhere between the realm of abstract and kitsch art. We shall come to see why Greenberg’s view of art creates a tension for Lichtenstein’s pieces when viewed using Greenberg’s approach. Then, we shall see the deceptively hidden nature of the avant-garde that rests in Lichtenstein’s seemingly kitsch works, and see how the essence of the avant-garde can be best described using the Buddhist notion of emptiness. But first let us examine these works in full using a descriptive analysis, and then we shall follow with Greenberg’s philosophical analysis of the works and investigate the tension that arises. As we will see, it is this tension that will lead us to uncover the empty nature of these works of art. Lichtenstein’s Landscapes in the Chinese Style can be thought of as an exercise in re- interpretation. What Lichtenstein has set out to do with these works is to re-interpret traditional Chinese prints of landscapes and scenes in nature by using techniques that depict these scenes as modern printed versions. Lichtenstein’s work mimics the effects of modern printing through the heavy use of Benday dots, thick outlines, and solid colors, drawing the viewer to both the surface of the artistic medium and to the representational depth of the landscapes depicted. Upon seeing these works the viewer is at once hit with an array of colored dots – patterned in a way to represent great spaces and vast landscapes. Yet, they are peculiarly drawn to the primary shape, the Benday dot, which resides on the surface of the canvas. In addition to the great scheme of colored dots, tiny figures of men and women sparsely populate these scenes. There are fisherman in canoes, elderly people with canes, bridges, rocks, trees, and bamboo shoots, all laid out across densely mountainous landscapes where rivers and waterfalls reside. These figures and landscapes are reduced to the simplest of forms. Men, women, trees, bamboo, and rocks are drawn with thick outlines and are lacking in detail, retaining the simplicity of the Chinese originals while still representing familiar forms in a pop art style. Blotches of yellow and green paint – mere smudges when examined up close – appear here and there along the mountain sides, depicting flowers and bushes. Waterways are often present in these scenes. Rivers and waterfalls have their detail not in the use of Benday dots and lines, but through the negative spaces that surround the dotted mountain landscapes, as seen in the piece Landscape with Scholars Rock (as seen on the next page).
6
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Mist and clouds are also depicted in the same way, arising from the negative spaces that result from the absence of the dots. The contours of oceans and thick currents, as well as the mountain peaks, are represented with darkly colored, thick dots, while shallowness and height can be seen by the varied size of the dots. In the case of representing a tall mountain the dots are small at the bottom, reaching their darkest and biggest size when they are used to outline the mountain’s peak. As for the color scheme of these works the primary color mostly seen is the white negative space – the background – between each colored Benday dot. This helps to provide an outline for the forms that are represented. The dots vary in color, mostly between black, blue, and red. The colors of the dots have different gradients, either appearing bold, faded, or somewhere in between. This depicts illusory space, form, and great heights. The outline of each landscape is often achieved through the use of dots, as seen in the scenes depicting mountains1. Another piece, Landscape with Boat (as seen on the next page), is initially seemingly abstract, with only the representation of a man in a boat at the far end of the canvas – barely in view – finally lending meaning to the madness of big and small, dark and light black dots that move across the blue background of the canvas.
1 Also, in many of these scenes heavy black outlines are used to depict forms, which are colored in with bold and vivid yellows, greens, browns, and greys, to depict trees, bridges, rocks and people. 7
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
At first, only a diverse smattering of dots is seen, and then, upon noticing the familiar boat in the far lower left corner, the shape of an ocean current unfolds, moving in an upper-right direction and carrying its lone passenger along an empty shoreline. The shore itself is without color or dots, aside from the blue background of the canvas, yet it is clearly represented by an invisible line that guides the dots representing the ocean current in an upper right direction, extending out beyond the view of the canvas. Another aspect of Lichtenstein’s Landscapes is that these pieces are infused with a sense of motion. Movement without movement occurs in these static landscapes; an effect and a trick that arises from the use of the Benday dots. The negative spaces that surround the mountain peaks and cut out the waterfalls in Vista with Bridge (below) come forth as depicting mist and clouds, haziness and depth, all at once.
8
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
While examining the canvas directly – taking the entire canvas into view – a tremendous movement is observed. Imagine a misty haze flowing through the mountainous terrain yet the image really does appear to move. The movement that occurs within the painting is of course not from the painting itself literally moving, but rather it is the result of the viewer shifting his focus from the dots on the surface of the canvas to the formal images that appear when the dots are viewed as a collective. This frequent shift in focus causes the viewer’s eyes to dance back and forth between the surface of the canvas and the hidden depth of the landscape, producing a sense of movement. This artificial movement also arises when one rapidly scans the canvas to try and take in the thousands of tiny hand drawn Benday dots. And so, the dynamics that occur in these works are the result of Lichtenstein’s Benday dot technique. The Benday dots help to create a sense of movement in these works, but the movement is actually the product of the viewer’s own perception. Lichtenstein’s clever technique produces the brilliant effect of motion, an aspect that is found in the entire series of Landscapes in the Chinese Style. While these pieces fool the viewer with an illusion of depth, they also draw the viewer to move closer for further inspection. The thousands of dots that depict these landscapes are immediately dizzying, drawing the eye to both the canvas surface while at the same time tricking the mind into seeing a vast space (see example below). As one moves closer and analyzes the dots to avoid this dizziness, their attention is drawn to the surface of the canvas. But as one moves away a scenic landscape unfolds before their eyes. The reality of the medium is evident by closely examining the Benday dots. In fact, upon close examination each Benday dot seems to become a miniature painting in itself. In these works one is not fooled into thinking that they are viewing a carbon copy of nature, or are gazing through a window into a scene of static space and time. The obviousness of the canvas is evident. However, as one pays attention to the surface of the painting they are simultaneously drawn to look through the canvas, to see a vivid and unique representation of the natural world. With these pieces form is evident yet lost; the subject is found then forgotten, as the eyes dance between the canvas’ material surface and the illusory depth of the scene.
9
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
So, how can we define the aesthetic experience that Lichtenstein’s work presents us with? Do these works carry any beauty or value, and how should one categorize what one is viewing? When viewing Landscapes in the Chinese Style with Greenberg’s philosophy in mind, a tension arises. Do these works belong to the world of high art – the avant-garde – or should they be labeled as kitsch, or low art? For Greenberg this question is extremely relevant, but to answer it we must first define our terms: avant-garde, and kitsch. I have already used the terms high art and low art to differentiate the avant-garde from the kitsch, but this is not enough. Greenberg describes the avant-garde as the result of a historical progression, a movement born out of a desire to move past the old and do something new, rather than refine the past. The avant-garde does not derive its value from its ability to represent objects in nature; rather, avant- garde art faces its medium and derives its value from itself. With Greenberg, the avant-garde is embodied in abstract art. Abstract art, like the avant-garde, doesn’t directly or accidently represent an object or subject. Instead, it presents purity by embracing its nature and turning the viewer’s attention to itself, to be appreciated as an artistic object in and of itself. Its value is found not in its ability to achieve a goal of accurately representing something or to have a purpose, but to be disinterested. The avant-garde consists of the negation of a subject and the dissolution of content, providing not the representation of an object or a realistic space, but what Nickolas Pappas calls a “sensual and meta-sensual” experience, which comes from the art’s ability to depict purity. This purity is derived from the art’s goal to be art for art’s sake, to not have a goal. The avant-garde challenges the viewer and creates an experience that stays with the viewer well after the art has been seen. The avant-garde is not easy. It must be studied and appreciated. However, along with the avant-garde there is its antithesis, kitsch. For Greenberg, kitsch is art made for the masses, or mass art. Kitsch is mechanical and often produced by machines; a product of the modern age. Kitsch can be thought of as pop art, which doesn’t require a cultivated mind to be enjoyed. Kitsch is goal oriented and after an effect, an effect of creating immediate pleasure in its audience, often for the end of producing profits. Kitsch can be seen in “magazine covers, illustrations, ads, slick and pulp fiction comics,” and is popular and commercial (Greenberg 2005, 5). Importantly, kitsch is universal, appreciated across the globe by all cultures; therefore, it relies on popular themes and images and “faked sensations,” “changing in style” but always remaining the same (Greenberg 2005, 5). For Greenberg, kitsch is not genuine, therefore it can’t be disinterested and enjoyed as an end in itself, with the latter aspect being the most important. The key distinction between the avant- garde and the kitsch is that the avant-garde gains its value and expresses true beauty because it is not merely a means to an end. It is not representing something or trying to be something other than a piece of art. It is simply an artwork in and of itself and therefore it is an end in itself. For Greenberg, when a piece of art is representational it is trying to be something that it truly isn’t; it is trying to be that which it seeks to represent. This kind of art is never disinterested. However, when the artwork is not representational, when it is abstract, it can finally embrace its natural essence and be disinterested. When art does this it represents purity itself. Therefore, because kitsch seeks to represent something – and sometimes it even seeks to represent abstract art itself - - it is not pure, because the pure art is disinterested. Now, where do the Landscapes in the Chinese Style fit for Greenberg? Are they in the realm of kitsch, or in the realm of the avant-garde? We can discover this when we apply Greenberg’s philosophy to these works, but the result is not as neat as we might presume it to be.
10
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
This is because of the tension that arises when we try to fit the Landscapes into one of these two categories, because the Landscapes carry with them elements of both abstract art and pop art, both the avant-garde and the kitsch. There is undeniably a kitsch quality to the art, but there are also elements of the avant-garde. The trouble with discerning the Landscapes as kitsch or avant- garde is because the work is itself a weird parody of kitsch, giving it both kitsch and abstract qualities. Let us proceed by exploring this point. First, we shall begin with the kitsch elements. These can easily be seen in the stereotypical Chinese and East Asian symbolism that heavily populates these works. Because kitsch is global it draws on the new global culture of pop images that have resulted from the commercialization of art. We can often see in kitsch a reduction of specific cultural elements of a certain cultural group. These are the stereotypical images that the general population – the masses – has of this group. In the Chinese landscapes there are several pop images of Asian culture; such as: the Chinese architecture, scholar’s rocks, bonsai trees, triangular shaped hats, and simple representations of bamboo shoots and leaves, to name a few. Even the Benday dots, Lichtenstein’s signature technique that achieves the kitsch look, are undeniably representative of everything that is kitsch. The dots are mechanical and numerous, and difficult to be thought of as being a product of hand drawn art. Indeed, all the human elements are replaced with a look that is representative of synthetic machine made versions. Indeed, it is no secret that Lichtenstein invites the notion of kitsch into his work, because he is trying to be kitsch! Regarding these works Lichtenstein himself commented that the Landscapes are “really supposed to look like a printed version” of the Chinese originals, nothing more and nothing less. But for Greenberg, the artist’s intentionality may be irrelevant when discussing their work, so we shall avoid discussing Lichtenstein’s intentionality in his pieces. When contemplating the Landscapes an important question arises: does the fact that Lichtenstein mimics kitsch qualities automatically make his work kitsch? The Landscapes are not the imitation of imitating, but rather the imitation of kitsch. Lichtenstein is after the effect of kitsch, but he is also after producing the effects of the Chinese originals, trying to depict their “pseudo-contemplative” and “mechanical” elements. For Greenberg, these aspects are precisely what makes these works kitsch; however, if these works are indeed truly kitsch than they would produce a quick and easy effect in the viewer, which they do not. So, a tension arises because for Greenberg these works cannot be both kitsch and avant- garde, but as I have shown these works contain both kitsch and avant-garde elements! For one, these works challenge us and challenge our judgment, which, for Greenberg, is a characteristic of the avant-garde, not the kitsch! With the avant-garde the meaning takes time to emerge, but with the kitsch the meaning is almost instantaneous. We have seen that the representations that these works are trying to produce are almost immediate, but it seems that there is also something deeper to be found here; perhaps it is the avant-garde? Does the “Zen-like” purity of these landscapes arise from the quintessential avant-garde feature of these works, their disinterested purity? Do these works really contain the subject-less purity of form which Greenberg states the avant-garde must contain? Let us look for these avant-garde features in Lichtenstein’s landscapes and see the elements of the abstract that they contain. Lichtenstein's work meets many of Greenberg's criteria for being avant-garde, but in many ways it does not. This is the tension that I have spoken of. The idea of purity is very important for Greenberg's definition of the avant-garde. Yet, is it present in the Chinese landscapes? I shall argue that is. The Landscapes have the form of purity because they can be
11
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013 seen as abstract objects in themselves, not just realistic representations of the world. In my descriptions of these pieces I emphasize the aspects of dynamics and simplicity, especially with the heavy use of abstract elements such as thick lines, and the simple circular shape of the Benday dots. These elements are all in the realm of the avant-garde for Greenberg. When we look at these works our eyes are drawn to the canvas – to the medium – and a sensual experience takes place. This sensual experience arises because we can disinterestedly contemplate these works, because the works often seem to be just two-dimensional canvases filled with dots, not representing anything at all. Now, certainly, as one stares at these works the forms of landscapes appear, but the eyes often dance between seeing a flat surface filled with random dots, and a vast representational landscape made up of dots. This aspect is most evident in Landscape with Boat. These flat disinterested aspects all belong to the avant-garde, and definitely not to the kitsch. Now, the Landscapes can be viewed as a kind of avant-garde interpretation of the 'disinterested' and pure Chinese art of the past, expressing purity through the avant-garde aspects I have just discussed. But Greenberg himself has stated that Chinese art of the past contains aspects of the pure and the disinterested that we see in modern abstract art (Greenberg 69, 1959). But, do Lichtenstein’s pieces express this purity accidentally, simply as a consequence of the style and the techniques that he employs? If this is the case then, for Greenberg, the landscapes can't be avant-garde. Also, when trying to define these pieces there are additional worries for Greenberg. Not only do Lichtenstein's pieces embody the avant-garde, they also take it in a new historical direction by incorporating representation, therein violating the avant-garde. So, how can the Landscapes truly be avant-garde if they are at the same time a contradiction of the avant- garde? How can the Landscapes be kitsch and still manage to be abstract and pure? Do the landscapes express purity by being a combination of avant-garde, kitsch, and Chinese elements? To find the avant-garde purity we must look to the negation that so heavily occupies these works. It is through analyzing this negation that we shall see where the avant-garde purity comes from. The central question of this paper so far has been this: how can the Landscapes in the Chinese Style be both kitsch and at the same time be abstract? How exactly do the elements that allow for disinterested contemplation fit with the representational elements? The answer to both of these questions lies in the negative spaces, which in these works are equally as important as the Benday dots. In my previous descriptions of the Landscapes I have briefly touched upon the dualistic quality that emerges when we view these works. We are simultaneously drawn to both the surface of the medium, and to the illusory depth of the landscapes. We see both an “at-onceness” – a unity of form – and also depictions of objects in nature. The disinterested “at-onceness” is the avant-garde, and the depictions of the objects are the kitsch. But, according to Greenberg, depictions of objects cannot show us the disinterested, so where does the disinterested element come from? It comes from the negative spaces in these works. I shall explain how we can prove this, but let us first explore the notion of a negative space. One of the most important and blaringly obvious – but easy to miss – elements of Lichtenstein’s Landscapes are the negative spaces that lie between each Benday dot. What I call negative space is essentially the blankness of the canvas between each dot and line. For nearly all of the Landscapes, except Landscape with Boat, this negative space is white in color. Now, this is because the canvas of these works is white, therefore whiteness surrounds each dot. However, this whiteness, which I shall call negative space, carries with it a unique form and character 12
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
entirely of its own. When the viewer gazes upon each Landscape not only are the dots strikingly obvious, but so is negative space that surrounds each dot. When taking in each work as a whole, one can see a tremendous amount of negative space present. Now, this negative space is easy to miss if the viewer only concentrates on the amalgamation of dots and the representational forms which, as a collective, the Benday dots depict. But, if the viewer instead concentrates on the negative space surrounding the dots instead of the formal landscapes, a collective unity of emptiness arises in each work. Within this emptiness lies the key to understanding how Lichtenstein’s pieces express both the purity of the avant-garde, and the representational objects of the kitsch, simultaneously. Greenberg states that kitsch is deceptive, but the deceptiveness of Lichtenstein’s kitsch Landscapes is deceptive in a different way. It is deceptive because it is both kitsch and representational, and it somehow has the element of purity – pure form seen only in the abstract – that belongs to the world of the avant-garde. However, this purity is hidden because it lies in the negative spaces surrounding the Benday dots. This purity is the form of emptiness that arises from the collective negative space within each canvas, which is only detectable when the canvas is viewed as a whole. The viewer can sense this purity and may not know where it comes if he only pays attention to the form of the landscapes. As the viewer gazes upon these works his eyes take in the elements of form, and the elements of formlessness, simultaneously. This causes the viewer to simultaneously detect both the avant-garde and the kitsch. The viewer consciously pays attention to the form of the landscapes, but he is also subconsciously taking in the formless quality of the negative spaces, thereby opening himself up to a sensual and meta-sensual experience. As I have noted before, the negative spaces in these works have an extremely powerful presence along with the representational forms that are depicted by the Benday dots. The element of negative space is largely a product of the Benday dot technique, but this point is not important. What is important is that this element of negation seems to jump through the canvas, hitting the viewer simultaneously as he sees the representational images of the landscapes. This creates a sensual and a meta-sensual experience for the viewer, but this confuses the viewer because the world of kitsch – which is a world of representational imagery – is not supposed to produce these sensual experiences. When each work is viewed as a whole, the negative spaces that surround the Benday dots in the work create a unified form that presents itself to the viewer. The viewer is aware of both an element of emptiness and an element of form. The element of emptiness that presents itself in these works is actually the pure form of subjectlessness. The emptiness is truly without a subject because there is literally no subject or object present within the emptiness. And so, the pure form of subjectlessness can be said to be present in the negative spaces of these works because the negative spaces embody the pure negation of a subject. Now, because this negative space is so prevalent it presents itself as a unity, an “at once- ness”. The negative space is perceived as a whole when the eyes take in the canvas as a whole, which results in the viewer seeing the collective form of emptiness, instead of the formal features of the landscape. Therefore, the viewer is able to detect both the formal landscapes, and the form of emptiness, simultaneously. This is because the viewer’s eyes dance between focusing on the landscape as a whole and focusing on the individual Benday dots. When the eyes see just the dots they don’t focus on the forms that arise from the pattern of the dots. Instead, they just focus on the dot. However, a consequence of focusing on the dot is that the dot’s immediate surroundings also come into focus. But what surrounds the dots? Sure, it is easy to say “other dots surround each dot” but this is misleading. What is less obvious is that what surrounds each 13
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013 dot is in fact negative space! As we focus on the dots on the surface of the canvas we are in a sense also focusing on the negative space that surrounds each dot. As our eyes dance from focusing on the formal features of the landscapes to focusing on the dots themselves on the surface of the canvas, the negative space that surrounds each dot arises collectively, and the viewer detects the form of emptiness. This collective emptiness hits the viewer as a haze, a blur, and is what causes the paintings to appear to move. But this “haze” that we see is truly nothing at all, because it is made out of nothing but the negative space that surrounds each dot. So, what is it that can be said to be hitting the viewer? Well, it is the pure form of subjectlessness. It is the pure form of emptiness. In Lichtenstein’s Landscapes the pure form of emptiness draws us in to the nature of the medium, allowing us to see the inherent empty nature of the flat canvas. Once we comprehend the nature of the medium, the idea begins to emerge that the subject of the artwork cannot be anything but the medium itself, the physical piece of artwork as a whole. We start to view the medium of the artwork as an object in itself. This appreciation of the canvas as an empty object – i.e. as an object in itself, and not the subject it represents – allows us to contemplate the disinterested nature of the object, causing us to see the purity of the object. Now, recall that Greenberg claims that purity arises only from abstract art because abstract art allows the viewer to gaze upon it disinterestedly. But, as we have seen, Lichtenstein’s kitsch representations of Chinese landscapes contradict Greenberg’s claim, for they also depict the purity that is inherent in the abstract. This causes the artwork to take on a dual nature. Each Lichtenstein Landscape displays two forms; the form of emptiness that is the avant-garde, and the form of representation that is the kitsch. This is why when applying Greenberg’s framework to the Landscapes in the Chinese Style a tension emerges, because when viewing these works the form of the avant-garde and the form of the kitsch emerge simultaneously to the viewer. Lichtenstein’s kitsch works have merged with the abstract and achieve the impossible by also depicting purity. However, Greenberg might contest this claim by stating that the avant- garde purity that is represented through each work’s collective negative space is really just an accidental quality of the Benday dots, and as such is not truly avant-garde. To make this claim is to say that in drawing the Benday dots the blankness that surrounds each dot is accidental. However, it would be a fallacy for Greenberg to make such a claim, for in drawing and positioning one Benday dot amongst other Benday dots, Lichtenstein is inviting the negative space into the artwork. It is as if Lichtenstein draws the negative space that surrounds each Benday dot without actually drawing anything at all. Greenberg might also state that the abstract purity that results from these works is not always present, therefore they can’t be avant-garde. For instance, the viewer can choose to focus on the negation – therein seeing the element of pure subject-less form – or, the viewer can choose to focus on the formal depictions. However, just because the eyes dance between the pure form of emptiness and the representational imagery does not mean that these elements aren’t always present. Furthermore, that the eyes dance when viewing these works represents an inherent quality of the artwork. The fact that the eyes dance is a cause of the artwork itself. This dance is a new and unique visual experience, therein elevating the Landscapes to the world of the avant-garde. The Landscapes move beyond traditional abstract and traditional kitsch works and present a visual experience unique in itself, moving art as a whole forward. Lichtenstein’s pieces produce a new sensual and meta-sensual experience, so, for Greenberg, they must be avant- garde.
