The Cognitive and Psychological Roots of Religion

Glenn Karl Barenthin

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Divinity, Trinity College and the Theological Department of the Toronto School of Theology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Theology awarded by Trinity College and the University of Toronto.

Glenn Karl Barenthin

Master of Theology

Trinity College University of Toronto

2013

Abstract

This thesis undertakes a broadly philosophical exploration of the nature of religious thought.

Karen Armstrong points out that “religion can be abused, but it seems to have been something that we have always done. It was not tacked on to a primordially secular nature by manipulative

Kings and Priests but was natural to humanity”. (Armstrong, p xix) Indeed there does not appear to be a time in history when people were without religion and her suggestion that religion is a natural phenomenon is supported by recent studies from psychologists and neuroscientists. The thesis on trial is that research by neuroscientists, coupled with studies and experiments by psychologists, suggests that due to the evolution of the mind, humans have the potential for spiritual thought and consequently, a variety of religious institutions. The studies examined suggest that there are features of brain functioning that give humans the propensity to have religious belief.

ii Table of Contents

Abstract...... ii

Chapter One: Brain Matter Matters ...... 1 1 Science and Religion ...... 1 2 Cognitive Science Approach ...... 3 3 Evolutionary Psychologists ...... 5 4 Religion Defined ...... 8 5 Distinguishing Between Religious and Spiritual...... 9 6 The Religious Institution...... 13

Chapter Two: Orchestras and Kludges ...... 14 7 Using Metaphors ...... 14 8 Evolutionary Perspective...... 15 9 Critics of Evolutionary Psychology ...... 16 10 The Brain as an Orchestra ...... 18 11 Problems with the Orchestra Analogy...... 23 12 Darwin’s Dangerous Idea...... 24 13 Darwin’s Kludge ...... 25 14 The Evolution of the Eye...... 26

Chapter Three: A Healthy Dose of Speculation ...... 28 15 The Mind in the Cave...... 28 16 The Spiritual Realm...... 29 17 Near Death Experience...... 33 18 Phantom Limbs...... 34 19 Characteristics of Near Death Experiences ...... 35 20 REM Consciousness...... 38 21 Summary ...... 39

Chapter Four: Countries, Crips and Churches ...... 40 22 Us and Them ...... 40 23 Oxytocin and Human Sociability ...... 42 24 Emotion and a Sense of Belonging ...... 44 25 Mirror Neurons...... 45 26 Theory of Mind ...... 48 27 Studies Supporting a We-intentionality ...... 50 28 Social Institutions...... 53 29 Forming Groups ...... 54 30 Summary ...... 57

Chapter Five: Closing Arguments ...... 58

References...... 61

iii Chapter One Brain Matter Matters 1 Science and Religion

In The Accidental Mind , Neuroscientist, David J. Linden recounts an evening with friends at a restaurant. While sipping his wine and sizing up his plate of boiled crawfish, Linden relayed to his companions his theory of religion and neural function. Sensing someone standing near him, Linden looked over his shoulder to find the waiter, with an overly large pepper shaker in hand, listening intently to Linden’s monologue. Linden’s momentary pause gave the waiter the opportunity to interrupt with, “would you care for some freshly ground speculation with that, sir?” (Linden, p 221) Unsettled and with his friends in stitches, Linden chose to keep his beliefs to himself.

There are those, such as the waiter, who seem to believe that the discussion of science and religion should not be undertaken and any suggestion that one (science) can explain the other (religion), must be avoided at all costs. For them, science and religion are two different domains of thought. Palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould, in his book Rocks of Ages , took this position and suggested a civil, non-interference between the two realms of thought. His solution rests with his principle of Non-Overlapping Magisteria (NOMA). (Gould, p 5) By magisterium, he means “a domain where one form of teaching holds the appropriate tools for meaningful discourse and resolution”. (Gould, p 5) For Gould, the magisterium of science is strictly to account for the empirical realm, such as proposing theories about how the world works, while the magisterium of religion is the exclusive domain for determining values, ethics, and questions about the ultimate meaning of life.

Now one could reasonably argue, and many have, that if we left religion to solely determine our values and ethics we would be in serious trouble indeed. For instance, Christian leaders did not officially condemn slavery until 1888, well after every country with Christian roots abolished it. More recently, the Pope suggested that same sex unions are a greater threat to humanity than global warming. (Hinde, p 247) Today, some religious leaders encourage the persecution of homosexuals and suggest condom use should be prohibited, even though there is substantial evidence to suggest that such a stance causes needless death and suffering. As for the assertion

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that without religion people would be selfish, there is no evidence to support the claim that “religious individuals are in fact more honest or helpful in their behaviour, even though they claim that they are”. (Hinde, p 148)

In contrast to the solution offered by Gould, this paper argues that it is disingenuous to hold science and religion in separate magisteriums and that to truly understand why there are so many religions in the world, our best approach is to use cognitive science. With recent developments in neuroscience and psychology, it is suggested that science is making great strides in explaining our behaviour in general, and why we have religious inclinations in particular. The thesis of this paper is that research by neuroscientists, coupled with studies and experiments by psychologists, give us the necessary evidence to hypothesize why humans have spiritual thought and consequently a variety of religions in the world. The studies that will be examined suggest that there are features of brain functioning that give humans the propensity to have religious belief. As E.O. Wilson suggests, “science for its part will test relentlessly every assumption about the human condition and in time uncover the bedrock of the moral and religious sentiments”. (Wilson 1975, p 562) This essay may not have the optimistic fervour of Wilson, but the studies reviewed will demonstrate that in gaining a better understanding of how our minds work, we will have the necessary tools to see why we come to believe what we do.

It is acknowledged that in a number of recent books, the scar tissue of historical battles between religion and science has been picked at by a number of authors. For instance, some argue that religion is a virus (Dawkins) or a spell (Dennett), while others suggest that religion poisons everything (Hitchens). Their otherwise lucid account of human behaviour is stained by their contemptuous attitude toward the religious believer. That said, the same criticism can be made against those who question the use of cognitive science to study religion. It is not being argued here that the hypotheses or methodologies of cognitive science should be taken as infallible and free from questioning, but when the criticism comes from a clearly biased point of view one should be skeptical of the work.

Barbara Smith, for instance, accuses the cognitive scientists of conceptual biases, methodological confinements and ideological taboos. (B. Smith, p 62) Perhaps, she takes this position because she herself has a narrow-minded view of the work by these scientists. In reading her book,

Natural Reflections , one finds that her biases leap from the page in the form of aggravating and persistent scare quotes when using words traditionally associated with science. For instance, words such as “phenomena”, “forces”, “cause”, “mechanistic”, “networks”, and “modules” appear in her book in such a fashion. It would be interesting to see whether she would employ the same style of writing when discussing physics rather than biology. One can only wonder if, reporting on the 2011 Nobel Prize for physics, she would say that Saul Perlmutter, Adam Riess and Brian Schmidt shared the 2011 prize for “showing” that the “universe” is not only “expanding” but the “expansion” is “accelerating”. One would hope this would not be the case and it seems she applies this technique in Natural Reflections because of her distaste for biological explanations.

2 Cognitive Science Approach

One very good reason for taking a cognitive science approach to the study of religion is simply that historically the reasons offered to account for the many religions in the world are not very convincing. For instance, one reason cited for the ubiquity and persistence of religion is it provides for an explanation of the world. The argument here is that people are inquisitive and seek to understand the origin of the world and our place in it. This explanation, however, does not hold true for all religions. Perhaps true for Christianity, where considerable importance is placed on the origin of the world, however in many religions, life is seen as cyclical with little importance placed on creation. As Pascal Boyer points out, “when we put forward general explanations of religion we had better make sure that they apply outside our parish”. (Boyer, p 10) Boyer also provides evidence that many religions that have been studied by anthropologists not only have little concern about creation but pay little attention to any explicit theology.

It has also been suggested that religion provides a purpose or guiding force in life. It has been claimed that the search for significance is the dominating guiding force in the meaning of life. As Nietzsche suggested, “men would rather believe than know, have the void as purpose than be void of purpose”. (Nietzsche, p 299) However, it can also be said that just because a plan is said to have come from a transcendent being does not necessarily guarantee that the design is meaningful. Philosopher Daniel Dennett argues that meaning does not come from on high but rather “percolates up from below, from the initially mindless and pointless algorithmic processes that gradually acquire meaning and intelligence as they develop”. (Dennett, p 205) Philosophers

4 such as Dennett, Owen Flanagan and scientists such as Richard Dawkins and Keith Stanovich provide convincing arguments for a meaningful life without religion.

Others have suggested that religion provides comfort. There may be sporadic anecdotal evidence to suggest that some prisoners of war or people under severe stress may cope better than those without religion, however the evidence is not conclusive. Perhaps a person found in such a horrendous circumstance may relieve stress by rationalizing that their situation is inevitable and it is the will of God. Furthermore, a person may take some comfort in believing that there is some sort of goodness in suffering, justifying their situation by believing they are acting just as their Saviour once did. Alternatively, it could be argued that fear rather than comfort is the motivating factor for people to accept religion. For instance, the threat of damnation has been a tool used historically by religious leaders to keep people in line. This, it is suggested, hardly provides comfort.

Similarly, it has been said that religion offers hope. If conditions in this life seem so unbearable, one could be attracted to the idea that there will be a better life to come and not necessarily a life of this world. There is ample evidence to suggest that a great many religions focus on life after death. (Hinde, p 95) For Hinde, “since the deceased has somewhere to go, this inevitably leads to belief in spirits of some sort – spirits which may continue to inhabit our world or live in a special spiritual abode”. (Hinde, p 97) Here, it seems that Hinde has fallen into the trap of rationalizing one’s beliefs. It is not clear why Hinde concludes that the prospect of death would ‘inevitably’ lead one to conclude that there is a spiritual abode, nor does he provide any evidence in support of this claim.

All these reasons-hope, comfort, purpose and explanation - given to account for religion are concerned about satisfying particular needs. Although it seems a bit of a stretch to conclude, as Hinde does that one is drawn to belief in a non-material world because of fear of death, he goes on to correctly point out that “in discussing beliefs in this way”, that is in satisfying one’s needs, “it is difficult not to give the impression that belief is a solely intellectual matter. Nothing could be further from the truth”. (Hinde, p 101) So Hinde concludes that it may appear that the belief in gods is an intellectual matter, but this is not necessarily the case. Furthermore, it could be

5 countered that many religions are more concerned with proper conduct, rituals and fostering certain attitudes rather than providing comfort or a sense of control.

It can also be argued that all the reasons given to account for religion were probably not part of the mental processes that were used to form the belief in the first place. It will be argued that our minds are wired to have thoughts about supernatural agents and once those thoughts are in place then we attempt to account for them.

3 Evolutionary Psychologists

An alternative approach to understanding why we have so many religions is to look at how the human brain functions. Evolutionary psychologists argue that the human brain is made up of a number of mental tools that operate automatically to solve the different problems that our hunter- gatherer forebears faced in the vast majority of our evolutionary history. Our minds therefore are comprised of a number of specialized inference systems that organize information. (Boyer, p 107) So for instance, we have templates that mark abstract categories such as person, animal or tool and these are used to organize specific concepts such as a man, dog or hammer.

Pascal Boyer and Justin Barrett separate beliefs into reflective and non-reflective. The former are those that are held consciously and arise through deliberate reflection while the latter come automatically and seem to arise instantaneously. Barrett suggests that “our minds produce non- reflective beliefs automatically all the time”. (Barrett, p 181) What we come to believe including what we believe exists in the world arises from these mental tools that dwell below our conscious radar. (Boyer, p 107) For Boyer, “when creating what might be called reflective beliefs, unless given strong reason to the contrary, we simply adopt these non-reflective beliefs as reflective beliefs”. (Boyer, p 107) Both reflective and non-reflective beliefs may not necessarily be true, empirically verifiable or justifiable on rational grounds. (Barrett, p 181)

For both Barrett and Boyer, our beliefs about anything come from a number of mental tools. One such mental tool that operates automatically is what Barrett calls a Hypersensitive Agent Detection Device (HADD). That is, people tend to interpret ambiguous evidence as being caused by an agent. Evolutionary psychologists say that this is a survival mechanism resulting from natural selection. They argue that one would have a better chance of survival if each time

6 we were startled by a noise we took it as a possible predator or agent rather than the wind or some other innocuous cause. So we are prone to look for agents in the world.

For these thinkers, belief in gods stems naturally from the functioning of completely normal mental tools working in natural social contexts. They argue that such things as gods could be easily conceived by taking the template for person and adding what they term counterintuitive properties. (Barrett, p 21) Furthermore, since gods are agents with ‘strategic information’, that is they are omnipotent and omnipresent, the belief in their existence is reinforced by other mental tools that are involved in human interaction. (Boyer, p 107) It is our HADD that make us more apt to look for agency in the environment and due to other inference systems we attribute this agency to gods.

Boyer and Barrett go on to argue that we believe in gods, ghosts and goblins not only because they make use of these natural inference systems but they also have enough counterintuitive properties in order to be attractive and easily recalled. For instance, ghosts have the natural intuitive concept of a person yet they have the minimally counterintuitive element of the ability to float. Both Boyer and Barrett place particular importance on the idea that it is minimally counterintuitive as some beliefs that seem too far of a stretch may not be workable. For instance, Boyer suggests that we can conceive of a Prince that turns into a frog quite easily; however, a Prince into a carburetor would not sit so well. (Boyer, p 68) However, many parents have had the pleasure of reading to their children the adventures of Thomas the Tank Engine. So if we can conceive of a story with Cranky the Crane as a character, then why not a Cranky Carburetor?

The main problem with the account of Boyer and Barrett is in the determination of what is and what is not counterintuitive. For that matter, how does one come to the conclusion that something is intuitive? Barrett defines intuitive as “conforming to intuitive expectations generated by mental tools”. (Barrett, p 186) There is no question that people have an easier time believing certain thoughts over others, but it is difficult to ascertain whether it is due to brain mechanisms or the result of one’s experience. Rather than suggesting that it is our biology that defines what is intuitive, it could be countered that it is culture.

