The Brusilov Offensive'

H-German Smith on Dowling, 'The Brusilov Offensive'

Review published on Tuesday, March 17, 2009

Timothy C. Dowling. The Brusilov Offensive. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. xxv + 208 pp. Illustrations. $24.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-253-35130-2.

Reviewed by Jeffrey R. Smith (School of Social Sciences, Northwestern State University) Published on H-German (March, 2009) Commissioned by Susan R. Boettcher

Uncovering the "Unknown War"

For English-speaking audiences of the twentieth century, the history of the First World War has overwhelmingly been told from the perspective of the western front, with its traumas of trench warfare, military immobility, and the introduction of new technologies, all of which would have profound consequences in shaping the politics of postwar Europe. Equally significant but much less familiar to these audiences is the eastern front, the scene of a titanic conflict involving the old, powerful empires of the Romanovs, Hohenzollerns, and Habsburgs that ultimately resulted in the downfall (or complete collapse) of all these states, a Marxist revolution in Russia, and an anticipation of German racial imperialism in the East. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that in recent years several efforts have been made to flush out what Winston Churchill called the "unknown war." The latest of these is Timothy C. Dowling's frequently engaging book, which delineates the preparation, execution, and aftermath of Russia's greatest military contribution to the Allied war effort. Launched in June 1916 and planned in conjunction with Somme offensive in the West, General Aleksei Brusilov's campaigns were essentially responsible for ending the offensive capacity of the Austro- Hungarian military, the remnants of which would be placed under a German unified command for the remainder of the war. What therefore emerges from Dowling's work is a partially rehabilitated picture of the Russian military effort against the Central Powers. Nevertheless, Dowling concludes, the mass casualties Russia experienced during the offensive did ultimately help "create the conditions for revolution within the Russian Imperial Army" (p. xv).

At the outbreak of World War I, Dowling argues, the Russian army was not of inferior quality to its German and Austrian counterparts in every respect, especially since the number of soldiers under arms was equal to the forces of the Central Powers combined. Additionally, he emphasizes, "it was the only army in Europe that met a first-class army in the field of battle" during its war with Japan in 1904-05, Russia's defeat notwithstanding, and "when led well and vigorously, and adequately equipped at the most basic level, Russian units were at least the equal of either the German or Austro-Hungarian forces" (p. 13). Dowling also reminds the reader that, because of the Japanese war, more veterans occupied the ranks of the Russian army than of any other in Europe. The underlying problem for Russia vis-à-vis its wartime enemies, therefore, lay not in its soldiery but in its still antiquated command structure, a problem reflected especially in its substandard officer class, which was still drawn predominantly from the nobility and who acquired their rank more from "social prestige than of martial ardor" (p. 10). Dowling stresses further that many officers were not even educated. He thus correctly attributes Russia's poor performance in the war's first two years, culminating in the disastrous "Great Retreat" of 1915, which ultimately led to Germany's occupation of most of Poland and the Baltic states, to its largely dysfunctional military leadership and its reliance

Citation: H-Net Reviews. Smith on Dowling, 'The Brusilov Offensive'. H-German. 09-30-2014. https://networks.h-net.org/node/35008/reviews/45784/smith-dowling-brusilov-offensive Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 1 H-German on outmoded military tactics, such as corrupt staff officers who supplied units with only fixed bayonets to face German artillery, as well as the command's misplaced confidence in Russia's defensive fortifications.

Nonetheless, Russia's experience of the Great Retreat brought about a significant restructuring and even modernization of the Russian army and its command hierarchy that ultimately made the successes of the 1916 offensives possible. By assuming personal command of the armed forces, for example, Nicholas II brought a new tone to Stavka and allowed a new breed of professional officers to attain more influential positions, Dowling argues. Among the important outcomes of this restructuring was the promotion of Brusilov, commander of the Eighth Army through 1915, to the command of the entire southwestern front and its four army divisions mobilized against Austria- Hungary. "In both background and outlook," Dowling writes, "Brusilov embodied the qualities of the 'new' Russian army that began to take form in the spring months of 1916, led by 'modest and sensible technicians'" who were, most importantly, "free of the class prejudices" of the old officer class (p. 37). Brusilov's most significant innovation was to apply the so-called Joffre attack, a western front tactic that involved short, small-scale artillery bombardments of nearby enemy trenches in preparation for a forward assault, to the broad expanses of the eastern front, which previous Russian leaders believed was not conducive to such a strategy. Brusilov's largely successful application of this approach underpinned the execution of his eponymous offensive against Austria-Hungary from June to December 1916.

Dowling then proceeds to devote the majority of his work to providing a detailed technical account of Brusilov's 1916 campaigns on Russia's southwestern front, thereby making his book a largely straightforward military history of the offensive. He does draw several significant conclusions regarding the far-reaching outcomes of the battles, however, and these may deserve greater consideration. Especially significant are the rather contradictory results of the Brusilov offensive, which Dowling isolates. For the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the offensive represented a military disaster that would ultimately contribute to the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy itself. Brusilov managed to inflict such high numbers of casualties on the Austrian forces (roughly two-thirds of the army) so rapidly that, by the end of 1916, its military had "for all intents and purposes, ceased to exist" (p. 173). Not only was the Austrian leadership forced to place its remaining military forces under German command for the rest of the war, but more importantly, the collapse of its military removed a major pillar of the monarchy's support, jeopardizing the empire's likelihood of surviving the war intact. Dowling thus successfully provides an important example of how the military situation on the eastern front ultimately contributed to revolutionary conditions throughout central Europe by 1918.

Dowling also emphasizes that, despite Brusilov's ability to eliminate Austria-Hungary as a fighting force, the 1916 campaigns represented Russia's final military contribution to the war as well as the "beginning of the end" for Russia itself (p. 160). The bottom line was that the Brusilov offensive caused approximately two million casualties for the Russian army, losses that would ultimately create revolutionary conditions within the military through the replacement of disaffected reservists "increasingly poisoned by propaganda," according to one officer (p. 161). In addition, the unprecedented mobilization the Russian war effort demanded resulted in a massive increase in the size of Russia's officer class between 1914 and 1917, and the majority of these new recruits came from non-noble families. The result, Dowling argues, was the significant diminishment of the

"stabilizing influence of the aristocratic officer class" (p. 161). It is thus impossible to separate Russia's descent into revolution from the ultimate outcome of the 1916 offensives, Dowling maintains. Unfortunately, he only devotes a few pages of his work to these very important conclusions, and readers would certainly benefit from a further investigation and elaboration of these issues. What is particularly striking is the apparent suggestion that the modernization of the Russian army after 1915 served to undermine the stability of the Russian imperial state, a paradox that would certainly seem to merit more in-depth examination. For English-speaking audiences in general, however, Dowling's work represents a significant contribution to a critical theater of the First World War that is only beginning to receive the attention it merits.

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Citation: Jeffrey R. Smith. Review of Dowling, Timothy C., The Brusilov Offensive. H-German, H-Net Reviews. March, 2009. URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=24057

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.