14
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
As we have seen, in trying to figure out the nature of the tension in Lichtenstein’s work, which results from the confusion of whether or not the work is avant-garde or kitsch, we have detected a hidden element at work. This hidden element is the empty subject-less form that arises from the empty spaces in these works. This pure form creates both the sensual and the meta- sensual experience the viewer gets, even though they are clearly looking at a kitsch art work. Because of the heavy use of negative space in Lichtenstein’s work the disinterested abstract pure form of the artwork is expressed and it becomes both avant-garde and kitsch at the same time. In conclusion, we have seen how Lichtenstein’s paintings carry with them a tension for Greenberg because they contain elements of both the abstract and the kitsch. I have elucidated the fact that the key element of the abstract – the avant-garde purity – is deceptively hidden within the elements of ‘emptiness’ – i.e., those elements that express the absence of a subject – amongst Lichtenstein’s kitsch depictions of Chinese landscapes. Therefore, the Landscapes belong to both the world of the avant-garde, and the world of kitsch, simultaneously. We detect this dual nature, which for Greenberg is not supposed to be there, but it is there nonetheless. Now that we have thoroughly examined Lichtenstein’s Landscapes we can understand why a tension is present for Greenberg when trying to define these works as either avant-garde or kitsch. While Greenberg’s conceptions of the avant-garde and the kitsch are still no doubt valuable, Lichtenstein’s Landscapes in the Chinese Style point out a major weakness in Greenberg’s theory.
15
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Works Cited Gagosian Gallery Press Release, Roy Lichtenstein: Landscapes in the Chinese Style 26 Apr. 2012 < http://www.gagosian.com/exhibitions/roy-lichtenstein--march-01-2012>. Greenberg, Clement. "Avant-Garde and Kitsch." Uthink: Blogs at the University of Minnesota. University of Minnesota, 21 April 2005. Web. 15 February 2013.
16
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Merits and Pitfalls: A Commentary Ting Yih City University of New York – LaGuardia Community College
In Joshua Liveris’ inventive article, Emptiness in Art: The Deceptively Hidden Nature of Lichtenstein’s Kitsch, a proposition is made at the beginning: “Philosophy is a tool” to help us “understand works of art,” and with this tool, “we can understand the merits and pitfalls of a philosophical approach to art.” (Liveris) He focuses on paintings by Roy Lichtenstein from an exhibition held recently in a prominent Chelsea art gallery and attempts to makes sense of an apparent contradiction in Lichtenstein’s work: Can a painting produced in and for the world of high-art culture embody both the avant-garde and the kitsch? The simple answer is: yes. The schism between high and low art was blurred a while ago. But, the more difficult and interesting problem that this nascent paper brings up is what I would like to discuss here. Liveris’ begins with a painting series titled, Landscape in the Chinese Style by Lichtenstein, to which he attempts to apply the theory of the avant-garde, argued by the mid- Twentieth century New York art critic Clement Greenberg, who is known for his persuasive but ultimately reductive and essentialist views on painting. In The Crisis of Easel Painting written in 1948, Greenberg posits that modernist painting has evolved from the “box-like cavity” of “three- dimensional semblances” to the advanced work of Jackson Pollack which, due in part to the scale of the canvas and the physicality of the swirl of paint, forefronts the flatness and anti-illusionary presence of pictorial space. Instead of the foreground and background of conventional painting, we are confronted by an “over-all”2 display of gestures, which decentralizes the picture and arguably decenters us, the viewers. His opinions influenced generations of American painters and art critics, starting with the New York School in the 40’s and 50’s, to their progeny in the 60’s and finally the Color Field painters of 60’s and 70’s. Some could also make the case that his ideas culminated with the infamous “death of painting” discussion of the late 80’s. With our modernist proclivity for progress and culture advancement, fostered by our overwhelming consumer culture, we forget that the trajectory of this “essentialist” attitude toward art had began much earlier, and that Greenberg really was just an expeditor, and perhaps was given too much credit for a larger debate of historicism. Liveris highlights the significance of Greenberg’s valuation of abstract painting, its self- referential nature that “presents purity” and is “to be appreciated as an artistic object in and of itself” (Liveris). This is consistent with a broader historical notion of the “avant-garde” (or “advanced guard,” or “vanguard”: the militant connotation noted), not necessarily in terms of “purity” per se, but in its opposition to “kitsch” (objects of poor taste, sometimes appreciated ironically, but in the earlier Twentieth Century, the term referred to popular culture in general) as argued by Greenberg in his seminal 1939 essay The Avant-Garde and Kitsch. Abstract painting, at least through most of its history, has been associated with high-culture in that it takes certain degrees of art acculturation to appreciate them. But nowadays, even the “avant-garde” has become academic, and we find abstract paintings in hotel lobbies and pre-framed copies of them are available at Ikea. Hence, Lichtenstein’s Landscape in the Chinese Style consists of both “pop” culture and “high-art” culture is not contradictory: it is in fact representative of our time. The art world is the acme instance of the consumer culture at large.
2 Clement Greenberg, Art and Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p.156. 17
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
With this notion of the “in and of itself” of abstract painting, Liveris also makes a connection to the concept of “disinterested”, which we attribute to Kant in his analysis of judgment of taste and the beautiful in the Critique of Judgment. There, Kant systematically lays out the important thesis that our judgment of taste in determining what is beautiful is devoid of interest. “In order to play the judge in matters of taste, we must not be in the least biased in favor of the thing’s existence but must be wholly indifferent about it.”3 In other words, when it comes to deciding whether something is beautiful or not, our perception of this object, by the nature of this perception, derives this judgment only on its own basis. If interests exist beyond the aesthetic pleasure itself (such as if one decides to want to posses the object, or if one’s liking for the object is influenced by its monetary value), it no longer is a purely aesthetic experience: it has transgressed into the realm of the ethical or the economic. Kant’s formulation might seem restrictive at this point. That is to say: why can’t ethics, or economics for that matter, also be beautiful? Kant’s conception of the “disinterested” is without question a remarkable model for understanding aesthetic experience, but like any theory, improvement surely can be made. For our purpose, it would be instructive to point out that this “disinterested” judgment as formulated by Kant is not limited to abstract painting, as Liveris seems to imply, at least as applied to Greenberg. Furthermore, Greenberg’s claim for the essentialism of abstract paintings could be understood better if we utilize the Platonic model rather than Kantian. In Book X of the Republic, Socrates argued that because painting is a “mimetic art”, an “imitation of reality”, therefore it is “far removed from truth”.4 But if abstract painting does not present anything but itself, it therefore expresses only its own reality, its own truth, and is not a copy of something else. Plato’s notion of Pure Form as the first order of truth from which everything else is just mere semblance can only be located in the ideal city (or in your mind) where philosophers would be kings, and artists need not apply. Is it conceivable then that abstract painters might have a chance to get in? In that realm where the soul is immortal, philosophers trade wisdom with one another, and abstract paintings are freed from the restriction of subject matter like the soul is liberated from the chains of the body. Can art for art’s sake have a place in that absolute order in the city of Pure Form? The idea of “disinterestedness” also has an indirect correlation to a classic philosophical concept in India. In Bhagavad-Gita, Krishna tells Arjuna that “The truly admirable man controls his senses by the power of his will. All his actions are disinterested. All are directed along the path to union with Brahman.”5 Here we turn to Liveris final argument, namely that the answer to resolving the contradiction within Lichtenstein’s painting is to approach the artwork as a visual metaphor for the Buddhist conception of emptiness. Difficulties arise quickly in view of our discussion above: are we violating the aesthetic realm again by applying a deeply profound concept on the nature of existence to a problem of pictorial representation? Liveris suggests that the reason why Greenberg’s theory of the avant-garde and kitsch runs into a problem with Lichtenstein’s work is because we did not see the abstraction in those paintings: the answer is there all along, and we need to zoom in and get a closer look. Beneath or in between the representation of landscapes lies the emptiness. It is a bit literal, which may contradict Liveris’ metaphor, but when painters discuss the ground of painting, i.e., the blank canvas, it is empty: a tabula rasa. Whatever colors, shapes and forms we apply to the ground of the canvas, the
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1987), p. 205. 4 Plato, The Collected Dialogues (Princeton; NJ: Princeton University, 1961), p. 823. 5 Anonymous, Bhagavad-Gita (New York; NY: Signet Classics, 2002), p. 52. 18
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
“emptiness” of the ground is literally, physically still there, always. This explanation might be clearer if we refer to watercolor paintings, or even more apropos, the Chinese landscape ink paintings which Lichtenstein started us off with, where the whiteness of the paper signifies something more than just the paper: the water, the fog or mist, the space, the reflection of light. This is what Liveris wants to say about emptiness. For the Buddhist, “form does not differ from emptiness; emptiness does not differ from form. That which is form is emptiness, that which is emptiness is form.”6 They are interdependent of each other. “Understanding the non-inherent existence of things means seeing the reality [i.e., emptiness] which eliminates ignorance about the reality of things.” And “By seeing these internal and external phenomena arising from causes and conditions they will eliminate the whole network of wrong views. With the elimination of wrong views they will have abandoned attachment, closed mindedness and hatred and thereby attain nirvana unstained by wrong views.”7 The force of this reasoning when applied to psychology and ethics is truly without equal, at least to this commentator. But it should be apparent to us also that we are really mixing it up here. On the one hand, we want to resolve a contextual problem in a group of paintings made by a Twentieth Century New York artist that mimics traditional Chinese art. On the other hand, we are using a non-aesthetic concept taken from the Indian antiquity to decipher an aesthetic related problem that is framed by a dated argument from an ornery art critic. No wonder we are vexed. Turning the question back to the proposition that Liveris begun with: how is philosophy working out as a tool to help us understand works of art? In Liveris’ original and thought provoking paper, I find there is much to be merited as well as pitfalls to be watchful of.
6 Mu Soeng, Heart of the Universe: Exploring the Heart Sutra (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2010), p. 7. 7 David Ross Komito, Nagarjuna’s “Seventy Stanzas”: A Buddhist Psychology of Emptiness (Ithaca; NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1987), p. 95. 19
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Works Cited Anonymous. Bhagavad-Gita (New York; NY: Signet Classics, 2002), p. 52. Greenberg, Clement. Art and Culture (Boston; MA: Beacon Press, 1961), p.156. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1987), p. 205. Komito, David Ross. Nagarjuna’s “Seventy Stanzas”: A Buddhist Psychology of Emptiness (Ithaca; NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1987), p. 95. Plato. The Collected Dialogues (Princeton; NJ: Princeton University, 1961), p. 823. Soeng, Mu. Heart of the Universe: Exploring the Heart Sutra (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2010), p. 7.