It is not being suggested, by any means, that the work of Boyer and Barrett is without merit. Indeed the position taken in this paper is that the human brain was designed by natural selection

7 to solve the problems faced in our evolutionary history; however, the search for templates, modules or inference systems may not necessarily be our best approach. In chapter two it will be argued that emphasis should be placed on how different parts of the brain, all of which are products of evolution, function together.

As mentioned earlier, one critic of the cognitive science approach to religion is Barbara Smith and she argues that the cognitive scientists are primarily concerned with what she terms microdynamics that occurs in the brain of the individual. For Smith, this narrow-minded view fails to see knowledge formation as involving a social collection that occurs over historical time. She feels that these macrodynamics are better left to philosophers, anthropologists and sociologists. (B.Smith, p 13) It seems that she mistakenly believes that those who take this approach to religion fail to take into account the environment and other factors that influence our behaviour. This couldn’t be further from the truth and we will see that the cognitive science approach to religion does not necessarily need to be considered in such a fashion.

One of the earliest proponents of evolutionary psychology was E.O. Wilson and he argued that being part of a religion favours the reproductive success of individuals in the context of a social group. Wilson suggests we consider gene-culture interaction. Here, he considers the group the unit of selection and he argues, on the one hand, that if too many individuals do not conform to the norms, values and beliefs of the group, then the group will suffer and decline. On the other hand, if too many individuals become overly selfish, then the society is vulnerable and expedites its decline. Wilson reasons that societies with more selfish individuals and therefore genes that predispose them, “will give way to those less weakened in genetic resolve and the overall frequency of conforming individuals in the population will rise”. (Wilson 1978, p 187)

The problem with the position taken by Wilson for some evolutionists, such as George Williams and Richard Dawkins, is that selection pressures work best at the individual level rather than at the group level. Williams said, “natural selection works more effectively at the individual level and adaptations that are produced are adaptive for those individuals in competition with other individuals of the same population, rather than for collective well being”. (Gazzaniga, p 81) It seems that Williams and Dawkins are not totally discounting group selection but they make it clear that it is at the individual level that selection pressures are the strongest.

Wilson does however, go on to say that it is not group selection but individual selection that is the driving force of Darwinian evolution and says that at the individual level, the willingness to conform to a particular religion provides them with all the benefits that come with that commitment. Others have taken a similar stance, reasoning that “religion may be a product of natural selection – not directly perhaps but as a consequence of selection for the survival of groups”. (Corballis, p 173) This paper too argues that religious belief did not evolve because the belief in a god necessarily provided an advantage over those who do not believe, but rather being part of a group provides numerous advantages to the individual and as a result of how our brains work, we are naturally inclined to be attracted to groups. Regardless of whether emphasis is placed on a specific form of modularity or on the reorganization of mental processing, what ties cognitive scientists together is the claim that “all of the present structures and functions of the modern mind are selected adaptations accumulated over the course of evolutionary history”. (Tremlin, p 64)

4 Religion Defined

In order to support the thesis of this paper, a working definition of religion needs to be laid out. In their approach to the study of religion, Boyer and Barrett have emphasized supernatural beings as the defining character of religion. Others too have taken this position. Jason Slone states that “the distinctive feature of religion is the presumption that superhuman agents exist”. (Slone, p 86) Harvey Whitehouse defines religion, as “beliefs and behaviours concerning culturally postulated supernatural beings and entities”. (Whitehouse, p 8) While Boyer says, “the notion of superhuman entities and agency is the only substantive universal found in religious ideas”. (Boyer 1994, p 9) All these thinkers have supernatural agents as the cornerstone of religion.

In contrast, James Laidlaw believes that it is a mistake to place such importance on supernatural beings when discussing religious beliefs and he points to Theravada Buddhism as evidence for a religion that is not particularly concerned with deities at all. (Whitehouse, p 220) However, Slone argues that the Buddha, as conceived by his followers, has been described with the same characteristics as deities from other religions. He points out that many anthropologists have clearly shown that the Buddha has been “depicted as being omniscient, omnipotent and capable of performing miracles.” (Slone, p 75) Slone argues that “despite the existence of strands of

9 monotheism in Theravada Theology, ethnographic data collected in Theravada cultures reveals that Theravada Buddhism is very much like other prototypical religious systems because of the widespread representation of the Buddha as a superhuman agent”. (Slone, p 71) Perhaps then, officially different forms of Buddhism may not acknowledge supernatural agents but in practice by many followers of Buddhism, the Buddha is considered to be like a supernatural agent.

Laidlaw goes on to suggest that cognitive scientists can’t possibly explain religion because it is not the type of “explanation science can provide”. (Whitehouse, p 212) He says that religion “is not an object with a single origin, let alone a single essence that defines it, but a fairly local and contingent meeting up of several different questions and areas of concern”. (Whitehouse, p 227) He says that since religions are a product of historical processes that were invented in particular times due to specific circumstances one cannot “adequately describe purely in terms of cognitive mechanisms, internal to individual minds”. (Whitehouse, p 225) It is acknowledged that the selective pressures on our forebears were not just from the environment but within a social context. This does not dismiss the work of the cognitive scientists as, “people are equipped to create and employ religious ideas because they are equipped to create and employ ideas”. (Tremlin, p 8)

5 Distinguishing Between Religious and Spiritual

To make the case for the cognitive science of religion as outlined above, it will be important to make a distinction between the terms religious and spiritual, despite the fact that historically, the terms have been used interchangeably. The Latin term religare means to bind and it is this idea of people binding together in beliefs, values and morals that they consider sacred that will be emphasized when defining religion. Michael Shermer defines religion as “a social institution to create and promote myths, to encourage conformity and altruism, and to signal the level of commitment to cooperate and reciprocate among members of a community”. (Shermer, p 166) For Augustine, on the other hand, religion is not a set of beliefs or even a part of an historical tradition but is a “vivid and personal confrontation with the splendour and the love of God”. (Smith, p 29) Today we consider religion to represent the views of the former while spiritual is more in line with Augustine’s description.

Neurologist Kevin Nelson, whose work we will look at in chapter three, suggests that we take spiritual to mean something that moves us deeply and brings us in contact with something larger than ourselves, something that transcends us. (Nelson, p 25) Influenced by William James, Nelson says a spiritual experience is “the feelings, acts and experiences that have touched whatever they may consider the divine”. (Nelson, p 26) For Nelson, the fundamental difference between the two terms is that religions are the culmination of spiritual experiences in social contexts while spiritual is personal and without social context.

It is important to differentiate the terms “religious” and “spiritual”; however the term spiritual could also lead to complications. The evidence in the following chapters will support the notion that one cannot interpret an individual’s spiritual experience without a social context. From Nelson’s research alone, it seems clear that the spiritual experience cannot be viewed in a vacuum. For instance, Nelson opens his prologue with a description of the spiritual experience of Joe Hernandez. Reportedly, Hernandez had a massive heart attack and while in bed in the Intensive Care Unit, had a vision of a devil with horns in a red robe but fortunately an angel with a halo stood between Hernandez and Satan to rescue him. For Hernandez, it was the miraculous work of Jesus Christ, his Saviour that rescued him from death. Clearly, Hernandez’s interpretation was due to his own upbringing and memory that led him to associate the devil with red robes and Jesus with angels.

Furthermore, Nelson makes a strong case for the similarities between spiritual experience and Near Death Experiences (NDEs). He says that autobiographical memory plays a key role in NDEs. He demonstrates that there is a difference in the visions interpreted by children and adults due, he reasons, primarily to the fact that children do not have the accumulation of life experiences. (Nelson, p 111) His research found that many adults NDEs included tunnels, out of body experience and meeting with dead family members. Children, on the other hand, visualize the afterword with castles and rainbows and often include pets, wizards and guardian angels. He found that the experiences of the NDEs were quite consistent due to our common biology and any slight differences were due to our social context. He concluded that the analysis of NDEs makes clear “that each one was shaped by life experiences, cultured background and the individual and shared biology”. (Nelson, p 104) With the distinction between religion and

11 spirituality having been made, it is time now to outline the way in which the thesis will be argued.

In chapter two it will be suggested that to help us understand how the human brain functions, two analogies can be employed. One emphasizes the fact that the brain is made up of a conglomerate of different parts responsible for different functions. The second analogy stresses the point that the human mind is a product of evolution by natural selection just like other organs in the human body. The result of this is a mind that is not necessarily passive, like a blank slate, but is actively involved in constructing an opinion of the world. How we perceive, associate and come to believe certain things is affected by the architecture of our brains.

Chapter three will suggest that the experiences of people who claim that they had a spiritual experience have the same characteristics of people who have experienced a NDE. The only difference in the two, it will be argued, is due to one’s interpretation based on experience. People articulate their experiences in accordance with one’s expectation and social environment. From Nelson’s work, and others, we will find that a spiritual experience cannot be isolated and discussed without considering the upbringing of the person having the experience. When we are referring to the brain mechanisms that give rise to a spiritual experience, we must distinguish this from the interpretation of the actual experience. There is a clear distinction between what occurs due to the physiological make up of our brains, and the way we attempt to make sense of those experiences.

This distinction between the mechanisms in the brain that give rise to people’s interpretation of a spiritual experience could be compared with Chomsky’s separation of the internal language (IL) of thought and its external language (EL). For Chomsky, IL is “in essence the basis of universal grammar, the set of principles thought to underlie all language”. (Corballis, p 24) Chomsky believes that humans have a biological predisposition for language, what Pinker has identified as a language instinct. For Chomsky, humans come to learn language due to how the brain works, not due to how culture works. He postulates that the human brain comes prewired with a Language Acquisition Device (LAD). Although his position that language could not have evolved by natural selection and his theory of LAD seems suspect, the separation of an internal and external language is supported by evidence from child psychologists.

For instance, a child has the potential to master any one of thousands of different languages. By the age of four or five, children are fairly proficient in the language that is spoken in their community. Each language however, has quite different speech patterns and the sounds that are produced are very different. For instance, English speakers make a clear distinction between the L and R sound but Japanese speakers do not. Trying to ascertain why this is the case, scientists set out to see whether children could discriminate between sounds. The common belief was that children cannot determine the slight differences between speech sounds but learn from their environment how to distinguish the important sounds in their language. Studies by child psychologist discovered this was not the case.

Alison Gopnik and her colleagues found that babies as young as one month old could discriminate English sound contrasts that were given to them. Furthermore, other scientists found that Spanish speaking babies from Mexico, as well as Kikuyu speaking babies from Kenya, could not only distinguish the particular sounds of their own language but were equally good at discriminating English sounds. (Gopnik, p 106) They also found that at about ten months of age, Japanese babies could no longer decipher the change from the R sound to the L sound. On the other hand, American babies progressively improved with that distinction. (Gopnik, p 107) This research suggests that humans have the capacity for any language, but that everyone’s native language is due to the environment in which the child is initially exposed.

Similarly, it will be argued that it is the chemistry of the brain that creates the mental landscape that makes it possible to have a belief in a spiritual world. The work of David Lewis-Williams will show that the human mind is wired with a spectrum of human consciousness. For Lewis- Williams there are three stages of what has been termed altered states of consciousness that results in different kinds of imagery and experiences for individuals. Due to our nervous systems it will be argued that everyone experiences entoptic phenomena, yet they are expressed differently as spiritual experiences.

In the second half of chapter three, Kevin Nelson’s work points to the fact that NDEs and spiritual experience share similar characteristics, such as tunnels and bright lights. For Nelson, both these experiences take place in the borderland of Rapid Eye Movement (REM) consciousness and wakefulness. His experiments will demonstrate that the human brain gives us

13 the potential to have a spiritual experience and while some people are prone to these types of experiences, others are not.

6 The Religious Institution

In chapter four it will be argued that the religious institution exploits the same neural mechanisms that lead people to form into groups. As outlined in chapter two, the human brain is the result of evolution by natural selection and in our evolutionary history there were selective pressures that caused the human brain to have a predisposition to empathize, cooperate with and to be with others. The evidence for this train of thought will come from studies on the effects of oxytocin and vasopressin in the mammalian brain. Patricia Churchland makes a convincing case that these two hormones give humans a predisposition to be with and to cooperate with others. Her thesis is supported by the work of Marco Iacoboni on the Mirror Neuron System. Furthermore, the work of Michael Tomasello will also show that humans are biologically adapted to cooperate and have evolved to work with others on joint ventures and commitments. Evidence from his work with children suggests that we have a predisposition to be attracted to those who we feel comfortable with.

Paradoxically, our natural inclinations to be with others, and to form into groups, inevitably leads to considering others, who are not considered a part of the group, as different and this leads to boundaries. And since our brains evolved to have a positive reaction in an environment of approval and belonging, and conversely a negative response to disapproval, our social institutions have a tremendous role in the understanding of ourselves and others. The key here is engagement with others. We are biologically adapted to act and think in groups. Once these groups or institutions are formed, a strong sense of conventionality is placed on all people within the group. It will be argued that religions constitute such a cooperative group. To support this hypothesis, we will begin with the human brain.

Chapter Two Orchestras and Kludges 7 Using Metaphors

In learning a new sport, language or musical instrument one must first learn the basic fundamentals of the task at hand. For example, in hockey it is necessary to learn the essentials of the game such as skating, stick handling and fighting. Perhaps the latter is a bit facetious however the point is that we must first learn the essential components of the game before moving on. Similarly when developing a thesis, the author often needs to address some key issues that may seem remote from the main topic but are essential for later chapters. Robert Hinde calls these “background issues”. (Hinde, 1999) This chapter will focus on these types of issues. The ideas presented here may seem far removed from religion, but it is believed that they will be helpful in articulating the main argument in the following chapters.

The purpose of this chapter is to determine the best path to take to understand how the brain works. After all, there is no denying the fact that when it comes to how the human brain works, there are many more questions to be asked than answers to give. This lack of knowledge is not limited to just brain researchers, but is a common occurrence across the scientific realm. For instance, although Newton was able to reduce the motions of objects in the world to just three laws, astronomers struggle with the observation that most of the universe, perhaps as much as 96 percent, is dark and unexplained. Furthermore, of that, a mere four percent is visible to us today. Therefore, we are missing about 90 percent of the total amount created from the big bang. Although there are no clear sets of laws that can be used to explain brain functioning, it is argued that our understanding of the human brain has made great strides, particularly in the last few decades and as experiments and better technology develop, we will be in a better position to account for our behaviour.

