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News of the Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation July 1-14, 2006

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News of the Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation July 1-14, 2006 Center for Special Studies Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center News of the Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation July 1-14, 2006 The Palestinian arena… …and the northern arena Contents Overview Northern front Operation Summer Rains Counterterrorism The abducted soldier Operation Summer Rains continues in the Gaza Strip to free the abducted Escalation in the north following a Qassam rocket fire soldier and stop Qassam rocket fire Hezbollah terrorist attack. Photo: The (Photo courtesy of the IDF spokesman, Statistical data bridge over the Awali River bombed by July 12). the Israeli Air Force as part of Israel’s Humanitarian responses to the Hezbollah attack (Al- conditions Jazeera TV, July 13) Internal Palestinian arena Overview Overview Escalation began in the northern arena following a Hezbollah terrorist attack during which eight IDF soldiers were killed and two abducted. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah proposed indirect negotiations for a deal to trade the abducted soldiers for Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails. Hamas and Fatah called upon Hezbollah not to release the soldiers except in a joint Palestinian-Lebanese prisoner-swap deal. Since the attack the IDF has acted against Hezbollah targets and Lebanese infrastructures and Hezbollah has attacked population centers in northern Israel. Operation Summer Rains continued in the Gaza Strip, during which infantry and armored forces operated in the northern, central and southern Gaza Strip. The IDF activity was accompanied by artillery fire at Qassam rocket-launching sites and intensive Air Force attacks on terrorist targets, Hamas government offices and civilian installations. In Judea and Samaria there were widespread arrests of Hamas operatives, including Hamas government ministers and members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and institutions belonging to the Hamas civilian infrastructure were closed. The goal of the activities was to effect the return of the abducted soldier and to stop the Qassam rocket fire; it has not yet been achieved. In the wake of the IDF activity in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinians warn of an impending humanitarian crisis. Israeli security sources reiterated the fact that despite the harm done to civilian welfare, basic needs are supplied by the partial opening of the Karni crossing and the fuel terminal. Nevertheless, the Palestinian terrorist organizations continue their efforts to carry out terrorist attacks at the crossings, hindering the entrance of vital supplies into the Gaza Strip. Northern front Hezbollah terrorist attack on Israel’s northern border To the two week-old Israeli-Palestinian crisis in the Gaza Strip has been added the new situation following the Hezbollah July 12 attack, unprecedented in severity since Israel withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000. During the attack Hezbollah abducted two IDF soldiers and killed eight. Israel holds the Lebanese government responsible for the attack. In response, IDF forces attacked Hezbollah and Lebanese infrastructure targets on July 13, including the international airport in Beirut. Hezbollah responded by a massive, ongoing rocket attack on the population centers in northern Israel. The international community has called for the release of the abducted soldiers and views Hezbollah as responsible for the current escalation, but is asking Israel not to use disproportional force. In the Palestinian arena, Hezbollah’s attack and abduction of the two soldiers were received with overt joy by all the terrorist organizations, which also view abduction as a means to accelerate the release of Palestinian prisoners. Senior Hamas leaders called the attack “heroic” and “legitimate.” Hamas and Fatah called upon Hezbollah not to release the two abducted soldiers unless an overall prisoner-exchange deal were brokered and to formulate a joint Palestinian-Lebanese plan for exchanging “captives.” For a preliminary report on the Hezbollah attack and the ensuing escalation, see the relevant Information Bulletin at http://www.terrorism- info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_upd1e.pdf. 2 Operation Summer Rains1 The IDF forces in the Gaza Strip continue Operation Summer Rains, whose goal is to return the abducted prisoner and stop the Qassam rocket fire directed at population centers in the western Negev. So far, the goals have not been achieved. As part of the operation, IDF infantry and armored forces conducted various activities which can be divided into three stages: DDD Phase 1 (which began on the night of June 27): IDF forces entered the southern Gaza Strip as far as the airport at Dahania. The aim of the activity was to prevent the abducted soldier from being removed from the Gaza Strip. DDD Phase 2 (which began on July 3): IDF infantry and armored forces entered the northern Gaza Strip to prevent Qassam rockets from being fired into Israel. The first actions were taken on July 3 in the near the town of Beit Hanoun. From July 5 on, after Qassam rockets landed in Ashqelon, the IDF conducted activities in the region of Al- ‘Atatra in the northwestern Gaza Strip, south of the disengaged Israeli settlement of Dugit. DDD Phase 3 (the night of July 11): An Israeli force entered the central Gaza Strip through the Kissufim road to the ruins of Gush Katif to cut off the northern Gaza Strip from the south. That was done to keep the Palestinian terrorists holding the abducted soldier from smuggling him out of the Gaza Strip and to hinder the activities of terrorists launching Qassam rockets. 