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provided by Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia (Università degli Studi di Bari) RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2017.0018 Vol. 8 (2017), n. 3, pp. 214-230

STUDI

Reflections on Sam Harris’ “Free Will” Daniel C. Dennett(α)

Ricevuto: 11 aprile 2016; accettato: 10 gennaio 2017

█ Abstract In his book Free Will Sam Harris tries to persuade us to abandon the morally pernicious idea of free will. The following contribution articulates and defends a more sophisticated model of free will that is not only consistent with neuroscience and introspection but also grounds a variety of responsibility that justifies both praise and blame, reward and punishment. This begins with the long lasting parting of opinion between compatibilists (who argue that free will can live comfortably with determinism) and in- compatibilists (who deny this). While Harris dismisses compatibilism as a form of theology, this article aims at showing that Harris has underestimated and misinterpreted compatibilism and at defending a more sophisticated version of compatibilism that is impervious to Harris’ criticism. KEYWORDS: Sam Harris; Free Will; Compatibilism; Incompatibilism; Neuroscience

█ Riassunto Riflessioni su “Free Will” di Sam Harris – Nel suo volume Free Will Sam Harris cerca di persua- derci ad abbandonare l’idea, a suo avviso moralmente perniciosa, del libero arbitrio. Il contributo seguente articola e difende un modello di libero arbitrio che non solo è coerente con le neuroscienze e con l’introspezione, ma che dà anche fondamento a varie forme di responsabilità, giustificando encomio, biasi- mo, premi e punizioni. Ilpunto di partenza è la lunga disputa, di vecchia data, fra compatibilisti (secondo i quali il libero arbitrio può convivere pacificamente con il determinismo) e incompatibilisti (che negano que- sta posizione). Mentre Harris respinge il compatibilismo considerandolo una forma di teologia, questo arti- colo intende mostrare come Harris abbia sottostimato e male interpretato il compatibilismo e come invece sia possibile enucleare una forma di compatibilismo più sofisticata, insensibile alle sue critiche. PAROLE CHIAVE: Sam Harris; Libero arbitrio; Compatibilismo; Incompatibilismo; Neuroscienza

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SAM HARRIS’S FREE WILL1 is a remarkable been brainwashed into believing that you little book, engagingly written and jargon – have – or rather, are – an (immortal, imma- free, appealing to reason, not authority, and terial) soul who makes all your decisions in- written with passion and moral seriousness. dependently of the causes impinging on your This is not an ivory tower technical inquiry; material body and especially your brain, then it is in effect a political tract, designed to per- this is the book for you. Or, if you have dis- suade us all to abandon what he considers to missed dualism but think that what you are is be a morally pernicious idea: the idea of free a conscious (but material) ego, a witness that will. If you are one of the many who have inhabits a nook in your brain and chooses,

(α)Center for Cognitive Studies, Tuft University, 115 Miner Hall - Madford (MA) 02115 USA E-mail: [email protected] ()

Creative Commons - Attribuzione - 4.0 Internazionale

Reflections on Sam Harris’ “Free Will” 215 independently of external causation, all your free will is not just confused but also a major voluntary acts, again, this book is for you. It obstacle to social reform. His brief essay is, is a fine “antidote,” as Paul Bloom says, to however, the most sustained attempt to de- this incoherent and socially malignant illu- velop this theme, which can also be found in sion. The incoherence of the illusion has remarks and essays by such heavyweight sci- been demonstrated time and again in rather entists as the neuroscientists Wolf Singer and technical work by philosophers (in spite of Chris Frith, the psychologists Steven Pinker still finding supporters in the profession), but and Paul Bloom, the physicists Stephen Harris does a fine job of making this appar- Hawking and Albert Einstein, and the evolu- ently unpalatable fact accessible to lay peo- tionary biologists Jerry Coyne and (when he’s ple. Its malignance is due to its fostering the not thinking carefully) Richard Dawkins. idea of Absolute Responsibility, with its at- The book is, thus, valuable as a compact tendant implications of what we might call and compelling expression of an opinion Guilt-in-the-eyes-of-God for the unfortunate widely shared by eminent scientists these days. sinners amongst us and, for the fortunate, the It is also valuable, as I will show, as a veritable arrogant and self-deluded idea of Ultimate museum of mistakes, none of them new and Authorship of the good we do. We take too all of them seductive – alluring enough to lull much blame, and too much credit, Harris ar- the critical faculties of this host of brilliant gues. We, and the rest of the world, would be thinkers who do not make a profession of a lot better off if we took ourselves – our thinking about free will. And, to be sure, these selves – less seriously. We don’t have the mistakes have also been made, sometimes for kind of free will that would ground such Ab- centuries, by philosophers themselves. But I solute Responsibility for either the harm or think we have made some progress in philoso- the good we cause in our lives. phy of late, and Harris and others need to do All this is laudable and right, and vividly their homework if they want to engage with presented, and Harris does a particularly the best thought on the topic. good job getting readers to introspect on I am not being disingenuous when I say this their own decision‐making and notice that it museum of mistakes is valuable; I am grateful just does not conform to the fantasies of this to Harris for saying, so boldly and clearly, what all too traditional understanding of how we less outgoing scientists are thinking but keeping think and act. But some of us have long rec- to themselves. I have always suspected that ognized these points and gone on to adopt many who hold this hard determinist view are more reasonable, more empirically sound, making these mistakes, but we mustn’t put models of decision and thought, and we words in people’s mouths, and now Harris has think we can articulate and defend a more done us a great service by articulating the sophisticated model of free will that is not points explicitly, and the chorus of approval only consistent with neuroscience and intro- he has received from scientists goes a long way spection but also grounds a (modified, toned- to confirming that they have been making down, non-Absolute) variety of responsibility these mistakes all along. Wolfgang Pauli’s fa- that justifies both praise and blame, reward mous dismissal of another physicist’s work as and punishment. We don’t think this variety “not even wrong” reminds us of the value of of free will is an illusion at all, but rather a crystallizing an ambient cloud of hunches into robust feature of our psychology and a relia- something that can be shown to be wrong. ble part of the foundations of morality, law Correcting widespread misunderstanding is and society. Harris, we think, is throwing out usually the work of many hands, and Harris the baby with the bathwater. has made a significant contribution. He is not alone among scientists in com- The first parting of opinion on free will is ing to the conclusion that the ancient idea of between compatibilists and incompatibilists.

