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Somali Fisheries
www.securefisheries.org SECURING SOMALI FISHERIES Sarah M. Glaser Paige M. Roberts Robert H. Mazurek Kaija J. Hurlburt Liza Kane-Hartnett Securing Somali Fisheries | i SECURING SOMALI FISHERIES Sarah M. Glaser Paige M. Roberts Robert H. Mazurek Kaija J. Hurlburt Liza Kane-Hartnett Contributors: Ashley Wilson, Timothy Davies, and Robert Arthur (MRAG, London) Graphics: Timothy Schommer and Andrea Jovanovic Please send comments and questions to: Sarah M. Glaser, PhD Research Associate, Secure Fisheries One Earth Future Foundation +1 720 214 4425 [email protected] Please cite this document as: Glaser SM, Roberts PM, Mazurek RH, Hurlburt KJ, and Kane-Hartnett L (2015) Securing Somali Fisheries. Denver, CO: One Earth Future Foundation. DOI: 10.18289/OEF.2015.001 Secure Fisheries is a program of the One Earth Future Foundation Cover Photo: Shakila Sadik Hashim at Alla Aamin fishing company in Berbera, Jean-Pierre Larroque. ii | Securing Somali Fisheries TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES, BOXES ............................................................................................. iii FOUNDER’S LETTER .................................................................................................................... v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................. vi DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................ vii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Somali) ............................................................................................ -
Download: Africa
TUNISIA MOROCCO ALGERIA LIBYA Western EGYPT Sahara MAURITANIA MALI NIGER ERITREA SENEGAL THE GAMBIA CHAD SUDAN GUINEA-BISSAU BURKINA DJIBOUTI FASO GUINEA BENIN NIGERIA SIERRA TOGO ETHIOPIA LEONE CÔTE CENTRAL D’IVOIRE GHANA LIBERIA AFRICAN REP. CAMEROON SOMALIA UGANDA SAO TOME EQUAT. AND PRINCIPE GUINEA REP. OF KENYA GABON THE CONGO RWANDA DEM. REP. BURUNDI OF THE CONGO INDIAN TANZANIA OCEAN ANGOLA MALAWI ATL ANTIC ZAMBIA OCEAN MOZAMBIQUE ZIMBABWE MADAGASCAR NAMIBIA BOTSWANA SWAZILAND LESOTHO SOUTH AFRICA Africa Rahnuma Hassan, Anna Horvai, Paige Jennings, Bobbie Mellor and George Mukundi Wachira publicized findings regarding the practice of human trafficking, including of women and girls, within Central and through the region, while others drew attention to the effects of drug trafficking. The treatment of asylum-seekers and refugees, many of whom may and West belong to minorities in their countries of origin, was also a serious concern. In one example, in July a joint operation between the governments Africa of Uganda and Rwanda saw the forced return of around 1,700 Rwandans from refugee settlements Paige Jennings in south-western Uganda. Armed police officers reportedly surrounded them and forced them onto he year 2010 marked 50 years of inde- waiting trucks, which proceeded to drop them at a pendence for many countries in Africa. transit centre in Rwanda. The United Nations High T Elections, some unprecedented, were Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) protested held in 22 countries, with others planned for 2011. at the failure to respect international standards While elections can be a positive indicator of the and reported that not only asylum-seekers but also level of respect for fundamental freedoms, the recognized refugees were among those forcibly region offered several examples of how electoral con- returned to their country of origin. -
Monthly Forecast
May 2021 Monthly Forecast 1 Overview Overview 2 In Hindsight: Is There a Single Right Formula for In May, China will have the presidency of the Secu- Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD) is also anticipated. the Arria Format? rity Council. The Council will continue to meet Other Middle East issues include meetings on: 4 Status Update since our virtually, although members may consider holding • Syria, the monthly briefings on political and April Forecast a small number of in-person meetings later in the humanitarian issues and the use of chemical 5 Peacekeeping month depending on COVID-19 conditions. weapons; China has chosen to initiate three signature • Lebanon, on the implementation of resolution 7 Yemen events in May. Early in the month, it will hold 1559 (2004), which called for the disarma- 8 Bosnia and a high-level briefing on Upholding“ multilateral- ment of all militias and the extension of gov- Herzegovina ism and the United Nations-centred internation- ernment control over all Lebanese territory; 9 Syria al system”. Wang Yi, China’s state councillor and • Yemen, the monthly meeting on recent 11 Libya minister for foreign affairs, is expected to chair developments; and 12 Upholding the meeting. Volkan Bozkir, the president of the • The Middle East (including the Palestinian Multilateralism and General Assembly, is expected to brief. Question), also the monthly meeting. the UN-Centred A high-level open debate on “Addressing the During the month, the Council is planning to International System root causes of conflict while promoting post- vote on a draft resolution to renew the South Sudan 13 Iraq pandemic recovery in Africa” is planned. -
Peoples Under Threat 2017 Briefing
