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Topics in Rational Choice Theory: Altruism, Consequentialism, and Identity Topics in Rational Choice Theory: Altruism, Consequentialism, and Identity by Sahar Zahida Akhtar Department of Philosophy Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Allen Buchanan, co-supervisor ___________________________ Alex Rosenberg, co-supervisor ___________________________ Jesse Prinz ___________________________ Susan Wolf ___________________________ David Wong Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Duke University 2008 ABSTRACT Topics in Rational Choice Theory: Altruism, Consequentialism, and Identity by Sahar Zahida Akhtar Department of Philosophy Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Allen Buchanan, co-supervisor ___________________________ Alex Rosenberg, co-supervisor ___________________________ Jesse Prinz ___________________________ Susan Wolf ___________________________ David Wong An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate in Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Duke University 2008 Copyright by Sahar Zahida Akhtar 2008 Abstract Rational Choice theory includes a broad body of research that attempts to account for how people act in a variety of contexts, including economic, political and even moral situations. By proposing, most generally, that individuals rationally pursue their self- interests regardless of the context, rational choice has had extensive theoretical and empirical success, on the one hand, and has also faced wide criticism when applied in a variety of disciplines, on the other hand. While there is disagreement over what the defining assumptions of rational choice theory are, in this dissertation I focus on three on which there is widespread agreement. These three features of rational choice theory are: its assumption of egoism or self-interest as the central motivation of individuals; its reliance on consequences as part of a comparative decision-making framework; and finally, its focus on the individual and not on groups as the methodological and normative unit of analysis. In correspondence to these three features, my dissertation is divided into three parts and explores the separate topics of (I) egoism and altruism; (II) consequentialism and ethical decision-making; and, (III) individualism and group identity. The dissertation is not an exercise in showing the extensive problems of rational choice theory, although there are many. The dissertation rather engages these three topics with differing results, some of which in fact attempts to revitalize rational choice, or at least features of rational choice. For the part on altruism, my goal is to demonstrate why the central assumption of egoism in rational choice theory is problematic. More broadly, I argue for a different way of defining genuine altruistic motivation. A result of my analysis there is that altruism iv appears to be more widespread than has been traditionally assumed and is more amenable to empirical examination. For my discussion on consequentialism, my aim is to re- characterize rational choice as a mode of moral decision-making. I argue that the moral agent is one who frequently compares her particular moral ends in a stable fashion and for this reason cost-benefit analysis is a fully moral framework, one that encourages the agent to genuinely care for her ends and values. For the topic of individualism and group identity, my objective is to show how a previously dismissed topic, once unpacked, is fully consistent with rational choice theory and ought to be of interest to the rational choice theorist. I show that if the liberal political theorist, including the rational choice theorist, is to value group identity, the commitment is only limited to valuing a form of group identity—particularized identity—that is individualist in character. v Contents Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….……..iv List of Tables……………………………………………………………………….…….ix List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………….x Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….1 Altruism………………………..………………………………………………...3 Consequentialism……………..………………………………………………….8 Identity……………………………………………………………………….....14 Part I: Rational Choice and Altruism 1.Genuine Altruism: What is it and Does it Exist………………………………………22 1.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………...22 1.2 Standard View of Altruism…………………………………………………26 1.3 Evolutionary Arguments……………………………………………………31 1.4 Problems with Evolutionary Arguments for Genuine Altruism……………40 1.5 Conclusion………………………………………………………………….48 1.6 Appendix 1: Are Feelings and Desires Separate?.........................................51 2. Ultimate or Instrumental Altruism? Who Cares…………………………………….. 64 2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………...64 2.2 Prior Suitability…………………………………………………………….65 2.3 Central Role of Feelings……………………………………………………67 2.3.1 Reason I………………………………………………………….68 2.3.2 Reason II…………………………………………………………73 2.3.3 Reason III………………………………………………………..87 2.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………….97 vi 2.5 Appendix 2: Applications to Rational Choice……………………………...99 2.5.1 New Avenues for Theoretical Research…………………………99 2.5.2 New Avenues for Empirical Research…………………….……108 Part II: Rational Choice and Consequentialism 3. The Structure of Moral Decision-Making……………………………………….…..115 3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………….….115 3.2 Against General Value………………………………………………….…118 3.3 Mediating Ends in Our Everyday Lives…………………………………...127 3.4 Considering Each of Our Ends…………………………………………….136 3.5 Mediating Our Moral Values……………………………………………...142 3.6 Conclusion………………………………………………………………...148 4. Cost-Benefit Analysis in Ethical Decision-Making………………………………....151 4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………..151 4.2 Intrinsic Value and Alienation…………………………………………….152 4.3 Comparing Values in Bioethics……………………………………….......161 4.4 Beyond Alienation: Other Costs and Benefits of Using CBA…………….169 4.5 Conclusion………………………………………………………………...175 Part III: Rational Choice and Individualism 5. Liberal Respect for Identity? Only for Particular Ones…………………………….177 5.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………….177 5.2 Identity and Autonomy…………………………………………………...180 5.3 Including Identity in Respect for Persons……………….………………..186 5.4 The Locality of Respect………………………………….……………….189 5.5 Collective vs. Particularized Identity…………………….……………….197 vii 5.6 Practical Implications of the Debate………………………………….....202 5.7 Conclusion……………………………………………………………….209 Biblography…………………………………………………………….…………….211 Biography………………………………………………………………………….....217 viii List of Tables Table 1………………………………………………………………………………..51 ix List of Figures Figure 1……………………………………………………………………………….38 Figure 2……………………………………………………………………………….44 Figure 3……………………………………………………………………………….74 Figure 4……………………………………………………………………………….80 Figure 5……………………………………………………………………………….92 x Introduction Rational Choice theory includes a broad body of research that attempts to account for how people act in a variety of contexts, including economic, political and even moral situations. By proposing, most generally, that individuals rationally pursue their self-interests regardless of the context, rational choice has had extensive theoretical and empirical success, on the one hand, and has also faced wide criticism when applied in a variety of disciplines, on the other hand.1 While there is disagreement over what the defining assumptions of rational choice theory are, in my dissertation I focus on three on which there is widespread agreement. These three features of rational choice theory are: its assumption of egoism or self-interest as the central motivation of individuals; its reliance on consequences as part of a comparative decision making framework; and finally, its focus on the individual and not on groups as the methodological and normative unit of analysis. In correspondence to these three features, my dissertation is divided into three parts and explores the separate topics of (I) egoism and altruism; (II) consequentialism; and, (III) individualism and group identity. The dissertation is not an exercise in showing the extensive problems of rational choice theory, although there are many. The dissertation rather engages these three topics with differing results, some of which in fact attempts to revitalize rational choice, or at least features 1 For general discussions of the assumptions, applications, and potential problems of rational choice theory, see Green and Shapiro, 1994, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory; a Critique of Applications in Political Science, Yale University Press: New Haven, especially chapter 2 and pp 47- 53 and 87-97; and Hausman, Daniel and McPherson, Michael. 1996. Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, especially pp.27-29; and Rosenberg, Alexander. 1992. Economics: Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns, University of Chicago Press. 1 of rational choice. For the part on altruism, my goal is to demonstrate why the central assumption of egoism in rational choice theory is problematic. However, for my discussion on consequentialism, my aim is to re-characterize rational choice as a mode of moral decision making. For the topic of individualism and group identity, my objective is to show how a previously dismissed topic, once unpacked, is fully consistent with rational choice theory and ought to be of interest to the rational choice theorist. The emphasis
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