216 Dennett

The latter say (with “common sense” and a This concern for varieties of indetermin- tradition going back more than two millen- ism is misplaced, argue the compatibilists: nia) that free will is incompatible with deter- free will is a phenomenon that requires nei- minism, the scientific thesis that there are ther determinism nor indeterminism; the so- causes for everything that happens. Incom- lution to the problem of free will lies in real- patibilists hold that unless there are “random izing this, not banking on the quantum phys- swerves”2 that disrupt the iron chains of icists to come through with the right physics physical causation, none of our decisions or – or a miracle. Compatibilism may seem in- choices can be truly free. Being caused means credible on its face, or desperately contrived, not being free – what could be more obvious? some kind of a trick with words, but not to The compatibilists deny this; they have ar- philosophers. Compatibilism is the reigning gued, for centuries if not millennia, that once view among philosophers (just over 59%, ac- you understand what free will really is (and cording to the 2009 Philpapers survey) with must be, to sustain our sense of moral respon- libertarians coming second with 13% and sibility), you will see that free will can live hard determinists only 12%. It is striking, comfortably with determinism – if determin- then, that all the scientists just cited have ism is what science eventually settles on. landed on the position rejected by almost Incompatibilists thus tend to pin their nine out of ten philosophers, but not so sur- hopes on indeterminism, and hence were much prising when one considers that these scien- cheered by the emergence of quantum inde- tists hardly ever consider the compatibilist terminism in 20th century physics. Perhaps the view or the reasons in its favor. brain can avail itself of undetermined quantum Harris has considered compatibilism, at swerves at the sub-atomic level, and thus es- least cursorily, and his opinion of it is breath- cape the shackles of physical law! Or perhaps takingly dismissive: After acknowledging there is some other way our choices could be that it is the prevailing view among philoso- truly undetermined. Some have gone so far as phers (including his friend Daniel Dennett), to posit an otherwise unknown (and almost en- he asserts that «more than in any other area tirely unanalyzable) phenomenon called agent of academic philosophy, the result resembles causation, in which free choices are caused theology». This is a low blow, and worse fol- somehow by an agent, but not by any event in lows: «from both a moral and a scientific the agent’s history. One exponent of this posi- perspective, this seems deliberately obtuse».3 tion, Roderick Chisholm, candidly acknowl- I would hope that Harris would pause at this edged that on this view every free choice is “a point to wonder – just wonder – whether little miracle” – which makes it clear enough maybe his philosophical colleagues had seen why this is a school of thought endorsed pri- some points that had somehow escaped him marily by deeply religious philosophers and in his canvassing of compatibilism. As I tell shunned by almost everyone else. my undergraduate students, whenever they Incompatibilists who think we have free encounter in their required reading a claim or will, and therefore determinism must be false, argument that seems just plain stupid, they are known as libertarians (which has nothing should probably double check to make sure to do with the political view of the same they are not misreading the “preposterous” name). Incompatibilists who think that all passage in question. It is possible that they human choices are determined by prior events have uncovered a howling error that has in their brains (which were themselves no somehow gone unnoticed by the profession doubt determined by chains of events arising for generations, but not very likely. In this in- out of the distant past) conclude from this stance, the chances that Harris has underesti- that we can’t have free will, and, hence, are not mated and misinterpreted compatibilism responsible for our actions. seem particularly good, since the points he de-

Reflections on Sam Harris’ “Free Will” 217 fends later in the book agree right down the most people used to believe the sun went line with compatibilism; he himself is a com- around the earth. They were wrong, and it took patibilist in everything but name! some heavy lifting to convince them of this. Seriously, his main objection to compati- Maybe this factoid is a reflection on how much bilism, issued several times, is that what com- work science and philosophy still have to do to patibilists mean by “free will” is not what eve- give everyday laypeople a sound concept of free ryday folk mean by “free will”. Everyday folk will. We’ve not yet succeeded in getting them mean something demonstrably preposterous, to see the difference between weight and mass, but Harris sees the effort by compatibilists to and Einsteinian relativity still eludes most peo- make the folks’ hopeless concept of free will ple. When we found out that the sun does not presentable as somehow disingenuous, unmo- revolve around the earth, we didn’t then insist tivated spin-doctoring, not the project of that there is no such thing as the sun (because sympathetic reconstruction the compatibilists what the folk mean by “sun” is “that bright take themselves to be engaged in. So it all thing that goes around the earth”). Now that comes down to who gets to decide how to use we understand what sunsets are, we don’t call the term “free will.” Harris is a compatibilist them illusions. They are real phenomena that about moral responsibility and the importance can mislead the naïve. of the distinction between voluntary and in- To see the context in which Harris’s criti- voluntary actions, but he is not a compatibilist cism plays out, consider a parallel. The folk about free will since he thinks “free will” has concept of mind is a shambles, for sure: dualis- to be given the incoherent sense that emerges tic, scientifically misinformed and replete with from uncritical reflection by everyday folk. He miraculous features – even before we get to sees quite well that compatibilism is «the only ESP and psychokinesis and poltergeists. So philosophically respectable way to endorse when social scientists talk about beliefs or de- free will»,4 but adds: «however, the “free will” sires and cognitive neuroscientists talk about that compatibilists defend is not the free will attention and memory they are deliberately us- that most people feel they have».5 ing cleaned‐up, demystified substitutes for the First of all, he doesn’t know this. This is a folk concepts. Is this theology, is this deliber- guess, and suitably expressed questionnaires ately obtuse, countenancing the use of con- might well prove him wrong. That is an em- cepts with such disreputable ancestors? I think pirical question, and a thoughtful pioneering not, but the case can be made (there are mad- attempt to answer it suggests that Harris’s dog reductionist neuroscientists and philoso- guess is simply mistaken.6 The newly emerg- phers who insist that minds are illusions, pains ing field of experimental philosophy (or “X- are illusions, dreams are illusions, ideas are il- phi”) has a rather unprepossessing track rec- lusions – all there is is just neurons and glia ord to date, but these are early days, and some and the like). The same could be said about of the work has yielded interesting results that color, for example. What everyday folk think certainly defy complacent assumptions com- colors are – if you pushed them beyond their mon among philosophers. The study by everyday contexts in the paint store and pick- Nahmias and colleagues in 2005 found sub- ing out their clothes – is hugely deluded; that stantial majorities (between 60 and 80%) in doesn’t mean that colors are an illusion. They agreement with propositions that are compat- are real in spite of the fact that, for instance, ibilist in outlook, not incompatibilist. atoms aren’t colored. Harris’s claim that the folk are mostly in- Here are some more instances of Harris’s compatibilists is thus dubious on its face, and move: «We do not have the freedom we think even if it is true, maybe all this shows is that we have».7 Who’s we? Maybe many people, most people are suffering from a sort of illusion maybe most, think that they have a kind of that could be replaced by wisdom. After all, freedom that they don’t and can’t have. But