Peoples under Threat 2017 Killings in the no-access zone www.peoplesunderthreat.org Peoples under Threat 2017: fact-based assessment’, as well as ‘claims that insecure Killings in the no-access zone conditions make it impossible to give ... access’. In Vulnerable peoples are living at deadly risk in a many cases, access delayed – while security operations growing number of no-go zones around the world. are ongoing, for example – is access denied. The 2017 release of Peoples under Threat highlights What is happening in the no-access zone? Where how lack of access from the outside world allows official monitors and investigators cannot enter, local killing to be perpetrated unchecked in disputed NGOs and civilian activists have nonetheless raised territories, militarized enclaves and, in some cases, the alarm and published evidence of gross violations: whole countries. arbitrary detention, torture and, in the case of those This is the 12th year that the Peoples under Threat country situations at the very top of the index, mass index has identified those country situations around killing. In one situation after another, violations the world where communities face the greatest risk of are targeted at communities on ethnic, religious or genocide, mass killing or systematic violent repression. sectarian grounds. Based on current indicators from authoritative sources The most pressing problems of access are described (see ‘How is Peoples under Threat calculated?’), the in the commentary below on individual states. But in index provides early warning of potential future mass addition to those we highlight here, it should be noted atrocities. that the challenge of international access also applies In June 2017 the United Nations (UN) High to a number of territories where the overall threat Commissioner for Human Rights reiterated his levels may be lower, but where particular populations alarm at the refusal of several states to grant access remain highly vulnerable. -
Brazil Country Handbook 1
Brazil Country Handbook 1. This handbook provides basic reference information on Brazil, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and trans- portation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Brazil. 2. This product is published under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP) with the Marine Corps Intel- ligence Activity designated as the community coordinator for the Country Hand- book Program. This product reflects the coordinated U.S. Defense Intelligence Community position on Brazil. 3. Dissemination and use of this publication is restricted to official military and government personnel from the United States of America, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, NATO member countries, and other countries as required and designated for support of coalition operations. 4. The photos and text reproduced herein have been extracted solely for research, comment, and information reporting, and are intended for fair use by designated personnel in their official duties, including local reproduction for train- ing. Further dissemination of copyrighted material contained in this document, to include excerpts and graphics, is strictly prohibited under Title 17, U.S. Code. CONTENTS KEY FACTS. 1 U.S. MISSION . 2 U.S. Embassy. 2 U.S. Consulates . 2 Travel Advisories. 7 Entry Requirements . 7 Passport/Visa Requirements . 7 Immunization Requirements. 7 Custom Restrictions . 7 GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE . 8 Geography . 8 Land Statistics. 8 Boundaries . 8 Border Disputes . 10 Bodies of Water. 10 Topography . 16 Cross-Country Movement. 18 Climate. 19 Precipitation . 24 Environment . 24 Phenomena . 24 TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION . -
South and Central Somalia
BRIEF REPORT JULY 2020 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) South and Central Somalia Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees newtodenmark.dk © 2020 The Danish Immigration Service The Danish Immigration Service Farimagsvej 51 4700 Næstved Denmark Telefone: +45 35 36 66 00 newtodenmark.dk July 2020 All rights reserved to the Danish Immigration Service. The publication can be downloaded for free at newtodenmark.dk The Danish Immigration Service’s publications can be quoted with clear source reference. SOUTH AND CENTRAL SOMALIA SECURITY SITUATION, FORCED RECRUITMENT, AND CONDITIONS FOR RETURNEES Contents Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ 2 1. Executive summary ......................................................................................................................... 3 2. Introduction, Methodology and Disclaimer ...................................................................................... 4 3. Political developments .................................................................................................................... 5 3.1 Federalism versus centralism .................................................................................................................. 5 3.2 National Elections .................................................................................................................................... 6 4. Actors in the conflict – capacity and -