20
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
The Determinist Paradox Gregory Smith Sarah Lawrence College
Philosophers and psychologists alike have questioned the notion of free will and its antithesis determinism. There is a general consensus that free will means the ability to make choices independent of genetic and environmental factors. In other words the individual is the cause or author of their decisions. For the sake of this paper, whenever free will is mentioned this is the intended meaning. This implies alternative possibilities could result from the current state of affairs. For example, Sandra is shopping at her local grocery store traversing the aisle contemplating which pasta sauce to purchase. There are several options available to her and according to theory of free will we are unable to predict whether she will choose Ragu or Prego because her decision consists of an unknown variable (her free will). Because her individual will is independent of traceable forces, namely biological and social, what Sandra chooses is only decided the moment she makes up her mind. Before moving forward let’s define determinism and examine the last scenario from its respective lens. By definition determinism claims all human actions are the result of genetic and environmental forces, and if all active forces were known behavior could be predicted. Thus, according to determinism although Sandra has numerous pasta sauces available to her at the store buying Prego is the only possible outcome. If we were omniscient beings we would be able to predict with certainty which pasta sauce Sandra would choose based on knowing all the variables in the given situation. Without hesitation most people would immediately defend the free will doctrine because they believe it accurately depicts their daily life. Every day all of us make choices that we deliberate over; we formulate a cost/benefit analysis and act according to the results. Due to its restrictive view of human agency most people feel threatened by the consequences of the determinist framework and reject it as false. However, when examining arguments of determinist proponents such as William Baum, B.F. Skinner, and Teleological Behaviorists Howard Rauch and Marvin Frankel, the experimental studies of Andrew Quinn and Barry Schlenker as well as examining Alain de Botton’s Status Anxiety, the consequences are not as dark as may be initially perceived. Ironically, by assigning responsibility to environmental and genetic factors instead of the individual a more accepting and sympathetic world unfolds. Paradoxically, it allows individuals to create new outcomes for their lives. This paper will discuss in depth the free will/determinism debate as well as the social and psychological implications of the determinism. The Free Will Debate Within Howard Kirschenbaum’s book Carl Roger’s Dialogues, a script of the discussion between B.F. Skinner and Carl Rogers highlights elements of the free will debate. B.F. Skinner is popularly known as one of the leaders of the Behaviorist movement in psychology. Behaviorism is an exclusively observable behavior based science which has no regard for mental concepts. Carl Rogers is another influential psychologist, but one who greatly differs from Skinner due to his methodology. Rogers was one of the founders of the Humanist school of psychology which emphasized human creativity and free will. Right from the beginning the positions of the two combatants is known, Rogers for free will and Skinner for determinism. 21
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Rogers leads off mentioning the rise of existentialism and stating the importance of living subjectively. He quotes Viktor Frankl, a holocaust survivor, “Everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms, to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s way”(84). Throughout the debate Rogers consistently refers to the “inner life” as the source of freedom and elevates it with the utmost importance, but how well do we really know subjective events? The problem with speaking about subjective feelings and experiences in an objective manner is the lack of a shared understanding amongst individuals. Skinner makes precisely this point, “I can’t say (to a child) ‘Now there, you see, that’s diffidence, and this is embarrassment.’ I may guess correctly that he’s feeling diffident ad use the word diffident, and he may then use it, but is it the way I use it? It is very difficult to set up any common vocabulary for the description of inner events”(101). What Skinner is trying to do with this statement is invalidate subjective experience as a sound base for knowledge. Methodologically speaking, Skinner is admittedly a positivist, or one who believes empirical evidence is the only proper route to establishing knowledge. He is attempting to prove that relying on internal processes as the causal explanation for action is epistemologically problematic because of the gross uncertainty with mental events. He cites Sigmund Freud to strengthen his point:
Freud, I think, showed clearly the kinds of variables which influence conscious behavior can also be proved to have been responsible for unconscious behavior. He freed the causal nature of experience from the need for observation. That is, what happens to you will affect your behavior whether you know it or not (102). This is a strong point for determinism because it undermines the causal relationship between conscious decision making and action which free will supporters purport. If all human actions are responses to stimuli than the only difference is sometimes they are aware of it and sometimes they are not. This leads to another objection determinists make regarding the epistemology of free will. A fellow Behaviorist, William Baum, is also a proponent of determinism who exploits an epistemological weakness of the theory of free will. The example Baum uses in his book, Understanding Behaviorism, compares faulty wiring causing a house fire and a young man named Tom setting a fire. The wiring may be said to cause the fire due to extenuating circumstances such as prolonged friction with other objects, but Tom himself would normally be blamed. However, to blame Tom for the fire only makes sense if he had a choice to perform a different action (free will). The point Baum wants to make is there is no real difference between the wiring and Tom. We think they are different because we have an explanation as to why the wiring became dysfunctional but no sufficient explanation for Tom. Baum writes, “The more we learn about the reasons for Tom’s setting the fire the less we say he chose freely. Say he was abused as a child or he is a pyromaniac. We begin to think of him as faulty in much the same way as the wiring, and we say he couldn’t help it”(166). We attribute agency to Tom because we are unaware of the causes of his behavior. A similar reaction may be provoked when we observe technologically advanced machines. Recently, due to developments in artificial intelligence, robotics engineers have created machines which display observable behavioral patterns that mimic human beings. Upon first glance it is surprising to see a human like machine capable of interacting with the immediate environment and making decisions accordingly. However, we are quick to claim it is only a mechanical device void of moral agency. We are able to make this 22
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
statement because of our comprehensive knowledge of the raw materials, operating software, etc. that went into the creation of the robot. What Baum and other determinists are stating is if we possessed equal knowledge of the inputs of human beings we would cite the causes of action to the responsible component (genetic or environmental) instead of the person themselves. Skinner reinforces this idea in his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity: “The issue is again visibility of control. As environmental contingencies become harder to see, the goodness of autonomous man becomes more apparent”(67). This poses a huge threat to free will defenders because actions are being increasingly explained away as products of biological and sociological forces as science continues to unfold the human being through empirical findings.
Responsibility and Punishment Some important elements of the free will/determinist argument are the concepts of responsibility and punishment. Under the framework of free will, since the individual is the cause of their actions and are capable of choosing from an alternative set of decisions, the individual therefore should be held responsible for their actions. This is exactly how the judicial system operates all over the world. If a person commits an illegal offense they are proven guilty and are punished for retributive reasons. Because John did something wrong he should be held responsible for his actions and punished accordingly. However, the notion of responsibility is very different viewed through the lens of determinism. If John is simply an amalgam of biological and environmental elements than it is unjust to punish him. Because he is incapable of producing actions independent of these controls punishing John for being John doesn’t make any sense. John is only guilty of inheriting flawed sociological and genetic conditions which led him to committing an offense. Assigning responsibility only makes sense if free will is involved. Marvin Frankel gives an example to illustrate this point: “We do not blame a rabid dog for having rabies even though rabid dogs are prone to attack others and with a bite kill them. Instead, we capture them and mercifully not vengefully euthanize them.”(class notes)? The point being we ought to be sympathetic to those who commit crimes because it is not the person who is evil but the conditions under which the person evolved. The determinist is not interested in punishment for retributive reasons, but rather to impose consequences that deter the person from engaging in additional bad behaviors. Punishment doesn’t always produce the consequences it intends to do though as Skinner points out: “A person who has been punished is not thereby simply less inclined to behave in a given way; at best, he learns how to avoid punishment”(81). Skinner and Frankel are challenging the way our culture treats its law breakers. Paying greater attention to long term contingencies and environmental/genetic controls over behavior both Behaviorists think it better to rehabilitate the person rather than punish him/her.
Is Responsibility Necessary For Moral Action? An important distinction that arises between determinists and free will theorists is the role of responsibility and its function in daily life. Many free will supporters defend their position espousing accountability for your actions as desirable because it elicits positive change. The empowerment an individual experiences once they believe they are the sole author of their fate leads to a more meaningful life. As one of the leading champions of free will, Jean Paul Sartre, 23
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013 once said, “To be completely free is to be completely responsible.” Carl Rogers doesn’t explicitly state a necessary link between responsibility and moral action, but he does declare responsibility to be a preferable consequence of therapy: “This is the experience of the client as he moves in therapy toward an acceptance of the realities of the world outside and inside himself and moves, too, toward becoming a responsible agent in this real world”(85). To be held responsible for one’s actions as the impetus for moral change leads to attitudes of praise and blame. It is on these grounds that Teleological Behaviorist Marvin Frankel denounces responsibility for two reasons:
1) Human beings are not deterred from engaging in immoral behavior due to fear of consequent feelings of shame which arise from irresponsibility.
2) A praiseful and blameful attitude does not lead to a better life. Here is an example Frankel uses to illustrate the first reason: As you are rushing down the stairs in the subway you are slowed down by an old lady walking in front of you. Does the concept of responsibility prevent you from pushing the old woman over to catch your train? Frankel doesn’t think so, “You do not hesitate to knock the woman over because you are in a rush out of a sense of responsibility or subsequent guilt feelings but because you are not even tempted to be part of a world in which such things are done”(email). On a deep level we understand that shoving elderly people is morally reprehensible and in this scenario the serious consideration to hurt a vulnerable person for self-gain never crosses our mind. The same principle follows in another example given by Frankel: “If a man were to tell his date that while he wants desperately to rape her, but he won’t because he has a strong sense of responsibility, would the woman be reassured or terrified? The woman would be terrified because responsibility should not inhibit rape but instead the knowledge that such an act is disgusting”(email). A potential counter free will advocates may respond with, regarding the previous examples provided by Frankel, could claim the examples given exclusively involve violent behavior. What about non-violent offenses such as theft and tax evasion? These crimes are not as extreme as rape or elderly abuse, but most would agree they count as immoral behavior. Does the knowledge of these acts being immoral restrain us from performing them? It doesn’t seem likely given the high rates at which they occur. Either the agents who engage in such activity know they are behaving immorally and do it anyway or they do not believe what they are doing is wrong. For the second reason Frankel provides another example: A young child receives much pleasure from solving math problems. The young child happily spends hours and hours a day wrestling with mathematical equations. However, when the young child discovers his sister is able to solve the same problems in half the time and receives better marks for her work he decides he is not good at math. The loss of interest in math for the young child is fueled by the attitude of praise/blame. “Praise and blame are the cause of diminution of interest. You may enjoy doing math but if you figure out others are better at it one may lose interest in the subject altogether”(Class Notes). The point here is once a person’s motivation becomes driven by external rewards (praise) the intrinsic enjoyment of the task becomes lost.
24
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
B.F. Skinner makes a point similar to this in his dialogue with Rogers, “As to the student who wants to learn more about art, you say it’s all right to use programmed instruction to teach the student what he wants to know. But I want to teach him to want to know more about art, and I believe it can be done”(102-103). Perhaps cultivating an attitude which no longer seeks the ex post facto rewards of performing tasks, which Frankel proposes, is in line with Skinner’s aspiration. To learn about math for math’s sake or art for art’s sake is to value the respective field intrinsically and could possibly yield a greater desire to learn more. Does Belief in Free Will Lead to Moral Behavior? Within the past five years research psychologists have undertaken experimental methods to determine the implications of believing in free will, as well as confronting accountability. In 2008 Kathleen Vohs and Jonathon Schooler conducted an experiment which involved either strengthening or weakening the subject’s belief in free will and taking an arithmetic test afterwards to see any correlation between a belief in determinism and immoral behavior. Each subject had an equal opportunity to cheat on the exam as they were told about a computer glitch that enabled them to view the correct answer before selecting their own. However, the participants were explicitly instructed to choose their own answer. Vohs and Schooler hypothesized subjects exposed to determinist literature would be more likely to cheat than those exposed to arguments supporting free will. They state their results, “As expected, we found a strong negative relationship… such that weaker endorsement of the notion that personal behavior is determined by one’s own will was associated with more instances of cheating”(50). The results of this experiment suggest, much to the chagrin of determinists, the practical value of believing in free will and therefore being held responsible for your actions. This empirical conclusion also offers evidence that having a sense of responsibility leads to moral behavior which challenges the view that a praiseless/blameless is socially desirable. Despite the strength of this empirical evidence, it should be kept in mind it only reflects the findings of a single experiment. In fact, other psychologists have discovered accountability, implies responsibility, to be associated with negative social implications. Problems of Accountability Andrew Quinn and Barry Schlenker performed an experiment which tested individual accountability and decision making. Subjects were presented with a sheet of paper which listed everyday situations and were asked about the decisions they would make in each setting. In one group the subjects were told they would be held accountable for their decisions and in another they were not. Some of the scenarios included the participant acting as the C.E.O. of a private company, thus the decisions he/she makes have massive consequences. The results of the experiment found that accountability was only a favorable condition to effective decision making when it was combined with a goal to be accurate. Quinn and Schlenker elaborate, “Accountability thus can boost motivation and performance, but the conditions under which it does so are limited. In fact, these limits suggest that accountability often does not have a beneficial impact on decision making”(473). Furthermore, Quinn and Schlenker discovered individual decision making is heavily influenced by peer preference. They discuss their findings, “If the audience’s prior preferences are known, people generally conform to that opinion, thereby gaining the favor of the audience and avoiding the extra cognitive effort of analyzing in detail the relevant information”(473). If an individual is held accountable for their decisions these conclusions suggest people would 25
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013 rather conform to the group and be viewed in a positive light than to stand alone and offer an independent analysis. This discovery is particularly troubling because the political democracy we live in needs free speech and diversity of opinion in order to thrive. Another worrisome conclusion of the study on accountability is the self-justification that it produces:
People will justify their prior choices to make them appear to be more desirable than the evidence might otherwise indicate. For example, when their prior decisions appear to produce poor outcomes, people who are accountable will continue to justify those decisions by rating them as more attractive and by committing more resources to them than people who are not accountable (473). Because free will advocates emphasize the importance of responsibility in moral behavior and living a meaningful life the research performed by Quinn and Schlenker severely undermine their assumptions. Being held accountable for decisions does not always lead to effective decision making and may lead to conformity. This evidence poses greater problems for free will libertarians who believe human actions can always be independent of external factors. Additionally, these findings allude to an instinctual “affiliative need” in human beings. That is, the need to be accepted and to be a part of the group. The importance of how we are viewed in society is central to how we view ourselves. Self-Blame & Low Self-Esteem: A Product of Society Which Values Free Will In his book, Status Anxiety, Alain de Botton shows how the existing culture, built upon meritocratic principles, leads to feelings of inadequacy and self-blame. Botton writes how important public opinion is, “The attention of others matter to us because we are afflicted by a congenital uncertainty as to our own value, as a result of which affliction we tend to allow others’ appraisals to play a determining role in how we see ourselves”(8). Due to this “congenital uncertainty” of our value, Botton theorizes we are heavily motivated to occupy a place in society that will secure for us love and praise. In a meritocracy an individual is situated within society based upon their ability and talent instead of family name. A belief suddenly arose that the position you hold is reflective to how important or valuable you are. If everyone is given a fair shot to succeed, those who inhabit the lowest economic rung in society have only themselves to blame. Botton puts it beautifully, “To the injury of poverty, a meritocratic system now added the insult of shame”(71). In today’s American culture that places great value on material wealth and equates it to self-worth a pervasive sense of low self-esteem has evolved. Self-blame, which leads to low self-esteem, however is only logically consistent under the free will doctrine due to the emphasis on responsibility for one’s actions. Self-blame, just like responsibility, doesn’t make much sense according to determinism. On what rational grounds can one blame themselves for their inherited genes and environment? What is even more troubling than a population who blames themselves for being the black sheep of society are the psychological consequences. Self-blame is insidious because if inhibits the person from giving and experiencing love. Blaming oneself for failures, past mistakes, etc. leads to a depreciated sense of self-worth, or self-esteem. Especially growing up in a meritocratic society, where the praise you receive is contingent upon your achievements, love is difficult to accept. Frankel elaborates further, “We reject unconditional love because we feel we need to earn love. We feel we are not worthy of it because we did nothing worthy to receive it”(class notes). This mode of being is detrimental to sustainable happiness because if we believe we need to accomplish goals in order to receive love,
26
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
we will never experience unconditional love. Self-blame and the meritocratic society create obstacles to a happier life, but is it possible it may lead to a more immoral one as well? Elliot Aronson, a social psychologist and proponent of cognitive dissonance theory, explains the connection between self-esteem and moral behavior. To begin, cognitive dissonance may be described as the tension a person feels when two contradicting cognitions are held simultaneously. Thus, a person would have great cognitive dissonance if they performed an immoral act but believed they were a good person. However, if a person views themselves in a demeaning light the same immoral action would not produce much cognitive dissonance. Aronson explains further, “In short, people who believe themselves to be schlunks expect to do schlunky things. In other words, people with low self-esteem will not find it terribly difficult to commit immoral acts-because committing immoral acts is not dissonant with their self- concept”(187). This is highly relevant to Botton’s conclusion that the culture we live in breeds low self-esteem because if cognitive dissonance theory is true we are condemned to an eroding moral society. It appears there is a vicious cycle of low self-esteem and immoral behavior which is fueled by self-blame occurring. How can this problem be corrected?
The Praise-less/Blameless Attitude Earlier this essay reported the Vohs and Schooler experiment which concluded that a belief in free will led to moral behavior. The results of this experiment pose a challenge to determinists and proponents of a praiseless/blameless attitude. However, I will argue present day society, displayed by Botton in Status Anxiety, presents a greater problem to free will supporters. B.F. Skinner once said, “A culture is the experimental space used in the study of behavior.” Thus, modern American culture filled with historical, social, and institutional underpinnings, which are void from Vohs and Schooler’s experiment, are much more profound evidence of the ills of free will ideology. To live in a meritocratic democracy may be preferable over a totalitarian dictatorship, but the indirect consequences of “status anxiety” have created great social cancers. As Aronson reports low self-esteem is more likely followed by immoral behavior which threatens further moral devolution of our culture. Is there a way to break this vicious cycle? Marvin Frankel has suggested an attitude absent of praise and blame will lead to a happier existence. The cultivation of this attitude seems impossible if one believes in free will due to assigning credit solely to the individual for his/her actions. Under determinism the individual must attribute any action to genetic and environmental forces, and therefore is unable to accept blame or praise. The elimination of self-blame opens the door to receiving and giving unconditional love which serves as a basis for high self-esteem and according to Aronson moral behavior. The elimination of self-pride allows for a “we-centered ego” or enables the individual to place the needs of the group before him or herself. The praiseless/blameless attitude, in theory, leads to a qualitatively better culture which appears to maximize happiness for all individuals. Frankel cites B.F. Skinner as the embodiment of the praiseless/blameless attitude in his writing Individualism and Group Membership: The Seminar Experience:
“I am not a creator. I am not an initiator. I am a locus in which a lot of lucky accidents have come together to make me productive… I’ve enjoyed my work. It has been accepted by enough people to make me think it will go on. That’s enough, I think, for you don’t need to feel you did it yourself. It was done through you and you were lucky enough to be the one who executed it because of the forces acting upon you”(46-47).