218 Dennett that settles nothing. There may be other, bet- to save the world from a space pirate, who ter kinds of freedom that people also think provides you with a special answering gadg- they have, and that are worth wanting.8 et. It has two buttons marked YES and NO and two foot pedals marked YES and NO. We do not know what we intend to do until A sign on the gadget lights up after every the intention itself arises. [True, but so question “Use the buttons” or “Use the ped- what?] To understand this is to realize that als.” You are asked “is Chicago the capital of we are not the authors of our thoughts and Illinois?”, the sign says “Use the buttons” actions in the way that people generally sup- and you press the No button with your fin- pose.9 ger. Then you are asked “Are Dugongs mammals?”, the sign says “Use the buttons” Again, so what? Maybe we are authors of and you press the Yes button with your fin- our thoughts and actions in a slightly differ- ger. Finally you are asked “Are proteins ent way. Harris doesn’t even consider that made of amino acids?” and the sign says possibility (since that would require taking “Use the pedals” so you reach out with your compatibilist “theology” seriously). foot and press the Yes pedal. A roar of grati- tude goes up from the crowd. You’ve saved If determinism is true, the future is set – the world, thanks to your knowledge and and this includes all our future states of responsible action! But all three actions mind and our subsequent behavior. And were unpredictable by Laplace’s demon be- to the extent that the law of cause and ef- cause whether the light said “Button” or fect is subject to indeterminism – quan- “Pedals” was caused by a quantum random tum or otherwise – we can take no credit event. In a less obvious way, random per- for what happens. There is no combina- turbations could infect (without negating) tion of these truths that seem compatible your every deed. The tone of your voice with the popular notion of free will.10 when you give your evidence could be tweaked up or done, the pressure of your Again, the popular notion of free will is a trigger finger as you pull the trigger could be mess; we knew that long before Harris sat tweaked greater or lesser, and so forth, down to write his book. He needs to go after without robbing you of responsibility. the attempted improvements, and it cannot Brains are, in all likelihood, designed by be part of his criticism that they are not the natural selection to absorb random fluctua- popular notion. There is also another problem tions without being seriously diverted by with this paragraph. The sentence about in- them – just as computers are. But that determinism is false: means that randomness need not destroy the rationality, the well‐governedness, the And to the extent that the law of cause and sense‐making integrity of your control sys- effect is subject to indeterminism – quan- tem. Your brain may even exploit random- tum or otherwise – we can take no credit ness in a variety of ways to enhance its heu- for what happens.11 ristic search for good solutions to problems.

Here is a counterexample, contrived, but These are not new ideas. For instance I have highlighting the way indeterminism could defended them explicitly in 1978, 1984, and infect our actions and still leave us responsi- 2003.12 I wish Harris had noticed that he con- ble (a variant of an old – 1978 – counterex- tradicts them here, and I’m curious to learn ample of mine): how he proposes to counter my arguments. Another mistake he falls for – in very good You must correctly answer three questions company – is the mistake the great J.L. Austin

Reflections on Sam Harris’ “Free Will” 219 makes in his notorious footnote about his wouldnt’ show what needed showing: some- missed putt. First Austin’s version, and my thing about Austin’s ability as a golfer, which, analysis of the error, and then Harris’s version. like all abilities, needs to be demonstrated to be robust under variation. Consider the case where I miss a very short Here is Harris’ version of the same mistake: putt and kick myself because I could have holed it. It is not that I should have holed it To say that they were free not to rape and if I had tried: I did try, and missed. It is not murder is to say that they could have resist- that I should have holed it if conditions had ed the impulse to do so (or could have been different: that might of course be so, avoided feeling such an impulse altogether) but I am talking about conditions as they pre- – with the universe, including their brains, cisely were, and asserting that I could have in precisely the same state it was in at the holed it. There is the rub. Nor does “I can moment they committed their crimes.14 hole it this time” mean that I shall hole it this time if I try or if anything else; for I may Just not true. If we are interested in wheth- try and miss, and yet not be convinced that er somebody has free will, it is some kind of I could not have done it; indeed, further ex- ability that we want to assess, and you can’t periments may confirm my belief that I could assess any ability by “replaying the tape”.15 have done it that time, although I did not.13 This is as true of the abilities of automo- biles as of people. Suppose I am driving along Austin claims to be talking about condi- at 60 MPH and am asked if my car can also tions as they precisely were, but if so, then go 80 MPH. Yes, I reply, but not in precisely further experiments could not confirm his the same conditions; I have to press harder belief. Presumably he has in mind something on the accelerator. In fact, I add, it can also like this: he could line up ten “identical” go 40 MPH, but not with conditions precisely putts on the same green and, say, sink nine as they are. Replay the tape till eternity, and out of ten. This would show, would it not, it will never go 40MPH in just these condi- that he could have made that putt? Yes, to tions. So if you want to know whether some the satisfaction of almost everybody, but No, rapist/murderer was “free not to rape and if he means under conditions “as they pre- murder,” don’t distract yourself with fanta- cisely were,” for conditions were subtly dif- sies about determinism and rewinding the ferent in every subsequent putt – the sun a tape; rely on the sorts of observations and little lower in the sky, the green a little drier tests that everyday folk use to confirm and or moister, the temperature or wind direc- disconfirm their verdicts about who could tion ever so slightly different, Austin himself have done otherwise and who couldn’t.16 older and maybe wiser, or maybe more tired, One of the effects of Harris’s misconstruing or maybe more relaxed. This variation is not compatibilism is that when he turns to the task a bug to be eliminated from such experi- of avoiding the dire conclusions of the hard de- ments, but a feature without which experi- terminists, he underestimates his task.17 At the ments could not show that Austin “could end of the book, he gets briefly concessive, have done otherwise,” and this is precisely throwing a few scraps to the opposition: the elbow room we need to see that “could have done otherwise” is perfectly compatible And it is wise to hold people responsible with determinism, because it never means, in for their actions when doing so influences real life, what philosophers have imagined it their behavior and brings benefit to socie- means: replay exactly the same “tape” and get ty. But this does not mean that we must be a different result. Not only can such an ex- taken in by the illusion of free will. We periment never be done; if it could, it need only acknowledge that efforts matter

