Answering the New Atheists: How Science Points to God and to the Benefits of Christianity
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Being and Time-Less Faith: Juxtaposing Heideggerian Anxiety and Religious Experience
Open Theology 2020; 6: 15–26 Phenomenology of Religious Experience IV: Religious Experience and Description Jonathan Lyonhart* Being and Time-less Faith: Juxtaposing Heideggerian Anxiety and Religious Experience https://doi.org/10.1515/opth-2020-0003 Received October 12, 2019; accepted December 19, 2019 Abstract: In Heidegger, fear reveals the thing to be feared in a fuller way than theory can. However, anxiety is distinct from fear, for while fear is directed towards a specific thing within the world, anxiety is anxious about existence itself, disclosing the totality of Being. A similar method could be applied to faith. Arguably, faith is a mood; a feeling of trust in the divine that can be phenomenologically consistent and overwhelming. However, faith is not necessarily directed towards a specific object within the world. One cannot point and say: “God is right there!” Indeed, attempts to do so through miracles, teleology or dialectics have been roundly critiqued by the Western tradition. But then what is this mood of faith disclosing if not something within the world? Perhaps, like anxiety, faith is not revealing an object within the world, but the world as a totality. Since God—at least the God central to much of the Judeo-Christian tradition—is not a being but Being itself (or in some formulations is actually ‘beyond being’), God therefore cannot be disclosed in the world as an object but has to be disclosed as that which is transcendently beyond it. Such a conclusion does not simply flee the realm of the everyday, but derives from, and legitimates, basic descriptions of religious experience. -
Agency: Moral Identity and Free Will
D Agency AVID Moral Identity and Free Will W DAVID WEISSMAN EISSMAN There is agency in all we do: thinking, doing, or making. We invent a tune, play, or use it to celebrate an occasion. Or we make a conceptual leap and ask more ab- stract ques� ons about the condi� ons for agency. They include autonomy and self- appraisal, each contested by arguments immersing us in circumstances we don’t control. But can it be true we that have no personal responsibility for all we think Agency and do? Agency: Moral Ident ty and Free Will proposes that delibera� on, choice, and free will emerged within the evolu� onary history of animals with a physical advantage: Moral Identity organisms having cell walls or exoskeletons had an internal space within which to protect themselves from external threats or encounters. This defense was both and Free Will structural and ac� ve: such organisms could ignore intrusions or inhibit risky behav- ior. Their capaci� es evolved with � me: inhibi� on became the power to deliberate and choose the manner of one’s responses. Hence the ability of humans and some other animals to determine their reac� ons to problema� c situa� ons or to informa- � on that alters values and choices. This is free will as a material power, not as the DAVID WEISSMAN conclusion to a conceptual argument. Having it makes us morally responsible for much we do. It prefi gures moral iden� ty. A GENCY Closely argued but plainly wri� en, Agency: Moral Ident ty and Free Will speaks for autonomy and responsibility when both are eclipsed by ideas that embed us in his- tory or tradi� on. -
"Intermediate" Models of Origins
Journal of the Adventist Theological Society, 15/1 (Autumn 2004): 71–92. Article copyright © 2004 by Jim Gibson. Issues in “Intermediate” Models of Origins Jim Gibson Geoscience Research Institute Discussion of issues in creation is often focused on contrasting the theory of naturalistic evolution with the biblical model of a recent, six-day creation. The differences between these two theories are profound, and the contrasts can read- ily be identified in such issues as whether the universe and human life were pur- posefully designed, the nature and extent of God’s actions in the universe, and the extent to which answers to philosophical questions can be inferred from na- ture and from Scripture. Biblical creation is based on a literal-phenomenal1 interpretation of Genesis 1–3 and other creation texts. The biblical model affirms that humans were sepa- rately created in a supernatural act of creation, some thousands of years ago, at the end of a six-day creation. They were endowed with the image of God and the possibility of eternal life. The original human pair freely chose to distrust God, bringing death and other evils into the world. By contrast, naturalistic evolution is based on a naturalistic approach to sci- ence, without respect to biblical teachings. Naturalistic (“scientific”) evolution claims that humans developed from ape-like ancestors, through strictly natural processes, over several millions of years. Humans have no special status in na- ture, and there is no basis for believing in life after death. Death, disease, and suffering are simply natural by-products of the processes operating in nature and cannot be considered good or evil in any “moral” sense. -
Revelation in the Theology of Walter Kasper