27
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Why Are Most People Deterred From Believing Determinism? Many people are driven away from determinism because they understand it to mean having no control over their lives. I too shared this common misunderstanding when I first encountered the determinist notion. I thought, “If all human actions are governed by forces outside of my control then what is the purpose of living?” Continuing, “Life is meaningless if the future is predetermined.” In short, life doesn’t make sense if human beings are equal to conscious automatons that regularly spend a great deal of time and energy making decisions they believe positively impact them. Why would human beings have the ability to be self-aware and reflect over past choices if these properties were of no use? The heavily influenced Judeo-Christian Western world where political and religious institutions preach the indomitable will of man stand in complete opposition to determinism. The existing cultural hegemony in America glorifies the individual born into poverty and is able to “pick himself up from his bootstraps” and by his own hard work and determination is able to achieve wealth and prosperity. Children are taught from religious institutions the moral worth of their actions will be weighed by God and thus breaking free from the bondage of sin is the only path to eternal life. Clearly the determinist ideology is faced with hundreds of years of free will indoctrination that is deeply ingrained into Western culture. There will undoubtedly be protests against the view which contradicts the beliefs a country was built upon. Interestingly, B.F. Skinner adds another point to the determinist argument that may convince free will defenders. He claims that although we are controlled by genes and social forces it doesn’t mean we have no control at all over our lives: “Assuming man is completely controlled by genetic and environment, this does not mean that he cannot control his destiny…Man has altered genetic and environmental factors since the dawn of civilization”(146). This is a new twist to the long time debate that portrays determinism in a more favorable light. Numerous free will advocates shun determinist doctrine because of the social and psychological implications that result, but as this paper demonstrates belief in determinism can actually produce a meaningful life and rich society. Conclusion This essay has presented the free will/determinist debate and viewed the social and psychological implications of each theory. Free will states the individual is the cause of their actions and therefore should be held responsible. Western society today reflects this ideology in its educational, religious, and legal practices. The notion of a meritocracy also implies free will and allows equal opportunities for all parties to achieve their dreams. However, the prevailing culture stemming from free will beliefs has led to increasing incidences of individual depression and low self-esteem. Determinists argue that human being’s actions are causally determined by genetic and environmental forces which may be predicted and controlled. Thus, individual accountability is devalued. Because free will theorists claim something immaterial to be the source of human action science will never prove or disprove their claim. To settle the dispute between the two camps one may argue the practical benefits as reason enough to believe in determinism or free will. This essay has cited an experiment which establishes a belief in free will to be associated with moral behavior. However, much confusion shrouds determinism and many believe it leads to nihilism. Hopefully with the arguments by B.F. Skinner, Marvin Frankel, Alain de Botton, and
28
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
William Baum were sufficient to unmask another side of determinism which paradoxically gives hope for the betterment of tomorrow. To rid oneself of self-blame and praise means to open one’s heart to others and nullify our self-obsession which has been cultivated by American culture. Belief in free will works for those who have achieved their goals and aspirations, but is it really better to blame those who have faltered along the way?
29
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Works Cited
Aronson, Elliot. The Social Animal, Boston: Worth Publishers. 2011. Print. Baum, William. Understanding Behaviorism, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 1994. Print. Botton, Alain de. Status Anxiety, New York: Vintage Books. 2004. Print. Frankel, Marvin. Individualism/Group Membership: The Seminar Experience. Fall, 2012. Print. Henderson, Valerie Land & Howard Kirshenbaum. Carl Rogers: Dialogues, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1989. Print Quinn, Andrew & Barry Schlenker.“Can Accountability Produce Independence? Goals as Determinants of the Impact of Accountability on Conformity”. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin. April 2002: 472-483. My.slc.edu. Web. Oct. 2012. Skinner, B.F. Beyond Freedom & Dignity. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1971. Print. Vohs, Kathleen & Jonathan Schooler. “The Value of Believing in Free Will: Encouraging a Belief in Determinism Increases Cheating.” Psychological Science, Jan. 2008 Vol. 19
Issue 1: 49-54. Academic Search Complete. Web. Dec. 2012.
30
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Musings: A Commentary Rosemary Jill Schaeffer City University of New York - LaGuardia Community College
I was privileged to work with Greg Smith on his paper concerning the debate on free will versus determinism. As I understood what Greg presented, he tried to convince his readers that belief in free will actually resulted in behavior that was perhaps less ethical or selfless than a deterministic view. A telling issue for Greg concerned education: According to the work of behaviorist, B. F. Skinner, a deterministic model could make it possible for a person to be more highly motivated to learn a subject because he or she really liked it, over and against a position of free will, which might force a person to learn a subject only because of the attendant rewards: higher grades, trumping over his or her classmates, a successful job or career.
None of these rewards took other people’s needs or interests into account, including the student’s own need to want to learn a subject for its own sake. It seemed to me that by taking a determinist position, a student or teacher actually eliminated a programmed understanding of learning that resulted in a carrot and stick approach to education: learn – get a reward; don’t learn, get a slap on the wrist or be punished. Taking a deterministic view then actually produces greater freedom than the belief in free will.
We certainly have to think about that. It’s true that students, for the most part, are motivated to succeed rather than to learn. Good grades lead to good jobs. But do they? Good marks on tests are supposed to indicate that students actually learn something about the subject covered by the tests, but do they? Aren’t we all, teachers and students alike “programmed” to think that way? Has that belief been tested? Moreover, has the meaning of determinism automatically been construed to produce immoral behavior while a belief in free will actually turned out to be the real culprit? To make things worse, the question of free will or determinism might just be the wrong question for our time. It might not yield clarity but confusion.
Inspired by Greg Smith’s paper, I gave my students in Critical Thinking the following homework assignment : “When does a Human Being start becoming a Machine, and when does a Machine start becoming a Human Being?” This question is a take off on the old problem of identity: How many new boards have to replace the old boards of the Good Ship Lollipop before the ship is no longer the Good Ship Lollipop? Or, how many hairs must be plucked from someone’s head before they can be called “bald?” As students and I reviewed this assignment, our initial responses took the same well marked trail of distinctions and differences between human and machine, among which appeared: “Human Beings have free will, that is, enjoy autonomy, while machines are programmed, which is to say that their outcomes are pre- determined.” However, the deeper we delved into that particular statement’s validity, the muddier the track became until we were sloshing around in uneasy quagmire of questions rather than intoning glib and programmed answers. Students began to compare and contrast what is necessary and sufficient to be either a machine and/or human.
They concluded that powering up both humans and machines were a necessary condition of being functioning or alive. A machine needs a constant source of electricity flowing through wires, while a human needs a constant source of nutrients carried by blood flowing through veins and arteries through the organism. The concept of free will seems to be off the mark. Students started talking about “autonomy” which isn’t quite the same thing as free will. I would like to
31
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013 thank Greg, for making us all thinks more critically of just who we are or claim to be or even who we can be.
32
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Causal Theory of Reference’s Extension to Natural Kind Terms: Rigid Designation, Rigid Application, and Change Adam Shatsky Grand Valley State University
Introduction
Saul Kripke defines a rigid designator as one that designates the same object in every possible world in which that object exists. According to Kripke, proper names are rigid. In addition, he extends rigidity to various kind terms; however, it is unclear how natural kind terms can be. One proposal (LaPorte 2000) is that kind terms rigidly designate abstract objects. If kind terms, however, designate abstract objects, then this trivializes the notion of rigidity, since all terms would come out rigid. In a series of recent papers, Joseph LaPorte (2000), Michael Devitt (1999; 2005), and Stephen Schwartz (2002) all have opposing views on how reference is determined for natural kind terms.8 Both Devitt and Schwartz have argued that LaPorte’s proposal for kind terms rigidly designating abstract objects does not suffice. I agree with their arguments against LaPorte.
Where I have disagreement, then, is with the exchange that arises (perhaps as a result) between Devitt and Schwartz. Devitt offers one proposal that preserves Kripke’s notion of rigidity. He argues that natural kind terms rigidly apply to members of their extension, rather than designating them. Schwartz objects that not all natural kind terms are rigid appliers, since certain gender terms and stage terms do no function rigidly. Though Schwartz’s objection is not detrimental to Devitt’s theory of rigid application (if successful), it does show certain inconsistencies with rigid application. This paper argues that Schwartz’s attempt to dispute rigid application is unsuccessful.
Kripke on The Causal Theory of Reference
Devitt argues “that rigid application for kind terms does the same primary work as rigid designation for singular terms, the work of refuting description theories of some terms; and it does the same secondary work, of explaining certain modal phenomena” (2005, 139). So, because of the influence Kripke had on Devitt, I will begin with a brief discussion on Kripke’s causal theory of reference.9
In his book, Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues that it is not how the speaker thinks that she got the reference, but rather the actual chain of communication that is of importance. Reference depends on things such as a community of speakers and the historical chain of how the name came to be used. Accordingly, the chain is not only important epistemically, in that it allows us to figure out what the name refers to, but also metaphysically, in that the object constitutes the reference of the term.
Consider the following example. When Richard Feynman was born, his mother named him ‘Richard’. She passed the name along to his father, which in turn lead to the rest of the
8 I will not be discussing any of LaPorte’s argument. 9 The majority of my discussion on Kripke is derived from his Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. 33
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013 family, which lead to close friends. Somewhere along this causal chain of the name ‘Richard’ being used, I heard it. When I heard it in my physics class, I was able to successfully refer to Richard Feynman.10 From this example, Kripke illustrates that ‘Richard’ is initially fixed by a speaker at the original act of naming, or what he calls an initial baptism. Thus, this example shows both important aspects of the causal chain: the name ‘Richard’, allowed me to figure out what was being referred to; and Richard, the man of flesh and blood, constitutes the meaning of the utterance ‘Richard.’
A consequence of this causal theory is that names are rigid designators. Kripke defines a rigid designator as something that designates the same object, or individual, in every world in which that object, or individual, exists. As a result, if a designator does not do this, it is not rigid. For example, ‘Nixon’ is (intuitively) a rigid designator because it designates the same thing in every possible world (that thing being Nixon). As Kripke states:
A designator rigidly designates a certain object if it designates that object where ever that object exists ... For example, ‘the president of the U.S. in 1970’ designates a certain man, Nixon; but someone else (e.g. Humphrey) might have been the President in 1970, and Nixon might not have; so this designator is not rigid.11
‘The president of the United States (in 1970)’ is not rigid because a possible world can be imagined where Nixon was not the President; it could have been otherwise–and with respect to such a world, ‘The President of the United States (in 1970)’ singles out that individual, whoever it is, that is President in 1970 there. But, for Kripke, the one thing we cannot do is imagine a world in which Nixon was not Nixon.12 This is not to say Nixon could have been named something else, it is merely Kripke’s way of saying that the meaning of ‘Nixon’ is not given by the (non-rigidly designating) definite description ‘The President of the United States (in 1970)’. Thus, according to Kripke, proper names are rigid designators. This original naming, which is the initiation of the causal chain, can occur through extension or the reference of a name can be fixed via a description.13
Kripke also holds that rigid designation extends to natural-kind terms such as ‘water’ if one is linked causally to the original act of naming. As he states, “[rigidity] holds for certain various species names ... such as ‘cat’, ‘tiger’, ‘chunk of gold’, or mass terms such as ‘heat’, ‘light’, ‘sound’, ‘lightening’, and, presumably, suitably elaborated, ... corresponding adjectives – ‘hot’, ‘loud’, ‘red’.14 Intuitively, the distinction between kind terms and proper names is that natural kind terms apply to kinds of things that have a hidden, metaphysically real essence, which science has revealed or will potentially reveal.15 But as for the argument Kripke has for these various terms, there is no new definition Kripke offers for these terms, and it is thus
10 This is not to say that the causal chain stops when I hear his name used, it instead continues on by my use (along with the rest of my classmates). 11 Kripke, 48-9. 12 Nixon would still be Nixon regardless of the name given to him. In addition, Kripke will go on to say that natural- kind terms are rigid designators just as proper names are. This will be addressed shortly. 13 Paralleling the Feynman example, suppose a baby is born and the mother points to the baby and says ‘My baby’s name is Jones’. Thereafter people call the baby ‘Jones’; the mother knows the name of her child and tells others the name of her child, who can then tell others the name of her child. Successful reference is achieved by being linked to the original act of naming (baptism) through the correct causal chain. 14 Kripke, 134. 15 One typical response is because of this [hidden] metaphysically real essence, kind terms should be left to their respective professional. Though I think professionals can largely contribute, I do not accept this proposal. 34
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
generally taken that the same argument from designation applies. It cannot, however, be exactly the same argument, since kind terms, by contrast to names, are introduced with respect to one token of the kind and then apply to other tokens of the same kind.
Further, though it is clear how ‘Nixon’ is rigid and ‘the President of the United States (in 1970)’ is not, it is unclear how natural-kind terms function the same way.16 Both ‘Nixon’ and ‘the President of the United States (in 1970)’ are “singular terms designating a certain concrete entity and so it is easy to see how they can be rigid or not rigid.”17 However, the kind terms that Kripke just stated are predicates, which do not necessarily designate at all. Consider, for example, ‘water is refreshing’. This, as a singular term, would designate “the mereological sum of all parts of the appropriate stuff.”18 But this would mean that water is not a rigid designator: it is possible for water to then designate different sums of water in another possible world. If kind terms, then, designate (in some sense) rigidly, they are not like proper names.
Devitt’s Extension of the Causal Theory to Natural Kind Terms19
Devitt’s proposal reconsiders how rigidity distinctions for kind terms should be thought of. As he claims:
The primary work of a rigidity distinction for kind terms is identifying terms that are not synonymous with descriptions and hence refuting description theories of meaning for those terms.20
In light of the foregoing, Kripke has shown that the primary work of rigidity is sufficient in undermining description theories of meaning. The fact that ‘Nixon’ rigidly designates the same individual in every possible world in which Nixon exists whereas its associated description, ‘the President of the United States (in 1970)’ does not, strongly suggests that ‘Nixon’ is not synonymous with that description. Thus the primary work of rigidity distinctions suffices for proper names, but does so in a different way for kind terms.21 Consider ‘tiger’. A ‘tiger’ is a token of the kind and use of the term ‘tiger’ may apply to multiple other tokens of the kind. But is it synonymous with its description? I will take tiger’s description to be ‘the large carnivorous quadrupedal felines that are tawny yellow in color with blackish transverse stripes and a white belly’. The identity claim, then, would be ‘tiger is the large carnivorous quadrupedal felines that are tawny yellow in color with blackish transverse stripes and a white belly’. The truth of this statement depends on three conditions:
(1) that a tiger exists (in the world the sentence is uttered); (2) there is something (exists) that is a large carnivorous quadrupedal felines that are tawny yellow in color with blackish transverse stripes and a white belly; (3) that the tiger is identical to this description (in the world it is uttered).
16 Cf. Michael Devitt, Rigid Application 2005, 140. 17 Devitt, 140. 18 Devitt, 140. 19 It is important to note that this debate between Devitt and Schwartz was initiated by Joseph LaPorte’s article Rigidity and Kind (2000), which in turn was responding to several other publications. 20 Cf. Michael Devitt, Rigid Application 2005; Michael Devitt and Sterenly Kim, Language and Reality 1987. 21 Before reiterating how it does for kind terms, which was alluded to in the previous section, it is necessary to clarify what kind terms I am referring to. I will be using natural kind terms; I will not be using nominal, artifactual, or artificial terms (unless indicated). 35
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
The truth (1) and (2) is preserved in multiple worlds, since they both are claiming the existence of something–namely, a tiger and a large carnivorous quadrupedal felines that are tawny yellow in color with blackish transverse stripes and a white belly–and the existence of either depends on the world under consideration. But the truth of (3) is contingent: a possible world can be thought of where a tiger is not its associated description. Thus, the previous example also strongly suggests that a natural kind term is not synonymous with its description. From the way tiger refers, we can also see that natural kind terms do not designate like proper names, such as ‘Nixon’. Though the primary work for the rigidity distinction as it pertains to proper names and natural kind terms is clear, it is not clear how natural kind terms designate, or if they do at all. Devitt says they do. But, again, they do so differently than proper names because of the fact that natural kind terms apply to numerous different individuals, while ‘Nixon’ picks out Nixon across all possible world where Nixon exists–and no other thing. So the natural kind term for ‘Nixon’, for example, ‘human’ would apply to Nixon in every possible world in which Nixon existed but also would apply to many more individuals; namely, all humans in all possible worlds in which humans existed. The same goes for ‘tiger’: the name ‘tiger’ would apply to all tigers across possible worlds (where tigers existed). Devitt claims that from thinking of rigidity of natural kind terms as an application, we can understand how they refer. He states:
A general term ‘F’ is a rigid applier iff it is such that if it applies to an object in any possible world, then it applies to that object in every possible world in which the object exists.22
The proposed definition is an intuitive way to extend the concept of rigidity in the sense that if any proper name designates just one individual, then natural-kind terms, as rigidly applying, designate “many” individuals of the same kind. For example, ‘gold’ applies to a lot of stuff in the actual world with atomic number 79 and it will apply to anything with that atomic number in another possible world (if it exists there). As Devitt says, this theory entails a strong metaphysical thesis because if a general term ‘F’ is a rigid applier, then any individual of that general term F must essentially be F.23 The idea is that ‘tiger’ applies rigidly because it applies to Raja, the tiger, in the actual world and to Raja in any possible world where Raja exists–by contrast, for example, to the descriptive phrase ‘Jasmine’s tiger’, which applies to Raja in the actual world, but not to Raja in any world where Raja is not Jasmine’s tiger. From this, essentialism follows, e.g., it follows that Raja could not be a non-tiger. Devitt finds essential membership of a general term widely accepted and intuitively plausible. And, as a result, his metaphysical commitment that is a result of rigid application is a merit. It is perhaps worthy to note two implications of Devitt’s proposal. First, the metaphysical commitment–just briefly mentioned–to essential membership. Second, Devitt’s argument from rigid application for natural kind terms features the same primary work of rigidity distinctions for proper names.
