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Frenchsoldierssoon of campaign for the Serrall forces will be mapped out «nd appfortd. PRESSED BY * END OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1917 ITALY'S ARMIES NOW ARE SORELY * » The Russian question undoubtedly will be one of the foremost, because HOPE BUT CONDITIONS of the neces- FINDS GERMANY WITHOUT GIGANTIC TEUTONIC FORCES, Russian duestion ot RusBla One of the Foremost. pursuing a SUCCESSFUL flrm courSe on OF BEING VICTOR IN WORLD WAR INDICATE CADORNA WILL EMERGE the side of her allies during the re¬ mainder of the war. Russia's armies must be rehabilitated, and, though the complete disaster. When these %rest provisional government is making conflicts were over they were still out¬ Bent on SITUATION ON ITALIAN FRONT. French and British Smashing Even With Russia Practically Beaten, Teu¬ numbered, outgunned. and not for eight¬ Eliminating some headway toward the Germans, remolding een months were the British able to With Consistency Slavic forces into a fighting machine put new armies in the fleld whose num¬ King Victor's Realm From Enemy worthy of the name Kussia, it is now tons Lack to Take Offensive bers and equipment enabled them to generally realized that the other allied Strength make effective attack, and not until on tlie of the year did Western Front. powers must far if effective results spring present Eng¬ War, Struggle Fiercely. go Enemies. land possess an army able to meet the during the remainder of the war are Against Other Germans on equal terms in all that to be gained on the eastern front. Rus¬ goes to make an army strong. LktneroC VON HINDENBURG MAY sia will be represented at the confer¬ Disappointment to Allies. BIG SUCCESSES SCORED; IK*' 7366"^-. ence for the first time by the demo¬ STRIVING, BY A COSTLY DEFENSIVE, v.°SiXME BEGIN WIDE RETREAT cratic elements of that nation. They The campaign of 1915 was a bitter MAY BE BUT TEMPORARY Ok\\\i ifi«iuM will be impressed with the magnitude WIN disappointment to the allies. Behind l OYODIL of the task at: hand and the absolute TO HOLD OUT UNTIL U-BOATS Iheir trench lines in France and Bel¬ of factional and necessity eliminating gium the Hermans easily and complete¬ Reverses Suffered on political disturbances within Russia Offer Menace and if Continued farcento Threatening that the nation's best effort may be ly put down all French and British of¬ Drives directed toward the common goal. in Now Most fensives, while Russia was wellnlgh de¬ Aisne as Well as Flanders Front. victory. That they will be impressed Viewed Perspective, Year Closing Italians Might Give Up Gorizia. is possibly without question, for it is stroyed and Serbia crushed. The cam- believed not only in Paris, but in Lon¬ Hopeful for Entente Allies Since paign of 1916 was only less disappoint¬ Tncesimo don. that the Russian democracy as ing. because while great successes were BIG ALLIED CONFERENCE at present constituted has not awak- made at the Sonime and Verdun, which, CHECK BELIEVED CERTAIN, ened fully to the necessity of full meed Beginning of the War. of concerted endeavor, as well as the begun with the promise of disorder, magnitude of the task facing the ended in a glorious victory, the allies Steps to Further Co-Ordinate En¬ entente Elaborate Plan of Cannot powers. were still unable to occupy Germany Campaign tente Endeavor in Wresting Early These Russian delegates undoubtedly Bv FRANK H. SIMONDS, completely and prevent*German masses Out Before Winter will be shown the unwisdom of at- from beating down Brusiloff's offensira Be Carried Victory to Be Taken in Paris. tempting to throw a. monkey wrench Author of "The World War," "They Shall Not Pass." land subsequently destroying Rumania. Interferes With in the allied machinery by demanding Hut the campaign of 1917 has seen Operations. revision of treaties, statement of allied (Germany at bay. incapable of offensive war aims and revision of purposes in \>w operations in the east, where the road ¦world What is equally as accordance with the fanciful utterances *'opyrlprht, 1917.The Trlbnne Am'd (The York Tribune). to to to Vladivos¬ to it tha Petrograd, Moscow, th* British government saw ^P"rtant- of the radical elements of Russia. tok. for that matter, was open; incap- BY OLIVER OWEN KUHN. armv hart every implement of war Russia will be asked to set aside ev¬ .able of 'JK: hfS The aid¬ of 1914 in the west ended on the 11th of Novem¬ succoring Turkey at Bagdad, Tn the mountain regions surrounding necessarv to successful endeavor erything except concrete endeavor The campaign incapable of any considerable or sus- flank of the whole British empire was called ing the common cause. cam¬ tained offensive anywhere, and Tolmino anrl on the left frav and the same high decree the statements of entente ber with the of the Prussian guard before Ypres. The yet, under th* Through repulse with all her men and all her guns at. great Italian armies operating Iradisca o/Knn,,a«r,n .hat exists in I.ondon ex- officialdom and advices received from of 1915 flickered out with the determination of the allied of¬ work in th^ west, unable to check the th* teadership of Gon. Cadorna, battles i«*ts in all of the British colonial do various Kuropean sources i? would ap¬ paign British, unable to will be made hold the dearly won of major importance have been raging minions. pear that every attempt fensives in and Loos in the first days of October. 