When attempting to explain any concepts or ideas to others, we tend to relate them to things more commonly known and as Douglas Hofstadter contends, “the best way to communicate our ideas is to exploit examples, analogies and metaphors galore”. (Hofstadter, p xv) Scientists have used analogies and metaphors to try to make clear their own hypotheses and experiments, as well as those of others. Indeed, metaphors and analogies can be an excellent heuristic tool. For

15 instance, to understand gravity it is commonly suggested to think of a flat, malleable object like a mattress or rubber membrane on which something heavy, like a bowling ball, rests. The weight of the ball causes the surface to distort. This is analogous to the fabric of space becoming distorted due to the sun. If you take a smaller object, like a marble and role it across the surface, it slopes toward the sagging fabric. Gravity then is the by-product of the bending of space-time. (Greene, p 68)

Now analogies and metaphors certainly do have limitations and while some will benefit from the above example, for others it may be as clear as mud. Furthermore, it is possible that some metaphors may prove to be more harmful than helpful. One author who finds evidence for the latter is Susan Sontag, who in Illness as Metaphor , suggests that metaphorical thinking could negatively affect the way people deal with disease. She feels a phrase, such as ‘fighting an illness’, may hinder the way a person comes to terms with the ailment. On the other hand, it could reasonably be argued that the same terminology may help a person combat the disease. Nevertheless, she raises a valuable point, that although metaphorical language is a great way to explain complex ideas, they can also be problematic.

Neurologists, psychologists and philosophers too have employed quite a variety of metaphors to give a meaningful picture of how the brain functions. John Locke, for instance used the Medieval Latin term , tabula rasa to emphasize his belief that the mind is a blank slate. Others have compared the mind to a computer, toolbox (Pinker, p 524), meme machine, anticipation machines (Dennett, p 177) and a Swiss army knife with each blade corresponding to a specific purpose. Psychologist Steven Pinker compared the mind to the Apollo Spacecraft, saying that “it was designed to solve many engineering problems and thus is packed with high tech systems each contrived to overcome our own obstacles”. (Pinker, p 4) He correctly points out that the brain was designed by natural selection to solve the types of problems faced in our evolutionary history; however he insists that the brain is “not a single organ but a system of organs, which we can think of as psychological faculties or mental modules”. (Pinker, p 27)

8 Evolutionary Perspective

Pinker, like Boyer and Barrett, can be grouped into those thinkers who take an evolutionary perspective on the human mind. The basic ideas of this method were explained by E.O. Wilson

16 in Sociobiology and by psychologists Leda Cosmides, John Tooby and Jerome Barkow in their book, The Adapted Mind . It seems the term evolutionary psychology was preferred over sociobiology due to the bad press received by the latter. Generally these thinkers believe we must “reverse-engineer” the human mind to its components or modules that were formed in relation to the environment of our Pleistocene forebears. For them, the mind is a collection of modules that formed by way of natural selection over the eons designed to combat specific problems. As an example, Pinker asks us to consider taking a piece of paper, crumple it up and throw it to the ground. Next, take a second piece of paper and do the same. Now imagine two individuals entering the room with you and each one retrieves the discarded pieces of paper. Pinker suggests that you would be able to distinguish between the two people even though their facial features are relatively the same. Yet, despite the fact that each crumpled piece of paper is distinct in shape, with different angles and folds, you would be hard-pressed to denote the difference. From this, Pinker draws the conclusion that humans have modules for objects, animate beings and other minds but we have an easier time identifying faces, because throughout our evolutionary history, recognizing a potential friend or foe was more advantageous for our species than our potential relationship with crumpled paper.

9 Critics of Evolutionary Psychology

Those who oppose the evolutionary psychologists take a holistic approach and counter that the brain functions as a whole and everything seems to be connected, so therefore there is no need to search for modules. They suggest, incorrectly it will argued, that the evolutionary psychologists, in trying to explain human behaviour fall into the trap of postulating “just so stories”. Arguably the most cited paper that challenges the evolutionary psychologists view is from Stephen Gould and Richard Lewontin’s , The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: a Critique of the Adaptations Program .

Gould and Lewontin’s paper begins with a description of St. Mark’s Cathedral, located in Venice. Anyone who has been to this City cannot help but be impressed by this piece of architecture. What is prominent for the observer is a mosaic of Christ and the gleaming illustration of the Christian faith. The authors draw our attention to what they term spandrels – the triangular “spaces formed by the intersection of two rounded arches at right angles” – that support the dome of the cathedral. (Gould and Lewontin) They suggest that an observer would

17 be mistaken if they believed that the architects designed the building in order to paint the Christian scenes rather than an architectural by-product of the design.

By way of an analogy, the authors cleverly argue that evolutionary biologists fail to consider architectural constraints when suggesting how biological traits have evolved as adaptations to the local environment. They suggest that this exclusive adaptationist thinking is nothing more that a Panglossian view, in that everything is made for the best purpose. The authors question this strictly adaptationist approach and suggest that more importance be placed on developmental constraints.

In a paper written later, Gould coined the term exaptations rather than spandrels and defines it as, “characters evolved for other images (or for no function at all) and later co-opted for their current role”. (Barkow, p 395) However no Darwinian, at least not thinkers such as Wilson, Pinker or Boyer, would suggest that organisms do not have characteristics that are unwanted or superfluous and may have had traits that had been used for something different in their evolutionary history. One example often cited is the belief that the feathers of birds were initially selected for insulation and not for flight. Psychologist Stephen Pinker says that selection versus constraints is a phony dichotomy and that natural selection “should not be pitted against developmental, genetic or phylogenetic constraint as is the more important one of them is, the less important the others are”. (Barkow, p 395)

A second misrepresentation by the opponents of the evolutionary psychologists is their Panglossian assumption that we live in the best of all possible worlds. Just as Voltaire was a little unjust to Leibniz, Gould and Lewontin are unfair to evolutionary psychologists as no serious evolutionary theorist would suggest that nature has in mind perfection. Any sports enthusiast knows full well that backs were not designed for running, or knees for squash, nor elbows for tennis. Richard Dawkins has clearly argued that evolution works on what is currently available and builds on existing structures which almost always does not lead to perfection. For instance, the vertebrate eye design was constrained by the physical properties of light. Evolutionary biologists suggest that since the eye initially evolved in water it is sensitive to “a narrow band of wavelength of electromagnetic radiation, the spectrum of visible light which is transmuted through water without significant attenuation”. (Barkow, p 396) For these thinkers,

18 all vertebrate eyes share this feature but also have some differences, due to selective pressures of the environment. Subsequently we find nocturnal birds with retinas consisting of more rods than cones due to their sensitivity to low light. Clearly, the eye was not designed optimally.

10 The Brain as an Orchestra

This paper takes a position somewhere in the middle between the computational and holistic schools and argues that our minds did indeed evolve during conditions present in that long stretch of time known as the Pleistocene, however the search for distinct modules may not be our best approach. The Swiss army knife metaphor of the mind suggests that each module is distinct and has a specialized purpose, while the evidence of how our brains functions suggest that this separation is not so sharp. To be fair to Pinker, however he did say that “modules accomplish specialized functions, thanks to specialized structures, but don’t necessarily come in encapsulated packages”. (Pinker 1997, p 315) Furthermore it is not being said here that we need to dismiss entirely the modularity approach, for evolutionary psychologists have made a very good case for arguing that we are innately programmed to detect imposters, suggesting a cheater detection module. (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992) It would be a mistake however to search for a spiritual or religious module just as it would be a mistake to search for a ‘God gene’. What we have to take into consideration is how the different parts of the brain, all of which are products of evolution, function together. In order to do this, we will first look to brain researcher, Susan Greenfield who likens the brain to an orchestra, emphasizing that different areas of the brain are involved in different functions, and then to David Linden for an evolutionary perspective. With these two analogies of the human mind we may be in a better position to answer the question as to why spirituality and religious thought is so widespread.

The position taken in this paper is that the most efficient way to understand human behaviour, including religious behaviour, is to understand better how the brain functions. Marvin Minsky argues that if you were to take your vehicle to the garage because it wasn’t functioning properly you would be a little confused if the mechanic told you that perhaps it isn’t starting because you have not treated it well lately. If we truly want to understand complex machinery such as cars and brains, he reasons, “one needs to develop good ideas about the relationships among the parts inside.” (Minsky, p 34) Greenfield emphasizes the relationship between different areas of the brain. For instance, when it comes to motion she says there are three distinct areas: the nasal

19 ganglia, cerebellum and the motor cortex that all contribute in some way. Comparatively, each section of an orchestra, for instance, strings, percussion and bass all contribute to the musical performance.

Furthermore, if we consider stubbing our toe or unintentionally hitting our finger with a hammer, one would think pain receptors at the surface of the body would send messages to one particular part of the brain causing us to recoil or shout a profanity. Brain researchers, however, have proved that “the concept of a pain centre is pure fiction unless virtually the whole brain is considered to be the pain centre because the thalamus, the limbic system, the hypothalamus, the brain stem reticular formation, the parietal cortex and the frontal cortex are all implicated in pain perception”. (Minsky, p 73) In fact, all sensory systems in the brain do not have a single map of the world but are spread out in different regions that are specialized for different functions. We will get a clearer picture of this when we look at our visual system.

In addition to the fact that there are many different areas of the brain contributing to one function, each brain area is involved in more than just one function. The prefrontal cortex, for instance contributes to visual perception but it is also instrumental in such things as depression, memory and personality. (Greenfield, p 6) If we now consider how cells in the brain communicate with each other, we can see how the brain/orchestra analogy makes sense.

The neural tissue in our brains is made up of two types of nerve cells, neurons and glial cells. The three important parts of a neuron are the cell body, the axon which is an output fibre and dendrites which are input fibres. When neuroscientists talk about gray matter they are referring to the collection of nerve cell bodies and dendrites, while the term white matter denotes the axons emerging from the cell bodies. (Greenfield, p 26) Glial cells, on the other hand, are non- neural and seem to be involved in escorting the neurons to different regions of the brain during brain development. (Ledoux, p 69)

Neurons come in two forms with one constituting a layering effect, as found in the cortex, while the second class of neurons are organized in a cluster. The latter type form a nucleus and the most important cluster type structures of the brain, for our purposes, are the amygdala and the thalamus. The amygdala is instrumental in linking the hippocampus, which is involved in

20 memory with the hypothalamus, which is involved in the regulation of hormones. The thalamus gets most of its information from the sense organs and relays them to the sensory cortex.

Now when neurons become active, they fire an electric current that is transmitted along the cell body to the axon terminals at the end of the axon. The current is known as the action potential and when it makes its way to the extremely small space between nerve cells, called the synapse, a neurotransmitter is released. (Crick, p 97) Each one of these synapses can be either excitatory or inhibitory and can be either on or off. Excitatory neurons release glutamate while inhibitory neurons release gamma-amniobutyric acid (GABA). (Crick, p 102) So whether an action potential takes place or not depends greatly on the interaction between glutamate and GABA. Important for us is the fact that the neurons generally only communicate with other neurons within a close proximity. These connections are the main carriers of information transmission and storage in the brain. We can say that the brain is divided into networks in the same way as an orchestra is divided into sections.

When it comes to the brain, it seems that size doesn’t matter. The human brain weighs approximately 2.1 percent of our body weight while our closest cousins, chimpanzees and bonobos come in at about 0.61 and 0.69 respectively. (Corballis 2011, p 197) Other species, such as mice and birds are higher than us. As brains get larger it needs more energy so there are a number of evolutionary trade-offs and one of these trade-offs is how neurons communicate with each other. So rather than having larger and larger brains, it appears that our higher intelligence is due to our neuronal networks.

Understanding how glutamate and GABA interact can help us understand how the brain processes information but there are other chemicals, called modulators involved as well. Modulators come in three types: peptides, amines and hormones. These modulators affect the efficacy of the glutamate and GABA. (Ledoux, p 57) For instance, monoamines such as serotonin and dopamine are produced by cells in the brain stem and are important in our arousal system. In times of stress, cortisol gets pumped into the blood stream making its way to the brain affecting the glutamate GABA interaction. The brain takes in information and stores this information in a number of different networks, often outside of conscious awareness.

If we take a bottom up view of the brain we find the spinal cord, which is essentially a conglomerate of nerves that continuously relays messages from the body to the brain and the brain to the body. (Ramachandran, p 17) At the top of the spinal cord is the evolutionary ancient brain stem that is divided into three lobes, the medulla, pons and the midbrain. Essential functions such as body temperature, blood pressure and breathing is regulated in the medulla. The cerebellum which controls balance sits on top of the pons. (Ramachandran, p 17)

The most recent part of the human brain from an evolutionary perspective is the cerebral cortex. This can be viewed as two mirror images, divided into a left and right hemisphere. Each cerebral hemisphere is itself divided by four lobes, occipital, temporal, parietal and frontal, with each lobe being responsible for a number of different functions. The occipital, for instance is linked with visual processing, while the temporal too is involved in perception but has more say in making the connection between objects and appropriate motions. Conveniently below the temporal is the hippocampus which is involved in the formation of new memories. Interestingly, found in the left temporal lobe, is a section of the cortex known as Wernicke’s area. This area is instrumental in understanding the semantic features of language. Not surprisingly, this area in humans is seven times the size of that found in apes. (Ramachandran, p 19) In the parietal lobes we find a number of processes going on including the handling of muscle and joint inputs from the body as well as vision, hearing and balance. For Ramachadran, this area of the brain is what gives us our “rich multimedia understanding of your corporeal self and the world around it: (Ramachadran, p 19) Finally, the frontal lobe has something to do with our social world as damage here causes people to become more withdrawn from society. We will have much more to say about the frontal lobe when it comes to mirror neurons.