220 Dennett

and that people can change. We do not change others, and thereby turn them into change ourselves, precisely – because we something bad – encouraging their racist or have only ourselves with which to do the violent tendencies, for instance, or inciting changing – but we continually influence, them to commit embezzlement, we may be and are influenced by, the world around us held responsible for this socially malign ac- and the world within us. It may seem para- tion. (Think of the drunk driving laws that doxical to hold people responsible for what now hold the bartender or the party host happens in their corner of the universe, but partly responsible for the damage done.) But once we break the spell of free will, we can then by the same reasoning we can justifiably do this precisely to the degree that it is use- be held responsible for influencing ourselves, ful. Where people can change, we can de- for good or ill. We can take some credit for mand that they do so. Where change is any improvements we achieve in others – or impossible, or unresponsive to demands, ourselves – and we can share the blame for we can chart some other course.18 any damage we do to others or ourselves. There are complications with all this, but Harris should take more seriously the var- Harris doesn’t even look at the surface of ious tensions he sets up in this passage. It is these issues. For instance, our capacities to in- wise to hold people responsible, he says, even fluence ourselves are themselves only partly the though they are not responsible, not really. result of earlier efforts at self‐improvement in But we don’t hold everybody responsible; as which we ourselves played a major role. It he notes, we excuse those who are unrespon- takes a village to raise a child, as Hilary Clin- sive to demands, or in whom change is im- ton has observed. In the end, if we trace back possible. That’s an important difference, and far enough to our infancy or beyond, we ar- it is based on the different abilities or compe- rive at conditions that we were just lucky (or tences that people have. Some people (are de- unlucky) to be born with. This undeniable termined to) have the abilities that justify our fact is not the disqualifier of responsibility holding them responsible, and some people that Harris and others assume. It disqualifies (are determined to) lack those abilities. But us for “Ultimate” responsibility, which would determinism doesn’t do any work here; in require us to be – like God! – causa sui, the particular it doesn’t disqualify those we hold original cause of ourselves, as Galen Straw- responsible from occupying that role. In oth- son has observed, but this is nonsense. Our er words, real responsibility, the kind the eve- lack of Ultimate responsibility is not a moral ryday folk think they have (if Harris is right), blemish; if the discovery of this lack moti- is strictly impossible; but when those same vates some to reform our policies of reward folk wisely and justifiably hold somebody re- and punishment, that is a good result, but it sponsible, that isn’t real responsibility!19 is hardly compelled by reason. And what is Harris saying about whether This emerging idea, that we can justifi- we can change ourselves? He says we can’t ably be held to be the authors (if not the Au- change ourselves “precisely” but we can in- thors) of not only our deeds but the character fluence (and hence change) others, and they from which our deeds flow, undercuts much can change us. But then why can’t we change of the rhetoric in Harris’s book. Harris is the ourselves by getting help from others to author of his book; he is responsible for both change us? Why, for that matter, can’t we do its virtues, for which he deserves thanks, and to ourselves what we do to those others, re- its vices, for which he may justifiably be criti- minding ourselves, admonishing ourselves, cized. But then why can we not generalize reasoning with ourselves? It does work, not this point to Harris himself, and rightly hold always but enough to make to worth trying. him at least partly responsible for his charac- And notice: if we do things to influence and ter since it too is a product – with help from

Reflections on Sam Harris’ “Free Will” 221 others, of course – of his earlier efforts? Sup- «I cannot take credit for the fact that I pose he replied that he is not really the au- don’t have the soul of a psychopath».21 True thor of Free Will. At what point do we get to – and false. Harris can’t take credit for the use Harris’s criticism against his own claims? luck of his birth, his having had a normal Harris might claim that he is not really re- moral education – that’s just luck – but those sponsible, isn’t really the author of his own born thus lucky are informed that they have book, isn’t really responsible, but that isn’t a duty or obligation to preserve their compe- what the folk would say. The folk believe in a tence, and grow it, and educate themselves, kind of responsibility that is exemplified by and Harris has responded admirably to those Harris’s authorship. Harris would have dis- incentives. He can take credit, not Ultimate torted the folk notion of responsibility as credit, whatever that might be, but partial much if not more than compatibilists have credit, for husbanding the resources he was distorted the folk notion of free will. endowed with. As he says, he is just lucky not Harris opens his book with an example of to have been born with Komisarjevsky’s murderous psychopaths, Hayes and Komisar- genes and life experiences. If he had been, jevsky, who commit unspeakable atrocities. he’d have been Komisarjevsky! One has shown remorse, the other reports A similar difficulty infects his claim that having been abused as a child. there is no difference between an act caused by a brain tumor and an act caused by a belief Whatever their conscious motives, these (which is just another brain state, after all). men cannot know why they are as they are. Nor can we account for why we are But a neurological disorder appears to be not like them.20 just a special case of physical events giving rise to thoughts and actions. Understand- Really? I think we can. The sentence is am- ing the neurophysiology of the brain, biguous, in fact. Harris knows full well that we therefore, would seem to be as exculpatory can provide detailed and empirically supported as finding a tumor in it.22 accounts of why normal, law‐abiding people who would never commit those atrocities Notice the use of “appears” and “seem” emerge by the millions from all sorts of back- here. Replace them both with “is” and ask if grounds, and why these psychopaths are differ- he’s made the case. In addition to the “sure- ent. But he has a different question in mind: ly”‐alarm I recommend all readers install in why we – you and I – are in the fortunate, their brains (2013), a “seems”-alarm will pick normal class instead of having been doomed to up lots of these slippery places where philoso- psychopathy. A different issue, but also an ir- phers defer argument where argument is called relevant, merely metaphysical issue. (Cf. “Why for. Even the simplest and most straightfor- was I born in the 20th century, and not during ward of Harris’s examples wilt under careful the Renaissance? We’ll never know!”). scrutiny: The rhetorical move here is well‐known, but indefensible. If you’re going to raise these Did I consciously choose coffee over tea? horrific cases, it behooves you to consider No. The choice was made for me by that they might be cases of pathology, as events in my brain that I, as the conscious measured against (moral) health. Lumping witness of my thoughts and actions, could the morally competent with the morally in- not inspect or influence.23 competent and then saying “there really is no difference between them, is there?” is a move Not so. He can influence those internal, un- that needs support, not something that can conscious actions – by reminding himself, etc. be done by assumption or innuendo. He just can’t influence them at the moment they