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تقارير 0 نوفمبر 2017 July 23, 2020 Egyptian Move Towards Libya Bet. Political Crisis & Military Build-up Mahmoud Gamal Introduction A previous study published by the Egyptian Institute for Studies (EIS) titled, Egyptian Role in Libya: Determinants and Tracks, concluded that the likeliness of a direct and declared intervention in Libya by the Egyptian army started to increase more than ever before; confirming that such potential intervention is linked to the failure to find a political track for resolving the Libyan crisis and the outbreak of battles waged by the GNA against the militias affiliated to Khalifa Haftar to control Sirte and Al Jafra, the line at which the internationally recognized GNA forces stopped after liberating several areas in western Libya that had been controlled by Haftar’s militias during the past months. Following up the ongoing developments in the Libyan file, there have been no serious political activity, whether international or regional, to avoid the state of conflict in the Libyan interior. Also, there have been no political initiatives, whether international or regional, to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiating table, except for the Egyptian initiative proposed by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in May 2020, which was immediately rejected by the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA forces are still stationed at the Sirte-Al Jafra line, where they stopped after liberation of several areas in the Libyan West during the past months. However, the Al Watiya base, which is now under the control of the legitimate GNA, was bombed early July by unidentified warplanes, where no party claimed responsibility for the airstrikes that targeted equipment inside the base, including air defense systems. -
Mammals, Birds, Herps
Zambezi Basin Wetlands Volume II : Chapters 3 - 6 - Contents i Back to links page CONTENTS VOLUME II Technical Reviews Page CHAPTER 3 : REDUNCINE ANTELOPE ........................ 145 3.1 Introduction ................................................................. 145 3.2 Phylogenetic origins and palaeontological background 146 3.3 Social organisation and behaviour .............................. 150 3.4 Population status and historical declines ................... 151 3.5 Taxonomy and status of Reduncine populations ......... 159 3.6 What are the species of Reduncine antelopes? ............ 168 3.7 Evolution of Reduncine antelopes in the Zambezi Basin ....................................................................... 177 3.8 Conservation ................................................................ 190 3.9 Conclusions and recommendations ............................. 192 3.10 References .................................................................... 194 TABLE 3.4 : Checklist of wetland antelopes occurring in the principal Zambezi Basin wetlands .................. 181 CHAPTER 4 : SMALL MAMMALS ................................. 201 4.1 Introduction ..................................................... .......... 201 4.2 Barotseland small mammals survey ........................... 201 4.3 Zambezi Delta small mammal survey ....................... 204 4.4 References .................................................................. 210 CHAPTER 5 : WETLAND BIRDS ...................................... 213 5.1 Introduction .................................................................. -
The Political Economy of Migrant Detention in Libya: Understanding the Players and the Business Models Arezo Malakooti DISCLAIMER
APRIL 2019 The Political Economy of Migrant Detention in Libya: Understanding the players and the business models Arezo Malakooti DISCLAIMER This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report was prepared, researched and written by Arezo Malakooti. Fieldwork was conducted by Arezo Malakooti, Naji Abou-Khalil, Jerome Veyret, Chiara Fall and Jessica Gerkin. Support was provided by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s local network in Libya. The report also draws on the in-house expertise of Global Initiative Director and Deputy Director, Mark Shaw and Tuesday Reitano, and Senior Fellow Mark Micallef. The report was peer reviewed by experts from the Clingendael Institute: Fransje Molenaar, Floor el Kamouni-Janssen and Mariska van Beijnum. We are also indebted to the various migrants and key informants who graciously shared their stories and experiences with us. The research for this report was supported by funding under the North of Africa window of the EU Emer- gency Trust Fund for Africa. However, the contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the Global Initiative and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union (EU). The photograph on the front cover was taken by the author in a migrant ghetto in Agadez, Niger. Please do not hesitate to contact the author: [email protected] ABOUT THE PROJECT ‘Monitoring the Political Economy of Human Smuggling in Libya and the Greater Sahara’ is a project funded under the North Africa window of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. -
Destiny Worse Than Artificial Borders in Africa: Somali Elite Politics1