How we perceive objects is a good example of how the brain can be compared with an orchestra. Despite the fact that there is no clear consensus among neuroscientists as to why so many different areas of the brain contribute to perception, they are in agreement with the fact that there is a division of labour, with each area responsible for a specific aspect of vision. According to Ramachadran, the information from the retina gets delivered to the brain by two means. One way he calls the old pathway and here the information travels to the parietal lobe through the superior colliculus. The new pathway, on the other hand, takes the information to the visual cortex. From the visual cortex, the information is divided into different routes again by axons

22 carrying cells known as Parvi cells (P cells) and Magni cells (M cells). The P cells are sensitive to colour, while the M cells are essential for capturing movement. These two different routes, Ramachadran calls the “how” and “what” routes. (Ramachandran, p 63-65)

In addition to these two different pathways, Ramachadran identifies a third route that takes on an emotional response to objects. He says that pathway three “passes high level object perception- and the whole rich penumbra of associations evoked through pathway two and ----quickly to the amygdala, the gateway to the emotional core of the brain, the limbic system”. (Ramachadran, p 65) Recall that the amygdala is like a transition zone between the areas of the brain involved in memory and those involved in the regulation of hormones. Although it is still unknown how the mind pulls together all these different associations of an object to encode meaning, it can be said that human perception is not simply submissive to visual input but is a constructed opinion of the world. (Ramachadran, p 49) And as will be argued later, this shaped opinion is derived from one’s emotional response in combination with pre-existing memories, biases and prejudices.

Although brain researchers are at odds as to what is the best way to describe the brain, most seem to be in agreement that the brain is a conglomerate of different parts. For instance, Neuroscientist Paul Maclean divides the brain into three sections and identifies it as the triune brain. He labels the bottom portion the reptilian brain, which is involved in what is often referred to as the four F’s – feeding, fighting, fleeing, and fornication. The Primitive mammalian brain, as Maclean calls it, is joined to the Reptilian brain and this, he suggests, is what gives us our social emotion. Surrounding that is the Neocortex, the brain that gives us our human intellect. Ledoux suggests that neo may be a misnomer as its not that this area emerged much more advanced in humans. (Ledoux, p 35) Greenfield is critical of Maclean’s description as it suggests reason and emotion are separated and we will discover later that recent research suggests that there is no clear boundary between reason and emotion.

Nevertheless, one can see that since the different areas of the brain are responsible for different functions and any network of neurons depends largely on the small community of neurons in their specific network, it can be compared with all the different types of instruments that make up an orchestra. Whatever these assemblies of neurons do, depends greatly on what other assemblies are doing, as well as, the influence those other assemblies have on them.

Furthermore, the area where these systems are located influences what each assembly contributes to the function of the system. The orchestra analogy makes it clear that separate entities contribute to the music of the mind and the brain is multifunctional in contrast to other organs that are specific to one function, such as the pancreas. For Neurologist Antonio Damasio the brain is nothing more than a “supersystem of systems”. (Damasio, p 30)

11 Problems with the Orchestra Analogy

Like all analogies however, there are complications with the orchestra analogy and as we saw with Sontag’s cautioning stance, it could lead to even greater problems. For instance, when one conjures an image of an orchestra, typically one thinks of a man or woman at the centre of the stage conducting all the musicians to produce an ear-pleasing piece of music. The problem here is that when it comes to the brain there is no homunculus or little man in our heads who is calling the shots. Although it is quite apparent that different areas of the brain are responsible for different functions, and it would seem that it is controlled by some type of command centre, there is no stage in the brain where all points of life meet. We found this with pain perception and it can be said that any complex system “can in fact function in what seems to be a thoroughly purposeful and integrated way simply by having lots of subsystems doing their own thing without any central supervisor”. (Humphrey, p 28)

Instrumental in suggesting that the brain has a centre where all the information is accumulated was Philosopher Rene Descartes. For Descartes, in order for an individual to be conscious of something, all information from the senses made its way to the pineal gland where, mysteriously there was an interaction between the immaterial mind and one’s material brain. When detectives have no leads in a case or the information provided cannot be corroborated or other evidence suggests that the witness is just plain wrong, then the detectives ‘box’ the case until sufficient evidence comes available that would justify re-opening the investigation. With current knowledge of how our brains function it is suggested here that the idea that there is a brain centre where all information rests and the idea that the mind is immaterial should be ‘boxed’. Just as we no longer believe that earth is the centre of the universe or that there is a hypothetical substance that is released from combustible bodies when burned, there is no evidence to suggest that we should pursue the mind/body hypothesis.

A second problem with the brain/orchestra analogy is that the musicians in an orchestra are playing a specific piece of music. They have a specific purpose in mind and that is to play a musical score, guided by the sheet music in front of them. In other words, they know beforehand, for the most part, what the end product will be. In contrast, the brain developed incrementally through the process of evolution through natural selection. There is no musical score to follow; no foresight or purpose. The brain/orchestra analogy certainly has its benefits but it can also lead to confusion. Now we will turn to another brain analogy that will provide us with more information on how the human brain works.

12 Darwin’s Dangerous Idea

Biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky wisely said, “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”. (Sapp, p xi) He was emphasizing the importance of evolutionary thinking in all aspects of biology and it is argued here that it is extremely important when considering how our brains function. As Pinker concluded, “the only successful account of the origin of complex biological structure is the theory of natural selection, the view that the differential reproductive success associated with heritable variation is the primary organizing force in the evolution of organisms”. (Barkow, p 708) To get a clearer picture of how the human brain evolved we will consider the main points of what Daniel Dennett calls Darwin’s dangerous idea.

Darwin begins his long argument by considering the great number of varieties of pigeons. He found slight differences in such characteristics as the size of the mouth, skull and beaks in these birds. He suggested the reason for these minor differences was due to gradual changes at the hands of the breeder. More importantly was Darwin’s conjecture that the actions of the breeders were not a deliberate act with foresight and a specific goal in mind. He wrote, “if man goes on selecting and thus augmenting any peculiarities, he will almost certainly unconsciously modify other parts of the structure owing to the mysterious laws of the correlation of growth”. (Darwin, p 34) For Darwin, the reason there are numerous varieties of domesticated species is due to purposeless accumulative selection.

From pigeons to dogs, Darwin goes on to argue that throughout history, breeders have methodically tried to select for the best strain of animal in the country. The weakest of the litter were not seen as admirable and therefore did not reproduce to the same extent as the more

25 treasured siblings. For example, the King Charles’s spaniel has been “unconsciously modified to a large extent since the time of that Monarch”. (Darwin, p 37) What is important for Darwin is that the changes have been quite effective, yet they were unconscious and gradual. This is another example where we find that the breeder did not have a preconceived idea of a perfect breed but simply selected the best of the lot and subsequently, those dogs passed on the best traits to the next generation.

Darwin saw the same gradual process of improvement with plants. He believed that the skill of the gardener having produced marvelous results is actually quite simple. It has consisted in cultivating the best known variety, “sowing its seeds, and when a slightly better variety has chanced to appear, selecting it, and so onwards.” (Darwin, p 39) Having demonstrated the gradual hereditary modification of plants and animals at the hands of an unconscious selector, Darwin turns to the variability of species in the state of nature and makes the logical assumption that “no obvious reason why the principles which have acted so efficiently under domestication should not have acted under nature”. (Darwin, p 456)

Regardless of the cause or degree of variation, if it is profitable to an individual of any species, Darwin reasoned, it would be preserved and most likely inherited by its offspring. The principle by which each slight variation is passed on to the next generation he termed natural selection, in order to indicate its relation to man’s power of selection. Neuroscientist David Linden takes Darwin’s ideas seriously and when it comes to the human brain, he considers it as nothing more than a collection of solutions to problems faced throughout our evolutionary history.

13 Darwin’s Kludge

Linden suggests that the brain is like a Kludge, “a design that is inefficient, inelegant and unfathomable but nevertheless works”. (Linden, p 6) Although correct in taking an evolutionary perspective, his use of the term design could inadvertently mislead some of his readers. Nevertheless, understanding the brain through an evolutionary lens as proposed by Linden, suggests that “everything about being human including love, memories, dreams and our predisposition to religious beliefs is due mainly to our inefficient brains. (Linden, p 27)

The term Kludge comes from military historian Jackson Granholm, who defines it as, “an ill- assorted collection of poorly matching parts, forming a distressing whole”. (Linden, p 6) Not a flattering definition by any means especially since we are talking about the foundation of our very being. The term distressing seems misplaced as the final product seems surprisingly well- oiled and unified despite the agglomeration of different parts. Since the brain is seen as another organ that evolved in the same way as other organs, we will next look at the evolution of the eye, since we have a better grasp on how the eye works, compared to our comprehension of the brain. This will give us a better understanding of Linden’s seemingly demeaning analogy of the brain.

14 The Evolution of the Eye

Both the brain and the eye are made of soft tissue so unlike investigations by paleontologists, eye and brain researchers must rely on studying the developing embryo and by conducting cross species analysis, rather than relying on evidence from fossils to determine when key characteristics arose. Researcher, Trevor D. Lamb did just that and discovered that rather than a perfect mechanism, the human eye has many imperfections due to its evolutionary history.

During the Cambrian explosion between 540 million to 490 million years ago, scientists believe that two different types of eyes originated. There is the compound eye, commonly found in spiders, insects and crustaceans and other invertebrates, while the vertebrates have a camera eye. The latter have different photoreceptors as they have two different types; namely, cones and rods. For Lamb, the similarities of the eyes of jawed vertebrates could not have originated independently and suggests that a similar type of eye must have existed in the common ancestor between the jawed and jawless vertebrates. (Lamb, p 66)

To find the evidence to hypothesize how our eyes may have evolved, Lamb and his co-workers looked at the hagfish and proposed that since its eyes lack a cornea, iris and lens it must not be involved in vision. Historically, those opposing evolution by natural selection have argued that there is no advantage in half an eye. This argument can be put to rest as Lamb demonstrates that the eye of the hagfish “provides input to the part of the animal’s brain that regulates crucial circadian rhythms as well as seasonal activities such as feeding and breeding”. (Lamb, p 68) So for these researchers, the eye at one time was a non-visual organ and eventually evolved the ability for vision.

In all animals, there are two types of photoreceptors: namely, rhabdomeric and ciliary. These two types of photoreceptors are fundamentally different with the “ciliary photoreceptors responsible for sensing light for non-visual purposes, such as regulating circadian rhythms while Rhabdomeric receptors sense light for the express purpose of enabling vision. (Lamb, p 68) It was believed that invertebrates held the former, while vertebrates used the latter. Evidence from molecular biologist in Germany suggests that this is not the case and they discovered that our retinas retain offshoots of rhabdomeric receptors which have been transformed to be able to send messages from the retina to the brain. This suggests that environmental pressures changed the rhabdomeric receptors into output neurons.

For Lamb and his colleagues, the eye evolved from a light sensory non-visual organ into a visual one. Due to the way our eyes evolved, we have a number of inefficiencies, such as shadows in our visual field and blind spots. The design of the eye then is not optimal, and if we consider the brain in the same evolutionary framework, we will find that although an extraordinary piece of machinery, it too has many inefficiencies.

The thesis of this paper is that both spirituality and religion can be explained by the way the human mind works. It is not being suggested that the pervasiveness of spirituality or religious systems in human culture evolved because of its adaptive value, rather religion is an indirect consequence of the way our minds work. In this chapter, we looked at two analogies of the brain to help us understand brain functioning. From these two analogies it was suggested that the human mind evolved just like any other organ in the human body by the slow process of evolution by natural selection. Due to the myriad environmental conditions that our forebears faced, the brain developed incrementally with different parts of the brain having different functions, all addressing solution to complex problems. In the next chapter it will be argued that the nature of our brains gave us the potential to be spiritual and the evidence for this may lie in caves in Southern Europe.

Chapter Three A Healthy Dose of Speculation 15 The Mind in the Cave

In his book, A Universe from Nothing , Lawrence Krauss suggests that there are three key principles of science. The first states that one must be prepared to follow the evidence where one is led. Secondly, one must equally try to prove a theory false as one is eager to prove it correct. Finally, the final adjudicator of truth is experiment and “not the comfort one derives from one’s a priori beliefs, nor the beauty or elegance once ascribes to one’s theoretical models”. (Krauss, p xvi) All three principles are to be strictly followed when articulating a theory. The question to be asked of any theory is “not just whether the theory does the job, but how likely it is to be true”. (Humphrey, p 221)

To find our spiritual roots, David Lewis-Williams suggest that we excavate the caves, in what is now Europe, to where our Upper Palaeolithic ancestors first began to create art. From the evidence found in these caves, Lewis-Williams proposes that these caves were not merely places to draw pictures but were part of an elaborate religious ritual where people would go to recreate a spiritual experience. For Lewis-Williams, the reason we have religion is the result of the attempt to recreate these altered states that derive from the wiring of our brains. Furthermore, the way in which these experiences are expressed and how some people undergo a deeper state of altered consciousness, granting them power over others, leads to the stratification of society.

In the Mind in the Cave , Lewis-Williams asks the reader to consider why it is that so many people believe in a separate non-material realm, populated by spiritual beings, who can influence our realm, despite the fact that this is most likely a false hypothesis. Indeed as argued in the opening chapter, one of the most prominent features of most religions is that they all postulate the existence of supernatural beings. For Lewis-Williams the various reasons put forth to explain why we have religion are not persuasive and as was outlined in the introductory chapter, most generally give a functionalist account. That is, religion serves a particular purpose.

For Lewis-Williams, “religion sits on the shoulders of a neurological substrate and the experiences that derive from it.” (Lewis-Williams 2010, p 120) It is not that we are innately curious about the world, but rather, religion is the product of our explanation of the complex

29 experiences that derive from the human mind. These individual experiences expressed within a social context leads to a whole range of other explanations which culminates into powerful social hierarchies. He proposes that evidence for this hypothesis can be found in the caves of the Upper Paleolithic, in what is now France and Spain, where people began to make art and images.