22 Devitt, 146. Furthermore, I want to note that Devitt does not only address natural-kind terms. He goes as far as saying that rigid application works for artificial, nominal, mass, and artifactual kind terms. However, I will be considering his extension only for natural-kind terms, e.g., water, gold, tiger, and frog. 23 Devitt, 146. 36
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Schwartz’s Criticism of Rigid Application
While Devitt foresees rigid application as contributing to the extension of the causal theory to natural kind terms, Schwartz sees it as an “artificial notion that does not mark off any significant semantic category.”24 Despite the strong claim Schwartz makes, he does not think all work of rigid application is useless. So before delving into Schwartz’s immediate criticisms, I will briefly note what he does accept. Schwartz states:
[Rigid application] helps to refute the traditional description theory, it enables us to distinguish semantically between, e.g. ‘bachelor’ and ‘gold’, and it does a nice job of explaining the necessity of e.g. ‘All tigers are animals’, since both ‘tiger’ and ‘animal’ are rigid appliers.25
Since the way rigid application refutes description theories of meaning and explains the necessity of ‘All tigers are animals’ has already been discussed, I will show what he means by his second acknowledgement; that is, rigid application distinguishes semantically between ‘bachelor’ and ‘gold’.
Consider Fred, who is a bachelor in the actual world. The term ‘bachelor’ would rigidly apply to Fred in the actual world since he has yet to tie the knot. ‘Bachelor’ however would not itself be a rigid applier because of the fact that Fred is not a bachelor in every possible world (nor does he necessarily exist in every possible world). So in a nearby possible world where Fred is married to Sally, ‘bachelor’ would not apply to him. It is important to note that in this nearby possible world Fred is the actual Fred’s counterpart. And, if this is so, for ‘bachelor’ to be a rigid applier should apply to him in every possible world where he exists, but it does not. Therefore, ‘bachelor’ is not a rigid applier. Furthermore, ‘bachelor’ is not a natural kind term–it is considered a nominal kind term. On the other hand, ‘gold’ is a rigid applier because it essentially has the atomic number 79 and applies to all the stuff that has atomic number 79 in every possible world in which it exists. ‘Gold’ differs from ‘bachelor’ in that gold essentially has the atomic number 79, but Fred is not essentially a bachelor in every possible world. This is why Schwartz rightfully claims that rigid application enables us to distinguish semantically between two different kinds of general terms.
I turn now to a discussion on Schwartz’s criticisms. He states that not all natural kind terms are rigid appliers because of the fact that some stage terms and gender terms would not satisfy the conditions Devitt set forth for rigid application.26 To illustrate this, he uses the term ‘frog’. Because of the fact that at one point frogs are tadpoles and there are some possible worlds where a tadpole never becomes a frog, ‘frog’ is not a rigid applier. Schwartz’s criticism then is regarding change. He claims:
24 Stephen P. Schwartz, Kinds, General Terms, and Rigidity: A Reply To Laporte 2002, 275. It is also important to note that this sequence of publications I am referring to does not match the structure of my paper: LaPorte published first, Schwartz responded to LaPorte but addressed Devitt as well, which in turn lead Devitt to respond to both. But given the way in which I am introducing their theories (that is, Devitt and Schwartz), I do not find it as an injustice. 25 Schwartz, 2002, 274. 26 Schwartz, 274. 37
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Change in the actual world does not entail similar change in every possible world. Thus rigid appliers would only apply to natural kinds that an individual cannot change into or out of.27
Schwartz is correct that because I am moving my fingers, typing this paper or the fact that tadpoles turn into frogs in the actual world, does not mean that I am moving my fingers nor that all tadpoles turn into frogs in every possible world.
Yet Schwartz’s understanding of change seems to be slightly different than these two situations. As he states, change in one world does not imply similar change in every world. So, it’s not that he is claiming the change of a tadpole to a frog is always the case in the sense that some tadpoles never become frogs; rather it seems that tadpoles could become something entirely different. The implication of change for Schwartz is threefold. First, if he means change in the sense that tadpoles could become something entirely different, then the term ‘frog’ does not seem to be a victim of the objection that it is not a rigid applier. As previously stated, natural kind terms have an essential membership.
Let us assume frog’s are essentially amphibians in the order of Anura. If this assumption is true, then ‘frog’ rigidly applies to every object that is an amphibian in the order of Anura in every possible world in which an amphibian in the order of Anura exists. And, since I am assuming the sense of change that tadpoles could change into something entirely different than a frog, they would not meet the essential membership of a frog (or a tadpole). Therefore, ‘frog’ would not apply to them (that is, a tadpole that changed into something other than a frog) because it would not be an amphibian in the order of Anura (and not a frog). This objection then does no harm to ‘frog’ rigidly applying to every object in every possible world in which that object exists. In sum, if ‘frog’ applies to tadpoles at all, it only applies to those tadpoles in the order of Anura. And those tadpoles necessarily morph into (what are recognizably) frogs–not, for instance, snakes or crocodiles.
The second implication of change is the one first stated: it may be the case that some tadpoles never make it to the frog stage. But if a tadpole never makes it to the frog stage–say it died while still a tadpole–then ‘frog’, as a rigid applier, would not be a victim to this objection because it does not exist in the world that ‘frog’ may intend to apply. For, as the definition of rigid application goes, if the object that is uttered does not exist, then it does not meet the last condition for being a rigid applier. The third implication of change is akin to the first: suppose there is one frog and its counterpart, frog*. The world the frog is in is the actual world, and frog* is in a nearby possible world. Everything in frog*’s world is exactly the same as the actual world except for one thing: this nearby possible world is a few months behind us, at such a time when frog’s counterpart is still a tadpole. So, the objection would be that if ‘frog’ is uttered, in hopes of applying to frog, it should apply to frog* as well, and yet frog* is a tadpole. Again, natural kind terms have an essential membership and while a tadpole is not a frog, their essential membership, being an amphibian in the order of Anura, remains the same from stage to stage. Therefore, maintaining that natural kind terms have an essential membership, allows for stage- terms to remain rigid appliers.
27 Schwartz, 275. 38
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Conclusion
It is clear that the work of Kripke has sparked much debate in whether the causal theory extends to natural kind terms. Devitt’s contributions explained the primary work of rigidity distinctions and established a strong way to consider this extension. What’s more, the proposal of natural kind terms as rigidly applying is preserved by fleshing out the implications of change Schwartz put forth. Though Schwartz’s objection of entirely doing away with rigid application seemed plausible because of certain stage terms and the puzzles it raises for rigid appliers, it does not succeed. There is still much use in thinking of natural kind terms as rigidly applying that Schwartz overlooked, and thus we should not be so quick to do away with viable concepts, such as rigid application.
39
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Works Cited
Devitt, M. (2005): ‘Rigid Application’, Philosophical Studies, 139-165.
Kripke, S.A. (1980): Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
LaPorte, J. (1997): ‘Essential Membership’, Philosophy of Science 64, 96-112.
---, (2000): ‘Rigidity and Kind’, Philosophical Studies, 293-316.
Morris, M. (2007): An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Schwartz, S.P. (2002): ‘Kinds, General Terms, and Rigidity’, Philosophical Studies, 265-277.
40
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Free Will Evolves in a Determined World Danny Choi City University of New York – LaGuardia Community College
A popular belief is that we, as rational human beings, can make free choices through our own volition. Perhaps we believe this because it is implicit in our daily lives. We learn that cleverness and labor towards a goal ought to be rewarded. Conversely, harmful behavior towards others deserves should be punished. To say that an action ought to be rewarded or punished means that an actor is in control, thus responsible for his/her decisions. Free will, then, requires two main conditions:
(1) choices to be actually free, i.e. one could have acted differently at time of event, given the same circumstance
(2) that our preferences, thoughts and feelings influencing our volition are consciously our own. This paper focuses on three major viewpoints of the free will debate, each of which has different views on these two main conditions. A Deterministic view represents the world in terms of events and causal relationships claiming that free will cannot exist. When people say, “I could not have done otherwise”, they are likely to be referring to a determined chain-of-causality that compels them internally and externally, to act in the way they did. This has certain implications on moral responsibility. Can we hold actors responsible for an action of which they did not control? This can generate some fatalistic assumptions that can be dangerous and not necessarily true. Indeterminism, on the other hand, claims that at least one event is random thus Determinism is false. This opens up room for free will, and this branch of Indeterminism is called, Libertarianism. Jean Paul Sartre champions a similar existential view, which talks not of finding one’s essence but rather, creating it through uniquely free action. This idea has several implications as well leading to emotions like anguish and despair from overwhelming responsibility. The Compatibilist view, the position that I will take, asserts that free will is logically compatible with Determinism. This view is, for me, is more rational than the preceding views. Though one can trace back the causal chain far enough to remove the actor from full control- there are practical and necessary reasons to hold both causality and some degree of randomness as true in our lived world. David Hume’s notion of “necessary connection” demonstrate that one cannot think, act, or build any rational structure without depending on causality (even where the relationship between two events can never be understood certainly). In this paper, I focus on two conceptions of the Compatibilist view by David Hume and Daniel Dennett. Dennett’s view that Darwinian Evolution can explain how free choice has evolved from our lower states is persuasive, and one that we can reasonably hold to be true. Our biological evolution has allowed us to create innovations of the physical, mental and social kind which allow for more degrees of freedom than we had before.
41
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Determinism
A precise definition of Hard Determinism is that, “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future”. (Van Inwagen 3) This means that if one wanted to change an action, one could not, given the exact set of circumstances. More broadly, Determinism could also mean that “every event, including human actions, are brought about by previous events in accordance with universal causal laws that govern the world”. (Chaffee 141) For example, we may take a uniquely human decision, like choosing between a chocolate cake or vanilla ice cream for dessert. Many claim that here, one does exercise free choice. However, a Determinist could appeal to causality once more saying that one’s preferences, medical conditions, and even existence of such a choice are products of things outside your control. These varying levels of causality seem to conflict with any idea of freedom in the absolute sense. It would be wise to distinguish Determinism with Fatalism. The notion of evitability is where Determinism departs from the latter. Fatalism in general, implies that events work towards an inevitable end. Determinism is merely the premise that events at a certain point and time are inevitable due to causal relations. Thus, things won’t just happen if you sit back and observe. It’s easy, but incorrect to treat both comparably because they are different only in the stage/moment of inevitability. This can lead to a type of despair from feeling a loss of control, autonomy and ambiguous (if not impossible) notions of moral responsibility. Determinism, however, once embraced- can lead to compassion and understanding; one is more likely to remember that actions (even harmful ones) are not completely in an actor’s control. A metaphor of a chess game is useful for imagining a determined worldview. Each piece has a pre-set algorithm of movement (not unlike human preferences and thoughts). These pieces, collectively, have endless permutations in which correspond to the events of human life. In this interpretation, Determinism does not exactly rule out making moral responsibility. Indeterminism
Indeterminism proclaims that at least one event may be random, thus Determinism is false. Grouped together with this view, Libertarians state that for the same reasons, human freedom is possible. William James, one charismatic of proponent of this view, authored several essays declaring that the greatest proof of free will is to practice it into existence. Critics might object to this view claiming it to be a tautology (circular reasoning), therefore false; evidence of free will cannot presuppose free will as a premise. James responds by reminding the reader the reasons for trying to conceive ideas at all; to explain our lived experience. Each individual has the ability to sift through evidence and develop their own conclusions that seems most rational. The deterministic world does little to describe our actual experience while living, because not everyone feels these alleged forces, internal and external, that shape behavior. For James, this universe does not withstand his rational examination and should be seen as an imaginary construct of the logical mind which holds conceptual value, but not yet expressed itself in reality. One appeal of Indeterminism is that it allows for refreshingly transparent treatment of responsibility. Hard Determinism in comparison doesn’t easily recognize what is correct to reward and punish because individuals are caused by factors outside their control. Robert Kane, an Indeterminist, has innovated new ways of approaching the problem of free will. He starts by arguing the goal of these discussions should begin and eventually center itself on, “Ultimate
42
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Responsibility [UR]”. (Kane 32) He states that the typical causation principle (discussed earlier) is insufficient, and the control we desire is found in responsibility of our outcome. In other words, free will requires there to be “Alternative Possibilities [AR]” at the instant both before, and making the decision. However, it isn’t enough for it to be just random. A Libertarian such as Kane argues that for free will to truly exist; one must have some certainty of control in the decision itself. This control is found in his concept of “Ultimate Responsibility [UR]”. Kane will proceed to detail (conditions, causes, and motives) leading up to the event as parts of the final responsibility or ownership by the actor. Once we are aware that we can make conscious choices that can influence our future selves- we have begun making “self-forming action [SFA]”. Jean- Paul Sartre’s will propose a similar view in his Existentialism is a Humanism, asserting that “each man chooses his own self…in creating the man that we want to be”. (Chafee 177) Sartre, however, will write of Kane’s Ultimate Responsibility [UR] to be more burdensome than liberating. For him, along with the freedom to choose comes a feeling of abandonment and neglect, left to make decisions on your own. Though it’s slightly different than the fatalism commonly associated with Determinism, despair expresses itself in a random, free universe as well. However, Sartre argued spiritedly that once an actor took full responsibility of his/her existence- this despair can transform into a powerful optimism. Compatibilism This section will discuss a Compatibilist view on free will, where free will is logically compatible with a Deterministic world. Hard Determinists will assert that no form of free will exists, where Libertarians argue that at least one event is random, thus, free choice is real. In general, Compatibilists will argue that Determinism is true but free will is possible. David Hume was particularly influential, and a section of his Enquiry applies directly to free will. In the chapter, “Liberty and Necessity”, he declares that the problem of free will is merely a disagreement on the semantic meaning of Liberty and Necessity. In a deterministic universe, all actions are caused by concrete principles of necessity. Hume’s account of causality, however, shows that it is impossible to have any idea of cause and effect relationships beyond its “necessary connection” (process) which in turn are induced from “constant conjunctions” (habitual relationships). Therefore, we can do away with any worries about a pre-determined universe because these types of laws are unable to be conceived. By redefining Necessitation as, “uniformity, observable in nature where similar objects are constantly engaged together” and Liberty as, “power of acting or not acting, according to the definitions of the will”, Hume has provided a new way to define in the classic ideas of internal constraints and external constraints. For him, one cannot be held responsible for decisions that are coerced by external constraints. It is only possible for an individual to be responsible for decisions from their internal motives alone. Arguably, Hume’s contribution to the free will is greatest where it concerns moral responsibility. Determinism is often criticized because it seems to imply that one is never fully responsible for his actions, because one never has full control of conditions. Hume argues along these lines but thinks that necessity and reasons influencing behavior are difficult, if not impossible to prove. This makes it difficult to justly punish a murderer. Hume offers a practical rationale to this problem. It’s possible to love and hate only a human being, and approval and disapproval are rational forms of these. To hold someone responsible is to simply regard him/her subject to approval or disapproval. The important part here is the relationship of love and hate
43
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
(approval and disapproval) with the responsibility that you will impose on the actor. Hume argues that it is possible to infer an actor’s tendencies and motives through “constant conjunctions” of their behavior through experience. Without this inference, one cannot make a rationally defensible judgment. This inference is Hume’s concept of necessitation. Simply, without necessity, no moral responsibility is possible. This is a powerful refutation to the intuitive claim that no responsibility can be had in a determined universe. In fact, responsibility requires it (necessitation). Returning to Hume’s notion of constraints- so long as one is not externally coerced, or internally compelled by uncontrollable compulsions- one can exercise free choice. External constraints refer to factors that influence your behavior outside your mind and body i.e. being shackled in chains as a form of physical coercion successfully limiting one’s physical freedom. One might think that once the chains are removed, the subject is now free to make choices. Hard Determinists will disagree saying that before the shackles were placed on the individual, they was subject to nature, society and other factors; removal of chains merely perpetuates these larger influences. An analogy to nature’s gravity could perhaps clarify further. Things fall towards the earth at a specific rate, because of factors already existing (namely, that of Earth’s density and the resultant field of gravity) One may temporarily suspend a freely falling body by obstructing its path. Once this obstruction is removed, it will surely fall freely again. In this way, the obstruction is analogous to the chains in the previous example. Internal constraints work much the same way, but its origin is within the individual. They can come in forms of compulsion and uncontrollable obsessions (addictions). Baron d’Holbach writes in his book, The System of Nature: The will…is a modification of the brain, by which it is disposed to action, or prepared to give play to the organs. This will is necessarily determined by the qualities, good or bad, agreeable or painful, of the object or the motive that acts upon his sense…in consequence he acts necessarily, his action is the result of an impulse. (Kane 224) D’Holbach asserts that all actions are the result of impulses driven by the will. To have impulses (in the form of emotion or thought) are determined by your will, and this acts as an internal constraint. Sam Harris, a Neuroscientist invigorates D’Holbach idea in his book Free Will saying, “You can do what you decide to do- but you cannot decide what you will decide to do”. (Harris 32) Harris translates D’Holbach’s “will” to mean levels of decision-making but the idea is the same- though one can choose things that he likes, feels or thinks; the actor cannot control what these things are. The question then, is the Compatibilist conception of free will actually free? If so, then is it worth wanting? Free Will Worth Wanting
Daniel Dennett, a contemporary philosopher at Tufts University suggests that we view free will through the lens of Darwinian Evolution. In his book, fittingly titled Freedom Evolves, he argues:
Free will is real, but it is not a pre-existing feature of our existence, like the law of gravity. It is also not what tradition declares it to be: a God like power to exempt oneself from the causal fabric of the physical world. It is an evolved 44
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
creation of human activity and beliefs, and it is just as real as such other human creations as music and money. And even more valuable. (Dennett 156) While Dennett holds Determinism to be true, he claims that actors have developed so that they can generate and entertain options, evaluate alternatives, and finally make this decision. This takes a subtle but deep turn from Robert Kane’s decision model, where Kane claims that alternative possibilities (options) are fully owned and realized by the actor in the stage of Ultimate Responsibility. Kane believes that randomness is implicit in the past, whereas Dennett argues that the opposite; our universe is causally determined. Dennett’s two stage model is represented below,