Department of Systematic Theology University of Helsinki Helsinki Event of the Radically New: Revelation in the Theology of Walter Kasper Tiina Huhtanen Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by due permission of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Helsinki in Auditorium XV on the 13th of April 2016 at 12 p.m. Helsinki 2016 ISBN 978-951-51-2045-8 (PBK) ISBN 978-951-51-2046-5 (PDF) Unigrafia Helsinki 2016 Abstract The present study analyses the concept of revelation in the theology of Walter Kasper (b. 1933). The method of the study is systematic analysis, which focuses on ascertaining the commonalities, characteristics and possible inconsistencies in Kasper’s thought. The sources for this study consist of works pertinent to the subject in the corpus of Kasper’s writings from 1965 to 2015. In order to offer a full account of Kasper’s understanding of revelation, this study analyses the philosophical and theological background of his thought. The present study outlines and discusses Kasper’s interpretation of the doctrine of revelation, his understanding of how the Bible should be interpreted and his dogmatic method. This study also discusses Kasper’s understanding of the meaning of revelation in the modern era. In line with previous studies of Kasper’s theology also this study concludes that the three influences that have most affected Kasper’s thought are: German idealist philosophy, the Tübingen School and the Second Vatican Council. This study argues that Kasper’s conception of revelation is dynamic and dialogical. With the help of the concepts of German idealist philosophy, especially that of F.W.J Schelling, Kasper sketches a model of revelation theology based on the idea that, precisely because the human being is finite, he is able to conceive that there must lie an infinite ground that is the ground of being of all reality. -
Natural Theology in Evolution: a Review of Critiques and Changes
This is the author’s preprint version of the article. The definitive version is published in the European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol.9. No. 2. 83-117. Natural Theology in Evolution: A Review of Critiques and Changes Dr. Erkki Vesa Rope Kojonen University of Helsinki, Faculty of Theology Abstract The purpose of this article is to provide a broad overview and analysis of the evolution of natural theology in response to influential criticiques raised against it. I identify eight main lines of critique against natural theology, and analyze how defenders of different types of natural theology differ in their responses to these critiques, leading into several very different forms of natural theology. Based on the amount and quality of discussion that exists, I argue that simply referring to the critiques of Hume, Kant, Darwin and Barth should no longer be regarded as sufficient to settle the debate over natural theology. Introduction Adam, Lord Gifford (1820-1887), who in his will sponsored the ongoing Gifford Lectures on natural theology, defined natural theology quite broadly as “The Knowledge of God, the Infinite, the All, the First and Only Cause, the One and the Sole Substance, the Sole Being, the Sole Reality, and the Sole Existence, the Knowledge of His Nature and Attributes, the Knowledge of the Relations which men and the whole universe bear to Him, the Knowledge of the Nature and Foundation of Ethics or Morals, and of all Obligations and Duties thence arising.” Furthermore, Gifford wanted his lecturers to treat this natural knowledge of God and all of these matters “as a strictly natural science, the greatest of all possible sciences, indeed, in one sense, the only science, that of Infinite Being, without reference to or reliance upon any supposed special exceptional or so- 1 called miraculous revelation. -
The Lions Seek Their Prey from God: a Commentary on the Boyle Lecture
S & CB (2005), 17, 41–56 0954–4194 R.J. BERRY The Lions Seek Their Prey from God: a Commentary on the Boyle Lecture John Haught asks how we can reconcile evolution with the idea of divine prov- idence: ‘The major question for theology, now as in the years immediately sub- sequent to the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, is how to reconcile the brute impersonality and blindness … in evolution’s recipe with trust in divine providence.’ In his book Can a Darwinian be a Christian? Michael Ruse1 focuses on the same point. He identifies as ‘the biggest question of all for the Christian believer is the “theodicy” problem. If, as the Christian believes, God is omnipotent and all-loving, then why evil? If He is all-powerful, He could pre- vent evil, and if he is all-loving, then He would prevent evil. Yet evil exists.’ For some this is a definitive proof against the sort of God revealed in the Bible. David Hull2 has written, The evolutionary process is rife with happenstance, contingency, incredible waste, death, pain and horror … Whatever the God implied by evolutionary theory and the data of natural selection may be like, he is not the Protes- tant God of waste not, want not. He is also not the loving God who cares about his productions. He is not even the awful God pictured in the Book of Job. [He] is careless, wasteful, indifferent, almost diabolical. He is certainly not the sort of God to whom anyone would be inclined to pray. This is the sort of interpretation which led to the notorious conclusion of Richard Dawkins3, that ‘Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually ful- filled atheist’. -
God and the Gaps Ross W