Not only does Lewis-Williams question the reasons typically given to account for religion, he also disagrees with the speculation by many anthropologists that humans began creating art chiefly for aesthetic reasons. He also finds unconvincing the argument that people had plenty of leisure time on their hands to dabble in art. He reasons that much of the art that has been discovered has been found hidden in caves inconveniently located and not easily accessible for the viewing pleasure of the public. The suggestion that our ancestors had plenty of time on their hands to partake in art is also a false lead, as art has also been found in Australia, a climate not always hospitable to our Antipodean ancestors. Although he admits that it is very difficult to prove the reasons for Upper Paleolithic art, he is adamant that they “were not driven by aesthetics”. (Lewis-Williams 2002, p 45)

Lewis-Williams wisely points out that one cannot consider the subterranean images in isolation without considering the social context in which they were made. Influenced by the work of Andre Leroi-Gourhan, Lewis-Williams suggests, that cave art is not the work of an Upper Paleolithic tagger, but was a community affair involving some form of ritual. Furthermore, he suggests one must take into consideration the ancient thought system of the people creating the art. He questions whether they had the same level of consciousness that we find in people today. By drawing a comparison between the communities that made the art with those of the Neanderthals, he postulates that the early Homo sapiens had similar brain functioning as us.

16 The Spiritual Realm

About 45,000 to 30,000 years ago, the Neanderthals were slowly overcome by modern Homo sapiens and it is here that the archaeological evidence suggests that there was a clear distinction in the art that these two groups produced. For Lewis-Williams, the absence of pictures and carvings, as well as, the fact that the Neanderthals did not have elaborate burial practices seems to mean that there were two different kinds of thought processes. Lewis-Williams posits, that the evidence of cave art and burial practices was possible for early Homo sapiens because they had

30 the capacity to consider another world such as the spiritual realm. Moreover, the making of art and rituals surely brings people together but more significantly it leads to social discrimination. The question that Lewis-Williams seeks an answer for is what is going on in the human mind that leads people to believe in the spiritual realm.

To make clear the difference between Neanderthals and Homo sapiens, Lewis-Williams makes a distinction between a primary consciousness and a higher order consciousness. The former is simply being aware of the current environment without having a sense of a personal self. He coins the term “remembered present” to give us a clearer picture. (Lewis-Williams 2002, p 187) Higher order consciousness, on the other hand, involves a sense of self-reflection for the individual. The key here is the ability of the individual to have a symbolic memory. It is only Homo sapiens, according to this reasoning, who have the capability of remembering the past, as well as, making plans for the future. For Lewis-Williams, the Neanderthals could not go beyond the here and now. (Lewis-Williams 2002, p 189)

One could counter that there are other species that have the capacity to go beyond the here and now. For instance, the manner in which bees are able to tell other bees where to find food sources suggests that they must hold onto some information for a period of time. Moreover, once the bees find a food source, they travel several kilometres to recruit others. (Bickerton, p 132) This suggests that not only do the bees convey information over time but also in a different place as well.

On the other hand, a counter argument could be that the bees are simply relying on smell and by following the scent, the bees instinctively return to the food. Amazingly, however, to recruit bees for a short flight to food, about seventy-five yards away, the enlisting bee performs a round dance. For those needed to go the extra mile, the recruiting bee performs the waggle dance. The evidence here points to a species that cannot possibly function simply in the here and now. The main point for us is not whether the Neanderthals and Homo sapiens were different in the way their brain functioned but that people who made the cave art most likely had the same brain capacity as humans today.

Lewis-Williams suggests that we consider consciousness, “not as a state, but as a continuum.” (Lewis-Williams 2002, p 126) He suggests that the human brain is wired with a spectrum of

31 consciousness and he identifies three stages of what is commonly interpreted as an altered state of consciousness that results in different kinds of imagery and experience for the individual. The first stage usually begins with images of geometric shapes. These patterns are known as entoptic phenomena or phosphenes and are described as dots, lines, grids and zigzags. Due to our nervous system, all people have these various images but depending on one’s social context, these images can be interpreted differently. The important point made by the author is that the forms are “universal, though their selection and meaning are culturally determined”. (Lewis- Williams 2010, p 146)

When moved into a deeper state of altered consciousness, people within a particular social environment begin to try to make sense of these images. Lewis-Williams believes that the interpretation comes with emotional and religious significance. When we move into the final stage, people report more than just visual hallucinations but feelings of being in a tunnel or vortex accompanied by a bright light. He says that this universal feeling is the result of our nervous system and is expressed in the final stage as a religious experience.

For Lewis-Williams the evidence for concluding that Homo-sapiens and not Neanderthals had the potential to have dreams and hallucinations, to share them with others and interpret them in different ways, is found in the caves in Western Europe. He suggests that these caves were used as a tool for social discrimination, giving power to the shamans who had the ability to connect with the spirit world. He makes the hypothesis that “entry into Upper Paleolithic caves was probably seen as virtually indistinguishable from entry into the mental vortex that leads to the experiences and hallucination of a deep trance”. (Lewis-Williams 2002, p 209) People could get a taste of the spirit world by entering the caves and see for themselves, “the fixed visions of the spirit world that empowered the shamans”. (Lewis-Williams 2002, p 210)

Why Lewis-Williams draws the conclusion that this cave art is linked to a religious social ritual involving a spiritual world, rather than simply a Paleolithic Picasso is from considering the manner the art is presented. He points to the caves in Rouffignac, where one finds an image of a horse that is not simply painted on the wall but it appears that the rear of the horse is in the wall while the head itself is emerging from the rock. The suggestion here is that the horse is actually

32 a part of the cave itself, “part of the nether world”. (Lewis-Williams 2002, p 213) He interprets this as part of a ceremony involving “vision questing”.

Furthermore, when it comes to interpreting the hand prints on the walls, we should pay more attention to the way these images were made, rather than the images themselves. Lewis- Williams reasons that if we consider the three tiered cosmos that the Shamans emphasized and the wall of the cave as a demarcation between the material and spiritual worlds, then we must consider that this is one of the earliest pieces of evidence for religious ceremonies. He concludes that if we take the context in which this art was created, then we can reasonably hypothesize about the role that these rituals may have played in Upper Paleolithic Society.

If we turn to other caves, such as at Enlene and consider the area known as the Sanctuary, we find that the scene is not one that we would find in contemporary art. For instance, many images are superimposed on top of each other and the authors of the painting appeared to have paid no attention to size, location or whether the image was upside down, sideways or right side up. This would suggest that the images are floating, and taking this evidence in totality, one could reasonably conclude that the art was “a complex ritual performance during which image makers engaged, controlled and embodied their visions”. (Lewis-Williams 2010, p 225)

In comparing the Enlene cave with Les Trois Freres, a cave that leads off Enlene, Lewis- Williams makes a convincing case for social stratification. We find that in the Enlene group, the images are not found on the walls or on the ceilings. His conclusion from this is that some members of the community at Enlene seemed to have, to a certain degree, less of a relationship with the spirit world, since the people did not touch the barrier between the material world and spiritual world. Yet those people who had access to the deeper areas of Les Trois Freres were free to do so and they were accompanied with “more intense mental states”. (Lewis-Williams 2010, p 231) Furthermore, for Lewis-Williams, the fact that caves such as those at Gabillou and Lascaux appear to have separate sections suggest that only a select few had access to certain parts of the cave. He is suggesting here that those whose brain functioning gave them the potential for altered states of consciousness endowed them with a higher standard in society.

In assessing the work of Lewis-Williams, it seems that he has a convincing argument for his theory that humans are wired for spiritual experiences. Although cleverly articulated, his

33 hypothesis that the rituals performed in hopes of recreating these experiences is a conjecture that seems impossible to prove or falsify. This is not to suggest that it is without merit. Equally hard to corroborate is the notion that these rituals led some people to have advantages over others, leading to a stratified society. If we follow the path of his first hypothesis and explore what is going on in the brain when one has a spiritual experience, it could lead to corroborating evidence. His theory about social stratification seems to be a dead end however. In search of evidence to support a theory for social discrimination one would be better suited to look at the brain mechanisms that lead people to be attracted to one group over another. This will be the subject matter of the next chapter. The rest of this chapter will look at work on NDEs.

17 Near Death Experience

Before carrying on however, a short explanation as to why research on NDEs is the proper path to take in our quest for an explanatory account of why we have spiritual experiences. Consider for instance a police detective faced with a number of sexual assault occurrences to solve. The officer would look at the circumstances around each incident and note the similarities between them. If, for instance, all the victims were blond, around thirty years of age and living alone in a basement apartment in a house that backs onto a ravine and that each victim had her arms bound with shoe string and the suspect entered through the back patio door, this would lead the detective to reasonably believe that the culprit in each incident was the same person. Now if the suspect is apprehended during the act of one of the assaults under the same circumstances, the prosecution could use ‘similar act’ evidence to suggest that he was also responsible for the other assaults.

Similarly, in comparing NDEs with those types of experiences that people report as spiritual are so alike that perhaps the ‘suspect’ in this case is the same. There is no question that it is a difficult to ascertain whether a spiritual experience is hardwired in our brains. Not only are we faced with the problem of capturing such an experience but how do we know that what we are capturing is indeed a ‘spiritual’ experience? Perhaps one day we will be able to download an app to allow us to capture the episode but today we are technologically hindered. Indeed both believers and non-believers agree that one cannot simply enter a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and expect to capture a spiritual experience. For the religious, this would suggest that we are asking for God’s intervention on command. For the scientist, the quantity of blood does not

34 necessarily disclose all brain activity. Furthermore, many small neuronal clusters are not captured by a MRI and the machine may not be able to detect any brain action that has been inhibited. For this reason, research by Neurologist Kevin Nelson may offer some ‘similar act’ evidence to support the theory offered by Lewis-Williams.

Nelson suggests that we look at the research into NDEs because there is such a similarity between these occurrences and one seen as spiritual. For instance, people for both affairs, report out of body experiences, tunnels, lights and a sense of mystical oneness. He argues that our primitive brainstem, along with our limbic system and cerebral cortex gives us the potential to have a spiritual experience. He sought to explain the possible cause of a NDE from a neurological point of view and determine a physiological account for the tunnel vision and the feeling of being out of body that people described when they are ostensibly at death’s doorstep.

Nelson identifies three states of consciousness, wakefulness, REM sleep and Non-REM sleep. He wants to see whether we can decipher what parts of the brain are active during an altered state of consciousness. Since NDEs take place in the “borderland” of these three states of consciousness, perhaps the spiritual experience can be found there as well.

Many of the people who have experienced a NDE say it involves intense light. Ironically, when we are in the REM state, our visual system is strongly activated. Nelson says that for many of these people, at one point in their lives, they had experienced what he terms, REM intrusion. This simply means that some aspect of REM sleep intruded their normally active day. He goes on to suggest that twenty five percent of us experience this phenomenon. (Nelson, p 201) The evidence here suggests that some people are more susceptible to experiencing a blending of consciousness. With this evidence it is reasonable to conclude that a spiritual experience may very well take place in the borderlands of these three states.

18 Phantom Limbs

It is not just with NDEs that our view of reality is altered, our brains are quite capable of distorting the way we understand our bodily sensations. For instance, when a patient loses a limb they may still sense pain in the area where the limb used to be. In the 1980’s, Ramachandran came up with an effective treatment strategy in order to relieve the ‘pain’ of one

35 of his patients. What he found was that the patient’s brain had a misrepresented map of his sensations. Ramachandran’s patient, Ron, had the feeling that his left arm was stuck in a painful position even though his left arm had been amputated years previously. By designing a box using mirrors and having Ron put his left arm in it in such a way that he saw the mirror image of his right arm, Ron was able to ‘feel’ his arm again. Ramachandran had Ron continue with this procedure over several weeks, for ten minutes each day, in order to redraw his brain map. (Ramachandran, p 34)

In another experiment by Ramachandran and Carrie Armell, a subject was seated at a table with his hands out of view behind a screen. The researchers then placed in front of the screen a rubber arm. Initially Ramachandran brushed both arms with an instrument and then only brushed the rubber arm. Unexpectedly, this caused the subject to ‘feel’ the sensation in his rubber arm.

Even more remarkable was when the researchers used a spot on the table instead of the rubber hand. When Ramachandran stroked the subject’s hand and the spot, the subject said that he felt the sensation at the spot on the table. Incredibly, when a Band-Aid was put on the table covering the spot and was ripped off, the subject felt the “emotional change in skin conductance as if expecting pain”. (Humphrey, p 112-113)

These examples show us that our sense of self can be fragmented. If Ron can experience pain without an arm to have such pain and then be coached into not feeling the discomfort, and if a rubber arm can seem to be stimulated, then it is plausible to say that passing through tunnels and out of body experiences may also be some type of illusion. Now we will take a closer look at the different aspects of NDEs beginning with tunnel vision.

19 Characteristics of Near Death Experiences

The United States military hired James Whinnery to study pilots at the Naval Air Warfare Centre in order to determine the best method of training. He discovered that “the majority of pilots experienced what he called dreamlets, a brief episode of tunnel vision, sometimes with a bright light at the end of a tunnel, as well as a sense of floating”. (Shermer, p 152) These experiences are characteristic of what people report when they suggest they had a NDE. In his book, Life

36 after Life , Raymond Moody described three of the most common characteristics of NDE. One was a feeling of leaving your body. A second was the feeling of passing through a tunnel or a spiral chamber, at times with a bright light at the end and thirdly encountering a deceased loved one or a God-like figure. (Shermer, p 152)

In the sixteen years studying pilots, Whinnery found that in over one thousand incidents, he was able to actuate the first two characteristics of NDEs. He videotaped the pilots and found when they lost consciousness, the pilots had these different types of experiences. This led him to conclude that the cause was due to a lack of oxygen to the cortex. It seems then that if the brain is deprived of oxygen then physiological events take place similar to those experiences that people report when they believed that they were about to die.

Research with pilots at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota during the Second World War, gives us more clues to the tunnel mystery. The researchers hoped to discover the amount of force a pilot could sustain while continuing to effectively manoeuvre a fighter jet. With too much pressure, measured in multiples of the force of earth’s gravity, it could cause a loss of blood resulting in a loss of consciousness. (Nelson, p 128) Neurophysiologist Edward Lambert was hired by the US military to see what goes on in the pilot’s brain when faced with g-force.