Dennett works with the premise of genetic determinism to prove a type of human agency that makes free choices. This is the belief that genes- and their response to environmental conditions- determine our behavior and choices. DNA contains generations of coded information from our ancestral line, causing people to be born a certain way. However, it is an evolved state and Dennett believes this is a great thing! These inborn tendencies allow for greatest chance of survival in the world. These instincts also apply to mental constructs, i.e. society and morality. Generations ago, our ancestors have presumably grouped together to increase their strength. From there, we have developed notions of peaceful morality, language, and exchange of ideas. It is from these evolutions that one has freed oneself enough to practice this free choice. Take for example, a salmon that is determined by nature to spend its entire adult life trekking upstream. It’s unlikely that it will stop in the middle of its trek to ponder its own meaning in life, lest chancing death. Humans don’t have this same problem, at least less than we used to. With innovations like that of homes, processed foods, energy, etc., we live comfortably without having to occupy our time with anxieties that once inhabited our race. This is an important premise towards establishing how evitability can exist in a determined world, “The concept of inevitability, like its source concept of avoidance, properly belongs at the design level, not the physical level”. (Dennett 62) Many physical and social inventions were created to avoid harm. I think this to be an excellent way to think about free will in that it offers certain desirable qualities of free choice (as far as ordinary, practical world is concerned). In his essay, “On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want”, Dennett outlines several reasons why an evolved state of free choice is a real, and worth having. First, it adheres to all types of intelligent decision making that people want to think they have, or the “selection, rejection and weighting of the considerations that do occur to the subject…Intelligence makes the difference here because an intelligent selection and assessment procedure determines which microscopic indeterminacies get amplified…into important macroscopic determiners of ultimate behavior”. (Dennett 302) Second, this model places randomness prior to decision rather than after- which is exactly where Indeterminist require it to have any meaning in free choice. Third, there are practical time 45
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013 considerations to making any decision. This model offers a relatively free heuristic in which an actor may make choices genuinely to oneself but also autonomously. Simply, his model is strategic and useful (thus more rational) in the lived universe. His fourth and fifth reason state that moral education is influential and we can consider human actors to be genuine authors of their moral choices. In other words, the world is causally determined but our evolved state allows us a degree of freedom to at differently than which we are obviously pressured to do. Finally, this type of evolution of free choice is one that can be reasonably expected to have come naturally from lower species. It appeals to common sense and not requiring exceptions to natural causal laws- as Dennett likes to say, “Magic doesn’t exist”. (Dennett 287) Conclusion I lean towards Dennett’s views because his two-stage model is a common sense approach to the problem of free will. In simple terms, our world has causal laws (though whether we perceive them correctly is another question). Yet we have evolved to be able to contemplate a moment of randomness, in the form of considering alternative possibilities, which allow us a genuine type of free choice in a Deterministic universe. Like any real thing, i.e. language, music, money, and any other societal invention- its persistence depends on what people believe and feel about it. We should be careful about how we treat this human freedom, because it is fragile and easily shattered by irrational or reckless behavior. The real threat to freedom, Dennett says,
…are not metaphysical but political and social. As we learn more about the conditions of human decision-making, we will have to devise, and agree upon, systems of government and law that are not hostage to false myths about human nature, that are robust in the face of further scientific discovery and technological advances. Are we freer than we want to be? We now have more power than ever to create the condition which we and our descendants will lead our lives (Dennett 287). Just as we benefit from the successes of previous societies, we have an ethical obligation towards future societies. Nicholas Maxwell, a philosopher of science, states that freedom is “the capacity to achieve what is of value in a range of circumstances”. (Dennett 302) The next question, then, is what is of value? Some might say rationality, others might say whatever is morally good. To me, I think finding and developing what is of value (a type of rational thinking) is where we find possibility for good society (and by extension, free will). Free will evolves only if we do.
46
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Works Cited
Chaffee, John. "The Philosophers Way: Thinking Critically about Profound Ideas." New York: Pearson, 2011.
Dennett, Daniel C. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Hanover, New Hampshire: MIT Press, 1981.
---,. Freedom Evolves . New York : Penguin Group, 2003.
---, http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/dennett/. n.d. Website. 12 April 2013.
Harris, Sam. Free Will. New York, New York : Free Press, 2012.
Hume, David. Enquiry concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
Inwagen, Peter Van. "An Essay on Free Will." Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1983.
Kane, Robert. Free Will . New York , 1998.
Laplace, Pierre Simon. "A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities ." Laplace. New York: Dover Publications, 1814.
47
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
The following section contains Abstracts of posterboard presentations that were made at the 3rd CUNY Undergraduate Philosophy Conference hosted by LaGuardia Community College on April 19, 2013.
LaGuardia Community College Philosophy THE GADFLY Spring 2013 [email protected]
48
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
On the Nature of the Self Joseph Cutolo City University of New York – LaGuardia Community College
The concept of the signification “I” has been the locus of centuries of false understanding concerning the concept of the self. The term “I” attempts to signify an already-there being, fully present in its own existence. Meaning, however, depends on other concepts and other meanings - in a word, difference - to be able to have meaning. Even the concept of absence holds meaning through the interweaving of meaning coming from all other terms and concepts. There needs to be a production and a system of differences for any term or concept to have meaning; this system is called différance. Using the concept of difference allows for a complete subversion of full presence within the signification “I”.
Any attempt to deny différance - which is exactly the telos of the meaning of “I” - is a failed attempt. There is no “before” différance. This was René Descartes’ fatal mistake in his thought. He could not simply be himself because his meaning came from all other meaning within différance. Whenever “I” is meant to signify a single presence, it simultaneously refers to all other elements in the economy of differences. The term “I” is a “transcendental signified” - that which attempts to be more original than différance. Needless to say, différance opens the door for new and fecund research, limiting that which attempts a “full presence” in itself and by its own existence. The idea of “I” is thus never there. The transcendental signified can never even be thought, nor can it ever be. The signification “I” is thus an incomplete sign, and never reveals truth.
49
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Understanding Buddhist Social Action in Burma Jason Cole Singletary Valdosta State University
The turbulent political history of Burma (Myanmar) involves both colonization and military dictatorship. Activists like Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi highlight the role of spiritual practice in confronting the continued suppression of any opposition to the ruling military junta. Both Buddhist monks and laypersons have led peaceful pro democracy movements, though they have often been met with violent opposition. As the military leaders of Burma ground their political legitimacy by appealing to Burma's history as a Buddhist monarchy, social action by Buddhist monks represents a powerful tool for progress.
The continued peaceful social action in Burma can be examined through tenets of Buddhist philosophy including nonduality, dukkha (suffering), and sunyata (emptiness). Through an examination of these concepts, the goals and methods of Buddhist social movements in Burma can be better understood, and hopes for communication between the military government, the Burmese citizenry, and the outside world can be encouraged.
50
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Existentialism and the Contemporary Moral Self Emiliya Abramova John Jay College of Criminal Justice
The philosophical tradition of Existentialism28 and their proponents developed a rigorous methodology to analyze, critique and transcend a stagnant ethical and moral tradition29 that has displaced individual’s freedom to predetermined destiny; furthermore, it has also displaced the notion of being30, effectively keeping it at the core of its discourse in order to present a proper image of the individual.31
Examining the most representative existentialist concepts on being and moral ideals preserving a sense of authenticity, I have observed that this has prompted an elevation of agency from mere pre-determination validity to a theory centered on humanity's ability to reach individual integrity and personal fulfillment.
My argument developed here unfolds as follows: first, I will provide some theoretical groundwork for developing a map of what constitutes the meaning of existentialism, namely Sartre32 and Heidegger33- in relation to ethics and what can be called authentic self. In that sense, this essay examines the impact of how thinking about human existence requires more than a previous pre-determined framework, namely religion.34 In so far as it examines an individual’s role outside of set prescriptive principles while emphasizing on the individual's roles in determining their own being.
After analyzing the discourse and method of Sartrean and Heideggerian existentialism, I examined that their influence on the re-construction of the moral system that emphasizes free will as the necessary condition for authentic being35. In that sense, the impact of proposing an authentic self when de-encompassing morality from a false sense of being36 is observed.
Overall, I want to suggest that responsibility is only possible when individuals are capable of self-reflection.
28 Existentialism is defined as a philosophical discourse that allows for one to analyze an individual’s role within the universe. It focuses on the value of choice as the center of an individual’s essence- therefor-debunking western ontological outlook of a pre-determined framework and achieving an “authentic” existence. 29 Modernity’s tradition places Western tradition that attempts to fuse human responsibility and a religious moral doctrine in order to dictate a being’s existence. God is seen as the ultimate guarantor of principles and an all- knowledgeable figure. 30 Being in this context is regarding as a self-thinking, rational and authentic self. 31 Philosophy of the person 32 Sartre- "Existentialism Is a Humanism." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online Academic Edition. Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 2013. Web. 09 Apr. 2013. Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press, 1992. Print. 33 Heidegger- Heidegger, Martin (2000), Being and Time, John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (trans), London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
34 This refers to western morality residue still impacting and imposing 35 Authentic being… 36 false sense of being. 51
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
The following section contains papers that connect Philosophy to Popular Culture. Enjoy!
LaGuardia Community College Philosophy THE GADFLY Spring 2013 [email protected]
52
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Jedi Reductionism and Paleo-Compatibilism Bryan Parsons City University of New York - LaGuardia Community College
The Force is the principal religious and philosophical structure in George Lucas’s Star Wars universe. Complete with fundamentalists, skeptics, and a vernacular all its own Lucas’s religion is a major component in his science fiction fantasy. But the Force is not a construct from thin air. Walter Robinson in his essay, “The Far East of Star Wars” calls attention to the many direct parallels that the Force makes with Eastern Philosophy. The concepts that are central to his connection are how the Taoist concept of “interdependence of opposites,” or the dichotomy of Ying and Yang, inspires the Dark and the Light side of the Force, as well how the Raw Rang Buddhist warrior monk is a direct model for the Jedi Knight (31:36). We see these aspects play out on screen as Luke slogs through these concepts under the tutelage of Jedi Masters Obi-Wan and Yoda. But the characters in the film are decidedly Western, created by a Westerner for a Western audience. In The Empire Strikes Back, Han Solo when going out to search for Luke in an inclement snowstorm is warned that, “he will die if he goes out there” responds with a resounding, “Then I will see you in Hell!” The habitation of Western souls in an Eastern universe, and their navigation of this paradox is one of the reasons that the Star Wars project is so enduring. When attempting to pick apart the philosophical concepts of Lucas’s work, it is useful to look through the lens of a philosophical framework that attempts to build a logical metaphysical system that allows for both East and West.
The Force as Faith “The Force is an energy field created by all living things. It surrounds us and penetrates us. It binds the galaxy together” Obi-Wan and Yoda, who both use this line of dialogue, function as teachers in Lucas’ Campbell-esque hero’s journey. These teachers serve as a kind of translator for the audience through the character Luke, expositing Eastern philosophy dressed up as “the Force.” One of the concepts that is core to Buddhism and important to examine if we are to understand how the Force works is semantic dualism or two truths. Semantic dualism holds that there are two truth predicates, “relative or worldly truth (samvriti satya) and absolute truth (paramartha satya)” or as we will say herein, conventional reality and ultimate reality (Hanh, 121) In conventional reality we use the concept of “I,” such as, ‘I am going to the store.’ The “I” in this case is a convenient placeholder when considering conventional reality, not a true denotation of self. For the Buddhist Reductionist, the “I” can be reduced to “trope-quanta, the first micro-level populated by homogeneous entities, because further divisions only exist mathematically/conceptually” (Repetti, 72). Thus we are left with no partite remainder of a conscious being; therefore semantically it is more correct to use the term non-self when referencing the agent of personhood. The ‘I’ in this paper when referencing to the “conventional self is just this, a convenient designator for the complex causal series that is the psychophysicological complex as a whole” (Siderits, Lecture). Ultimate reality has been compared to a sort of “fabric,” this fabric is the energy field that is so often referenced in the films. The Force is ultimate reality.
53
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Yet Lucas in his films provides us with certain proofs of the hypothetical. For one, he takes knowledge of ultimate reality a step further by allowing his characters to manipulate the physical illusion. In conventional reality we see this exhibited as a lightsaber being telekinetically retrieved from across a room or an X-Wing fighter being lifted from the swamp. And not just nonliving objects, but living beings as well are subject to this manipulation; storm troopers are given the old Jedi mind trick, Darth Vader crushing the esophagus of his commanders. There is a caveat there though, “only weak minded” can be controlled. So we observe that one’s relationship to ultimate reality has an affect on their ability to be, or not to be, manipulated by another agent who has a profound relationship to the Force. We also can make the statement based on our on screen observations, that the soul of an agent exists; and this soul is everlasting, it exists for all time. So we see that within the Star Wars fantasy we can make the contra-statements: (1) The soul is real and eternal; (2) Semantic Dualism exists; and we can consider these knowledge when otherwise we could not. Free Will and Causal Reality The attempt to answer the question of will here on Earth has yielded two extremes. On one end d’Holbach, who argues for total causality, where all of one’s actions are, “a line that nature commands him to describe upon the surface of the earth, without his ever being able to swerve from it, even for an instant.” (Chaffee, 178). And on the other end Sartre, the champion of free will who commands from the perspective that “existence precedes essence… that man first of all is a being who hurls himself toward a future and who is conscious of imagining himself as being in the future.” (Chaffee, 205). When we discuss the possibility of free will, we say that an agent is free if said agent has the possibility to chose one action over another. Additionally, to say that an agent is free, is to say that said agent is responsible, ethically, morally or otherwise for any action committed by them; and thus is deserving for any praise or punishment in reference to said action. A compatibilist, like the determinist, holds the view that all events, including human actions are causally determined, “however… we can consider human actions ‘free’ if they are the result of internal motivations” (Chaffee, 174). The origins of compatibilism are modern, and come to philosophical discourse in light of the incompatibility movement; it is important to note that there are no compatibilists if there are no incompatibilists to argue the dissenting opinion (Siderits, Lecture). There are two types of incompatibilist, the hard determinist like d’Holbach who states that there is no free will, and the libertarian like Sartre who holds that all actions are freely chosen. Within the types of compatibilism, and emerging model, paleo-compatibilism works to create a system that is digestible to both East and West. These thinkers prefer to make the ‘paleo’ distinction when naming their form of compatibilism; for a neo-compatibilist will try to argue within the framework of incompatibilism, a paleo-compatibilist works from outside of incompatibilism with the view that, “freedom required for moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism about the factors relevant to moral assessment, since freedom and determinism are true in distinct and incommensurable ways” (Siderits, 30). 54
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
So what constitutes internal motivations for characters in the Star Wars galaxy, and how do we define these agents as being free? The answer to this is I suggest, depends on an agent’s relationship to the Force. The more an agent’s understanding is of ultimate reality the more free they are, because free will as I will argue, is possible only in ultimate reality. One goes from conventional reality as the illusion of a physical form or a non-self, to an understanding of ultimate reality via intentionless meditation; in Star Wars this is called, “learning the ways of the Force” in Buddhism this is called awakening. This meditative process is a practice that allows a character to become increasingly, “One with the Force,” e.g. Darth Vader in his hyperbaric chamber, a Whirling Dervish, Luke standing on his hands. In Star Wars this process of awakening is shown through Luke’s journey; going from practicing sword play with the blaster shield of his helmet down, to tentatively retrieving a lightsaber on Hoth, to full scale manipulation of the minds of Jabba’s minions on Tattoine. So in Return of The Jedi, Yoda begins the film as the most free having the strongest relationship to the Force, after his passing, Darth Vader takes the top spot, Luke is a close second, and Han the skeptic is far, far behind. My approach is stark departure from traditional paleo-compatibilism in many ways. Principally, paleo-campatibilists seek to construct a semantic dualism in which on the conventional level “persons exist and have free will, and the ultimate in which there are no persons but only person-series that are entirely determined by impersonal causes” (Repetti, 90). Semantic dualists who posit compatibilism have to struggle with the logic of a non-self having causal relations, I have the luxury of Star Wars logic, complete with an eternal soul on the ultimate level. As well, I am not burdened with appeasing thousands of years of tradition. Buddhist Reductionists did not use semantic dualism as paleo-compatibility do to, “show how freedom and responsibility are possible in a deterministic universe,” but to “solve several difficulties arising from their acceptance of karma and rebirth” (Siderits, 37). Lucas shows us that the doctrine of karma and rebirth in the Star Wars galaxy is a false hypothesis. So where compatibilists working within the East West paradigm struggle with rebirth based on a previous life’s merit or demerit, I get to throw the baby out and keep the bathwater, replacing karma with a bifurcated soul, keeping semantic dualism and ignoring heaven and it’s associated claims about afterlife. From this framework when Han kills Greedo in A New Hope, he is morally responsible on an ultimate impartite level for this action, but on the conventional level this action is outside the jurisprudence of morality for two reasons (1) there is no Han and there is no Greedo and (2) this action is causally determined. But if all actions are determined on the conventional level, then the agent is not free to choose because there is no possibility of choice; therefore there is not morality that can be reasonably assigned to an action. So how is it then that we can assign moral and ethical qualifiers to these characters such as, Jabba is a degenerate and Uncle Owen and Aunt Beru were innocent victims?