222 Dennett are having their effect on his choice. He also can’t curious tactic of heaping scorn on daft doc- influence the unconscious machinery that de- trines of his own devising while ignoring rea- termines whether he returns a tennis serve with sonable compatibilist versions of the same ide- a lob or a hard backhand once the serve is on its as, but I’ve given enough illustrations, and the way, but that doesn’t mean his tennis strokes rest are readily identifiable once you see the are involuntary or outside his – indirect – con- pattern. Harris clearly thinks incompatibilism trol. At one point he says is not worth his attention (so “deliberately ob- tuse” is it), but after such an indictment, he bet- If you don’t know what your soul is going ter come up with some impressive criticisms. to do, you are not in control.24 His main case against compatibilism – aside from the points above that I have already criti- Really? When you drive a car, are you not in cized – consists of three rhetorical questions control? You know “your soul” is going to do lined up in a row.27 Each one collapses on closer the right thing, whatever in the instant it turns inspection. As I point out in Intuition Pumps out to be, and that suffices to demonstrate to and Other Tools for Thinking, rhetorical ques- you, and the rest of us, that you are in control. tions, which are stand‐ins for reductio ad ab- Control doesn’t get any more real than that. surdum arguments so obvious that they need Harris ignores the reflexive, repetitive na- not be spelled out, should always been scruti- ture of thinking. My choice at time t can influ- nized as likely weak spots in arguments. I offer ence my choice at time t’ which can influence Harris’s trio as exhibits A, B, and C: my choice at time t”. How? My choice at t can have among its effects the biasing of settings (A) You want to finish your work, but you in my brain (which I cannot directly inspect) are also inclined to stop working so that you that determine (I use the term deliberately) can play with your kids. You aspire to quite my choice at t’. I can influence my choice at t’. smoking, but you also crave another ciga- I influenced it at time t (without “inspecting” rette. You are struggling to save money, but it). Like many before him, Harris shrinks the you are also tempted to buy a new comput- me to a dimensionless point, “the witness” er. Where is the freedom when one of these who is stuck in the Cartesian Theater awaiting opposing desires inexplicably triumphs over the decisions made elsewhere. That is simply a its rival?28 bad theory of consciousness. But no compatibilist has claimed (so far as I, as the conscious witness of my experience, I know) that our free will is absolute and trou- no more initiate events in my prefrontal ble‐free. On the contrary there is a sizable and cortex than I cause my heart to beat.25 fascinating literature on the importance of the various well‐known ways in which we respond If this isn’t pure Cartesianism, I don’t to such looming cases of “weakness of will,” know what it is. His prefrontal cortex is part from which we all suffer. When one desire tri- of the I in question. Notice that if we replace umphs, this is not usually utterly inexplicable, the “conscious witness” with “my brain” we but rather the confirmable result of efforts of turn an apparent truth into an obvious false- self‐manipulation and self‐education, based on hood: empirical self‐exploration. We learn something about what makes us tick – not usually in neu- My brain can no more initiate events in my roscientific terms, but rather in terms of folk prefrontal cortex than it can cause my psychology – and design a strategy to correct heart to beat.26 the blind spots we find, the biases we identify. That practice undeniably occurs, and undeni- There are more passages that exhibit this ably works to a certain extent. We can im-

Reflections on Sam Harris’ “Free Will” 223 prove our self‐control, and this is a morally but it is false, as just noted. Once you stop significant fact about the competence of nor- thinking of free will as a magical metaphysical mal adults – the only people whom we hold endowment and start thinking of it as an expli- fully (but not “absolutely” or “deeply”) re- cable achievement that individual human be- sponsible. Remove the word “inexplicably” ings normally accomplish (very much aided by from exhibit A and the rhetorical question has the societies in which they live), much as they a perfectly good answer: in many cases our learn to speak and read and write, this rhetori- freedom is an achievement, for which we are cal question falls flat. Infants don’t have free partly responsible. (Yes, luck plays a role but will; normal adults do. Yes, those of us who so does skill; we are not just lucky).29 have free will are lucky to have free will (we’re lucky to be human beings, we’re lucky to be (B) The problem for compatibilism runs alive), but our free will is not just a given; it is deeper, however – for where is the free- something we are obliged to protect and nur- dom in wanting what one wants without ture, with help from our families and friends any internal conflict whatsoever?30 and the societies in which we live. Harris allows himself one more rhetorical To answer a rhetorical question with an- question on page 19, and this one he emphat- other, so long as one can get what one wants ically answers: so wholeheartedly, what could be better? What could be more freedom than that? Any (D) Am I free to do that which does not realistic, reasonable account of free will occur to me to do? Of course not.32 acknowledges that we are stuck with some of our desires: for food and comfort and love Again, really? You’re playing bridge and try- and absence of pain – and the freedom to do ing to decide whether or not to win the trick in what we want. We can’t not want these, or if front of you. You decide to play your ace, win- we somehow succeed in getting ourselves in- ning the trick. Were you free to play a low card to such a sorry state, we are pathological. instead? It didn’t occur to you (it should have, These are the healthy, normal, sound, wise but you acted rather thoughtlessly, as your desires on which all others must rest. So ban- partner soon informs you). Were you free to ish the fantasy of any account of free will that is play your six instead? In some sense. We screwed so tight it demands that we aren’t free wouldn’t play games if there weren’t opportuni- unless all our desires and meta‐desires and me- ties in them to make one choice or another. ta‐meta‐desires are optional, choosable. Such But, comes the familiar rejoinder, if determin- “perfect” freedom is, of course, an incoherent ism is true and we rewound the tape of time idea, and if Harris is arguing against it, he is not and put you in exactly the same physical state, finding a “deep” problem with compatibilism you’d ignore the six of clubs again. True, but so but a shallow problem with his incompatibilist what? It does not show that you are not the vision of free will; he has taken on a straw man, agent you think you are. Contrast your compe- and the straw man is beating him. tence at this moment with the “competence” of a robotic bridge‐playing doll that always plays (C) Where is the freedom in being per- its highest card in the suit, no matter what the fectly satisfied with your thoughts, inten- circumstances. It wasn’t free to choose the six, tions, and subsequent actions when they because it would play the ace whatever the cir- are the product of prior events that you cumstances were whereas if it occurred to you to had absolutely no hand in creating?31 play the six, you could do it, depending on the circumstances. Freedom involves the ability to Not only has he not shown that you had ab- have one’s choices influenced by changes in the solutely no hand in creating those prior events, world that matter under the circumstances.

224 Dennett

Not a perfect ability, but a reliable ability. If ceptual understanding of ourselves as per- you are such a terrible bridge player that you sons. This is a bait and switch. The psycho- can never see the virtue in ducking a trick, play- logical truth is that people feel identical to a ing less than the highest card in your hand, then certain channel of information in their con- your free will at the bridge table is seriously scious minds. Dennett is simply asserting abridged: you are missing the opportunities that we are more than this – we are coter- that make bridge an interesting game. If de- minous with everything that goes on inside terminism is true, are these real opportunities? our bodies, whether we are conscious of it Yes, as real as an opportunity could be: thanks or not. This is like saying we are made of to your perceptual apparatus, your memory, stardust – which we are. But we don’t feel and the well‐lit environment, you are caused/ like stardust. And the knowledge that we determined to evaluate the situation as one that are stardust is not driving our moral intui- calls for playing the six, and you play the six. tions or our system of criminal justice.34 Turn to page 20 and get one more rhetor- ical question: I have thought long and hard about this passage, and I am still not sure I understand it, (E) And there is no way I can influence since it seems to be at war with itself. Harris my desires – for what tools of influence apparently thinks you see yourself as a con- would I use? Other desires?33 scious witness, perhaps immaterial – an im- mortal soul, perhaps – that is distinct from Yes, for starters. Once again, Harris is ig- (the rest of?) your brain. He seems to be say- noring a large and distinguished literature that ing that this folk understanding people have defends this claim. We use the same tools to of what they are identical to must be taken as a influence our own desires as we use to influ- “psychological fact” that anchors any discus- ence other people’s desires. I doubt that he sion of free will. And then he notes that I denying that we ever influence other people’s claim that this folk understanding is just plain desires. His book is apparently an attempt to wrong and try to replace it with a more scien- influence the beliefs and desires of his readers, tifically sound version of what a conscious and it seems to have worked rather better person is. Why is it “bait and switch” if I claim than I would like. His book also seems to have to improve on the folk version of personhood influenced his own beliefs and desires: writing before showing how it allows for free will? He it has blinded him to alternatives that he really can’t have it both ways. He is certainly claim- ought to have considered. So his obliviousness ing in his book that the dualism that is uncriti- is something for which he himself is partly re- cally endorsed by many, maybe most, people is sponsible, having labored to create a mindset incoherent, and he is right – I’ve argued the that sees compatibilism as deliberately obtuse. same for decades. But then how can he object When Harris turns to a consideration of that I want to replace the folk conception of my brand of compatibilism, he quotes at free will based on that nonsense with a better length from a nice summary of it by Tom one? The fact that the folk don’t feel as if they Clark, notes that I have approved of that are larger than their imagined Cartesian souls summary, and then says that it perfectly ar- doesn’t count against my account, since I am ticulates the difference between my view and proposing to correct the mistake manifest in his own. And this is his rebuttal: that “psychological fact” (if it is one). And if Harris thinks that it is this folk notion of free (F) As I have said, I think compatibilists like will that “drives our moral intuitions and our Dennett change the subject: They trade a legal system” he should tackle the large litera- psychological fact – the subjective experi- ture that says otherwise.35 ence of being a conscious agent – for a con- One more rhetorical question:

