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Reply Great Soclalist People's Libyan Arab

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Reply Great Soclalist People's Libyan Arab INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE (LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYNCHAD) REPLY SUBMITTED BY THE GREAT SOCLALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA VOLUME 1 14 SEPTEMBER 1992 TABLE OF CONTENTS PART 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................1 CHAPTER 1. THE ESSENTIALS OF THE LIBYAN CASE AND THE DISTORTIONS OF THAT CASE IN CHAD'S COUNTER-MEMORIAL............................... 1 SEC~~ON1. The Essentials of the Libyan Case ......................................... 1 SECTION2. The Distortions of Libya's Case in Chad's Counter-Memorial ......................................................6 CHAPTER II. THE ISSUES THAT CONTINUE TO DIVIDE THE PARTIES ......................................................12 CHAPTER III. THE TASK OF THE COURT ............................................14 SEC~ON1. Interpretation of the Compromis: Ordinary Meaning, Context and Travaux Préparatoires ........................................................16 (a) The Ordinary Meaning of the Accord-Cadre ......... 17 (b) The "Context" of the Accord-Cadre and the Importance of the Positions Adopted by the Parties in their Written Pleadings ......................19 (c) Factors Establishing Chad's Recognition of the Court's Compétence to Examine the Merits of Libya3sClaim .......................................21 (d) The Lack of Purpose of Embarking on an "Historical" Interpretation of the Accord-Cadre........................................................ 26 SECTION2. The Nature of the Dispute and the Task of the Court ....................................................................28 (a) The Alleged "Political Nature" of the Dispute as Presented by Libya ....................... 28 (b) ?le Nature of the Dispute: Territorial" or "Boundary"? ......................................29 (c) The Compétence Ratione Materiae of the Court ..................................................................30 (d) The Extent of the Court's Powers .............................30 (e) The Applicable Law ...................................................31 (f) The Order of Questions Submitted to the Court .................................................................. 32 THE ISSUE OF THE TREATY BASIS OF THE BOUNDARY ...........................................................35 CHAPTER IV . THE DIFFERING POSITIONS........ OF THE...p. PARTIES~p~ CONCËRN~NGTHE EXISTENCEOF A CONVENTIONAL BOUNDARY .................................... The Two Positions Compared ..............................................35 Deceptive Points of Agreement and Disagreement Conceming the 1955 Treaty ........................ 36 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 392 (V) of 15 December 1950 .............................................................38 CHAPTER V . THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1955 TREATY ................................................................................. 46 Introduction .............................................................................46 The Treaty's Object and Purpose .........................................49 Ordinary Meaning of the Terms of Article 3 ...............................................................................51 Context of Article 3 ................................................................66 (a) The 1956 Agreement .................................................. 66 (b) The 1955 Convention ................................................. 67 (c) Other Elements Within the Context of the 1955 Treaty .......................................71 (i) U.N. Maps ......................................................72 (ii) Libyan Petroleum Regulation No . 1 and Map No . 1 of 14 August 1955................................................ 72 (iii) Statement of Prime Minister Ben Halim on 14 October 1955 ........................................74 (iv) Failure to Register the 1955 Treaty Under Article 102 of the U.N. Charter ...................75 (v) The 1955 Treaty's 20-Year Term ................77 (d) 1966 Libya-Chad Accord ........................................77 Travaux Pré~aratoires.......................................................... 79 (a) Preliminary Comments ..............................................79 (iii) (b) The asIncorrect and Inadequate Treatment of the Travaux ....................81 (c) Additional Travaux from the French Diplomatic Archives ....................................90 CHAPTER VI. THE BOUNDARY STATUS QUO ON THE CRITICAL DATE AS RECOGNISED IN ACCORDANCE WïïH THE CRITERIA OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1955 TREATY ...............................................................................92 SECTION1. Introduction ...........................................................................92 SECTION2. 1899 Declaration ...................................................................95 SECTION3. The 1900-1902 Accords ....................................................105 SECTION4. 1902 Anglo-Italian Accord ...............................................117 SECTION5. Treaty of Ouchy (1912); 1912 Franco-Italian Agreement ...................................... 120 (a) Introduction ............................................................120 (b) The Role of the 1912 Treaty of Ouchy in the Settlement of the Present Dispute ........... 122 (c) 1912 Franco-Italian. Agreement (Tittoni-Poincaré) ..................................................125 (i) Ordinary Meaning ..................................... 125 (ii) Object and Purpose - Context ................. 127 (iii) Travaux Préparatoires .............................. 131 (iv) Subsequent Conduct .................................134 (A) Conduct of France and Italy: Ofiïcially Published Maps ............ 136 (B) Impending Negotiations Between rance and the Ottoman Empire and, then, France and Italy............................. 140 (C) Franco-Italian Delimitation Negotiations ................................142 (D) The 1928 Attem t of the French Govemment to 8.btain Italian . Recognition of the 1899 Declaration (as modified in 1919) and of the 1900-1902 Accords ........................................144 SEC~ON6. 1915 Secret Treaty of London ......................................... 145 SECTION7. 1919 Anglo-French Convention (8 September)............ 146 (a) Ordinary Meaning of the Text in its Context and in the Light of the Object and Purpose ............................................................ 146 (i) Text and Context .......................................147 (ii) Object and Purpose ..................................149 (b) Non-opposability of the 1919 Convention to Italy ...................................................................... 151 (c) The 1919 Line in the Light of Article 3 of the 1955 Treaty ................................................153 (d) The Unaccounted For Segment of the Conventional Boundary Claimed by Chad: West of the Tropic of Cancer (and 16"E) to the Border with Niger ................... 156 SECTION8. 1919 Franco-Italian Accord (12 September) ................. 160 (a) The 1919 Franco-Italian Accord Fixed the Westem Boundary of Libya Between Ghadamès and Toummo for the First Time ..................................161 (b) The Accord's Relationship to Article 13 of the 1915 Treaty of London ................................................... 163 (c) Libya's Right to Invoke France's Unpaid Debt in respect to Libya's Southem Boundaiy .............................................164 SECTION9. 1924 Anglo-French Protocol and Declaration .............. 164 SECITON10. Period of Italian Protests, Anglo-French Replies and Franco-Italian Proposals and Negotiations: 1919-1935 ...................................................169 (a) Introduction ....................................................... 169 (b) The Diametrically O posed Views of the British and French &' overnments Over the Meaning and Effect of the 1919 Convention ..............................................................172 (c) The Contention that Italy Had No Right to Protest the 1919 Convention ............................176 (d) The "Mock War" Between the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Colonies ..............................................177 (e) 1930 Italian School Map Atlas Incident .............. 179 (f) The Consistency of Italian Conduct in Protesting and Rejecting the 1919 Convention and in Protesting French Military Incursions North of a Strict Southeast Line .....................................................181 (g) French Conduct During the Period Revealing the French Govemment's Awareness that there Was No Conventional Libyan Boundary East of Toummo .............................................................182 SECTION11. The 1935 Franco-Italian Settlement ...............................183 (a) Introduction .........................................................183 (b) Reco nition of the Absence of Any 8onventional Boundary ................................ 184 (c) Recognition of Italy's Title to the Temtories to the North of the 1935 Line ......................................................188 (d) The Influence on the Settlement of the Present Dispute of France's Obligations to Italy under Article 13 of the 1915 Treaty of London ............................... 188 (e) Conclusion ...............................................................190 SECTION12. Post-1935 Agreements and Events .................................191 (a) 1941 Italian Armistice Commission .....................192 (b) 1947 Italian Peace Treaty .....................................196 (i)
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