Digital Commons @ George Fox University Faculty Publications - College of Christian Studies College of Christian Studies 4-2013 God and the Gaps Ross W. McCullough George Fox University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ccs Part of the Biblical Studies Commons, and the Christianity Commons Recommended Citation McCullough, Ross W., "God and the Gaps" (2013). Faculty Publications - College of Christian Studies. 341. https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ccs/341 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Christian Studies at Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications - College of Christian Studies by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Support FIRST THINGS by turning your adblocker o or by making a donation. Thanks! GOD AND THE GAPS by Ross McCullough April 2013 ost often the story is told like this: There is some feature of the world that science is at a loss to M explain. Christians rush to claim that this feature can only be explained by God. Science later produces probable non-theistic hypotheses, and the Christians must beat a hasty retreat. In the early nineteenth century, the feature was the complexity of life, the scientic explanation Darwinian evolution. Atheist pulses quicken at this story, but its lesson is just as received among theologians: We must not put God in the gaps. We must keep our commitments clear of the contracting ignorance of scientic explanations. As Dietrich Bonhoeer said, we must nd God in what we know and not in what we don’t know. -
Answering Your Question: the Bible and Traditional Beliefs
Digital Collections @ Dordt Faculty Work Comprehensive List 1-23-2015 Answering Your Question: The Bible and Traditional Beliefs Benjamin J. Lappenga Dordt College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/faculty_work Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons Recommended Citation Lappenga, B. J. (2015). Answering Your Question: The Bible and Traditional Beliefs. Retrieved from https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/faculty_work/345 This Blog Post is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Collections @ Dordt. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Work Comprehensive List by an authorized administrator of Digital Collections @ Dordt. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Answering Your Question: The Bible and Traditional Beliefs Abstract "Christians must acknowledge that our readings of Scripture are subject to criteria for determining their validity." Posting about Biblical interpretation from In All Things - an online hub committed to the claim that the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ has implications for the entire world. http://inallthings.org/answering-your-question-the-bible-and-traditional-beliefs/ Keywords In All Things, Bible, faith, science, hermeneutics Disciplines Christianity | Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Comments In All Things is a publication of the Andreas Center for Reformed Scholarship and Service at Dordt College. This blog post is available at Digital Collections @ Dordt: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/faculty_work/345 Answering Your Question: the Bible and traditional beliefs inallthings.org/answering-your-question-the-bible-and-traditional-beliefs/ Benjamin Lappenga Christians often talk about the need to avoid reductionism, especially scientific naturalism. -
New Atheism and the Scientistic Turn in the Atheism Movement MASSIMO PIGLIUCCI
bs_bs_banner MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY Midwest Studies In Philosophy, XXXVII (2013) New Atheism and the Scientistic Turn in the Atheism Movement MASSIMO PIGLIUCCI I The so-called “New Atheism” is a relatively well-defined, very recent, still unfold- ing cultural phenomenon with import for public understanding of both science and philosophy.Arguably, the opening salvo of the New Atheists was The End of Faith by Sam Harris, published in 2004, followed in rapid succession by a number of other titles penned by Harris himself, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Victor Stenger, and Christopher Hitchens.1 After this initial burst, which was triggered (according to Harris himself) by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, a number of other authors have been associated with the New Atheism, even though their contributions sometimes were in the form of newspapers and magazine articles or blog posts, perhaps most prominent among them evolutionary biologists and bloggers Jerry Coyne and P.Z. Myers. Still others have published and continue to publish books on atheism, some of which have had reasonable success, probably because of the interest generated by the first wave. This second wave, however, often includes authors that explicitly 1. Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004); Sam Harris, Letter to a Christian Nation (New York: Vintage, 2006); Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2006); Daniel C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Viking Press, 2006); Victor J. Stenger, God:The Failed Hypothesis: How Science Shows That God Does Not Exist (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2007); Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (New York: Twelve Books, 2007). -
PDF Download the Moral Landscape Kindle