1 he heights about Verdun. * ro whip all entente endeavor into the Champagne Had Russia done her part Is for the past several days. Austrian * ^ state of perfection. That this success at Beaumont- nothing ^!iln» T?Q 11 highest campaign of 1916 ended with the British plainer than that we should have had a armies largely reinforced by Germans, Italy after entering the war started will he done is believed certain. There military decision this but it is be no if is to year, under von Mackenpen, "the bloody." 3T7Monfalcoa out with the best intentions and with cati slip-up.^ Germany Hamel on the r3th of November. We arc, then, rapid!}- approaching necessary to face the fact that neither be defeated next year. Mighty p..wet- now nor hereafter is have been hurled forward. More than Fufnicelio^_ ^ the promises be sec of the of the | there any chance Du inO^ iDuttoule, must crented through tremendous the date which will the end operations present year. that Russia will do her part or have b en taken by . con¬ any 30,W' prisoners HlsclaMoPdtini- of "f consistent exertion of all nations. The Paris part. She has an Lack Adequate oil wheels that there will be more this winter than in become illusory ally: the Teutons, accord:n? to advices from aid from the ference undoubtedly will the Jt is conceivable activity she lias become a burden. Such of of the entente war machine. The re¬ the Berlin and Vienna, the Italian armies sana Aid Felt by Italy. is Baker, in a recent state¬ Russian territory as the Germans feel cntentP. u sult is certain, as it always has been the two preceding winters. Secretary like forced over the Isonzo and taking such cities and such fort*. have been an undeniable fart that frequently the certain, but the time to accomplish the a Yet it is essential to they can take. Vet it is on soil. task be ment. has foreshadowed winter campaign. necessary also battles now are raging Italian Italian armies, brave and courageous may materially shortened. to recognize that as Russia has become ? where the main so Teutonic leaders state that captures as thev have been and eager as they recognize that the weather conditions in Flanders, helpless, also German operations in * * Russia have become as and other successes continue. Plainly are early to the on are in completely a vanquish enemy, Russia's political questions continue attacks must be made, since the British are there, such that side show as was the British operation the Italians were outweighed in the several occasions have to at been forced The war Gallipot!. The decisive front is the first of the battles owing to the Arrow 1."Where Austro-ticrman drive started. perplexing. preliminary parliament all wars and in the present in the past three western front and on stage desist after ushering in promising of¬ has in previous great this front Ger- the Teutonic 2.Scene of Teutonic below Tolmino. convened many is losing the war. great preparation of Arrow trains fensives. because the entente powers vears it has been necessary to over active operations from No¬ I Arrow .1.Where Italian retreat from Bainsizza ha* started. Petrograd and give Every sign that one can see points armies. plateau failed to supply the needed military as Russ Situation; to the of German his ( Premier Keren- vember until failing numbers, the Will Cadorna readjust positions well as economic stores. This was due April. breaking down of German mora le. KerensKy in Plea. <=ky in his speech the year in the west. Their sustained The and hold the enemy? to lack of cohesion in the entente plan: The present is then perhaps an appro¬ <*hemin-des-1>ames (process is going forward; the disinte¬ Is Italy to be overrun as was Bel¬ to this body eloquently advocated time for reviewing the fourth cam¬ attacks along the gration is unmistakable, tree's Rumania and Monte¬ BATTLE IN FLANDERS. at least action was faulty, even if pur¬ priate rivaled in pertinacity and in extensive- which army, gium. Serbia. WHERE ARMIES greater unity of purpose and more loyal of the war.
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