Destiny Worse than Artificial Borders in Africa: Somali Elite Politics1 Abdi Ismail Samatar I. Introduction Much political and scholarly energy has been spent in understanding the nature and impacts of political boundaries on African development and public life. The standard argument by many anticolonial groups is that the Berlin Conference that instigated the European scramble for Africa in the 19th century paid no attention to the geography of Afri- can livelihood experiences.2 Drawing boundaries engulfing territories claimed by various Europeans was arbitrary, and the legacy of their existence has caused much grief in the continent.3 It is a fact that colo- nial boundaries in Africa were artificial, but it is also the case that all political boundaries nearly everywhere are not natural. Most of these studies underscore how artificial colonial borders seg- mented communities that shared economic, ecological and cultural resources. In some cases, these boundaries have been the “cause” of inter-state conflicts between post-colonial countries, i.e., Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia; Kenya and Somalia; Algeria and Morocco; Libya and Chad. But other equally artificial borders in the continent have not incited similar conflagrations despite fragmenting cultural, religious and ethnic groups, such as the Massai of Kenya and Tanzania, and the many communities that straddle along the borders of South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, etc. An unexplored question that demands urgent attention is why conflicts develop over some borders and not over others in different parts of the continent.4 As important as this question is, this paper examines a related but 19 Bildhaan Vol. -
Unodc Maritime Crime Programme
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime MARITIME CRIME PROGRAMME Annual Report 2014 Project Part Funded by the EU Foreword Success against transnational organized crime We are also repositioning ourselves to ensure that is often about quiet evolution rather than noisy the MCP can respond to new regional threats. With revolution and the continued expansion of this in mind, the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime UNODC’s Maritime Crime Programme (MCP) Crime has been set up to coordinate responses to is a prime example of this approach. Thanks to a broader range of maritime crime in the region, the strong support of Member States and the hard particularly drug trafficking. work of UNODC staff, the MCP has matured from countering piracy off the Somali coast to There were also successes this year with the Hostage confronting the broader issue of maritime crime Support Programme, particularly the release of the and its spreading geographical reach. “Albedo” crew. Although we must not rest while a single hostage remains, it is encouraging that only 30 The considerable achievements of the piracy hostages are left. UNODC will continue to advocate prosecution model, including on-going trials for for their release, and to support their families. piracy in the Indian Ocean region and the scheduled transfer of pirates, underscore the strength of Given these activities, the MCP continues to lay UNODC’s capacity building programme. Next year, down essential milestones in terms of its development UNODC’s Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme and delivery on its mandate. However, in doing so, will become the Somali Prison Development we remain entirely responsive to Member States’ Programme (North). -
Zambia Country Mining Guide
MINING Zambia Country mining guide kpmg.com/mining KPMG INTERNATIONAL Strategy Series © 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”). KPMG International provides no client services and is a Swiss entity with which the independent member firms of the KPMG network are affiliated. © 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”). KPMG International provides no client services and is a Swiss entity with which the independent member firms of the KPMG network are affiliated. Contents Executive summary 2 New geographic expansion risk framework 3 Country snapshot 4 World Bank ranking: Ease of doing business 5 Type of government 5 Economy and fiscal policy 6 Fraser Institute rankings 6 Regulatory environment 7 Sustainability and environment 9 Taxation 11 Power supply 13 Infrastructure development 14 Labor relations and employment situation 16 Inbound and outbound investment 17 Key commodities — Production and reserves 18 Mining prospects in Zambia 24 Major mining companies in Zambia 27 Foreign companies with operations in Zambia 28 Further insight from KPMG 29 Mining asset life cycle 31 KPMG’s mining strategy service offerings 31 KPMG’s Global Mining practice 32 KPMG’s footprint in Africa 33 © 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”). KPMG International provides no client services and is a Swiss entity with which the independent member firms of the KPMG network are affiliated. © 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”). KPMG International provides no client services and is a Swiss entity with which the independent member firms of the KPMG network are affiliated. 2 | Zambia mining guide Executive summary For 2 decades, Zambia’s mining sector has experienced significant foreign interest and investment driven mainly by the privatization of state-owned Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (“ZCCM”), a low taxation environment and low political interference.