Reflections on Sam Harris’ “Free Will” 225

(G) How can we be “free” as conscious ficer, we hear the doorbell and jump up to see agents if everything that we consciously in- who’s there. These are all voluntary actions tend is caused by events in our brain that we for which we are normally held responsible if do not intend and of which we are entirely anything hinges on them. Harris notes that unaware? We can’t.36 the voluntary/involuntary distinction is a valuable one, but doesn’t consider that it Let’s take this apart, separating its ele- might be part of the foundation of our moral ments. First let’s try dropping the last clause: and legal understanding of free will. Why «of which we are entirely unaware». «How not? Because he is so intent on bashing a car- can we be “free” as conscious agents if every- icature doctrine. thing that we consciously intend is caused by He ends his chapter on compatibilism events in our brain that we do not intend»? with this: Well, if the events that cause your intentions are thoughts about what the best course of People feel that they are the authors of action probably is, and why it is the right their thoughts and actions, and this is the thing to do, then that causation strikes me as only reason why there seems to be a prob- the very epitome of freedom: you have the lem of free will worth talking about.38 ability to intend exactly what you think to be the best course of action. When folks lack I can agree with this, if I am allowed to that ability, when they find they are unable to make a small insertion: act intentionally on the courses of action they deem best, all things considered, we say they People feel that they are the authors of their suffer from weakness of will. An intention that thoughts and actions, and interpreted un- was an apparently causeless orphan, arising charitably, their view can be made to appear for no discernible reason, would hardly be absurd; taken the best way, however, they can seen as free; it would be viewed as a horrible be right; and this is the only reason why interloper, as in alien hand syndrome, im- there seems to be a problem of free will posed on the agent from who knows where. worth talking about. Now let’s examine the other half of Har- ris’s question: «How can we be “free” as con- One more puzzling assertion: scious agents if everything that we conscious- ly intend is caused by events in our brain of Thoughts like “What should I get my which we are entirely unaware?».37 I don’t daughter for her birthday? I know – I’ll always have to reflect, consciously, on my take her to a pet store and have her pick reasons for my intentions for them to be both out some tropical fish” convey the appar- mine and free. When I say “thank you” to ent reality of choices, freely made. But somebody who gives me something, it is from a deeper perspective (speaking both “force of habit” and I am entirely unaware of objectively and subjectively) thoughts the events in my brain that cause me to say it simply arise unauthored and yet author but it is nonetheless a good example of a free our actions.39 action. Had I had a reason to override the habit, I would have overridden it. My not do- What would an authored thought look ing so tacitly endorses it as an action of mine. like, pray tell? And how can unauthored Most of the intentions we frame are like this, thoughts author our actions? Does Harris to one degree or another: we “instinctively” mean cause, shape and control our actions? But reach out and pull the pedestrian to safety if an unauthored thought can cause, shape and without time for thinking; we rashly adopt a control something, why can’t a whole person sarcastic tone when replying to the police of- cause, shape and control something? Probably

226 Dennett this was misspeaking on Harris’s part. He will».42 should have said that unauthored thoughts True, but then other experiences we have are the causes, shapers and controllers – but are often very suggestive of free will. I make a not the authors – of our actions. Nothing promise, I solemnly resolve to keep it, and could be an author, not really. But here again happily, I do! I hate grading essays, but recog- Harris is taking an everyday, folk notion of nizing that my grades are due tomorrow, I re- authorship and inflating it into metaphysical luctantly sit down and grind through them. I nonsense. If he can be the author of his book, decide to drive to Boston and lo and behold, then he can be the author of his thoughts. If the next thing I know I’m behind the wheel of he is not the author of Free Will, he should my car driving to Boston! If I could almost take his name off the cover, shouldn’t he? But never do such things I would indeed doubt my he goes on immediately to say he is the cause own free will, and toy with the sad conclusion of his book, and «If I had not decided to write that somewhere along the way I had become a this book, it wouldn’t have written itself».40 helpless victim of my lazy habits and no longer had free will. Entirely missing from Harris’s Decisions, intentions, efforts, goals, will- account – and it is not a lacuna that can be re- power, etc., are causal states of the brain, paired – is any acknowledgment of the moral- leading to specific behaviors, and behaviors ly important difference between normal peo- lead to outcomes in the world. Human ple (like you and me and Harris, in all likeli- choice, therefore, is as important as fanciers hood) and people with serious deficiencies in of free will believe. But the next choice you self‐control. The reason he can’t include this make will come out of the darkness of prior missing element is that his whole case depends causes that you, the conscious witness of in the end on insisting that there really is no your experience, did not bring into being.41 morally relevant difference between the rav- ing psychopath and us. We have no more free We’ve already seen that the last sentence is will than he does. Well, we have more some- false. But notice that if it were true, then it thing than he does, and it is morally im- would be hard to see why “human choice is im- portant. And it looks very much like what eve- portant” – except in the way lightning bolts are ryday folks often call free will. important (they can do a lot of damage). If your choices “come out of the darkness” and Of course you can create a framework in you did not bring them into being, then they which certain decisions are more likely are like the involuntary effusions of sufferers than others – you can, for instance, purge from Tourette’s Syndrome, who blurt out ob- your house of all sweets, making it very scenities and make gestures that are as baffling unlikely that you will eat dessert later in to them as to others. In fact, we know very well the evening – but you cannot know why that I can influence your choices, and you can you were able to submit to such a frame- influence my choices, and even your own work today when you weren’t yesterday.43 choices, and that this “bringing into being” of different choices is what makes them morally Here he seems at first to be acknowledg- important. That’s why we exhort and chastise ing the very thing I said was missing in his and instruct and praise and encourage and in- account above – the fact that you can take form others and ourselves. steps to bring about an alteration in your cir- Harris draws our attention to how hard it cumstances that makes a difference to your can be to change our bad habits, in spite of subsequent choices. But notice that his con- reading self‐help books and many self‐admo- cession is short‐lived, because he insists that nitions. These experiences, he notes, «are not you are just as in the dark about how your even slightly suggestive of freedom of the decision to purge your house of all sweets