Knowledge and Ultimate Reality How do we go from the ersatz freedom of conventional reality to the moral responsibility of ultimate reality? Knowledge of the force is the fundamental aspect in an agent becoming one with the Force. Remember, one can only become one with the Force through ultimate knowledge, which is not conventionally possible. “We enter the door of practice through relative truth,” writes Buddhist philosopher Thich Nhat Hanh, “but if we know how to use it, it can help us penetrate ultimate reality itself” (212, 130). Here it might be helpful to define who according to Lucas, can have such knowledge. We can contemplate a rock or an X-Wing fighter and say
55
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
‘this object is not living’. We can contemplate a plant or the creature that lives in the trash compactor in The New Hope and say this is a living thing as it meets the scientific criteria of being alive. But to be a capable of oneness with the force to the degree of transcendence to ultimate reality is to have a certain threshold of rationality. This definition however is slightly vague, as one only needs to look at the droids and say that these are rational beings. The threshold that I am going to implement in this case is: a living rational being, must first meet the scientific criteria of being alive, and by rational we will say that said agent must be able to achieve total enlightenment, or in Lucas’s galaxy oneness with the force; whether or not the causal reality of their existence even allows for this opportunity. One is contextually a rational being if the manifestation of itself as an illusion is of sound enough mind to achieve awakening; assuming the circumstances, such as a proper teacher, exist. This increasing of knowledge as a strengthening of a capacity to use the Force is evidenced when Luke, on Hoth, struggling to retrieve his lightsaber and then after his stint on Dagobah he is able perform this task with ease. Practice is the bridge between the two realities that, according to Buddhist Reductionists, there is “full semantic insulation between the two discourses. No statement having an ultimate truth-value can have a conventional truth-value” (Siderits, 36). So throughout the trilogy we see evidence of characters increasing their knowledge and power thorough practice that cannot be related conventionally. So we can see how free will can exist, and not exist, based upon knowledge of what is conventionally unknowable. Once inside of this meditative state a “self” can be shaped by ultimate reality, however it is important to note that ultimate reality, or the force, is what shapes the self, not the self. Once an agent leaves the meditative state they are morally enhanced, but still subject to the hard deterministic causality of conventional reality. A rational being can retreat into and out of meditative states that lead to awakening and transcendence with ultimate reality. Darth Vader as a Case Study So let us go to a case study to illustrate this model in real time. Darth Vader, a character who goes through an incredible range of change during the entirety of the space opera. No character seems to embody more literally and metaphysically Sartre’s statement that “man chooses his own self… in making this choice he also chooses all men.” (Chaffee208). Anakin “chooses” the dark side and becomes Vader to restore order to the galaxy. Cinematically, Vader as a persona is the kind of abstraction who demands obedience. Vader is order via intimidation, punishing all who oppose his sense of order, murdering wantonly by “a conscious decision, which is subsequent to what we have already made of ourselves… a manifestation of an earlier, more spontaneous choice that is called ‘will’”(Sartre, 205). But from a Star Wars stand point Vader/Anakin is also prophecy. Living out his existence in Lucas’ fantasy as the Chosen One. When Vader tosses the emperor into the reactor he fulfills this prophecy against what his, up to that point, stated intentions were. So with all this talk about prophetic vision, and then the fulfillment of said prophecy, we can assume that events in the galaxy are causally related. Thus when considering the frame work of Star Wars a libertarian reductionist Vader fails to maintain its own inner logic is it is an agent that “tries to preserve agency and moral responsibility by introducing agent causation into a world where the psychophysical elements are already in through going causal interaction” (Siderits, 42). Not to mention, from the point that a, “Buddhist cannot espouse the libertarian form of incompatibilism “(Siderits, 30). So libertarianism goes down the shaft with Palpatine. 56
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
So what of hard determinism? If all is as d’Holbach reasons, “life is a line that nature commands him to describe upon the surface of the earth, without his ever being able to swerve from it, even for an instant. He is born with out his own consent... it is pretended that he is a free agent” (Chaffee, 179). This seems to hold true for Anakin turned the Dark Lord, who despite being one of the most ardent supporters of the dark side still is unable to escape its prophetic destiny. Looking at Darth’s knee jerk reaction to telekinetically choking his commanders, he seems unable to do anything else but suffocate them at every turn. In fact, the only decision that he makes that comes as any surprise is the decision at the end of the entire series to kill Palpatine and save Luke. However this is not the first time that Darth has opposed the emperor in order to save Luke. When receiving a transmission about a “disturbance in the force” in the asteroid field, Darth saves Luke by suggesting that he can be saved if he can be turned to the Dark side. Anakin’s inference to Palpatine here is that because Obi-Wan is dead Luke can no longer be trained in the ways of the Jedi. So to say that his mind was changed in the end of the trilogy is incorrect, it seems more that the complex emotions (as well as a bit of cinematic teasing) are what played out in the end of Return of the Jedi, but the decision of Anakin to save his son is never in question. This suggests that life for Anakin is determined. In the Empire Strikes Back we fist see Darth Vader’s meditation chamber when the fleet comes out of light speed in preparations to attack the ice planet in the Hoth system. Disappointed with Admiral Ozzel, Darth contacts him on the screen and proceeds to choke him to death. This choking action is the same as in the previous film with a marked difference: Vader no longer needs to hold out his and to mime the squeezing of the esophagus, he does not need to step forward, the action is effortless. He is getting stronger with the force. So we have walking prophecy Darth Vader, Dark Sith Lord, formerly Anakin Skywalker. Darth’s actions are causally determined within the illusion of conventional reality, but he is also morally responsible for these actions, which he has no control over, as he has knowledge of the Force via a practice of meditation that offers him insight into the true nature of reality. It is this insight that allows Darth to be shaped by ultimate reality, which although he is not in control of, he also is. This is possible due to an invocation of paleo-compatibilism, which is itself an invocation of semantic dualism, which makes free will, and determinism in the galaxy is compatible. In other words, the actions that one commits, one has no conventional control over, but the tenor of the person, or the tone in which said person conducts themselves is ultimately malleable. This is how we can say one is morally responsible for their actions.
The Force as God According to Buddhism, once one attains total enlightenment they are liberated form the process of reincarnation. This is evidenced in the evaporation of the physical self’s of Yoda and Obi-Wan, or the moment in which these characters become God. It would seem though, that Darth manages this feat despite the fact that he does not dissolve into the either. We see him standing with Yoda and Obi-Wan in the final montage of heroes. This would then suggest that Lucas breaks from the Eastern tradition of demanding enlightenment as a ticket of entry for becoming free from the cycle of rebirth. Here his religious structure takes a turn for the Western, in that all beings that exist in his conventional reality also have a bifurcated soul (or we can glibly say non-soul).
57
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
So then Luke, Han, Darth Vader, and even Jabba are to some degree God in the partite sense, but to become God ultimately is to become totally awakened; to become one with the Force. God, as we know, is a very generic term. God in this sense, it is best understood as a consciousness. The Force as God consciousness is ultimate impartite reality; the differences depend almost entirely on context. So in Star wars, God is monotheistic ubiquitous and non- existent. So ultimately Lucas gives us the best of both worlds, we become God; we can achieve a oneness with the fabric that binds us, and we get to keep our conscious self, quite a happy ending indeed.
58
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Works Cited d’Holbach, Paul Henri Thiry, Baron. “The System of Nature.” The Philosopher’s Way: A Text With Readings: Thinking Critically about Profound Ideas 4th ed. Ed. John
Chaffee. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2013. Print. Hanh, Thich Nhat. “The Heart of the Buddha’s Teaching.” New York: Broadway Books. 1998. Print. Sartre, Jean-Paul. “Existentialism Is a Humanism” The Philosopher’s Way: A Text With Readings: Thinking Critically about Profound Ideas 4th ed. Ed. John Chaffee.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2013. Print. Siderits, Mark. “Buddhist Paleo-Compatibilism. University of Chicago’s South Asia Seminar. Lecture, 2 November 2006. Podcast. http://chiasmos.uchicago.edu/events/siderits.shtml accessed 5 December 2012. ---, “Buddhist Reductionism and Paleo-Compatibilism.” Sophia Vol. 47:29-42. 23 April 2008. Repetti, Riccardo. “Buddhist Reductionism and Free Will: Paleo-compatibilism.” The Journal of Buddhist Ethics. Vol. 19 2012. http://blogs.dickerson.edu/buddhistethics. Web, 2 December 2012. Robinson, Walter (Ritoku). “The Far East of Star Wars.” Eberl, Jason T. Star Wars and Philosophy: More Powerful Than You Can Possibly Imagine. Print Deckler and Jason T. Eberl. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2005. Print. Lucas, George, dir. Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope. Twentieth Century Fox, 1977. Film. ---, producer. Star Wars Episode V: The Empire Strikes Back. Twentieth Century Fox. 1980. Film. ---, producer. Star Wars Episode VI: The Return of The Jedi. Twentieth Century Fox. 1983. Film.
59
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
The Zombie in the Mirror Johnny Cercado City University of New York – LaGuardia Community College
In the film 28 Days Later, directed by Danny Boyle, civilization is plagued by a virus called rage. This virus is unknowingly released by a group of angry animal activist. The viral outbreak results in an epidemic that transforms its victims into brutish and violent beings. The movie follows a small group of survivors who struggle with survival in this zombie filled world. The film uses the uncanny as defined by Sigmund Freud in “The Uncanny” and the ideas found in Thomas Hobbes “The Leviathan” to help examine and criticize the role of Nietzsche’s slave and master morality in society. In Nietzschean essay Good and Evil, from “The Genealogy of Morals of Moral” he claims that in master morality “the concept good is essentially identical with the concept useful” (27). Slave morality on the other hand is the opposite, in slave morality “the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; suffering, deprived, sick ugly alone are pious… the powerful and noble, are on the contrary the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless to all eternity; and you shall be in all eternity the unblessed, accursed, and damned” (34). Nietzsche claims that these two set of moral values where in conflict and that “the masters have been disposed of; the morality of the common man has won” (36) in his essay. This is the status quo of morality that the world of 28 Days Later is in but rather than resentful priest we find a more modern form of slave morality in the animal activists that break into a university lab. The activist’s values the impotent, suffering, and deprived, and as a result feel the need to save the helpless animals. The activist perceives the scientists who experiment on the apes as evil and because of this they are consumed by rage. Their rage can find its origin in the hating of evil and this hating of evil that is encouraged by slave morality is what the movie criticizes. This can be seen in the way the rage virus spreads among society and results in dismantling of society. This self-destruction of society can be seen in cities uncanny atmosphere. According to Freud the uncanny is what is familiar and foreign to us at the same time. The first major uncanny component we see in the film that fits Freud’s definition is the city itself. The protagonist Jim finds himself in empty hospital. As Jim begins to explore his surroundings it becomes apparent that the entire city is empty. The city becomes, because of the lack of people, uncanny. A similar uncanny experience to Jim’s is shared by Sigmund Freud. Freud says:
Once, as I was walking through the deserted streets of a provincial town in Italy which was strange to me, on a hot summer afternoon. I found myself in a quarter the character of which could not long remain in doubt. Nothing but painted women was to be seen at the windows of the small houses, and I hastened to leave the narrow street at the next turning. But after having wandered about for a while without being directed. I suddenly found myself back in the same street….Now; however, a feeling overcame me which I can only describe as uncanny.(11) The emptiness and familiar streets both resulted in Jim’s and Freud’s uncanny feelings. Another uncanny component shown in the film is the zombies. The zombies are almost human but not just quite. This disconnect is unsettling. In fact the zombies in 28 Days Later are especially disturbing. These aren’t the decrepit walking dead found in older movies; instead we have the walking livings, who are our neighbors, family, and friends. While the zombies are 60
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
familiar in the sense that they look human and foreign in that they are monsters another understanding of uncanny shows the relationship between the zombies and the director’s criticisms of society. Freud also said the uncanny is what is repressed and somehow returns. The citizens of Britain were normal prior to being infected with the virus. After infection the virus triggered what was repressed, their rage, and returned it to the surface. In this scenario the virus is the “somehow” that returns the repression to the surface. If the rage of the zombie was always there but just repressed then it could be said that the characteristics the director gave the zombies is what he thinks is repressed in every human. Similar to Thomas Hobbes, the director thinks that man is a selfish and violent creature. Further proof of this shared philosophy of social contract theory between the director and Hobbes can be seen in the actions and beliefs of the characters. For example, in “The Leviathan”, Thomas Hobbes claims that in nature, man is in a state of war and “In such a war nothing is unjust “because “there is no law; where no law, no injustice” (Hobbes 83). Hobbes also describes the three principal causes of this conflict as “first, competition; second, diffidence; thirdly, glory” (Hobbes 81). Selina, one of the two survivors who originally found Jim, adapts to the viral outbreak by living by Thomas Hobbes’s philosophy. The affirmation of Hobbes’s claims can be seen in Selina’s treatment of her original partner Mark and her initial treatment of Jim. Early in the movie Mark is infected with rage and without hesitation Selina begins to chop Mark up in to bits. Selina’s ability to completely disregard Marks life comes from diffidence. Her personal security takes priority over everything else. Her vicious murder might seem unjust but to Selina, who has accepted that world is in a state of chaos, understands that the typical rules of law don’t apply and survival is all that matters. These same principles come up again when Selina is offering an exhausted Jim a drink and as soon the zombies make their presence known she immediately leaves Jim behind. Even when Selina is kind she quickly switches to Hobbesian instincts when her survival is in jeopardy. Another example of Hobbesian thought can also be seen in the character Major Henry West. During a welcome dinner for Jim and his group, Major West explains his personal view of the world after the viral outbreak, he says “This is what I’ve seen in the four weeks since infection, people killing people, which Is much of what I saw in the four weeks before infection and in the four before that and before that, as far back as I care to remember. People killing people which to my mind put us to in a state of normality right now” (28 Days Later). The Major’s view of man is violent and destructive. He believes like Hobbes that in nature man is always “in a war of everyone against every one” (Hobbes 82). Major West’s ideas are seen again when he asks Jim “who have you killed, since it has begun who have you killed!? You wouldn’t be alive now if you hadn’t killed someone.” Jim admits he killed a boy. Major West reminds Jim that survival is the motive and that in this zombie world, killing is a necessity. While the trigger for the zombie’s return to rage is clearly the virus, the explanation for the humans to return to Hobbesian inspired violence isn’t so clear. At first glance it might seem like survival against zombies is the reason but this would be an over simplification, since, as Major West points out the selfish interest for survival is always present. What changed in the movies was not the need for survival in it of it-self but the means of survival so the better question is what caused the change in means of survival? Through this question the director forces the audience to think about what exactly is missing to connect humans to their repressed brutishness. By using Freud’s uncanny city the director leads the audience to the same freighting conclusion Jim has when he yells, “of course there’s a government. There's always a government, they're in a bunker or a plane, somewhere!”(28 Days Later). The government is
61
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013 gone. Without a government, the movie creates a world reminiscent of the world described in Thomas Hobbes’s “The Leviathan” that is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 82). Jim, unlike Selina and Major West, does not begin the story with the survivalist mentality required to survive Hobbesian like state. Jim instead maintains the standard ethical beliefs held by society prior to the viral outbreak, which are aligned with the values of slave morality. He has yet to switch over to an ethical system which values master morality and would encourage him to adapt traits that would be of use to him. Jim is later forced to change his sentimentalities when Major West claims that the men need the women for the sake of the future and as result they take the women as prisoners to be used as sex objects. The reasoning behind this conflict matches Thomas Hobbes description of man in a natural state. Hobbes writes, “Men are by nature equal…from equality proceeds diffidence...from diffidence war.” (Hobbes 81-82). The Major gives Jim the option of joining him. This choice that the Major offers to Jim is a truce that is “extorted by fear” (Hobbes 86) and is given with a “sword” to Jim’s neck. In the climax of the movie, the women become the diffidence that justifies the conflict and the battle between Jim and the military group ends up being caused by a combination of competition over the women and their safety. During the battle between Jim and the military unit, Jim in order to the overcome an oppressive regime of Major West transforms into something uncannily similar to the zombies. This signifies his switch in slave morality to master morality. For example, earlier in the film Jim criticizes Selina for killing Mark, a fellow survivor, because she showed no mercy and asks “How did you know he was infected” (28 days later). Her lack of compassion is sickening to him and he uses his affinity for mercy to justify his criticisms. In contrast, during Jim’s battle against the soldiers, he has no issues in killing his human enemies even when they are begging. Here he begins to fight like a zombie and joins the ranks of admirable barbarians that Nietzsche mentions in his essay “The Genealogy of Morals.” Jim through his transformation acquires all the traits the audience finds dangerous in the zombies; their cruelty, lust, insatiability and power, the same traits that are encouraged in master morality. Jim is no longer the weakling that Selina left behind while running from zombies, instead he is a strong willed warrior, stalking the soldiers. With this change comes the defeat of the soldiers. The directors choice to make Jim weak from the beginning and have him change through the story implies that to defeat an abusive authority like the soldiers, a switch is needed in values that goes from patiently weak to self-affirmably strong. The film starts by showing how the consequential effects of slave morality can turn seemingly good people into hateful and rage full beings and how despite their good intentions, can end up causing needless destruction. With the idea of evil, born from slave morality, rage spreads like an epidemic and becomes justified, resulting in society’s collapse. The director is also concerned with justifying the rejected values of master morality in today’s society. By forcing Jim to transform into something uncannily familiar to a zombie and placing him under an abusive leader, the director shows how the values that contemporary society shuns as evil can still have place in society. While master morality can be a vicious answer to oppression, unlike slave morality it doesn’t create the same unhealthy feelings of resentment and hate that lead to a zombie apocalypse.