Lambert used a simulator to see how much force a pilot could tolerate and still be able to see the control panel lights while being spun around at a high rate of speed. It turns out that very quickly the pilot’s peripheral vision becomes restricted when exposed to such a force that would cause one to faint and within five seconds that vision would be lost. Before blacking out, the pilots reported only seeing a small circle in front of them, similar to a tunnel. (Nelson, p 129)

To ascertain whether the tunnel vision was due to blood drawing from the eyes or was due to brain functioning, Lambert devised a pair of goggles for the pilots so that pressure would be lowered just enough to provide blood flow to the brain. What he discovered was that when our brains are deprived of blood, our eyes fail, causing tunnel vision just prior to blacking out.

In addition to bright lights and tunnel vision, a third characteristic of both NDEs and spiritual experience is the sense of an out of body experience. Nelson defines it as a “disembodied sensation, seeing the world from the perspective different from the body’s actual location”.

(Nelson, p 138) It seems that this experience is more common in people than thought. According to a survey of 13,000 people in Europe, over 5.8 percent had this type of experience. (Nelson, p 139) This may even be at the low end as some people may feel uncomfortable or embarrassed to admit to such an experience.

For Nelson, an out of body experience is created when one’s sense of the body is displaced. To understand where our body is at this very moment, the brain must coordinate all the bodily sensations such as vision, feeling of our arms and legs, as well as, the vestibular organs in the middle ear that affects our sense of balance. Recall from the analogy of the brain in the previous chapter that a number of different areas of the brain are involved in perception. From work with patients who were undergoing surgery to alleviate seizures, doctors discovered that sensations get disjointed where the temporal and parietal lobes meet, in the temporoparietal junction. (Nelson, p 140) The doctors found that by stimulating the temporoparietal region, they were able to cause the patient to feel as if they were leaving their body. .

There have been other researchers who were able to artificially prompt similar illusions by electrical stimulation to parts of the brain. Neuroscientist Olaf Blanke stimulated the right angular gyrus in the temporal lobe of a woman who was suffering epileptic seizures and this resulted in the woman reporting that she saw herself “floating about two metres above the bed, close to the ceiling”. (Shermer, p 153) This suggests that if doctors can manipulate parts of our brain to cause such a sensation, it seems reasonable to conclude that the feeling of a soul leaving the body is a combination of the wiring of the brain and the individual’s belief that one actually has a soul. From this, one could speculate that a spiritual experience is the result of brain processing.

So far we have been able to explain such things as bright lights, tunnel vision and out of body experiences from the working of the physical brain; it is now time to look at REM Consciousness. After all, it is Nelson’s belief that the spiritual experience takes place in the borderland of REM consciousness and wakefulness. We need to see what is going on in the brain when we switch from one state to the other and to see whether it is possible to get stuck between these two states.

20 REM Consciousness

There are a number of elements of REM consciousness including paralysis, visual activation and dreaming, all of which are working independently in different parts of the brain. Research suggests that when the move from REM sleep and wakefulness takes place, it is possible for REM sleep to fragment. The transfer from one state to the other is possible through the balancing act of the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems. The chemical nor- adrenaline in the brain maintains waking consciousness, while acetylcholine slows the heart rate and is used, by the brain, for REM sleep. Nelson suggests that it is possible for a person to be stuck between these two states and offers the example that some people are unable to move after awakening from REM sleep. Sometimes, people feel frozen and have a feeling that there is someone or something in the room with them. (Nelson, p 195) Although, typically lasting for seconds, it could very well feel much longer.

Nelson considered that since REM consciousness is the likely candidate to trigger a near death experience, then perhaps those people who are susceptible to blending REM and waking consciousness are predisposed to NDEs. Research on people who suffer from narcolepsy found that they lacked the necessary chemicals to control the balancing act described earlier in the temporoparietal junction. This deficiency causes the switch to transfer quickly and often into REM consciousness. Since they are not able to control the movement from one state to the other, patients have sleep attacks and REM intrusion. Nelson presumed that people without narcolepsy may also have similar experiences. To test this hypothesis, Nelson interviewed fifty- five people who had a near death experience where they believed they were about to die.

The research revealed that people who had a NDE were two and a half times more likely to blend the two states. (Nelson, p 202) Self-reportedly, these people had a history of paralysis, visionary imagery and auditory hallucinations. Nelson’s study clearly showed that people who have had a NDE possess an arousal system predisposed to blending REM and Waking consciousness. This work demonstrates that sleep paralysis and dream imagery are common in otherwise healthy people, during the transition between the two states. Here, one could reasonably conclude that the Shamans who Lewis-Williams described earlier may have been ‘spiritually gifted’, as they were more prone to be stuck in the borderland.

We have suggested that there is a link between NDE and fainting with the latter, at times, causing the former. We also saw that when there is a chemical imbalance in the temporoparietal area, an out of body experience could occur. Now we will see that there is a connection between our arousal system and out of body experience.

Nelson suggests that the reward system that is connected to our fight or flight response is closely associated with REM consciousness. That is, the acetylcholine nerves that are necessary for REM consciousness is also connected to the brain’s reward region. Experiments have shown that when researchers damage the REM region of animals, they no longer craved food or heroin that they had longed for prior to the injury. (Nelson, p 213) Although researchers have not been able to have a look at the human brain while one is having a NDE or spiritual experience, it does seem that the feeling of rapture often described in both experiences is tied to our reward system within our brains.

21 Summary

To sum up Nelson’s work, we found many physiological reasons for the many features of NDEs. For instance, the appearance of the tunnel is due to low blood flow to the retina, bright lights is attributed to REM visual activations and the feeling of rapture is associated with our reward system. He reasons that NDE is nothing more than a “combination of low blood flow to the eyes, fight or flight reactors and the triggering of REM consciousness”. (Nelson, p 212) We have strong evidence to link NDE with the spiritual experience and therefore suggest that the human brain is wired in such a fashion as to allow for the potential for some to have a spiritual experience.

It has been argued that the human brain gives us the potential to have a spiritual experience and while some people are prone to these types of experiences, others are not. Lewis-Williams has suggested that those more likely to have these types of encounters had an advantage over others, and subsequently used it to hold power over them. As mentioned earlier, this may or may not be true, but what we can explore is whether our brains are designed in such a way that we tend to associate with some people and exclude others. The following chapter will look at the evidence that supports this claim.

Chapter Four Countries, Crips and Churches 22 Us and Them

Days after the terrorist attack on the United States of America, President George Bush said, “Every Nation in every region now has a decision to make, either you are with us or you are with the terrorists”. (www.cnnnews.com 2001) Certainly the distinction between us and them has been strategically used by politicians for political gain and even to incite hatred towards other nations or tribes. This tribal mentality does not rest solely within the political realm but is found in all walks of life. It seems that it is natural for humans to classify people and group them into particular compartments. This type of thinking is found in nations, religions, and on the streets of urban cities.

Consider, for instance, a search warrant that was executed by police at an apartment complex where cocaine, cash and drug paraphernalia was seized. Considering the occupant of the unit was a local gang member, the discovery of such contraband was not particularly surprising. What was interesting, however, was the discovery of a school assignment found in the home. In the essay, the writer had deliberately crossed out every third letter of the alphabet or wrote it upside down. The reason for this peculiar style of correspondence is simply due to the fact that the author of the paper was a member of the Bloods and consequently, he refuses to use the letter C, as this is the first letter of their arch rivals the Crips. To show disrespect to their enemies, the Bloods habitually write the letter C upside down , cross it out or simply replace it with a the letter K.

The hatred between the Bloods and Crips is so entrenched in the minds of these gang members that even the creation of a simple essay is influenced by such tribal thinking. Of course, this is an extreme example of an “us” and “them” mentality, however, “there is apparently no people known to history or anthropology that lacks a distinction between “us” and “them”. (Bereby, p 125) This inevitably leads to a distinction between what constitutes a good person and a bad person and this way of conceiving others, leads to a categorization of people which could have serious consequences for humanity.

Influenced by Philosopher Ian Hacking, author David Bereby calls categories such as black and white, Protestants and Catholics or gays and straights human kinds. (Bereby, p 16) Bereby makes the case that human kinds are not the result of what people actually are but what people tend to believe. And this belief is often mistaken and not supported by evidence. Furthermore, he says that this type of thinking is the antecedent rather than the consequence of religious institutions, national governments and racial classes. He argues that since humans have historically changed these classification systems, we should not necessarily “bless certain categories like race, religion, or nation with permanent relevance”. (Bereby, p 74)

This chapter, using the same methodology as previous chapters, will argue that in the human brain there is a neural scaffolding from which religious institutions are built. It will be argued that religious institutions, like other institutions such as nations, clubs, associations and even gangs are the result of how we think. To be sure, by including gangs here, it is not inviting an excuse for criminal behaviour; rather the argument states that all institutions exploit the same neural mechanisms that lead people to form into groups. The human brain, as discussed in chapter two, is the result of evolution and in our evolutionary history there were selective pressures that resulted in the human brain having a predisposition to emphasize, cooperate and to be with others.

It does seem that a sense of identity or a sense of belonging to a group can enhance our social bonds and even help us be more charitable and less self centred. However, care needs to be taken here, as the formation of an inner circle inevitably leads to an exclusion of those who are outside of the group. By providing evidence from experiments by psychologists, it will be argued that group formation can be so arbitrary that insisting on one singular identity, at the expense of all others, may lead to a host of complications. As Amartya Sen points out, much violence in the contemporary world is due to categorizing people along religious or cultural lines and if we seriously want to achieve peace we need to recognize “the plurality of our affiliations and in the use of reasoning as common inhabitants of a wide world rather than making us into inmates rigidly incarcerated in little containers”. (Sen, p xv) We will begin by looking at what motivates us to be with others.

23 Oxytocin and Human Sociability

The central hypothesis that Patricia Churchland tables in her book, Braintrust is that human morality stems from the neurobiology of attachment and bonding. For Churchland, attachment means, “the disposition to extend care to others, to want to be with them, and to be distressed by separation.” (Churchland, p 16) She says that what we tag ethics or morality is forged by many interlocking brain processes. These processes include caring, the ability of interpreting the psychological states of other human beings, solving problems within a social environment and the ability to learn. She acknowledges that the beliefs and associated practices of a particular community play a fundamental role in morality and ethics. However she also suggests that there is a core biological foundation for mammalian sociability in general and human sociability in particular. (Churchland, p 10)

Key to this explanation is the ancient peptides oxytocin and vasopressin, which are manufactured in the mammalian brain and is related to “ancestral hormones that play a key role in behaviour like nest-building in mammalian species”. (LeDoux, p 231) For Churchland, it is the evolution of this peptide that not only functions as hormones, but also as neurotransmitters and modulators that eventually adapted to take on a new role of caring for offspring and eventually expanded to include relatives and friends. Churchland cites studies that show that oxytocin, vasopressin and the neurotransmitter dopamine all play a significant role in the well being of one’s offspring and through evolution this attachment, she argues, gradually expanded to include kin and friends.

For Churchland, two other interdependent evolutionary changes took place in the human brain to allow for greater sociability and eventually, morality. The first being the adaptation that took place giving mammals the fear factor when threatened with a loss of an offspring, as well as the feeling of relief or joy when that threat is no longer imminent. (Churchland, p 15) Secondly, the human ability to learn, linked with pain and pleasure, gave humans the ability to understand the behaviour of others within a group. Consequently, due to the evolution of our brain, humans have the urge to be with others and to learn to socialize with each other because the positive reward system, “responds to approval and affection” while the negative reward system that is instrumental in regulating “pain, fear and anxiety, responds to exclusion and disapproval.” (Churchland, p 16)

Recall that according to evolution by natural selection, genes that code for behaviour that results in greater reproductive success will become more common in the population. Fundamentally, the organism is concerned about self preservation and the brain evolved to ensure the survival of the body in which the brain is housed. Much of what keeps the body alive is regulated unconsciously by the brain in a process called homeostasis. For Chruchland, pain is a homeostatic emotion, instrumental in the well being of the organism. (Churchland, p 28)

When a person accidently touches a hot kettle or is hit with a hockey stick, the signals received from the body tissue arise in the spinal cord and then travels to the brain stem making its way to the thalamus. There are two other areas within the brain that gives us a better understanding of pain. The insula is essential for quantifying the negative aspect of the pain and the anterior cingulate cortex is primarily tasked with doing something about it. We find that the insula and the anterior cingulate cortex are not only activated during physical pain but also at the prompting of emotional pain as well. (Churchland, p 39) Both these areas are activated when one is separated from a loved one, excluded from a group or met with disapproval.

Studies conducted by Neurologist Antonio Damasio have shown that patients with damage to the insula have a high tolerance for pain as well as a loss of empathetic responses. (Damasio, p 266- 267) What this suggests is that the pain or discomfort we feel when separated or ostracized from others “exploits, expands and modifies what is already in place for physical pain and homeostatic emotions in premammalian species”. (Churchland, p 39) Other studies suggest that when an infant feels safe and content there is a release of oxytocin and endogeneous opiates in the brain in both the mother and child. For Churchland, the general good feeling that we get when we are with others exploits the neural network for “feeling comfortable in safe and familiar, rest and digest conditions”. (Chuchland, p. 46)

Neuropsychologists have conducted experiments that support the theory put forward by Churchland. Carsten DeDreu, for instance, sought to see whether intranasal oxytocin had an effect on the cooperation by individuals who were within a group or outside of a group. He was also interested whether it had any impact on out-group hostility. Interestingly, DeDreu found that men who received the oxytocin demonstrated, “significantly more” cooperative behaviour with in-group members. Additionally he found that both the subjects given oxytocin and those

44 who did not, exhibited negative behaviour to out-group members. This suggests that while oxytocin plays a significant role influencing cooperative behaviour there is no evidence to say that the influence extends outside of the in-group. (Churchland, p. 75)

When it comes to pain, Churchland make it clear that, in addition to oxytocin, there are a number of different connections, pathways and neurochemical reactions taking place in the mammalian system. For all vertebrates, she argues, “fear, anxiety and physical pain are registered as protect myself warning signals” in the organism’s ancient brainstem and hypothalamus. (Churchland, p 35) For Churchland, this self preservation circuitry eventually evolved to include the mammalian response to protect one’s offspring. The same feelings and responses that one has to protect oneself are also activated when those close to us are threatened.