Reflections on Sam Harris’ “Free Will” 227 came about. But that is, or may well be, false. our beliefs, but the environment in general is You may know exactly what train of thought not such an agent, and hence is no puppeteer. led you to that policy. But then, you can’t When sunlight bouncing off a ripe apple caus- know why that train of thought occurred to es me to decide to reach up and pick it off the you, and moved you then. No, you can, and tree, I am not being controlled by that master often do. Maybe your candy‐banishing is the puppeteer, Captain Worldaroundme. I am nth level result of your deciding to decide to controlling myself, thanks to the information I decide to decide to decide […] to do some- garner from the world around me. Please, thing about your health. But since the regress Sam, don’t feed the bugbears.47 is infinite, you can’t be responsible! Nonsense. Harris half recognizes this when later in You can’t be “ultimately responsible” (as Ga- the book he raises puppets one more time: len Strawson has argued) but so what? You can be partially, largely responsible. It is one thing to bicker with your wife be- I cannot resist ending this catalogue of cause you are in a bad mood; it is another to mistakes with the one that I find most glaring: realize that your mood and behavior have the cover of Harris’s little book, which shows been caused by low blood sugar. This un- marionette strings hanging down. The point, derstanding reveals you to be a biochemical which he reiterates several times in the book, puppet, of course, but it also allows you to is that the prior causes (going back to the Big grab hold of one of your strings. A bite of Bang, if you like) that determine your choices food may be all that your personality re- are like the puppeteer who determines the quires. Getting behind our conscious puppet’s every action, every “decision”. This thoughts and feelings can allow us to steer a analogy enables him to get off a zinger: more intelligent course through our lives «Compatibilism amounts to nothing more (while knowing, of course, that we are ulti- than an assertion of the following creed: A mately being steered).48 puppet is free as long as he loves his strings».44 This is in no way supported by anything in So unlike the grumpy child (or moody his discussion of compatibilism. Somehow bear), we intelligent human adults can «grab Harris has missed one of the deepest points hold of one of our strings». But then if our made by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in bodies are the puppets and we are the pup- their introduction to their ground‐breaking peteers, we can control our bodies, and 1953 book, Theory of Games and Economic Be- thereby our choices, and hence can be held havior.45 Whereas Robinson Crusoe alone on responsible – really but not Ultimately re- his desert island can get by with probabilities sponsible – for our actions and our charac- and expected utility theory, as soon as there is ters. We are not immaterial souls but embod- a second agent to deal with, he needs to worry ied rational agents, determined (in two sens- about feedback, secrecy and the intentions of es) to do what is right, most of the time, and the other agent or agents (what I have called ready to be held responsible for our deeds. intentional systems). For this he needs game Harris, like the other scientists who have re- theory. There is a fundamental difference be- cently mounted a campaign to convince the tween an environment with no competing world that free will is an illusion, has a laudable agents and an environment populated with motive: to launder the ancient stain of Sin and would‐be manipulators.46 The manifold of Guilt out of our culture, and abolish the cruel causes that determine our choices only inter- and all too usual punishments that we zestfully mittently includes other agents, and when mete out to the Guilty. As they point out, our they are around they do indeed represent a zealous search for “justice” is often little more challenge to our free will, since they may well than our instinctual yearning for retaliation try to read our minds and covertly influence dressed up to look respectable. The result, es-

228 Dennett pecially in the United States, is a barbaric sys- other of the abilities that constitute this mor- tem of imprisonment – to say nothing of capi- al competence are often said, by everyday tal punishment – that should make all citizens folk, to lack free will, and this fact is the heart ashamed. By all means, let’s join hands and re- of compatibilism.) form the legal system, reduce its excesses and If you think that the fact that incompatibil- restore a measure of dignity – and freedom! – ist free will is an illusion demonstrates that no to those whom the state must punish. But the punishment can ever be truly deserved, think idea that all punishment is, in the end, unjusti- again. It may help to consider all these issues fiable and should be abolished because nobody in the context of a simpler phenomenon: is ever really responsible, because nobody has sports. In basketball there is the distinction “real” free will is not only not supported by sci- between ordinary fouls and flagrant fouls, and ence or philosophical argument; it is blind to in soccer there is the distinction between yel- the chilling lessons of the not so distant past. low cards and red cards, to list just two exam- Do we want to medicalize all violators of the ples. Are these distinctions fair? Justified? laws, giving them indefinitely large amounts of Should Harris be encouraged to argue that involuntary “therapy” in “asylums” (the poor there is no real difference between the dirty dears, they aren’t responsible, but for the good player and the rest (and besides, the dirty of the society we have to institutionalize them)? player isn’t responsible for being a dirty play- I hope not. But then we need to recognize the er; just look at his upbringing!)? Everybody powerful (consequentialist) arguments for who plays games must recognize that games maintaining a system of punishment (and re- without strictly enforced rules are not worth ward).49 Punishment can be fair, punishment playing, and the rules that work best do not can be justified, and in fact, our societies could make allowances for differences in heritage, not manage without it. training, or innate skill. So it is in society gen- This discussion of punishment versus erally: we are all considered equal under the medicalization may seem irrelevant to Har- law, presumed to be responsible until and un- ris’s book, and an unfair criticism, since he less we prove to have some definite defect or himself barely alludes to it, and offers no infirmity that robs us of our free will, as ordi- analysis of its possible justification, but that narily understood. is a problem for him. He blandly concedes we will – and should – go on holding some peo- █ Notes ple responsible but then neglects to say what that involves. Punishment and reward? If 1 S. HARRIS, Free Will, Free Press, New York 2012. not, what does he mean? If so, how does he 2 The random swerve or clinamen is an idea going propose to regulate and justify it? I submit back to Lucretius more than two thousand years that if he had attempted to address these ago, and has been seductive ever since. questions he would have ended up with 3 S. HARRIS, Free Will, cit., p. 18. something like this: Those eligible for pun- 4 Ivi, p. 16. 5 Ibidem. ishment and reward are those with the gen- 6 eral abilities to respond to reasons (warnings, See E. NAHMIAS, S. MORRIS, T. NADELHOFFER, J. TURNER, Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about threats, promises) rationally. Real differences Free Will and Moral Responsibility, in: «Philo- in these abilities are empirically discernible, sophical Psychology», vol. XVIII, n. 5, 2005, pp. explicable, and morally relevant. Such abili- 561-584. ties can arise and persist in a deterministic 7 S. HARRIS, Free Will, cit., p. 5. world, and they are the basis for a justifiable 8 D.C. DENNETT, Elbow Room, MIT Press, Cam- policy of reward and punishment, which bridge (MA) 1984, p. 143. brings society many benefits – indeed makes 9 S. HARRIS, Free Will, cit., p. 13 – my italics. 10 S. HARRIS, Free Will, cit., p. 30 – my italics. society possible. (Those who lack one or an-