THE MORAL LANDSCAPE PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Sam Harris | 384 pages | 04 Dec 2012 | Transworld Publishers Ltd | 9780552776387 | English | London, United Kingdom The Moral Landscape PDF Book By Marilynne Robinson. Some morals may be consistent in some form across times and cultures. Since it's possible that human well-being and moral goodness are not identical, it follows necessarily that human well-being and moral goodness are not the same, as Harris has asserted. Horgan, "Be wary of the righteous rationalist: We should reject Sam Harris's claim that science can be a moral guidepost" , Scientific American blog, Oct. I don't think, though, that the failure of this claim is fatal to the rest of Sam's claims. Immorality is knowing what is right and wrong but acting wrongly anyway. But would a life spent popping MDMA, although presumably full of "good feelings", be a peak in his moral landscape? For example, he says that there are objectively good and bad moves in chess Moral Landscape , 8. A rustic-style deck, for example, will look much better attached to a log cabin than to an ultra-modern contemporary. Morals in the US. It seems to me that morality, particularly when it is promoted for the good of the general public, ought to emphasise concern with the latter harms committed against others , if it even concerns the former "harms" committed against oneself at all. Nuzzolilli wrote a generally favorable review in a journal of the Association for Behavior Analysis International :. Now, Sam's notion that a society of equally-matched sadists and masochists would could be morally equivalent to a world of conventionally wired people is harder to defuse given his premises, but let's look at it a little critically: in fact, it doesn't take much to immediately question whether the experience of a masochist is genuinely one of equal well-being with that of a normally-adjusted individual. -
Experimental Philosophy and Free Will Tamler Sommers* University of Houston
Philosophy Compass 5/2 (2010): 199–212, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00273.x Experimental Philosophy and Free Will Tamler Sommers* University of Houston Abstract This paper develops a sympathetic critique of recent experimental work on free will and moral responsibility. Section 1 offers a brief defense of the relevance of experimental philosophy to the free will debate. Section 2 reviews a series of articles in the experimental literature that probe intuitions about the ‘‘compatibility question’’—whether we can be free and morally responsible if determinism is true. Section 3 argues that these studies have produced valuable insights on the fac- tors that influence our judgments on the compatibility question, but that their general approach suffers from significant practical and philosophical difficulties. Section 4 reviews experimental work addressing other aspects of the free will ⁄ moral responsibility debate, and section 5 concludes with a discussion of avenues for further research. 1. Introduction The precise meaning of ‘experimental philosophy’ is a matter of controversy even among its practitioners, but all agree that it refers to a movement which employs the methods of empirical science to shed light on philosophical debates. Most commonly, experimental philosophers attempt to probe ordinary intuitions about a particular case or question in hopes of learning about the psychological processes that underlie these intuitions (Knobe 2007).1 The unifying conviction behind the movement is that many deep philosophical problems ‘can only be properly addressed by immersing oneself in the messy, contingent, highly variable truths about how human beings really are’.2 And the problem that has received the most attention from experimental philosophers thus far is the problem of free will. -
Free Will: Hail and Farewell
Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism © 2019 The American Humanist Association volume 27 (2019), article 6, 98-124. ISSN 1522-7340 (print), 2052-8388 (online) Free Will: Hail and Farewell James A. Montanye Independent scholar, Falls Church, VA [email protected] This essay traces the evolution of the free will concept, from Plato to the present. It examines interpretations offered by theologians, political philosophers, philosophers of mind and consciousness, neuroscientists, evolutionists, legal scholars, and economists. The essay illuminates the concept’s instrumental use as an artifice for manipulating behavioral adaptations to the scarcity of economic resources. Macroeconomic and ngram data reveal these manipulations as having locked Western civilization into centuries of social and economic stagnation. Keywords: free will, consciousness, economics, prosperity, scarcity, competition, neuroscience, compatibilism, incompatibilism, ngrams “The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal. After all these centuries of writing about free will, it does not seem to me that we have made very much progress.” John Searle (2007, 37) “A flood of ink has been spilled, especially in the modern era, on how to understand the concept of being able to do otherwise.” Timothy O’Connor (2016) “...the whole arcane issue about free will is a miscast concept, based on social and psychological beliefs held at particular times in human history that have not been borne out and/or are at odds with modern scientific knowledge about the nature of our universe.” Michael Gazzaniga (2011, 219) “...if we no longer entertain the luxury of a belief in the ‘magic of the soul,’ then there is little else to offer in support of the concept of free will.” Anthony Cashmore (2010, 1) [98] 1.