Having suggested that our brains evolved in order to protect ourselves and our kin, Churchland goes on to say that cooperation in larger groups may also depend on the suite of neurochemicals and other networks in the brain. She wisely admits that it is very unlikely that we can ascribe just one mechanism for mammalian cooperation and one cannot overlook the fact that the cooperative systems that extend beyond kin and families is also dependent on culture. That said, she makes the case that since humans receive such gratification from approval and belonging and the “generalized pain of shunning and disapproval is so aversive…what is learned regarding social practices has a corresponding emotional valence”. (Churchland, p 131)

24 Emotion and a Sense of Belonging

One study that supports the idea that emotion affects our sense of belonging is an experiment on perception by the Neuroscientist Gregory Berns. (Zimbardo, p 264) Berns had thirty two volunteers look at images of three dimensional objects that were rotated and asked the volunteers whether the objects were the same or different from the original object. In the waiting room, however, each volunteer was introduced to four other volunteers who were actually confederates who would fake their answers when they took the test. The confederates joined forces to give the same answer; however, the answers were often not the correct one. Now the confederates did give some correct answers and occasionally gave mixed group answers to lend greater credibility to the test.

Like many tests of this nature, the volunteers gave in to group pressure and on average gave the wrong answer 41 percent of the time. (Zimbardo, p 264) What is interesting for this paper are the results from the brain scans of the volunteers who were faced with the fact that their answer was different from that of the group. Surprisingly there were no changes in the forebrain that typically deals with such issues as planning, monitoring conflicts and other higher order activities. The area of the brain that was triggered was the right caudate nucleus and amygdala, areas of the brain that we have seen is associated with emotion. This suggests that people faced with resisting the beliefs of others are confronted with emotional strain. Berns posits, “we like to think that seeing is believing but the study’s findings show that seeing is believing what the group tells us to believe.” (Zimbardo, p 265) He goes on to conclude that how we actually perceive the world is clearly affected by the views of others, especially when those views are “crystallized into a group consensus”. (Zimbardo, p 266)

Churchland shows that there is convincing evidence to suggest that humans have a predisposition to be with others. The cultural niche that Churchland describes suggests that both learning through imitation and cooperation are important for understanding why people tend to associate in groups. Granted there is no clear consensus among scientists on the neurobiological mechanism that supports how we learn through imitation even though there is some evidence pointing to a mirror neuron system. For Neuroscientist, Marco Iacoboni there is a core imitation circuitry that he feels is activated in empathy.

25 Mirror Neurons

Iacoboni outlines the experiments conducted by Giacomo Rizzolatti and his colleagues on Macaque monkeys, who were hoping to learn more about motor functioning. The purpose of their research was to look for clues that would lead them to help those patients who had dysfunctional motor skills, resulting from brain damage. However the work by Rizzolatti shines some light on imitation and to a lesser extent cooperation.

The reason the scientists chose Macaque monkeys is largely due to the similarity in brain structure with that of humans. Although the brain of the Macaque is smaller, both have a right and left hemisphere and, it turns out, the mirror neurons are located in the frontal and parietal lobe area. The researchers conducted a number of grasping exercises with the monkeys in an

46 attempt to draw a clearer picture of what is going on inside the monkey’s brain. They found that there is a set of cells that fires during both the grasping of an object and the observation of a graspable object. (Iacoboni, p 34) One would think that when we want to pick up a book from the shelf, the brain would first process the book and then set in motion the action. This research, however suggests that perception and action are not separate entities but is an integrated process in the brain.

Rizzolatti and his team did not limit their investigation to studies involving the visual field. They also observed the mirror neurons when the monkeys heard a particular sound, as well as a combination of hearing and seeing an action. What they found was that the same areas of the brain fired when one hears a peanut being cracked, as well as the actions that are associated with breaking a peanut. For Iacoboni, “the only way we can actually recognize that sound is by simulating or internally imitating in our brain the action that produces the sound”. (Iacoboni, p 36)

To see as to what extent mirror neurons distinguish between the same grasping actions and the various intentions of those actions, Leo Fogassi and colleagues conducted a number of experiments. One experiment had the monkeys pick up different objects, including food and either place the object in a container or eat it. The purpose here was to see if the brain activity would be different for different intentions. They found that over three quarters of the brain cells discharged for the grasping to eat action, less for grasping to place and even less for no preference. (Iacoboni, p 32) This suggests that what was more important for the monkey was not the type of object to be grasped but the intention of the action the monkey was doing.

More importantly, for the purpose of this paper, is an experiment that the researchers conducted where one of the researchers sat face to face with the monkey. This time the monkey was the observer and the researcher was to either place the objects in a container or eat it. What they found was that the brain activity of the monkey fired similarly whether they were doing the action themselves or watching the experimenter doing the actions. For Iacoboni, this type of research supports the notion that to understand the mental states of others, our mirror neurons simulate them.

Within the circle of investigators advocating Simulation theory, there are a number of different opinions. One version of Simulation theory posits that one infers the emotional state of other individuals by initially putting oneself in the other’s position and then taking into consideration how one feels, rationalizes how the other is thinking. (Gazzaniga, p 159) However, for Iacoboni, the simulation is automatic rather than deliberate. To test this hypothesis, experiments were devised to establish a better understanding of action, context and intention.

The subjects were shown a series of video clips. One involved only action, where a hand was shown grasping a cup, context free. In the second type of video, the subject was shown a scene that included a number of different objects, set up in different positions. For instance, one scene had a cup, some cookies and a teapot, neatly arranged, suggesting an invitation for tea. In another clip, the table was a mess, suggesting that tea time had just finished. In the final set of videos, the researchers had a hand grasping a cup in either one of the two context scenes. The researchers found higher mirror neuron activity when the subjects watched the video where the hand grasped the cup in either one of the context scenes. Similar to the research with the monkeys, there was higher activity when the subjects saw grasping when the intention was clearly for drinking and not cleaning. This evidence corroborates the notion that mirror neurons, not only code for actions, but intentions as well.

If Iacoboni is correct in his hypothesis that the fundamental role of mirror neurons is to help us understand the intentions and emotions of others, then mirror neurons play a crucial role in the development of social behaviour. In the research by Rizzolatti and current research in human brain activity, it seems that there is a close connection between brain activity when we are thinking of ourselves and of others. For Iacoboni, our mirror neuron system develops in the brain when we are infants. He says, “although it is likely that some mirror neurons are functioning very early in life and facilitate the earliest interaction”, he believes most of our mirror neurons system is actually formed during the months and years of such interaction. This strongly suggests that mirror neurons develop in relation with others and supports the model offered by Churchland.

26 Theory of Mind

How we understand the mental states of others has been a much debated topic. Historically, developmental psychologists held to what is referred to as ‘Theory Theory of Mind’ or a third person perspective. This posits that we take a scientific approach to our understanding of others by postulating the behaviour of others by comparing their intention and action. Gazzaniga writes, “an individual uses his own version of psychology, which is either innate or learned, and infers the mental states of others from how they are acting and what they are doing, where they are and whom they are with and how they have been in the past”. (Gazzaniga, p 159) There are different versions of this theory. Nevertheless they all suggest that to understand the minds of others we must take a deductive rational approach. We get to know our own mind and the mind of others by making hypothesises about the world and then testing them to see whether they are falsifiable or not. This suggests that the theory is “seen as a prerequisite for engagement with other minds and indeed for experiencing one’s own”. (Reddy, p 24)

From this perspective, child psychologists such as, Jean Piaget argued that children are limited to the here and now, what Lewis-Williams referred to as the remembered present. Others have suggested that children’s brains create a causal theory of the world. They offer as evidence the fact that many children have imaginary friends and suggest that “our ability to imagine possible worlds is closely tied to our ability to think causally”. (Gopnik, p 32) The reason given for the creation of imaginary friends is to enhance the ability to think counterfactually. (Gopnik, p 55) We find that most children have these types of friends between the ages of two and six, a period in life where these psychologists suggest the formation of a causal theory of mind begins to develop. Psychologist, Alison Gopnik says, “perhaps most potent of all children can learn about the mind by observing the interactions and intervention of people around them”. (Gopnik, p 101)

There are two problems with the position posed by Gopnik. First of all, not all children have imaginary friends and secondly, in a world of hypothesizing individuals making evidence-based decisions, one would expect that humans wouldn’t be so irrational. Gopnik speaks about the scientist in the crib, but her hypothesis that babies are rational beings begs for an explanation for why adults are so often irrational. For instance, consider what causes earthquakes. Seismologists tell us that the heat from the earth’s core pushes the plates at the surface of the earth to a point where the pressure is so unforgiving that the plates lurch forward causing

49 movement resulting in an earthquake. Once the pressure is released, the tremors stop and the cycle starts over again. Scientists cannot ascertain exactly when this will occur but with elaborate technology, they can offer a very good idea. What they can tell us definitely however is that the threat of another earthquake is lowest immediately following one.

Armed with this type of information, in a world of hypothesise producing, rational beings one would think it would be quite simple to be able to predict a pattern of sales in earthquake insurance. Since we find that the threat of an earthquake is at its lowest following one, then sales should drop. (Gardner, p 53) In reality, however the exact opposite is true, similar to the irrational stock picker who sells when the stock drops it seems that emotion plays an instrumental role in our theories about the world and it would seem in theories of others as well.

An alternative approach to understanding the minds of others and for that matter, one’s own mind, is known as the argument from analogy or simulation theory. This first person approach posits that we know others by seeing that others are similar to us. As we have seen, Iacoboni is a proponent of this method and suggests that we understand others by actually simulating the actions of others. (Iacoboni, p 73) For him, mirror neurons give us the ability to re-enact in our brains the intentions of others and provides us with a clearer picture of the mental states of others. Moreover, he suggests that this simulation is automatic and unconscious. (Iacoboni, p 73) It is mirror neurons that allow us to “automatically and deeply understand the hand movements and gestures of other people and to imitate their gestures”. (Iacoboni, p 100) It is through imitation that we understand the emotions of others.

Reddy although intrigued by the research into mirror neurons, is not satisfied with either approach and suggests that to truly understand the minds of others we should take a second person approach. Relying on the rules of grammar, she says that the second person is the voice that is used when there is direct engagement. One speaks directly to the other person, a person that is recognized as another person and has the ability to respond and understand. The essential ingredient for Reddy is the emotional engagement between people and for her, the traditional first person and third person understanding of other minds, fails to take this emotional interaction into account.

Reddy convincingly argues that although most psychologists have dropped the Cartesian mind/body dualism, they have mistakenly picked up a mind/behaviour dualism. (Reddy, p 10) She correctly points out that how we feel and interact with others is instrumental in our experience of them. There is considerable evidence to suggest that how we perceive is always influenced by proprioception and “engagement profoundly influences how perception relates to proprioception”. (Reddy, p 29)

When it comes to understanding how we know others and ourselves, Reddy says that “it is the shared experience of mentality that allows for privacy”. (Reddy, p 31) The public sharing is a developmental step necessary for allowing the private concealment and not the other way around. Quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein, Reddy argues that the prerequisite for knowing one’s own mental experience is the shared mental experience. This is along the same lines as we saw in chapter three when we spoke about how people come to speak about a spiritual experience. If the person only experienced tunnel vision in isolation without witnessing it in others or spoke to others about it, it is argued here that the person could not satisfactorily know it as something. For Reddy, having a sense of self comes to mind in the same manner. She convincingly concludes, “it is only because we can share it as an aspect of engagement that it becomes an entity, one which subsequently becomes named and is further shared”. (Reddy, p 20)

Taking the position that Reddy suggests, that we come to know ourselves and those of others through engagement with Churchland’s point that our primary goal of self preservation expands to include kin and eventually friends, suggests that a clearer term to use would be first person plural. It seems that both these thinkers are championing the view that our sense of self is in relation with others and this indicates a we-intentionality. Studies conducted by Michael Tomasello supports this we-intentionality, as well as the humans natural inclination to work together.

27 Studies Supporting a We-intentionality

For Tomasello, humans are “biologically adapted to grow and develop to maturity within a cultural context”. (Tomasello, p 107) He correctly points out that our uniqueness is due to our skills set for motivation and cooperation. His research centred on cooperation in young children and chimpanzees, as well as, altruism and collaboration. He suggests that humans evolved to

51 work together with one another on joint ventures with joint commitments. He says that the cooperative process rests in our ability to both teach and imitate each other in order to conform to the group. He reasons that Homo sapiens are adapted for acting and thinking cooperatively in groups. We will now look at the research by Tomasello to see whether it provides us with some clues as to why we tend to cooperate with some and not others and whether this cooperative drive comes naturally or is learned.

The evidence suggests that children as early as one year old are generally already cooperative and helpful. Tomasello says that as the child gets older, the child is certainly influenced by such things as whether reciprocity is likely and the child will be concerned about the opinions of others. However, in the very early years, children are found to share and help others and this suggests that they have a predisposition to cooperate. (Tomasello, p 5) Experiments with eighteen month olds showed that children “in the vast majority of cases, stopped playing a fun activity in order to help a struggling adult”. (Tomasello, p 9) If the experimenter walked into a room and dropped a book most children would stop what they were doing to go and help. In these types of experiments it demonstrated that the child paid a price in order to help others. They stopped the activity that they were engaged in, and presumably enjoying, to assist others.

In other acts of cooperation, researchers found that children, as young as twelve months of age, informed others by gesturing with their hands. These children, without the ability to converse, had the intention to inform others while evidence from ape studies suggests that apes do not point for each other. (Tomasello, p 14) In these particular studies, researchers had children in a room with an adult who was stapling papers. This adult then left the room while a second adult entered and proceeded to move the stapler to a shelf and then immediately left the room. The first researcher returned armed with more paper with the intention of stapling. Reasoning that the adult wanted the stapler, the children either pointed or grunted or did a combination of both to inform the researcher as to where the stapler was located. While sharing information seemed to come naturally to the children in studies with apes this was not the case. Apes in contrast to children tend not to inform each other by either hand movements or vocalization. (Tomasello, p 21) For Tomasello, this research shows that at a very young age, children have a sense of a we- intentionality.