Reflections on Sam Harris’ “Free Will” 229

11 Ibidem. ognizes his – dare I say? – responsibility to deal with 12 See D.C DENNETT, Brainstorms. Philosophical this challenge. essays on Mind and Psychology, MIT Press, Cam- 18 S. HARRIS, Free Will, cit., p. 63. bridge (MA) 1978; D.C. DENNETT, Elbow Room, 19 See L. SIEGEL, Net of Magic. Wonders and Decep- cit.; D.C. DENNETT, Freedom Evolves, Viking, tions in India, Chicago University Press, Chicago New York 2003. 1991, p. 425: «“I’m writing a book on magic,” I ex- 13 J.L. AUSTIN, Ifs and Cans, in: J.L. AUSTIN, Philo- plain, and I’m asked, “Real magic?” By real magic sophical Papers, edited by J. URMSON, G. people mean miracles, thaumaturgical, and super- WARNOCK, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1961, natural powers. “No,” I answer: “Conjuring tricks, pp.153-180, here p. 166. not real magic.” Real magic, in other words, refers to 14 S. HARRIS, Free Will, cit., p. 17. the magic that is not real, while the magic that is re- 15 See my extended argument to this effect in D.C. al, that can actually be done, is not real magic». DENNETT, Freedom Evolves, cit. The point was 20 S. HARRIS, Free Will, cit., p. 4. made long ago by A.M. Honoré in his classic pa- 21 Ibidem. per A.M. HONORÉ, Can and Can’t, in: «Mind», 22 Ivi, p. 5. vol. LXXIII, n. 292, 1964, pp. 463-479, and more 23 Ivi, p. 7. recently deeply grounded in J. PEARL, Causality: 24 Ivi, p. 12. Models, Reasoning and Inference, Cambridge Uni- 25 Ivi, p. 9. versity Press, Cambridge 2000. 26 Ibidem. 16 Given the ocean of evidence that people assess 27 Ivi, pp. 18-19. human abilities, including their abilities to do or 28 Ivi, p. 18 – my italics. choose otherwise, by methods that make no attempt 29 See D.C. DENNETT, 1984. to clamp conditions “precisely as they were,” over- 30 S. HARRIS, Free Will, cit., p. 19. looking this prospect has required nearly superhu- 31 Ibidem. man self‐blinkering by incompatibilists. I consider 32 Ibidem. Austin’s mistake to be the central core of the ongo- 33 Ivi, p. 20. ing confusion about free will; if you look at the large 34 Ivi, p. 23. and intricate philosophical literature about incom- 35 Starting with, e.g., S. MORSE, The Non-Problem of patibilism, you will see that just about everyone as- Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, in: sumes, without argument, that it is not a mistake. «Behavioral Science and the Law», vol. XXV, n. 2, Without that assumption the interminable discus- 2007, pp. 203-220; S. MORSE, Determinism and the sions of van Inwagen’s “Consequence Argument” Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Respon- could not be formulated, for instance. The excellent sibility from Neuroscience, in: «Minnesota Journal of article by Kadri Vhivelin (see K. VIHVELIN, Argu- Law, Science, and Technology», vol. IX, n. 1, 2008, ments for Incompatibilism, in: E.N. ZALTA (ed.), pp. 1-36, here pp. 3-13. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2003, substan- 36 S. HARRIS, Free Will, cit., p. 25-26. tive revision 2017, http://plato.stanford.edu/en- 37 Ibidem. tries/in-compatibilism‐arguments/) cites Austin’s 38 Ivi, p. 26. essay but does not discuss this question. 39 Ivi, p. 32. 17 Here more than anywhere else we can be grateful 40 Ivi, p. 34. to Harris for his forthrightness, since the distin- 41 Ibidem. guished scientists who declare that free will is an illu- 42 Ivi, p. 35. sion almost never have much if anything to say 43 Ivi, p. 38. about how they think people should treat each other 44 Ivi, p. 20. in the wake of their discovery. If they did, they 45 See J. VON NEUMANN, O. MORGENSTERN, Theo- would land in the difficulties Harris encounters. If ry of Games and Economic Behavior, John Wiley & nobody is responsible, not really, then not only Sons, Princeton 1953. should the prisons be emptied, but no contract is 46 Ivi, pp. 10-11: «2.2.2. Crusoe is given certain valid, mortgages should be abolished, and we can physical data (wants and commodities) and his task never hold anybody to account for anything they do. is to combine and apply them in such a fashion as to Preserving “law and order” without a concept of real obtain a maximum resulting satisfaction. There can responsibility is a daunting task. Harris at least rec- be no doubt that he controls exclusively all the vari-

230 Dennett

ables upon which this result depends – say the allot- function (his above-mentioned “result”) of which ting of resources, the determination of the uses of he does not control all variables. This is certainly the same commodity for different wants, etc. Thus no maximum problem, but a peculiar and discon- Crusoe faces an ordinary maximum problem, the certing mixture of several different maximum difficulties of which are of a purely technical – and problems. Every participant is guided by another not conceptual – nature, as pointed out. principle and neither determines all variables 2.2.3. Consider now a participant in a social ex- which affect his interest. This kind of problem is change economy. His problem has, of course, nowhere dealt with in classical mathematics». many elements in common with a maximum 47 See D.C. DENNETT, Elbow Room, cit. problem. But it also contains some, very essential, 48 S. HARRIS, Free Will, cit., p. 47. elements of an entirely different nature. He too 49 Apparently some thinkers have the idea that tries to obtain an optimum result. But in order to any justification of punishment is (by definition?) achieve this, he must enter into relations of ex- retributive. But this is a mistake; there are conse- change with others. If two or more persons ex- quentialist justifications of the “retributive” ideas change goods with each other, then the result for of just deserts and the mens rea requirement for each one will depend in general not merely upon guilt, for instance. Consider how one can defend his own actions but on those of the others as well. the existence of the red card/yellow card distinc- Thus each participant attempts to maximize a tion in soccer on purely consequentialist grounds. ____