62
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Works Cited “28 Days Later”. Dir, Danny Boyle. 20th Century Fox, 2002. Film
Hobbes, Thomas. “The Leviathan”. What is Justice?. ED. Robert C. Solomon and Mark
C. Murphy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, 81-92.Print.
Freud, Sigmund. “The Uncanny”. What is Justice?. ED. Robert C. Solomon and
Mark C. Murphy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, 81-92.Print.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “The Genealogy of Morals”. Tran. Walter Kaufman and R.J.
HollingdaleED. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books. Print.
63
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
The Truth Strikes and Bites Back Mira Vuorinen City University of New York – LaGuardia Community College
I often feel that something has changed in our society. Familiar and unfamiliar linger in the air yet I can’t properly define that abstract sensation without deeper analysis. Feeling that we lack something crucial in our lives somehow reflects from the environment. The daily hurry carries something unsatisfying in it and stigmatizes the society with hollow meanings of life. I will examine that void feeling through the movie 28 Days Later and a definition of uncanny. I claim that uncanny is an experience of highly industrialized society where human beings lost contact with themselves. What once was good, or better yet familiar, turns against the society. The virus in the movie is a symbol of the uncanny: how intentions only aiming for the benefit of few selected eventually destroys the society. I will first examine how Freud defines the uncanny and how it relates to the movie and to the society. Secondly I’ll represent Rousseau’s social contract theory and show how the errors of the society that the uncanny virus has caused in 28 Days Later can be seen through the theory. Thirdly, I’ll bring Marx to the discussion and show how the industrialization has brought sense of uncanny to our society and how in 28 Days Later that uncanny causes alienation.
28 Days Later 28 Days Later illustrates the survival story of a few people unknown to each other. The movie begins at Cambridge University laboratory. Monkeys in cages that are part of the medical research are infected by “rage”. A group of animal activists catches the infection while setting the monkeys free. The chaos is born. Jim, one of the main characters, wakes up in an empty hospital 28 days later after the first contamination. Jim’s wandering on the streets of the London shows the empty city. What once was society is now abandoned land and human beings survive as an individual. Jim finds his way to the church. Bodies are covering the floor of the sacred place and what breaks the silence is an infected priest trying to attack Jim. Two more survivors, Selena and Mark, save Jim. The group is formed quite accidentally as they escape from the church together. Selena and Mark inform Jim how the virus called rage has collapsed the whole society and caused the disruption by turning people into zombies. It is very unclear how many have survived and how far the rage has spread. Paris and New York are the last geographical coordinates. Jim, Selena and Mark continue their journey to Jim’s parents’ house. His parents are lying in bed dead after committing suicide. The group’s presence is noticed by zombies and Mark gets badly wounded and infected during the attack. Selena kills Mark in the name of survival. There can’t be any weaknesses or danger in the group and Selena’s motive for killing is to protect at least herself if not also Jim – together they have better changes to survive if they both aim for that. Jim’s and Selena’s journey continue and they meet two more survivors: Frank and his daughter Hannah. They plan to get through together and work as a team. Frank dies during the battle of survival and Jim, Selena and Hannah form an even tighter, almost family-like, society together. Their final physical fight happens in an army base where
64
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Major Henry eventually creates tension and rage inside the “safe” walls. The three survivals lives are threatened in that small corrupted society. In the end Jim, Selena and Hannah have survived and go to the house in the countryside. They are working together for help but even when their attempt is noticed it remains unclear if they will ever be saved from that chaos and disorder which now is dominant condition.
Freud and Uncanny For Freud uncanny is something that already exists in the society, it has always been there but the familiar sense of that thing has chanced opposite, something unfamiliar — to become unfamiliar the object needs to have a sense of familiar in it. In “The ‘Uncanny’” Freud represents the concept of unheimlich: first through dictionary meanings from different languages and then proceeds to the psychological definition of unheimlich, the uncanny. That is something concealed, repressed and meant to be kept out of sight. It might not be totally strange, and we can identify something of ourselves in it as a threat, but the uncanny doesn’t seem to have place in our common world. Freud accentuates in his work the primitive fears that create the feeling of uncanny: “It is no matter for surprise that the primitive fear of the dead is still so strong within us and always ready to come to the surface at any opportunity. Most likely our fear still contains the old belief that the deceased becomes the enemy of his survivor and wants to carry him off to share his new life with him” (Freud 14). The fear of the death returning is relevant here: it is the fear of something that used to be good in our society turning against. The first scene of 28 Days Later depicts this dystopian vision. Medical science has created something that can actually destroy the human kind though that science is usually associated as cure in society. The activists setting chimps free launch a chain of events where the hidden development of medical sciences turns against the society. The “rage” spreads fast and quickly turns human beings to creatures that has humane features but are full with anger and blood thirst. The concept of zombies created in the environment of scientific achievements has a sense of something uncanny, the familiar has turned unfamiliar. There are two scenes when Jim wakes up: first in the hospital and second time in the country house when the active part of the battle is done. Both times there is a moment of wonder: is he just dreaming of his worst fears — dreaming of something repressed. There is a sense of truth in his dreams and whatever is happening is somehow possible with its familiar content but the good forces has turned wrong: what once was sacred, or kept as sacred, is now under the same rage that controls the society. In the army base such a hierarchy and precedence is turned upside down. Soldiers are acting like animals trying to rape the women, Selena and Hannah. They are neglecting their duties and instead of protection offering just fear. The movie makes a clear statement that our nowadays society won’t function if we give ourselves titles and privileges based on nothing else than rank order and privileges of few selected. In 28 Days Later the zombies represent the double, “insurance against the destruction of ego” (Freud 9). Freud specifies that fear of the double is the denial of death and inanimate suddenly being animate is a fearful reflection of ourselves (Freud 9). In the movie the fear of double is very tangible and fear of transformation real. Where the criticism lies here is the fear of being a primitive creature and losing the supremacy, control over the society. The man-made technology literally attacks back. We have automatic assumption that our contemporary culture with its great technology is our greatest achievement. In the movie Selena’s theories of survival 65
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013 and how other people will just slow her way to make it out alive is an allegory of how we act today. At some point we might even see other human beings as a double and recognize in them weaknesses we don’t want to recognize in ourselves or in something that we produce. We fear of being unsuccessful creatures and our selfish fears of being the lower class of the society are the fear that causes inequality and turns people and their achievements against each other. Rousseau and Social Contract Theory In The Discourse on the Origins of Inequality and The Social Contract Rousseau considers human being as good and equal. Life is something human nature preserves, but human being can also prioritize his own life in danger: “His duties toward others are not uniquely dictated to him by the belated lessons of wisdom; and as long as he does not resist the inner impulse of compassion, he will never harm another man or even another sentient being, except in the legitimate instance where, if his preservation were involved, he is obliged to give preference to himself” (Rousseau 102). Human being is good and he has natural instinct to preserve of life of other sentient beings through the feeling of pity. The natural feeling of pity guides Jim, Selena, Mark, Hannah and Frank. They find themselves in the state of nature, form their own society where they are equal as sentient beings and feel empathy towards each other. Selena’s affection to Hannah depicts the inner impulse of compassion, empathy. They all have their liberty in a group and their political agenda is based on prototype of family which Rousseau describes as follows: “the leader is the image of the father, the populace is the image of the children, and, since all are born equal and free, none give up their liberty except for their utility” (Rousseau 111). The humane feelings of affection and caring besides of the general will are the ones that fulfill Jim’s, Selena’s and Hannah’s potential as a society. Rousseau states that having property is the reason for forming a society and having a social contract or otherwise the possession causes inequality in society. Rousseau’s ideal situation is that even in society where individuals agree and give up their freedom for greater benefit they do have feeling of freedom in functional society. Yet in a broken society there are no legitimate instances. The rulers of the deserted city are the zombies: the incarnation of the corruption in the society. All the survivors need to put themselves first in order to protect each other. Rousseau states that even in the state itself the strongest is never strong enough to be master all the times. In 28 Days Later the fighting could be seen in the weakness and corruption of the legitimate instance: the ruler’s greed for higher achievements in society, like the “rage”, eventually endangers the whole society. Fear and tyranny are not the right way to lead the society. Individual freedom suffocates under the fear. The more Jim fights against the corruption of the society, the zombies, more powerful he becomes. Jim reaches the level of the state of nature but eventually, all covered in blood, it’s hard to say if he has become a zombie too. Rousseau writes that man is more aware of his capability as individual in the state of nature: “If he had had a ladder, would he climb a tree so nimbly? If he had had a horse, would he run so fast?” (Rousseau 104). Jim clearly finds his individual strength while fighting against the zombies but the rage he fights against is changing him too. Society weakens our ability to survive as individual or better said weakens our natural way of act. But if we don’t have the society do we have the general will to obtain the same good? Rousseau himself saw society complex concept which questioned individuality. I feel that the fight against zombies expresses this contradiction very well.
66
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Tyranny means enslaving another man, alienating him, to give or sell and this is harmful to society (Rousseau 111). In 28 Days Later the empty city shows how society under such a chaotic circumstances caused by the society itself has lost its ability to survive but also to function. Tyranny has left little freedom to human beings to maintain their natural strengths: “It is the same for man himself. In becoming habituated to the ways of society and a slave, he becomes weak, fearful, and servile; his soft and effeminate lifestyle completes the enervation of both his strength and his courage” (Rousseau 104). The army presents both weaknesses of the society and the tyranny. In the scene where infected soldier kept outside attacks culminates the whole tension of hierarchy and shows individual’s inability to survive from what the society has become. The society based on obedience and inequality and not enough individual liberty to feel safe shows its other side: the hidden failure and danger strikes back. The possession of private property has turned individuals into a possession of society. Alienating act of taking away man’s dignity makes him weak. Marx And Alienation In Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Karl Marx criticizes the industrialized society and capitalism for causing alienation: individuals and groups become rejected by society and society functions by private ownership. External labor is self-sacrifice and the work doesn’t belong to the worker, it belongs to employer. Marx separates religion from the fall of mankind. He approaches the subject from an economic fact. In Marx’s theory the alienation is caused by human actions and the uncanny can be seen not only through the forms of alienation but through the reason that causes the alienation. “Labor produces not only commodities: it produces itself and the worker as commodity – and this in the same general proportion in which it produces commodities” (Marx 107). Mass production and consumption creates greed. In 28 Days Later the greed turns against the society: the creators which also possess the workforce. The zombies are the product that has turned against the society. They are familiar yet a product of something new and unrecognizable—the achievements of the alienating forces and possession of capital. The attack of zombies criticizes the form of production: the worker is zombie just as much as the product. The theme of greed is crucial in the movie and the reason behind the born of uncanny. The medical science development called “rage” turns against its creators. Marx states that “the only wheels which political economy sets in motion are greed and the war amongst the greedy— competition” (Marx 107). When the group of zombies attacks the tunnel where Jim, Selena, Frank and Hannah are stuck the fast running, rage and thirst for human flesh feels greedy. They satisfy their needs by hunting and infecting and the rage, the greed, spreads in the society. In the tunnel two formerly separated societies encounter. The survivors work to stay alive: “Indeed, labor, life activity, productive life itself, appears in the first place merely as a means of satisfying need—the need of maintaining physical existence” (Marx 113). The group of survivors fights against the greed of the society and the pressure of it is tangible. It positions the survivors to the situation where they have very little choices to decide what to do with their lives. They can surrender and get infected or fight back and protect each other. Even when preserving each other’s lives the idea of group having better chances to survive reminds that their activity’s meaning is no more and no less than to stay alive. The destruction of society has caused alienation from the nature, from the self and from the product: “Man is a conscious being that he makes his life activity, his essential being, a mere 67
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013 his existence“ (Marx 113). In the movie zombies represent the existence of man-made activity. The history of zombies relates to the idea of possessing someone and using the possession as a slave. The zombie is something repressed: we don’t want to believe that slavery exists in our society yet the enslaving actions are still present. This is indicative of Marx’s idea of alienating power of labor. The mere of survivors’ existence is to survive— fight against the society to maintain their life. The army doesn’t do any better though it represents safety of the society: no society is safe if alienation and inequality exist. The army’s commands and rules accentuate the hierarchy of society. The hierarchy is the reason for the failure to save society from the zombies. Then we have the zombies. Marx states that “worker becomes slave of his object” (Marx 109). In 28 Days Later it’s not only individuals becoming slaves of the chaotic circumstances but the whole society, even the creators of the virus, become slaves of what the greed intentions produced. The life activity is defining the existence. This struggle is physically seen in Jim’s battle against the zombies, the attack of society, and for a moment the same blood thirst is present in his character…until the bike courier returns. The virus is the possession that strikes back, the uncanny: “Private property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, the alienated labor” (Marx 117). The virus has alienated the city and what is left is the hollow silence when the virus, the zombies, can’t survive without the human who created them. This is the cycle: the born, the existence and destruction are caused by refining the society.
We Shall Conclude The uncanny is the possession of private property in society. The need to possess has become insatiable and generated greed. Rousseau accentuates the equality between human beings and the society as a union which individuals benefit from. The possession of private property creates comparison. Marx states that private property creates competition. Industrialized society takes away the meaning of individual and turns the individual just to be part of the bigger machine — into a “zombie”. The machine that keeps society progressing alienates individual from the self. Freud’s uncanny comes alive. The possibility of zombies’ existence in 28 Days Later was already present in the virus before the first creature was even born. The intended creation turned out to be opposite and embodied the fear of double: the fear of failure and losing the control over a society. The uncanny force – the human being – that has power to create unfamiliar from familiar created the virus. The very same force turned the society against itself by forcing people to fight against each other. The survivors fight against what they are afraid becoming of – they are fighting against the insatiable need to have more, the greed.
68
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Works Cited Freud, Sigmund. “The Uncanny.” 1919. Print. Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Print. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Discourse on the Origins of Inequality and The Social Contract (1712-1778).Print.
69
LaGuardia Community College Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2013
Read Previous Issues of The Gadfly here:
http://www.lagcc.cuny.edu/philosophy/gadfly/
If you would like to submit a paper for publication in the next issue of The Gadfly, send it to: [email protected] with your name and “Gadfly Submission” in the subject line. Please include your name and school in the body of the email.
Philosophy at LaGuardia Community College [email protected] Become a fan on Facebook and Google Groups! Find us on the web at: http://www.lagcc.cuny.edu/philosophy Philosophy Program – Humanities Department LaGuardia Community College 3110 Thomson Ave E202 Long Island City, NY 11101
70