For Tomasello then, children are certainly affected by socialization. However, the development of altruism rests with a predisposition to help others and to cooperate. Not only do children learn to be selective and who to select, humans also come with a predisposition to be attracted to those who they feel comfortable with. From this, it is suggested that when humans participate in we- intentionality they are likely to be affected by social pressures, as well as identifying with the group, who are a part of this shared intentionality. (Tomasello, p 44)

In studies to see whether children would work together and commit themselves to a joint goal, researchers discovered that most children did in fact collaborate. For instance, in one particular study, researchers had two children carry a pole up a step-like apparatus with each child on either side. Positioned along the way were rewards for the child but it was set up in such a way that only one child at a time could retrieve the reward. The experiment showed that some children took the reward but returned to finish the goal, while others waited until the goal was completed then both received the treat. (Tomasello, p 65) The point here is that most children were committed to the joint activity.

In addition to our we-intentionality, young children also demonstrate a tendency to enforce the rules, whether the behaviour of others affects them or not. It seems that the children studied were not necessarily concerned solely with the norms that involved cooperation but on “constitutive rules that are, in an important sense, arbitrary”. (Tomasello, p 40) For instance, in a number of games where the children were participating in a common activity, there were certain learned rules that they had to obey. If the researchers introduced a puppet that deviated from the rules, the children would intervene. They would say such things as “it doesn’t work like that” to ensure that the puppet or researcher would conform to the rules. (Tomasello, p 37) In other words, the children were quite insistent that others followed the norms of the group.

In contrast to human behaviour, studies involving apes, found that when one chimp stole from another, the victim of the theft would attempt to prevent the perpetrator from enjoying the spoils of the theft. However, researchers found that there was no third party intervention. That is, a non-affected ape would not try to stop another ape from eating the stolen food. Reaction only occurred when the particular ape was affected. (Tomasello, p 88)

Tomasello suggests that these studies give us a clearer picture of the earliest activities in human evolution. He believes that the environment, in which our ancient forebears found themselves, was the context in which collaborative skills developed. He reasonably concludes that in order to gather food and survive, there was a selection pressure for collaboration and cooperation.

28 Social Institutions

From all the studies that Tomaselllo spells out, it seems that the children quickly learn how things should be done. Humans naturally cooperate and this cooperation is guided by some form of conventionality. (Tomasello, p 93) This, for Tomasello is the source of in-group and out- group behaviour. “Humans come to engage in collaborate activities with a joint goal and distinct and generalized roles, with participants mutually aware that they were dependent on one another for success”. (Tomasello, p 99) Although we are bred for cooperation, this cooperation is limited to one’s group. And these local groups come in a variety of social institutions, including the religious institution. Once people are within the social group they feel more comfortable with the people who they know.

Studies show that people tend to feel more comfortable with people who are more like themselves. In one particular experiment, a student was placed in a room with a researcher. The researcher was instructed to either mimic the student who they were with or not. Those students who were mimicked tended to evaluate the researcher “more favourably” than if they had not been mimicked. Furthermore, those who were mimicked would tend to be more helpful if given the opportunity. For example, if the experimenter set up a situation where an accident took place as the students were leaving the room, the mimicked students were much more likely to stop and help out. (Churchland, p 157) This suggests that unconscious mimicry plays an essential role in our ability in establishing relationships with others. For Churchland, this mimicry is a tremendous signal of social competence and allows a person to feel comfortable knowing that since the other person is similar; it gives them the ability to predict the other’s behaviour. When a person has this reassurance, the person feels more comfortable and the levels of stress hormones are reduced. On the other hand, being in the company of people who are not known makes it much more difficult to predict their behaviour and consequently, a feeling of discomfort is experienced.

Other experiments by social psychologists also point to the fact that we are attracted to those who are similar to us. For instance, Tanya Chartrand and and John Bargh had a subject look at a series of pictures and were asked to describe what they thought was happening in them. (Iacoboni, p 113) Unbeknownst to the subject, the person in the room was there to either closely mimic the mannerisms and postures of the subject or to remain neutral. When the session was over, the subjects were asked whether they believed the session was a success or not.

What the researchers found was that people who were mimicked reported that the session went well compared to those who were not. (Iacoboni, p 114) From this experiment, we can reason that people feel more comfortable or like others more if they are similar to themselves. Other experiments support this hypothesis as well. For instance, Iacoboni had subjects look at a series of pictures of people shopping with different types of credit cards. Some of the pictures they looked at had a specific credit card logo in the lower right corner. Some people saw the pictures with no embedded logo. Those subjects who saw pictures with a credit card logo of the type that they carry, had higher mirror neuron activity, while non-credit cardholders did not have any impact. (Iacoboni, p 236) It seems that these subjects identified with people simply because they happen to share the same type of card.

It is not just that we like people more because they do as we do. It seems that our experience and our social context shape the activity of how our minds work. For instance, experiments monitoring the brain activity of Brazilian Capoeira experts and ballet dancers highlight the influence of our experience. While watching video footage of ballet dancers, the ballet dancers themselves had more mirror neuron activity than their counterparts. Likewise, when both groups watched the Capoeira martial art performances, the Capoeira experts had more mirror neuron activity than the ballet dancers. From this, we can see that we have a predisposition to like those who are more like us.

29 Forming Groups

So far in this chapter it has been argued that the neurobiology of attachment found in the mother/child relationship evolved to include kin and then friends. Additionally, since our brains evolved to have a positive reaction in an environment of approval and belonging and conversely, a negative response to disapproval, our social institutions have a tremendous role in our

55 understanding of ourselves and others. The key here is engagement with others. We are biologically adapted to act and think in groups. Once these groups or institutions are formed, a strong sense of conventionality is placed on all people within the group. Now we will look at three experiments that demonstrate that, although we have distinct social institutions, the distinction between us and them can be made quite arbitrarily.

Consider for instance, Muzater Sherif’s Robbers Cave camp, where twenty two boys from Oklahoma City were bussed to a camp in the Sans Bois Mountains. All the boys were white from a protestant middle class background. The division into groups was merely to facilitate the mode of transportation- eleven boys in one bus and eleven in the other. To be clear, the two groups of boys were not introduced to each other before travelling to the camp. The first week for the boys was spent exploring the area and “automatically and without anyone finding it odd created our ways of doing things”. (Bereby, p 168) Each group had their favourite swimming area and each had a way of getting there. Both groups chose a name for themselves and adopted a symbol to identify themselves as a group.

In the first week, these boys did not know there was another group in the area. However, when they did learn the existence of the other group their immediate reaction was to confront and challenge them. (Bereby, p 168) In the 1950’s when this experiment took place it was common to tag others with racist names. Both groups associated the other as a different race. When they learned that the other boys were actually white, they simply adopted different ways of labelling the other group. Within two weeks these otherwise similar boys divided themselves into groups who were hostile to each other. Although the boys cooperated and participated in joint activity within their own group they isolated themselves from the other group.

Moving forward a couple of decades, in a separate 1971 study, at Stanford University, Psychologist, Philip Zimbardo guided an undergraduate class in a project that focused on the psychology of imprisonment. This was known as the Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE). The volunteers of this initiative were paid fifteen dollars a day for their service. All the volunteers were middle class, educated youth who were randomly assigned to either a prisoner or a guard. In total, there were three crews of three guards who worked eight hour shifts in charge of nine prisoners. The make-shift jail was located in the basement of Stanford’s psychology department.

The purpose of the experiment was to see whether the researchers could differentiate between what people bring into the prison environment from what the prison environment brings out of the people. In other words, to what extent are we “creatures of the situation, of the moment, of the mob”. (Zimbardo, p 9) For Zimbardo, psychologists historically do not place sufficient emphasis on the importance of situational qualities and focus too heavily on the dispositional qualities of the individuals. (Zimbardo, p 8) He says that the primary lesson of the SPE is that it shows that the environment in which one is found has a discerning effect on the behaviour of the individual.

The SPE was supposed to last two weeks but had to be cut short as the guards physically, sexually and emotionally abused the prisoners. Rather than conversing about hobbies and sports, the guards were obsessed with problem prisoners and dreaming up other ways to humiliate the prisoners. The prisoners, on the other hand, became emotionally drained and began to question their own sanity. The author himself now admits that he was so caught up in his role as Prison Superintendent that he did not see the emotional damage that was happening to the prisoners and had to be convinced by an outside person to stop the experiment.

While Zimbardo sees this experiment as an example of the power of roles in our society and how the situation could account for personal transgressions, there is another lesson that the SPE teaches. That is, how arbitrary a group can be. Zimbardo concludes that the SPE “shows that the need to belong, to associate with others and to accept group norms can also be perverted into excessive conformity, compliance and in-group versus out-group hostility”. (Zimbardo, p 230) However, just as we saw with the students in the San Bois Mountains, the human need to belong and cooperate can rest on arbitrary lines drawn in the sand.

In a third experiment, in the rural town of Riceville Iowa, school teacher Jane Elliott in an attempt drive home the feeling of how it feels to be the underdog and to face prejudice she arbitrarily designated one part of her grade four class as superior and the other inferior, simply based on eye colour. The blue eyed children were labelled superior and were given special privileges while the inferior brown eyed group was designated with a collar in order to show their inferior status. Elliott discovered that before the end of the first day a sharp division occurred and that fights occurred between the two groups. She found that the blue eyed children

57 became more confident while the brown eyed children became “depressed, sullen and angry”. (Zimbardo, p 283) She also found that when the roles were reversed so too was the behaviour of the students.

30 Summary

In short, it has been shown that at our very core is a need for engagement with others and it has been suggested that social institutions are the result of this need. It has also been shown that groups can be formed quite superficially. Furthermore, it can be argued that people who are members of particular churches, mosques or temples may not have made the decision to be a part of that religion but rather it was chosen for them. They are Catholics because their parents were Catholics. Now the conclusion here is not to resist our natural inclination to join groups but to be aware of the reasons for our attraction to some over others. Armed with this knowledge one can be an Anglican, teacher, rotary club member, liberal and German without placing extreme importance on one at the expense of all others.

Chapter Five Closing Arguments

At the completion of a criminal investigation, the police provide the Crown Attorney with the evidence gathered and in turn, the Crown provides a copy of the evidence to the Defence. This is termed disclosure and the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that disclosure must be fair, frank and full (complete). In this essay, the evidence presented has been both fair and frank but admittedly, it falls short of being full. The reason for this deficiency is that when it comes to understanding how our minds work, new evidence continuously surfaces and once armed with new evidence, we must respond accordingly.

Once the case is prepared and disclosed, a trial date is set and a jury selected. The Crown then presents a theory of the crime to the jury by interpreting the evidence at hand. The task of the jury is to weed out facts from fiction and deem whether the person is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, a reductionist theory as to why humans can have a spiritual experience and subsequently, a host of different religions, has been presented in this paper, using evidence from cognitive scientists and psychologists. The responsibility now lies with you, the reader, to be both judge and jury and decide whether the evidence presented supports the claims made.

However, like most trials, there is no ‘smoking gun’ evidence being presented here. The facts of the case rest, for the most part, with circumstantial evidence. In other words, we are drawing conclusions from the evidence presented and forming a working hypothesis in order to suggest why we have a variety of religions. That is, conclusions will be drawn and theories offered, but it is conceded that perhaps the conclusions may rest on a faulty foundation. As a result, there is no need for an appeal process, as the case is left open and with open arms, we welcome new evidence, or even a fresh interpretation of existing evidence, that may result in a change in the verdict. Keeping this in mind, it is time now to provide a brief summary of the evidence and close with some final arguments.

The evidence is quite clear that human beings were shaped by Darwinian natural selection over many generations. At the heart of the theory of evolution is the fact that “evolution is guided in adaptively non-random directions by the non-random survival of small random hereditary

59 changes”. (Dawkins, p 95) The point being that adaptive evolution is both gradualistic and contingent.

Like every other organ in the human body, the brain was designed by natural selection to solve various problems that were confronted by our forebears throughout our evolutionary history. It was argued that evolution works on what is currently available and therefore the result may not necessarily be optimal. It has been suggested that the way the human brain evolved, having different parts performing disparate functions gives humans the potential to have a spiritual experience.

David Lewis-Williams provided evidence that supports the proposition that humans have a readiness for spirituality. The main point in his testimony is that the human brain is wired with a spectrum of consciousness. Lewis-Williams describes how an altered state of consciousness results in different types of imagery, with entoptic phenomena being the initial stage in this spectrum. However, while all humans have the capacity for this imagery, it was argued that selection and meaning are culturally determined.

The claims made by Lewis-Williams were corroborated by Kevin Nelson’s research on NDEs. Nelson distinctly demonstrated that the characteristics of a spiritual experience were analogous with features reported by those experiencing NDEs. Yet the interpretations of those types of experiences were shaped by the dominate winds of culture. What can be concluded from this evidence is that spirituality is an incidental illusion of human brain functioning while religions feed on this idiosyncrasy.

The evidence presented went on to suggest that all institutions, including religious institutions are the result of how our minds work. Due to the selective pressures in our evolutionary history, humans have a predisposition to emphasize and cooperate. Furthermore, based on the evidence from a number of psychologists, we found that within the storms of human decision making, choices are made in a sea of emotions. Since humans have a positive reaction in an environment of approval and belonging, and a negative response to disapproval, our social institutions have a tremendous role in shaping our beliefs and influencing our understanding of ourselves and others. We are biologically adapted to act and think in groups. Once these groups or institutions

60 are established, a strong sense of conventionality is placed on all people within the group. The evidence supports the claim that religious institutions constitute such a cooperative group.

In short, it has been argued that science is not just our best hope for understanding why we have so many religions but our only hope. Since “religious ideas can easily become the basis of one’s identity, the blueprint of one’s epistemology, the catalyst of one’s behaviour, the wellspring of one’s politics, and the boundary of one’s community” the evidence presented in this paper may not be welcomed with open arms. (Tremlin, p 162) However, with the ubiquity of religious beliefs and with all, in one way or another, purporting to hold the key to unlock the mysteries of life, it is imperative that we begin to dig for the roots of religion in the landscape of the human mind.

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