1 The situation as of morning of July 14. For further information see our Information Bulletin entitled “IDF force attacked and soldier abducted near Kibbutz Kerem Shalom,” at http://www.terrorism- info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/kerem_shalom_e.pdf, and the six updates. 3 IDF soldiers in the area of disengaged Gush Katif (Photo courtesy of the IDF spokesman, July 12) Ground activity was accompanied by air strikes and artillery fire from the land and from Israeli Navy boats to destroy Qassam launching sites and the access roads leading to them. The activities included: DDD Attacks on headquarters and on senior terrorist leaders: the most conspicuous attack was an air strike carried out on the night of July 11, attacking a structure in the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood of Gaza in which Hamas terrorist-operative leaders were having a meeting. Apparently three of them were wounded, it is not known how seriously. Among them were Muhammad Deif, commander of the Hamas’s terrorist- operative wing, and Ahmad al-Ghandour, head of the terrorist-operative wing in the northern Gaza Strip. DDD Attacks on armed squads of terrorists, including those firing anti-tank missile and Qassam rockets. DDD Attacks on the offices of the interior and foreign ministries of the Hamas government and on the prime minister’s office, and on Hamas’s civilian infrastructure, including the Islamic University and the Dar Al-Arqam school. DDD Attacks on civilian installations: bridges, roads and the power station supplying electricity to the southern part of Gaza City, resulting in power outages in large parts of the city. 4 DDD Attacks on buildings used for the manufacture and storage of weapons. DDD Attacks on Palestinian terrorist organization training camps. Response of the terrorist organizations During Operation Summer Rains, the terrorist organizations continued firing Qassam rockets into populated Israeli areas (See below). At the same time, squads of terrorists were active against the IDF, especially in the northern Gaza Strip, shooting small arms and attempting to lay small side charges along the roads. There was also a significant increase in the use of anti-tank missiles against the IDF forces in the Gaza Strip. During the evening of July 2 near the airport at Dahania, a suicide bombing attack against IDF soldiers was foiled. The soldiers saw a group of three armed terrorists, opened fire and killed them. On two of the bodies explosive belts ready for detonation were found. Security force operations On the morning of June 29, at the beginning of Operation Summer Rains, Israeli security forces carried out widespread arrests throughout Judea and Samaria. About 360 terrorist- operatives were arrested, including senior Hamas leaders. Among them were eight members of the Hamas government and members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. To be able continue functioning as a government, the remaining ministers in the Gaza Strip took the portfolios of those arrested. IDF forces also took action against more than 40 offices of institutions belonging to Hamas’s civilian infrastructure (da’wah) in Judea and Samaria, especially the “charitable societies.” Such organizations are part of the apparatus supporting Hamas’s terrorist-operative activities and serve as conduits for the channeling of funds from abroad into Hamas coffers. During the action the institutions were closed and documents and inflammatory materials were confiscated.2 2 For further information see our Information Bulletin entitled “The Hamas civilian infrastructure in PA territories,” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_0706e.pdf. 5 IDF and Palestinian losses during Operation Summer Rains During the activity an IDF soldier was killed by friendly fire near Al-Atatra and two were slightly wounded. Approximately 50 Palestinian terrorists and civilians (in whose midst the terrorists operate) were killed and more than 100 were wounded. It should be noted that during the operation civilians, among them teenagers, customarily congregate around the terrorists firing weapons, contributing to the number of wounded among them (See photo below). Propaganda… …and reality A cartoon by militant Hamas supporter Gazan teenagers watching terrorists firing at Omaya Joha, portraying an IDF soldier as a IDF forces in Beit Lahiya (Al-Hayat Al- “hunter of children.” A prominent aspect of Jadeeda, July 7). Hamas’s hate propaganda is depicting Israel as deliberately harming Palestinian children (Hamas Website, July 11). Threats of vengeance and anti-Semitic hate propaganda [Following[ the attack on leaders of Hamas’s terrorist-operative wing on the night of July 11, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades issued a strong condemnation.
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